Rather a lot of megaphone diplomacy followed the recent UN vote on Syria. Confusion and anger flowed from British and western media. So why did Russia and China veto the UN security council draft resolution on Syria? As Chinese ambassador in the UK, I feel it is timely to give a more measured explanation of why China voted no. Also, I want to explain how together we can, must and should give peace a chance in Syria.

Since day one of this crisis, China has been watching the situation very closely. We have consistently urged all sides to stop violence, avoid civilian casualties and restore order in the country. Central to any lasting solution must be a clear principle: the Syrian people’s call for change should be heard, and their interests need to be protected. This is the best possible result for the Syrian people.

For this to happen, China has backed the Arab League’s efforts to find a political solution and maintain stability in the region. In addition, we encouraged all sides in Syria to respond positively to these efforts to mediate. The goal must be an immediate end to all violence; once that is achieved, we must encourage an inclusive political process led by the Syrian people. Peaceful dialogue is the best way to tackle differences and grievances and restore stability to Syria.

The international community should act in a way that constructively helps this goal, not the opposite. It is fundamental that Syria’s sovereignty, independence and territory must be respected. The security council should adopt a calm and measured response to the crisis; above all it must stand by the purposes and principles of the UN charter.

Any decision the council makes must reduce rather than inflame tension, encourage reconciliation and contribute to regional peace and stability in the Middle East. Entrusted with a responsibility for world peace and security, the last thing the UN should do is to further complicate the crisis. What we need from the UN security council is a sustainable solution, not a rash decision. It was following the above principles that led China to vote no.

China has been an active negotiator at the security council to try to produce a draft resolution on Syria. We continue to work hard to win a consensus. But imposing hasty deadlines on these debates will most likely lead to failure; this was particularly so at a time of sharp divide on the text and some members’ insistence on further consultations. Furthermore, the Russian foreign minister had announced a visit to Damascus to begin a new round of mediation. This means it was, and is, not a good time for forcing a vote on Syria. The end result was anticipated by those members who pressed for the vote; the solidarity and authority of the security council is undermined as a result, and we are further away from a sustainable and lasting solution.

Chinese people abhor the violence and bloodshed in Syria as much as those in Britain and other countries. China voted against the resolution for a simple reason: the resolution as drafted will not help cool down the situation. It does not facilitate political dialogue. It does not address distrust, or bring peace and stability to the region. Quite the contrary, China believes that forcing the vote only aggravates these tension and makes the situation more unmanageable.

So what about the track record of no votes in the UN security council? In the 41 years since the People’s Republic’s return to the council, China has only cast a no vote eight times. This is a frequency far lower than any of the other four permanent members. China always strives for consensus and harmony; this attitude is embedded in our culture. So the low pattern of no votes by China shows my government thinks very hard before voting. It means that China’s veto on Syria this time around was a very tough decision.

China in this process has shown a consistent and clear commitment to work with the international community to seek a responsible and lasting solution to the Syrian issue. But the vote itself is a powerful reminder of the international responsibility to choose a constructive path forward.

The governments in Russia and China very much want to uphold the principle that every now and then, the state must crush people who want freedom. That is why they worked together to veto a fairly toothless United Nations resolution condemning the regime in Syria and calling for President Bashar Assad, the lipless murderer who runs the place, to step down.

The free world, still nominally led by the United States, erupted in outrage. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton denounced the U.N. Security Council veto as a “travesty.” U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Susan Rice said the U.S. was “disgusted” by it. French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe said the Russian-Chinese veto was a “moral stain.” A spokesman for British Prime Minister David Cameron proclaimed that “Russia and China are protecting a regime which is killing thousands of people. We find their position both incomprehensible and inexcusable.”

Although I agree that the veto was disgusting and a travesty, I’m at a loss as to why so many people are shocked — or at least are pretending to be shocked.

Isn’t this what the United Nations is about?

I’ve never quite understood the idealistic enthusiasm people have for the United Nations. First of all, it’s a club pretty much anyone can join so long as you have a government and internationally accepted borders, and someone is willing to vouch for your existence. As far as organizations go, that’s a pretty low bar — like a club exclusively for humans with a pulse.

The whole thing stinks from the top down. The Security Council isn’t a democratic entity; it’s based on brute force. Russia and China became permanent members when they were totalitarian dictatorships. They have seats because they are powerful, not because they are decent or wise or democratic. And the same is true for us. Our seat was bought with might, not right.

I think part of the confusion stems from a category error. We tend to anthropomorphize countries, talking about them as if they were people. U.N. members vote for stuff, so people think the U.N. is somehow democratic in more than a procedural way. But that’s not true. There’s nothing in the U.N. Charter — at least nothing that has any binding power — that says a government has to be democratic or even care for the welfare of its people. When the ambassador from North Korea claims to speak for his people at the U.N., it has no more moral legitimacy than a serial killer speaking for the victims he has locked in his basement.

But those who fantasize about creating a “Parliament of Man” overlook all of that, in no small part because they see the U.N. as a useful counterweight to the United States.

Less idealistic supporters of the U.N. insist that the place is important — nay, vital — because America must engage the world, and the U.N. is the place where deals get done. And that’s true. But that’s not a moral case for the U.N., it’s an instrumental one.

None of this is an argument for getting rid of the U.N., though I’d certainly be happy to see it go. But it does point to the stupidity of expecting nobility and idealism from it. Sure, the U.N. does good things from time to time, but that is because good nations want to see good things done.

What would be so terrible about giving those good nations someplace else to meet? And by good, I mean democratic. A league, or concert, of democracies wouldn’t replace the U.N., but it would offer some much-needed competition.

We’ve had to go around the U.N. before, and usually we go to NATO. That’s what President Bill Clinton did in the Balkans and what President Barack Obama did in Libya. Now Hillary Clinton wants an ad hoc “friends of a democratic Syria” similar to the coalition that helped topple Moammar Gadhafi (and Saddam Hussein).

That’s all fine, but there are problems with making these things up as you go. NATO is a military alliance. Many friends of a democratic Syria are not, themselves, democratic.

A permanent global clubhouse for democracies based on shared principles would make aiding growing movements easier and offer a nice incentive for nations to earn membership in a club with loftier standards than mere existence.

Tribune Media Services

U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton have an opportunity this weekend as they address the Munich Security Conference to suggest ways to stabilize NATO’s ailing defense capabilities.

European nations have slashed their defense budgets to record low levels without much regard for NATO’s overall defense requirements. And last week the United States announced that it would remove two of its four Brigade Combat Teams from Europe.

Those European reductions are beginning to weaken NATO’s core military capabilities. Most European defense cuts have been across the board, creating the potential for hollow forces with low readiness and low sustainability levels. More recently key allies like the British and Dutch have eliminated entire military categories such as carrier aviation and armor.

The alliance is certainly not doomed. In 2011, Europe still had two million personnel under arms and spent about €215 billion on defense; those numbers are declining. NATO emerged victorious in Libya without losing a man; and maritime operations are having a positive impact against pirates and terrorists. The Afghanistan coalition was shaken recently with France’s decision to withdraw early, but NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen has since said that the United States and its allies would step back from a combat role in Afghanistan in mid-2013.

The real long-term risk to NATO is that gaps will appear in the European force structure that the United States won’t be able to fill, and that the alliance will be unable to act in a future crisis. That risk needs to be faced squarely at the NATO summit in Chicago in May.

Panetta and Clinton might consider a five-part plan to deal with this looming problem. First, NATO needs to define more precisely what military capabilities are needed to meet its three agreed tasks: collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security. NATO’s Allied Command Transformation has been unable to design such a “must have” priority list.

The U.S. National Defense University has just completed a major study on this which might serve as a starting point for prioritization. Skilled military personnel, technology and deployable capability are more important than massed armies and large installations.

Ideally, at the Chicago summit, heads of state would pledge that as they consider their national defense budgets, they would protect these “must have” military capabilities. They might also pledge to build back beyond this minimal requirement after the economic recession has passed.

Second, NATO must take a bolder approach to Rasmussen’s concept of Smart Defense. The alliance has identified some 16 current multinational defense projects where military assets are pooled or shared by several nations. That is a good start, but it will not deal with the magnitude of this crisis. The level of specialization and cooperation needs to be raised to the mission level in order to maximize efficiency and political attractiveness. Clusters of willing nations might form what has been called “mission focus groups” that prepare for certain types of missions, such as fighting piracy, policing the air and special operations. Those nations would self-organize under the general guidance of the NATO secretary general. Rewiring the alliance around a mission focus group concept may be a bridge too far for Chicago, but the concept should considered there.

Third, the United States European Command, Eucom, needs reorientation. During the past decade, U.S. forces in Europe have followed a “lily pad” strategy by which they sit waiting to jump to another theater. Given the nature of NATO’s coming capabilities crisis and U.S. reductions, Eucom needs to work more closely with its European allies to maintain European skills and trans-Atlantic interoperability.

A recent American decision to dedicate a U.S. based Brigade Combat Team to work with the NATO Response Force is precisely the kind of close U.S.-European military interaction that is needed.

Fourth, NATO’s partners need to play enhanced roles and even consider dividing some of the labor with NATO. For example, the European Union might agree to take the lead on certain missions, such as peacekeeping in Africa. Russia might form a close cooperative arrangement with NATO on counterterrorism. Historically non-aligned European nations like Sweden and Finland might integrate even more with NATO for missions like Baltic defense. The most capable partners can be closely associated with Smart Defense efforts and take a leadership role in training and education.

Finally, to reassure our Eastern allies, NATO needs to exercise its contingency plans for so-called Article 5 missions using U.S.-based forces and to retain its current nuclear posture in Europe. With NATO’s conventional capabilities in decline, this is no time to remove the remaining handful of U.S. nuclear bombs in Europe that both reassure allies and deter potential adversaries. Any future nuclear reductions need to be part of a broad negotiation with Russia.

NATO must keep up its guard even in times of austerity. It may also need to lower its level of ambition and focus on priority missions. These five measures can maximize military efficiencies and maintain basic confidence that the Alliance will be able to deal with the uncertain challenges that lie ahead.

At the close of the Cold War, hopes were high for a more organized and peaceful international system. Two decades later, there is not much sign of one emerging.

The focus of governments is shifting away from the Euro-Atlantic community — the heart of the international system up to now — and there is little consensus within the international community on how to deal with today’s challenges of sovereign debt, economic recession, climate change, nuclear proliferation and radicalism.

In many ways, this historic “pivot” from the Euro-Atlantic region represents a form of progress; the great rivalries between the United States, Russia and the European powers that produced two world wars and threatened to destroy the world during the Cold War are hopefully a relic of the past.

Yet it would be a grave mistake for Euro-Atlantic governments to neglect the security and stability of their own region. This great network is the bedrock of Western values of democracy, open markets and individual freedoms. It contains the largest trading zones in the world as well as most of the world’s nuclear weapons. It is vitally important for the entire world that the wider Euro-Atlantic region remain peaceful.

Beyond this, it is more important than ever that these states begin fashioning what has been too long delayed: a functioning, inclusive Euro-Atlantic security community. The world badly needs the leadership that this could provide in meeting the day’s new threats — from nuclear and bioterrorism to cyber insecurity and health pandemics.

We worry, however, that the security situation across this vital region today is in fact sliding backwards. The traditional bonds between the United States and Europe are weakening, and historical enmities between Russia and the West continually resurface. A destructive atmosphere of distrust lingers, and the present economic vicissitudes are only likely to raise the political tension.

Two years ago, we brought together a first-of-its-kind commission of former senior government officials, generals and business leaders from Europe, North America and Russia. We began from the recognition that despite progress, the rapprochement that everyone hoped would follow the ending of the Cold War remains distant.

The “Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative” set out to identify the practical steps needed to secure the region’s future. Rather than drafting new treaties, creating new institutions or expanding existing alliances, the commission sought to create new pathways to a more inclusive and effective Euro-Atlantic community, focusing on the military, human and economic dimensions of security. (The final report will be available at carnegieendowment.org/EASI .)

Modest goals will not do. Hard as it will be, the goal must be to transform the entire Euro-Atlantic region into a genuine security community in which the use or threat of the use of military force to settle disputes disappears; in which a common front forms against the looming threats of this new century and the protracted conflicts that menace the region’s peace are resolved. Only by pooling their efforts will these governments be able to meet this era’s new security threats, all the more so given shrinking economic resources.

The commission recommends six areas of action. Here we highlight four.

• U.S., European, and Russian leaders should instruct their senior defense officials to begin a strategic dialogue on practical measures to increase early warning and decision-making time in all military areas, ensuring that no nation live in fear of short-warning attack.

• Europe missile defense cooperation should be approached not simply as an answer to a potential intrinsic threat, but as a means of transforming the Russian-NATO/U.S. strategic relationship.

•The Arctic, where the challenge of climate change, energy resources and national security intersect, should be seen as a potential building block for a Euro-Atlantic security community and approached as such.

•A breakthrough on Europe’s protracted conflicts, beginning with Transnistria, should be a priority reinforced by a new strategy bringing to bear the resources of civil society.

The goal is, indeed, large. But the price of shirking it is greater yet — great enough to warrant struggling to start the process, and that can be tomorrow if leaders in Brussels, Moscow and Washington publicly pledge their support for this vision and then put in place the first pieces of a concrete agenda.

From my first day in office as NATO secretary general, I have made clear that NATO-Russia cooperation remains of strategic importance. We share common security interests and face common challenges. And since our NATO-Russia summit meeting in Lisbon a year ago, we have come a long way in tackling new threats with new thinking.

We are bringing stability to Afghanistan, and stemming the flood of narcotics out of the country — together. We are fighting terrorism in our cities and our airspaces — together. We are combating piracy off the Horn of Africa — together. This cooperation benefits all of us. At Lisbon, we also agreed to discuss pursuing missile defense cooperation.

The missile threat we face is grave and growing. Over 30 states are working on advanced missile technology. Some of them already have ballistic missiles that can be fitted with conventional warheads or with weapons of mass destruction. Some of our major cities are already in range. That is why at the Lisbon summit, NATO agreed to develop a missile defense capability to protect its population, territory and forces. That remains our position today. We owe it to our people to defend them.

Along with a prominent U.S. contribution, a number of allies have made significant announcements, including Turkey, Poland, Romania, Spain, the Netherlands and France. These national contributions will be brought together under a common NATO command and control system. Key elements of it have already been tested successfully. By the time of our summit meeting in Chicago in May, we expect initial components of the system to be in place.

NATO’s system is a strong demonstration of solidarity in action. It also shows the strength of the trans-Atlantic link between North America and Europe. Our 28 nations agree on the significance of the threat and the importance of working together to address it. And by cooperating within NATO, rather than as nations working alone, we deliver a far more effective system at a far lower price.

Our threat perceptions may currently differ, but Russia could also be threatened by ballistic missiles. So it makes sense for us to cooperate in defending against them, by building two separate systems with the same goal. It makes sense practically, militarily and politically. It would show once and for all that we can build security with each other, rather than against each other.

NATO and Russia have held many discussions on missile defense. We have made it clear that our missile defense system is not directed at Russia. It is designed to protect European nations in NATO against threats from outside Europe; it is a defensive system.

Allies and NATO as a whole have made three practical proposals to allay Russian concerns. First, we offered transparency on missile defense programs through exchanges at the NATO-Russia Council, which is our forum for political dialogue, and we issued a standing invitation to Russian experts to observe and analyze missile defense tests. Second, we proposed holding joint NATO-Russia theater missile defense exercises next year. And third, we suggested establishing two joint missile defense centers, one for sharing data and the other for supporting planning.

Russia has also said it needs legal guarantees that NATO missile defenses are not a threat. In fact, when NATO and Russia signed the NATO-Russia Founding Act in 1997, we agreed that we will refrain from the threat or use of force against each other. So the guarantee has been there for over a decade.

Some of President Dmitri Medvedev’s recent comments about NATO’s missile defense system reflect a misunderstanding of the system. As a result, Russia has suggested deploying missiles in areas neighboring the alliance. Such suggestions reflect the rhetoric of the past and are inconsistent with the strategic relationship NATO and Russia agreed to seek. I am, however, pleased that Medvedev has not closed the door on continued dialogue with NATO about missile defense.

Missile defense cooperation can radically change the way NATO and Russia look at each other. In the 21st century, confrontation is not a choice. The only real choice is cooperation.

I cannot imagine a world without music, art, film, dance, theater and books. It would be a dreary and colorless existence, with little cooperation and communication among citizens. The arts are the glue that holds us together, the cultural fabric of our lives, and they sow the seeds for inventive, universally shared experiences.

Amid today’s challenging times — when creative minds will be needed to solve our collective problems — the stalled peace process between Israelis and Palestinians has taken an unlikely casualty, one that I care about deeply: UNESCO.

When Palestine was voted in as a UNESCO member by more than 100 countries in October, U.S. law required that all of its UNESCO funding be abolished. This restricted the United States from paying its 2011 dues, which account for 22 percent of the agency’s budget. Without those funds, UNESCO will be forced to slash programming and, possibly, invaluable staff positions. This law will damage the United States as well, because our country stands to lose its influence over UNESCO’s work, which includes designating cultural heritage sites, promoting tolerance, protecting media freedom and fostering creativity.

UNESCO offers literacy programs in conflict zones that help people develop critical-thinking skills necessary to fight violent extremism. Without the requisite funds, this is one of many programs that will be negatively affected. Girls in Pakistan will no longer have a UNESCO program for basic education; support for free and competitive media in Iraq, Tunisia and Egypt will be weakened; literacy education for police officers in Afghanistan will halt; training for journalists in the Arab region will be diminished.

Many Americans shrug their shoulders, while others celebrate what they believe is a comeuppance for the United Nations. I, however, strongly believe it is essential that we stay involved and engaged. UNESCO helps ensure that our world remains soulful, spirited and full of life.

Case in point: UNESCO recently endorsed April 30 as International Jazz Day. This is an opportunity to spread the gospel of jazz, its message of peace and cooperation, and its unique American traits. Under UNESCO’s banner, we plan to spearhead concerts and major educational and cultural events from New Orleans and New York to Rio de Janeiro, Johannesburg, Moscow, Beijing and beyond, finding common ground among uncommon allies.

Jazz has its roots in the late 19th century, when disenfranchised African slaves began to develop new forms of music. Their efforts were spontaneous, emotional and improvisational — and became the backbone of modern jazz. This music has been the cornerstone of my career, the melodies that have shaped my life force; the sounds, tones and notes that have helped soothe and uplift millions of souls.

As a UNESCO goodwill ambassador, I have an obligation to help dispel the misinformation and ignorance about other cultures, religions and ethnicities that stand as barriers to communication and togetherness. People need to know that we have much more in common with one another than our differences.

I am not new to UNESCO or to the politics that swirl around this United Nations agency. I began my affiliation 10 years ago, working on International Philosophy Day before President George W. Bush returned the United States to the organization in 2003. Shortly after, when first lady Laura Bush was designated honorary UNESCO ambassador for literacy, she noted that, “with UNESCO’s leadership, freedom can be realized throughout the world with the promise of education for all.”

Music is an essential ingredient of my life, and I am in awe of its power. In my decades of experience, I have seen how innovative thinking can achieve miracles, revolutionize lives and positively influence communities. Music, art, science and faith in people can make powerful changes in our humanity.

UNESCO can help promote music as a tool for building peace as well as other facets of culture, enabling distant communities to work together for the benefit of all nations.

That is why U.S. engagement in UNESCO and the United Nations must continue. This is indeed a challenging moment: Having won a seat at UNESCO, the Palestinians are eligible to join the World Intellectual Property Organization, which is responsible for protecting copyright and trademarks and fighting piracy. Palestinian leaders have expressed interest in seeking membership in the World Health Organization; the International Atomic Energy Agency; and the International Civil Aviation Association, which coordinates international airline security.

Following its current mandate, the United States would be required to stop contributing dues to those important organizations as well, which would force our country to recoil from the world. As we face challenges that threaten the very existence of humanity — changing climatic conditions, pandemics and illiteracy — solving these issues demands a concentrated effort from leaders and citizens of all nations and will require a world where people live in harmony to overcome these obstacles to our survival. During these crucial times, the work of UNESCO is needed more than ever.

This weekend’s NATO airstrike on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border was a tragedy. I know how much this has upset the Pakistani people, and I feel deeply for the loss of life and offer my heartfelt condolences. There will be a thorough investigation, which should allow both countries to remain focused on the bedrock national interests we share. This incident underscores just how badly we all need to work together to end the war and bring stability and security to the region.

The road to peace was never going to be easy. The past year has been especially trying for the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. Despite our many frustrations and setbacks, both sides must remember what is at stake here and that we have more to gain by finding common ground. We have to take a collective deep breath.

Next week in Bonn, Germany, we have another chance to try to move forward. The Bonn conference, at which leaders from NATO, Afghanistan and its neighboring countries are to discuss the future of Afghanistan after U.S. troops withdraw, will not be a panacea for the region’s problems, but it is an opportunity for all parties with a vested interest in Afghanistan’s future to engage.

We should all seize this moment — including Pakistan, whose role is key in making any kind of peace last. If Pakistan does not attend Bonn, it will send a dangerous message that it is not serious about working with Afghanistan and the international community to promote stability.

Regardless of whether or not Pakistan participates, Bonn is still an opportunity for the United States to make clear that we are not abandoning Afghanistan. We have significant long-term strategic interests in the region that will be imperiled if we do not engineer a responsible transition.

Our message in Bonn must be that in 2014, when the majority of our troops will leave the country, we will begin a new phase in our relationship with Afghanistan. We must make clear that our military will continue to work with the Afghan National Security Forces to prevent the return of terrorist safe havens. Much as we are doing in Iraq, we will remain vigorously engaged politically and economically on security, governance, and economic and social development.

We face a strategic challenge today because too many in the region doubt our staying power and fear we will turn our backs on Afghanistan and its people. That’s why we need to make our intentions clear.

Afghanistan’s neighbors anticipate a security vacuum that hostile actors are only too eager to exploit. Some are cutting their own deals and strengthening ties with different Afghan factions, laying the groundwork for continuing conflict and instability. Improving regional cooperation hinges on convincing the region that our core interests align. The United States is not pursuing its security goals at the expense of destabilizing the neighborhood.

In addition to the need for cooperation with Pakistan, other neighbors warrant attention, too. Russia, for example, is looking to reassert its authority in the region and could use our departure as a pretext to redeploy Russian troops on the Tajik-Afghan border. The Chinese are expanding their economic footprint but have chosen not to engage politically or militarily, in part because they’re fearful of stirring separatist sentiments in the volatile Xinjiang region bordering Afghanistan. Iran, too, has strengthened economic and trade cooperation with Kabul, building on its cultural ties to reassert its role in the region. And the Indians recently signed a strategic partnership agreement with Afghanistan, cementing their long-term ties.

Meanwhile, smaller neighbors have gone into a defensive crouch. Uzbekistan is concerned by drug smuggling and militant groups crossing from Afghanistan, which it assumes will only get worse as coalition forces depart. And Tajikistan, the weakest link in greater Central Asia which has the most porous border with Afghanistan, strongly opposes a Taliban takeover but has limited means to defend itself from any security threat.

What links all of the neighbors is their growing fear that the West will “lose Afghanistan.” The region is hedging its bets, which has empowered the Taliban and its allies who are trying to project an inevitability of their return.

Afghans are looking for a comprehensive political transition strategy for 2014. It is not enough only to engage armed actors like the Quetta Shura Taliban and Haqqanis, which is what many believe is currently happening. Afghanistan’s ethnic groups and women must feel included, too. If not, they will cut their own deals with various power brokers to best defend their interests. This will lead to greater political hemorrhaging and a possible civil war.

While Afghans must decide their future, the United States’ role can be pivotal, providing security guarantees, investing in economic development, and supporting an emerging political class of Afghans who work hard to earn public legitimacy and consent to govern. We need to build the foundation for a comprehensive peace process, which after all should be the dividend of our military sacrifice in the region these past ten years.

Bonn is our opportunity to make clear that the United States’ role is changing, not evaporating. A responsible drawdown and transition is both in the region’s interests and ours to avoid another war there or closer to home. The stakes are enormous: done right, our military drawdown will motivate Afghans and their neighbors to negotiate seriously with each other about their future; done wrong, it could precipitate another war.

Monday, Oct. 31st, seven months after it started, NATO’s operation in Libya will come to an end. It is the first time NATO has ended an operation it started. And it comes on the heels of an historic victory for the people of Libya who, with NATO’s help, transformed their country from an international pariah into a nation with the potential to become a productive partner with the West.

Seven months ago, the Libyan people were under threat and attack by the armed gangs commanded by Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi, the strongman who had brutally ruled Libya for 42 years. Within 10 days of the U.N. Security Council voting a resolution mandating the protection of Libya’s civilians, policing of a no-flight zone, and prevention of illicit arms transfers by air and sea, NATO took command of a significant force of dozens of ships and hundreds of airplanes and commenced military operations. NATO’s success was swift — saving tens of thousands of Libyan lives, grounding Qaddhafi’s air force, and watching Libya’s coast.

This was a true alliance effort. The United States played a leading role, first by taking out Libya’s integrated air defense system, then by providing the critical enablers that allowed other NATO countries and partners to shoulder their significant share of the burden. Meanwhile the U.S. provided the vast majority of the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets to monitor Qaddafi’s forces and equipment threatening civilians, the targeters that turned this information into targets for NATO forces to strike, and the aerial refueling that enabled our partners to stay up long enough to locate and destroy those targets.

The crucial and irreplaceable U.S. contribution to the overall effort was to enable other allies and partners to fully participate in the operation. In all, 14 NATO members and 4 partner countries provided naval and air forces for NATO’s three missions.

Together, these 18 countries bore the heaviest brunt of the alliance effort. While U.S. planes flew a quarter of all sorties over Libya, France and Britain flew one third of all missions — most of them strikes — and the remaining participants flew roughly 40 percent. The non-U.S. NATO and coalition partners flew 75 percent of the sorties overall.

Ten years earlier, in NATO’s war in Kosovo, the United States was responsible for dropping 90 percent of all precision-guided munitions, with other allies responsible for the remaining 10 percent. In this operation, the percentages were reversed: Allies struck 90 percent of the more than 6,000 targets destroyed in Libya. And they did so with a precision that is historically unprecedented.

Importantly, this was a collective effort. France and Britain played an extraordinary part in the operation, leading the pack in providing air and naval assets and striking over 40 percent of all targets. Italy, too, made an outstanding contribution. Not only was it the fourth largest contributor to the strike mission, it was an indispensable host to hundreds of aircraft at seven airbases.

Smaller allies also punched above their weight. Denmark and Norway together destroyed as many targets as Britain; Denmark, Norway, and Belgium dropped as many bombs as France. Canada, too, was part of the strikers coalition. And Spain, the Netherlands, Turkey, Greece and Romania played useful parts, enforcing the no-flight zone and arms embargo at sea. Those NATO members that didn’t contribute forces still supported the operation by staffing the command structure; not one of the 28 members balked at the challenge. Even Sweden, not a NATO member, was a crucial partner, contributing its own naval and air forces.

This wasn’t just a NATO success, let alone a Western intervention. NATO acted only after it was clear that it had broad-based regional support, including from the Transitional National Council and the Arab League, which requested the intervention. Four key Arab partners — the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Jordan and Morocco — participated in the effort. And it acted on the basis of a clear U.N. mandate, which authorized taking the necessary measures to protect Libyan civilians.

As Operation Unified Protector comes to a close, the alliance and its partners can look back at an extraordinary job, well done. Most of all, they can see in the gratitude of the Libyan people that the use of limited force — precisely applied — can affect real, positive political change. And as the alliance ends its operations, NATO remains committed to Libya’s future, ready to help as needed and requested.

Every operation offers lessons to be learned. The Libya operation exposed some shortfalls in allied capabilities, and highlighted the importance of allied commitments to addressing these shortfalls. It also made clear the need for like-minded partners around the world. Moreover, the operation’s success rested on a set of unique circumstances. A brutal dictator who had decided to inflict murder and mayhem rather than step aside provided a demonstrable need for outside intervention. Strong regional support, from the opposition and the Arab League, ensured that any intervention would be welcomed. And the U.N. mandate provided a sound legal basis for action.

Demonstrable need. Regional support. A sound legal basis. These are what made intervention necessary. NATO is what made successful intervention possible.

The demise of Moammar Gaddafi— and the liberation of the Libyan people from more than 40 years of tyranny — demonstrates the powerful forces for change that are reshaping the Arab world. It also highlights the unique and irreplaceable value of U.S. leadership of strong alliances.

President Obama has made strengthening our security alliances in Europe and Asia a cornerstone of America’s engagement with the world. These alliances provide unique benefits to U.S. security: shared threat assessments, reliable habits of cooperation, the ability to take military action quickly and seamlessly, real burden-sharing for the American taxpayer, and democratic values that we hold in common. They reflect the persistent work of presidents of both parties since the end of World War II. No other nation possesses anything like the U.S. alliance system.

In Libya, the investment the United States has made in revitalizing NATO has paid off in multiple ways:

First, NATO acted with dispatch to achieve a clearly defined mission to protect civilians. This was the fastest formation of a NATO operation in history. After the United States provided the lead in the early days, NATO quickly took over command and control of the entire military effort, protecting Libyan civilians as the Transitional National Council organized, grew in strength and ultimately drove Gaddafi from power.

Second, the speed and effectiveness of the operation would not have been possible if we had had to rely on an ad hoc coalition of the willing. At the outset, NATO members and Arab partners explicitly requested that NATO take over command and control to ensure full coordination among the 18 countries involved. Significantly, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar were full partners in the effort — a testament to NATO’s relationships with nonmember countries throughout the world. The ability to rapidly integrate such countries within NATO’s command-and-control architecture stems from the fact that NATO has the only standing multinational military command structure in the world.

Third, the operation demonstrated the value of maintaining highly capable militaries that plan, train and equip together. NATO planes flew more than 26,000 sorties and nearly 10,000 strike sorties. The United States provided the bulk of the military muscle in the early days to halt Gaddafi’s advances and then played an indispensable supporting role with its unique assets, flying three-quarters of the surveillance and aerial refueling missions. But our allies also stepped up. Overall, U.S. forces flew just more than 10 percent of the strike missions. Perhaps most impressive as a sign of collective strength, countries other than the United States, the United Kingdom and France flew nearly half of all sorties. Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Italy and Norway fully participated in the civilian-protection mission. The Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and others found additional ways to contribute.

Fourth, this operation shows that sharing the burden is more than a slogan — it means sharing the costs. Our total contribution to the nearly eight months of operations in Libya will be approximately $1.2 billion — a fraction of the overall international contribution to Libya — and less than a week’s worth of the cost of operations in Afghanistan or Iraq.

In this effort, the U.S. leadership role remained decisive. Last March, President Obama directed that we shape a robust U.N. Security Council resolution with teeth — enabling international action to hold Gaddafi to account. He insisted that we precisely define our role so that U.S. forces would do what no other nation could do in shaping the battlefield in the campaign’s early days. And he intervened at critical junctures to increase the pressure on Gaddafi and support the Libyan people — adding armed Predators to the effort in June; increasing intelligence and targeting resources over the summer; and rallying other nations to join us in recognizing a new Libyan government in July. This approach succeeded in meeting our objectives and led to a division of labor that enabled others to contribute based on their distinctive capabilities and interests.

As we take stock of NATO’s strengths, we will also focus on how our alliance can be more effective in the future. We know that allies need more advanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. They face shortages in helicopters and transport aircraft. They need to make greater investments in the precision munitions and unmanned systems that are critical on today’s battlefields and will be even more important in the future. As President Obama prepares to host the next NATO summit in Chicago in May, he is asking the alliance to ensure that it has cutting-edge capabilities.

Libya is liberated today because NATO’s unmatched might was joined by an indigenous movement for change led by the Libyan people, who broke the back of the regime.

In the days ahead, Libya will face many challenges as it works to heal the wounds created by decades of Gaddafi’s rule — from standing up a new government to securing and destroying dangerous weapons to assisting thousands of wounded and displaced citizens. Although NATO’s military mission is ending, the United States and its NATO allies will continue to work to support the new Libya.

This underscores a basic fact: From the Atlantic to the Pacific, America’s strong alliances and partnerships are an enduring source of our national strength and global leadership — helping underwrite our security, enabling our prosperity, and promoting our values.

The Palestinian bid for statehood recognition by the United Nations is almost certain to be rejected if it is taken up by the Security Council. But as early as this week, the governing assembly of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization could grant the Palestinians membership in that organization.

