La muerte totalmente evitable de alrededor de ochenta aficionados al fútbol egipcios en un estadio en Port Said a finales de enero provocó una ola de teorías de la conspiración según las cuales la policía egipcia, el Consejo Supremo de las Fuerzas Armadas (CSFA) al mando del país e incluso el presidente estadounidense, Barack Obama, y la CIA han sido acusados de violencia planificada. El jefe del Consejo, el mariscal Mohamed Husein Tantaui, puso su grano de arena en el asunto diciendo que las muertes habían sido intencionadas, aunque culpando a quienes se proponen desestabilizar Egipto. Prometió hallar y castigar a los autores, sumando así una más a las numerosas promesas similares del CSFA durante el año pasado, todas las cuales siguen sin cumplirse.

Ciertamente, la negligencia y la torpe incompetencia de que hizo gala la policía antidisturbios en el estadio de fútbol refleja el fracaso total del CSFA durante todo un año para poner remedio a los errores y debilidades patentes en el sector encabezado por el Ministerio del Interior: la policía, las fuerzas paramilitares de la seguridad nacional y los diversos servicios de inteligencia. Más allá de la espectacular ineptitud para llevar a cabo tareas rutinarias como el control de masas sin tener que recurrir a la fuerza bruta, el fallo principal del presidente del CSFA es no haber hecho nada para inculcar un auténtico sentido de la responsabilidad y acabar con la cultura de la impunidad. En ese sentido, tanto el CSFA como el Ministerio del Interior pueden ser considerados culpables en el plano penal.

Ahora bien, el factor que ha revestido de una connotación política tan destacada las muertes del estadio es la lucha entre el CSFA y varios partidos y movimientos políticos por el control del proceso por el que se elaborará la nueva Constitución y se decidirá el futuro equilibrio de poderes entre la presidencia, hasta ahora todopoderosa, y el Parlamento. Para el CSFA está en juego asegurarse de que el presupuesto de defensa, las empresas de importancia militar y los nombramientos de altos cargos del mando sigan estando fuera del control civil, así como ejercer el poder de veto sobre política de defensa nacional, y, sobre todo, preservar la inmunidad permanente del personal de las fuerzas armadas –en activo o retirado– respecto de cualquier tipo de juicio o acusación de acuerdo con las leyes civiles.

En este momento, la evolución de la situación depende en buena medida de los Hermanos Musulmanes. Las manifestaciones promovidas por los elementos de la plaza Tahrir en noviembre frustraron el intento del CSFA de consagrar los poderes y facultades coercitivas que pretendía asegurarse en forma de principios permanentes de carácter supraconstitucional. Pero en calidad de principal ganador de las recientes elecciones parlamentarias, con el 43,4% de los escaños y una cohesión sólida y disciplinada, el factor que puede inclinar la balanza es la organización de los Hermanos Musulmanes.

De hecho, debido a la importancia de la posición de los Hermanos Musulmanes, los críticos de talante más revolucionario temen que puedan concluir un acuerdo entre bambalinas con el CSFA en que este último ceda los últimos poderes y facultades coercitivas mencionados a cambio de presidir el Parlamento y, en definitiva, formar el gobierno posterior al periodo de transición. La sospecha de que los Hermanos Musulmanes formarían una coalición de mulás y generales con el CSFA, comparable a la de Pakistán, ha sido el estribillo del último año. Los Hermanos Musulmanes están deseosos de aprovechar la oportunidad de acceder al poder. Pero esta crítica pasa por alto tres cuestiones.

En primer lugar, los Hermanos Musulmanes han expresado criterios correctos respecto a las futuras relaciones cívico-militares. Su guía supremo, Mohamed Badie, destacó a finales de enero que el Parlamento tiene el derecho a exigir unas instituciones responsables, sobre todo en el caso de las fuerzas armadas, así como a determinar, e incluso reducir, el presupuesto de defensa. Un destacado miembro del partido Libertad y Justicia, vinculado a los Hermanos Musulmanes, Mohamed Gamal Heshmat, añadió que “debe impedirse todo acto de pillaje financiero” dondequiera que se descubra en el aparato estatal, incluidas las fuerzas armadas.

En segundo lugar, existe una divergencia fundamental entre los Hermanos Musulmanes y el CSFA sobre la fase siguiente del proceso de transición. El CSFA aún no ha renunciado a su intento de modelar la redacción de la nueva Constitución, que los Hermanos Musulmanes consideran una prerrogativa parlamentaria. No menos polémica es la insistencia del CSFA en mantener el sistema presidencial de Egipto, en la creencia de que el presidente siempre será susceptible a su influencia y hará uso de sus amplios poderes para mantener sus privilegios y su inmunidad. Cualesquiera que sean sus opiniones sobre el equilibrio de las relaciones cívico-militares, los Hermanos Musulmanes se oponen firmemente a la marginación del Parlamento y se esfuerzan en impulsar una relación equilibrada entre el presidente y el Parlamento en el futuro.

Buena parte de las duras críticas a los Hermanos Musulmanes se ha relacionado con su reciente oferta de una salida segura para el CSFA: protección ante cualquier acusación por los errores o actos delictivos cometidos por personal militar durante su gobierno a cambio de una entrega sin oposición y completa del poder. Pero esta crítica, a su vez, pasa por alto las ciertas realidades políticas, no siendo la menor que los civiles de Egipto no presentan un frente unido. El partido salafista Nur, que obtuvo el 25% de los escaños en el Parlamento, se ha distanciado reiteradamente de todo lo que pueda ser interpretado como una crítica al CSFA, en tanto que el esperanzado candidato presidencial Amro Musa, ex secretario general de la Liga Árabe, aprueba plenamente mantener el sistema presidencial del país.

El CSFA, por su parte, conserva los colmillos afilados. La detención y juicio inminente de 44 activistas defensores de la democracia, incluidos 19 estadounidenses, por las autoridades egipcias tras ser acusados de introducción de fondos extranjeros ilícitos “con la intención de desestabilizar la seguridad nacional de Egipto” es menos un enfrentamiento avieso con EE.UU. que una calculada estratagema destinada a desactivar la política estadounidense como factor susceptible de inclinar la balanza interna egipcia de forma desfavorable, tras la aparente apertura de la Administración Obama hacia los Hermanos Musulmanes y sus llamamientos a favor de una pronta y entera transferencia de poder a los civiles. La amenaza de una suspensión de la ayuda económica y militar de EE.UU. a Egipto sólo sirve a los propósitos del CSFA, lo que le permite demostrar su patriotismo y justificar sus esfuerzos para controlar las etapas restantes del proceso de transición.

En consecuencia, aunque los Hermanos Musulmanes no deben poner en riesgo los principios básicos de supervisión civil y control democrático de las fuerzas armadas, no se equivocan al avanzar por una senda prudente.

Rather a lot of megaphone diplomacy followed the recent UN vote on Syria. Confusion and anger flowed from British and western media. So why did Russia and China veto the UN security council draft resolution on Syria? As Chinese ambassador in the UK, I feel it is timely to give a more measured explanation of why China voted no. Also, I want to explain how together we can, must and should give peace a chance in Syria.

Since day one of this crisis, China has been watching the situation very closely. We have consistently urged all sides to stop violence, avoid civilian casualties and restore order in the country. Central to any lasting solution must be a clear principle: the Syrian people’s call for change should be heard, and their interests need to be protected. This is the best possible result for the Syrian people.

For this to happen, China has backed the Arab League’s efforts to find a political solution and maintain stability in the region. In addition, we encouraged all sides in Syria to respond positively to these efforts to mediate. The goal must be an immediate end to all violence; once that is achieved, we must encourage an inclusive political process led by the Syrian people. Peaceful dialogue is the best way to tackle differences and grievances and restore stability to Syria.

The international community should act in a way that constructively helps this goal, not the opposite. It is fundamental that Syria’s sovereignty, independence and territory must be respected. The security council should adopt a calm and measured response to the crisis; above all it must stand by the purposes and principles of the UN charter.

Any decision the council makes must reduce rather than inflame tension, encourage reconciliation and contribute to regional peace and stability in the Middle East. Entrusted with a responsibility for world peace and security, the last thing the UN should do is to further complicate the crisis. What we need from the UN security council is a sustainable solution, not a rash decision. It was following the above principles that led China to vote no.

China has been an active negotiator at the security council to try to produce a draft resolution on Syria. We continue to work hard to win a consensus. But imposing hasty deadlines on these debates will most likely lead to failure; this was particularly so at a time of sharp divide on the text and some members’ insistence on further consultations. Furthermore, the Russian foreign minister had announced a visit to Damascus to begin a new round of mediation. This means it was, and is, not a good time for forcing a vote on Syria. The end result was anticipated by those members who pressed for the vote; the solidarity and authority of the security council is undermined as a result, and we are further away from a sustainable and lasting solution.

Chinese people abhor the violence and bloodshed in Syria as much as those in Britain and other countries. China voted against the resolution for a simple reason: the resolution as drafted will not help cool down the situation. It does not facilitate political dialogue. It does not address distrust, or bring peace and stability to the region. Quite the contrary, China believes that forcing the vote only aggravates these tension and makes the situation more unmanageable.

So what about the track record of no votes in the UN security council? In the 41 years since the People’s Republic’s return to the council, China has only cast a no vote eight times. This is a frequency far lower than any of the other four permanent members. China always strives for consensus and harmony; this attitude is embedded in our culture. So the low pattern of no votes by China shows my government thinks very hard before voting. It means that China’s veto on Syria this time around was a very tough decision.

China in this process has shown a consistent and clear commitment to work with the international community to seek a responsible and lasting solution to the Syrian issue. But the vote itself is a powerful reminder of the international responsibility to choose a constructive path forward.

Finales de enero de 2002. El entonces coronel Jaime Coll llegaba a Kabul para mandar el primer contingente militar español enviado a Afganistán. La operación «Libertad duradera» había hecho caer al régimen talibán y el Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas había ordenado una misión paralela para respaldar al nuevo gobierno provisional, ISAF («International Security Assistance Force»), la más peligrosa y costosa en la que han estado involucradas nuestras fuerzas armadas. Transcurridos diez años, las dos misiones continúan. Como era previsible en el actual ambiente de zozobra económica, el aniversario de la intervención occidental en Afganistán ha pasado desapercibido, lo cual hace oportuno una revisión de sus resultados.

La valoración de cualquier misión debe estar necesariamente referida a los objetivos que se le atribuyan. El problema es que los objetivos anunciados han sido diversos. Dejemos aparte las aspiraciones más desmesuradas: democratización plena, fin de la corrupción, igualación de derechos de hombres y mujeres, abandono del subdesarrollo y la pobreza. Fines más que deseables que se invocaron con frecuencia. Aunque en verdad fueron otros, menos ambiciosos, los que motivaron la intervención. Primero, devolver a Al Qaida el golpe del 11-S y neutralizarla. Muchos dicen ahora que el peligro representado por Al Qaida fue sobrestimado. Quizá. Pero a finales de 2001 el problema no era sólo la capacidad destructiva de la organización fundada por Bin Laden, que ya se había demostrado aterradora. El problema remitía también a lo que Al Qaida habría logrado hacer si en los años siguientes hubiera continuado operando impunemente bajo la protección del régimen talibán. Por suerte, la expulsión de los talibán, el otro objetivo inicial de la intervención, sólo costó unas pocas semanas. En cuanto a Al Qaida, es cierto que no se derrumbó de un día para otro y que durante toda la década pasada permaneció activa y logró infligir graves daños, tanto por algunas acciones directas como por la enorme violencia que inspiró entre sus organizaciones asociadas y otros grupos afines. Mas la pérdida del santuario afgano frenó su inquietante progresión, dando inicio a un lento proceso de marginalización del que hoy ya nadie duda. Así que, mal que les pese a derrotistas y buenistas, la guerra iniciada por Occidente en Afganistán ayudó a cumplir dos buenos objetivos. Aunque hubo otros.

Tras constituir el nuevo gobierno provisional afgano, todos los gobiernos de la coalición se comprometieron a apoyar la reconstrucción del país y continuar con las misiones militares hasta pacificarlo o estabilizarlo. Ese compromiso era lógico y exigible, por dos razones. Una: invadir un país acarrea responsabilidades para con el pueblo invadido y, en consecuencia, lo mínimo que merecían los afganos es que antes de que los extranjeros abandonaran su tierra la dejaran en mejores condiciones que las deplorables circunstancias encontradas al llegar. La otra razón, naturalmente, era estratégica. Los talibanes habían sido desalojados de las instituciones pero no derrotados y abandonar Afganistán en un corto plazo seguramente hubiera propiciado una rápida vuelta al poder de los «barbudos». Estos buenos propósitos serían afianzados en las sucesivas conferencias internacionales celebradas al respecto en los años siguientes. Y no sólo con retórica sino con esfuerzos que sería injusto ignorar. De una parte, esos esfuerzos se miden en vidas: 2.700 soldados muertos hasta septiembre de 2011, entre ellos 96 militares españoles y dos guardias civiles. De otro lado, la inversión económica realizada por los países occidentales ha sido astronómica. Sólo la misión ISAF supone un coste de 100.000 millones de dólares cada año, mientras que el coste global de la presencia española en Afganistán desde 2002 hasta la mitad del pasado año ascendía a 2.200 millones de euros. Este desembolso ha hecho posible, entre otras muchas cosas, que en una de las zonas más pobres y desasistidas de Afganistán se haya construido un hospital y diversas clínicas rurales, la mortalidad infantil se haya visto reducida en un 70 por ciento, 15.000 niños y niñas hayan sido escolarizados y 65.000 personas se beneficien hoy de un sistema de suministro de agua potable antes inexistente. Quede dicho esto como homenaje al trabajo desempeñado por el equipo de reconstrucción establecido en la provincia de Badghis y compuesto por personal militar y civil español. Pero es preciso reconocer que los resultados rendidos por la campaña afgana no son suficientes ni halagüeños.

En 2011 el número de ataques de la insurgencia se redujo tras cinco años de progresión geométrica. Empero, los niveles de violencia siguen siendo muy elevados: unos setenta incidentes al día. Y en los terrenos del desarrollo institucional, económico y humano tampoco ha habido grandes avances. La lista de problemas para los que no se ha logrado solución es larga: gobernabilidad, corrupción, pobreza, ausencia de servicios sociales básicos, narcotráfico, analfabetismo, tensiones interétnicas. En suma, el país no está suficientemente reconstruido ni estabilizado y continúa amenazado por una insurgencia feroz que está convencida de que tiene el tiempo de su parte (los occidentales tienen los relojes pero ellos poseen el tiempo, suelen decir…). Sería largo desentrañar todos los factores que han llevado a la deprimente situación actual. Algunos son fruto de la historia, la geografía y las características de la población afgana, su cultura y sus costumbres, etc. Pero la intervención también se ha visto lastrada por algunos errores de bulto. Uno de ellos proviene seguramente de la pretensión demostrada por no pocos países occidentales de librar una «guerra a medias», disfrazándola bajo eufemismos pacifistas (como solía el anterior gobierno español), limitando drásticamente el margen de actuación de sus tropas o condicionando la permanencia de las mismas a unas garantías de seguridad absurdas en cualquier país en conflicto, como las que solicitaba hace semanas el presidente Sarkozy (igual que si el capitán de los bomberos pusiera la ausencia de fuego como condición para enviar sus hombres a un incendio). Con tales actitudes no es de extrañar que Estados Unidos se haya hartado de esta guerra cuya lista de bajas ha estado copada por sus propios soldados (por encima de 2.700 muertos y más de 18.000 heridos).

