By Philip Bowring (THE NEW YORK TIMES, 19/12/09):

Two apparently unconnected stories made the front pages of newspapers last week: The story behind a massacre in the Philippine province of Maguindanao and a decision by India’s central government to divide the state of Andhra Pradesh into two. But they are linked — by the issue of decentralization in developing democracies. They are two examples of governments attempting to balance stability with diversity.

The Philippine massacre stemmed from rivalry between two political clans. The alleged perpetrators are connected to the family of the governor of the province and of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, of which Maguindanao is the largest part. They are political allies of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo.

In principle, the Philippines, with 80 provinces for 90 million people, is not a decentralized country. Maguindanao is one of the larger ones but its population has only 1.3 million. The provinces, and the Muslim Autonomous Region, have scant money-raising powers so are dependent on the central government for revenues. Senate and presidential elections are based on national votes, not U.S.-style state-level results. Yet Philippine national politics has long remained heavily influenced by local dynasties, particularly in the least-developed provinces like Maguindanao, the Philippines’ second poorest.

The dynasties’ wealth and guns keep the voters in line while the central government has limited impact, thanks to a weak and politicized bureaucracy. A lack of strong parties makes it necessary for those aiming for national power to make alliances with these local power brokers for their vote banks and reward them with budget allocations that tend to enhance their power rather than aid development.

Geography too plays a part in the weakness of the center as the Philippines has a multiple of islands and no large river basins, which have been the core of centralized Asian states such as Thailand.

Indeed, it is a recurring criticism of neighboring Indonesia’s new democracy that the extreme centralism of the military-backed Suharto regime, in power for three decades, has been replaced by a less efficient but equally corrupt decentralized democracy.

The Indonesian system devolves much power and some revenues to the elected district level to avoid the creation of big regional power centers. Proponents argue that this engages local communities in a way that does not threaten national unity. Critics complain that it could lead to Maguindanao-type situations. Although, Indonesia lacks the old landowner class — so strong in the Philippines — and still has a strong army dedicated to maintaining central authority. Decentralization has brought big problems as well as big benefits.

India has always in principle been de-centralized but in recent years central power has been further eroded both by the rise of regional political parties and by economic liberalization, which has reduced the public sector’s role.

A division of three of India’s states in 2000, making a total of 28, seemed to add to the localization trend.

Decentralization does tend to exacerbate regional differences in levels of income, education, health and other development indicators, which have long been extreme in India. So creating more states to satisfy very localized democratic demands might seem to make matters worse. But these, it is usually agreed, owe more to cultural differences than to administrative issues or access to revenues. But as the abysmal governance of India’s most populous state, Uttar Pradesh, with 166 million people, suggests size and good governance may not go together.

So maybe splitting Andhra Pradesh, the fifth largest with 76 million people, may make economic as well as political sense. Alternatively, while a split may mean the new entity does well, a dismembered Andhra may fall further behind.

Either way, democratic Asia will continue to battle for balance between centrifugal democratic demands, good governance and the modicum of economic and social equality that most nations expect.