If this happens, as is widely expected, the United States would have to resign from UNESCO because of a 20-year-old law forbidding the payment of dues by the U.S. to any U.N. body that accepts Palestine as a member.

And the consequences wouldn’t end there. UNESCO’s acceptance of Palestine would automatically trigger Palestinian membership in the U.N.’s World Intellectual Property Organization, and it could smooth the way for membership in other U.N. entities, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency and the World Health Organization.

American critics of the U.N. assert that a UNESCO pullout wouldn’t matter. Last week, a spokesman for the conservative Heritage Foundation insisted that UNESCO does very few things that are “central to U.S. interests around the world.” But that is far from true.

Alongside its important functions facilitating peace and cooperation among nations and helping to conserve the world’s cultural heritage, UNESCO is also good for American business. Through the organization, American companies such as Cisco, Intel and Microsoft have been introduced to expanding Third World markets hungry for high-tech products, and that facilitation by UNESCO has helped to create or retain thousands of American jobs.

UNESCO also does work that protects the lives and safety of U.S. citizens. For example, it was a tsunami warning system coordinated by UNESCO that alerted Californians to a possible tsunami following Japan’s devastating earthquake in March. The organization also supports U.S. national security by teaching literacy skills to Afghan citizens who will be taking over security functions when allied forces leave the country.

Because Palestinian membership in UNESCO would trigger its acceptance into the World Intellectual Property Organization, the United States would also have to give up participation in that group, which plays a key role in the international safeguarding of intellectual property, including the vast range of patents, copyrights and trademarks belonging to U.S. companies and individuals.

Lest you think that recognition of UNESCO’s crucial role is a partisan issue, it’s not. Not only is President Obama a strong UNESCO supporter; it was President George W. Bush who led the U.S. effort to rejoin UNESCO in 2003, and former First Lady Laura Bush remains a goodwill ambassador for the organization.

It is clear that whatever happens at UNESCO, Palestinians will continue to seek membership in the U.N.’s many specialized agencies. And each time they succeed, the United States will have to resign from another world body, thereby losing influence and input on international issues. We might no longer be able to participate in decisions about how nuclear weapons and nuclear fuel stockpiles are safeguarded around the world by the International Atomic Energy Agency, or decisions about how people are protected during pandemic outbreaks by the World Health Organization, or about how international food supplies are kept safe from disease and terrorism by the Food and Agriculture Organization.

Within a few short months, without discussion at the White House or debate in Congress, the U.S. could find itself shut out of a great many international decisions that have a direct impact on American jobs, lives, safety and security.

The Obama administration and U.S. allies are scrambling to put together a diplomatic solution, at least in the short term. But in the long run, Congress must also take a fresh look at a law that could literally force the U.S. off the international stage.

There are those who would like to believe that the U.S. brings more to the U.N. table than it takes away, and that our leaving these U.N. agencies would be a bigger loss for the rest of the world than for Americans. But that is simply not true.

The U.N. and its related organizations bring the world together to consider issues that affect all of the planet’s human beings. Every day, decisions are made that have a direct effect on American prosperity, health, safety and security. The discussions won’t stop and the international policies won’t disappear just because the U.S. no longer participates. Our absence would only lessen our ability to influence how the world functions and would undermine the legitimacy of vitally important global institutions.

Par un hasard peu ordinaire de calendrier, le nouveau concept stratégique de l’OTAN adopté par ses 28 membres en décembre dernier a été signé à Lisbonne, au même endroit et presque un an jour pour jour après l’entrée en vigueur du traité européen du même nom. Coïncidence ou non, en inscrivant à son agenda les problèmes de sécurité et le développement de capacités civiles de gestion des crises, l’OTAN attise le feu de relations déjà complexes avec l’Union européenne. Dans ce débat, la rigueur du raisonnement cède souvent le pas aux conclusions hâtives. La plus répandue semble dénoncer une sorte d’illégitimité à l’existence d’une Europe de la Défense, dont une partie des membres est particulièrement sensible aux sirènes atlantistes. Pourtant “comparaison n’est pas raison”. Le vieux proverbe mérite vraiment d’être entendu et médité. Comparer l’Europe de la Défense à l’Alliance atlantique s’avère à bien des égards un exercice stérile. Et dans ce débat passionné, on en oublierait presque l’essentiel, le rôle majeur que l’Europe de la Défense sera amené un jour à jouer dans le rayonnement du vieux continent.

Rappelons tout d’abord que les deux alliances ne sont pas du tout de la même nature. L’une, l’OTAN, est une alliance unidimensionnelle, de nature militaire. Sa vocation originelle n’est pas sécuritaire mais défensive. Le cœur de son action est la guerre, le rétablissement de la paix par des moyens exclusivement militaires. Depuis quelques années, son centre de gravité géographique se déplace irrémédiablement vers l’Orient. Ses préoccupations ont changé aussi. D’une mission de défense stricte des frontières de l’Europe, l’Alliance se présente aujourd’hui comme une organisation à vocation de sécurité globale et mondiale. L’autre est multidimensionnelle, l’Union européenne. Elle est à la fois politique, militaire, économique et financière. Le volet gestion de crise s’inscrit dans une approche à vocation régionale, comme un outil de rayonnement et de politique étrangère visant à la fois la promotion de valeurs intangibles telles que la paix et la prospérité, et la protection d’intérêts communs proprement européens, tels que la maîtrise des flux migratoires rentrants. Son action s’inscrit dans une logique de prévention des crises et de reconstruction d’Etats fragilisés. Pour ce faire l’UE dispose d’une large palette de moyens diplomatiques et financiers, ainsi que d’un vivier d’experts civils et militaires œuvrant sur le terrain au rétablissement des institutions légitimes des dits Etats.

Les structures et les moyens financiers des deux organisations sont radicalement différents. L’une compte plus de dix mille militaires, des états-majors de tous les niveaux, de la zone d’opération jusqu’au niveau stratégique. Elle possède sa propre flotte d’avion de surveillance AWACS. Son budget avoisine les deux milliards d’euros et se trouve pour près de la moitié soutenu par les Etats-Unis d’Amérique. L’autre compte à peine 250 militaires, deux petits Etats-majors civils et militaires capables de planifier des opérations d’envergure modeste. Son approche est systématiquement civilo-militaire. Le budget de la Politique de sécurité et de défense commune (PSDC) pèse deux cent millions d’euros, soit quasiment rien. Seules les missions civiles de l’Union sont financées par le budget communautaire. Le coût des opérations militaires repose directement sur les épaules des Etats.

Entre concurrence et complémentarité, le débat mérite d’être dépassionné. Pour la France et ses partenaires européens, l’Union européenne et l’OTAN sont tout à fait complémentaires. Vingt et un Etats européens, dont la France, sont membres des deux organisations. L’UE et l’OTAN ont donc parties liées. Et le succès de l’une procède de l’épanouissement de l’autre. Personne ne remet en cause le rôle incontournable de l’OTAN. Elle catalyse toute la puissance militaire occidentale dans une approche proprement guerrière, et bénéficie de l’effet démultiplicateur du pacte transatlantique. L’Europe puise dans l’Alliance, mais pour combien de temps encore, la garantie de son intégrité territoriale et trouve un moyen de conserver une influence militaire et politique au-delà de sa sphère régionale.

Soyons en convaincu. Pour les Européens, les enjeux politiques sont considérables. Car autour de ce débat UE-OTAN, c’est la question du rapport de l’Europe à la puissance qui est brutalement posé. La PSDC a toute sa place dans l’architecture sécuritaire de l’ordre international présent et à venir. Elle doit constituer la réponse des Européens à la nécessité de s’affirmer comme un bloc homogène et solide. Certes c’est un outil fragile et embryonnaire. Mais il est unique et dispose d’un niveau d’intégration à la fois civil, militaire, politique et économique inégalé. La PSDC offre à l’Europe une nécessaire autonomie d’action conforme à ses intérêts immédiats, parmi lesquels son rayonnement et la sécurité de son voisinage. Car l’Europe de la Défense ne peut être une utopie. Elle constitue l’avenir d’une Europe qui devra, à un moment ou à un autre, affirmer et défendre seule ses propres valeurs, et à travers elles son identité. Cette Europe devra résolument faire ce choix de puissance si elle veut pouvoir conserver son rôle dans les relations internationales. Encouragé par des faiblesses militaires structurelles, le risque grandit de voir nos Etats européens finir par confier un jour leur Défense et leur sécurité à d’autres.

C’est pour cela notamment que l’Europe de la Défense ne peut être sacrifiée sur l’autel du développement de l’OTAN et du désintérêt des peuples européens, au seul motif de contraintes budgétaires nationales aggravées par une crise financière mondiale. C’est aussi l’intérêt du retour de la France dans la structure intégrée de l’OTAN que de servir à faire connaître et reconnaître la place et le rôle essentiel de la PSDC dans la promotion de cette autre “idée de l’Europe”.

The Arab Spring entered a new phase with the collapse of the Qaddafi regime, but it is still far too soon to pronounce North Africa stabilized. International peacekeeping arrangements may yet be needed in a Libya riven by ethnic and religious cleavages, and policymakers should think about long-term arrangements and consider a new collective security framework for the Maghreb region as a whole. In short, the region needs a new NATO – the North Africa Treaty Organization.

The unrest and instability of the Arab Spring – a term that many Arab political activists reject in favor of revolution or uprising – is far from over. And the best way to calm tempers and move towards democratic governments and more vibrant economic development is for Europe to balance economic cooperation with a regional approach to security.

The Arab League failed to play an adequate role as the popular uprisings gathered momentum, and NATO says that its own role in North Africa is coming to an end. The Alliance has neither the political appetite nor the financial resources to remain involved in Libya. With tensions between the country’s western and eastern parts likely to persist, the way ahead is probably a force of United Nations peacekeepers drawn from Asia or Africa, along with a distinctly Arab international security mechanism. Hence the idea of NATO II.

But it would be preferable to create a new North African security umbrella under the aegis of the European Union, rather than to link it to NATO. European governments know that they must be in the vanguard of a strategy to reconstruct the Arab world’s failing economies, and it would make sense to introduce a strong security component to their development partnerships.

Europe’s security and defense policy has so far been dogged by EU countries’ waning military capabilities and a general lack of cohesion. Helping to bring security and political stability to the Arab world would be a major achievement, and few international organizations, if any, can match the EU’s track record on the voluntary pooling of sovereign powers.

Until very recently, it would have been unthinkable for EU policymakers to contemplate a security framework. The European Commission’s eurocrats are most familiar with the politics of trade and economic cooperation, not security. Now, though, with the 2009 Lisbon treaty’s creation of an EU “foreign ministry” – the European External Action Service – the Union has a mandate for making security policy key to its relations with Arab countries.

There is a lot of ground to be made up. Europe’s relations with its neighbors in the Maghreb have been disappointing. Neither Arab autocrats nor the EU have wanted a collective approach, so “tailored” bilateral trade deals and association agreements have been the norm.

But this approach by Arab governments has been the root of their countries’ poverty and lack of opportunity. Only 2-3% of North African countries’ modest foreign trade occurs within the region, so they have missed out on the surge in international business that over the last two decades has lifted billions of people out of backwardness and misery in Asia, Latin America, and even sub-Saharan Africa. By all accounts, the lack of jobs has been as important as the lack of freedom and human rights in fueling the Arab spring.

The Maghreb countries have attracted little more than a trickle of foreign investment, and the chief source has been Europe. One reason is that the EU farmers’ lobby has ensured that these countries’ access to European markets for competitive exports like agricultural produce remains limited. Small wonder that the Maghreb’s principal export has been young men seeking a better life.

No one knows where the Arab Spring is headed. But, in Egypt and Tunisia as much as in Libya, post-revolutionary politics will be extremely volatile. A first step towards calming the turmoil will be to create a permanent forum for the new leaders to wield collective muscle when talking about terms of trade and other economic issues, and also to be in constant communication with each other. In its early years, NATO was, in addition to a bulwark against Soviet encroachment, a vehicle that enabled former World War II adversaries to create close new links.

From the EU’s timid Barcelona Process of the 1990’s to the damp squib of the current Union for the Mediterranean, Europe has been torn between a concern to stave off trouble and unrest in North Africa and its self-interested measures to protect its culture and economy. With the tumult in the Arab world far from over, European politicians are slowly waking to the idea that they must construct a relationship that is much more generous and far-sighted. It won’t be just a security mechanism, but nor can it be limited to economic issues alone.

The main issue before the United Nations General Assembly this week is the Palestinian quest for recognition. Less attention is being paid to a related, and no less important question: Are the Palestinians capable and ready to run a state?

That question has been the focus of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, the donor support group to the Palestinian Authority, which is chaired by Norway. The committee is the only forum in which both the Palestinian Authority and the government of Israel are members, together with regional partners, the European Union, the United Nations, the United States, Russia and a dozen key donors.

The committee’s method has been to work closely with the Palestinian prime minister, Salam Fayyad, to support his plan to reform the Palestinian economy and Palestinian institutions with a view to preparing them for statehood.

An integral part of our method has been to monitor progress by exposing Palestinian performance to scrutiny by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the United Nations.

Prime Minister Fayyad’s ambition has been to have adequate state institutions in place by September 2011. So what has the Palestinian Authority achieved, in tandem with the donor community? Last Sunday the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee met in New York to take stock.

According to the World Bank and the I.M.F., the Palestinian Authority has been remarkably successful in building Palestinian public institutions. The World Bank affirms that Palestinian institutions have achieved a level above the threshold for a functioning state in key sectors such as revenue and expenditure management, economic development, service delivery and security and justice. In this respect, Palestine has achieved more than many states that are full U.N. members, and has also passed a tougher economic stress test than many E.U. member states.

In recent years, illiteracy has almost been eliminated. There is a high standard of health care. Key planning and governance systems are in place, such as the Palestinian Monetary Authority and the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, which operate in accordance with O.E.C.D. standards.

The West Bank has become a safer place under the rule of law, primarily thanks to security reforms, judiciary reforms and training of the Palestinian security forces and effective cooperation with Israel. By assisting the state building project, donors have contributed to the security of Palestinians but also to the security of Israel.

The budget deficit has been reduced by 60 percent over four years, from 27 percent of Gross Domestic Product in 2008 to 11 percent this year. Reliance on foreign aid has been halved. Revenue collection, consisting mainly of taxes and customs duties collected by Israel and transferred to the Palestinian Authority on a monthly basis, has doubled during the same period. Growth has been high, stimulated by structural reform. According to the World Bank, the major obstacle to further growth is the various physical and legal barriers imposed by the occupying power, Israel.

Then what about Gaza? The Gaza Strip is under the political and military control of Hamas. However, the P.L.O. is the legitimate representative of the entire Palestinian people. Moreover, it is the Palestinian Authority that is the main service provider to the people of Gaza. Since 2008, the Palestinian Authority has spent $4 billion — more than half of its external aid — on salaries for teachers and doctors and to cover electricity and water expenses in Gaza.

According to the I.M.F., the Palestinian Monetary Authority exercises full control over private banks in Gaza, ensuring the transfer of salaries and payments, out of the reach of Hamas. Despite Hamas’ repressive control of the Gaza Strip and the unacceptable terrorist rocket attacks on Israel, the non-Hamas Palestinian National Authority reaches almost all of the Palestinian population with key assistance.

So the answer to my initial question — whether the Palestinians can actually run a state — is yes. By building robust and well-functioning institutions, the Palestinians and the donor community have taken a bottom-up approach to the peace process. The final status issues — borders, security, refugees and Jerusalem — can only be settled through negotiations, which is an example of a top-down approach. In an ideal world, these two approaches should have converged. Regretfully, they haven’t. This is the core of the Israeli-Palestinian impasse.

When U.N. member states consider how to cast their vote on the Palestinian issue, they should bear in mind that no resolution will resolve the final-status issues. Only real, serious negotiations will. But the main obstacle to the realization of Palestinian statehood is the occupation. The Palestinians are otherwise fully capable of running a state.

The Palestinian statehood show at the UN is finally on the road. With his application this week to the UN secretary general and address to the general assembly, the Palestinian president formally launched the statehood process. In so doing Mahmoud Abbas has shown astonishing resolve against a formidable array of Israeli, US and European pressures to force him into retracting his position. Whatever else, this newfound determination will ensure a fresh lease of life for a leadership considered by many Palestinians, still shocked by the Palestine papers‘ revelations of subservience to Israel, to be unrepresentative, discredited and illegitimate. Israeli-US threats and frantic last-minute manoeuvring by the Quartet powers to halt the statehood process have only lent further credence to the Palestinian position.

Admitting “Palestine” as a full member state would undoubtedly provide some advantages. Statehood would change the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem from occupied territories to an occupied state, which could then request international help to end the occupation, as happened with Kuwait in 1990. Israel’s borders would be defined by law for the first time since the 1949 armistice and its expansion potentially halted.

However, given US determination to use its veto in the security council to prevent Palestine gaining full UN membership, it will not happen. But, with a two-thirds majority vote in the general assembly for Palestinian statehood almost assured, the Palestinians would be upgraded to non-member observer state status, like the Vatican. That would admit them to membership of several UN bodies hitherto barred, and could enable them to pursue cases against Israel at the international criminal court.

Public opinion seems to be widely in favour. A recent BBC survey found majority support for the Palestinian bid in most of 19 countries, especially in Egypt. Another recent opinion poll showed popular majorities for Palestinian statehood in Germany, France and Britain, even though European governments are divided, with Germany actively opposed, and Britain undecided.

Much of this popular support doubtless arises from a genuine desire to see the Palestinians gain freedom. But such sentiments, though admirable, are misguided. They ignore the realities of history, geography, and what justice for the Palestinians actually entails.

Historically, the current statehood initiative is a replay of December 1988, when the UN general assembly recognised the “proclamation of the state of Palestine” by more than 100 votes. Palestine acquired de facto state recognition in many international forums, and gained the status of a UN observer body. PLO representatives became quasi-ambassadors in western states. “Palestine” had already been a member of the Arab League and the Islamic Conference Organisation for a decade. But on the ground, where it really mattered, these diplomatic privileges never halted one inch of Israel’s encroachment on Palestinian land, and are unlikely to do so now Israel currently controls more than 60% of the West Bank and all Jerusalem. In 2010 there were 518,974 Jewish settlers and 144 settlements dotted all over the West Bank and East Jerusalem, with 1,600 more housing units planned and an apparently unstoppable settlement expansion. Unless this changes dramatically, no viable Palestinian state is possible while settlement expansion goes unchecked.

The Palestinian position on statehood is not unified. The Hamas government in Gaza is generally opposed to it, and ordinary Palestinians, whom no one has bothered to consult about this important initiative, are uncertain and divided, with many seduced by the dream of freedom it promises.

But the UN drama now unfolding is no more than a dangerous sideshow detracting from the real issue. The statehood debate has hijacked the historical facts and created a new reality: that the Israeli-Palestinian problem is about the 1967 Israeli occupation, and dividing historic Palestine into two states is the solution. This is the reality the international community has been encouraged to accept. In fact the conflict dates from the 1948 expulsion of the majority of Palestine’s inhabitants to accommodate Israel’s creation, as today’s 6.5 million Palestinian refugees can attest. Redressing that terrible injustice is the only durable solution. While Palestinian statehood in a fifth of the original homeland might seem attractive given the power imbalance between both sidesand Israel’s obduracy in peace negotiations, this was the worst historical moment to push for such a paltry aim which Palestinians may live to regret.

The Arab revolution sweeping the region should have been an object lesson for Palestinians. The new Arab revolutionaries have not fought just to attain a few of their rights; they have demanded a totally new order. Israel’s growing global isolation and enfeeblement should have been another spur to Palestinian action. Rather than seizing this unprecedented historic opportunity, the Palestinian leadership has pulled out the stops for a minimal political arrangement, ignoring the rights of refugees and legitimising Israel’s 1948 occupation of almost 80% of the original Palestine, including its post-1967 illegal settlements under cover of the “land swap” device. This misreading of the zeitgeist was a massive blunder and an inexcusable failure of leadership.

The vigorous campaign to enlist world support for this pathetic arrangement, as if it were the acme of Palestinian ambition, should have been fought instead for basic Palestinian rights. If limited statehood had been an interim stage in a longer-term strategy to attain those rights, it could have been acceptable.

As things stand, the danger is that international endorsement of the current statehood proposal will make it the benchmark for all future peace negotiators, and entrench the idea that partitioning Palestine unequally means justice. True friends of the Palestinians should oppose this application and support their struggle for real justice.

Some 150 countries appear ready to vote in the United Nations General Assembly to recognize Palestine as an “observer state” and would be ready to recognize it as a “member state” if the United States did not plan to veto such a proposition in the U.N. Security Council.

They are prepared to do this even though Palestine does not have a government that is sovereign over the entire territory that is presumed to be Palestine. In other words, Palestine lacks the single most fundamental attribute of statehood. As everyone knows, there are two governments in charge: Fatah rules the West Bank, Hamas rules Gaza, each with its own security forces (not to mention other free-standing militias).

This is a travesty. And it should make one give second thought to America’s Founding Fathers’ admonition that we pay a decent respect to the opinions of mankind.

Not to mention that the proposed resolution, so far as we know, provides for the state of Palestine to be drawn along the 1967 borders that are, in fact, the 1949 armistice lines expressly designed not to prejudice any future determination of borders.

Not to mention that one of the two governments of Palestine, Hamas, is a virulently anti-Semitic organization – perhaps, neo-genocidal would be the correct adjective – whose own charter repeats the anti-Semitic tropes of yesterday’s Europe while insisting that no inch of “historic Palestine” (meaning the 1923 borders, not the 1967 “borders”) can be ceded to the Jews.

If the president of the United States were, say, a cowboy, he probably would withdraw all U.S. funding from the United Nations – not without reason. But, in 2011, that is not going to happen.

So let me make a constructive suggestion that the Obama administration could reasonably be expected to execute and could possibly save Palestine from its own destructive self, since right now it is hard to see how Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas could prevent Hamas from being the prime beneficiary of all the events that ensue from this historic vote, including possibly a third Intifada, as events spin out of control. Even short of that, there will likely be no further negotiations for years to come as a result of this Palestinian violation of the Oslo Accords.

Washington does not want to be placed in the position of vetoing a resolution recognizing Palestine as a member state of the U.N., for that would place the United States out of step with the vast majority of the rest of the world – especially the Muslim world. That would doom a key element of U.S. foreign policy under Mr. Obama, which has been the attempt to remake relations with the Muslim world and set them on a positive footing.

Therefore, its only recourse is to put forth an alternative resolution that provides for Palestine to become a member state while also ratifying Israel’s existence as a Jewish state along the lines explicitly envisaged in the 1947 U.N. Partition Plan. In addition instead of establishing the 1967 lines as the borders, it should call for borders to be negotiated on the basis of the 1967 lines on the understanding that those lines are themselves subject to agreement on land swaps, as Mr. Obama urged in his speeches last May.

But even this would not solve Mr. Abbas‘ problem, which is not Israel, but Hamas. So long as Hamas is in the picture, peace is impossible – not just between Palestine and Israel, but within Palestine itself. You don’t need secret documents to determine what Hamas is up to; they spell it all out in their charter and have never since hesitated to articulate their goal – the destruction of the Jewish state and its replacement by an Islamist state.

If the U.N. really wanted to ensure peace between a Palestinian state and a Jewish state – and in the process, save Palestine from itself – it would do what Mr. Abbas has been too weak to accomplish: the disarmament of Hamas and the renunciation of its charter. These are essential ingredients in any alternative resolution offered by the United States.

One interesting question raised by the Palestinian statehood initiative at the United Nations is how this will affect the role of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in skirmishes between the Israelis and the Palestinians in Gaza and in other conflict zones. Some assert that triggering ICC prosecutions of Israeli soldiers and government officials for war crimes is a primary motive behind Palestine’s push for statehood. But as is often the case in the Middle East, things are more complicated than they appear.

The Palestinian Authority has been pounding on the ICC prosecutors door since January 2009, trying in vain to trigger an investigation into Israel’s alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity during “Operation Cast Lead” in December 2008. The prosecutor of the ICC initially responded that, because Israel is not a party to the court and the Palestinian Authority is not a state, he had no jurisdiction to investigate. But a few weeks later, he reconsidered, and said he would look more carefully at whether the PA might have enough earmarks of a state to bring an ICC claim.

Following an almost bizarre process, the prosecutor has now been thinking about this question for more than 2 1/2 years. He invited briefs and memoranda on the question, many of which he posted online; he held a forum in which the matter was debated (what prosecutor hosts in-house salons to decide whether to bring a case?); and still no decision. What does that tell us? It may tell us this presents complex policy questions but as a legal matter, his first impression that there is no jurisdiction seems obviously right. More likely it tells us this is a political can of worms that he would like to kick down the road until his term ends next year.

Criminal courts are not proper venues to sort out thorny political, diplomatic, military and strategic questions that characterize the decades-long conflict between Israel and the Palestinians in Gaza and other conflict zones. Criminal judges simply do not have the background and expertise to handle such questions, and empowering an independent prosecutor to run around the world turning conflicts into criminal charges does not serve anyone.

Meanwhile, back at the U.N., it appears the United States is prepared to veto actual statehood for the Palestinians at the Security Council, so that “observer statehood” from the General Assembly is the most likely outcome. Can an “observer state” of the U.N. accede to the Treaty of Rome, which created the ICC, and therefore bring a matter before the prosecutor for investigation? And who decides that? These questions are more difficult than they may seem.

It appears that U.N. officials are already running for cover when such questions are asked. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has declined to state his position on the matter, though there are unconfirmed reports that he has sought a legal opinion that he would not need to make that decision. Another U.N. official has reportedly said that the secretary-general should accept a request from an “observer state” to join a treaty on file with the U.N., assuming the Palestinians will surely make one. If it takes a prosecutor two or three years to decide whether a nonstate might have jurisdiction to bring a complaint to the ICC, imagine how long this U.N. dance might go on.

Further, the Treaty of Rome is clear that the court does not have retroactive jurisdiction, so a new state party could not bring a matter from the past (Operation Cast Lead in 2008-09) before the court. So even joining the ICC would not enable the Palestinians to bring a matter to the court immediately. And then there are still very difficult territorial questions that would should be resolved – for example, who actually “controls” Gaza? Further complicating matters, the U.N. Security Council has the power both to initiate and to halt an ICC case. Would the United States try to protect Israel from ICC prosecution through the Security Council? Could it get a majority of council votes to accomplish that? As a new party to the court, would the Palestinians investigate their own alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity?

All this underscores the importance of settling statehood through a diplomatic process, not through appeals to U.N. bureaucrats and criminal courts, where the end result is unanswered questions and unintended consequences.

It goes without saying that Palestinians and Arabs are outraged by the idea that the United States is threatening to block recognition of a Palestinian state at the United Nations.

What is less obvious, perhaps, is that some of the most vociferous critics of the Palestinian bid for upgraded U.N. recognition are Palestinians themselves. How could it be that advocates of Palestinian rights could be suspicious of, if not altogether opposed to, the U.N. gambit? Isn’t the creation of an internationally recognized independent state the goal shared by all Palestinians?

Not exactly. The Palestinian cause concerns more than merely statehood. And although much depends on how the statehood bid is formally expressed, there is every possibility that U.N. action on the wrong set of terms could be a setback in the Palestinians’ decades-long struggle for self-determination and the right to live normal, dignified lives in their ancestral land.

At the heart of the problem is how “Palestine” might come to be defined in the U.N. The statehood bid probably will be structured along the lines long discussed as the basis for a two-state solution: territory encompassing the 22% of historical Palestine that remained after hundreds of thousands of Palestinians were forced from their homes during the creation of Israel in 1948 — namely, the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip, which were subsequently captured by Israel in 1967. But that could change who the United Nations considers to be Palestinian and how their rights may be determined, to their profound detriment.

Today, the Palestine Liberation Organization is recognized by the U.N. and most of its member states as the sole legitimate representative of the entire Palestinian people: those living under occupation, those living in Israel and those living in exile or as refugees, who constitute the single largest group of Palestinians. If its place in the international body is taken by a Palestinian state identifying itself with the occupied territories, Palestinians who do not live in those territories — that is, the majority of Palestinians — could lose their representation at the U.N. and be pushed back into the shadowy silence and invisibility from which they fought to emerge in the 1960s. The 1.5 million Palestinians living as second-class citizens of Israel could be left to fend for themselves against legalized discrimination and political repression directed against them as non-Jews in a state whose Jewish identity the Israelis are demanding ever more insistently that the Palestinians acknowledge.

Moreover, an internationally recognized state limited to the shards of Palestine that remained after 1948 would do nothing for the Palestinian right of return to homes and land in what is today Israel, and could in fact gravely threaten the exercise of that right, which is fundamental to the Palestinian cause.

A very broad set of Palestinian rights is already recognized by the U.N. As the Oxford legal scholar Guy Goodwin-Gill notes, the General Assembly has repeatedly emphasized that “the Palestinian people is the principal party to the question of Palestine,” just as it has recognized that the right to self-determination and the right of return to homes and property from which they were displaced inheres in the Palestinians as a people. And U.N. resolutions do not limit the Palestinian people or their rights merely to the territories occupied in 1967; General Assembly Resolution 194, for example, expressly recognizes their right of return to homes in what is now Israel.

It would be profoundly problematic, not to say dangerous, if the Palestinian U.N. bid substituted a very narrow formal recognition — which would mean little practically, given that mere recognition would do nothing to actually end Israel’s ongoing occupation of Palestinian land — for the much broader definition of the Palestinian constituency and the array of Palestinian rights already recognized by the U.N.

These worries are not unfounded if one considers the Palestinian politicians preparing the statehood bid: the venal clique surrounding Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian Authority “president” whose term expired almost three years ago. Abbas and his circle are not merely unelected; their party was actually thrown out of office in the last Palestinian elections in 2006.

Shrouded in mystery, their current bid is consistent with the pattern they established during the endless secret negotiations of a two-decade peace process whose only tangible result has been to give them a fleeting taste of power while leading their people deeper and deeper into a morass. Indifferent to the democratic tide sweeping the Arab world, they neither have, nor have they sought, a popular mandate for the gamble they are undertaking. Indeed, many Palestinian observers see the current U.N. gambit as yet another cynical maneuver that has more to do with resuscitating a failed two-state strategy —and Abbas’ own waning political fortunes — than with genuine concern for his people’s inalienable rights.

We are, then, in a moment pregnant with ironies. With its eye on the 2012 elections, the Obama administration intends, as usual, to come to Israel’s rescue at the U.N. But in the act of serving Israel by blocking the expression, however flawed, of legitimate Palestinian aspirations, the U.S. would also inadvertently be thwarting Abbas and company, one of the unpopular and undemocratic regimes it has long propped up throughout the Arab world. And, although it would be doing so for the wrong reasons, by standing in the way of recognizing a state whose contours and purported leadership do nothing to address the rights of most Palestinians, the U.S. might also contribute unwittingly to maintaining the integrity of the Palestinian cause.

After decades of failed negotiations over a Palestinian state, it is tempting to imagine that the potential vote in the U.N. General Assembly on Palestinian statehood might help finally resolve one of the most vexing problems that the world has inherited from the previous century. And after all, that’s just how a Jewish state was born — by a U.N. General Assembly vote in 1947.

But a U.N. vote that seeks to bypass negotiations and impose a fait accompli on Israel will only undermine a two-state solution. By deepening Israel’s isolation, the vote will reinforce the sense among Israelis that this is not a time for concessions but for resolve.

As polls in recent years show, a majority of Israelis supports a two-state solution. And for good pragmatic reason: Israelis see a Palestinian state as an existential necessity for Israel itself, a means of preserving their country’s Jewish majority and democratic identity.

But that same majority also perceives a Palestinian state as a potential existential threat. Even primitive missiles launched from the West Bank hills against greater Tel Aviv would end normal life here. And should Israel then be forced to send its soldiers back into the West Bank, it would likely find itself judged — perhaps literally — in the court of world opinion.

That, after all, is what happened when Israel invaded the Gaza Strip in 2009, even though Israel had withdrawn from Gaza four years earlier, only to be hit by thousands of rockets over its international border.

A Palestinian state, then, could create an untenable choice for Israel: learn to live with terror as a daily reality, or defend yourself and become a pariah.

In endorsing an imposed solution, the General Assembly would be telling Israelis that their security concerns are irrelevant. It is, in other words, far more important to the U.N. to create Arab state No. 22 than it is to ensure the safety of the lone Jewish state.