Ese hartazgo, sumado a problemas económicos y cálculos electorales, llevaría al presidente Obama a cometer otro error flagrante al anunciar en junio del año pasado un calendario de retirada que finalizaría en verano de 2014, provocando una cascada de declaraciones similares entre los países de la coalición. Hace pocos días, el actual secretario de Defensa de Estados Unidos rectificaba: ni siquiera se va a esperar a 2014. Así, Occidente ha cambiado la prioridad de estabilizar Afganistán por la de marcharse pronto. Para justificar dicha marcha se apuesta fuerte por la estrategia combinada de acelerar la transferencia del control sobre la seguridad a las autoridades afganas y reintegrar a la insurgencia, incluidos los talibanes, a base de amnistías, incentivos y acuerdos negociados. Pero hay motivos para dudar de que estos mimbres puedan servir para devolver a Afganistán a unas mínimas condiciones de estabilidad. No es seguro que las jóvenes Fuerzas de Seguridad Nacional Afganas, adiestradas en el marco de la misión ISAF, acumulen y lleguen al verano de 2014 con un número suficiente de miembros como para reemplazar a las tropas de la coalición. Y las objeciones a una negociación con los talibanes son variadas. Hasta el momento todos los ensayos han sido fallidos y no está claro por qué deberían darse prisa en llegar a un acuerdo con quien ya se ha comprometido a abandonar el terreno de juego. Tampoco cabe descartar la posibilidad de un acuerdo en falso, firmado para ser incumplido. Y si lo cumplieran no se sabe que harían los talibanes con la cuota de poder que se les concediera: seguramente nada bueno. Por último, si nada de lo anterior funciona y la inestabilidad continúa el país correría el riesgo de regresar al pasado, transitando hacia una nueva guerra civil o recuperando su zona franca para terroristas y criminales. Esto es lo que podría sembrar Occidente en Afganistán si insiste en escapar de allí. Seguramente eso es lo que haremos en breve: abandonar a los afganos a su suerte. Y que sea lo que Alá quiera…

L’embargo sur les importations de pétrole iranien et les sanctions contre la Banque centrale iranienne prononcés par les ministres des Affaires étrangères de l’Union européenne, le 24 janvier dernier, sont intervenus après plusieurs semaines de fièvre galopante impliquant l’Iran, Israël et les Etats-Unis: manœuvres militaires iraniennes dans le golfe Persique, menace de Téhéran de fermer le détroit d’Ormuz, tests de missile menés avec ostentation par les Israéliens, meurtre d’un scientifique nucléaire iranien et innombrables déclarations politiques envisageant la possibilité, et parfois même la nécessité, de procéder à des frappes militaires contre l’Iran.

Les propos les plus modérés sont avant tout venus de la part de ceux qui connaissent les conséquences de la menée d’une guerre: ainsi, le chef des services secrets israéliens a fait comprendre que l’Iran représentait, certes, une menace pour Israël, mais non un danger existentiel. Le secrétaire américain à la Défense a parlé des suites fâcheuses que pourrait entraîner une attaque militaire israélienne et le chef d’état-major américain s’est rendu en Israël afin de prévenir une action militaire non concertée et, du point de vue des Etats-Unis, non souhaitée, contre l’Iran. Dans le même temps, le président Obama et son secrétaire à la Défense Leon Panetta ont cependant tracé deux lignes rouges dont le franchissement par Téhéran serait susceptible de déclencher des actions militaires de la part des Etats-Unis: le blocage effectif du détroit d’Ormuz et la fabrication d’une arme atomique.

Ces déclarations ont plutôt été le signe d’une détente de la situation que celui d’une nouvelle escalade dans la confrontation, montrant que Washington désire éviter, autant que possible, un conflit militaire. De l’avis des Américains, il suffit pour l’heure qu’eux-mêmes en particulier, mais aussi l’Union européenne et leurs autres amis et alliés, durcissent leurs sanctions à l’égard de l’Iran et suspendent – ou, pour le moins, limitent – leurs importations de pétrole iranien pour empêcher Téhéran de développer le volet militaire de son programme nucléaire et pour sanctionner les infractions aux obligations découlant des résolutions du Conseil de sécurité.

Les sanctions constituent bel et bien un des pans de l’action diplomatique qui peuvent amener les gouvernements à infléchir leur politique. Nous disons bien: «peuvent», car si les sanctions ont toujours quelque effet, elles ne font habituellement qu’affaiblir l’Etat visé et ne déclenchent que beaucoup plus rarement le virage politique souhaité. D’une manière générale, les gouvernements concernés sont plus enclins à changer leur politique si de telles mesures sont prises par l’ensemble de la communauté internationale, ou du moins par ses membres les plus importants. Les sanctions doivent en outre être suffisamment claires, c’est-à-dire qu’elles doivent expliquer pourquoi une politique – ou le comportement d’un Etat, d’une société ou d’un dirigeant – est aussi durement visée. Mais les sanctions qui visent un régime en tant que tel afin de le faire tomber ou de le forcer à abdiquer échouent dans presque tous les cas. Cuba en est l’exemple le plus durable. Enfin, toutes les sanctions devraient s’inscrire dans un contexte politique et diplomatique plus large en venant compléter, et non remplacer, un effort politique visant à une résolution pacifique des différends.

Cet effort incombera avant tout aux Européens, notamment à l’Allemagne, à la France et à la Grande-Bretagne. Le gouvernement Obama n’y fera pas obstacle mais se gardera bien de donner l’impression, en ces temps de campagne électorale hautement polarisée, d’avancer trop activement dans la direction de Téhéran.

De nouveaux efforts diplomatiques ne seraient nullement voués à l’échec. Le gouvernement iranien, considérant les sanctions européennes à venir et souhaitant, bien entendu, éviter leur mise en œuvre, a accepté de nouvelles négociations avec le groupe «3+3» (Etats-Unis, Russie, Chine et, du côté européen, France, Grande-Bretagne et Allemagne) ainsi que de nouvelles inspections de ses installations par une délégation des autorités nucléaires internationales (AIEA). C’est un signal positif qui devrait être exploité.

Bien sûr, il ne suffira pas d’une ou deux tables rondes pour régler le conflit nucléaire avec l’Iran: la défiance mutuelle est trop forte pour cela et les positions respectives trop éloignées l’une de l’autre. Il serait totalement illusoire de s’attendre à ce que l’Iran, ainsi que le Conseil de sécurité l’a exigé dans ses résolutions, renonce complètement à l’enrichissement d’uranium.

Car en Iran aussi, la politique étrangère est avant tout une politique intérieure. Au printemps prochain se tiendront les élections parlementaires et, à l’été 2013, l’élection présidentielle; aucun des candidats ne veut courir le risque de se voir reprocher d’avoir courbé l’échine devant les Occidentaux. Par conséquent, même si des négociations sérieuses se tiennent, il est probable qu’il n’en sortira que des solutions provisoires accompagnées d’éventuelles mesures de détente militaire.

On pourrait imaginer un processus progressif qui définirait ce qu’on attend des Iraniens pour que soient levées certaines sanctions ou qu’elles ne soient pas mises en œuvre. Par exemple, si l’Iran cesse d’enrichir de l’uranium à 20%, les Etats-Unis et l’Europe pourraient abandonner l’embargo sur le pétrole et les sanctions financières. En fin de compte, une levée complète des sanctions prononcées par le Conseil de sécurité est actuellement aussi peu vraisemblable que l’arrêt de toutes les activités d’enrichissement iraniennes. En outre, il serait judicieux de renouer avec l’idée d’un échange de combustible dans le cadre duquel l’Iran fournirait ou vendrait de l’uranium moyennement enrichi à la Russie ou à la France en échange, ou contre paiement, de barres de combustible pour son réacteur de recherche médicale. Un tel accord ne constituerait certes pas une grande avancée, mais il pourrait frayer la voie à de futures négociations et éloigner quelque peu la menace du développement à des fins militaires du programme nucléaire iranien.

Ces dernières semaines ont montré à quel point le danger de malentendu est important, les navires de guerre américains et iraniens opèrent dans certaines zones à proximité immédiate les uns des autres. Il est nécessaire – et tout à fait concevable – d’adopter des mesures simples destinées à renforcer la confiance. Dernièrement, un navire américain a sauvé une douzaine de pêcheurs iraniens retenus en otage par des pirates somaliens: cet événement pourrait inciter les Etats concernés à fixer quelques règles fondamentales en matière de prise de contact afin d’éviter des incidents regrettables en haute mer.

Volker Perthes (* 16. Mai 1958 in Homberg/Niederrhein) ist ein deutscher Politikwissenschaftler und seit 2005 Direktor der Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP).

L’idée que les localités israéliennes bâties au-delà des lignes d’armistice de 1949 constituent un obstacle à la paix est devenue un dogme chez les diplomates et journalistes européens. Or ce dogme est contredit par trois faits :

1. Le monde arabe était en guerre contre Israël bien avant la construction des premières implantations israéliennes dans les années 1970 ;

2. Le leadership palestinien a rejeté à deux reprises l’offre israélienne (par Ehud Barak en juillet 2000 et par Ehud Olmert en septembre 2008) de démanteler ces implantations en échange d’un accord de paix ;

3. Lorsqu’Israël démantela toutes ses implantations de la Bande de Gaza en 2005, elle reçut à la place de la paix qu’elle escomptait des tirs de missiles incessants.

Bien plus que les implantations, l’un des principaux obstacles à la paix entre Israël et les Palestiniens est la question des réfugiés. Sous couvert de l’euphémisme humanitaire de “droit au retour,” les Palestiniens veulent envahir Israël avec sept millions d’immigrants qui sont les descendants réels ou supposés des quelque six-cent mille Arabes qui quittèrent leurs maisons pendant la Guerre d’Indépendance d’Israël. Le “droit au retour” transformerait Israël en un État binational avec une majorité arabe.

Certains relativisent le “droit au retour” comme étant une simple tactique de négociations et un phantasme auquel les Palestiniens eux-mêmes ne croient pas. Et pourtant, c’est bien en vertu de ce “droit au retour” que Yasser Arafat et Mahmoud Abbas rejetèrent les offres de paix respectives d’Ehud Barak et d’Ehud Olmert. Par ailleurs, les médias d’État palestiniens ne présentent pas le “droit au retour” comme rêve irréalisable mais bien au contraire comme l’un des principes fondateurs du nationalisme palestinien, un principe dont l’abandon constitue un acte de haute trahison.

Le “droit au retour” perdure entre autre à cause de l’UNRWA (l’office de secours et de travaux des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés de Palestine dans le Proche-Orient), et ce pour deux raisons. D’abord parce que la mission de l’UNRWA (contrairement à la mission du Haut Commissariat des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés, ou UNHCR) n’est pas d’intégrer les réfugiés palestiniens dans leurs pays d’accueil mais au contraire de subventionner leur vie de réfugiés. Ensuite, parce que l’UNRWA applique la définition de “réfugié” aux descendants des réfugiés, tandis que l’UNHCR (qui est en charge de tous les réfugiés du monde à l’exception des réfugiés palestiniens) limite cette définition aux réfugiés eux-mêmes.

Du fait de ces différences de missions et de définitions, le nombre de réfugiés dans le monde a décru de soixante millions en 1947 à dix-sept millions aujourd’hui, tandis que le nombre de “réfugiés palestiniens” a accru de six-cent mille en 1948 à sept millions aujourd’hui.

Si les réfugiés palestiniens, comme le reste des réfugiés dans le monde, avaient été la responsabilité de l’UNHCR, le problème des réfugiés palestiniens aurait été résolu depuis longtemps. Des six-cent mille réfugiés de 1948, quelque cent-mille seraient encore en vie aujourd’hui. Au lieu d’être ségrégués dans des camps, ils seraient des citoyens à part entière de pays dont ils partagent l’appartenance ethnique, la langue, et la religion. Démanteler l’UNWRA et faire de l’UNHCR l’agence responsable des réfugiés palestiniens mettrait fin à un obstacle majeur à la paix au Proche-Orient.

La décision récente de l’Union européenne (UE) d’attribuer 72 millions d’Euros à l’UNWRA ne fait que retarder cette réforme nécessaire. Cette contribution à l’UNWRA n’est pas seulement un affront aux Palestiniens eux-mêmes dans la mesure où elle encourage des pays comme le Liban et la Jordanie à ne pas remplacer leur politique de ségrégation par une politique d’intégration. Il s’agit également d’un affront à la cause de la paix.

Tandis que l’UE a réalisé dans ses frontières la vision kantienne de paix démocratique (avec un peu d’aide des États-Unis qui protégèrent l’Europe de la menace soviétique), la contribution de l’Europe à la paix en dehors de ses frontières n’est pas reluisante – comme peuvent en témoigner le Rwanda ou l’ex-Yougoslavie. L’aveuglement européen face à un soi-disant “printemps arabe” qui a amené les islamistes au pouvoir est le dernier exemple tragique en date. La décision de l’UE de contribuer au financement de l’UNRWA ne fait pas que confirmer cet aveuglement. Elle fait de l’EU un obstacle à la paix au Proche-Orient.

ALMOST one year after anti-government protests began in Syria, a disaster of enormous moral and strategic proportions is fast approaching. Full-scale civil war is now likely. And a multifront, conventional and possibly unconventional war ignited by events in the Levant is also increasingly plausible.

However, many in the West, in some Arab governments and even in the Syrian opposition still think a “controlled collapse” of Bashar al-Assad’s government is possible.

According to this view, increasing pressure from all around will, at some point, fracture the government and its supporters both at home and abroad. Any resulting death and destruction, as well as regional blowback, will be within acceptable limits.

Unfortunately, there are at least three problems that make a controlled collapse unlikely.

First, the Assad government, which still enjoys substantial support from the army, the elite and other segments of the population, may be able to prolong its bloody denouement, with help from outsiders. Russia, which sees Syria as an indispensable strategic asset, joined China on Saturday in vetoing a United Nations resolution against the Assad government.

Iran has staked its own vital interests on Mr. Assad’s regime, which is a crucial conduit for Tehran’s support for the militant Shiite Muslim group Hezbollah in their common struggle against Israel.

Second, the violence from any drawn-out collapse will most likely exceed the limits of moral or strategic acceptability for the West and its allies — not to mention the Syrian people. Sectarian conflicts that divide the Alawites and other minority communities from the majority Sunni population will accelerate, compounding tensions in neighboring Lebanon, where Sunni fighters are now staging attacks into Syria, and also in Iraq, where sectarian violence has sharply increased in recent weeks.

Third, the resulting movement of refugees will add yet another destabilizing element to a humanitarian crisis. After all, Syria already hosts millions of Iraqi and Palestinian refugees who are likely to experience further anguish and loss.

Far from controlled collapse, a likelier scenario is a bloody last-ditch effort by Mr. Assad, Iran and Hezbollah to save the Syrian government, which they have the means to do.

These “axis of resistance” forces would most likely project their formidable military power — which includes chemical weapons in the case of Syria — against their enemies in a fight for their collective existence. Conveniently for all three of them, there are multiple ways Israel could be goaded into a major conflict without it seeming as if Mr. Assad or Hezbollah were responsible, in the eyes of their supporters. Indeed, a lone rocket attack from southern Lebanon that kills a large number of Israeli civilians is a distinct possibility.

To counter this dangerous situation responsibly, the United States and its allies would have to be willing to plan for and then swiftly implement a wide pre-emptive military strike. In even the best-case scenario, this would mean holding large chunks of Lebanese and Syrian territory with ground forces.

Adequate pre-emptive planning and action, though, seems extremely unlikely given the political and financial constraints faced by Western countries at the moment, not to mention the repercussions a major war in the Middle East would have for Western interests.

It is not enough, then, to blame Russian and Chinese vetoes at the Security Council or even the murderous Assad regime for the danger that is gripping the region right now — even if they deserve much of the blame.

Instead, Washington should adopt a realistic, albeit distasteful, strategy that seeks to steadily defuse the conflict rather than watch it explode in everyone’s face. And that means dealing with Mr. Assad.

Mr. Assad is a brutally repressive and dangerous leader who is responsible for most of the death and destruction that has plagued Syria in recent months, but the consequences of pushing Iran, Syria and Hezbollah beyond their red lines will most likely be far worse.

America must therefore dispense with the inconsistent maxim that bargaining is morally prohibited when a leader is deemed to have gone beyond the pale — especially when bargaining could actually mitigate future fallout, while eventually securing one’s interests and values.

The main reason for making a deal with Mr. Assad right now — even one where he is initially offered more carrots than sticks — is precisely that a Western-led process that steadily undermines his ability and desire to use violence would stabilize a quickly deteriorating regional situation, gradually opening up Syria’s political system and reducing repression over time.

Thankfully, America and its allies are far more powerful than Syria, which means they possess the tools and flexibility to see such a strategy of pre-emptive concessions through to a successful conclusion.

The broad coalition currently facing Mr. Assad would first have to publicly lay out a grand bargain that retreats from the position of demanding that he step down immediately.

In exchange, a robust and competent contingent of Arab and United Nations monitors should promptly fan out across the country in order to verify the army’s pullback of heavy weaponry and the steady release of political prisoners. They would provide a permanent presence, and citizens could approach them to register complaints about violence committed by any side.

A national reconciliation conference outside of Syria should then be convened under Arab League and United Nations auspices. This would lay the groundwork for writing a new constitution and holding multiparty, supervised parliamentary elections later this year — as Mr. Assad himself recently proposed — and presidential elections in 2013. The reconciliation conference should also begin an investigation into the violence of the past year.

Three incentives could make the deal extremely difficult for Mr. Assad to reject.

First, America and its allies should call on the Free Syrian Army and other insurgents to suspend their operations. This would entail working with neighboring countries like Turkey and Jordan to create internationally supervised, weapons-free safe zones for the fighters, their families and others who feared retribution.

Second, the United States and the European Union would relax sanctions based on the government’s adherence to the deal and would set up an international conference of donors to support the material needs of the Syrian people.

Finally, so that it is not tarred as a Western plot, any deal would have to include a serious American-led effort to broker the return to Syria of the Golan Heights, which Israel has controlled since 1967.

Although there appears to be little political will for such an approach in Israel at the moment — the government sees no need to make concessions to Mr. Assad’s weak, teetering government — expending American political capital on a more promising peace process makes sense. Unlike the now defunct Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, talks with Syria could actually succeed (they broke down over a few hundred meters of land in 2000). Achieving an Israeli-Syrian deal could truly isolate the intransigent Iran-Hezbollah axis at a critical moment in the standoff over Tehran’s nuclear program.

This benefit, together with the prospect of normalized ties between Israel and Syria, might prove attractive to members of Israel’s security establishment who have long viewed a deal with Syria as both politically doable and strategically vital.

For its part, the badly shaken government in Damascus might find this a propitious moment to accept a deal as a way back from the abyss, even if this would most likely mean Mr. Assad’s eventual exit in the future. And if Mr. Assad rejects it, such a patently unreasonable move might actually offer the best hope yet of splitting his government and controlling the resulting collapse.

Admittedly, the prospects of successfully orchestrating such a deal now are far less promising than they were early last year.

But the realization that die-hard elements in Damascus, Beirut and Tehran could unleash great regional destruction should prompt a long overdue discussion about putting forward a credible and comprehensive bargain.

Negotiations now, rather than war later, could lead to a far better outcome for all parties — even if that means Syrians’ aspirations for freedom might be met much later than anyone would like.

While Russia and China were using their veto to abort a UN security council resolution against the Syrian regime, the news of a massacre in Homs came thick and fast. In an unprecedented escalation, the Syrian regime sought to exploit the international hesitancy to have a bloody showdown with its opposition.

This came after Syrians had observed for the first time in 30 years the anniversary of the massacre carried out in Hama in February 1982. It is regarded as one of the most gruesome events in Syria’s modern history. On that occasion, former president Hafiz al-Assad decimated most of the city of Hama with aerial bombings and tanks. About 30,000 inhabitants perished, while a similar number were detained, tortured and many killed in prisons. All this occurred in the shadow of the cold war and with the cover of the Soviet Union, which was then allied to Hafiz al-Assad’s regime.

Last Friday, Syrian protesters rallied under the slogan “forgive us Hama, we apologise”; a clear reference to the abject silence that has overshadowed that massacre throughout the last three decades. Although Hama was an ever-present bleeding wound in the Syrian popular conscience, and a humiliating disgrace that shook their souls, people were prohibited from remembering or mentioning it throughout the entire period of Hafiz al-Assad’s rule. When his son assumed power in 2000, many were optimistic that he would at least give some consideration to the victims or reveal the fate of the thousands who were swallowed up in the prisons. But the young president chose to follow in his father’s footsteps; he perpetrated another massacre in Hama and many others in Homs and other Syrian cities and towns. However, this time Bashar al-Assad has miscalculated. The Syrian revolution, which has so far sacrificed more than 7,000 dead, will not end unless the regime is overthrown.

Hafiz al-Assad’s regime managed to get away with the massacre of Hama in 1982 because of the international silence dictated by the balance of forces during the cold war and a media blackout, which denied the victims a voice and prevented them from presenting the images of their calamity.

It is true that the regional and international balance of power continues to play a negative role in ending the suffering of the Syrian people. But the Syrians – as other Arab people in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen – have now become the most important actors in the flow of events. This would enable them to overcome all external factors in their quest for freedom from tyranny and repression.

Regional and international hesitancy in dealing with Syria stems from two main factors. The first relates to the regional balance of power and what would happen if the regime collapsed. The second is linked to the alternatives that would replace the Ba’ath regime.

On a regional level, Syria represents the cornerstone of a strategic axis that extends from Tehran through Baghdad to Damascus and ends in Beirut. A change of regime in Syria would result in a fundamental change in this regional political configuration and alliances. In such a scenario, Iran would lose an important ally, which would affect its influence in Lebanon and Iraq. Therefore, Iran has a strong interest in defending the Syrian regime until the bitter end.

As for the possible alternatives to the regime, this is another problem confronting the main players in the region. Despite the theoretical state of “war” between Israel and Syria, the Assad regime has maintained quiet borders with Israel since 1967. Israel would face a new situation with unpredictable consequences if the Ba’ath regime collapsed, similar to the new relationship it faces with Egypt.

Analysts and politicians share a number of concerns about change in Syria; most importantly, the security of the religious minorities should the Sunnis become the majority in the new regime. What would this mean for the Alawites, Druze and Christians? Others have raised the issue of Syria’s territorial integrity if a civil war erupts. Still, others highlight the organisational weakness of the Syrian opposition and question whether the Syrian National Council is capable of representing the Syrian masses and speaking on their behalf.

All these fears seem legitimate on the surface, except that they ignore an important truth, which is that the Syrian street is astute and its revolution is well aware of the dangers that surround it. They are very careful not to fall foul of these. A close examination of the popular action in recent months shows that the street has succeeded to largely neutralise the spectre of sectarianism and the militarisation of their revolution.

The Syrian popular consciousness has been able to protect the revolution from the virus of sectarianism and ethnicity by preserving its national character. From day one, the ranks of the opposition included Alawites, Christians, Druze and Sunni Arabs and Kurds. They all stood as one front, demanding freedom and dignity. Despite severe repression, the revolution managed to preserve its predominantly peaceful nature except in the context of defending civilians; this is a role now mainly carried out by the Free Syrian Army. This army consists of individuals and experienced officers who defected from the regime’s army. They resolutely preserve the national discourse, and have not resorted to sectarian rhetoric. The Syrian street knows that the language of sectarianism will only serve the interest of the regime and it will divert the revolution from the path of democracy to that of an internal conflict that would end all hopes of living in freedom and dignity.

As for the supposed weakness and organisational ability of the Syrian opposition, there is in fact a huge capacity to organise and instil discipline. The people’s co-ordinating committees administer to the people’s needs efficiently. They communicate between themselves in all parts of Syria, assigning duties and dealing with logistics in a manner that is now much better than it was in the early days of the revolution. At the same time, the Syrian National Council has begun to organise its ranks abroad, agreeing on a political discourse that is more coherent and co-ordinated. True, the Syrian opposition is less well organised than their counterparts in Egypt, Tunisia and Yemen because of the extreme brutality of the Syrian regime, but an acceptable measure of maturity and commitment has been achieved. The street, with its civil and political forces, is able to guide the process of transition to democracy with no less proficiency than the other peoples in the region who have already got rid of their regimes.

The demonstrations that Syria witnessed last Friday (“forgive us Hama, we apologise”) show that the Syrian people have resolved to overthrow the regime. It is now for the international community, especially Russia and China, to ask for forgiveness from Hama, Homs, Idlib and the Syrian people. They should also make their choices, because this time the Syrian people have a voice, and it is being heard, with photos of their daily suffering being widely circulated, and memories that never die.

Many in Washington have been debating whether Turkey’s governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) could be a model for the Arab Spring , as our neighbors in the Middle East aspire to get rid of totalitarian regimes and become true democracies. But the reality in Turkey makes clear that the AKP model does not hold.

On Nov. 9 I visited the Silivri prison where hundreds of journalists, publishers, military officers, academics and politicians are being held. Trials were opened in 2007 on charges that an ultranationalist underground organization had plotted for years to overthrow the government. Many of those indicted have been detained for years without trial. There has not been a single conviction to date. Justice is at stake — and, so far, has been flagrantly denied. At work is an insidious attack on the rule of law by Turkey’s governing party. These trials could have been an occasion for Turkey to achieve a much-needed catharsis for correcting past wrongs, but they have been turned into instruments to silence the opposition and suppress freedoms.

Among those being held are eight opposition members of parliament. Turkey’s high election board declared that these people were qualified to stand for elections, and all won seats in parliament. That they are incarcerated violates their rights under Turkish law as elected representatives of the people.

A universal norm of the rule of law is that one is innocent until proven guilty. Another is that evidence leads to the arrest of a suspect. In today’s Turkey, however, people are treated as guilty until proven innocent. One gets arrested; then authorities gather evidence to establish an infraction. Presumed guilt is the norm. Sadly, all opponents of the government are viewed as potential terrorists or plotters against the state.

The AKP is systematic and ruthless in its persecution of any opposition to its policies. Authoritarian pressure methods such as heavy tax fines and illegal videotaping and phone tapping are widely used to silence opponents. Even more disturbing is the AKP’s claim that such things are being done in the name of democratic progress. The latest government target is the primary vestige of our democracy, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), which I lead.

While at the Silivri center in November, I likened the conditions to those of a concentration camp and said that prosecutors and judges were not meting out justice and did not deserve to be called upholders of justice. This month, I learned that the prosecutor’s office had opened an inquiry into my comments, contending that I was “seeking to influence a fair trial” and “insulting public officials.” Never mind that not a day passes without some comment by government officials, such as the prime minister, on the process of law and justice. Clearly, an effort to single out the leader of the main opposition party ratchets up the pressures on freedom of expression. Meanwhile, the Constitutional Court penalized our party when we asked for the chief justice to recuse himself from particular cases. Our request was based on ill will, we were told when the $3,000 fine was levied, and the CHP was unnecessarily preoccupying the court’s time.

It all boils down to this: In today’s Turkey, when one criticizes the justice system, one is prosecuted. When one appeals to the courts, one is penalized.

But here is why I stand behind my words: I have the right and duty to be critical of all that is wrong in my country. It is my inalienable right to point to injustices and to ask for justice. If the courts are not performing their duty, one can, and should, stand up and say so. I do not ask for forgiveness. Rather, I want my own immunity as a member of parliament to be lifted so that I can be tried in a court for all to witness the outcome. Righteousness is the ultimate immunity.

Turkey today is a country where people live in fear and are divided politically, economically and socially. Our democracy is regressing in terms of the separation of powers, basic human rights and freedoms and social development and justice. Citizens worry deeply about their future. These points are, sadly, reflected in most major international indexes, such as Human Rights Watch, which rank Turkey quite low in terms of human rights, democracy, freedoms and equality.

Our party stands for democracy, secularism, the rule of law, human rights and freedoms. We envision a progressive Turkey where citizens, regardless of their faith, ethnicity, gender or political view, are equal before the law. Building political, economic and cultural walls between people is not consistent with democracy or social justice. Only a nation at peace with itself can be a model for its neighbors. A nation plagued by multiple forms of division and polarization is doomed to failure.

Tactics such as oppression, preying on fear and restricting freedoms can help sustain a government’s rule for only so long. Never in history has a government succeeded in ruling permanently through authoritarian measures. Oppression does not endure; righteousness does. Turkey will be no exception.

A finales de 1980 decidí dar un curso sobre el conflicto israelo-palestino en la Universidad de Haifa. Al finalizar, y de acuerdo con sus preferencias, los estudiantes presentaron sus conclusiones en forma de proyectos o trabajos de investigación. Algún tiempo después, uno de aquellos estudiantes -Teddy Katz-, nacido en Haifa y miembro del kibutz Magal, decidió seguir investigando la suerte que corrieron varias aldeas palestinas -en particular la de Tantura- durante la guerra de 1948, y en 1998 presentó su tesis de maestría ante la Universidad de Haifa obteniendo como calificación un altísimo 97% (yo le hubiera dado un 100%). De las pruebas reunidas, Katz sacó una serie de conclusiones, entre otras que durante la ocupación de Tantura por las tropas judías unos 225 palestinos habían sido asesinados: 20 habrían muerto durante la batalla y el resto, civiles y no civiles desarmados, habrían sido ejecutados después de la rendición de la aldea. Meses después, a finales de enero de 2000, Teddy Katz fue entrevistado por Amir Gilat, un periodista del diario Ma’ariv; la reacción entre los veteranos de la Brigada Alexandroni responsable de la captura de Tantura fue casi inmediata: algunos de entre ellos se negaron a admitir la masacre pero otros, junto con los propios testigos palestinos, confirmaron los datos recogidos por Katz. No pasaría mucho tiempo antes de que los veteranos de la Alexandroni afectados por los resultados de esta investigación interpusieran contra Katz una denuncia por calumnias, demandándole por libelo y reclamando un millón de shekels como compensación.