With its disdain for Israel, the U.N. has invalidated itself as a forum in which to try to heal the Arab-Israeli conflict. Israel isn’t just condemned by the world body more than any other country; the Jewish state is condemned more often than all other countries combined. According to U.N. Watch in Geneva, the U.N.’s Human Rights Council has adopted, since its founding in 2006, about 70 resolutions condemning specific countries, 40 of which have been against Israel. In the General Assembly, about 20 anti-Israel resolutions are adopted each year, as opposed to five or six against other countries. That is not mere hostility but pathological obsession.

The vote to recognize Palestine will almost certainly increase anti-Israel violence in the region. It will also likely encourage the international boycott-Israel movement, which uniquely ostracizes the Jewish state. Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas has said that upgraded Palestinian status at the U.N. would “pave the way” to press for legal sanctions against Israel. The likely result would be to turn any Israeli act of war, even in self-defense, into a war crime.

Statehood is a responsibility to be earned. And so far the Palestinian national movement has hardly proved its willingness to live in peace beside Israel. Palestinian schools and media — those of Fatah as well as of Hamas — routinely portray Israel as an artificial and temporary creation, without any rootedness in the land. All of Jewish history — from the ancient temple in Jerusalem to the Holocaust — is dismissed as a lie. No Palestinian leader has told his people — as Israeli prime ministers since Yitzhak Rabin have told their people — that the land must be shared by two nations. Instead, Palestinian leaders have consistently told their people that the goal is a state on all the land between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea, and they encourage their people to dream of a Middle East without Israel.

The U.N. vote comes at a time when Israelis are feeling increasingly besieged. In the last year, Israel’s closest regional ally, Turkey, has turned outright hostile; Turkey’s Islamist prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, last week threatened to dispatch warships against Israel. The peace with Egypt is unraveling: Two weeks ago, as a mob ransacked Israel’s embassy in Cairo, Egyptian leaders refused to take desperate calls from their Israeli counterparts and dispatched commandos to rescue Israeli personnel only after American intervention. Israel evacuated its embassy in Amman, Jordan, over the weekend to avert a similar situation.

Meanwhile, terrorist enclaves on Israel’s borders — Hezbollah in the north, Hamas in the south — aim tens of thousands of missiles at Israeli cities. And the Iranian regime, whose declared goal is the destruction of Israel, is moving ever closer to nuclear capability.

For many Israelis the sense of threat recalls May 1967, when Arab leaders vowing to destroy the Jewish state massed their armies on its borders. And while the international community remembers Israel’s stunning victory against those forces in June 1967, Israelis recall the terrible isolation of the weeks before, when even Israel’s friends offered little assistance.

Israel tends to take risks for peace when it believes the chance for peace is credible and when it senses a fair international climate. Israel withdrew from the Sinai desert — which is three times the size of Israel and which provided it with strategic protection — because Egyptian President Anwar Sadat convinced the Israeli public he was serious about peace. And when Eastern European and many Third World countries established diplomatic relations with Israel following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Israel responded with an overture to the Palestine Liberation Organization that became the Oslo process.

But when the international community treats the Jewish state with contempt, Israelis tend to reciprocate. The result is a stiffening of hard-line attitudes.

In large measure, then, the future of a Palestinian state will be determined by whether Israelis perceive it more as existential necessity or as existential threat, and whether they feel the international community is receptive to their security concerns.

In one sense the U.N. vote is a useful reminder of the origins of the conflict. In 1947 the General Assembly voted for partition; it didn’t call for creating only a Jewish state but a Palestinian state as well. The Arab world rejected partition and tried to destroy Israel.

That rejection remains the core of the conflict. However problematic, settlements are not the main obstacle to an agreement. Both former Prime Ministers Ehud Barak and Ehud Olmert offered to uproot dozens of settlements and concentrate the rest in “blocs” along the border to enable Palestinian territorial contiguity. Palestinian leaders dismissed those offers.

In endorsing a diplomatic process that ignores Israel, the U.N. would, in effect, affirm the Arab world’s attempt to erase Israel’s legitimacy. And by encouraging Israeli despair, it could help turn Palestine into a permanent virtual state.

In Lewis Carroll’s “Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland,” the heroine falls down a rabbit hole into a confusing fantasy world. Writing today, Carroll might have placed Alice in the 66th General Assembly of the United Nations, where Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas plans this week to seek U.N. recognition of statehood. If Alice was perplexed by the Mad Hatter or the Queen of Hearts, it would be interesting to see her reaction to a president whose mandate has long expired applying for statehood over territory, part of which he is too afraid to visit. Her confusion would be compounded on discovering that a majority of the world’s states were happy to indulge this fantasy.

The Palestinian Authority’s bid is likely to pass in the General Assembly, where voting dynamics effectively ensure that nearly every Palestinian whim is rubber-stamped. The truth is that the head of the Palestinian Authority has absolutely no authority in the Gaza Strip. Abbas has not set foot in Gaza since the Hamas terrorist organization carried out a bloody coup and took control of the area in 2007. It’s like New York City electing a mayor who is unable to travel to Brooklyn.

Every state recognized by the U.N. has the obligation to be willing and able to exert its authority over its own territory. Is Abbas willing and able to control Hamas? Perhaps the citizens of southern Israel, semi-permanent residents of bomb shelters, could offer an informed answer. The continued rain of Hamas rockets, mortar shells and missiles on Israeli homes, hospitals and schools provides a vivid illustration that the Palestinian Authority is both unwilling and unable to uphold this basic requirement.

In supporting this initiative, many in the international community seem willing to sweep issues of Palestinian terrorism, incitement and lack of coherent governance under the carpet. They are only indulging a march of folly. The General Assembly cannot create a Palestinian state — and a unilateral action would be bad for peace, bad for our region and, above all, bad for advancing the Palestinians’ aspirations for genuine statehood.

Many Palestinian leaders, including Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, have recognized as much. They understand that as a direct result of enhanced Israeli-Palestinian economic and security cooperation, the Palestinian economy experienced 10% growth in 2010. The only “bank” in the world to boast such figures is the West Bank. Those who comprehend the hard work necessary for a real state don’t wish to jeopardize this progress with a premature, fanciful declaration for an imaginary state.

What would a yes vote by the General Assembly do?

First, it would feed the fantasy that compromises reached in negotiations can be bypassed. John F. Kennedy once described the impossibility of working with those who say “What’s mine is mine and what’s yours is negotiable.” The basic premise of the Palestinians’ U.N. bid is this: Give us everything without negotiation, and then we will negotiate about the rest.

True friends of the Palestinians in the international community should urge them to return immediately to direct talks with Israel. No one but Israelis and Palestinians, on their own, at the table, can face the major challenges that must be addressed if peace is to be achieved. This unilateral action does the opposite, enabling the Palestinian Authority to sidestep negotiations, while standing in violation of every bilateral agreement between Palestinian leaders and Israel since the Oslo accords.

It also encourages reckless behavior in an already fragile region. Voting for this unilateral gambit is a recipe for instability, the breakdown of cooperation and, potentially, violence. Passing resolutions in the General Assembly requires no concessions, no leadership and no responsibility from the Palestinians. The inevitable talks with Israel will not be as easy. They will entail hard work, frustration and many sleepless nights, but negotiations remain the only way forward.

While Palestinians leaders are crying for unilateral recognition, those who support this measure may be soon crying about its consequences.

The pursuit of virtual statehood falls in the same realm of fantasy that Alice discovers in Wonderland, all white rabbits and red herrings. Only in the real world, in a direct dialogue filled with difficult truths and serious compromises, can Israelis and Palestinians forge a viable, secure and long-lasting peace.

The second secretary general of the United Nations, Dag Hammarskjold, died 50 years ago this weekend on a mission to the Congo, when his plane crashed on its landing approach to Ndola, now in Zambia, then Northern Rhodesia. In his eight years at the United Nations, he brought vitality to the world organization and established its secretary general as a major player in global affairs.

Hammarskjold’s resolute international leadership has never been equaled. He developed the role of the secretary general at a particularly dangerous point in history to such a degree that “Leave it to Dag” became a slogan, even as he ran the risk of arousing the ever-vigilant defenders of unlimited national sovereignty. The men who succeeded him (when, at last, will a woman be nominated?) have often been measured against Hammarskjold, and they have referred to him as a model for their own efforts.

When Hammarskjold arrived at the United Nations in April 1953, most of the members of the Security Council were under the impression that they had voted for a competent Swedish civil servant who would not rock the boat or be particularly active or independent. The next eight years were quite a surprise.

By 1953, the cold war had virtually paralyzed the Security Council. Regional conflicts were potential brush fires that could ignite a nuclear East-West confrontation, and Hammarskjold became an accepted go-between; his first success was to negotiate the release of the American airmen who had come down in the People’s Republic of China during the Korean War and been imprisoned as spies.

Some of the most powerful nations, including the United States, came to view Hammarskjold as an outstanding leader, even if they sometimes disagreed with him. Nikita S. Khrushchev’s Soviet Union and Charles de Gaulle’s France did not see him in this light. In a famous scene in the General Assembly, Khrushchev demanded his resignation. Hammarskjold refused and received a standing ovation.

Of all the people I have known, Hammarskjold was by far the most successful in organizing his public life and his widespread intellectual, spiritual and aesthetic interests into an integrated and self-sustaining pattern. Literature in three or four languages, music, the visual arts and nature were his beloved companions, and his posthumously published diary, “Markings,” showed that he was developing his own version of mysticism. His friend the sculptor Barbara Hepworth said, “Dag Hammarskjold had a pure and exact perception of aesthetic principles, as exact as it was over ethical and moral principles. I believe they were, to him, one and the same thing.” But Hammarskjold’s feet were firmly on the ground. “The United Nations was not created to bring us to heaven,” he told an audience in 1954, “but to save us from hell.”

Hammarskjold had few of the conventional trappings of a leader. For the secretariat, his authority was absolute because we respected the intellectual and moral effort and the judgment that went into his decisions, and the calmness and lack of pretension with which they were communicated. There is a photograph of him reviewing the first contingent of the first United Nations peacekeeping force on its arrival at Abu Sueir on the Suez Canal in 1956. His slight, lonely and profoundly unmilitary figure dominates the scene and leaves no doubt as to who is in charge. There was, I think, more than a touch of genius in Hammarskjold’s passionate and imaginative service. It is this that makes him so memorable.

The cold war, the Soviet Union and the “balance of terror” are gone, and with them, one hopes, the ever-present threat of nuclear war. But the potential combination of unconventional weapons and terrorism, climate change and environmental degradation, global shortages of basic resources and the possible breakdown of the economic order present immeasurable risks unless the world’s governments decide to address them seriously and together. Hammarskjold’s ability to focus international attention on essential questions would have found full scope in this intensely troubling time.

The excitement, danger and hope of Hammarskjold’s time at the United Nations are hard to recall and impossible to replicate. Governments reach agreement in the organization and outside of it to a far greater extent than before. The Security Council is exploring new ground under the concept of the “responsibility to protect.” The international and independent leadership that was Hammarskjold’s hallmark is conspicuously lacking.

What sort of person do governments want as the secretary general of the United Nations? For all the tributes pouring forth on this anniversary, there is no evidence that the members of the Security Council have ever tried to find another Hammarskjold. Can it be that eight years of dynamic leadership half a century ago was enough for them?

The Security Council has recommended, and the General Assembly has approved, a second five-year term for Secretary General Ban Ki-moon. But the process of finding his successor by an imaginative, widespread search procedure should start soon. In a time of ominous global problems, the example of Dag Hammarskjold could provide important guidance in that search.

As the Palestinians seek U.N. support for a state of their own, Washington has advanced two arguments to dissuade them: first, that taking the issue of statehood to the United Nations is a unilateral move away from negotiations with Israel; and second, that the effort will be counterproductive because the United States will veto any such U.N. Security Council resolution.

These arguments miss the point. The United Nations may in fact be just the place to invigorate stalled diplomacy. The question should not be what would happen when the United States vetoes the U.N. resolution but what if it doesn’t.

Israelis and Palestinians have been in conflict for decades, and Israel has controlled the West Bank and Gaza for 44 years. The overwhelming majority of Palestinians in these territories were born under occupation. Although Israel has been recognized by the United Nations for its entire existence, it has yet to be recognized by most Arab states. Israelis live in insecurity. Decades of direct and indirect negotiations have not produced peace.

It cannot be ignored that Israeli settlers in the occupied territories vote in Israeli elections, and Palestinians do not. Short of a strong international position, every Israeli government will hear the settlers’ voices before hearing the Palestinians’. Occupation is thus prolonged and Palestinian statehood becomes less viable.

Even the argument of Israelis seeking compromise has been distracting, resting on the fear that, without a Palestinian state, Arabs would undermine Israel’s Jewish majority or its democracy. That may be true, but Israel’s principal obligation to withdraw from the occupied territories is the same as the Arabs’ obligation to accept Israel — U.N. resolutions. When asked by pollsters in 2007, a majority of Israelis said their government should be more willing to make decisions within the United Nations, even when that means sometimes going along with a policy that is not Israel’s first choice. As for the Palestinians, without appeal to the United Nations and to international laws and norms, what would persuade them to refrain from using provocative or militant means to rid themselves of occupation?

U.N. Security Council resolutions lay out blueprints, backed by the world’s great powers, for moving countries and regions from war to peace. Thanks to persistent efforts, the world’s battle deaths in the past decade were about a third of those during the Cold War. The chances of any cease-fire lasting, only 50-50 in the 1990s, have increased to 88 percent. U.N. actions are no guarantee of peace, but overall they are working much better than many realize.

Given congressional opposition to U.N. action, the Obama administration is almost certain to exercise its veto power in the Security Council — itself the ultimate unilateral move and something President Obama opposed when he ran for office. But that is more a symptom of our broken politics than of sensible policy. What if the United States preempted a U.N. General Assembly resolution with a Security Council resolution endorsing a two-state solution? It would have legal and normative implications, providing restraint to both sides and pushing them toward the negotiating table. In the Arab world, where a public awakening is increasingly expressing anger with Israel, a new focus on U.N. legitimacy would not be a bad thing — for Israel and the Palestinians.

U.N. Resolution 1397, passed in 2002, affirmed “a vision of a region where two States, Israel and Palestine, live side by side within secure and recognized borders.” Obama has said that the two-state solution must be based on the 1967 borders with land swaps. His administration would not be pushing the envelope far with its own Security Council resolution or by abstaining on a resolution drafted by European allies.

What would such a resolution include? Two states, based on the 1967 borders, with comparable mutually agreed swaps. Israel, as a state of the Jewish people and all its citizens, and Palestine as a state of the Palestinian people and all its citizens. The capital of Israel in West Jerusalem and the capital of Palestine in East Jerusalem. Mutual security arrangements to be negotiated, including possible deployment of international peacekeeping forces. And the Palestinian refugee problem to be resolved in a manner that respects the refugees’ legitimate rights, taking into account previous U.N. resolutions and the principle of the two-state solution outlined above.

Even if the United States must negotiate any such resolution, the effort would be better received than attempts to dissuade the Palestinians from taking up the issue of statehood at the United Nations — a move that will be condemned in the region regardless of its outcome. The audience is greater than the Palestinians and Israelis: Polling suggests that the souring Arab mood toward Obama has been principally based on his policy toward the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. As Egypt enters its electoral season and Arabs everywhere are asserting their opinions, much is at stake for the United States.

Washington faces a choice: It can block the Security Council from acting, or it can get out front and shape a solution using the best tool the world has today.

When the Palestinian Authority (PA) was pushing last month to receive $50 million in direct funding to help alleviate its dire fiscal situation, it received critical support from a seemingly unlikely source: the right-wing government of Israel.

Israel quietly supported the Obama administration’s plan to deliver $50 million in direct assistance to cover the PA’s general budget shortfalls just three weeks before the Palestinians are planning to short-circuit the peace process by forcing a vote for statehood at the United Nations.

Though the timing certainly is curious, such a move actually fits recent a recent pattern. Since the death of Yasser Arafat, one of the staunchest defenders of continued U.S. support for the PA has been the Jewish state. While the logic is clear that the PA is a lesser evil than its rival Hamas, a designated terrorist organization, Israel’s steadfast backing has enabled the PA to receive billions of dollars in recent years without addressing rampant corruption or ending its widespread incitement against Israel.

With the Palestinians reportedly poised to force a vote for statehood at the U.N. Security Council next week that would embarrass the United States and be seen as a direct assault on Israel, the PA’s smooth sailing in Washington could soon end abruptly. Its standing in Washington already has been tenuous because Congress this year finally has made the ongoing Palestinian incitement against Israel a priority.

Several delegations comprising roughly one-fifth of Congress visited the Middle East during the August recess, and each group delivered a unified message to Palestinian leaders that pursuing the U.N. statehood vote, the first round of which is now scheduled for Sept. 23, would seriously damage relations and could result in a cutoff of aid. Obama administration officials have delivered similar messages in recent weeks.

Yet even with the PA’s unyielding position that it will force a vote at the U.N., President Obama on Aug. 30 quietly signed the presidential waiver required to release money directly to the PA. Though signing the waiver has been routine going back to the George W. Bush administration, the lack of public congressional outrage has not been routine.

This year, top House members on the foreign-aid spending panel, Rep. Kay Granger, Texas Republican, and Rep. Nita M. Lowey, New York Democrat, did not even issue a press release. Even with the United States mired in record deficits and politicians scouring for spending cuts, the U.S. giving $50 million to cover the PA’s general budget shortfalls attracted barely any media attention.

What should have garnered media scrutiny is not just the expenditure of the $50 million, but how the Palestinians will spend it. Although U.S. taxpayer funds do not officially cover Palestinian broadcasting – and officially cannot – the fungible nature of money means that U.S. taxpayers indirectly make possible rabid and unrelenting Palestinian incitement against Israel.

Mr. Obama moved to deliver $50 million directly to the PA on the heels of a month in which the Palestinians have not only advanced their push for a U.N. vote but have continued their ugly history of incitement against the Jewish state.

Consider that PA TV, the PA’s official television station, last month broadcast from the home of the planner of the infamous 2001 Sbarro Pizza suicide bombing, expressing a desire for freedom for the terrorist, who is serving a life sentence. During the show, according to a translation provided by Palestinian Media Watch (PMW), “best wishes of loyalty” and “freedom” also were sent to the woman who drove the suicide bomber to the location.

PA TV, according to PMW, also has repeatedly broadcast a program glorifying the Palestinian terrorists behind the deadliest terror attack in Israeli history, a 1978 bus hijacking that resulted in the murder of 37 Israeli citizens.

A little more than a week before Mr. Obama signed the waiver to fund the PA, the official PA newspaper Al-Hayat Al-Jadida ran a cartoon suggesting that “Palestine” should replace all of Israel, according to a PMW report.

No wonder many observers are concerned that the U.N. vote next week could help usher in a new wave of violence, perhaps even a third intifada. Two recent, successful terrorist attacks only add to those fears.

Mass protests scheduled for next week, on the eve of the U.N. vote, could be transformed easily into violent clashes, perhaps even directed against the PA. Palestinian officials are worried privately, for example, about unrest already building on the streets of Jenin, and they are not confident that they can maintain control of the situation.

In other words, the U.N. vote next week could have two major ramifications at once: (1) destabilizing the political situation in the Palestinian territories with a new round of violence and (2) eviscerating the support the PA would need from Israel and the United States to maintain its tenuous hold on power.

So, should the PA persist in forcing the U.N. vote next week, which seems almost certain now that the Arab nations have come out publicly in favor, it could mark a Pyrrhic Palestinian victory, undermining not just Israel and the United States, but the PA itself.

In September 1978, Anwar Sadat and Menachim Begin signed the Camp David Accords, following four Arab-Israeli wars in which Egypt had provided the overwhelming military force that threatened the existence of Israel.

The Egyptian Parliament and the Israeli Knesset overwhelmingly approved the agreement, which called for honoring all aspects of United Nations Security Council Resolution 242. One of its key provisions was the “inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security.” The accords called for the withdrawal of Israeli military and political forces from the occupied territories and the granting of “full autonomy” to the Palestinians.

Six months later, a peace treaty between the two nations was adopted, which provided for Israeli withdrawal from the Egyptian Sinai, Israel’s use of the Suez Canal and full diplomatic relations.

Since then, the terms of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel have prevailed, but the key provisions of the Camp David Accords have been ignored. Following the death of Sadat, President Hosni Mubarak did not press for Palestinian rights, though most of the Egyptian people have continued to insist that Israel honor these commitments. The primary subject of concern is the continued occupation by Israel of the West Bank and East Jerusalem and the building of Israeli settlements on confiscated Palestinian land.

President Barack Obama acknowledged the centrality of this issue in a major speech in Cairo in March 2009, when he called for a freeze on all settlement activity. Later, in May 2009, President Obama declared that the prevailing borders before the 1967 Arab-Israeli war — adjusted to account for some Israeli settlements near Jerusalem — should be the basis of a peace agreement.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has rejected both proposals, continued building settlements, and raised unacceptable new demands for a permanent military presence in the Jordan River valley and recognition of Israel as a “Jewish state” (about 25 percent of Israeli citizens are non-Jewish).

The U.S. has basically withdrawn from active participation in the peace process. The Palestinians and other Arabs have interpreted U.S. policy as acquiescing on the occupation and biased against them.

Declaring that they are left with no alternative, Palestinians plan to request recognition of a Palestinian state later this month in the U.N. Security Council and General Assembly. In Egypt, militants have overrun the Israeli embassy and forced the evacuation of the ambassador.

With the reasonable assumptions that Palestinian statehood is widely recognized despite a U.S. veto in the Security Council, what are the options for the future?

With leadership from Europe, there will be an opportunity for the United States and other members of the International Quartet (Russia, the European Union and the United Nations) to put forward a comprehensive peace proposal based on the fully compatible U.S. official policy, previous U.N. resolutions and the Quartet’s previous demands. There is little doubt that the Arab Peace Proposal could be modified to comply.

This can be followed by the full engagement of the United States and/or the United Nations in a mediation effort with direct or indirect talks — whichever is more effective — between Israel and the Palestinians. Subsequently, the same approach can be taken to resolve the issue of the Golan Heights with Syria.

The Palestinians will have to refrain from violence, accept Israel’s right to exist in peace within the 1967 borders (modified through negotiations with land swaps), a long-term presence of either U.N. or NATO peacekeeping forces within Palestine, and the right of return of its people to its own lands (with perhaps a token number to Israel). Israelis would, in the process, accept the same borders and peacekeeping presence.

The result can lead to peace for Israel and all its neighbors. The United States would regain its leadership role in the region, based on its commitment to freedom, democracy and justice, and a major cause of widespread animosity toward America within the Arab world would be eliminated.

The alternative to this new international effort will be an expansion of hopelessness, animosity, and probable violence.

Por supuesto, Libia ha representado un duro reto para la OTAN, que hoy puede presentarlo como positivo. No fue fácil el comienzo de la misión, con un Obama que mandaba señales contradictorias. Tampoco lo había sido consensuar una legitimadora resolución del Consejo de Seguridad -la 1973-, que salió con más abstenciones de las deseables y a la que hoy claman por sustituir no pocas cancillerías, entre ellas la española. Costó tanto conseguirla que hay miedo a su actualización.

Solo una enérgica diplomacia francesa y el apoyo británico consiguieron involucrar a la Alianza Atlántica, demasiado acostumbrada al liderazgo norteamericano en la toma de sus decisiones.

En resumen, misión peculiar sin antecedentes. Por primera vez, los mandos militares no dependían de su habitual mando político, el Consejo Atlántico, sino de un grupo de contacto que en su última reunión de Estambul agrupaba a 29 países, no todos de la Alianza, y a siete organizaciones internacionales.

La lectura actual de la Carta Atlántica, de la propia de Naciones Unidas, de los estatutos de la Corte Internacional de Justicia y de la resolución 1973 lleva a dudar de todo, admitiendo las especialísimas condiciones de realpolitik que concurren en Libia.

La resolución 1973 trata de un pueblo libio, cuando todos sabíamos que había dos; excluye claramente las «tropas de ocupación», cuando el propio ministro de Defensa británico, Liam Fox, dijo que prestaban «servicios de inteligencia y herramientas de reconocimiento», y la CNN norteamericana aseguraba que fuerzas especiales de Reino Unido, Francia, Jordania y Catar operaban en la zona. The Daily Telegraph lo remató: Fuerzas especiales SAS operan en Libia con un papel decisivo. La OTAN se vio obligada el pasado 25 de agosto a negarlo en boca de su portavoz, Oana Lungescu: «La Alianza no persigue a ningún individuo especifico»; «la Alianza no puede tomar partido»; «ha habido una mala interpretación de las palabras de Fox, involucrando a la OTAN». Para complicarlo más, Londres puntualizó: «Este departamento , refiriéndose al War Office, nunca se pronuncia sobre las operaciones de sus fuerzas especiales».

No hay que ser Napoleón para estar convencido de que los éxitos de los rebeldes tienen mucho que ver con las ayudas en material de transmisiones -EEUU reconoce que mandó 20 millones de dólares en equipos de comunicación-, con el armamento entregado -Francia lo lanzó en paracaídas en las montañas occidentales de Nafusa y Catar, por vía marítima, lo introdujo por Bengasi-, pero, sobre todo, con los comandos de operaciones especiales que dirigen en primera línea el fuego a los aviones de la Alianza sobre objetivos tácticos bien determinados.

Alguien ha puesto orden en las diseminadas y tribales unidades; alguien ha pagado salarios; alguien ha seguido minuto a minuto la evolución de los acontecimientos desde Awacs o desde satélites reorientados especialmente sobre suelo libio.

Hoy no sabemos más. El difícil reto está asumido y hoy por hoy casi resuelto. La Alianza no podía permitirse otra alternativa.

NATO’s military intervention in Libya was initiated under the principle of the “responsibility to protect,” a concept born from the ashes of the Rwandan genocide: that the world should not stand by while mass atrocities go on within a sovereign state.

Though morally self-evident, this concept was slow to gain acceptance in the international community, particularly among developing countries, many of which saw it as a ploy by Western powers to meddle in the internal affairs of weaker countries.

After much lobbying, the principle was finally enshrined by the 2005 World Summit and successfully used to resolve dangerous crises in Kenya and Guinea. But never, until Libya, had its most controversial aspect — the use of force as a last resort — been put to the test.

In the eyes of many countries, NATO has failed that test.

In March, as Moammar Kadafi prepared to crush the rebel stronghold of Benghazi, the U.N. Security Council authorized military action in Libya. But it made clear that the point of the action was to protect the Libyan people.

Many countries that opposed the Security Council’s action, and even at least one that supported it, now believe the Western operation has gone far beyond merely protecting Libyans, and it is now widely seen as an action intended from the start to get rid of the Libyan ruler.

However unpopular Kadafi might be, the idea that NATO’s warplanes were trying to kill him has struck a nerve among countries allergic to regime change and already suspicious of the responsibility-to-protect concept, known in diplomatic circles as R2P.

“Libya has given R2P a bad name,” India’s U.N. ambassador, Hardeep Singh Puri, said recently. Diplomats from South Africa, which unlike India supported U.N. Resolution 1973, have expressed similar concerns, saying they feel used and are indignant that the West ignored calls by the African Union for a cease-fire.

One could argue that when a leader is bent on committing mass atrocities against his population, the only effective way to protect civilians is to bring down the tyrant. Yet no NATO state has made this case openly; instead its members have gone to great lengths to assert their neutrality.

The Libya operation has strengthened the case of those questioning the concept that the world has a responsibility to protect citizens from their rulers, and the backlash is already contributing to tragic consequences.

In Syria, where security forces have killed more than 2,000 protesters and arbitrarily arrested and tortured thousands, including children, people are clearly in need of protection. If the Security Council were to take its responsibility to protect seriously, it would have long ago used the many nonmilitary tools at its disposal to put pressure on Bashar Assad’s regime. It could have passed a resolution demanding an end to the violence, the creation of a commission of inquiry, an arms embargo or an array of sanctions targeting the leadership of the government or the oil sector.

There are many reasons for this disturbing failure to act: the opposition of veto-wielding Russia and China, the silence of the Arab League, the presence in the Security Council of Lebanon, which is a virtual hostage of Syria. But a crucial factor against action has been that key votes in the council — India, South Africa and Brazil — are missing. Behind closed doors, their diplomats have explained that they are reluctant to go down the Libya road again. Of course, nothing in a draft resolution initially offered by the Europeans even hinted at military action or regime change. But for India, South Africa and Brazil, it’s payback time. The Syrian people are paying the price for what some countries see as NATO’s overreaching in Libya.

So here we are, once again, with the Security Council standing virtually idle while mass atrocities are being committed, the very situation the responsibility-to-protect concept was designed to avoid.

We will never know how many civilian lives would have been lost had NATO not intervened in Libya. What we do know is what happens when the international community takes a back seat in the face of mass atrocities. Up to 40,000 civilians, for example, were killed during the final months of war in Sri Lanka, while the best the Security Council could muster was holding an informal hand-wringing session in a U.N. basement, because of Russian and Chinese obstructionism, with too little protest from Western powers.

Countries that waged war in Libya under the banner of the responsibility to protect have a duty to explain themselves and accept a sober and critical look at their actions. They should not be seen as brandishing responsibility-to-protect when it’s politically expedient and ignoring it when it’s not. They should address the complaints of countries that genuinely supported action to protect civilians but felt alienated by the way military operations were conducted. It’s the only way to ensure that Libya’s legacy brings us closer to a world that does not tolerate mass atrocities ever again.

La reciente visita al Departamento de Estado de los Estados Unidos de Dmitri Rogozin, enviado especial del Presidente de Rusia para la cooperación con la OTAN en materia de defensa antimisiles, pone de relieve uno de los numerosos obstáculos para la cooperación ruso-estadounidense en materia de defensa antimisiles balísticos (DAB). Los ministros de Asuntos Exteriores y de Defensa de Rusia han afirmado la primacía del diálogo con los EE.UU., pero con perspectivas y prioridades diversas. Los diplomáticos de Rusia han adoptado en general, pero no siempre, una postura más dura, mientras que Rogozin ha estado impulsando un programa propio en materia de DAB.

Otra complicación es la incertidumbre sobre quién gobernará en Rusia. Dadas las diferentes opiniones del Presidente Dmitri Medvedev y el ex Presidente y actual Primer Ministro Vladimir Putin, candidatos principales a las elecciones presidenciales del año próximo, muchos burócratas rusos prefieren no ofrecer iniciativas audaces en materia de DAB y otras cuestiones relativas al control de las armas estratégicas hasta saber quién será el próximo presidente. Medvedev parece menos temeroso de la OTAN que su semiparanoide predecesor, pero Putin ha dado muestras en el pasado de una flexibilidad sorprendente en relación con algunas cuestiones estratégicas.

Las evaluaciones conjuntas sobre las amenazas en materia de misiles que el Gobierno de Rusia llevó a cabo recientemente con la OTAN y los EE.UU. revelaron muchas coincidencias entre los expertos técnicos participantes, pero algunas diferencias fundamentales entre los estrategas encargados de la formulación de políticas. Por ejemplo, mientras que los representantes occidentales ven en general en el Irán una amenaza cada vez mayor, muchos rusos siguen insistiendo en que el régimen iraní no ha dejado de ser una amenaza de proliferación que se puede abordar por medios diferentes de la DAB, como, por ejemplo, la diplomacia y las sanciones internacionales limitadas.

De forma más general y por razones de orgullo e historia, muchos rusos se niegan a creer que las autoridades de los EE.UU. hayan llegado a sentirse más preocupadas por el mínimo potencial estratégico del Irán que por las sólidas fuerzas nucleares de Rusia. Así, pues, suponen que, pese a las manifestaciones americanas en sentido contrario, los EE.UU. pretenden conseguir capacidades en materia de DAB que puedan anular los medios de disuasión estratégica de Rusia bajo la apariencia de proteger a su país y a sus aliados contra el Irán.

En las negociaciones bilaterales con Moscú, los funcionarios de los EE.UU. han estado ofreciendo cuatro proyectos concretos de colaboración en materia de DAB:

• centros binacionales y multinacionales dirigidos conjuntamente en los que el personal ruso pueda ver el carácter no amenazante de las actividades de defensa antimisiles de los EE.UU. y la OTAN;

• estudios conjuntos de expertos rusos y estadounidenses sobre cómo podría afectar la DAB a la capacidad nuclear disuasoria de Rusia y qué medidas se pueden adoptar para reducir al mínimo cualesquiera problemas que pudieran surgir;

• ejercicios más amplios de la OTAN y Rusia con DAB en el campo de operaciones que partan de la colaboración anterior, interrumpida por la guerra de Rusia con Georgia en agosto de 2008, y en los que se ensayen las formas como las fuerzas desplegadas por la OTAN y Rusia pueden defenderse conjuntamente contra las amenazas con misiles; y

• un marco jurídico subyacente para apoyar esos y otros proyectos de cooperación.

Los funcionarios rusos han expresado cierto interés en dichos proyectos (algunos de los cuales fueron propuestos originalmente por el Kremlin), pero han insistido en la consecución de un consenso previo con los EE.UU. sobre los principios estratégicos subyacentes. Ante todo, quieren que este último país firme un acuerdo jurídicamente vinculante en el que se declare que su DAB nunca será una amenaza para la capacidad nuclear disuasoria de Rusia.

Los funcionarios americanos subrayan que no intentarán anular la capacidad estratégica disuasoria de Rusia, intento imposible, dados el tamaño y la complejidad de las fuerzas nucleares ofensivas de Rusia, pero el gobierno de Obama no puede firmar un acuerdo en el que declare que limitará deliberadamente la capacidad de los Estados Unidos para protegerse a sí mismos y a sus aliados de los ataques extranjeros con misiles.

Aparte de esos debates concretos sobre la DAB, las medidas de control de las armas adoptadas por los EE.UU. junto con Rusia se centran actualmente en las conversaciones sobre estabilidad estratégica y otros diálogos destinados a establecer un fundamento conceptual favorable para la próxima ronda de negociaciones oficiales sobre el control de las armas. En dichas conversaciones se podrían abordar muchas de las cuestiones dejadas de lado con las prisas por concluir el nuevo Tratado START. Además de la defensa antimisiles, otros temas podrían ser las armas nucleares no estratégicas (tácticas), las cabezas nucleares de reserva que se han retirado de los arsenales operacionales, pero aún no se han destruido, y la colocación de municiones tradicionales en los sistemas vectores estratégicos, como, por ejemplo, los misiles balísticos de gran alcance, que normalmente se utilizan para transportar cabezas nucleares.

Esas conversaciones se están celebrando bilateralmente, entre Rusia y los EE.UU., y multilateralmente, en el marco de las llamadas conversaciones P-5, en las que participan los cinco miembros permanentes del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas, los únicos países a los que el Tratado sobre la no proliferación de las armas nucleares permite legalmente mantener armas nucleares en espera del desarme universal.

En los diálogos recientes entre los EE.UU. y Rusia se han abordado formas de pasar de un mundo caracterizado por la destrucción mutua asegurada a otro basado en la estabilidad mutua asegurada, pero han topado con dificultades. Sólo un pequeño grupo de especialistas rusos, principalmente expertos no gubernamentales, adoptan y emplean los conceptos estratégicos de los EE.UU. Muchos rusos siguen empleando conceptos negativos y anticuados de la época de la Guerra Fría al examinar las relaciones nucleares entre Rusia y los EE.UU.

Pese a esos problemas, se pueden abordar algunas de las preocupaciones de Rusia relativas a la DAB mediante iniciativas sobre transparencia y creación de confianza mutuamente acordadas. Aunque limitar los programas futuros de DAB de los EE.UU. con acuerdos jurídicamente vinculantes es políticamente imposible, los funcionarios de este último país podrían informar sin demasiada dificultad a sus homólogos rusos sobre sus planes en materia de DAB a largo plazo.

El Departamento de Defensa de los EE.UU. incluye siempre esos datos en sus documentos de presupuestos y planificación. También se cuenta con apoyo para la creación de centros dirigidos conjuntamente, visitas de los expertos rusos a las instalaciones de DAB de la OTAN e intercambio de información de alerta temprana procedentes de los radares rusos y de la OTAN sobre posibles lanzamientos de misiles.

Una señal esperanzadora es la de que los funcionarios rusos han reconocido recientemente el carácter impráctico del plan sectorial de DAB que Medvedev propuso en la cumbre del Consejo OTAN-Rusia celebrada el pasado mes de noviembre. El objetivo era el de que Rusia protegiera a la OTAN contra misiles atacantes que pasaran por encima de su territorio, con la esperanza de que entonces la Alianza renunciase a crear defensas con capacidad para interceptar misiles por encima de Rusia. Los funcionarios de la OTAN argumentaron convincentemente que no su organización no podía delegar su compromiso de defensa mutua en un país que no fuera miembro de ella. Otro problema de carácter práctico es el de que Rusia carece de capacidad pare destruir misiles balísticos que viajen por el espacio.

Los funcionarios rusos deben retirar su petición, políticamente imposible, de que se apliquen limitaciones jurídicamente vinculantes a la DAB de los EE.UU. En su lugar, deben examinar la posibilidad de cooperar en proyectos concretos de DAB. Mejor aún: deben reorientar sus medidas cooperativas para abordar cuestiones menos problemáticas, pero importantes, como, por ejemplo, la consecución de la estabilidad en el Afganistán después de la retirada militar de la OTAN. En ese caso, podría resultar más fácil una colaboración productiva sobre otras cuestiones.

Has the Atlantic alliance outlived its usefulness? The British journalist and historian Geoffrey Wheatcroft raised that question in an opinion article on June 16, commenting on a speech by Robert Gates in which the outgoing U.S. defense secretary accused other members of the Atlantic alliance of not pulling their weight. Stanley R. Sloan joins the discussion. See also.

Several weeks ago I warned parti-cipants in a NATO-sponsored conference on future deterrence strategy that NATO would come under renewed fire from the western side of the Atlantic. I suggested that the international experts and officials present ask themselves: “Can the American people be convinced that NATO deterrence strategy is intended to serve American interests, not just to protect those ‘damned Europeans’?”

The speech by U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates opened the floodgates to a torrent of predictions about the demise of the alliance. Gates was widely reported as having predicted such an outcome. In fact he did not. Rather, he warned that if Europeans did not improve their contributions, the alliance’s future could be in doubt. The warning was appropriate, but much of the post-speech speculation has been shortsighted.

NATO’s critics complain that because Europe as a whole has more people and a comparable G.D.P. to that of the United States, it should be able to produce much more than the currently modest military effort. But statistics alone do not tell the whole story.

First, “Europe” does not exist; it is not a sovereign state able to call on the resources of the entire entity to support a role as a global power. In spite of claims by some in Europe and wishful thinking by some in the United States — reflected, for example, in Sarwar A. Kashmeri’s comments in “NATO’s surreal world” (Counterpoint, June 23) — “Europe” is not likely to develop a unified defense and foreign policy until E.U. members decide to form a full political union, something unlikely to happen anytime soon.

If we add to this reality the fact that we Americans spent decades after World War II convincing the Germans that they should never again use their power aggressively, it becomes easier to understand Germany’s self-imposed limits. It is fortunate that Germany now spends more time and money on force projection rather than border defense (as well as helping rescue the Greeks and other debt-stricken E.U. members).

Moreover, how could Washington expect the Europeans to have been enthusiastic contributors in Afghanistan after first saying that America didn’t need their help and then giving second-class status to our effort there while we focused on Iraq. Now, the Europeans are showing the same impatience with the continued U.S. commitment in Afghanistan that we see in the United States.

This is not to say that we shouldn’t continue to press European governments to do more. But it is unrealistic to simply add up European resources and say that they should produce defense efforts like a global power.

The American response to the Gates speech has been impressive, across the political spectrum. Everyone knows that the alliance is by no means a perfect arrangement. And free-riding is an unfortunate but unavoidable consequence of cooperation between large and smaller powers.

Yet in spite of all the criticism there has been a notable shortage of credible proposals for U.S. strategic options other than remaining in close cooperation with our European allies. The United States and its allies certainly need to strengthen the alliance. One way to do so would be to put more emphasis on cooperation in nonmilitary responses to security challenges while encouraging the Europeans to take their military commitments more seriously.

But if the United States tries shock therapy, as some advocates suggest, it might not get the hoped-for results. Individual NATO members might opt to make their own deals — some with other E.U. members, some with the United States, some with Russia, etc.

Indeed, a united Europe might emerge, designed to compete against rather than cooperate with the United States. There are enough uncertainties to suggest that America would be better off trying to improve and strengthen the alliance than dump or devalue it.

When searching for alternatives to NATO, it is advisable to take a look around the world and ask what other countries would be as willing and able as the European members of NATO to contribute to international security in alliance with the United States. We face security challenges in Asia, but there is virtually no potential for an organized alliance there to help us deal with them.

Before consigning NATO to the scrap heap of history, we Americans should ask what we would put in its place and whether it would serve U.S. interests as well. Meanwhile, our European allies need to ask themselves if they want to encourage continued U.S. support for the alliance, and, if so, what they are prepared to do to earn it.

As the United Nations wrapped up its recent climate conference in Bonn, talks organizer Christiana Figueres proclaimed that climate change is the “the most important negotiation the world has ever faced.” Faced with real problems – financial meltdowns, unemployment, war and genuine human suffering – the world no longer agrees.

It’s a good thing human productivity doesn’t threaten the global thermostat the way the U.N. would have us believe. If it did, we’d be cooked. Countries rich and poor are backing away from commitments they made years ago during rosier economic times, before the public became aware of Climategate, renewable energy costs and genuine debate.

The Kyoto Protocol, the only binding international agreement signed since the global warming scare began, expires after 2012. Canada, Russia and Japan have declared they will not renew; China and the United States never signed it, and the U.S. has made it plain it is not about to. And poor countries are becoming less enamored about signing on, as they realize hard economic times mean there will be little climate “mitigation” and “restitution” money coming their way from (formerly) rich countries.

Even die-hard warmists increasingly recognize that bureaucratic solutions hatched at these conferences are rife with waste, fraud and abuse. They may enrich a few, but they are powerless to control Earth’s climate.

In March, German investigators reported that 850 million euros disappeared when shady companies swarmed into carbon trading, emissions and energy businesses.Criminal enterprises raked in tens of millions, fended off regulators with delaying tactics and then announced bankruptcy or vanished. An Italian sting operation resulted in arrests of wind-farm developers who billed the country for subsidies but never produced a kilowatt of electricity.

London’s liberal Guardian newspaper was aghast to learn that the World Bank’s Biocarbon Fund had arranged to pay European “entrepreneurs” $1 million to establish a system under which 60,000 Kenyans would restrict themselves to farming under rigidly controlled, inefficient, “sustainable” techniques. For that they will receive $1.4 million over 20 years.

That’s right, the beneficent World Bank will enrich more Europeans so 60,000 Kenyans can receive $23.83 apiece for 20 years of drudgery, poverty and misery – a princely $1.19 a year.

Even the European Union finally understands how little bureaucracy and energy deprivation dictates the climate. “It is not enough for the EU to simply sign up for another commitment period,” EU climate representative Jurgen Lefevere admitted. “We only represent 11 percent of global emissions.”

Burning fossil fuels contributes only a fraction of total annual atmospheric carbon dioxide buildup, and the EU contributes just 11 percent of that. The EU’s commitment to slashing CO2 emissions by 20 percent invites corruption, has no control over Chinese or Indian emissions and has no effect on the climate.

The biggest divide evident in Bonn was between the United States and large emerging economies. Even Obama administration officials who are thoroughly committed to man-made global warming catastrophe claims finally recognize the fraud problem. In Bonn, the U.S. insisted that all countries subject their emission reduction claims to verification.

However, China will accept only an agreement that lacks verification – and guarantees the right to cheat. Meanwhile, the Chinese are happy to be “the world’s leader” in manufacturing wind turbines – 95 percent – which they gladly sell to guilt-ridden Western countries.

China and other nations support the notion that prosperous countries owe the world restitution for the “sin” of engaging in the Industrial Revolution and becoming prosperous. We can only hope some nation’s representative will have the courage to remind China and its fellow climate travelers that the West never forced them to spend 50 years mired in communism, bureaucracy and stagnation.

While it is encouraging that the global warming camp no longer has things entirely its own way, celebration would be premature. For all the gnashing of teeth and complaining about corporate influence we hear from global warming bureaucrats and campaigners, the truth is that, today, the warmists are the establishment.

Billions are being redistributed to researchers, developing nations, carbon speculators, alternative energy investors and other carbon profiteers – who would like to turn billions into trillions. Pity the poor carbon traders whose markets expire with Kyoto. Not all have their villa in the sun yet.

But rest assured, they will do whatever is necessary to get theirs. Big Warming will not surrender its hold on Western taxpayers without a fight.

The warmist camp plans to retake the initiative at the December U.N. conference in Durban, South Africa. It intends to turn back the clock to the time when the media would attribute any weather or nature event to global warming, without question or critical examination. Al Gore’s recent RollingStone diatribe essentially calls on the media to censure climate disaster skeptics and adopt a one-sided man-made warming narrative.

The NewYorkTimes may go along, but the huge and growing alternative media will not. This week’s Heartland Institute international conference of climate-alarm skeptics in Washington will only reinforce the lack of evidence for man-made Armageddon, and the disastrous consequences of staying the current U.N. course.

Many believe the last-minute appearance by dozens of world leaders crippled the Copenhagen climate conference. But with the big names absent from Cancun, Mexico, and now Bonn, the U.N. wants them back.

Ms. Figueres capped the Bonn conference with a call for “high-level political attention.” If she succeeds, just imagine the mischief a gathering of heads of state, foreign ministers, bureaucrats, researchers, green campaigners and carbon profiteers can do at an African beach resort.

Then imagine how nearly impossible it will be to repair the harm they inflict. Action must be taken to avert such a result.

El mundo puede respirar mejor con la reelección este mes del Secretario General de las Naciones Unidas, Ban Ki-moon, para un segundo mandato en el cargo. En un mundo xxx la unidad mundial resulta particularmente vital. Durante los cinco últimos años, Ban Ki-moon ha encarnado esa unidad, tanto con su excepcional diplomacia personal como en su papel de jefe de esa indispensable organización mundial.

Conseguir la reelección para dirigir las NN.UU. no es asunto fácil. Como jefe de una organización de 192 Estados miembros, el Secretario General nota inevitablemente xxx de las divisiones mundiales. En relación con cualquier asunto, el Secretario General se encontrará casi con seguridad entre grupos de países enfrentados. Sin embargo, Ban ha inspirado confianza mundial en su dirección hasta el punto de lograr un segundo mandato indisputado y unánime.

El consenso a favor de la reelección de Ban resulta tanto más asombroso cuanto que forman parte de él los llamados P-5, los cinco miembros permanentes del Consejo de Seguridad de las NN.UU.: los Estados Unidos, el Reino Unido, China, Francia y Rusia. Esos cinco poderosos países deben su preeminencia en las NN.UU. xxx la segunda guerra mundial, cuando fueron aliados en la victoria. Conforme a la Carta de las NN.UU., los cinco deben apoyar la elección de todos los Secretarios Generales. Ban Ki-moon ha conservado el firme respaldo de los cinco miembros permanentes,

Yo tengo el honor de prestar servicio como Asesor Especial del Secretario General sobre los Objetivos de Desarrollo del Milenio. Como tal, veo al Secretario General en acción en todas las partes del mundo. Es una experiencia grata, que me infunde una gran esperanza en un éxito final en la resolución de problemas mundiales como, por ejemplo, la pobreza, las amenazas medioambientales y los conflictos violentos.

Los numerosos problemas del mundo llegan hasta el despacho del Secretario General día y noche. Ya se trate de guerra y paz, revoluciones y golpes de Estado, desastres naturales, epidemias, elecciones discutidas o los insufribles problemas  del hambre, la pobreza, el cambio climático y las migraciones en masa, las crisis inevitablemente requieren la atención del Secretario General. Es una cantidad de trabajo inconcebible y requiere el compromiso del Secretario General y su equipo durante las 24 horas del día.

Durante un reciente viaje con Ban a Egipto y Túnez, lo contemplé, impresionado, respaldar con destreza los cambios democráticos que están en marcha en esos dos países, al tiempo que abordaba muchos otros levantamientos habidos en la región. Ban ofreció su apoyo generoso y estimulante a los valientes dirigentes juveniles de los dos países que están en la vanguardia de los cambios políticos puestos en marcha este año.

Desde sus primeros días en el cargo, Ban insistió en que muchos de los mayores problemas –o la mayoría de ellos– se reducen a una realidad simple, pero brutal: ahora somos una sociedad mundial, interconectada y superpoblada, con siete mil millones de personas luchando para encontrar un punto de apoyo en un planeta muy vulnerable. Los imperativos de alimentar al mundo, mantenerlo a salvo de epidemias, como, por ejemplo, el paludismo y el SIDA, y combinar el progreso económico con la seguridad medioambiental local y mundial son los que caracterizan nuestro tiempo. Con frecuencia las causas subyacentes de la guerra y la violencia son el hambre, la pobreza y la degradación medioambiental, como, por ejemplo, el cambio climático inducido por el hombre.

En una palabra, estamos en una era mundial, que podemos denominar la “era del desarrollo sostenible”, en la que nuestra seguridad e incluso nuestra supervivencia dependerán de que el mundo entero forje un triple compromiso: acabar con la pobreza extrema, garantizar los derechos humanos a todos y proteger el medio ambiente natural contra las crisis, inducidas por el hombre, del cambio climático, la destrucción de la diversidad biológica y el agotamiento de las reservas de agua dulce y otro recursos vitales. Ban ha insistido incansablemente en la necesidad de colocar el desarrollo sostenible en el centro de nuestro pensamiento.

Los problemas de la pobreza, el agotamiento de los recursos, el cambio climático y los derechos humanos predominarán en el segundo mandato de Ban y en la labor de quienes lo sucedan como Secretario General. En 2012, los gobiernos del mundo se reunirán en Río de Janeiro, veinte años después de la histórica conferencia en la que firmaron el tratado amplio para luchar contra el cambio climático inducido por el hombre. Desde entonces se ha logrado demasiado poco y, entre bastidores, Ban trabaja incansablemente para deshacer los xxx y evitar el desastre climático.

Al comienzo del tercer milenio, el predecesor de Ban, Kofi Annan, reunió a los dirigentes del mundo para que aprobaran los objetivos de desarrollo del Milenio, con las ambiciosas metas que se debían alcanzar en la lucha contra la pobreza, el hambre y las enfermedades en 2015. Ban ha sido un adalid incansable de dichos objetivos y ha organizado viarias campañas muy creativas para aumentar el compromiso con ellos a escala mundial.

El año pasado, por ejemplo,  Ban lanzó una nueva y audaz iniciativa mundial, “Todas las madres, todos los hijos”, para mejorar la atención de salud de las madres y los hijos. Ha abanderado la lucha contra el VIH/SIDA, la tuberculosis y el paludismo y se ha ganado a muchos dirigentes y figuras públicas mundiales para la causa. Bajo la dirección de Ban, se están logrando avances notables, aunque, como ha subrayado, son posibles y necesarios unos avances más rápidos. En 2015, el Secretario General contribuirá a guiar el mundo hacia compromisos  aún más audaces en la lucha para acabar con la pobreza extrema y la privación en dos próximos decenios.

La historia de Ban se caracteriza por una gran satisfacción personal, que infunde esperanza a todos. Cuando Ban viaja a las regiones empobrecidas de África, se mezcla con los habitantes de las aldeas y cuenta que él mismo creció en la pobreza y la privación de la Corea del decenio de 1950 y que, comprometiéndose con el trabajo denodado, la educación, la ciencia moderna y los valores compartidos, Corea del Sur llegó a ser uno de los países más ricos y logrados del mundo.

El ascenso de Ban desde la pobreza a la dirección mundial es paralelo de la trayectoria de su país. Es una historia de decencia, compromiso y generosidad que le ha granjeado la confianza mundial y puede contribuir a guiar el mundo en un momento de riesgos sin precedentes y oportunidades excepcionales.

Las recientes predicciones del secretario de Defensa estadounidense, Robert Gates, de que el futuro de la OTAN es oscuro y sombrío han generado un amplio debate, pero que podría ser muy optimista. Resulta que junio marca otro hito en el camino incierto de la alianza: la duración de sus operaciones en Libia ya supera a la de las de Kosovo de hace doce años. En 1999, Slobodan Milosevic se rindió en Serbia después de 78 días, mientras que el general libio Muammar el-Kaddafi aún no entiende el mensaje – y de hecho tal vez lo esté malinterpretando.

Para los que participamos en las operaciones durante la crisis de Kosovo, la intervención en Libia parece un déjà vu. En los cielos de Serbia y Kosovo, los aviones de la OTAN atacaban objetivo tras objetivo pero no para contribuir a la liberación del territorio o como parte de una campaña de bombardeos estratégicos sino para hacer cambiar de postura a Milosevic. Sin duda, negar a Milosevic los medios para emprender una “limpieza étnica” fue otra razón que se sumó en los días posteriores al inicio de la campaña, pero el propósito verdadero era convencerlo de que tenía que dejar entrar a las fuerzas de la OTAN en Kosovo. Fue un clásico desajuste de la política y la estrategia.

No hay guerra que no tenga su lista de supuestos falsos, y la campaña de Kosovo tuvo los suyos. Tal vez el más importante fue la memorable – pero equívoca– creencia de que Milosevic se rendiría después de algunos días de bombardeos. En cambio, como muchos líderes en esas circunstancias, se encerró en un bunker, literal y figurativamente, y permaneció ahí con escasas comunicaciones. Mientras tanto, los estrategas de la OTAN buscaban afanosamente identificar objetivos que le negaran los medios de llevar a cabo una limpieza étnica o, más a menudo, que lo alentaran a reconsiderar su posición.

En la intervención hubo momentos malos, y tal vez ninguno peor que el bombardeo de la embajada china, que se identificó erróneamente como una instalación en la que había activos de seguridad serbios – instrumentos de represión contra Kosovo. También hubo momentos de gran preocupación sobre si los aliados estarían dispuestos a mantenerse firmes a medida que pasaban los días, las semanas y los meses sin un final a la vista. Sin duda quienes participan actualmente en Libia están sintiendo presiones similares.

En marzo de 1999, pocos líderes de la OTAN ponían en duda que expulsar a Milosevic de Kosovo por la fuerza era lo correcto. Tampoco había muchas dudas de que los líderes de Europa y los Estados Unidos habían hecho esfuerzos de buena fe para convencer a Milosevic con negociaciones y medios pacíficos. La guerra era el último recurso.

En efecto, en marzo de 1999 se consideró que la decisión de emprender la guerra era correcta porque se habían agotado todas las demás posibilidades. Con (demasiada) frecuencia se cita el aforismo del teórico militar prusiano del siglo XIX, Carl von Clausewitz, de que la guerra es la continuación de la política por otros medios. Pero en esos días decisivos se recordó otro pensamiento suyo, más pertinente: la guerra es un medio serio para lograr objetivos serios.

Ninguno de los participantes en las operaciones de Kosovo pensaba de modo distinto, y a nadie se le ocurría que la OTAN pudiera darse por vencida. Por eso la OTAN empezó a formar un grupo de tierra. A fin de cuentas las tropas de tierra resultaron innecesarias, pero el fracaso no era una opción que se pudiera considerar.

Tampoco puede serlo actualmente. En Libia también hay un desajuste de la política y la estrategia. La política es sacar a Kaddafi del poder. La estrategia –es decir, el mandato para el uso de los medios– es proteger a los civiles. Este último no garantiza el éxito de lo primero.

La brecha comienza a cerrarse a medida que la OTAN comienza a utilizar activos como los helicópteros de combate, enfocados de manera más directa y audaz al objetivo real de derrocar a Kaddafi. No obstante, se debe hacer mucho más para asegurar el éxito. Las quejas sobre la ineficacia de los rebeldes no ayudarán. La oposición Libia es lo que es.

Gates se ha centrado adecuadamente en la cuestión de la sostenibilidad financiera de la OTAN. Es fácil ver por qué planteó la cuestión, dado que los líderes militares europeos que participan en la operación hablan en público sobre las limitaciones de sus presupuestos. (Nota para los líderes militares europeos: por favor no le den a entender a Kaddafi que se les están acabando las bombas.)

Pero Gates señaló un punto mucho más grave: la falta de voluntad política. Algunos países que tienen recursos que se necesitan no los han facilitado y otros ni siquiera han dado apoyo político. La OTAN siempre ha funcionado con este enfoque a la carta. Lo nuevo es la posibilidad de que la OTAN fracase. Mientras se mantienen al margen, los guerreros reacios de la alianza deben considerar ese riesgo.

Estos son días difíciles para la OTAN, como ha señalado Gates, que está en el ocaso de su brillante ejercicio. Se tomó una decisión de intervenir militarmente en una situación que se puede decir que era de interés marginal, pero ahora los aliados deben comprender que están utilizando medios serios para lograr un objetivo serio. Todos los países que tomaron la decisión de intervenir en Libia, incluidos los Estados Unidos, deben conducirse con un renovado vigor y con la idea de que la OTAN —independientemente de sus deficiencias—debe triunfar.

L’agenda du G20 agricole révèle une situation dont la gravité est désormais reconnue par la communauté internationale, en même temps qu’il témoigne de la complexité des enjeux agricoles mondiaux. Je salue la décision du président Nicolas Sarkozy de faire de la volatilité des prix agricoles et de la sécurité alimentaire les priorités de la présidence française du G20.

Depuis l’initiative prise au cours du sommet du G8 de l’Aquila en 2009, une question fondamentale est posée à l’humanité : dans un contexte environnemental et financier contraints, comment nourrir neuf milliards d’hommes, de femmes et d’enfants ?

Certains, à la suite du sommet de Pittsburg, ont tenté d’apporter une réponse en créant le Global Agricultural and Food Security Programme (GAFSP) doté d’un milliard de dollars, et mis en œuvre par la Banque mondiale. De son côté, l’Union européenne a mis en œuvre une initiative représentant un milliard d’euros.

Pourtant, aujourd’hui encore, alors que le monde produit assez d’aliments pour nourrir la population mondiale, plus d’un milliard de personnes continuent à avoir faim chaque année. Si les initiatives sont nombreuses, il semblerait que les divergences de vues, l’incapacité à s’entendre sur les remèdes à apporter, nuisent à l’efficacité de notre action. En témoignent les difficultés éprouvées à enrayer les récentes émeutes de la faim. Il ne s’agit donc pas seulement d’un problème technique mais aussi et surtout d’un problème politique.

Se donner les moyens de nourrir le monde, c’est là le sens même de la création de l’Organisation des Nations unies pour l’alimentation et l’agriculture (FAO). Les fondateurs de l’organisation se sont appuyés sur un constat simple : les hommes n’arriveront pas à se nourrir si l’agriculture mondiale n’est pas organisée.

Il n’y a évidemment pas de solution unique et univoque à un enjeu si complexe que l’agriculture dans le monde. Il s’agit à la fois de résoudre les causes concrètes et locales de la faim (les leaders africains ont montré l’exemple en décidant à Maputo en 2003 de consacrer au moins 10 % de leurs budgets nationaux à l’agriculture, la recherche, le développement et l’innovation, tout en garantissant aux citoyens l’accès à la nourriture produite), comme de s’attacher au fonctionnement des puissantes multinationales, afin de les ramener à leur objectif initial mais trop souvent oublié : nourrir la planète.

Le G20 consacré à l’agriculture jouera pleinement son rôle de gouvernance mondiale, en fixant les priorités et les feuilles de route pour les dix années à venir. C’est en effet sur le long terme que pourra être bâtie une gouvernance cohérente, respectueuse, porteuse d’emplois, accompagnant un développement efficace de l’agriculture.

A ce titre, je trouve le thème choisi par le G20 particulièrement pertinent. En effet, la volatilité des prix revêt assez bien les différentes facettes du problème : il s’agit d’un problème d’ordre financier (les marchés doivent être mieux régulés afin d’éviter les distorsions), auquel il faut inclure les paramètres d’analyse d’un cadre plus global. La volatilité est à la fois contingente de la production (produit-on et produira-t-on assez et dans quel but ?) et de l’organisation des territoires (quelles infrastructures pour exporter les productions et quelle organisation pour le monde agricole ?).

Les documents de préparation du G20 montrent qu’aucun aspect ne sera évité. Améliorer la transparence sur les stocks, développer des mesures d’urgence pour faire face aux fluctuations extrêmes (mécanismes de réponse rapide, augmentation des réserves alimentaires d’urgence), mettre l’accent sur les besoins des petits agriculteurs (principaux fournisseurs des citoyens les plus vulnérables), aller vers une meilleure utilisation du progrès scientifique : telles sont les propositions qui devront êtes négociées les 22 et 23 juin lorsque les ministres de l’agriculture du G20 se réuniront à Paris.

Reste à savoir ce que nous saurons et pourrons faire des conclusions du G20. L’objectif principal est de redonner à l’agriculture sa mission essentielle et vitale : libérer l’humanité de la faim. C’est au cœur de la réorganisation du secteur de l’agriculture, sans laquelle les améliorations ne se feront qu’à la marge : la spéculation sur les produits agricoles continuera et la volatilité ne sera réduite qu’à court terme.

Il faudra bien sûr restructurer les moyens afin de prendre en compte les missions renouvelées de la FAO, mais aussi faire preuve de créativité en matière de financement. Je réfléchis d’ores et déjà à des sources de financement alternatives et innovantes qui permettraient, comme Unitaid l’a permis pour le HIV-sida, la tuberculose, et la malaria, de concentrer les masses critiques indispensables à notre action.

Sur la base des diagnostics élaborés par les équipes de la FAO, des priorités clairement assumées et présentes dans la feuille de route du G20, je souhaiterais établir une nouvelle méthode de travail. Si je suis élu directeur général de la FAO lors des élections qui auront lieu le 26 juin, j’entends construire mon action en étroite coordination avec le Fonds international de développement agricole (FIDA) et le Programme alimentaire mondial (PAM). Cela implique de renouveler le pacte centenaire qui unit la FAO et les scientifiques, de renforcer les relations entre les grands groupes agro-alimentaires, les coopératives paysannes des pays les plus pauvres, les gouvernements des pays donateurs et récipiendaires, et les institutions multilatérales. L’interdépendance des acteurs est essentielle pour permettre à la FAO de jouer son rôle de tour de contrôle de l’alimentation et de la sécurité alimentaire dans le monde.

La faim et ses corollaires que sont la sous-alimentation, la dénutrition ou les carences alimentaires, peuvent être assimilés à la peste de notre temps mais nous en connaissons les remèdes : une alimentation saine et diversifiée, sans risque de pénurie ou déni d’accès.

Mon défi sera de renouveler les termes du mandat de la FAO, la motivation de son personnel, en faire l’institution qui saura rayer le spectre de la faim de nos peurs collectives. Je suis convaincu que l’organisation sortira renforcée de la prochaine élection et jouera un rôle majeur pour mettre l’alimentation et l’agriculture au cœur de la gouvernance mondiale.

Tema: La OTAN ha mantenido relaciones con varios países árabes dentro del marco del Diálogo Mediterráneo y de la Iniciativa de Cooperación de Estambul que ahora debe revisar tras las crisis de los últimos meses en muchos de esos países y después de la intervención militar de la OTAN en Libia.

Resumen: El Diálogo Mediterráneo y la Iniciativa de Cooperación de Estambul son la muestra más palpable de la preocupación de la Alianza por proyectar estabilidad en dos regiones de excepcional importancia estratégica: el Mediterráneo y la región del Golfo Pérsico. La cooperación tuvo comienzos difíciles y el progreso no ha sido fácil, pero ahora, tras los cambios que se están produciendo en los países árabes, la OTAN deberá replantearse la relación con nuevos interlocutores y en un contexto político diferente. Este ARI estudia los orígenes y el desarrollo de las iniciativas de cooperación en vigor, el impacto de las operaciones aliadas en Libia y la necesidad de que la OTAN preste más atención al Mediterráneo y al Golfo que lo que tenía previsto en su último Concepto Estratégico, así como cambiar un enfoque de la cooperación orientado a la estabilidad a uno que ayude a consolidar los cambios democráticos que se esperan.