Fuertemente presionado por la Universidad e incluso por su familia, en un momento de depresión que estuvo a punto de costarle la vida, Katz aceptó firmar una carta de disculpa donde se retractaba de lo publicado y donde admitía que en Tantura no había tenido lugar ninguna masacre, aunque enseguida se arrepintió. La juez Pilpel dio por cerrado el caso. La Universidad, sin embargo, ya había decidido lo que tenía que hacer y sus directores pidieron la anulación de la calificación obtenida acusando no solo a Katz de haber inventado muchas de las pruebas, sino también a mí por haberlo apoyado. Y es que después de pasar tres días y sus correspondientes noches escuchando las grabaciones que había realizado Katz con los testimonios y pruebas recogidos, no quedaba sino aceptar la heladora realidad de los monstruosos hechos sucedidos en Tantura. A partir de ese instante, comprendí claramente que mi obligación era defenderlos y darlos a conocer de todas las maneras posibles, así que hice un resumen y lo colgué en la página web de la Universidad para que todo el mundo pudiese leerlos. Propuse también que se convocara un panel de expertos para discutir el tema y averiguar si hubo o no una masacre, pero la Universidad lo rechazó, medida que terminaría provocando un boicot en su contra en lugar de un motivo más para enlucir su reputación en el mundo académico.

Desgraciadamente, Ben Artzi y especialmente Yoav Gelber consideraron que su única obligación era defender el sionismo olvidando la historia, de manera que al descalificar la tesis de Teddy fue como si enviaran un mensaje a cada estudiante de investigación y a cada profesor sin titularidad diciéndoles que si investigaban la historia de 1948 de un modo que contradijera la narrativa sionista no llegarían a ninguna parte. Fue entonces cuando descubrí con horror hasta qué punto mi propia Universidad había manipulado la historia al hacer desaparecer no solo los testimonios de los supervivientes de las aldeas palestinas arrasadas, sino también la evidencia de los crímenes cometidos durante la guerra de 1948. En aquella época -que coincidió con el inicio de la Segunda Intifada- mis críticas a la Universidad se sumaron a mi abierta oposición a las insensibles políticas de Israel en los territorios ocupados: restricción de alimentos a comunidades enteras, demolición de viviendas, asesinato de ciudadanos inocentes -muchos de ellos niños-, hostigamiento continuo en los checkpoints y, en general, la destrucción programada del entramado económico y social de la vida en los territorios.

Fue así como, sometido a un boicot de facto, me convertí en un paria dentro de mi propia Universidad. Amigos y colegas cancelaron las invitaciones a los cursos y seminarios que me habían enviado antes de que estallara el affaire Tantura, unos hechos que ponían al descubierto la brutal naturaleza de la limpieza étnica realizada por Israel en 1948 y -lo que todavía era más importante- su estrecha conexión con el proceso de paz y cualquier posible solución del conflicto. Fue mi compromiso y mi empeño en difundir estos hechos por lo que, seis meses después de acabarse con el tema Katz, me gané la declaración de persona non grata en mi propia Universidad y -como consecuencia- la primera respuesta de boicot académico a Israel por parte de la Asociación de Profesores Universitarios de Gran Bretaña (AUT por sus siglas en inglés) no solo en mi defensa -aunque también-.

Pienso, sinceramente, que un boicot general es necesario porque existe el imperativo moral de terminar con la ocupación y solo una presión exterior similar a la que en su tiempo se ejercía sobre el régimen de apartheid en Suráfrica podría tal vez lograrlo. El juicio en mi contra fue un intento de utilizar un procedimiento legal para librarse de mi persona y solo fracasó por el apoyo internacional que obtuve. En ese sentido, el boicot a las universidades israelíes forma parte de un creciente boicot del que no se habla y que afecta desde los productos a los cantantes israelíes, y que si se abatió sobre nuestras universidades fue porque ellas decidieron formar parte de la propaganda oficial, de esa elaborada publicidad que vende a Israel como la única democracia de Oriente Próximo y que en lugar de ejercer su papel de guardianas de la democracia se han convertido en las refrendarias de la ideología gobernante. No, no es posible ignorar todo eso, sobre todo cuando se hace en tu nombre.

One year after the revolution that ousted President Hosni Mubarak, the Egyptian military is closing down civil society organizations and trying to manipulate the constitution-writing process to serve its narrow interests. Meanwhile, in Pakistan, where the military has also held sway for more than half the country’s existence — for much of that time, with America’s blessing — a new civil-military crisis is brewing.

For the United States, the parallels are clear and painful. Egypt and Pakistan are populous Muslim-majority nations in conflict-ridden regions, and both have long been allies and recipients of extensive military and economic aid.

Historically, American aid tapers off in Pakistan whenever civilians come to power. And in Egypt, Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama both resisted pressure from Congress to cut aid to Mr. Mubarak despite his repression of peaceful dissidents.

It is no wonder that both Egyptians and Pakistanis express more anger than appreciation toward the United States. They have seen Washington turn a blind eye to human-rights abuses and antidemocratic practices because of a desire to pursue regional objectives — Israeli security in the case of Egypt, and fighting Al Qaeda in the case of Pakistan.

The question now is whether the United States will, a year after the Egyptian revolution, stand by and allow the Pakistani model of military dominance and a hobbled civilian government to be replicated on the Nile.

Pakistan and Egypt each have powerful intelligence and internal security agencies that have acquired extra-legal powers they will not relinquish easily. Pakistan’s history of fomenting insurgencies in neighboring countries has caused serious problems for the United States. And Egypt’s internal security forces have been accused of involvement in domestic terrorist attacks and sectarian violence. (However, Washington has long seen Egypt’s military as a stabilizing force that keeps the peace with Israel.)

The danger is that in the future, without accountability to elected civilian authorities, the Egyptian military and security services will seek to increase their power by manipulating Islamic extremist organizations in volatile and strategically sensitive areas like the Sinai Peninsula.

Despite the security forces’ constant meddling in politics, Pakistan at least has a Constitution that establishes civilian supremacy over the military. Alarmingly, Egypt’s army is seeking even greater influence than what Pakistan’s top brass now enjoys: an explicit political role, and freedom from civilian oversight enshrined in law.

Egypt’s army was once considered heroic for siding with peaceful demonstrators against Mr. Mubarak, but it has badly mishandled the country in the past year. The riot at a soccer match on Wednesday that killed around 70 people underscored the leadership’s failure to undertake badly needed police reform and restore security. The economy is teetering, peaceful demonstrators have been tried in military courts, anti-Christian violence has spiked and ministers appointed by the military have hounded civil society groups that advocate government accountability, budget transparency, human rights and free elections.

A dismayed Congress has attached conditions to future military assistance to Egypt (now $1.3 billion a year), requiring the Obama administration to certify that the military government is maintaining peace with Israel, allowing a transition to civilian rule and protecting basic freedoms — or to waive the conditions on national security grounds — if it wants to keep aid flowing.

The Egyptian military is clearly not meeting at least two of those three conditions right now. Consequently, the Obama administration should not certify compliance, nor should it invoke the national security waiver by arguing that Egyptian-Israeli peace is paramount and that Egypt’s military is the only bulwark against Islamist domination of the country — because both of these arguments are deeply flawed.

First, hardly anyone in Egypt favors war with Israel, and a freeze or suspension of American aid would not change that. Second, continuing support to an Egyptian military that is bent on hobbling a liberal civil society would only strengthen Islamist domination. Islamist groups won some 70 percent of seats in the recent parliamentary elections, but they will now face tremendous pressure to solve the deep economic and political problems that caused the revolution.

In Egypt, as in Pakistan, the ultimate solution is a peaceful transfer of power to elected, accountable civilians and the removal of the military’s overt and covert influence from the political scene. At a minimum, Egypt should establish the clear supremacy of the civilian government over the military and allow an unfettered civil society to flourish.

Washington should suspend military assistance to Egypt until those conditions are met. Taking that difficult step now could help Egypt avoid decades of the violence, terrorism and cloak-and-dagger politics that continue to plague Pakistan.

Just after the first anniversary of the onset of the Arab Spring, the Obama administration announced in December an enormous arms sale to Saudi Arabia, with a price tag greater than the annual gross domestic product of more than half the countries in the world. The administration hailed the sale as a “historic achievement” that “reinforces the strong and enduring relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia.” The close juxtaposition of the anniversary and the apparent repair of the temporary rough patch in U.S.-Saudi relations highlights crucial overlooked realities about the Arab Spring and the U.S. response.

Although accounts of the Arab Spring often refer to a wave of political change washing across the Middle East, the reality is otherwise. The wave has bisected the region, swamping one half while leaving the other barely damp. Governments in the majority of the region’s republics, namely Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria and Yemen, have been toppled or have faced serious domestic siege. In startling contrast, however, all of the region’s monarchies appear secure, with the possible exception of Bahrain. Most have enough oil money to keep their citizens well off, and some have a special religious legitimacy.

We should keep in mind that the various autocrats in the region who fell from power last year also looked to be well-entrenched, for all sorts of solid and frequently elaborated reasons, right up until the moment they no longer were. In this time of political surprises, which often stem from sudden, roiling popular protests, betting on reliable autocrats is more perilous than ever.

President Obama says that he recognizes this reality. He declared in May that “after decades of accepting the world as it is in the region, we have a chance to pursue the world as it should be” and that it will be “the policy of the United States to promote reform across the region.” And it is true that where political upheaval has hit, the United States has usually backed democratic change, sometimes actively, as in Libya; sometimes hesitantly, as in Egypt. But where autocratic stability continues to reign, the administration sticks to the decades-old U.S. policy of uncritical support for friendly dictators who are helpful on matters of security and economics.

When the government of Bahrain cracked down harshly on the massive protest movement within its borders last spring, the administration basically folded. The United States was unwilling to risk jeopardizing the convenient Persian Gulf home of the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet for the sake of its commitment to Arab democracy. Saudi Arabia’s military participation in Bahrain’s crackdown and its steadfast opposition to even a glimmer of liberalization within its own borders has not deterred the administration from enthusiastically reaffirming the intimacy of U.S.-Saudi ties. Consider also that, despite having taken no serious steps toward democratic reform in response to popular demands for change, Jordan’s King Abdullah has received only praise and aid from Washington.

A stark division underlies U.S. policy in the Middle East. Serious efforts to bolster democratic transitions in parts of the region are carried out alongside firm support for most of the remaining non-democratic governments. This two-faced stance, little remarked on in Washington but glaringly evident in the region, badly undercuts the persuasiveness of our democracy promotion efforts.

The realpolitik logic that drives the continuing attachment to friendly Arab monarchies is clear enough. The interests at stake — from oil to counterterrorism to containing Iran — are weighty. Yet the logic is so clear precisely because it is so familiar. It is exactly the same logic that we hurriedly disavowed last year after it suddenly looked terribly hollow in country after country.

The United States regretted then being caught so unprepared for historic change and having done so little to pave the ground toward a more democratic Middle East. We lamented our failures to push harder on autocratic friends to take reform seriously, to widen and deepen our support for pro-democratic civil society activists, and to broaden our knowledge of and dialogue with new societal forces that we understood only dimly.

If only we had taken seriously the daunting but not insurmountable challenge of finding a way to combine useful partnerships with regional autocrats with real attention to their political liabilities.

So as we move beyond the first anniversary of the Arab Spring, we might pause from congratulatory toasts to getting U.S.-Saudi relations back on track and think hard about how to avoid potential future regrets in a region that has barely opened a historic period of change.

Aside from Egypt, perhaps no place in the world was more galvanized by the events in Cairo’s Tahrir Square last year than Washington. American policymakers and foreign policy experts on both sides of the aisle rallied behind the cause of the young men and women who braved violence at the hands of the country’s notoriously vicious state police to march for freedom.

The Obama administration saw its defense of the revolutionaries, and its eventual demand that Hosni Mubarak step down, as a fulfillment of the promise the president made in his June 2009 Cairo speech — that he and the United States would stand alongside young Muslims, supporting their best dreams and highest aspirations. Officials from the previous White House saw the revolution as a vindication of George W. Bush’s freedom agenda and the comeuppance of a despot who stood in the way of his people’s hopes.

A year after the uprising that toppled Mubarak, the bright hope lit by young Egyptians taking their fate, and their country’s, into their own hands has begun to fade beyond recognition. The first indication that the political energies unleashed by the two-week uprising were not entirely salubrious was a mob’s sexual assault against American journalist Lara Logan in the middle of Tahrir Square. While some tried to pin this awful crime on pro-Mubarak thugs, subsequent manifestations of mob violence and its political commitments showed that the masses were moved by forces that had nothing to do with the old regime.

A week after Mubarak’s resignation, a long-exiled Muslim Brotherhood preacher, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, returned to Cairo, where he drew a massive crowd to Tahrir and led it in a communal prayer that ended with martial chants to march on Jerusalem. In September, a mob directed by soccer supporters stormed the Israeli Embassy, whose diplomats and security officials barely escaped with their lives. Several fatal attacks on Coptic Christians, including bombings and burnings of churches, culminated in an incident in October when at least 22 people, most of them Copts, were killed in a clash with the army, urged on and assisted by Muslim bystanders.

If the situation looks bad to the revolution’s admirers from afar, it is even worse for the fate of the uprising. The young, nominally liberal-minded cadres that first took to the streets have been effectively shut out of the parliament, as recent elections awarded the Muslim Brotherhood and the ultra-conservative Salafi movement more than two-thirds of the seats. Worse for Egypt is that tourism — a key source of national income — is drying up, capital is fleeing the country, foreign direct investment is vanishing, and the Islamists have no practical solutions to rescue an economy in free-fall. Even optimists can console themselves only with the notion that Egypt is going to have pass through a very dark tunnel before it reaches the light. And those, like myself, who expressed doubts about the purpose and direction of the uprising even as it unfolded will find it very difficult to read these two recent accounts of last winter without feeling sad and wishing the reality were otherwise.

Ashraf Khalil’s “Liberation Square” and Wael Ghonim’s “Revolution 2.0” are perhaps best read in tandem — not least because Khalil’s version describes in first-person detail the events that shook the Middle East and that Ghonim missed while he was held in prison for 11 days. It wasn’t until Ghonim was released from jail that he saw how his social-media campaign, waged on Facebook and Twitter, had helped bring down a pharaoh — and made him an international hero.

Brief as his detainment was, Ghonim’s two understated chapters of his time in chains and blindfolded deserve to become part of the canon of classic prison literature. Fearful of jeopardizing any of the thousands of protesters whose names he had on the laptop that was captured along with him, he insisted that his role in promoting the protests against the Mubarak regime derived from his love for Egypt. Indeed, he even showed respect for the security officials who persecuted him and his colleagues.

The most moving exchanges in the book are between Ghonim and one of his interrogators, who was injured in the 1990s fighting terrorists “who attacked the homes of peaceful Egyptians,” he explains to Ghonim, “like your family and mine.” Ghonim told his captor that he opposed the rigging of elections and the emergency law, and gave his interlocutor a chance to respond.

“Although he didn’t think the situation was ideal,” Ghonim writes, “he nevertheless believed it was the lesser of two evils, since without this regime Egypt would quickly sink into an abyss of mayhem and political discord.” It takes physical courage to go to jail for your political convictions, and intellectual courage to accord your political opponent respect for predicting Egypt’s future reality.