Análisis: El Diálogo Mediterráneo hay que contemplarlo en el marco de la iniciativas de cooperación que lanzó la Alianza Atlántica poco después de terminada la Guerra Fría. El Consejo del Atlántico Norte siguió con especial atención la evolución de la situación en los países del centro y este de Europa y puso en marcha una intensa actividad diplomática y de intercambios para fomentar la cooperación de los miembros de la OTAN con los antiguos adversarios de la Organización del Pacto de Varsovia.[1] El 10 de enero de 1994, durante una cumbre en Bruselas, se creó la Asociación para la Paz para avanzar en la cooperación bilateral entre la OTAN y cada uno de los países socios. En la Declaración de esa cumbre se reconocía que la seguridad aliada estaba ligada íntimamente con la seguridad de sus vecinos y, por eso, el Consejo Atlántico del 1 de diciembre de 1994 acordó establecer contactos, caso por caso, con los países mediterráneos no aliados para contribuir al “fortalecimiento de la estabilidad regional”. Había nacido el Diálogo Mediterráneo que en sus comienzos era sólo un foro de diálogo y que luego ha ido aproximándose lentamente al modelo de la Asociación para la Paz. En la cumbre de Estambul, en junio de 2004, se relanzó la relación con los países árabes mediante, por un lado, el lanzamiento de la Iniciativa de Cooperación de Estambul dirigida a los países del Medio Oriente y el Golfo Pérsico y, por otro, se reforzó la cooperación con los socios de la Asociación para la Paz y especialmente con los del Diálogo Mediterráneo.

El Diálogo Mediterráneo permite a la OTAN tener una asociación con siete países de la zona: Argelia, Egipto, Israel, Jordania, Mauritania, Marruecos y Túnez (Libia quedó excluida). Sus objetivos principales son los de contribuir a la estabilidad y seguridad en la región, evitar malentendidos entre la Alianza y sus socios mediterráneos y promover unas relaciones cordiales entre los países participantes en el Diálogo. Éste se fundamente en los principios de no discriminación, la diferenciación según las necesidades específicas de cada socio, el interés mutuo y la complementariedad con otras organizaciones internacionales de seguridad. El Diálogo se impulsa desde el Grupo de Cooperación del Mediterráneo, creado en 1997 bajo la autoridad y supervisión del Consejo Atlántico, con un enfoque progresivo tanto en lo referido a la participación como a los contenidos.

Desde 1997, el Programa de Trabajo anual del Diálogo Mediterráneo indica las diferentes áreas de cooperación práctica en su dimensión civil y militar en las que pueden participar los países del Diálogo de forma bilateral (OTAN+1) y, desde 2002, trilateral (OTAN+2). Las actividades incluidas en el Programa son mayoritariamente militares (un 85%) pero las áreas de cooperación son muy variadas e incluyen: diplomacia pública, educación militar, doctrina y entrenamiento, política de defensa y estrategia, planeamiento de emergencia civil, manejo de crisis y armamento, entre otras actividades. En el campo militar se incluyen cursos en el Colegio de Defensa de la OTAN y diversas escuelas OTAN y la posibilidad de observar o participar en ejercicios militares. De esa forma se mejora la capacidad de las fuerzas de los países del Diálogo Mediterráneo para participar en operaciones lideradas por la Alianza, para lo que es imprescindible progresar hacia la interoperabilidad.

En la Cumbre de Estambul mencionada, los jefes de Estado y Gobierno aliados decidieron incrementar la dimensión política del Diálogo Mediterráneo, incluyendo reuniones de ministros de Asuntos Exteriores, de ministros de Defensa y de jefes de Estado y de Gobierno, en lugar de seguir manteniéndolas a nivel de embajadores, así como también celebrar celebran reuniones de los jefes de Estado Mayor de la Defensa. Además de las reuniones plenarias (OTAN+7), tras la reunión de Estambul se aumentó considerablemente el número de áreas del Programa de Trabajo anual y las actividades en cada una de las diferentes áreas (778 en 2008 y 794 en 2009). Además, la dimensión práctica del Diálogo se vio mejorada con la oferta de Programas de Cooperación Individual que señalan los objetivos de la cooperación de un determinado país con la OTAN a corto y medio plazo y sitúa esa cooperación en un marco estratégico e individualizado. Los primeros países en completar sus programas individuales fueron Israel y Egipto, mientras que Marruecos, Túnez, Argelia y Jordania han avanzado bastante en su preparación. Como regla general, las actividades del Diálogo Mediterráneo son autofinanciadas aunque la Alianza puede considerar caso por caso la posibilidad de facilitar ayuda financiera. No obstante, la OTAN ha permitido a los países del Diálogo Mediterráneo acceder al mecanismo de los Trust Fund de la Asociación para la Paz para que puedan cumplir, entre otras, las obligaciones contraídas bajo la Convención de Ottawa respecto a la prohibición del uso, almacenamiento, producción y transferencia de minas antipersonal así como su destrucción y la de la de munición caducada sin explotar.

La OTAN ofreció el año 2004 en la cumbre de Estambul elevar el nivel de cooperación del Diálogo al de una verdadera asociación (partnership en la terminología aliada). En esa línea se ofreció a los socios del DM la oportunidad de mejorar su interoperabilidad participando en determinados ejercicios militares y en algunas de las actividades de las iniciativas de la Asociación para la Paz como el Concepto de Capacidad Operativa. Igualmente se les ofreció colaborar en la lucha contra el terrorismo, compartiendo inteligencia y contribuyendo a las operaciones militares (por ejemplo, Marruecos e Israel han participado en la operación Active Endeavour y Marruecos ha contribuido con fuerzas a la estabilización de Kosovo).

En la Cumbre de Riga de noviembre de 2006 se lanzó la Iniciativa OTAN de Cooperación en Entrenamiento para favorecer la modernización de las estructuras de defensa, hacer a sus fuerzas militares más capaces e interoperables con las de los aliados. A los países interesados se les ha animado a aumentar su participación en las estructuras y actividades existentes, pero la respuesta ha sido desigual y no se han aprovechado las oportunidades ofrecidas. En la primera fase del entrenamiento ofrecido se creó un cuerpo docente sobre temas del Oriente Medio en el Colegio de Defensa de la OTAN en Roma que pudo realizar en 2009, tras un período de pruebas en 2008, su primer Curso OTAN de Cooperación Regional con una duración de 10 semanas. En una segunda fase se preveía el establecimiento en la región de un Centro de Cooperación en Seguridad (SCC) bajo responsabilidad de los países participantes pero no ha llegado a materializarse.

La Iniciativa de Cooperación de Estambul: una iniciativa todavía joven

La Iniciativa de Cooperación de Estambul nació en la Cumbre de la OTAN que se celebró en la histórica ciudad turca los días 28 y 29 de junio de 2004. Su objetivo es contribuir a la seguridad global y regional, ofreciendo a los países de la región ampliada de Oriente Medio cooperación bilateral práctica con la OTAN en materia de lucha contra el terrorismo y contra la proliferación de armas de destrucción masiva. Entre todos los países miembros del Consejo Cooperación del Golfo (CCG), hasta el momento sólo Bahrein, Emiratos Árabes Unidos, Kuwait y Qatar han participado en la Iniciativa, mientras que Arabia Saudí y Omán permanecen fuera (el CCG propuso en junio de 2011 el ingreso a Marruecos y Jordania). La Iniciativa es la más joven de las iniciativas de cooperación de la OTAN y en apenas cinco años no ha encontrado una identidad propia. La OTAN ha aplicado a la Iniciativa los instrumentos empleados con éxito en el Diálogo Mediterráneo y, en su caso, podría usar instrumentos diseñados para la Asociación para la Paz. Entre otros, ha adoptado un Programa de Cooperación Individual para individualizar la cooperación con la OTAN similar al existente dentro del Diálogo Mediterráneo, además de abrir la Iniciativa de Cooperación en Entrenamiento mencionada anteriormente a los participantes del Consejo de Cooperación del Golfo. La cooperación práctica de la OTAN con los países miembros de la Iniciativa de Cooperación de Estambul se ha canalizado a través de los países de la OTAN como EEUU y el Reino Unido con mayor presencia en el Golfo, lo que ha reducido la visibilidad de la OTAN. Al igual que en el Diálogo Mediterráneo, la Iniciativa no se creó para facilitar el ingreso de sus miembros en la Asociación para la Paz ni tampoco se les dan garantías de seguridad frente a terceros.

La necesidad de revisar el enfoque del Diálogo Mediterráneo

La experiencia de los años de diálogo con los países árabes mostraba la necesidad de cambiar el enfoque de la cooperación si se querían superar los obstáculos estructurales que han limitado su progreso y conducido a su estancamiento.[2] Un primer elemento de dificultad has sido las difíciles relaciones de cooperación entre los propios países miembros, alguno de los cuales no desean ser tratados en pie de igualdad con el resto de los países árabes y prefiere la vía bilateral (OTAN+1) en lugar de la multilateral (OTAN+7). El segundo se refiere a que la presencia de Israel y las repercusiones del conflicto palestino-israelí en el Diálogo dificulta la relación porque todos los países árabes desean evitar verse asociados con Israel. La dificultad de conciliar las renuencias árabes a la cooperación con Israel contrasta con el deseo israelí de sacar todo el partido que pueda a la cooperación aprovechando el marco atlántico, lo que, a su vez, genera diferencias entre los miembros de la OTAN según sus posiciones frente al conflicto latente en Oriente Medio. En consecuencia, el diálogo ha funcionado mejor en los escalones inferiores, más discretos, que en los superiores que llamarían más la atención (hace más de tres años que no se llevan a cabo reuniones ministeriales del Diálogo Mediterráneo).

La experiencia también muestra que se ha progresado más en los instrumentos cuanto más flexibles y variados han sido estos. Si en el Diálogo la iniciativa estaba en manos de la OTAN y a los países árabes sólo podían aceptar o no la proposición, la aproximación de la cooperación a las posibilidades de una asociación (partenariado) facilita una mayor iniciativa, aunque sin llegar al grado de espontaneidad que se da en el Diálogo 5+5). De esta forma, algunos miembros del Diálogo se quejaban de que la OTAN ofrecía más posibilidades e instrumentos de cooperación en otros foros.

España siempre ha sido un valedor del Diálogo Mediterráneo y durante el proceso de elaboración del nuevo Concepto Estratégico trató de resaltar la importancia del Mediterráneo como un espacio de riesgos y oportunidades diferenciado. Sin embargo, el Concepto Estratégico (CE) aprobado en la Cumbre de Lisboa de 2010 dedicó una atención limitada a las iniciativas de cooperación en general y al Diálogo Mediterráneo en particular. El nuevo Concepto reitera el firme compromiso de la Alianza con el Diálogo Mediterráneo y con el desarrollo de relaciones amigables y cooperativas con todos los países del Mediterráneo, para lo que se propone desarrollar aún más el Diálogo en los próximos años aunque sin concretar cómo. También reitera la importancia que conceden los aliados a la paz y la estabilidad en la región del Golfo y pretenden profundizar la asociación de seguridad con los socios de la Iniciativa de Cooperación de Estambul. El Concepto prevé profundizar la cooperación en ambos foros y abrir la puerta a nuevos miembros en ellos, desarrollando el concepto de seguridad cooperativa –incluida la posibilidad de consultas ante problemas de seguridad que afecten a los miembros del Dialogo–, y unificar los instrumentos de asociación para evitar agravios comparativos. De esta forma, y antes de que se iniciaran los cambios en los países árabes, la OTAN consideraba esenciales la paz y la estabilidad en la región. Mediterránea para la seguridad euro-atlántica y se proponía aprovechar la ampliación y profundización de la cooperación política y práctica para fomentar la confianza mutua y afrontar juntos los retos a la seguridad existentes en la región.

Tras la revisión del Concepto Estratégico de la OTAN, el secretario general Rasmussen, comenzó a relanzar la Iniciativa pero las crisis registradas en el mundo árabe desde los primeros meses de 2011 han dificultado su revisión. Tanto los cambios en los países árabes como los acontecimientos de Libia cogieron a la OTAN ensimismada en el desarrollo e implementación de los cambios acordados en Lisboa. La Organización no aprovechó sus relaciones para explorar la situación y, de pronto, se vio envuelta en la imposición del embargo autorizado en la resolución 1970 del Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas así como en la protección de civiles autorizada en la resolución 1973 del mismo Consejo. La OTAN se hizo cargo de las operaciones el 27 de marzo de 2011 y desde entonces desarrolla operaciones navales y aéreas –la resolución no autoriza la ocupación del territorio– en las que participan miembros de la OTAN junto a otros países árabes como Qatar, Emiratos Árabes Unidos y Jordania. En la operación Unified Protector no participa ninguno de los miembros del Diálogo Mediterráneo aunque la protección de la zona de no exclusión cuenta con el apoyo de la Liga Árabe.

Las condiciones de la OTAN para poner fin a las operaciones militare fijadas por los ministros de Asuntos Exteriores de la OTAN y de los países que participan en la operación Unified Protector el 14 de abril en Berlín son: (1) que el régimen libio cese en sus ataques a civiles; (2) que retire sus fuerzas a sus bases de forma verificable; y (3) que permita el acceso humanitario, inmediato y libre a todo el territorio.El secretario general Rasmussen, tras la reunión de los ministros de Defensa que participan en la operación Unified Protector de la OTAN el 8 de junio en Bruselas, anticipó que los ministros comenzaban a planificar el día siguiente a la caída del régimen de Gadafi. En la misma rueda de prensa y posteriormente en otras ocasiones, el secretario general Rasmussen ha descartado que la OTAN vaya a asumir su liderazgo aunque dispone de experiencia en el campo de la reforma del sector de la seguridad que podrían aprovecharse, en cooperación con otras organizaciones internacionales, para articular unas fuerzas armadas libias sujetas a un poder civil, una experiencia adquirida en los países del este de Europa gracias a las iniciativas de cooperación de la OTAN.

Conclusiones: El Diálogo Mediterráneo, y la Iniciativa de Cooperación de Estambul en menor medida, han conseguido notables desde su creación pero no han desarrollado todo su potencial. La progresiva flexibilización del Diálogo amplió los mecanismos disponibles pero los miembros árabes del Diálogo no llegaron a disponer de los mismos instrumentos que otras asociaciones de la OTAN. La Alianza Atlántica aprovechó el cambio de Concepto Estratégico para unificar los mecanismos y oportunidades de cooperación pero las crisis en los países árabes llegaron antes de que se pudieran poner en marcha las posibilidades que ofrecía la seguridad cooperativa para ampliar y profundizar la relación bilateral o multilateral.

Dada la magnitud de los cambios y la intervención militar en Libia, la OTAN deberá replantearse ahora las iniciativas de cooperación y ajustarlas a la nueva situación y, sobre todo, a los nuevos actores que no están socializados en el proceso del Diálogo Mediterráneo. Los cambios plantean retos y oportunidades. Retos como superar el recelo de los nuevos interlocutores a dialogar con quienes lo hacía con sus predecesores que carecían de legitimidad democrática, por lo que habrá que dedicar tiempo y esfuerzos para restablecer la confianza perdida. Oportunidades como la de recuperar a Libia para el diálogo, elevar el nivel del diálogo y fomentar el diálogo multilateral entre el norte y el sur y entre el sur y el sur del Mediterráneo.

Superada la inercia de preservar la estabilidad y el statu quo regional habrá que apoyar los desarrollos democráticos en esos países aunque las nuevas democracias árabes no sean reflejo exacto de los estándares europeos o norteamericanos. A diferencia de la Asociación para la Paz, en la que exigían ciertos estándares democráticos, ni el Diálogo ni la Iniciativa se diseñaron para cooperar a la democratización de los países árabes, un proceso al que las movilizaciones populares están obligando en algunos de ellos. El secretario general Rasmussen ha puesto en valor la experiencia de la OTAN en la transformación democrática de las fuerzas armadas de los países del este de Europa y ha ofrecido su posible aplicación a los gobiernos que deseen aprovechar esa experiencia. Esa voluntad estaba coartada en el pasado porque el Diálogo no pretendía fomentar procesos internos de democratización sino reforzar la estabilidad.

La cooperación en materia de seguridad no va a ser fácil. A pesar de los progresos señalados, las relaciones de la OTAN con los países árabes no han podido superar el obstáculo del conflicto palestino-israelí y la desconfianza entre ellos. No es algo que sólo le haya ocurrido a la OTAN porque tampoco han tenido mejor fortuna otras iniciativas multilaterales euro-mediterráneas como el Proceso de Barcelona, la (la Unión para el Mediterráneo no tenía ningún componente –“cesta”– de seguridad), el Foro Mediterráneo o el Diálogo 5+5 del Mediterráneo Occidental (Libia dejó de participar en él tras comenzar el conflicto en 2011). Ahora, tras los cambios, y con nuevos interlocutores, será necesario recomponer las iniciativas de cooperación con los países árabes, revisar la prioridad del espacio mediterráneo para la Alianza y velar cuidadosamente por la imagen de la OTAN en el mundo árabe, para lo que es importante el desarrollo de la intervención en Libia. Seguramente no es tan importante poner sobre la mesa nuevas iniciativas como agotar las posibilidades de las ya establecidas aprovechando las oportunidades abiertas por las crisis árabes.

NOTAS:

[1] Para una valoración de todas las iniciativas, véase Federico Yaniz Velasco (2010), “Las Iniciativas de Cooperación de la OTAN ante el nuevo Concepto Estratégico”, Documento de Trabajo nº 2/2010, Real Instituto Elcano.

[2] Un análisis de éstos previo a las crisis árabes puede encontrarse en Pierre Razoux (2010), “How to Revitalize the Dialogue between NATO and the Maghreb Countries”, Research Paper nº 46, diciembre, Colegio de Defensa de la OTAN, Roma.

Tema: La OTAN viene desarrollando operaciones navales en el Mediterráneo desde su creación, aunque en los últimos años han tenido mayor notoriedad sus actividades relacionadas con la lucha contra el terrorismo desde 2001 y para respaldar el embargo de armas a Libia en 2011.

Resumen: La OTAN siempre ha tenido interés por el Mediterráneo, por lo que ha mantenido en ese mar una estructura de mando, contado con agrupaciones navales, realizado ejercicios navales y llevado a cabo operaciones militares reales para imponer el embargo naval en los conflictos de Bosnia y Kosovo, luchar contra el terrorismo o la piratería y, ahora, llevar a cabo otro embargo marítimo frente a Libia. Este ARI describe la evolución de la estructura de mando y fuerzas, así como de las operaciones navales hasta llegar a la operación Unified Protector con la que se impone el embargo marítimo a Libia.

Análisis: Al crearse la OTAN en 1949 y nacer con vocación marítima, para unir la orilla occidental europea con la oriental norteamericana en caso de conflicto con la URSS, no olvidó la importancia del Mediterráneo, estableciendo uno de sus mandos operacionales principales en Nápoles, ciudad que también contaría con el Mando Componente Marítimo (MCM) en la isla de Nisida, en la amplia bahía napolitana. Prácticamente desde su creación, la OTAN dispuso de una serie de agrupaciones navales de buques de superficie tipo destructor/fragata y otro de buque de medidas contra minas tipo cazaminas. Estas agrupaciones en número de cuatro, fueron repartidas por igual en el Atlántico y en el Mediterráneo con la diferencia que las primeras eran permanentes y las segundas on call, es decir sobre aviso pasando a denominarse STANAVFORLANTla agrupación de escoltas del Atlántico y NAVOCFORMEDla del Mediterráneo. En 1992, y con ocasión del conflicto yugoslavo, la agrupación de escoltas del Mediterráneo pasó a ser también permanente denominándose STANAVFORMED. En la última reorganización de la Alianza, ambas agrupaciones cambiaron de nombre el 1 de enero de 2005 denominándose Standing NATO Maritime Groups 1 y 2 (STNMG1 y 2), respectivamente, mientras que los dos grupos de medidas contra minas se denominarían igualmente Standing NATO MCM Group 1 y 2 (SNMCMG1 y 2),refiriéndose siempre el 1 al Atlántico y el 2 al Mediterráneo.

El mando operativo de los Grupos del Atlántico radica en el Cuartel General Marítimo Aliado en Northwood (MCC Northwood), Reino Unido, bajo el mando del almirante británico Trevor Howard, y los del Mediterráneo en el Cuartel General Marítimo de Nápoles (MCC Naples) bajo el almirante italiano Rinaldo Veri. Ambos almirantes dependen, a su vez, del comandante del Mando de Fuerzas Conjunto de Brunssum, Países Bajos, en el caso de Northwood y del de Nápoles en el caso del MCC Naples. Elgeneral alemán Wolf Langheld tiene bajo su mando el Joint Forces Command Brunssum y el almirante norteamericano Samuel J. Locklear III manda el Joint Forces Command Naples. Tradicionalmente, el Mando Aliado de Nápoles ha estado siempre dirigido por un almirante norteamericano, mientras que el de Brunssum lo ha estado bajo un general del Ejército de Tierra. Ambos oficiales generales dependen a su vez del comandante supremo de Europa (SACEURen sus siglas de inglés) siendo, al contrario de Nápoles y por primera vez en su historia, el comandante del Mando de Operaciones un almirante norteamericano, a pesar de su apellido griego, James Stavridis, que depende en temas militares del Comité Militar y siempre bajo la dirección política del Consejo del Atlántico Norte (NAC), tal y como refleja la Figura 1.

Centrándonos en la Grupo Marítimo Permanente del Mediterráneo o SNMG2,hay que aclarar que es una fuerza marítima integrada multinacional, formada por navíos de las naciones miembros de la Alianza que operan conjuntamente como una sola unidad. El Grupo está permanentemente disponible para realizar una serie de cometidos al servicio de la Alianza, desde realizar ejercicios de adiestramiento hasta su participación en una respuesta de crisis y misiones reales de combate. Aunque su área normal de actuación es el Mediterráneo, puede ser desplazado allí donde la OTAN requiera su actuación, como es el caso del Océano Indico para luchar contra la piratería. La composición del Grupo varía de acuerdo con los navíos que aporten las naciones miembro, pero normalmente son siete u ocho escoltas tipo destructor o fragata, y su mando es rotatorio entre las naciones participantes que aporten buques. Actualmente el comandante del SNMG2 es el comodoro (OF 5) neerlandés Michiel B. Hijmans, que recibe órdenes directas del Mando Marítimo aliado de Nápoles, bajo el almirante Rinaldo Veri. Una de las actividades del SNMG1es la escala en puertos del Mediterráneo no sólo de los Estados miembros de la OTAN sino también de los que forman parte del Partenariado para la Paz, el Diálogo Mediterráneo o la Iniciativa de Cooperación de Estambul, siendo estas dos últimas los foros de cooperación de la OTAN con siete países árabes de la zona.

Tras los atentados del 11 de septiembre de 2001, el Consejo Atlántico movilizó la Agrupación Naval del Mediterráneo –todavía con las siglas de STANAVFORMED–, dentro de la operación Active Endeavour (OAE) para luchar contra el terrorismo internacional en aplicación del artículo 5 del Tratado de Washington. Desde el 6 de octubre de 2001, primero la STANAVFORMED y luego el SNMG2 han participado en apoyo de la operación Active Endeavour cuando han sido requeridos. En octubre de 2008 y a petición de las Naciones Unidas, el SNMG2 fue destacado a las aguas de Somalia para defender y proteger a los buques del Programa Mundial de Alimentosde los ataques de los piratas dentro de la Operación Allied Provider, permitiendo a los navíos fletados por ese Programa llevar alimentos a la población somalí. El 12 de diciembre de 2008 la agrupación fue relevada por el SNMG1no sin antes haber asegurado la llegada de 30.000 toneladas de alimentos al puerto de Mogadiscio, habiendo participado en la operación 1.000 marinos de la SNMG2.Posteriormente en junio de 2009 la SNMG2 volvió a participar en la misma operación, esta vez con el nombre de Ocean Shield, hasta noviembre de 2009 en sustitución de la SNMG1.

En el ámbito de la guerra de minas, la Standing NATO MCM Group 2, es una fuerza marítima multinacional integrada, formada por buques de medidas contra minas que operan juntos como una sola unidad para realizar una serie de cometidos que van desde los simples ejercicios hasta una respuesta de crisis y operaciones reales. Normalmente el SNMCMG2 opera en el Mediterráneo, pero puede ser destacado allí donde la Alianza lo requiera. Este Grupo se forma con las aportaciones de cazaminas y buques de mando de la OTAN y su mando que rota entre las naciones que aportan buques. El comandante actual del Grupo es el capitán de navío griego Georgios Pelekanakis, que recibe órdenes directas del almirante Rinaldo Veri desde Nápoles.

La capacidad de medidas contra minas permanente de la OTAN en el Mediterráneo fue activada el 27 de mayo de 1999, con el nombre de Mine Counter Measures Force Mediterranean (MCMFM) y normalmente comprende unos ocho buques del tipo cazaminas y un buque de mando/apoyo. El 3 de septiembre de 2001, la Fuerza cambió su nombre por el de MCMFORSOUTH, al haber cambiado su nombre el Mando de Nápoles por el de AFSOUTH (Allied Forces South) para volverlo a cambiar de nuevo el 1 de enero de 2005 de forma acorde con la nueva organización, por el actual de SNMCMG2, haciendo a este Grupo parte de la Fuerza de Respuesta de la OTAN (NRF en sus siglas inglesas).

Tan sólo un mes después de su creación, el Grupo fue destacado al Mar Adriático para limpiarlo de las minas sembradas durante la Operación Allied Force. En ese momento la MCMFM estaba formada por 11 cazaminas de Bélgica, Dinamarca, Grecia, Italia, los Países Bajos, Turquía, el Reino Unido y EEUU. La Operación denominada Allied Harvest, comenzó el 9 de junio de 1999 y duró 73 días, inutilizando y eliminando un total de 93 minas en las 1.041 millas cuadradas asignadas a la OTAN. El Grupo también participa cuando es requerido, en la operación Active Endeavour contra el terrorismo.

Los ejercicios navales de la OTAN en el Mediterráneo

La eficacia de una fuerza o agrupación naval, depende de su grado de adiestramiento. Si además nos referimos a una fuerza combinada, es decir, formada por unidades de unidades de diferentes naciones, el adiestramiento de la unidad es vital para unificar procedimientos, métodos y capacidades para el combate, dado que cada uno de los buques del Grupo tendrá unas características diferentes. Como ejemplos más significativos del adiestramiento de la OTAN en el Mediterráneo en el 2011, cabe destacar los ejercicios Proud Manta, Noble Mariner y Bold Monarch en lo que se refiere a buques de superficie y submarinos y el ejercicio Italian Minex en lo referente a guerra de minas.

En el Proud Manta11, ejercicio antisubmarinorealizado en el Mar Jónico entre el 4 y el 17 de febrero de este año, participaron 10 naciones con un total de ocho buques de superficie y seis submarinos, uno de ellos español, además de aviones de patrulla marítima y helicópteros antisubmarinos. La serie de ejercicios Manta proporciona una oportunidad única para experimentar nuevas tácticas contra submarinos convencionales y nucleares. En esta ocasión participaron por primera vez helicópteros antisubmarinos Merlin británicos.

El ejercicio Noble Mariner 11, que tuvo lugar entre el 28 de febrero y el 10 de marzo, sirvió para comprobar que el Componente Marítimo de la Fuerza de Respuesta de la OTAN (NRF 17),estaba preparado para realizar las operaciones que se le encomendasen en cualquier parte del mundo. Este ejercicio involucró a 3.500 personas de 11 países y 17 buques de guerra, de superficie, incluyendo al español Castilla, que actuó de buque de mando, junto con cuatro submarinos, cazaminas y cinco aviones de patrulla marítima.

El ejercicio Bold Monarch 11, de salvamento y rescate de submarinos, pertenece a la serie de LIVEX, es decir, ejercicios reales no simulados y que dado su costo se realiza cada tres años, alternando normalmente Atlántico y Mediterráneo. Así como el Bold Monarch 08 se realizó en aguas de Noruega, esta vez le tocaba al Mediterráneo, escogiéndose las tranquilas aguas y aplacerados fondos próximos a la costa de San Pedro del Pinatar en Murcia. El Bold Monarch 11 tenía la primicia además de contar con la presencia de un submarino ruso clase Kilo, el Alrosa, que tendría un papel destacado como submarino siniestrado o DISSUB, junto con el submarino español Galerna, un submarino portugués y otro turco. El ejercicio se desarrolló entre el 30 de mayo y el 11 de junio, participando unas 2.000 personas de 20 naciones, culminando con una fase de 48 horas en que se realizó la evacuación de 150 “supervivientes” de los cuatro submarinos, utilizando vehículos submarinos de rescate de Italia, EEUU, Rusia y Suecia, interviniendo equipos médicos con cámaras hiperbáricas de Francia, Grecia, Italia, los Países Bajos, España, Suecia y el Reino Unido. Especial énfasis se hizo en el mando y control de toda la operación de rescate utilizando procedimientos OTAN, pese a que alguno de los países participantes no pertenecían a la Alianza, como Rusia y Suecia. Con 40 naciones en posesión de submarinos, estos ejercicios Bold Monarch levantan una gran expectación en toda la comunidad submarina, incluyendo países como Australia, Brasil, Chile, China, Japón, Pakistán, Perú y Corea del Sur, por lo que muchas de estas naciones envían representantes para observar este extremadamente real ejercicio y sacar sus propias lecciones aprendidas.

En lo referente a guerra de minas, hay que tener en cuenta que cualquier ejercicio importante con buques de superficie, lleva implícito una fase en la que se dragan y limpian las canales de acceso a puertos y zonas de ejercicio, fase en la que intervienen de forma activa los buques de MCM. No obstante, entre el 23 de mayo y el 3 de junio se llevó a cabo en el Mar de Liguria un ejercicio específico de Guerra de Minas denominado Italian MInex 11, dirigido por la Marina Italiana y en la que participó el Standing NATO MCM Group 2 de la OTAN, agrupación que contaba con un buque de mando griego y cinco cazaminas, entre ellos el español Sella. Durante la fase de mar, los cazaminas realizaron operaciones de MCM en las áreas asignadas, levantando numerosas minas de ejercicio, mientras el buque de mando patrullaba la zona para protegerlos de cualquier ataque procedente de la amenaza asimétrica, tan en boga hoy en día.

Operaciones reales en el Mediterráneo

En la actualidad se están llevando a cabo dos operaciones reales en el teatro operacional del Mediterráneo, ambas dirigidas desde Nápoles: Active Endeavour y Unified Protector. La primera de ellas ya mencionada, se inició el 26 de octubre de 2001 y tiene como misión realizar operaciones marítimas en el Mar Mediterráneo para demostrar la resolución de la Alianza para disuadir, defender, interrumpir y proteger a las naciones contra el terrorismo. La OAE ha ido evolucionando desde un operación a pequeña escala hasta lo que es hoy en día, utilizando de forma rotacional los buques de los Standing NATO Maritime Group 1 y 2, en uno de los entornos geoestratégicos más importantes y por el que transitan en todo momento más de 7.000 buques. La Operación se manda en todo momento por el almirante Rinaldo Veri, desde su Cuartel General en la Isla de Nisida, para lo que tiene dos elementos navales a su disposición: la Task Force Endeavour patrullando el Mediterráneo Oriental y un segunda Task Force en el Estrecho de Gibraltar (STROG), que puede ser activada en caso necesario. En esta Operación participan, no sólo las naciones de la Alianza sino un total de 50 países y proporcionan información vital a la base de datos del Maritime Safety and Security Information System (MSSIS) del centro de operaciones del Cuartel General del almirante Veri. Desde el inicio de la OAE, más 100.000 buques mercantes han sido contactados en la mar, siendo abordados 160 por resultar sospechosos, mientras que un total de 488 buques de alto valor han sido escoltados a través del Estrecho de Gibraltar. Con la operación Active Endeavour se ha tratado de disuadir la comisión de atentados terroristas contra los intereses de los países aliados y, de paso, se ha obtenido información sobre tráfico de drogas, transporte ilegal de explosivos, movimientos ilegales de inmigrantes y se han desviado buques sospechosos a puertos aliados para su registro.

Operación “Unified Protector”

Desde que estallase la crisis de Libia y por la decisión del Consejo del Atlántico Norte de intervenir en el país africano, los buques de la Alianza Atlántica, en virtud de la resolución 1973 del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas, tienen como misión reducir el tráfico de armas, material de guerra y mercenarios con destino a Libia. La participación de la OTAN en esta crisis no tiene otra finalidad que contribuir al esfuerzo internacional para proteger a los civiles en el país norteafricano de la violencia ejercida por las fuerzas del régimen de Gadafi.