While Ghonim has written the inside story of the social-media techniques he used to build a revolutionary constituency, Khalil paints a bigger picture. A longtime Middle East correspondent based in Cairo, the Egyptian American Khalil explains that he was not merely a witness to history but also a participant. Nonetheless, he offers a solid journalistic account that places the Egyptian revolution in a regional context and details the events over the past decade that led to Mubarak’s downfall. Among other catalysts leading to the January 2011 uprising, Khalil lists the March 2003 protests against the U.S. invasion of Iraq, when demonstrators overran Egyptian security forces.

However, it was the Iraq war that led to the Bush administration’s pressure on Mubarak, which Khalil believes also set the stage for the Egyptian revolution. In particular, he credits a “harsh speech” that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice delivered at the American University of Cairo in June 2005, demanding that the Mubarak regime open up the political system. “Bush and Rice probably won’t be remembered too fondly in Egyptian history,” Khalil writes. “But this brief window — when America abandoned regional realpolitik — deserves to be remembered generously.”

Ghonim and Khalil agree that there were two proximate causes of the Egyptian uprising. First was the revolution in Tunisia. “The sight of the Tunisians,” Khalil writes, “accomplishing what Egyptians couldn’t do had rekindled that semidormant sense of Egyptian competitive pride.” Second was the killing of Khaled Said. In June 2010, half a year before the Tunisian revolution began, the 28-year-old Said was beaten to death outside a cybercafe in Alexandria by two policemen, with no apparent motive other than to terrorize someone weaker. Said’s death and the subsequent cover-up, says one of Khalil’s sources (an Egyptian blogger called Sandmonkey), “showed the middle class that their devil’s bargain with the Ministry of Interior meant nothing. Being silent and minding their own business wouldn’t protect them.”

Ghonim, living at the time in Dubai, where he was working for Google, was moved by an Internet photo of Said’s mangled corpse “to employ,” as he writes, “all my skills and experience to demand justice” — not just for Said, but for all of Egypt. Ghonim’s Facebook page “Kullena Khaled Said” (“We Are All Khaled Said”) had more than 100,000 fans in less than a week and became a launching ground for the revolution, sending followers to the streets and giving them a way to stay in contact with one another.

Ghonim reprints many of the comments that appeared on the Facebook page, including some of his own impassioned pleas. These, in conjunction with his descriptions of his efforts, will doubtless be of interest to many who are invested in the notion that the uprising’s prime mover was social media. However, it’s not clear how much Facebook and Twitter actually had to do with bringing down Mubarak.

Once people have gone to the streets, there’s little to guarantee they will stay there, especially if they are facing armed men with orders to shoot. Egyptian security forces killed hundreds of protesters over those two weeks, but compared with casualties during the 10-month uprising in Syria, where human rights groups estimate that Bashar al-Assad’s security forces have killed nearly 7,000 people, the toll in Egypt was very low. Why didn’t Egyptian forces commit themselves to the same levels of bloodshed? The answer goes to the essential tragedy of the revolution.

It is true, as Khalil writes, that “Hosni Mubarak was never as brutal, ruthless, or sadistic as some of his contemporaries”; moreover, it seems that the White House warned the regime against turning its weapons on civilians. But that’s not why Egypt’s security and military apparatus didn’t send more protesters to their deaths. One of the revolutionaries’ most famous chants was that the army and the people went hand in hand. However, events over the past year have shown that Egypt’s beloved army is interested in one thing only — maintaining the formidable economic interests that make it the most powerful and therefore the most corrupt institution in a country where wasta (connections) and baksheesh (bribery) have made corruption systemic for centuries.

Mubarak was not the regime; he was merely the civilian facade of a military order that has ruled since Gamal Abdel Nasser overthrew the monarchy in 1952. The irony is that Mubarak made the same error as the protesters in assuming that he was the ultimate authority. His unstated but obvious desire to pass the presidency on to his youngest son, Gamal, outraged not only the demonstrators but also the army, which availed itself of the opportunity the revolutionaries had created by going to the streets. Once the White House came out against Mubarak, the old man was finished, toppled by a military coup with which both Washington and the revolutionaries had unwittingly collaborated.

The current power-sharing arrangement between the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces and the Islamists, who include some of the same terrorists that Ghonim’s interrogator fought in the ’90s, means that the revolution’s two biggest losers are the revolutionaries and the United States. The fall of Mubarak cost Washington an ally who had kept the peace with Israel for 30 years, at some risk to his own life. The Camp David accords turned the United States into a power broker and underwrote its position in the Middle East. The Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty showed other Arab states what prizes would come to them should they simply make peace with Jerusalem: American money, American prestige and of course American weapons. The peace was for the sake not only of Israel but also of Egypt, which receives roughly $2 billion a year in U.S. assistance if it avoids risking national suicide again in another war with Jerusalem’s superior, and nuclear, forces.

By appearing to turn its back on Mubarak, the United Statessuggested that perhaps peace with Israel isn’t that important. Egypt, with more than 50 percent of its population too young to remember the devastation of the 1967 and 1973 wars, is perhaps inclined to agree. Those who dismiss the likelihood of renewed Israeli-Egyptian conflict assume that the Egyptian army does not dare forfeit the $1.3 billion that flows to it in U.S. military aid each year. However, the army’s priority is not to obtain American cash but simply to stay in power. Over the past half-century, international, regional and domestic dynamics have repeatedly driven Egypt’s rulers and its army to make war against Israel in spite of what would seem to be their better interests. A military that represses its people for the sake of its own wealth is liable to make any sort of mistake.

What transpired in Egypt last year was not a social-media revolution, nor was it a revolution in the sense that it overturned an existing political system. And yet, as both books show, it was a revolution insofar as Egyptians were able to change their sense of what they can accomplish in concert. Given the way that Egypt is going, it seems that they will likely have to draw on that talent again, sooner rather than later.

As the death toll in Syria has climbed to perhaps 7,000, proponents of humanitarian intervention are asking, quite reasonably, why the West does not intervene as it did in Libya last year. Not only was Libya’s dictator, Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi, ousted with relatively few Western casualties, but the NATO campaign also set a precedent for successful humanitarian intervention.

In the 63 years since the United Nations adopted a genocide convention in the wake of the Holocaust, world leaders have failed to prevent the deaths of millions, from Biafra and Cambodia to Rwanda and Darfur — not just because they have lacked the political will to intervene, but also because of the norm of genocide itself. By setting the bar for intervention so high — unmistakable evidence of clear intent to destroy a national, ethnic, racial or religious group — the international community has stuck itself in a Catch-22: by the time it is clear that genocide is occurring, it is often too late to stop it.

A new standard for humanitarian intervention is needed. If a continuing government-sponsored campaign of mass homicide — in which thousands have died and many thousands more are likely to die — is occurring, a coalition of countries, sanctioned by major international and regional institutions, should intervene to stop it, as long as they have a viable plan, with minimal risk of casualties for the interveners.

The recent war in Libya was a case in point. When large parts of Libya broke away from Colonel Qaddafi’s rule, he retaliated with tanks, air power and artillery against heavily populated urban areas. His loyalists promised “rivers of blood.” The signs of impending state-sponsored mass murder were clear.

For weeks, the United States and other nations appeared paralyzed, unclear whether Colonel Qaddafi’s brutality would reach the level of genocide, while Robert M. Gates, then the defense secretary, fretted about the open-ended costs in the “ouster of a Middle Eastern leader” and the fallout from attacking “yet another Muslim country.”

But rather than seeking regime change to prevent genocide, President Obama focused on the narrower objective of preventing “a humanitarian catastrophe” and explicitly ruled out foreign-imposed regime change.

These more modest, pragmatic goals sidestepped Mr. Gates’s objections and reflect the emerging new standard for humanitarian intervention. The United States took the lead, but initially only to halt the mass-homicide campaign. And it rightly set goals that would not require an ambitious military commitment.

Libya was a success — and it was as low-risk as any United States military mission of the past 20 years. Colonel Qaddafi’s threat to civilians rested on his ability to direct heavy concentrations of weapons against rebel-controlled populated areas and to cut off supplies into ports; NATO airpower could blunt both tactics.

Within weeks, the threat to eastern Libya was minimized, giving the rebel movement breathing space to gain cohesion and battlefield experience and eventually defeat Colonel Qaddafi’s small and increasingly unpopular army.

In the past few decades, the United States and other countries have successfully intervened for humanitarian purposes on three other occasions — in 1991, to stop Saddam Hussein’s attempted massacre of the Kurds in northern Iraq after the gulf war, and to protect first Bosnians, in 1993, and then Kosovars, in 1999, from the Serbs’ attempts at ethnic cleansing. All three humanitarian interventions occurred after thousands of people had been killed and exponentially more people had been injured or displaced. And all three were successful and saved thousands of lives.

None of these cases, nor the war in Libya, amounted to true genocide, where hundreds of thousands were already dead at the time of intervention. Most important, none could become a genocide because intervention stopped the killing at an earlier stage.

Limited military force to stop campaigns of state-sanctioned homicide is more pragmatic than waiting for irrefutable evidence of “genocide.” It will not work in every case, but it will save large numbers of lives. It also promotes restraint in cases where humanitarian intervention would be high-risk or used as a pretext for imperial designs.

As the world’s sole military superpower, the United States will be at the center of many future debates over humanitarian action. Rather than hewing to the old standard of intervening only after genocide has been proved, the emerging new standard would allow for meaningful and low-risk military action before the killing gets out of control.

Syria is, I admit, a tough case. It is a borderline example of a government’s engaging in mass killings of its citizens. The main obstacle to intervention is the absence of a viable, low-casualty military solution. Unlike Libya, where much of the coastal core of the population lived under rebel control, the opposition to Syria’s dictatorial president, Bashar al-Assad, has not achieved sustained control of any major population area. So air power alone would probably not be sufficient to blunt the Assad loyalists entrenched in cities, and a heavy ground campaign would probably face stiff and bloody resistance.

If a large region broke away from the regime en masse, international humanitarian intervention could well become viable. Until then, sadly, Syria is not another Libya. A mass-homicide campaign is under way there, but a means to stop it without unacceptable loss of life is not yet available.

“If you deal in camels, make the doors high,” an Afghan proverb cautions. As the dangers mount in the confrontation between the United States and Iran, both sides will have to raise the doors high for diplomacy to work, and to avoid conflict.

A diplomatic strategy must begin with the United States’ setting its priorities and then defining a practical path to achieve them. To achieve its top priorities, it will have to learn what Iran needs. Since the United States will not get total surrender from Iran, it must decide what it can put on the table to assure that both sides can reach a deal that will be durable.

American leaders have been masterly at diplomatic strategies — “building high doors” — to make deals. Franklin D. Roosevelt opened relations with the Soviet Union in 1933 to balance the ascendance of menacing forces in Germany and Japan. He was acting for geopolitical reasons, and in spite of his objection to Communism. Richard M. Nixon opened relations with China to enhance American leverage in dealing with the Soviet Union. He re-framed — but did not give up on — the American commitment to Taiwan to accomplish his objective. In each case, the presidents were acting against the advice of most of their close advisers.

In our own time, President Obama’s initial instincts on Iran were correct: only he can lead the United States to agreements with Iran that advance American national interests.

The first question is how to get such diplomacy started, and on that, Nixon’s strategy toward China is instructive.

Before traveling to Beijing in 1972, Nixon outlined on his ubiquitous yellow pad three analytical pillars of his strategy: What do they want, what do we want and what do we both want? The Chinese, he continued, wanted to “build up their world credentials,” to recover control of Taiwan and to get the United States out of Asia, while the United States wanted to succeed in Indochina, establish communication “to restrain Chinese expansion in Asia” and, in the future, “reduce threat of confrontation by China Super Power.” The United States and China both wanted “to reduce danger of confrontation and conflict, a more stable Asia, a restraint on U.S.S.R.”

In the Shanghai Communiqué, issued at the culmination of the meeting in Beijing, the continuing differences were highlighted, but both sides agreed to expand the common ground between them.

In developing a diplomatic strategy toward Iran, President Obama might respond to Nixon’s three questions as follows: Iran wants recognition of its revolution; an accepted role in its region; a nuclear program; the departure of the United States from the Middle East; and the lifting of sanctions. The United States wants Iran not to have nuclear weapons; security for Israel; a democratic evolution of Arab countries; the end of terrorism; and world access to the region’s oil and gas. Both Iran and the United States want stability in the region — particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan; the end of terrorism from Al Qaeda and the Taliban; the reincorporation of Iran into the international community; and no war.

With those assumptions as a skeleton, the shape of a final agreement with Iran is imaginable. The United States would agree to full recognition and respect for the Islamic Republic, and Iran would agree to regional cooperation with the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq. Both sides would agree to address the full range of bilateral disputes.

The International Atomic Energy Agency and the United Nations Security Council could accept an Iranian civil nuclear program in return for Iran’s agreeing to grant inspectors full access to that program to assure that Iran did not build a nuclear weapon. Once international agencies had full access to Iran’s nuclear program, there could be a progressive reduction of the Security Council’s sanctions that are now in effect. Iran would agree to cease making threats against Israel, and the United States would agree to support efforts toward achieving a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East.

It would be important to make arrangements for Israel’s security; the exact shape of those measures would have to be worked out in the negotiations. An agreement in which there would be full access to Iran’s nuclear program, with a monitored limitation of 5 percent enrichment, would offer Israel additional reasons for confidence in the deal.

Both sides would agree to cooperate in reducing the influence of the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan; in combating drug trafficking; and in keeping open the routes through which energy flows to the world from the Persian Gulf. Both sides would agree that while wide differences between the two nations remained, those differences must be resolved peacefully.

The China analogy for American-Iranian relations falls short in some areas. The most important is that Mao was ready for an American approach, while Iran’s supreme religious leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is not. Instead, he is convinced that the United States will not work with Iran until his regime is gone.

For Iran’s leadership, the notion that the United States is bent on overthrowing its rulers is rooted in historical experience: the United States did overthrow Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh in 1953, supported the Shah afterward, supported Saddam Hussein’s war against Iran in the 1980s, and now backs increasing efforts to weaken and isolate Iran.

Reducing the malign influence of this legacy on the thinking of Ayatollah Khamenei will be essential to achieving any deal. Simply “keeping the door open to diplomacy” will not be sufficient. So the Iranian leader must be approached directly, but discreetly, by someone he trusts who conveys assurances from President Obama that covert operations and public pressure have been demonstrably reduced. The interlocutor might be a leader from a country in the region, enlisted when the American president felt the time was right.

Ayatollah Khamenei will have to be convinced by actions, not just messages. Just as Nixon halted covert action in Tibet before approaching China, a similar signal will be needed with Iran.

There is no guarantee that diplomacy will succeed. But that is also true of war. And only diplomacy can offer Iran’s current rulers a stake in building a secure future without a nuclear bomb. Only diplomacy can achieve America’s major objectives while avoiding the mistakes committed in Iraq or Vietnam.

Reactions in Europe to the Arab Awakening have veered too wildly between optimism and pessimism. As the initial euphoria gives way to the inevitable doubts, we need to stay the course and reaffirm our commitment to the emerging democracies.

Our starting point should be that democracy — everywhere — can be awkward: thrilling, inspiring and liberating, but also messy, turbulent and unpredictable. Short-term upsets are inevitable. But history, not least the history of our own continent, tells us that once deep democracy sets down roots, with the rule of law, human rights, gender equality, impartial administration, free speech and private investment, as well as honest elections, countries prosper and seek to live in peace with those around them.

That is why I am an optimist. And what has happened in the past 12 months is truly remarkable. We have witnessed free and fair elections in Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco. Some have fretted over the Islamist successes at the ballot box. Others are asking for time in order to observe how this new political situation will unfold.

In Tunisia, Ennahda has entered into a coalition government with the secular political forces. In Morocco, an important chapter of “cohabitation” has been opened between the king and the prime minister from the Party of Justice and Development. A recent Gallup poll shows that while most Egyptians affirm the importance of Islam in their lives, they want religious leaders to be limited to an advisory role to the government authorities.

In Egypt, the first democratically elected Parliament in 60 years has had its first historic session. Of course, building real and deep democracy demands sustained effort and commitment. Egyptian civil society must be allowed to play its crucial role as a pillar of democracy and it is important that the state of emergency be lifted completely and the transfer to civilian rule takes place as early as possible.

I also hope Libya will build a democracy that will benefit all Libyans. We are fully engaged. Together with the United Nations, the European Union is organizing a workshop with our Libyan partners to speed up our support. Our concern is not confined to North Africa. The newly discovered rights apply whether you are from Syria, Yemen, or for that matter from Jordan, Bahrain and the other Arab monarchies. And with rights come responsibilities. That is why we look to the Libyan authorities to leave no stone unturned in investigating recent allegations of torture.

I have heard skepticism about whether “we” can trust these new political groups, who inspire themselves from various strands of Islamism. Some are worried and argue that it is not in the interest of Europe to support and assist the Arab Awakening. I disagree. We have a moral duty as well as a practical need to help our neighbors secure democracy and prosperity. We are not “spectators.” We have committed ourselves to engage, work and discuss with all the governments, parliaments and organizations with whom we share our commitment to democracy.

So let me address the issue of trust directly. It goes both ways.

A question the Islamists often raise is whether “they” can trust us? I think there is an acute need for getting beyond this mutual suspicion and for getting to know each other better. Lumping all Islamists into one and the same category is misleading and unhelpful.

We realize the need for more first-hand knowledge. Each political party and movement has to be understood and appreciated according to its own merits, just as they need to be judged by their concrete actions and deeds. These are political movements that are learning and changing before our eyes and we have taken note. They are eager to learn and government responsibility and public office will now give them the opportunity to translate their commitments into concrete laws and policies. The more we do to understand them, and help them to understand us, the better.

That is why we need mutual trust as the basis for the engagement with the new political leadership. This can only be done through direct dialogue. We will show humility in front of this huge task.

I am delighted that the prime minister of Tunisia, Hamadi Jebali, has accepted our invitation and chosen Brussels for his first official visit abroad. This visit this week is as symbolic as it is important. It shows the new government wants a close relationship with the E.U.

With Tunisia, we held a successful joint task force in September to inject direction and joint ownership into our support for the transition. We were able to bring together the international community, E.U. institutions, multilateral financial institutions, and crucially, private sector companies with one objective: backing the transition and making sure that together we become a catalyst for quicker and more effective assistance.

Now, one year after the Tunisian people decided to take the future in their own hands, the visit of Prime Minister Jebali shows that the E.U. and Tunisia want to work together to respond to the hopes of all Tunisians.

Elections are an important part of democracy. But building deep democracy is about much more. It is about the next election, about defining the ground rules and then sticking to them. It is about delivering on one’s promises, and it is about drafting constitutions that are inclusive and protect citizens’ rights, particularly with regard to women. Governing is also about providing jobs, and about being pragmatic in the face of the many social and economic challenges.

Pulling together in broad coalitions is a promising start. The journey will not be easy. But the E.U. is committed to staying the course: navigating the bumps along the way and quietly helping the demonstrators who toppled tyrants to live their dream.

«Pon tu bandera a media asta, / recuerdo. / A media asta / el día de hoy y siempre». En la penumbra de la biblioteca y en voz alta, releo el Shibbolethde un Paul Celan siempre acosado por la fuga de muerte y humo que danza sobre la música más alta o la más alta poesía. Y es Israel lo que retorna en la herida enigmática del poeta. Y en la mía, y en la de cualquier hombre de nuestro siglo que no apueste por ser asesino o imbécil. No es política. Es la áspera teología de un ateo, que trata de entender el absoluto, sin ceder a sentimiento ni afecto. Y sin en nada creer. Y nada amar, a no ser clandestinamente. Ni ante nada aceptar nunca cerrar los ojos. Por más que puedan doler. Y pueden mucho.

Todo el que por allí pasó evoca la luz de Jerusalén como un prodigio de pureza geométrica. A mí me desasosiega. Las pocas veces que estuve en la Ciudad fue por obligación y me sentí extranjero; más aún que en cualquier otro sitio, que ya es mucho. Hay demasiados dioses que, bajo ese cielo de cristal tallado, sobrevuelan la explanada, que unos llaman del Templo y otros de las Mezquitas. Y todos ellos son el Dios único que a todo otro excluye. A los otros Dioses únicos, antes que a todo. A quien en nada cree creer, ese fuego cruzado le es fatal. Infaliblemente. Y huye de tal angustia lo antes que puede. Como debiera haber huido Rilke del ángel aquel de las Elegías de Duino, ángel demasiado bello para no ser homicida. Así fue para mí. Pero no es cosa mía. Sólo. Los filósofos somos los últimos huérfanos del politeísmo. Uno solo de esos Dioses únicos nos aniquilaría, al modo en que aniquila la excesiva poética del ángel rilkeano. La inmortal guerra a muerte de los tres únicos hace, a quien la mira a los ojos, naufragar en la melancolía de no haber entendido, al cabo, que el saber nada cura. Tanto pensar, para esto.

Cualquier rincón umbrío, cualquier calleja, la más mezquina plazuela que el sol inunda, pueden pedir cuentas al descreído. Se las piden. Mucho más que las gentes, al cabo presas de su cortesía, las piedras, arrumbadas o en perfecta sintaxis, hablan todas de lo mismo: perseveramos. Nosotras. Y aquellos que, en nosotras, ponen un sentido al mundo: aunque sea un sentido horrible. La ingenua pretensión de dejar en el umbral de lo humano toda creencia, que hirió al griego inventor de esa disciplina vuestra, en la cual se soñaba descifrar «el estupor ante lo uno y lo múltiple», es tan vana cuanto las fantasías de mundos luminosos que trajeron el infierno en el siglo veinte, sin siquiera el consuelo con el cual nosotras, piedras sagradas, revestimos a quienes por fidelidad nuestra mueren, matan.

A ninguna de esas fidelidades al absoluto yo sobreviviría. No puedo amar, pues, a sus oficiantes. Soy impermeable al masoquismo, y lo sacrificial me conmueve tan sólo en literatura. En lo real me desasosiega. Pero a ningún discípulo, hoy, de San Pablo se le va a ocurrir —salvo excepción psiquiátrica— venir a exigirme que retire del Areópago mis dioses precarios o bien perezca. Pero a ningún estudioso talmúdico va a turbarle el espíritu —salvo excepción psiquiátrica— conversar sobre lo en-sof con un educado discípulo del Epicuro al cual la Misnácondena a ser aniquilado. Jerusalén, como Roma, es hoy eso: la exigencia de que a nadie se imponga una creencia; de que a nadie —y eso es lo que de verdad importa— le sea arrebatada una no-creencia. Eso separa a los dos primeros monoteísmos del tercero. Y de la barbarie. Que hoy lo amenaza todo. Y, frente a esa barbarie, se dibuja la línea última de resistencia que Maurice Blanchot exige a aquel que escribe, a aquel que, «en la retaguardia de la política, no se aparta ni se retira, sino que trata de mantener esa distancia y ese impulso de la retirada para instalarse en ella (precaria instalación), como un centinela que no estuviese allí más que para vigilar, mantenerse despierto».

¿Amo a Israel? Ni más ni menos que a otro sitio. O que a ninguno. Nadie ama sinceramente a un país. Ni siquiera al suyo: menos que a ninguno al suyo. Ama, a veces, muy pocas, a las ciudades. En las que fue feliz o desdichado: que, en la vida de un hombre, es diferencia escasa. En cuya luz deseó morir o ser eterno; no mortal, en todo caso. Ciudades, las más de veces leídas, porque es en la escritura sólo en donde las ciudades revisten la luz cegadora de lo sagrado. No amo a Israel. Como no amo casi nada. Sé —y saber tiene más peso que amar alguno, por intenso que ese amar sea— a Israel una de las muy pocas apuestas necesarias del que fue mi siglo. Y puede que la única moralmente irrenunciable. Sé que hay verdad primordial en las líneas de Emil Ludwig Fackenheim que vaticinan cómo «en la historia en la que Auschwitz es accidental Dios ha muerto, y en la historia en la que es esencial está vivo»; aunque sea con la paradójica vida moral del pensar ateo. Y sé que toda batalla para evitar que Israel sea destruido es justa. Y que, en esa batalla, contará conmigo. Sin que haya en esa apuesta mía generosidad alguna. Puro egoísmo necesario: la fría certeza de que Israel es nosotros, hombres libres.

No amo a Israel. Amo la razón. Y si Israel es la razón hoy en el Cercano Oriente, enhorabuena. Aunque esa razón haya tenido que pagar el precio más horrible que haya pagado jamás pueblo alguno: la Shoá, el proyecto bien planificado de la aniquilación completa durante el nazismo. Y el no creyente que soy piensa, como el rabino, que toda la historia contemporánea se juega en esa atroz paradoja: que «el marco midrásico ha sido destrozado para siempre por Auschwitz, que el Dios de la historia ha muerto». Y que, después de Auschwitz, judíos somos todos. Todos los que, aún hoy y a pesar de todo el peso aplastante de nuestro siglo y contra él, nos llamamos libres. «Ni un solo francés —escribía Jean-Paul Sartre en 1946— estará seguro mientras un solo judío, en Francia y en el mundo entero, pueda temer por su vida». Donde Sartre escribe «francés» nosotros escribimos «hombre»; donde Francia, mundo. Es todo. Y hoy en Jerusalén se juega ese envite.

No hay otra teología posible, después de Auschwitz, que no sea esa lucha sin esperanza contra el mal que renace siempre. Israel cifra esa lucha. Lo siento, pero no es cuestión de afectos. El día en el que Israel caiga, habremos caído todos. Como cayó Centroeuropa el día en el cual la solución final fue una hipótesis factible. Eli Wiesel lo da en el cruel relato del niño que, en la formación del campo de exterminio, ante los cuerpos de los tres judíos que acaban de ser ahorcados por los SS frente a sus compañeros de martirio, pregunta: «¿Dónde está Dios? ¿Dónde está?» Y una voz, tras él, susurra: «¿Que dónde está? Está aquí, colgando de esa horca». En esa respuesta cabe, con precisión exquisita, el enigma ineluctable del absoluto: el único que tiene valor para el que piensa.

Existiremos como hombres mientras Israel exista. Tal ha sido, tal es, la indigente certeza de un politeísta, anclado en sus anacronías griegas, que en nada cree y que nada espera. Y que desea ya tan pocas cosas. No es política, desde luego. Es la áspera teología de un ateo, que trata de entender el absoluto, sin ceder a sentimiento ni afecto. Y sin en nada creer. Y nada amar, a no ser clandestinamente. Ni, ante nada, aceptar nunca cerrar los ojos. Que, en la penumbra de la biblioteca y en voz alta, relee el Shibbolethde un Paul Celan siempre acosado por la fuga de muerte y humo que danza sobre la música más alta o la más alta poesía: «Pon tu bandera a media asta, / recuerdo. / A media asta / el día de hoy y siempre».

In the end it will come down to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. His senior officials will make their cases, but he alone will have to make one of the most critical decisions inIsrael’s history: whether to attackIran’s nuclear program. I do not envy him.

There has been much media speculation lately about possible Israeli military action, largely from those who have never borne the crushing weight of momentous national decisions. Israel has made many controversial decisions over the decades, some mistaken. One thing that cannot be said is that it has taken major military action lightly. Rarely if ever have the stakes been higher.

The debate in Israel over the Iranian nuclear threat is narrow but critical nonetheless. No one in Israel disputes that a nuclear Iran would pose a dire threat to its security and that Israel should go to great lengths to prevent this from happening. Some believe that Iran is an extremist but essentially rational actor, and can thus be deterred. Others believe the threat to be truly existential — that Iran’s theocratic commitment to Israel’s destruction may lead it to take unimaginable steps and risks — and thus that Israel must do everything it can to prevent that.

Neither side can afford to be wrong. Netanyahu, by all indications of the existentialist mind-set, certainly cannot.

In this case, as in no other, it behooves critics of Israel generally and Netanyahu specifically to approach the issue with caution and humility. If one can legitimately argue whether a nuclear Iran truly is an existential threat to Israel, Netanyahu’s perception of it as such is sincere.

Imagine him alone in his office, prior to the final decision: on the one hand, a threat to Israel’s very existence, and the Jewish people have already undergone one Holocaust in recent history. Israel was established so that the Jewish people would never again face the threat of extermination. Never again.

Conversely, the consequences of acting are also potentially dire, even assuming a successful attack. Iran already has the technical means to produce a nuclear bomb, and an attack could set the program back by no more than a few years — of value in itself but not a solution.

Moreover, according to Israeli estimates, Iran has hundreds of Shahab missiles capable of striking Israel. And along with Syria, Iran has provided Hezbollah with an almost unfathomable arsenal of more than 50,000 rockets, designed precisely for this scenario, which can blanket all of Israel from Lebanon.

There is no reason to believe that Hezbollah will not use this arsenal. During the 2006 Lebanon war, Hezbollah fired 4,000 rockets at Israel, about one-third of its 13,000-missile arsenal at the time; if it were to employ a similar ratio today — and it could be far larger — the results would cause a level of destruction Israel has never before experienced. Hamas too has a large rocket arsenal in waiting, but “just” thousands.

Furthermore, the destabilization of the regimes in Egypt and Syria, following the Arab Spring, greatly increases the dangers that they too might be drawn into the confrontation. Syria, because it may have an interest in deflecting domestic unrest by focusing public attention on an external enemy. Egypt, because the new Islamist-based government will, at very best, be far less committed to peace with Israel. An explosion of popular fury on the Egyptian and Arab street may force it to act.

The international community, which is finally beginning to take serious measures to deal with the Iranian threat — nearly 20 years after Israel and the U.S. first began warning of it — will undoubtedly respond harshly to an Israeli action and in some cases even impose sanctions. The Obama administration has made clear that it firmly opposes military action, although its own measures have failed to address the threat. Israel has lived with international recriminations before, but it cannot afford an overly severe response from the U.S., its one major ally, on whom it would be even more dependent in a post-attack period.

So herein lies the dilemma: a potential risk to the nation’s existence versus the uncertain results of military action, the likelihood of a devastating Iranian/Hezbollah response, the risk of an end to the peace with Egypt and even a military confrontation and regional war, severe international opprobrium and a partial rift with the United States.