La operación Unified Protector está dirigida desde el Cuartel General del Mando Conjunto de Fuerzas en Nápoles (Joint Forces Command Naples)por el teniente general canadiense Charles Bouchard, segundo comandante del JFC Naples y que informa directamente al almirante Stavridis, SACEUR. El embargo marítimo está dirigido por el almirante Rinaldo Veri, comandante del Maritime Command Naples, con su Cuartel General en tierra, en la Isla de Nisida. De él depende directamente el contralmirante italiano Filipo Foffi, que manda desde el 1 de junio la Task Force creada al efecto y que iza su insignia a bordo del portaviones Garibaldi. En el embargo marítimo de la operación Unified Protector (OUP) participan buques de Bélgica, Canadá, EEUU, España, Francia, Grecia, los Países Bajos, Italia, el Reino Unido, Rumanía y Turquía, que aportan una veintena de buques de superficie, entre ellos la fragata española Méndez Núñez, y dos submarinos, comprendido el español Mistral, además de varios aviones de patrulla marítima incluidos dos CN 235 españoles. El área de operaciones de la OUP, en el ámbito marítimo abarca toda la costa de Libia como límite sur, llegando hasta el paralelo de Nápoles como límite norte, extendiéndose al oeste hasta prácticamente la costa de Cerdeña y al este hasta la costra turca. En el curso de las operaciones realizadas hasta la fecha, han sido interrogados 1.119 buques en la mar, siendo abordados para su inspección 66 para ser finalmente enviados a puerto para ser registrados diez buques mercantes.

Pero la intervención de la Task Group aliada no se ha limitado a la interrogación y registro de buques mercantes para implementar el embargo marítimo. El 16 de mayo de 2011 los buques aliados detectaron dos embarcaciones neumáticasque salían de la vecindad de Zlintan con rumbo hacia el puerto de Misurata. Helicópteros de los buques que se encontraban vigilando el área se dirigieron hacia las lanchas, dándose a la fuga a gran velocidad una de ellas y siendo abandonada la otra. Inspeccionada, se encontró en ella una tonelada de explosivo y dos maniquíes a bordo, por lo que dedujeron que el objetivo de estas embarcaciones era realizar un ataque suicida contra algunos de los buques que transportaban ayuda humanitaria al puerto de Misurata. Los buques de la OTAN también han interceptado buques libios minando las aguas próximas a Misurata provenientes también de Zlintan y Yefren, dos localidades próximas a la frontera con Túnez y en las que se observaba una gran actividad por parte de las fuerzas de Gadafi. Estos hechos provocaron que la aviación de la Alianza hundiera ocho buques de la Marina libia atracados en los puertos de Trípoli, Al Khums y Surt, en la madrugada del 20 de mayo, destacando la destrucción de la corbeta Al Ghardabia, de la clase Nanuchka, atracada en el puerto de Trípoli.

Conclusión: A lo largo de de los 62 años de existencia de la OTAN, el Mediterráneo ha sido considerado como “un lago de la Alianza”, incluso durante el período de la Guerra Fría en que eran corrientes las incursiones de los submarinos soviéticos. Desde entonces los buques de la OTAN se hallan omnipresentes en este mar que tiene 2,5 millones de de kilómetros cuadrados y 3.860 km de longitud. La intervención de esos buques ha sido decisiva para que la OTAN alcanzara sus objetivos en las diferentes crisis sufridas en los países ribereños. Así en la guerra de Yugoslavia con la operación Sharp Guard, los buques aliados realizaron cometidos similares a los que están realizando en la operación Unified Protector, actualmente en vigor, y que está implementando un riguroso embargo marítimo para evitar la llegada de armas al régimen libio para debilitarle y acortar la prolongación de la guerra actual. Por su parte, la veterana operación Active Endeavour, ha contribuido a la seguridad marítima del Mediterráneo, un remanso de paz si se compara con otros entornos marítimos en que campan libremente piratas y salteadores de la mar. Tanto por los ejercicios navales como por las operaciones reales que se llevan en sus aguas, el Mar Mediterráneo seguirá necesitando la presencia naval de la OTAN, especialmente ahora que está cambiando su contexto estratégico y multiplicándose los retos de seguridad.

Tema: Desde el 31 de marzo de 2011 la OTAN se ha hecho cargo de las operaciones militares en Libia derivadas de las resoluciones 1070 y 1973 del Consejo de Seguridad de Nacionales Unidas.

Resumen: La OTAN se hizo cargo de las operaciones militares en Libia a partir del 31 de marzo de 2011, 12 días después de que comenzaran bajo mando estadounidense primero, y de una coalición internacional después. El relevo vino obligado por la incapacidad de los miembros de la coalición para relevar a EEUU y estuvo acompañado de divergencias sobre el papel que debía tener la OTAN en la gestión militar de la crisis, unas divergencias que no han cesado de evidenciarse aunque, poco a poco, la OTAN ha ido haciéndose con el mando y el control de las operaciones. Para explicar su actuación, la OTAN ha desarrollado una narrativa que soterra las divergencias que surgen sobre los objetivos, duración y medios de este conflicto. Este ARI estudia las luces de la operación que se refieren a la conducción militar de las operaciones, protegiendo a la población, debilitando progresivamente la capacidad militar del régimen de Gadafi y tratando de evitar los daños colaterales. Entre las sombras se analiza la instrumentalización de la OTAN por Francia, el Reino Unido y EEUU para implementar su interpretación de las resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad, la parcialidad de la intervención aliada y los daños causados a la Alianza por el desfase entre la deficiente dirección política y la ejecución militar de la OTAN.

Análisis: El antiguamente denominado “flanco sur” de la OTAN no se encontraba entre las principales preocupaciones de la Alianza Atlántica cuando actualizó su Concepto Estratégico en la cumbre de Lisboa de noviembre de 2010. A pesar de los esfuerzos españoles, el Mediterráneo no recibió una atención especial y la relación con los países árabes vecinos se igualó a la que se prestaba a otros más lejanos. El relanzamiento del Diálogo Mediterráneo y de la Iniciativa de Cooperación de Estambul tampoco figuraba entre sus prioridades y los cambios en los países árabes sorprendieron a los aliados. El levantamiento –y su represión violenta– comenzaron el 17 de febrero y fueron creciendo en intensidad durante los días siguientes. A pesar de ello, la OTAN no se ocupó de la situación en Libia hasta el 25 de febrero de 2011. El día antes, el secretario general de la OTAN, Anders F. Rasmussen, manifestó que la OTAN no tenía planes de intervención porque la situación en Libia no era una amenaza directa para la Alianza y sus Estados miembros, aunque para entonces muchos nacionales de esos países residentes en Libia se encontraban ya en medio de un enfrentamiento armado entre las fuerzas leales a Gadafi y los rebeldes. El secretario general Rasmussen cambió de opinión al día siguiente y convocó una reunión de emergencia afirmando que lo que ocurría en Libia preocupaba a todos. No existiendo sobre el terreno ningún hecho relevante, la preocupación súbita podría responder a la iniciativa franco-británica de imponer sanciones al régimen de Gadafi, una posición a la que se sumó, con dudas, el presidente Obama y que condujeron a la resolución 1970. Tras la aprobación de esta resolución, se especuló con la posibilidad de que la OTAN pudiera participar en la creación de una futura zona de exclusión, pero las fuerzas rebeldes parecían ser capaces de acabar con el régimen de Gadafi y la OTAN no adoptó ninguna decisión concreta aunque su sistema de gestión de crisis ya seguía el desarrollo de los acontecimientos.

El primer ministro británico, David Cameron, fue el primero en predicar con el ejemplo y el 28 de febrero ordenó a sus mandos militares la evaluación de una zona de no exclusión, y el primer ministro francés, François Fillon, se mostraba partidario de que la OTAN sopesase implicarse “en una guerra civil al sur del Mediterráneo”. Mientras algunos países miembros desarrollaban operaciones navales y aéreas, a título individual, para extraer a sus nacionales de Libia, algunas unidades navales de EEUU se desplazaban a la zona para respaldar una gama de opciones más amplia, ya que el presidente de EEUU, Barack Obama, no tenía decidido qué hacer y los responsables militares y de inteligencia mostraban reservas sobre la idoneidad de una intervención armada, dadas las limitadas capacidades militares disponibles –empeñadas en otros escenarios bélicos– y la falta de intereses nacionales en juego.

Las opciones militares siguieron en estudio mientras que en la guerra civil sobre el terreno, y contra todo pronóstico, las fuerzas leales a Gadafi dieron la vuelta a la situación y se presentaron a las puertas de Bengasi. Fue entonces cuando Francia y el Reino Unido optaron por una intervención militar, incluso unilateral, y presionaron a la dubitativa Presidencia estadounidense a unirse a ellos a la búsqueda de una resolución habilitante del Consejo de Seguridad que legitimar su intervención si era posible. La determinación política de los tres líderes pesó más que las consideraciones geopolíticas y su diplomacia se movilizó para recabar todos los apoyos posibles entre los miembros de la OTAN, la UE, la Liga Árabe, la Unión Africana y otras para solicitar una zona de exclusión aérea ante el Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas.

La OTAN siguió evaluando la situación y el día 7 de marzo sus AWACS reforzaron la vigilancia área, mientras las tropas leales a Gadafi comenzaban a inclinar la balanza de su lado. En su reunión de los días 10 y 11 de marzo, los ministros de Defensa de Turquía y Francia se opusieron, por distintas razones, a una implicación de la OTAN en la hipotética zona de exclusión aérea que se pedía, y dejaron cualquier planeamiento a expensas de la aprobación de la resolución. El mismo día 11 Francia reconoció unilateralmente al Consejo Nacional libio y dos días después los tres mentores de la intervención presentaron una propuesta al Consejo de Seguridad que iba más allá de la zona de exclusión negociada con sus aliados.

A pesar de la presión diplomática de los tres y aunque ningún miembro del Consejo de Seguridad deseaba cargar con la hipotética responsabilidad de una matanza de civiles en Bengasi, la resolución 1973 no salió como esperaban sus promotores. Para evitar el veto y conseguir la mayoría necesaria, tuvieron que admitir cambios en su propuesta y admitir la limitación de que la intervención no implicaría la ocupación del terreno. En su lugar, el mandato de la resolución incluye, por este orden, un alto el fuego, la búsqueda de una solución política, una zona de exclusión aérea y la protección de los civiles frente a ataques o amenazas. Los promotores de la operación conocían por experiencias anteriores que un mandato redactado en esos términos complicaba extraordinariamente su ejecución, ya que sin la ocupación militar del terreno es difícil garantizar el éxito de la misión. La zona de exclusión aérea podría servir para proteger a los civiles pero no para revertir la situación militar en beneficio de los rebeldes, un objetivo que anidaba en la voluntad de los tres promotores, pero que no consta en el mandato de la resolución 1973. Sin embargo, los promotores se dispusieron a implementar la resolución confiando en su capacidad militar para librar una campaña rápida y fulminante.

El 19 de marzo comenzaron las operaciones sin otra participación de la OTAN que una acumulación de medios navales frente a las costas libias. Aunque la zona de exclusión aérea se impuso sin apenas oposición, pronto quedó claro que algunos miembros de la coalición empleaban “todos los medios a su alcance” para fines distintos de lo previsto, tal y como denunciaron al día siguiente representantes de la Liga Árabe, la Unión Africana y miembros abstencionistas del Consejo de Seguridad. Los días posteriores crecieron las dudas sobre los objetivos, liderazgo, estructura de mando y duración de la operación militar y se multiplicaron cuando el presidente Obama anunció el 21 de marzo su deseo de transferir el mando de la misión (hasta entonces estaban bajo el mando estadounidense del AFRICOM en Europa que no pertenece a la OTAN). El 22 de marzo comenzaron los debates entre aliados sobre si la OTAN debería o no asumir el mando de las operaciones, oscilando las posiciones contrapuestas en un abanico que iba desde Francia, que quería subordinar la actuación militar a la dirección política del Grupo de Contacto; a Alemania y Turquía que se negaban al traspaso o al Reino Unido e Italia, que pedían el control total. Al retirarse EEUU del liderazgo de la operación, la única forma de continuarla era su relevo por la OTAN ya que sólo ésta dispone de la infraestructura de teatro necesaria para garantizar el mando y control de las operaciones, unos medios de los que carecen Francia y el Reino Unido. Finalmente, la OTAN controla las operaciones militares desde el 31 de marzo de 2011 (con la excepción de las operaciones francesas que se realizan desde el portaviones Charles de Gaulle).

Narrativa y realidad en la guerra de Libia

Casi tres meses después de hacerse cargo de las operaciones la OTAN, la guerra continúa y a pesar del progresivo debilitamiento de las fuerzas leales a Gadafi, ni los rebeldes ni la OTAN han conseguido poner fin al régimen libio o a los enfrentamientos. El estancamiento de los frentes, el alargamiento de la guerra, el esfuerzo militar y económico de las operaciones han acentuado las tensiones latentes hasta el punto de que el secretario de Defensa estadounidense, Robert Gates, calificó el futuro de la Alianza como “oscuro, si no negro” y denunció, dentro y fuera del Consejo Atlántico de Bruselas, la falta de colaboración de los aliados y la desproporción de sus contribuciones.[1]

Las quejas del principal miembro de la Alianza contrastan con la normalidad con la que la narrativa venía presentando hasta entonces las operaciones y revela un desfase entre el discurso oficial y la realidad. Según la narrativa oficial, la OTAN está desarrollando una operación militar para proteger a los civiles libios de acuerdo con las resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas que va avanzando progresivamente hacia sus objetivos. No obstante, algo debe ocurrir para que el discurso oficial encuentre tantas dificultades para progresar. En primer lugar, y aunque parezca sorprendente, la operación Unified Protector no es propiamente una operación de la OTAN, sino una operación que la OTAN desarrolla por delegación de un grupo de países que se han hecho cargo de implementar la resolución citada. La diferencia estriba en que las decisiones sobre las operaciones en lugar de tomarse al más alto nivel posible, el del Consejo Atlántico a nivel de ministros de Exteriores o de Defensa, se hace al nivel más bajo posible: Comité Militar y sesión de embajadores del Consejo Atlántico (la primera reunión de los ministros de Exteriores –donde se fijaron los objetivos de las operaciones– tuvo lugar el 14 de abril en Berlín). Tampoco se dispone de un Consejo Atlántico reforzado a nivel de embajadores ni de un Comité de Contribuyentes, por lo que la OTAN no dispone de una adecuada dirección estratégica de la intervención, sus autoridades políticas mantienen un perfil bajo y se limitan a la conducción político-militar de las operaciones.

Tampoco puede considerarse como una actuación colectiva una operación en la que sólo participan 14 de sus 28 miembros, y de los cuales participan en los ataques a tierra EEUU, el Reino Unido, Francia, Noruega, Dinamarca, Italia y Bélgica, mientras que los Países Bajos, Polonia, Turquía y España sólo participan en la zona de exclusión aérea. Su distinto nivel de compromiso y esfuerzo con la OTAN, al que aludía el secretario Gates, refleja que la OTAN no está funcionando en Libia como una alianza política y militar, sino como “caja de herramientas” (toolkit box) a la que sus miembros recurren para desarrollar acciones militares de su interés y seleccionan las aportaciones que precisan. La pericia de los diplomáticos y militares hace funcionar esta subcontratación de la estructura de mando de la OTAN a las orientaciones de un Grupo de Contacto pero no puede suplir la falta de una dirección estratégica clara y unificada y se evidencia un desfase entre los objetivos estratégicos y los militares de la misión.

En segundo lugar, no cabe duda de que la operación de la OTAN sirve para proteger a los civiles libios. Si la operación Odisea del Amanecer evitó una posible masacre en Bengasi, las operaciones de la OTAN también están protegiendo a la población civil y facilitando la llegada de asistencia humanitaria. Sin embargo, la OTAN también protege a civiles armados y a militares rebeldes que combaten en un conflicto interno, lo que significa que actúa con parcialidad. Contra la opinión del Comité Internacional de la Cruz Roja, la Unión Africana, el fiscal de la Corte Penal Internacional y el Comité de Derechos Humanos de Naciones Unidas, entre muchos otros, la narrativa de la OTAN sigue ignorando la existencia de un conflicto interno y sólo habla de civiles. Esta negación de la realidad sirve para no acentuar las tensiones entre quienes quieren evitar los efectos de la guerra sobre la población y quienes tienen como objetivo –adicional o primigenio– apoyar a una de las partes en conflicto. La negación provoca un daño colateral sobre el principio de la “responsabilidad de proteger”, ya que su reconocimiento está vinculado a la indefensión de la población civil frente a la represión de sus gobiernos. Proteger a unos “civiles” más que a otros, deslegitima en parte la intervención en Libia y crea dudas sobre si la “responsabilidad de proteger” era una convicción o una excusa, especialmente cuando ese principio no se aplica para proteger a una población como la siria que está padeciendo una represión interna superior a la constatada en Libia cuando se produjo la intervención. Por otro lado, la guerra sigue incrementando el número de los damnificados entre la población libia y el alargamiento de la guerra acentuará ese sufrimiento. No existen datos oficiales sobre las victimas y heridos de los enfrentamientos, pero si cuando empezó la operación se barajaban cifras en torno a centenares de muertos, ahora las fuentes barajan miles de ellos. Según datos de la Oficina de Coordinación de la Asistencia Humanitaria de Naciones Unidas, si a 20 de marzo habían abandonado el país 320.423 personas, según datos posteriores de la Organización Internacional para las Migraciones, el total acumulado el 18 de abril era de 543.532, y a 30 de mayo el nivel era de 900.923, lo que supone que la guerra ha triplicado su número. Además, si hasta mediados de junio las operaciones de ataque a tierra apenas produjeron daños colaterales entre los rebeldes, la escalada de bombardeos de junio ha producido ya las primeras víctimas civiles en Trípoli y ofrecido a Gadafi la foto que buscaba de la OTAN: atacando y matando a civiles libios.

En tercer lugar, es cierto que la OTAN está actuando bajo las resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad cuando lleva a cabo el embargo naval, la exclusión aérea y la protección de civiles frente a ataque o amenazas como organización militar, pero las resoluciones tenían otros objetivos que la dirección político-estratégica de esa organización no está atendiendo con el mismo interés. Las resoluciones pedían un embargo para todo armamento destinado a Libia, y a pesar del éxito del bloqueo naval impuesto, ni la OTAN ha impedido que sigan llegando armas a los “civiles” de Misrata por mar regularmente ni la OTAN y los países vecinos han podido evitar el flujo de armas, combatientes y suministros para sostener el enfrentamiento entre leales y rebeldes. Las resoluciones también pedían una solución política al conflicto y ésta no se ha logrado a pesar de varios intentos de mediación, aunque es una responsabilidad que no debe atribuirse a la OTAN. Descalificados como interlocutores Gadafi, sus familiares y colaboradores directos y remitidos para encausamiento a la Corte Penal Internacional desde la primera resolución, los coligados no han tenido el éxito o la intención de llegar a ningún acuerdo político con Gadafi y quienes le apoyan. El Consejo Nacional de Transición, más interesado que ellos en la caída del régimen gadafista, se ha negado a atender las ofertas de mediación recibidas y, ya que el autócrata se niega a exiliarse por falta de garantías e interés, se hace inviable la negociación de una salida política o de un alto el fuego, lo que prolonga una guerra de desgaste.

El multilateralismo ha sido también otra víctima de daños colaterales en Libia porque las decisiones de Naciones Unidas y de la OTAN obedecen más a la instrumentalización de esos foros multilaterales por agrupaciones de miembros influyentes que a procedimientos colectivos y solidarios de participación. La resolución 1973 delega en manos de aquellos que toman “todas las medidas necesarias” decidir cuáles han de ser estas. En el caso de Libia, la dirección estratégica de las operaciones recae efectivamente sobre los tres patrocinadores de la intervención, aunque estos se amparen en la cobertura multilateral para legitimar sus decisiones. En contrapartida a que las organizaciones multilaterales de seguridad y defensa sean lideradas por unos pocos, el resto decide libremente su contribución. Tiene razón el secretario Gates cuando denuncia la desigualdad de contribuciones en la OTAN, en general, y en Libia, en particular, pero la organización conocía muy bien las contribuciones y las reservas de cada aliado desde el principio de la operación, por ello no participó el Consejo Atlántico. Si entonces no se pusieron reparos, es porque en ese momento era más importante lograr el consenso de todos los Estados miembros que realizar un buen análisis de riesgos: el desfase entre las capacidades necesarias y las aportadas. Así que si ahora se echan en falta esas capacidades, en lugar de criticar a quienes han contribuido como España o Turquía según se comprometieron, deberían practicar la autocrítica por poner en marcha una operación sin una valoración adecuada de la misma.

Conclusión

Los efectos de la guerra libia sobre la OTAN

La guerra de Libia, como las de Afganistán, Kosovo y los Balcanes han ido agravando las contradicciones estructurales de la Alianza Atlántica, aunque su organización militar ha demostrado ser un instrumento eficaz. Las diferencias en materia de cultura estratégica, en el nivel de esfuerzo militar y presupuestario o en los intereses de seguridad afectan a la eficacia de la organización pero sobre todo afectan a la solidaridad y cohesión política. Sobre el terreno, las operaciones progresan aunque una intervención que iba a durar unos días se ha prolongado, de momento, hasta septiembre de 2011. La OTAN ha incrementado el ritmo de sus operaciones y eso ha acentuado el estrés operacional de los equipos y tripulaciones, poniendo en apuros a países como Bélgica y Canadá que están al límite de sus capacidades aéreas y acentuando las diferencias entre sus contribuciones (Noruega y Dinamarca han ofrecido el 12% de los aviones de ataque a tierra y se han hecho cargo de un tercio de los blancos). Los costes presupuestarios también se dispararan y su coste medio diario, aproximado, alcanza el millón de euros para Francia, unos 2 millones de euros para el Reino Unido y 4 millones de euros para EEUU. El esfuerzo militar en Libia, añadido al realizado en otros escenarios geográficos está poniendo a prueba la capacidad de la OTAN para sostener una acción militar prolongada (a 20 de junio la OTAN ha realizado 11.781 salidas y de ellas 4.469 de ataque a tierra).

Para acelerar la conclusión de la guerra, la OTAN sólo puede incrementar el número de sus ataques aéreos, lo que no es fácil porque no hay nuevos países que quieran participar en los ataques a tierra y porque aumenta la fatiga de las tripulaciones, los riesgos de errores y el vaciamiento de los stocks de municiones. Otra alternativa sería la de poner tropas sobre el terreno, pero de momento la OTAN no desea hacerlo aunque el despliegue de asesores y helicópteros, así como la preparación de misiones humanitarias podría encubrir la voluntad de hacerlo. También se ha rechazado hacerlo después de la caída de Gadafi, limitándose la OTAN a mostrar su disponibilidad para contribuir a la reforma del “sector de la seguridad” si Naciones Unidas se lo pide pero, como muestran experiencias recientes, no es posible estabilizar ni reformar la seguridad sin ocupar el terreno con fuerzas suficientes. La tercera posibilidad es que el régimen de Gadafi se desmorone, su líder perezca en algún bombardeo o que se le agoten los fondos y suministros con los que mantiene la actividad de sus tropas.

En conjunto, las operaciones funcionan bien aunque las fuerzas leales a Gadafi no necesitan derrotar a los rebeldes apoyados por la OTAN para ganar la guerra, les basta con no ser derrotados. La narrativa también funciona bien porque todos deseamos que se acabe el régimen de Gadafi cuanto antes y el pragmatismo en la política internacional acaba llevando a que los fines justifiquen los medios. Progresivamente se va reconociendo al Consejo Nacional de Transición –sean cuales sean sus miembros e intenciones– y se comienza a preparar el día siguiente para Libia tras la caída de Gadafi. Mientras, corre el tiempo que Gadafi y la OTAN creen que juega a su favor, aunque será ese tiempo el que diga si se ha jugado bien o mal a favor de Libia.

[1] Discurso ante la Security and Defence Agenda de Bruselas del 10 de junio de 2011, accesible en http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1581.

The fight against hunger and poverty must be placed high on the agenda of governments, multilateral institutions and NGOs. In 2050, the world population will reach 9 billion. To ensure their needs, the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) points to the need for a robust increase in world food supply. African production will have to increase fivefold. Latin American production will have to double.

The FAO estimates that 90% of those needs could be achieved with gains in productivity. But we also know that the problem of hunger is essentially a problem of access to food. The global challenges with respect to food supply are particularly complex, and the FAO can – and should – play a central role to fight hunger, stimulate the sustainable production of food, and enhance global food security.

Leadership – and partnership – in this arena have never been more urgently required. Hunger and poverty go hand in hand, so in addressing food supply we can help tackle the broader challenges of achieving global sustainable development at a time of increasing suffering and instability in many regions. Families are facing pressures over vulnerable food supplies with little hope for relief in the near future. Just this month the FAO forecast that high and volatile agricultural commodity prices are likely to prevail into 2012.

In fact, the bill for international food imports is expected to reach its highest level this year – $1.29 trillion – but the burden of that cost will not be shared equally. The UN-classified least developed countries will spend 30% more on food imports in 2011, raising their spending to roughly 18% of their imports, compared with a world average of around 7%. This situation is not conducive to global economic and social stability.

Brazil’s credentials in tackling hunger and poverty are well established. The Zero Hunger programme, created in 2003 and co-ordinated by Dr José Graziano da Silva, combined emergency actions with structural measures for food security. It was the starting point for all other policies implemented in the following years. Income transfer programmes such as Bolsa Familia – which supports more than a quarter of the population – combine food safety, access to education and health, and measures to foster local development, especially in rural areas.

The encouragement of family agriculture was fundamental to the success of social policies in Brazil. Family farming is responsible for 70% of food consumed domestically and represents 10% of Brazil’s GDP. These results would not be possible without agricultural research, agrarian reform and land tenure, technical assistance, and access to credit and insurance, among other things. With these, 32 million Brazilians (over 16% of the population) have overcome poverty.

Consistent with this, Brazil has been working internationally for a more balanced and socially equitable global order. Our approach is based on the construction of equal partnerships with developing countries worldwide.

Putting the fight against hunger and poverty as one of the top international priorities is a commitment made by my country. It was precisely for this reason that, as president of Brazil, last year I presented Graziano da Silva as a candidate to be the FAO’s director general.

No country can achieve sustainable development without improving the living conditions of its people; and the Brazilian experience shows that overcoming hunger requires co-ordinated actions, political will and the participation of all society. With Graziano da Silva’s FAO candidacy, Brazil reaffirms its commitment to the universal agenda of combating poverty and hunger.

Has the Atlantic alliance outlived its usefulness? The British journalist and historian Geoffrey Wheatcroft raised that question in an opinion article on Thursday, commenting on the speech by Robert Gates in Brussels last week in which the outgoing U.S. defense secretary accused other members of the Atlantic alliance of not pulling their financial and political weight. Ivo H. Daalder, the U.S. permanent representative to NATO, joins the debate.

“Who needs NATO?” asks Geoffrey Wheatcroft. A good question, with a simple answer: We all do.

NATO is, as President Obama has said, “the most successful alliance in human history.” During its first 40 years, it won the Cold War. In the next 20, it secured an enduring European peace — not least by welcoming 12 new members through the enlargement process Mr. Wheatcroft so derides. And today, as its 28 leaders declared in Lisbon, “the alliance remains an essential source of stability in an unpredictable world.”

Today, more than 150,000 troops participate in six NATO operations on three continents.

In Afghanistan, a NATO-led force made up of troops from 48 nations is helping to build security so that none of us will ever again be threatened by terrorists trained in secure safe havens in that war-torn country.

In Libya, 17 allies and partner nations have taken on the new responsibility of helping the Libyan people determine their own destiny in an operation that prevents illicit flows of arms by air and sea, polices a no-fly zone, and protects civilians in Libya against attack by Muammar el-Qaddafi’s brutal regime.

At the same time, NATO is countering the scourge of piracy off the coast of Africa, and conducting counterterrorism activities in the Mediterranean. NATO is also training Iraq’s security forces. And it continues its long-standing commitment to stabilize the Balkans.

Today’s NATO is an alliance that is busier than ever, an alliance that works with more partners than ever, and an alliance that is more needed by more people than ever.

The reasons are clear. We live in a world of complex and unpredictable challenges and threats to security. In this world, the local has gone global. Cyberattacks transit time zones in nanoseconds — disrupting bank operations, government activities and even teenage gaming. Weapons of mass destruction and the means to make and deliver them are proliferating wide and far. Instability in distant countries enables transnational terrorist groups to find safe havens and launch attacks close to home.

In such a world, we need strong alliances and partnerships — and none is stronger and more needed than today’s NATO. That is why it is so important that all of the alliance’s members invest in and possess the defense capabilities necessary to meet our collective responsibilities.

As Defense Secretary Robert Gates said during his visit to Brussels last week, this should include serious efforts to protect defense budgets, coordinate procurement decisions, and follow through on our commitments to NATO and each other.

Which brings us back to Mr. Wheatcroft’s question. Although the Cold War is definitely over, we all still need NATO.

Just ask the citizens of Libya and Afghanistan, and the peoples of Europe and North America, who are among the hundreds of millions relying on NATO to secure a peaceful present — and a better future.

No European should be surprised at the resentful words spoken in Brussels last week by Robert Gates, the departing U.S. defense secretary. Americans have been grumbling about the failure of the European partners in NATO to pull their weight almost since the organization was founded in 1949.

“Because we had had our troops there, the Europeans had not done their share,” President Eisenhower said. “They won’t make the sacrifices to provide the soldiers for their own defense.”

But there is more to it. If the relationship of the United States with Europe in NATO included a dubious bargain from the start, the treaty organization did at least once have a clear purpose.

Now, if Americans are going to ask why they should pay three-quarters of the cost of NATO at a time of “politically painful budget and benefit cuts,” in Gates’s words, then Europeans might respond with a more existential question: Just what is the purpose of the organization any more? Who needs NATO?

Once upon a time there was a simple answer. The object of NATO, said General Lord Ismay, its first secretary general, was “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down” (if only we had public servants today with that kind of pith and candor!).

Whether the Americans wanted to stay had been in some doubt. It was widely apprehended that the United States might withdraw after 1945, as it had done after 1918. There were those like Senator Robert Taft, a leading Republican in his day, who opposed American membership of NATO. “Peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations,” Thomas Jefferson had counseled the American people in his first inaugural address, “entangling alliances with none.” And NATO was an entangling alliance if ever there was.

But most Americans accepted that the goal of keeping the Russians out was worth the price, which meant that the Americans picked up a disproportionate share of the tab. That was not only understandable but inevitable. At the end of the war, the United States was the outstanding winner, having suffered relatively minor casualties and material damage by comparison with devastated Europe, and having undergone an astonishing wartime economic boom, which only highlighted European impoverishment.

Over the postwar course of what the French called les trente glorieuses and the Germans the Wirtschaftswunder , Western Europe enjoyed its own economic transformation. And this miracle of free-market growth was combined — in Europe, that is, with a strong system of public welfare.

By European standards, the United States had the most rudimentary welfare services, and still has. President Obama struggled to introduce a healthcare scheme which, even in its fuller version, would have been rejected by most European conservative parties as too right-wing. And yet, by paying for NATO, the Americans indirectly subsidized Europe’s much more lavish welfare.

The later outcome was still stranger, and even more unsatisfactory. Forty years after it was founded, NATO triumphed. Not only was West Europe saved, not only did the Red Army never cross the Elbe, but the Cold War ended in total victory for the West without a shot fired. The Berlin Wall fell, the Soviet Union imploded, and its satrapies in Eastern Europe were liberated.

At which point the question might have been asked what NATO was now for. Alas, as is so often the case, an institution which had out lived its original purpose had to think of new things to do — like expanding eastward to include the former Warsaw Pact countries.

This was a betrayal of a specific undertaking Washington had given to the Russians. And it also illustrated again the baleful effect of American domestic politics: President Clinton impulsively promised that Poland could join NATO while addressing a Polish-American audience in Chicago.

Altogether, that eastern expansion was a fine example of what’s called an answer without a question. But it was also hypocritical nonsense. It was all very well lightheartedly to admit Latvia to NATO. But did anyone really believe that if Russian troops crossed the border near Karsava, France, Germany or the United States would shed blood for Latvia?

Other new tasks for NATO, quite unimagined by its founders, were “liberal intervention” and “nation-building.”

Whether or not a military response in the former Yugoslavia was desirable, it’s hard to see what it had to do with NATO. Under the crucial Article 5 of the 1949 treaty, the members agreed that “an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all,” and whatever else Milosovic and Mladic might be accused of, they had not attacked any NATO member.