Netanyahu alone will have to make the final decision. May he choose wisely.

Russia has been steadfast in its diplomatic support for the embattled regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, even as Assad becomes ever more isolated within the Arab League and the international community.

The Kremlin sent a strong message earlier this month when its aircraft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov, anchored off the Syrian port of Tartus. Then last week, Moscow said a draft resolution introduced at the U.N. Security Council by the Arab League calling on Assad to step aside “crosses our red lines.”

Russia’s support for Syria dates back to the days of the Soviet Union. The continuing partnership can be attributed to several factors — historic ties, economic interests and geopolitics.

Recent Russian arms sales to Syria are worth $4 billion, including fighter jets and advanced missiles. Russian business investments in Syria encompassing infrastructure, energy and tourism amount to nearly $20 billion. A natural gas processing plant about 200 kilometers east of Homs is being constructed by a Russian engineering company, Stroytransgaz.

But financial investment carries only so much weight in the face of international criticism. The United States, for example, had billions invested in the Mubarak regime in Egypt, yet halted its support as protests mounted.

Russia has refused to follow suit in Syria, demonstrating a willingness to absorb criticism. For the Kremlin, it appears more important to demonstrate a confident and sovereign foreign policy in defiance of the West.

Russia has major geopolitical and strategic considerations that dictate supporting Damascus. As the world’s largest oil producer and second largest exporter, Russia is in no need of oil supplies from the Arab world. Moscow also reaps the benefits of controlling regional energy markets. Russia therefore has no need to appease the predominately Sunni Arab bloc, which is currently acting in tandem with the West in opposing the Assad regime.

In addition, Russia has its own problems with Islamists in the Caucasus and Central Asia, and it fears rebellions similar to Syria’s breaking out in such areas as Dagestan, Abkhazia, Ingushetia or Chechnya. By supporting its ally in Syria, the Kremlin is sending a strong message to dissident groups that might want to fight unpopular governments within the Russian federation. The Syrian regime also provides Russia with a key strategic asset: a deep warm-water port at Tartus. The lack of such a port has plagued Russia’s global ambitions for centuries and is said to be one reason behind its invasion of Afghanistan.

The importance of the port may not be as great as it was in Soviet times, but unfettered access to the high seas remains a driving force for Russian strategic thinking as Russia’s main ports are either ice-locked for much of the year or land-locked by straits controlled by other powers.

Tartus, which garrisons Moscow’s growing Mediterranean fleet, is worth defending for the Kremlin. The recent shipment of arms delivered to the port underscored Russia’s commitment to its multibillion-dollar arms deal while ignoring an E.U. arms embargo. The port is being upgraded to accommodate larger vessels, as Assad declared the port will eventually be home to some of Moscow’s nuclear-armed warships.

In the end, Russia’s bold declarations and actions in support of the Assad regime are cold calculations meant to revive its position as a global superpower. While Russia has considerable economic and strategic reasons for the continued support, Syria above all offers the Kremlin the chance to counter the West’s influence in the Middle East. Backing the Assad regime is not based on ideological or moral convictions, but on pure power politics.

Drones are not just for firing missiles in Pakistan. In Iraq, the State Department is using them to watch for threats to Americans. It’s time we used the revolution in military affairs to serve human rights advocacy.

With drones, we could take clear pictures and videos of human rights abuses, and we could start with Syria.

The need there is even more urgent now, because the Arab League’s observers suspended operations last week.

They fled the very violence they were trying to monitor. Drones could replace them, and could even go to some places the observers, who were escorted and restricted by the government, could not see. This we know: the Syrian government isn’t just fighting rebels, as it claims; it is shooting unarmed protesters, and has been doing so for months. Despite a ban on news media, much of the violence is being caught on camera by ubiquitous cellphones. The footage is shaky and the images grainy, but still they make us YouTube witnesses.

Imagine if we could watch in high definition with a bird’s-eye view. A drone would let us count demonstrators, gun barrels and pools of blood. And the evidence could be broadcast for a global audience, including diplomats at the United Nations and prosecutors at the International Criminal Court.

Drones are increasingly small, affordable and available to nonmilitary buyers. For hundreds of thousands of dollars — no longer many millions — a surveillance drone could be flying over protests and clashes in Syria.

An environmental group, the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, has reported that it is using drones to monitor illegal Japanese whaling in the waters of the Southern Hemisphere. In the past few years, human-rights groups and the actor and activist George Clooney, among others, have purchased satellite imagery of conflict zones. Drones can see even more clearly, and broadcast in real time.

We could record the repression in Syria with unprecedented precision and scope. The better the evidence, the clearer the crimes, the higher the likelihood that the world would become as outraged as it should be.

This sounds a lot like surveillance, and it would be. It would violate Syrian airspace, and perhaps a number of Syrian and international laws. It isn’t the kind of thing nongovernmental organizations usually do. But it is very different from what governments and armies do. Yes, we (like them) have an agenda, but ours is transparent: human rights. We have a duty, recognized internationally, to monitor governments that massacre their own people in large numbers. Human rights organizations have always done this. Why not get drones to assist the good work?

It may be illegal in the Syrian government’s eyes, but supporting Nelson Mandela in South Africa was deemed illegal during the apartheid era. To fly over Syria’s territory may violate official norms of international relations, but governments do this when they support opposition groups with weapons, money or intelligence, as NATO countries did recently in Libya. In any event, violations of Syrian sovereignty would be the direct consequence of the Syrian state’s brutality, not the imperialism of outsiders.

There are some obvious risks and downsides to the drone approach. The Syrian government would undoubtedly seize the opportunity to blame a foreign conspiracy for its troubles. Local operators of the drones could be at risk, though a higher-end drone could be controlled from a remote location or a neighboring country.

Such considerations figured in conversations we have had with human rights organizations that considered hiring drones in Syria, but opted in the end for supplying protesters with phones, satellite modems and safe houses. For nearly a year now, brave amateurs with their tiny cameras arguably have been doing the trick in Syria. In those circumstances, the value that a drone could add might not be worth the investment and risks.

Even if humanitarian drones are not used in Syria, they should assume their place in the arsenal of human rights advocates. It is a precedent worth setting, especially in situations where evidence of large-scale human rights violations is hard to come by.

Drones can reach places and see things cell phones cannot. Social media did not document the worst of the genocide in the remote villages of Darfur in 2003 and 2004. Camera-toting protesters could not enter the fields where 8,000 men and boys were massacred in Srebrenica in 1995. Graphic and detailed evidence of crimes against humanity does not guarantee a just response, but it helps.

If human rights organizations can spy on evil, they should.

Def Jam will probably never sign them, but Cheikh Oumar Cyrille Touré, from a small town about 100 miles southeast of Dakar, Senegal, and Hamada Ben Amor, a 22-year-old man from a port city 170 miles southeast of Tunis, may be two of the most influential rappers in the history of hip-hop.

Mr. Touré, a k a Thiat (“Junior”), and Mr. Ben Amor, a k a El Général, both wrote protest songs that led to their arrests and generated powerful political movements. “We are drowning in hunger and unemployment,” spits Thiat on “Coup 2 Gueule” (from a phrase meaning “rant”) with the Keurgui Crew. El Général’s song “Head of State” addresses the now-deposed President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali over a plaintive background beat. “A lot of money was pledged for projects and infrastructure/Schools, hospitals, buildings, houses/but the sons of dogs swallowed it in their big bellies.” Later, he rhymes, “I know people have a lot to say in their hearts, but no way to convey it.” The song acted as sluice gates for the release of anger that until then was being expressed clandestinely, if at all.

During the recent wave of revolutions across the Arab world and the protests against illegitimate presidents in African countries like Guinea and Djibouti, rap music has played a critical role in articulating citizen discontent over poverty, rising food prices, blackouts, unemployment, police repression and political corruption. Rap songs in Arabic in particular — the new lingua franca of the hip-hop world — have spread through YouTube, Facebook, mixtapes, ringtones and MP3s from Tunisia to Egypt, Libya and Algeria, helping to disseminate ideas and anthems as the insurrections progressed. El Général, for example, was featured on a mixtape put out by the dissident group Khalas (Enough) in Libya, which also included songs like “Tripoli Is Calling” and “Dirty Colonel.”

Why has rap — an American music that in its early global spread was associated with thuggery and violence — come to be so highly influential in these regions? After all, rappers are not the only musicians involved in politics. Late last week, protests erupted when Youssou N’Dour, a Senegalese singer of mbalax, a fusion of traditional music with Latin, pop and jazz, was barred by a constitutional court from pursuing a run for president. But mbalax singers are typically seen as older entertainers who often support the government in power. In contrast, rappers, according to the Senegalese rapper Keyti, “are closer to the streets and can bring into their music the general feeling of frustration among people.”

Another reason is the oratorical style rap employs: rappers report in a direct manner that cuts through political subterfuge. Rapping can simulate a political speech or address, rhetorical conventions that are generally inaccessible to the marginal youth who form the base of this movement. And in places like Senegal, rap follows in the oral traditions of West African griots, who often used rhyming verse to evaluate their political leaders. “M.C.’s are the modern griot,” Papa Moussa Lo, a k a Waterflow, told me in an interview a few weeks ago. “They are taking over the role of representing the people.”

Although many of these rappers style themselves as revolutionary upstarts, they are most concerned with protecting a constitutional order that they see as being trampled by unscrupulous politicians. On “Coup 2 Gueule,” Thiat accuses President Abdoulaye Wade of election fraud and of siphoning money from Senegal’s Chemical Industries company (I.C.S.) and the African air traffic management organization (Asecna). He raps in Wolof, the dominant language in Senegal, “Old man, your seven-year presidential reign has been expensive/As if it wasn’t enough that you cheated during the last elections/You ruined the I.C.S. and hijacked Asecna’s money.” (It flows better in Wolof.)

Most of these rappers made music prior to the political events that swept their countries. But by speaking boldly and openly about a political reality that was not being otherwise acknowledged, rappers hit a nerve, and their music served as a call to arms for the budding protest movements. In Egypt, the rapper Mohamed el Deeb told me in a recent interview, “shallow pop music and love songs got heavy airplay on the radio, but when the revolution broke out, people woke up and refused to accept shallow music with no substance.”

As the Arab revolutions and African protests are ousting and discrediting establishment politicians, the young populations of these regions are looking to rappers as voices of clarity and leadership. Waterflow raises money at his shows to support his community because, like many of his fans, he believes that “waiting for our political leaders to give us opportunities is a waste of time.” Other Senegalese rappers helped found the movement Y’en a Marre (“We’re Fed Up”), which has crystallized opposition to President Wade and led a campaign to register young voters for the elections next month. Some are even supporting candidates for president. The rapper Keyti does not back the candidacy of Mr. N’Dour, because he thinks he’s trying to run out of self-interest, but acknowledges that it “was much needed to make people realize how politicians have failed.”

Rappers are hoping to inaugurate a different kind of politics. They would sooner make a pilgrimage to the South Bronx than to the Senegalese, Sufi holy city of Touba; they reject the predefined roles available within the political arena. And we shouldn’t forget that despite being thrust into the spotlight at a historic moment, rappers are also artists who want to make their music. As Deeb raps in his song “Masrah Deeb” (Deeb’s Stage) — written in the early days of the Egyptian revolution to remind people why they were taking to the streets — “I’m not a dictator/Deeb’s a doctor in the beat department.”

“Whatever the majority in the People’s Assembly, they are very welcome, because they won’t have the ability to impose anything that the people don’t want.” Thus declared General Mukhtar al-Mulla, a member of Egypt’s ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF).

Al-Mulla’s message was that the Islamists’ victory in Egypt’s recent election gives them neither executive power nor control of the framing of a new constitution. But General Sami Anan, Chief of Staff and the SCAF’s deputy head, quickly countered that al-Mulla’s statement does not necessarily represent the official views of the Council.

So, one year after the revolution that overthrew Hosni Mubarak, who, exactly, will set Egypt’s political direction?

The electoral victory of the Muslim Brotherhood’s political wing and the Salafi parties, which together won more than 70% of the parliamentary seats, will give them strong influence over the transitional period and in drafting the constitution. But they are not alone. Aside from the Islamists, two other powerful actors will have their say: the “Tahrirists” and the generals.

Tahrir Square-based activism has not only brought about social and political change, but also has served as the ultimate tool of pro-democracy pressure on Egypt’s military rulers. Indeed, while the army, the most powerful of the three actors, still officially controls the country, there is little confidence in the generals’ commitment to democracy. “The SCAF are either anti-democratic….or some of their advisers told them that democracy is not in their best interest,” says Hazem Abd al-Azim, a nominee in the first post-Mubarak government.

If the generals do not want democracy, nor do they want direct military rule à la Augusto Pinochet. So, what do they want? Ideally, they would like to combine the Algerian army’s current power and the Turkish army’s legitimacy. This implies a parliament with limited powers, a weak presidency subordinate to the army, and constitutional prerogatives that legitimate the army’s intervention in politics.

The minimum that they insist on is reflected in statements by Generals al-Mulla, Mamdouh Shahim, Ismail Etman, and others. That would mean a veto in high politics, independence for the army’s budget and vast economic empire, legal immunity from prosecution on charges stemming from corruption or repression, and constitutional prerogatives to guarantee these arrangements.

The new parliament and constitutional assembly will have to lead the negotiations with the SCAF. But, given that any successful democratic transition must include meaningful civilian control over the armed forces and the security apparatus, the SCAF’s minimum demands could render the process meaningless.

The veto in high politics would include any issues that touch on national security or sensitive foreign policy, most importantly the relationship with Israel. With an Islamist majority in the parliament promising to “revise” the peace agreement with Israel, tensions over foreign policy are likely to rise.

The independent military-commercial empire, which benefits from preferential customs and exchange rates, no taxation, land-confiscation rights, and an army of almost-free laborers (conscripted soldiers), is another thorny issue. With the Egyptian economy suffering, elected politicians might seek to improve conditions by moving against the military’s civilian assets – namely, by revising the preferential rates and imposing a form of taxation.

Immunity from prosecution is no less salient. “The Field-Marshal should be in jail now,” screamed the elected leftist MP, Abu Ezz al-Hariri, on the second day of the new parliamentary session. When Mahmoud Ghozlan, the Muslim Brotherhood spokesperson, proposed immunity (known in Egypt as the “safe-exit” option), he faced a wave of harsh criticism.

Pressure from the United States has also influenced the SCAF’s decision-making. “The military establishment receives $1.3 billion from the US….They are very sensitive to US requests,” according to Saad Eddin Ibrahim, who lobbied the Obama administration to support the revolution in January 2011.

But most of the SCAF’s pro-democracy decisions have come as a result of massive pressure from Tahrir Square. This includes the removal of Mubarak, his trial (and that of other regime figures), and bringing forward the presidential election from 2013 to June 2012.

Two other factors are equally, if not more, influential: the status quo inherited from the Mubarak era and the army’s internal cohesion. With few exceptions, the SCAF’s members benefited significantly from Mubarak’s regime. They will attempt to preserve as much of it as possible.

“The sight of officers in uniform protesting in Tahrir Square and speaking on Al Jazeera really worries the Field Marshal,” a former officer told me. And one way to maintain internal cohesion is to create “demons” – a lesson learned from the “dirty wars” in Algeria in the 1990’s and Argentina in the 1970’s and 1980’s.