Then came Sept. 11. What happened in New York was certainly an armed attack on a member, though not by a recognizable state. And, once again, the American-led military response under the aegis of NATO could scarcely be justified by the treaty. That same article said that a member attacked could expect the assistance of other members, “including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area .” By what geographical sleight of hand did that come to include the Pamirs?

For all the compromises, NATO did originally represent a fair balance of interests, but that cannot be said of the Afghan war. If Americans complain about having to pay most of the cost of the alliance, Europeans could reply that that’s only fair if NATO is going to be little more than the American Foreign Legion.

A new height of dangerous absurdity came with the short-lived conflict between Georgia and Russia. Hillary Clinton — in electioneering rather than State Department mode — had already demanded that both Ukraine and Georgia should be admitted to NATO, prompting the question how Washington would have felt if Leonid Brezhnev had invited Mexico and Cuba to join the Warsaw Pact.

Then during that crisis in the summer of 2008, David Cameron struck his own attitudes. The Conservative opposition leader, who would be prime minister within two years, flew to Tbilisi and demanded that Georgia should be admitted to NATO forthwith, which bizarre suggestion, if taken seriously, might have precipitated an international war.

A voice of sanity was heard from Sir Malcolm Rifkind, a former Tory foreign secretary, who said how foolish it was to make threats which were not going to be carried out. As Rifkind rightly said, “The U.S., Britain and France would not go to war with [Russia] to force South Ossetia back into Georgia.”

A slow learner, it would seem, Cameron has now led the way for the NATO intervention in Libya, along with Nicolas Sarkozy, who had also flown to Georgia in 2008 to rattle his own flimsy sabre.

Quite apart from the fact that, as our top brass keep telling us, yet another operation puts an intolerable strain on military resources, which the Cameron government is cutting fiercely, this has gone awry with alarming speed, while its justification has also quickly changed. A mission to protect life became an intervention in a civil war, or one more war to effect regime change.

Much mental energy has been expended on debating what the purpose of the European Union is and how its problems could be resolved. The question is even more pertinent about NATO. Is it really needed any more? If not, wouldn’t it be wiser to call it a day.

La interacción del proceso de globalización y la Gran Recesión han puesto de relieve el marcado contraste de la limitada capacidad de las sociedades y Gobiernos nacionales frente a la extraordinaria ampliación de la esfera de influencia de las empresas multinacionales y los centros de poder económico. El desfase entre el ritmo acelerado de la globalización económica (especialmente financiera) y la lenta o deficiente respuesta regulatoria ha creado grandes brechas de gobernabilidad que es ineludible abordar si se quiere avanzar hacia una prosperidad sostenible y una globalización inclusiva. No se puede continuar como si nada hubiera pasado, apuntalando el statu quo, con el riesgo de volver a caer en lo mismo, según alertaba recientemente el director general de la OCDE, Ángel Gurría, en estas mismas páginas (EL PAÍS, 25 de mayo). Hay que innovar e introducir cambios sustantivos en la manera de producir, de consumir y de gobernar. Para que estos cambios sean efectivos han de tener dimensión global.

Es hora de dejar atrás viejos y falsos dilemas excluyentes. Necesitamos más calidad de todo: más Estado democrático de derecho y más políticas públicas redistributivas que promuevan la equidad y la inclusión social; más mercados abiertos y competitivos que creen empleos productivos, fomenten la innovación y generen prosperidad; y más sociedad civil participativa que desempeñe labores de supervisión ciudadana de los Gobiernos y de las empresas mediante la exigencia de transparencia y rendición de cuentas. Sobre todo, es necesario crear mecanismos eficaces de coordinación de la gobernanza global que permitan agregar capacidad política a nivel nacional, regional y multilateral y, a la vez, promuevan la formación de robustas coaliciones internacionales de la sociedad civil para facilitar su participación y escrutinio en la toma de decisiones.

A menos que se quiera seguir insistiendo en la ficción de considerar el ámbito económico-financiero y el funcionamiento de los mercados como “moralmente neutros”, resulta necesario tener en cuenta criterios de naturaleza ética a la hora de evaluar los resultados de la acción de los diversos agentes económicos, incluido su impacto sobre los derechos humanos. Parece indudable que la naturaleza de la crisis ilustra claramente la necesidad de desligarse de la búsqueda de un irrestricto interés individual si se aspira a construir una sociedad digna, basada en lo que Adam Smith también reclamó en su Teoría de los sentimientos morales como la práctica del public spirit para promover el interés común.

La considerable acumulación de poder económico, fruto de la globalización, ha generado en correspondencia una creciente demanda social de fortalecimiento de los poderes democráticos y de regeneración ética. La alta dosis de irresponsabilidad en la gestación de la crisis, la impunidad de los principales perpetradores y sus devastadores efectos sociales (desempleo, desigualdad y exclusión) no han hecho sino acentuar estas expectativas. La responsabilidad corporativa se ve así interpelada por un fuerte imperativo de carácter ético, que trasciende el marco de obligaciones legales y demanda un compromiso social. Para que este compromiso sea efectivo deberá estar integrado en las estrategias empresariales a largo plazo y tener en cuenta tanto las exigencias de sus accionistas y la competencia como las repercusiones sobre los grupos de interés concernidos (stakeholders). Cada vez más, se admite la necesidad de una regulación preventiva y eficaz que incorpore una evaluación de las potenciales consecuencias de la actividad económica en los entornos sociales y ambientales, más allá de la cuenta de resultados a corto plazo. El impacto sobre los derechos humanos está ocupando el centro del debate actual y, de este modo, la responsabilidad social corporativa se ha ido situando en un espacio, cada vez más amplio, entre las normas legales y las expectativas sociales.

Disponemos ya de instrumentos operativos para ir cubriendo algunas de las brechas de la gobernanza global en este ámbito. Desde la pasada década, los marcos conceptuales y la experiencia práctica de la responsabilidad social empresarial cuentan ya con un importante acervo, gracias a la iniciativa multilateral promovida por las Naciones Unidas con el Pacto Mundial (2000) y el subsiguiente mandato del Representante Especial del Secretario General de la ONU sobre Empresas y Derechos Humanos (2005-2011), que han facilitado un amplio proceso de diálogo y evaluación con representantes de los Gobiernos, las empresas y la sociedad civil de una amplia gama de países, incluidos los países emergentes. La labor de investigación y consulta del representante especial John Ruggie ha cambiado la naturaleza del debate, evitando el exceso de doctrinarismo y confrontación ideológica de las etapas anteriores para situarlo en un nuevo contexto que combina los principios éticos con un pragmatismo eficaz.

La renovada agenda internacional sobre empresas y derechos humanos impulsada por Naciones Unidas está basada en un marco comprehensivo de políticas (policy framework) para proteger, respetar y remediar, con el objetivo de guiar la acción de los Estados, de las empresas y de la sociedad civil en la prevención y evaluación de riesgos, y, en su caso, hacer frente a los impactos negativos derivados de la actividad económica en los derechos humanos. El marco descansa en tres pilares: la obligación de los Estados de proteger los derechos humanos; la responsabilidad de las empresas de respetarlos, actuando con diligencia para prevenir que sus actividades puedan infringir los derechos de terceros y responder de los impactos negativos que puedan ocasionar; la existencia de mecanismos efectivos, judiciales y no judiciales, para remediar los abusos y reparar a las víctimas (http://www.business-humanrights.org/SpecialRepPortal/Home).

Los principios rectores y las recomendaciones destinadas a la puesta en práctica de este marco de políticas serán presentados ante el Consejo de Derechos Humanos de las Naciones Unidas en la próxima sesión del mes de junio. El marco ha recibido ya el apoyo de un amplio espectro de Gobiernos, empresas, organismos internacionales (entre ellos la OCDE) y organizaciones de la sociedad civil. No obstante, algunas de estas últimas han señalado la necesidad de una especificación más precisa de las obligaciones de los Estados de proteger y la responsabilidad de las empresas de respetar, así como de una mayor cobertura de los mecanismos de reparación de los abusos, incluida la posibilidad de aplicación de instrumentos de derecho internacional en el ámbito extraterritorial, en relación con la actividad de las empresas multinacionales. Asimismo, se aboga por el establecimiento de mecanismos sólidos de supervisión que estén institucionalizados dentro del sistema de derechos humanos de la ONU, como la creación de uno o más procedimientos especiales relativos a las empresas y los derechos humanos, con objeto de reforzar su alcance normativo.

En cualquier caso, la culminación del mandato del representante especial John Ruggie representa un hito, tanto en el desarrollo conceptual como en la aplicación operativa de la responsabilidad social corporativa en materia de derechos humanos. Al comienzo de su labor, hace seis años, Gobiernos, empresas y representantes de la sociedad civil, estaban situados en una especie de “guerra de trincheras” y no existía un vocabulario común, ni principios sobre los que construir un espacio de confianza mutua. Ahora, estos mismos actores disponen de un contrastado acervo de conocimientos y lecciones aprendidas (de buenas y malas prácticas), así como de una plataforma para la acción concertada. La utilización de este nuevo instrumento multilateral de soft law permite poder avanzar a corto y medio plazo de forma gradual y acumulativa, sin descartar desarrollos más ambiciosos a largo plazo.

Como ha señalado el propio Ruggie, el objetivo estratégico del marco para proteger, respetar y remediar es: “lograr la máxima reducción de daños ocasionados por los impactos negativos de la actividad económica en los derechos humanos, en el menor tiempo posible”. El respaldo del Consejo de Derechos Humanos de la ONU es una gran oportunidad de empezar a cerrar una de las brechas más críticas de la gobernanza global.

Turquía se unió a la OTAN a principios de la Guerra Fría para obtener la protección de Estados Unidos en caso de un ataque soviético. En aquel entonces, Turquía se puso claramente en la primera línea; hoy, sin embargo, sus dirigentes están impulsando activamente una política exterior y de seguridad independiente, y su creciente confianza está poniendo a prueba la cohesión de la Alianza.

Mientras tanto, la cooperación entre la OTAN y la Unión Europea sigue estancada, debido a la disputa con Turquía sobre el Chipre dividido. Más aún, en agudo contraste con la mayoría de los miembros de la OTAN, Turquía sostiene que Irán y Siria no deben ser vistos como una amenaza. Y, en el punto álgido de la crisis de Libia, mientras los funcionarios de la OTAN preparaban planes operativos de intervención, el Primer Ministro de Turquía Recep Tayyip Erdogan hacía declaraciones en contra de la acción militar.

Como resultado, algunos dicen ahora que Turquía está dando la espalda a Occidente. Pero sería más exacto decir que Turquía está ampliando su alcance. Turquía, de hecho, puede generar tensiones dentro de la OTAN, pero su posición representa un astuto equilibrio entre la lealtad a la Alianza y el cuidado apropiado de sus propios intereses nacionales.

Cambios geopolíticos como el final de la Guerra Fría y, últimamente, el impulso a la democracia en el Oriente Medio, junto con el deseo de tener “cero problemas” con los países vecinos de Turquía, han creado nuevos objetivos para los estrategas de política exterior turca. De hecho, los líderes turcos están reduciendo la importancia de los problemas de seguridad de “poder duro” en favor de aumentar el poder blando del país, aprovechando al mismo tiempo las oportunidades económicas.

Una consecuencia principal de esta “des-securitización” de la política exterior de Turquía ha sido una alteración del equilibrio de poder entre las instituciones militares y civiles del país. Una consecuencia no menos importante es el cambio en la relación entre Turquía y Occidente.

En los últimos años, la colaboración para la defensa constituía un pilar de las relaciones de Turquía con Occidente. Pero se trataba de una relación asimétrica, en la que Turquía, como consumidor de seguridad, dependía en gran medida de Occidente. Las opciones de política exterior de Turquía se veían limitadas por la necesidad de mantenerse alineada con la de su proveedor de seguridad.

Hoy en día, sin embargo, la disminución de las percepciones de amenaza han modificado de manera fundamental este punto de vista y han reducido la necesidad de Turquía de actuar al unísono con Occidente. Por otra parte, la menor preocupación de Turquía por su integridad territorial ha disminuido considerablemente la influencia de Occidente. El aflojamiento de la relación de seguridad ha dado una mayor libertad a Turquía en política exterior.

Sin embargo, sería erróneo afirmar que Turquía se está alejando de la OTAN. Turquía sigue siendo un miembro activo e influyente, y espera beneficiarse lo más posible de ser parte de la alianza. Tiene un compromiso con la OTAN y su presupuesto militar cumple más o menos el criterio de gasto de defensa de la OTAN del 2% del PIB. También compromete tropas a las operaciones de la OTAN, en particular para la operación ISAF en Afganistán. El papel de Turquía en la Alianza es más activo que el de la gran mayoría de los demás Estados miembros.

Turquía está presionando a la alianza para adaptarse a los nuevos retos de seguridad y, sin embargo, se mantiene firme en su adhesión a las políticas de uso compartido de recursos nucleares de la OTAN. Turquía es uno de los seis países de la OTAN que han albergado armas tácticas nucleares de los EE.UU. por más de 40 años, incluidas 90 bombas de gravedad B61. La disponibilidad de las armas nucleares que hay en su territorio -una cuestión de semanas o meses en lugar de horas- ofrece poco valor estratégico. Sin embargo, Turquía siempre ha argumentado que una capacidad de disuasión nuclear creíble de la OTAN es vital para la defensa colectiva de la alianza.

En efecto, la posición de Turquía se encuentra en contradicción con los tres países de Europa Occidental – Bélgica, Alemania y los Países Bajos – en la actualidad piden una retirada de las armas nucleares de los EE.UU. de su territorio. Turquía insiste en que tales decisiones no se pueden tomar de manera unilateral, y que es necesario un consenso de la OTAN en su conjunto para cambiar este elemento fundamental de la disuasión nuclear de la alianza.

Turquía también participa activamente en la revisión en curso de las capacidades de disuasión de la OTAN, cuyo objetivo es lograr un equilibrio entre las capacidades nucleares y convencionales de la Alianza, y también apunta a aclarar el papel de defensa antimisiles en este contexto. Las autoridades turcas dicen que no se opondrían a un programa que fortalezca la seguridad de la OTAN. Pero temen el despliegue de un sistema de defensa antimisiles dirigido exclusivamente a los vecinos de Turquía.

Como resultado, los líderes turcos han establecido tres condiciones para aceptar dicho programa. En primer lugar, el sistema debe tener en cuenta los riesgos de seguridad actuales, basándose en la capacidad de misiles existentes de los países que no pertenecen a la OTAN. En segundo lugar, debe cubrir todo el territorio de Turquía. Por último, ya que Turquía no tiene ningún deseo de ser un estado en “primera línea de conflicto” en Oriente Próximo, como lo fue durante la Guerra Fría, se opone vigorosamente a que Irán y Siria sean identificados como amenazas directas.

Hoy en día, Turquía considera su pertenencia a la OTAN como sólo un aspecto de su política de seguridad más amplia. Su gobierno busca desempeñar un papel importante en los asuntos mundiales y, en consecuencia, sus políticas no siempre coinciden con las de la mayoría de los miembros de la OTAN. En última instancia, sin embargo, los líderes turcos no tienen ninguna intención de socavar la cohesión y eficacia de la OTAN. Por el contrario, su objetivo es afirmar la posición de Turquía en la OTAN para que la Alianza refleje mejor sus propios objetivos.

At Wednesday’s meeting of NATO defense ministers with their Russian counterpart, the Western alliance will seek to win Russian support for and cooperation in a European missile-defense system.

Moscow’s assent would constitute a major step toward rapprochement between NATO and its former enemy, advancing the cause of anchoring Russia firmly in the Euro-Atlantic community.

Moscow is no longer vehemently denouncing any and all U.S. talk of missile defense and instead appears ready to explore ways to merge its own evolving system with NATO’s. Nonetheless, the issue is far from settled and, if not managed carefully, has the potential to scuttle the progress already made in resetting Russia relations with the West.

The nub of the problem is that Moscow fears that NATO’s missile-defense system could eventually threaten the efficacy of Russia’s nuclear deterrent.

Although Washington has made amply clear that the system is targeted against Iranian missiles and that it would in no way degrade Russia’s deterrent, Moscow remains unconvinced. It has therefore asked for binding assurances that would limit the scope of NATO’s system. Washington justifiably rejects the notion that Russia should dictate the parameters of NATO missile defense — the mere suggestion of which is enough to prompt a riot on Capitol Hill.

The United States has sought to alleviate Moscow’s concerns by making Russia a stakeholder in the evolving system. Through sharing technology and building linkages between the NATO system and Russia’s, Washington contends that Russia would be able to divine the benign nature of U.S. plans and enjoy the additive benefits of working with the NATO system.

Russia, however, envisages a level of cooperation that goes well beyond what NATO has in mind. The U.S. is prepared to share only so much sensitive technology with Russia, and NATO would hardly countenance arrangements that would give Russia operational control of its system. Especially for NATO members hailing from Central Europe, sharing privileged technology or command authority with Russia is tantamount to letting the fox in the hen-house.

Wednesday’s NATO-Russia dialogue will hardly resolve this stalemate. The bottom line is that Russia does not yet trust the United States or NATO enough to give a green light to Washington’s plans. Nor do Washington and its NATO allies trust Russia enough to fling open their doors and make Russia an equal partner in their missile-defense system.

Nonetheless, NATO and Russia should map out a concrete work plan that enables them to gradually build common ground on missile defense. Already in the works is an effort to draw up a legal framework for increased sharing of technology between the United States and Russia. Once in place, this arrangement would enhance the transparency of NATO’s missile-defense plans and give Russia more confidence in U.S. intentions.

NATO and Russia should also establish “fusion” centers where they can share relevant data, coordinate missile threat alerts and even exchange information on targeting inceptors. Establishing a joint research center on missile defense offers another vehicle for deepening NATO-Russia collaboration.

Orchestrating a breakthrough on missile defense will require more than incremental progress on technological and operational cooperation. Such progress must be backstopped by a broader effort to continue deepening ties between Russia and the West.

For starters, both parties should make more of the NATO-Russian Council, the main forum for consultations between the alliance and Moscow. NATO members must do a much better job of making the council a vehicle for real give and take and the incorporation of Russian concerns into NATO decisions.

In return, Russia must stop using the forum for theatrical obstruction and instead capitalize on the opportunity for deliberation and cooperation.

NATO and Russia can also deepen mutual confidence and trust by advancing concrete collaboration on many fronts. Russia can enhance its assistance to NATO’s efforts in Afghanistan. Having succeeded in concluding the New Start Treaty to reduce their nuclear arsenals, the United States and Russia can now focus on conventional arms control. More contact between U.S. and Russian armed forces would be especially helpful in diluting the mutual suspicions left behind by the Cold War. In addition, there is plenty of room for more NATO-Russia cooperation on peacekeeping, naval operations to combat piracy and drug trafficking and cybersecurity.

The United States and the European Union should continue to develop their economic linkages with Russia. The more integrated Russia is into Western markets the greater incentive it has to lay to rest its strategic rivalry with the West. Finalizing Russia’s entry into the World Trade Organization would advance this agenda.

Should NATO and Russia succeed in reaching an accommodation on missile defense, there will still be tough disagreements ahead, including over the future of NATO enlargement and the status of Georgia’s breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Nonetheless, a durable reconciliation between NATO and Russia is as last becoming a realistic prospect. A deal on missile defense is not yet at hand. But Wednesday’s meeting can help lay the foundation for that deal, moving Europe closer to finally including Russia in the post-Cold War settlement.

Missile weapons and technologies are becoming ever more available, and a growing number of countries are interested in acquiring them. For some, this is because missile technologies are closely linked with delivering weapons of mass destruction.

Clearly we should analyze the motives of certain countries that seek these weapons. And we should continue examining what Western countries and Russia can do together to successfully address the proliferation of W.M.D. and means of its delivery. By its nature, this question is more political and diplomatic than military-technical.

Before creating ballistic-missile defense (B.M.D.) systems and investing billions of dollars, it is important to understand the motivation of those who try to develop W.M.D. and missile weapons at all costs. Are these “bad guys” so bad that they entertain ideas of a perfidious attack against Old Europe? Or do they want to raise their international clout and become members of the nuclear club by such perverse means?

Or, perhaps, are these countries trying to thwart foreign aggression? Iraq is a good example. The country was attacked under the pretext that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction. Washington knew this was not true, and despite that, decided to send its soldiers on a land operation. The problem is that other countries, not willing to share the fate of the Iraqi dictator, might now attempt to get hold of weapons of mass destruction and missiles.

Nonetheless, Russia does recognize the fact that missile challenges are gradually becoming a risk and a reality. This conclusion can be drawn from the Lisbon summit commitments made by Russia and NATO in November 2010. The Russian position is simple: European missile defenses should be based on equal participation and a common indivisible security for all the countries of the continent.

This means that European missile defenses should be a smart system, not overpriced, using pooled resources and protecting all European nations. It should be located in regions potentially at risk from missiles, i.e. the south. Why play “Star Wars” in northern Europe, where there are no threats?

President Dmitri Medvedev has made it clear that Russia is ready to conduct a comprehensive joint analysis of a framework for cooperation in this sphere. He has suggested that this project should be based on equality, transparency, technology and responsibility. He also put forward the idea of creating a “sectoral” ballistic-missile defense, with participants assuming responsibility for specific areas.

Russia views future cooperation with NATO on missile defenses as an intermediate stage of building a strategic partnership with the alliance — the goal defined at the Lisbon summit meeting.

Real cooperation should help us get rid of the nightmares and phobia of the Cold War. It would give us a common task — an important and sophisticated one from both political and technological points of view. Our work would result in solid security and the restoration of European unity.

Russia and NATO should be completely sincere and honest with each other in creating the European B.M.D. There is no place for double standards. So to begin joint work we should give each other legal and political guarantees of mutual security.

Russia does not want U.S. anti-missile defenses to extend to our territory, especially to its North European part, because should a negative scenario develop, this could upset the strategic balance of forces between our country and the United States. The missile-defense system should not be used against each other. For Russia it is a matter of principle to remove any threat to its strategic capabilities, which guarantee our sovereignty and independence.

The United States should ensure that its anti-missile capabilities are not aimed against Russian national interests. We are not yet aware what the architecture and parameters of the future European B.M.D. are. But we do know what they should not be. Proposed as a project capable of alleviating threats for Europe in the future, this anti-missile shield should not create new threats far more serious than the notorious “Iranian missile threat.”

Moreover, a joint European missile-defense system will inevitably lead to abandoning military planning against each other, which will dramatically enhance mutual trust between Russia and the West. Conversely, a missile-defense system without Russia would return us to bloc politics, mutual suspicion and a new European arms race.

We suggest creating a common perimeter of missile defense with all ballistic-missile defense capabilities pointed outside the Euro-Atlantic region. It should be geared primarily for areas that could pose threats, and these in reality can only emanate from the south.

Russia counts on European states to show an active interest in this project. It is about the protection of Europe, and the stance of an idle observer that European diplomacy has assumed up to now is not quite clear to me.

We need a broad, expert discussion on a European ballistic-missile defense system, which could include the establishment of a group of “European wise men.” The European B.M.D. project should be based on equal cooperation of all countries of the Continent.

Convinced of the historic necessity to preserve peace in Europe, Russia is trying to understand what exactly we were offered in Lisbon: lasting friendship or a redesign of ideas from the former U.S. administration implying the creation of a third positioning area for a global U.S. ballistic-missile defense, which Moscow has vigorously opposed. The security of the entire Euro-Atlantic region depends on the answer to this question.

The dramatic developments across North Africa and the Middle East remind me of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War. From Tunis to Cairo to Benghazi, people overcame fear to embrace freedom. Some governments in the region have taken important steps to meet the rightful demands of their citizens. Others realized their time was up and moved aside. But I was appalled to see that in some countries, and especially in Libya, the call for freedom and dignity has been met with state violence.

NATO’s reaction to the crisis in Libya has been quick and resolute. In March, acting under the authority of an historic United Nations Security Council Resolution, the alliance took overall command of military operations to protect the Libyan people against Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi’s outrageous attacks. Working together with partners, including from the region, we have made significant progress in degrading Qaddafi’s ability to attack civilians and to lay siege to cities.

Some people have asked why NATO acted in Libya but not elsewhere, in particular in Syria. My answer is clear. We took action in Libya because we have a strong mandate from the Security Council and solid support from countries in the region. That is a unique combination which we have not seen elsewhere.

Three months ago, nobody would have predicted a NATO operation in North Africa. But NATO allies have long understood that our security is closely tied to that of our southern neighbors. That is why it also makes perfect sense to consider how we can help North Africa and the Middle East become a region that is free, democratic, and stable.

First, we will sustain our efforts to fulfill the United Nations mandate to protect the Libyan people. We will continue operations until all attacks and threats of attack against civilians have ended; until the regime has verifiably withdrawn its forces and mercenaries back to their bases; and until full, safe and unhindered humanitarian access is guaranteed to all the people in Libya in need of assistance.

However, there is no solely military solution to this conflict. The only lasting solution will be a political one that responds to the legitimate aspirations of the Libyan people. NATO allies and partners will keep up the pressure to pave the way for such a solution. As the Contact Group and the recent G-8 summit made clear, the question is not if Qaddafi will go, but when.

Second, President Obama has already announced a far-reaching policy to support democratic reform and economic development in North Africa and the Middle East. The European Union could also have a major role to play. NATO, too, can make a unique contribution. Many allies went through demanding reforms after their own revolutions over 20 years ago and have a wealth of experience to share. Modern defense and security institutions which are fully accountable to democratically elected authorities will be a vital reform priority for Libya and many other countries in the region.

Finally, the Arab Spring has shown the importance of intensifying our political dialogue. NATO already has two partnership frameworks that bring together the 28 allies with many countries of the region: our Mediterranean Dialogue with Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia, and our Istanbul Cooperation Initiative with Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. They form an excellent basis to discuss common security concerns, develop common responses, and build lasting trust between our nations. We are open and stand ready to include other countries. A democratic Libya, if it were interested, would be a most welcome new partner.

As an alliance of democracies, we believe that fundamental values are the true foundation for stability. That is why I am convinced that lasting stability, security and prosperity across North Africa and the Middle East can only be possible once all the people of the region enjoy the fundamental values that we all cherish: freedom, democracy and human rights.

As the third month of military operations begins, the NATO-led efforts to protect civilians in Libya are subject to a vast array of questions. The most important is whether political leaders are fully cognizant of the inherent limits of military force in achieving humanitarian goals. Whether it is called “kinetic military action” or “war,” all combat is subject to fog and friction in a contest of wills — even when the ultimate purpose is defending innocent bystanders.

One of the paradoxes of using military force to achieve humanitarian goals is that when less than vital national interests are involved, the avoidance of friendly military casualties becomes an imperative.

This dynamic increases the risk to the civilians who are being defended. For example, aircraft fly at higher altitudes to reduce the threat of being shot down and thus make it harder for pilots to distinguish enemy military units from innocent civilians and reduces the accuracy of weapons dropped or launched from the air.

The most effective way of protecting civilians is usually to interpose highly capable military forces on the ground between the objects of protection and their attackers. Yet as has been glaringly evident in the public debates about the ongoing Libyan operations, there is great reluctance to use ground forces because of the fear that they will themselves become casualties or hostages.

If land forces are indeed committed, they face decisions about minimizing deadly force and accepting a much higher threat to their own lives. When uncertain about enemy locations, do they perform “reconnaissance by fire” or expose themselves to a potential ambush by first sending patrols to take a look? When a building must be cleared, shall troops be limited to using small arms at much greater risk to themselves or do they employ tanks, artillery fire and close air support as they would during conventional combat operations and thereby increase the risk to civilians?

When the reason for a military operation is to protect the innocent, the phrase “collateral damage” is insidious when applied to civilian casualties. The primary objective of a mission cannot, by definition, be something collateral. Yet whether directly (civilians accidently struck by “friendly fire”) or indirectly (civilians succumb from lack of medical care, food or sanitation in the combat zone), civilian casualties are inevitable during extended armed conflict. The longer the conflict, the greater the number civilian casualties.

This is the extraordinary challenge of humanitarian military intervention and increases the moral hazard for those who are making the decisions about what levels of risk to intervening military forces and to civilians are acceptable. Without other, arguably broader, national interests to pursue, the question of net benefit is central: how many civilian lives will it cost in comparison to how many saved? This is an extremely problematic calculation.

Additionally, military force is also a surprisingly poor tool for shaping the behavior of other countries, except when only their peripheral interests are involved. When a regime perceives that its very survival is at stake, it is almost impossible to get it to change its ways through military attacks on its marginal capabilities. It is not enough to degrade its armed forces and to eliminate command, communications and intelligence nodes. A much more brutal and concerted effort with overwhelming force is necessary.

Defeating an “implacable foe,” as the American military theorist General Huba Wass de Czege has written, requires eliminating its ability to continue the fight. Historically, this has meant the introduction of ground troops because “only close combat can absolutely foreclose the enemy’s ability to delay defeat.”

Many ardent advocates of intervention in Libya when U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973 was debated are now surprised that the operation has drawn out for this long. When justifying the initial involvement of their armed forces, national leaders spoke of days or weeks to complete the mission, not months and certainly not years. However, the U.N. Resolution specifically excludes a “foreign occupation force,” there is no consensus within NATO for sending ground forces, and the Arab states show little interest in providing troops.

Absent the introduction of ground forces or a lucky strike that eliminates Muammar el-Qaddafi, the conflict is likely to draw out for many years, as we’ve seen in Somalia, Darfur and Iraq during the interval between the first and second Gulf Wars. Contrary to the theories of air power enthusiasts, experience shows that protecting civilians or forcing regime change via bombing alone is very unlikely.

Madeleine Albright famously asked Colin Powell, “What’s the point of having this superb military that you’ve always been talking about if we can’t use it?” The ugly truth is that military force can be very effective when the purpose is to kill people and break things. However, its utility is much more limited when it comes to tasks that are poorly suited to its nature.

La adopción el pasado marzo por el Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas de su resolución 1973 perseguía poner coto a las atrocidades perpetradas por el régimen de Gadafi contra su propio pueblo. Significó la aplicación práctica del principio de la “responsabilidad de proteger”, propiciado desde finales de los años noventa por la Asamblea General y por dos secretarios generales de la Organización, el actual Ban ki Moon y su predecesor, Kofi Annan.

El impulso onusiano lo inició Annan en 1998, empeñado en calificar la protección de los civiles como “imperativo humanitario”. Eran los años inmediatamente posteriores a aquellos en que 800.000 ruandeses fueron masacrados en apenas 100 días y en que 5.000.000 de personas perdieron la vida en el Congo, Burundi, Sudán y África Occidental. Y también aquellos en que la disolución de Yugoslavia causó casi 300.000 muertos y generó un nuevo y siniestro concepto: limpieza étnica.

Ante un panorama tal, no es de extrañar que el secretario general y su equipo -escépticos sobre los buenos deseos institucionales de la Carta de San Francisco- se movilizaran para procurar evitar que las guerras y los conflictos de índole diversa continúen infligiendo a la humanidad sufrimientos indecibles. De ahí que en 2000, Annan proclamara que “si la intervención humanitaria es, en efecto, un inaceptable asalto a la soberanía, ¿cómo debemos responder a Ruanda, a Srebrenica, a las graves y sistemáticas violaciones de los derechos humanos que ofenden a nuestra común humanidad?”.

La doctrina de la responsabilidad de proteger fue asumida por la Asamblea General y, lo que es más importante, por el Consejo de Seguridad en su Resolución 1674 (2006). Todo ello ha hecho posible la intervención en Libia. Ahora bien, ¿por qué Libia sí y Siria no? ¿Acaso había masacres en Libia y no las hay en Siria? Al contrario. La agresión cruel, despiadada e indiscriminada contra civiles sirios (que ni siquiera disponen de armas, a diferencia de los rebeldes libios) ha alcanzado ya en Siria niveles superiores a los de Libia. Reinan el terror y la crueldad. ¿Acaso no hay razón para invocar y poner en práctica la responsabilidad de proteger, como en Libia?

El cinismo del Gobierno sirio es insultante. Su embajador en la ONU dice que “las autoridades han demostrado máxima contención” y que la violencia, agitada por “fuerzas extranjeras”, está causada por “grupos extremistas que quieren derribar al Gobierno”. Estos días se acusa a Occidente de doble moral, de doble rasero: sí en Libia, no en Siria.

Da la impresión de que Europa y Estados Unidos recelan de una Siria sin la familia Asad. Que Israel prefiere a esta -con la que mantiene desde hace décadas una relación de útil enemistad contenida- a un impreciso futuro. No obstante, el fracaso de la reunión sobre Siria del Consejo de Seguridad (29-04-2011) no se debió a “Occidente” sino a “Oriente”. En concreto, a China y Rusia, pero sobre todo a esta última, aliada estratégica de Siria. Empero, hay que destacar que ambas estuvieron arropadas, entre otros, por Brasil o Líbano, quienes esgrimieron el argumento de la necesaria estabilidad de la zona.

La Resolución 1296 (2000) del Consejo de Seguridad estableció que “la deliberada selección de poblaciones civiles como objetivo y la comisión de violaciones sistemáticas y flagrantes del derecho internacional humanitario (…) pueden constituir una amenaza a la paz y la seguridad internacionales”. Pues bien, en la reunión del Consejo del 29 de abril, el embajador ruso argumentó que “la actual situación en Siria, a pesar del aumento de la tensión, no representa una amenaza para la paz y seguridad internacionales. La verdadera amenaza para la seguridad regional podría producirse como consecuencia de una injerencia externa en Siria”.

La reafirmación de la responsabilidad de proteger que ha supuesto la resolución 1973 no debe ser socavada por la inacción del Consejo a propósito de Siria. El papel de la Liga Árabe fue clave para lograr el consenso en el caso libio. Europa y Estados Unidos deben convencer a los dirigentes árabes de que la complicidad o el silencio con un régimen que actúa como lo hace el de Damasco acabará perjudicándoles a ellos. No es necesario ser una democracia para desmarcarse de la masacre que está cometiendo la familia Asad. Una actuación decidida de los Estados árabes obligaría a Rusia y China a reconsiderar su actual postura.

No cabe duda de que tanto la defensa de la humanidad como la de la soberanía son principios rectores de las Naciones Unidas y que la dificultad estriba en cómo discernir cuál de ellos debe prevalecer cuando colisionan entre sí. En cualquier caso, los Estados que están impidiendo la actuación del Consejo de Seguridad en Siria -en especial Rusia- deben explicar por qué los sirios -a diferencia de los libios- no merecen ser protegidos por el Consejo. Asimismo, aquellos que alegan el temor a la inestabilidad como causa para la inacción deben convencerse de que la estabilidad será genuina cuando las vidas y haciendas de los ciudadanos sirios estén garantizadas y los responsables de las matanzas sean llevados ante el Tribunal Penal Internacional.

El fiscal de la Corte Penal Internacional, Luis Moreno Ocampo, solicitará cualquier día de estos al Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU sendos mandatos de arresto de varios nefastos personajes internacionales por crímenes de lesa humanidad. Es posible que entre ellos figure Gadafi. De ser así, los 15 miembros del Consejo de Seguridad deberán sacar las conclusiones lógicas de su decisión anterior: intervenir en Libia por motivos humanitarios.

Aún no hay veredicto final sobre la injerencia humanitaria en Libia. Se evitó sin duda -y no es poca cosa- una hecatombe en Bengasi; se impidió la destrucción de las facciones rebeldes; y se le asestó un duro golpe a Gadafi. Pero duro no significa necesariamente mortal, y es difícil descartar la patética posibilidad de que el dictador de las dunas sobreviva. Surgirá entonces el peor de los mundos: los unos podrán criticar una intervención casi meramente occidental en un país árabe, y los otros carecerán de la única respuesta eficaz: el éxito.

No obstante, entre los haberes del episodio ya podemos incluir uno para nada despreciable, a saber, la mayor disposición de países tradicionalmente recalcitrantes a emprender una acción militar que se origina en preocupaciones humanitarias, aunque obviamente contenga consecuencias políticas, diplomáticas e incluso -el petróleo- económicas. No había sido fácil en el pasado conjuntar la voluntad de los cinco miembros permanentes del Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU para hacerlo: en Ruanda se negaron, por falta de liderazgo de Estados Unidos, y en Kosovo terminó por ser la OTAN quien actuó, debido al veto ruso para una operación de cascos azules. La idea misma, más allá de sus características particulares en cada caso, choca con el sentimiento “soberanista”, antiintervencionista y con la desconfianza de países como China, Rusia, la India y muchos otros afroasiáticos.

Consentir una acción encubierta, injerencia o bombardeo franco-inglés, apadrinado por Washington, en un país árabe o islámico, evoca demasiados recuerdos: Suez en 1956, Irán en 1954, Argelia a finales de los cincuenta. Pero cuando la propia Liga Árabe la pide y los rebeldes libios la aplauden, algo ha cambiado en el firmamento internacional. El avance es significativo, aun si no se coronara de éxito o se prolongara en exceso, o incluso si fuera una mera golondrina a destiempo en plena primavera árabe que se disipara como antecedente de acciones futuras.

Es cierto que China y Rusia solo se abstuvieron en la ONU, y que no han participado en las operaciones en el Mediterráneo. Pero no impidieron la extensión de un mandato legal a quienes se afanaban por las razones que fueran en la intervención, y no han maniobrado o conspirado para dete

-ner las operaciones con el pretexto de un cese de fuego o una negociación artificial. El problema, extraña y afortunadamente, esta vez no han sido los miembros permanentes del Consejo de Seguridad. Reside más bien en los miembros no permanentes o rotativos, que por pura casualidad resultaron ser, entre otros, tres integrantes del famoso P-4, es decir, los países que buscan un escaño permanente para sí mismos.

Alemania, Brasil y la India, junto con Japón, conforman el P-4. Desde hace tiempo sostienen, con bastante razón, que por su población, su poderío económico, su representatividad y la diversidad que su membrecía entrañará, deben acceder al estatus de miembros permanentes del Consejo de Seguridad, con o sin poder de veto. En tiempos recientes, la campaña de la India y Brasil ha tomado vuelo, en parte por el activismo del expresidente Lula, en parte por la necesidad de Estados Unidos y de otras potencias de contrarrestar la influencia china en Asia a través de una mayor interlocución con Nueva Delhi. El caso de Japón sigue congelado, debido a la oposición china; el de Alemania, por un veto de facto de Italia. Pero la gran pregunta es otra: ¿para qué quieren todos estos estar en el Consejo, si a la hora de las grandes decisiones, se abstienen?

En efecto, al votarse la resolución 1973 sobre la zona de prohibición de sobrevuelo en Libia y la defensa de la población civil, China y Rusia no emitieron veto alguno, lo cual representó un cambio importante para ellos. Pero Alemania, Brasil y la India se abstuvieron, y Sudáfrica votó a favor solo después de una intervención directa de Barack Obama con el presidente Jacob Zuma y de la desaparición durante un par de días de su representante en la ONU (según las versiones de prensa).

Las razones variaron: Alemania por su pacifismo e incomodidad ante las acciones armadas, aunque tiene tropas en Afganistán; Brasil porque supuestamente quien preside el Consejo no vota (una tesis falsa y absurda, ya que entonces jamás habría votaciones unánimes), y la India por no avalar una intervención de dudosa eficacia y legitimidad.

Ninguna de estas objeciones es despreciable, y a la larga, quizás los escépticos tengan razón. Pero los verdaderos motivos de la renuencia de los tres abstencionistas son otros: aún no se despojan de sus viejas costumbres antiintervencionistas, en el caso de Brasil y la India (y de Sudáfrica también), y del primado de la política interna y electoral en el de Alemania. En otras palabras, no quieren, o no pueden, y quizás no deben, asumir las responsabilidades propias de miembros permanentes del Consejo de Seguridad. Ni votan en contra, por razones geopolíticas, económicas o ideológicas (es difícil inventar una afinidad ideológica con el autor de Libro Verde), ni votan a favor, debido a sus atavismos y fantasmas. La solución: abstenerse o esconderse.

Dicho de otro modo: no deben adquirir ni derecho de veto en la ONU, ni rango de potencias mundiales, no solo porque no lo son, sino porque en los hechos no desean serlo. Y no lo desean porque aún no se convencen de las virtudes del régimen jurídico internacional que a paso tortuoso se viene construyendo a lo largo de los últimos decenios, con sobresaltos, retrocesos y una fuerte dosis de hipocresía. Solo ven sus innegables riesgos y lagunas.

En efecto, como lo podemos incluso ya suponer en caso de Osama Bin Laden, las grandes potencias de siempre respetan y fortalecen el nuevo regimen jurídico (Corte Penal Internacional, Consejo de Derechos Humanos, intervención humanitaria y derecho de proteger -R2P-) cuando les conviene (Darfur, Libia, Kosovo a medias), y lo violan cuando no: Pakistán, Afganistán, Ruanda, Sierra Leona. Intervienen con toda razón en Libia para salvar a civiles, pero no en Siria donde quizás hayan ya muerto más. Ejecutan a Bin Laden, en parte porque no existían alternativas accesibles, pero no a Bashir; juzgan a Charles Taylor y a Milóse-vic en La Haya, pero no a Sadam Husein, ni a Mubarak, ni a Mugabe.

Existe, sin embargo, una gran diferencia entre la hipocresía de las viejas potencias y la reticencia y pasividad de las nuevas: la sociedad civil. En China, la India, Brasil y Rusia (los BRIC), el compromiso con el emergente régimen jurídico internacional carece de apoyos en la sociedad civil: no hay capítulos fuertes y vigorosos de Amnistía Internacional, de Human Rights Watch, de Greenpeace, de activistas a favor de la CPI o del derecho humanitario. Son sociedades civiles menos organizadas, menos activas, menos poderosas, que las que sí existen, a pesar de sus Gobiernos, o en ocasiones gracias a ellos, en las viejas democracias del Atlántico Norte. Con el tiempo esto cambiará; por ahora, es una realidad tan dura e inamovible como la creciente potencia económica de los llamados países emergentes.

Even the best-laid military plans, it is said, rarely survive first contact with the enemy. At the moment, America and its NATO allies are finding this out the hard way in North Africa, where they now face a stark choice regarding their intervention in Libya: stalemate or escalation.

The grass-roots protests that erupted in Libya in mid-February, inspired by the political ferment next door in Tunisia and Egypt, prompted a savage response from the country’s dictator, Col. Moammar Gadhafi. Over the month that followed, Libya descended into civil war, with regime forces carrying out indiscriminate bombings of civilian areas, torturing suspected rebel fighters, importing mercenaries from nearby African states and intentionally targeting civilians. Not surprisingly, the international response, when it finally came, was overwhelmingly humanitarian in nature. United Nations Security Council resolution 1973, passed on March 17, authorized the imposition of a no-fly zone over Libyan airspace, as well as the implementation of “all necessary measures” to protect Libyan civilians and halt Col. Gadhafi’s offensive.

And yet, in recent weeks, Col. Gadhafi and company have managed not only to hold their ground, but to at least partially turn the tide of the rebellion. This has presented NATO with a serious strategic dilemma: Should it double down on its intervention in Libya and seek to oust Col. Gadhafi by force? Or should it settle for some sort of protracted status quo that would leave the Libyan leader in power, albeit contained?

European leaders seem to be gravitating to the former option. Great Britain, France and Italy have announced plans to send “military advisers” to help the Libyan opposition with training and logistics, the crucial components of any sustained insurgent offensive. Arms seem to be flowing as well; persistent rumors suggest France is providing Libya’s rebels with short-range missiles via intermediaries such as Qatar. Other nations may also be quietly contributing weapons.

The United States, by contrast, has done far less of late. So far, the Obama administration’s biggest contributions to the fight have been the authorization of Predator drone strikes against loyalist forces and the allocation of some $25 million in nonlethal aid to the Libyan opposition. These steps fall short of the commitments of other NATO members and of attaining the political goals that the White House itself has outlined: getting Col. Gadhafi to step down. Team Obama, in other words, hasn’t put its money – or its strategic capabilities – where its mouth is.

Inevitably, it will need to. Reasonable minds may differ over whether our intervention in Libya, a country exceedingly marginal to U.S. strategic interests, was warranted in the first place. What isn’t in dispute is that having made the decision to intervene, the United States and its allies need to do more than simply muddle through. They must now unequivocally seek victory, as they themselves have defined it: the removal of Col. Gadhafi and his regime, by proxy if possible and by direct military intervention if necessary.

This certainly isn’t because regime change in Libya is necessarily a good idea. The West still knows precious little about Libyan politics, or what kind of political order might follow the Gadhafi era. Rather, it’s because, having committed its resources and prestige, a failure by NATO to finish the job would have catastrophic consequences.

Left intact, Col. Gadhafi’s regime doubtless will remain a menace to its political opposition and the Libyan population at large – one that requires an extensive, protracted international commitment in order to contain. Chances are, it also will re-emerge as an existential adversary of the West, perhaps even reverting to its historic role as a major sponsor of international terrorism. Most crucially, however, a failure to defeat Libya’s Third-World military decisively will demolish NATO’s credibility, taking the alliance’s future capacity for collective deterrence with it. All of this makes Col. Gadhafi’s ouster the logical objective of NATO intervention, even if its members – worried over the practical implications of such “mission creep” – are still hesitant to say so.

They shouldn’t be. The longer the United States and its allies fail to commit the necessary political, economic and military resources to make that outcome a reality, the more problematic our Libya intervention is bound to become. NATO, in other words, needs to learn to love the idea of regime change in Libya, and soon.

The US department of justice (DOJ) has submitted a written defence of the US role in this new war in Libya to the US Congress. The DOJ claims the war serves the US national interest in regional stability and in maintaining the credibility of the United Nations. Who knew?

The regional stability line would be a stretch for the UK but is downright nuts for the US. Who, outside of US strategic command types working on weapons in space, thinks Libya and America are in the same region? (In fact, the US is in Northcom and Libya in Africom, in the lingo of the Pentagon’s structure of global domination. Europe is in Eucom.) And what has done more good this year for the region that Libya is actually in than instability (think Tunisia, Egypt)?

The bit about the credibility of the United Nations is really cute coming from a government that invaded Iraq in 2003 – despite UN opposition and for the express purpose (among others) of proving the UN irrelevant. This also comes from the same government that just this month refused to allow the UN special rapporteur to visit a US prisoner named Bradley Manning to verify that he is not being tortured. How does that maintain UN credibility? And how exactly does authorising the CIA to violate the UN arms embargo in Libya maintain UN credibility? How does violating the UN ban on “a foreign occupation force of any form” in Libya maintain UN credibility?

So, one of the main justifications offered to the first branch of the US government is that the war in Libya is justified by a UNresolution, the credibility of which must be maintained even while violating it. But the DOJ memo also stresses that such a justification is not needed. A US president, according to this memo, albeit in violation of the US Constitution, simply has the power to launch wars. Any explanations offered to Congress are, just like the wars, acts of pure benevolence.

The DOJ memo also argues that this war doesn’t really measure up to the name “war”, given how quick, easy and cheap it’s going to be. In fact, President Obama has already announced the handover of the war to Nato. I think we’re supposed to imagine Nato as separate from the US, just as Congress does when it conducts no investigations of any atrocities in Afghanistan that the US attributes to Nato. Do the other Nato nations know that this is the purpose Nato serves in US politics?

But how quick and easy will this war really be? One expert predicts it will last 20 years, with the US eventually pulling out and allowing the European Union to inherit the illness of empire it had earlier shared with us. Certainly, the promise of a quick and easy war in Iraq in 2003 was based on the same baseless idea as this one, namely that killing a president will hand a country over to outside control (excuse me, I mean, flourishing democracy). The blossoming democracy in Iraq has just banned public demonstrations. The fact is that Gaddafi has a great deal of support, and making him a martyr would not change that.

Popular “progressive” US radio host Ed Schultz argues, with vicious hatred in every word he spits out on the subject, that bombing Libya is justified by the need for vengeance against that Satan on earth, that beast arisen suddenly from the grave of Adolf Hitler, that monster beyond all description: Muammar Gaddafi. But you can’t really fight a war against one person. The last time we did that to Gaddafi, we killed his little daughter, while he survived.

Even if you had the legal or moral right to assassinate foreign leaders, and even if you independently and rationally worked up your passion to kill a particular dictator by sheer coincidence in the same moment in which your government wanted to bomb him, you couldn’t do it without killing innocent people and shredding the fabric of international law (with or without UN complicity). Hatred of a single individual is great propaganda – until people begin to question what killing him will involve and what will come next.

Popular US commentator Juan Cole supports the very same war that Ed Schultz does, but supports it as a gentle act of humanitarian generosity. The Libya war has become less popular more quickly in the US than any previous US war, but it has its supporters. And to them, it doesn’t matter that half their fellow war supporters have a different or even opposing motive. For years, Americans cheered the slaughter of the hated Iraqi people while other Americans praised the Iraq war as a great act of philanthropy for the benefit of the Iraqi people (whether they wanted it or not).

But let’s examine Cole’s claims about Libya, because they are quite popular and central to the idea of a “good war”. One claim is that the Nato countries are motivated by humanitarian concern. Another is that this war might have humanitarian results. These have to be separated because the former is laughably absurd and the latter worthy of being examined. Of course, many people in Nato countries are motivated by humanitarian concern; that’s why wars are sold as acts of philanthropy. Generosity sells. But the US government, which has become a wing of the Pentagon, does not typically intervene in other nations in order to benefit humanity. In fact, it’s not capable of intervening anywhere, because it is already intervened everywhere.

The United States was in the business of supplying weapons to Gaddafi up until the moment it got into the business of supplying weapons to his opponents. In 2009, Britain, France and other European states sold Libya over $470m-worth of weapons. Our wars tend to be fought against our own weapons, and yet we go on arming everyone. The United States can no more intervene in Yemen or Bahrain or Saudi Arabia than in Libya. We are arming those dictatorships. In fact, to win the support of Saudi Arabia for its “intervention” in Libya, the US gave its approval for Saudi Arabia to send troops into Bahrain to attack civilians, a policy that US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton publicly defended.

The “humanitarian intervention” in Libya, meanwhile, whatever civilians it may have begun by protecting, immediately killed other civilians with its bombs and immediately shifted from its defensive justification to attacking retreating troops and participating in a civil war. The United States has very likely used depleted uranium weapons in Libya, leading American journalist Dave Lindorff to remark:

“It would be a tragic irony if rebels in Libya, after calling for assistance from the US and other Nato countries, succeeded in overthrowing the country’s long-time tyrant Gaddafi, only to have their country contaminated by uranium dust – the fate already suffered by the peoples of Kuwait, Iraq, Afghanistan and Kosovo.”

Irony is one word for it. Another is hypocrisy. Clearly, the military power of the west is not driven by humanitarian concerns. But that still leaves the question of whether, in this particular case, such power could accidentally have humanitarian results. The claim that a massive massacre of civilians was about to occur, on careful review, turns out to have been massively inflated. This doesn’t mean that Gaddafi is a nice guy, that his military wasn’t already killing civilians, or that it isn’t still killing civilians. Another irony, in fact, is that Gaddafi is reportedly using horrible weapons, including landmines and cluster bombs, that much of the world has renounced – but that the United States has refused to.

But warfare tends to breed more warfare; and cycles of violence usually, not just occasionally, spiral out of control. That the United States is engaging in or supporting the killing of civilians in Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, Bahrain and elsewhere, while ignoring the killing of civilians in various other countries, is not a reason to tolerate it in Libya. But escalating a war and doing nothing are, contrary to Pentagon propaganda, not the only two choices. The United States and Europe could have stopped arming and supporting Gaddafi and – in what would have been a powerful message to Libya – stopped arming and supporting dictators around the region. We could have provided purely humanitarian aid. We could have pulled out the CIA and the special forces and sent in nonviolent activist trainers of the sort that accomplished so much this year in the nations to Libya’s east and west. Risking the deaths of innocents while employing nonviolent tools is commonly viewed as horrific, but isn’t responding with violence that will likely cause more deaths in the end even more so?

Washington imported a leader for the people’s rebellion in Libya who has spent the past 20 years living with no known source of income a couple of miles from the CIA’s headquarters in Virginia. Another man lives even closer to CIA headquarters: former US Vice President Dick Cheney. He expressed great concern in a speech in 1999 that foreign governments were controlling oil. “Oil remains fundamentally a government business,” he said. “While many regions of the world offer great oil opportunities, the Middle East, with two thirds of the world’s oil and the lowest cost, is still where the prize ultimately lies.”

Former supreme allied commander Europe of Nato, from 1997 to 2000, Wesley Clark claims that in 2001, a general in the Pentagon showed him a piece of paper and said:

“I just got this memo today or yesterday from the office of the secretary of defence upstairs. It’s a, it’s a five-year plan. We’re going to take down seven countries in five years. We’re going to start with Iraq, then Syria, Lebanon, then Libya, Somalia, Sudan, we’re going to come back and get Iran in five years.”

That agenda fit perfectly with the plans of Washington insiders, such as those who famously spelled out their intentions in the reports of the thinktank called the Project for the New American Century. The fierce Iraqi and Afghan resistance didn’t fit at all. Neither did the nonviolent revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt. But taking over Libya still makes perfect sense in the neoconservative worldview. And it makes sense in explaining war games used by Britain and France to simulate the invasion of a similar country.

The Libyan government controls more of its oil than any other nation on earth, and it is the type of oil that Europe finds easiest to refine. Libya also controls its own finances, leading American author Ellen Brown to point out an interesting fact about those seven countries named by Clark:

“What do these seven countries have in common? In the context of banking, one that sticks out is that none of them is listed among the 56 member banks of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). That evidently puts them outside the long regulatory arm of the central bankers’ central bank in Switzerland. The most renegade of the lot could be Libya and Iraq, the two that have actually been attacked. Kenneth Schortgen Jr, writing on Examiner.com, noted that ‘[s]ix months before the US moved into Iraq to take down Saddam Hussein, the oil nation had made the move to accept euros instead of dollars for oil, and this became a threat to the global dominance of the dollar as the reserve currency, and its dominion as the petrodollar.’ According to a Russian article titled ‘Bombing of Libya – Punishment for Gaddafi for His Attempt to Refuse US Dollar’, Gaddafi made a similarly bold move: he initiated a movement to refuse the dollar and the euro, and called on Arab and African nations to use a new currency instead, the gold dinar. Gaddafi suggested establishing a united African continent, with its 200 million people using this single currency. During the past year, the idea was approved by many Arab countries and most African countries. The only opponents were the Republic of South Africa and the head of the League of Arab States. The initiative was viewed negatively by the US and the European Union, with French President Nicolas Sarkozy calling Libya a threat to the financial security of mankind; but Gaddafi was not swayed and continued his push for the creation of a united Africa. […] If the Gaddafi government goes down, it will be interesting to watch whether the new central bank [created by the rebels in March] joins the BIS, whether the nationalised oil industry gets sold off to investors, and whether education and healthcare continue to be free.”

It will also be interesting to see whether Africom, the Pentagon’s Africa Command, now based in Europe, establishes its headquarters on the continent for which it is named. We don’t know what other motivations are at work: concerns over immigration to Europe? Desires to test weapons? War profiteering? Political calculations? Irrational lust for power? Overcompensation for having failed to turn against Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak until after he’d been unseated? But what about this one: actual fear of another Rwanda? That last one seems, frankly, the least likely. But what is certain is that such humanitarian concern alone did not launch this war, and that the continued use of war in this way will not benefit humanity.

The United Nations, far from being made credible, is being made the servant of wealthy nations making war on poor ones. And within the United States, where the United Nations is alternatively held up as a justification or mocked as irrelevant, the power to make war and to make law has been decisively placed in the hands of a series of single individuals who will carry the title “president” – precisely the outcome American revolutionaries broke with Britain in order to avoid.

Libya has rightly dominated the headlines in recent weeks. Many views have been expressed, including those who favor doing nothing and those who accuse the international community — and NATO as part of it — of not doing enough.

It is quite right that we should have this debate. A free and open media is an essential characteristic of democratic societies and is, ultimately, one of the values we are battling to help secure for the Libyan people.

These disparate views in the newspaper headlines underscore the fact that it is never easy to forge a broad-based agreement to take military action. But the international community and NATO had to act in Libya — and we did so quickly. Let me explain why, and why I believe our course of action to be the correct one.

First, we could not stand idly by while Col. Moammar Gaddafi unleashed indiscriminate violence against his people as they sought change from his despotic regime. Defying worldwide appeals for restraint, his forces brutally attacked Libyan civilians with tanks, heavy guns and snipers.

Second, our actions have been based on the support of the international community, including the United Nations, the Arab League and countries in the region, every step of the way.

When the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1973 on March 17, voting 10 to 0, it made a historic statement that it was prepared to take on the responsibility of protecting the Libyan people against systematic attacks, which — according to Resolution 1970 on Libya — “may amount to crimes against humanity.”

In this broad international effort, NATO was asked to play a key part. NATO allies have taken on full responsibility for implementing all military aspects of this resolution: policing the arms embargo, patrolling the no-fly zone and protecting civilians from the threat of attack. The Contact Group on Libya — including 21 countries and representatives of key international and regional organizations — welcomed NATO’s command and control of military operations at its meeting in Doha, Qatar, this week.

We agreed to take on the U.N. mandate after intensive discussion and careful planning within NATO and on the basis of solidarity among all 28 member states.

Third, NATO is doing its utmost to fully enforce the U.N. mandate around the clock. Since we took over command of the mission in Libya on March 31, the operational tempo has not abated. We have flown more than 2,000 sorties, of which over 900 have been strike sorties.

What has changed is the situation in Libya. In the early days, sorties focused on static targets — the locations of which were known. Now we are conducting pinpoint strikes and degrading the ability of Gaddafi’s forces to fight. We are targeting air defenses, tanks, armored personnel carriers, ammunition dumps and fuel supplies. Gaddafi is hiding his tanks and heavy weapons in city centers, near schools and mosques, showing his utter disregard for the lives of civilians. In stark contrast, NATO pilots strike with care and precision to maximize the effect of our actions while minimizing the danger to civilians.

Our actions mean that the pro-Gaddafi forces cannot fight where they want, cannot fight how they want and cannot use the weapons that they want against the civilian population.

Within a clear and internationally agreed mandate, our alliance is conducting its mission with vigor and determination, supported by countries stretching from the Arctic Ocean to the Arabian Gulf.

NATO provides a tried and tested hub for the coordination of the efforts of all the allies. It also provides a trusted framework for including partner contributions. Together, allies and partners are contributing to the enforcement of United Nations resolutions 1970 and 1973. We have the capabilities required; we are using them effectively and successfully. And we are committed to providing all necessary forces and maximum operational flexibility within our mandate. On Thursday, NATO foreign ministers meeting in Berlin made it clear that we would continue to exert this pressure on legitimate targets as long as is necessary.

In NATO, we have three key objectives. First, to stop all attacks and the threat of attacks against civilians and civilian populated areas. Second, to see a credible and verifiable withdrawal of all the regime’s forces back to their bases, including a withdrawal from the populated areas they have occupied. Finally, the regime must allow immediate, full, safe and unhindered humanitarian assistance to all the people of Libya.

As I have made clear, ultimately there is no purely military solution to this crisis. That is why the international community is urgently seeking a political settlement. A settlement that ensures that the people’s legitimate demands for genuine transition and a brighter future do not run into the Libyan sands.

No one following the record of air power as an instrument of national whim should be surprised that Moammar Kadafi’s army remains apparently uncowed, even driving Libyan rebels back in headlong retreat despite an onslaught of NATO bombs and missiles. In fact, history is repeating itself in more ways than one.

The very first bombing raid ever occurred almost 100 years ago on Nov. 1, 1911, when an Italian airman hand-dropped four 4.5-pound bombs on forces defending Tripoli against Italian invaders. This momentous event went down well with the press: “Italian Military Aviator Outside Tripoli Proves War Value of Aeroplane,” headlined the New York Times. But it had little effect on the fighting, thus commencing a pattern of disappointment that has recurred with monotonous regularity in subsequent conflicts, irrespective of advances in technology. Precision bombing, touted as an instrument of victory in World War II and Vietnam, turned out to be anything but, leaving the wars to be decided by foot soldiers on the ground.

The 1999 NATO air campaign against Serbia is often cited as a turning point in this sorry narrative. Despite the fact that it lasted 11 weeks rather than the three days predicted by NATO commanders, not a single U.S. serviceman was killed. Furthermore, the attacks ended when the Yugoslav leader, Slobodan Milosevic, agreed to withdraw from Kosovo, thus permitting the return of hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanian refugees freed from the threat of Serb persecution. Not only had the operation apparently vindicated liberal interventionists in the Clinton administration, but it also indicated that at long last, air power alone could win a war.

Subsequent inquiry gravely tarnished this shining example. The Serbian army deployed in Kosovo had been the principal target of bombs and missiles, yet at the end of the conflict allied military observers were surprised to see Serb formations withdrawing in good order, morale and equipment apparently intact. And despite contemporary official claims that more than 300 tanks had been destroyed, the actual number, according to sources on the command staff and an internal Air Force study, was 14. Most strikingly of all, the cease-fire terms were almost identical to those accepted by Milosevic before the war.

Nevertheless, the rapid eviction of the Taliban from Afghanistan in 2001 appeared to refute the doubters finally and unequivocally. A combination of very precisely guided bombs and missiles, deployed in conjunction with unmanned surveillance drones and select teams of Special Forces target designators on the ground, were deemed to have destroyed large numbers of enemy and routed the rest. Dangerously, this rapid triumph convinced then-Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld that his preference for brief campaigns waged with few troops and high-tech precision weaponry had been totally vindicated, with disastrous consequences on planning for the invasion of Iraq.

As it turned out, the Taliban had not been destroyed (the number of wounded left by its retreating forces was tellingly small). For the most part, they stood down when their sponsor, Pakistan’s ISI intelligence agency, ordered a tactical retreat. In more recent years, the Taliban has steadily re-extended its grip over much of Afghanistan despite constant and heavy air assault.

None of these salutary qualifications appear to have had much effect on air power enthusiasts in the current administration, particularly those veterans of the Clinton years who cherish warm, if inaccurate, memories of the Kosovo campaign. So the hard lessons will have to be learned all over again: Jet fighters flying at 15,000 feet — standard altitude in these conditions — have great difficulty spotting targets such as tanks, especially when they make some effort to hide or camouflage themselves. Additionally, in the last week, forces loyal to Kadafi have reportedly taken to moving in pickups identical to those used by the rebels, rendering the task of airborne targeteers even more difficult. For even minimal success, U.S. personnel acting as ground spotters are indispensable, and they, of course, will require further troops to protect them and train local allies — a role now reportedly being delegated to the CIA.

It is worth bearing in mind that following that inaugural bombing raid in 1911, for which the invaders had such high hopes, and despite the infusion of ever-larger numbers of Italian troops, the war lasted another 20 years.

The start of military action in Libya was marked by U.S. and coalition forces quickly carving out a no-fly zone across a large section of Libyan airspace. The U.S. military carried the predominant share of mission responsibility, leading the coalition in terms of aircraft sorties and strikes.

For anyone watching, the strength and effectiveness of America’s military was on display. Now it’s NATO’s turn.

The international coalition that directly supported the Libyan mission is now in the lead, with NATO standing at the forefront. From the first days of the Libyan operation, there has been heavy criticism about the way the mission was organized, its execution and the lack of coordination with Congress on the part of the Obama administration. All of this is a typical byproduct of any military campaign. And it almost goes without saying that Congress will have a say in what happens from here – as it should.

These criticisms aside, transferring mission responsibility to NATO was the right decision. In all aspects of the Libyan operation, there is no part for the United States beyond providing limited mission support, such as logistics and intelligence. This is not only due to Europe’s close proximity to the Libyan coastline. It’s also a matter of ensuring the global security burden is more equally divided.

NATO is more than capable of seeing this mission all the way through, but the United States must still proceed cautiously to guarantee the Libya operation does not turn back to an American-led effort. In other words, NATO cannot be a euphemism for American combat resources, troops and funding. No matter how the operation proceeds, what’s essential is that both the president and Congress make this point abundantly clear and stand firm against any attempt to return the United States to any type of leadership role in Libya.

American military muscle can be a defining factor in any engagement. In Afghanistan, where the U.S. mission is flying under the NATO flag, progress is slow but advancements continue to occur, thanks in large part to Gen. David H. Petraeus. The U.S. military is undeniably out front in Afghanistan and will continue leading the way to ensure mission success is achieved, since it’s in our immediate national security interests to do so.

With the focus of the U.S. military on Afghanistan, it’s time for our NATO allies to step up and do their part in Libya. That means devising strategic objectives, containment policies and the end-state, none of which should fall on the United States to decide.

The situation in Libya is a real opportunity for our international partners to show their strength to the rest of the world and carry the security burden on their shoulders, even if only for a while. It’s their turn to deliver.