In particular, Coptic protesters are an easy target against which to rally soldiers and officers. Last October, amid an unnecessary escalation of sectarian violence, state-owned television featured a hospitalized Egyptian soldier screaming, “The Copts killed my colleague!” The systematic demonization of the Tahririst groups, and the violent escalation that followed in November and December, served the same purpose.

Despite everything, democratic Egypt is not a romantic fantasy. A year ago, Saad al-Ketatni, the Muslim Brotherhood leader, would never have dreamed of being Speaker of Parliament. The same applies to the leftists and liberals who now hold around 20% of the parliament’s seats.

If 2011 witnessed the miracle of Mubarak’s removal, a brave parliament’s institutional assertiveness, coupled with non-institutional Tahririst pressure, could force the generals to accept a transfer of power to civilian rule (with some reserved domains for the army establishment) in 2012. What is certain is that this year will not witness a return to the conditions of 2010. Egypt may become stuck in democratization’s slow lane, but there will be no U-turn. The hundreds of thousands who marched to Tahrir Square on the revolution’s anniversary will guarantee that.

Aparentemente, la situación política en Israel es tranquila: tres años de gobierno de Beniamin Netanyahu gracias a una coalición de partidos no muy grande pero estable. Al menos, eso demuestra el hecho de que la mitad de sus miembros se siente en los consejos de ministros del mayor gobierno de Israel en toda su historia y no tengan prisa en abandonarlo. Estamos hablando de un gobierno, formado por personas de la derecha conservadora y por religiosos ultraortodoxos, con un elemento en común: la falta de iniciativa en cualquier terreno. Ehud Barak, que abandonó el Partido Laborista, siendo él el líder, para formar junto con cinco diputados un partido llamado Independencia, no obtendría ahora –según las encuestas– ni un solo diputado. Así que depende de la buena voluntad del primer ministro Netanyahu, que le otorgó cuatro ministerios a su partido. Pero si mañana cayera el Gobierno actual, el partido Independencia pasaría a la historia.

Sin embargo, pese a este aspecto de estabilidad, lo cierto es que pronto puede darse un cambio político en Israel. El causante sin duda es el propio Netanyahu, que queriendo aprovechar su popularidad en su partido ha decidido promover unas primarias para elegir al líder y futuro candidato para las próximas elecciones. Su idea era plantear ahora las primarias y posponer las elecciones generales para noviembre del año 2013. Pero las cosas no van como se esperaba. Si bien ha conseguido convencer a su partido para que dentro de unas semanas se celebren las primarias en el Likud y tener así la victoria asegurada, su decisión ha hecho que en Israel ya se haya generado un ambiente preelectoral.

El popular periodista Yair Lapid ha decidido dejar la televisión para anunciar que se lanza al mundo de la política. Las encuestas ya le dan hasta 15 escaños de los 120 que componen el Parlamento israelí. Sus votantes, en su mayoría, vendrían del partido Kadima, fundado por el ex primer ministro Ariel Sharon y que ganó las elecciones en el año 2006 bajo el liderazgo de Ehud Olmert, aunque en el año 2009 ya no volvió a ganar cuando se presentó con la candidatura de Tzipi Livni.

A raíz de la entrada de Yair Lapid en el ruedo político, otras personalidades han anunciado que se suman a distintos partidos de la oposición de cara a las próximas elecciones generales. Y pronto Arieh Deri, el que fuera líder del partido religioso Shas, volverá a la política tras haber estado en la cárcel por corrupción. Para mi pesar, la ley israelí permite a aquellos que han cumplido condena por este delito poder presentarse a diputado en el Parlamento pasados siete años.

Deri es una de las personas más interesantes y odiadas dentro de la política israelí. Es un hombre de ideas políticas moderadas que ayudó a Yitzhak Rabin a obtener mayoría en el Parlamento para aprobar los acuerdos de Oslo, y que podría sumarse a una coalición de centroizquierda, en caso de fundar un nuevo partido suponiendo que su antigua formación no le permitiese presentarse como candidato a primer ministro. A diferencia de Lapid, que representa más al sector de centroizquierda, Deri representa al sector de centroderecha en la sociedad israelí, y podría sumarse a una coalición dispuesta a llegar a un acuerdo con los palestinos sobre la base de los parámetros de Clinton y la Iniciativa de Ginebra.

Beniamin Netanyahu va a hacer todo lo posible para que las elecciones sean dentro de dos años, pero es difícil que lo consiga, ya que en las últimas semanas en Israel se respira un ambiente preelectoral y eso implica que los miembros de la coalición de gobierno van a intentar desmarcarse para encauzar su propia campaña electoral y no parecer que se esconden bajo la sombra del partido que lidera el Gobierno.

El primer partido candidato a abandonar la coalición es el liderado por el ministro de Exteriores, Avigdor Lieberman, pero también el Shas puede hacer lo mismo y así, desde la oposición, prepararse para la doble batalla: contra el Likud de Netanyahu y contra el partido que forme su antiguo líder, Arieh Deri. Y desde el momento en que uno de estos partidos deje la coalición, el Likud se quedaría en minoría y habría, por tanto, que adelantar las elecciones. En definitiva, ya se ha abierto la veda.

Egyptians are sweeping up in Tahrir Square after celebrations marking the first anniversary of the Jan. 25 launch of their revolution. In a few days, on Feb. 11, they will mark another milestone, one year since hundreds of thousands of protestors toppled President Hosni Mubarak, who had held power for almost 30 years.

One year ago, amid the euphoric suggestions that democracy and freedom lay just around the corner, the journalist Christopher Hitchens sounded a note of caution. Hitchens, who died last December, had witnessed revolutions succeed in a host of countries. He had identified the ingredients he found necessary for freedom to replace tyranny. He didn’t think those essential ingredients existed in Egypt.

As he often did, he went against the conventional wisdom and warned that while the “seeds have surely been sown,” Egyptian democracy was not about to be born. He declared success remained far off, pessimistically concluding, “this wouldn’t be the first revolution in history to be partially aborted.”

Writing in the first week of February, before Mubarak fell, he all but predicted in his Vanity Fair column that the revolution would fizzle out.

Whether his prediction failed or not, Hitchens’ opinion was instructive because of his special insights. He had covered the struggle against tyranny in starkly different contexts, reporting from the ground about the fall of communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the demise of dictatorships in places like South Korea, Chile and Portugal, among others.

He dismissed the analysis that looked at the then optimistically-labeled Arab Spring and saw an enchanting new version of what sprouted in 1989 in places like Poland and Czechoslovakia. In Eastern Europe, the people basically wanted to join Western Europe, he said. In essence, all they had to do was knock down the wall to make it happen. The European Union and NATO were there, he said, ready to hand them material help, a political system and well-formed political organizations consistent with democracy.

A common denominator in all the successful revolutions — the ones that ended with new systems embracing equality, freedom and democracy — was that they were driven by well-developed ideologies and charismatic individuals committed to the modern ideals of liberty.

South Africa had Nelson Mandela when the white-rule regime ended. The Philippines had Benigno Aquino to lead after Ferdinand Marcos; South Korea had Kim Dae Jung; the Czechs had Vaclac Havel and the Poles had Lech Walesa.

Even revolutions that succeeded in overthrowing a regime but failed to bring freedom had strong, charismatic leaders. Egypt’s revolution, Hitchens noted, had no discernible leader. It didn’t even have the kind of personalities who could lead a counter-revolution, Egyptian versions of Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini or Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe.

In addition to lacking an opposition leader, he pointed out, Egyptians launched their revolution amid desperate economic conditions that would force them to remain reliant on Western cash, whether from tourism or from military aid.

Hitchens dismissively observed that Egypt had no organized political parties, “with the partial exception of the obsessively-cited Muslim Brotherhood.”

Was he wrong?

Some analysts have declared that there has been no “regime change” in Egypt, because the army remains in power, just as it was while Mubarak was president. And, to be sure, a military junta still rules and is trying to preserve as much power as possible. But there is no denying that Egypt, and the rest of the Arab world, are undergoing dramatic political change.

Hitchens was wrong in thinking Egypt’s revolution would not overturn the system. But he was right in foreseeing the uprising’s inability, at least in the near term, to bring the kind of system that liberals in Egypt were demanding.

The Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist parties swept parliamentary elections and will now write the country’s constitution and dominate the political environment.

And yet, the shortcomings of the revolution Hitchens noted — a lack of individual leadership, the absence of a convincing political ideology and the existence of harsh financial constraints — mean that the ultimate outcome of the revolution, in the longer term, could still be up for grabs.

Hitchens was right that the euphoria of the liberals, and their supporters in the West, was misplaced. This was no freedom Spring sprouting in Cairo. For now, the Islamists have won and the liberals have lost. But the missing ingredients of the revolution, insightfully enumerated by Hitchens a year ago, leave a small opening for the forces of liberal democracy to fight another day.

Amid new strains in U.S.-Egypt ties, some in Washington are studying the tensions and results of recent voting for indications that democracy can take hold. Those who say the Muslim Brotherhood is showing new signs of moderation should compare its message to outsiders, in English, with its message to Egyptians and other Arabs, in Arabic.

Take the Brotherhood’s official English and Arabic Web sites, IkhwanWeb and IkhwanOnline, from one day this month. In English, the home page featured no fewer than eight articles on the solicitude of the Brotherhood toward Egypt’s Coptic Christian minority. The Arabic home page, by contrast, included just two small pieces on this theme. The contrast is sharper on other key issues. On democracy, the English home page one January day featured several articles with headlines such as “Why Islamists Are Better Democrats” and “Democracy: One of the Objectives of Shariah?” There was nothing comparable in Arabic. Instead, Arabic readers saw three pieces against freedom of the press, attacking two top independent Egyptian dailies for printing criticisms of the Brotherhood.

This kind of double talk is part of a pattern. Last February, right after Hosni Mubarak was overthrown, the Brotherhood published what it called an English-language version of Supreme Guide Mohammed Badie’s message to the Egyptian people, celebrating their revolution. In that version, he supposedly spoke mainly of democracy, tolerance, pluralism and coexistence between Egypt’s Muslims and Christians. But the text of his statement, published simultaneously in Arabic, had a totally different tone. In his authentic message, Badie wrote at great length on how Egypt’s uprising was a blessing from Allah — and how much Egyptians needed to stay firm in their Muslim faith to reap its real rewards. The following headlines on the Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) led the English site in recent months: “FJP and Christians Stem Sedition,” “FJP Denounces Attack on Israeli Embassy” and “FJP Women’s Committee Provides Free Medical Services in Sharqiyyah City.” But not one of those stories appeared on the Arabic home page. Throughout the past year, women often are referred to by the Brotherhood in English — but almost never in Arabic. The same is true for the English and Arabic Web sites of the FJP, which now controls Egypt’s parliament.

Some might note that all political parties, to at least an extent, engage in mixed messaging. But when this degree of duplicity is demonstrated, the group’s credibility is, or should be, compromised accordingly. Some will say the Brotherhood includes some relatively moderate voices. True, but it is a very disciplined, hierarchical movement: Many of its moderates have left in the past year or have been expelled, and its most senior leaders are the hard-liners. Some will continue to say the Brotherhood is demonstrating that it can modify its positions. But as the movement has gained strength on the street and at the polls in recent months, the modification is mainly less moderate, not more.

For example, the Brotherhood belatedly joined the protests in Tahrir Square, but after Mubarak fell, its leaders opposed any “supraconstitutional” guarantees of individual freedoms and then barred members from further demonstrations. The group initially said it wanted no more than 30 percent of the seats in parliament; then switched to around half; then said maybe a majority, but in coalition with others; and now is drifting toward exercising complete control by taking the most important leadership and committee positions without having established formal coalitions with other parties. As for the upcoming presidential election, the Brotherhood once said it would not participate, then said it might support one of the existing candidates; now it appears it might search for a yet-unmentioned candidate of its choosing.

Meanwhile, one thing that has not changed is the Brotherhood’s hostility toward U.S. policies and interests. In its electoral platform, the FJP begins its section on “Regional Leadership” by explicitly rejecting the old regime’s approach of “supporting occupiers and colonisers, through its presence in the so-called axis of moderation, which is sponsored by the United States.” In August, the Brotherhood called U.S. funding for Egyptian nongovernmental organizations “a disgrace.” In its supposed denunciation of the violent police crackdown on NGOs in December, it nevertheless reaffirmed its continuing opposition to this funding.

Of course, it would be a welcome surprise if the Brotherhood does change into a more truthful and trustworthy interlocutor. In the meantime, however, we should pay no attention to anything the Brotherhood says in English and little attention to any private “assurances” it offers. And given the group’s record of double-dealing, observers should take everything the Brotherhood says in Arabic with due doubt. The United States has to deal with the Brotherhood, but we don’t have to trust anything it says — at least until it proves we should.

On the afternoon of Dec. 25, 2011, in the northern Takhar Province of Afghanistan, a funeral procession was gathering in a field on the outskirts of my hometown, the city of Taloqan, when a suicide bomber approached Mutalib Bek, a member of Parliament, and detonated his explosive vest. Mutalib Bek, who was my father, was killed instantly, along with 24 others, including a 12-year-old boy.

My father was a former commander of the Mujahedeen, the anti-Soviet resistance. He later joined the United Front — a coalition of anti-Taliban fighters — and played a key role in the war against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in northern Afghanistan. As the Taliban regime collapsed, and a new Afghan government was formed after the U.S.-led intervention, my father gladly gave up arms and committed himself to work toward establishing a democratic political system.

My father was a devout Muslim who built many mosques and schools with his own money. Throughout his time as a member of Parliament, he worked within the system to bring about improvements in our country, focusing primarily on promoting education for girls and women.

His death added to a long list of his friends, fellow commanders and government officials who have been assassinated: Ahmed Shah Massoud, former commander of the United Front; Burhanuddin Rabbani, former president of Afghanistan; General Daoud Daoud, police commander of the northern region; Ahmed Wali Karzai, head of the Kandahar provincial council; Muhammad Omar, governor of Kunduz; Jan Mohammad Khan, a close adviser to President Hamid Karzai; Khan Mohammed Mujahid, the Kandahar police chief; Maulana Sayed Khel, chief of police of Kunduz Province; Maulana Shah Jahan Noori, chief of police of Takhar Province and many others.

The targeted killings of former Mujahedeen commanders in the north and tribal elders in the south mark a strategic shift in the Taliban’s modus operandi. The Taliban has decided to wait out the U.S. military withdrawal in 2014, and eliminate all major figures who would potentially play a critical role in mobilizing support against them and Al Qaeda. They have now managed to assassinate the main leaders of the Uzbeks (my father), the anti-Taliban Pashtuns (Omar), the Khans, (Ahmed Wali Karzai) and the Tajiks (Daoud and the Maulanas).

While mourning my father’s death, I wish to speak up. I share the belief with my father that America’s Afghan strategy is shortsighted and probably based on domestic rather than strategic considerations. As Afghans, we rarely understand U.S. policy. One day the U.S. military declares the Taliban the enemy, the next day they’re willing to make peace. Does this policy reflect the realities on the ground? Is it a winning strategy?

The line between a peaceful, stable and prosperous Afghanistan and absolute chaos is thin. The nature of its political climate will have ramifications for the whole world, as has been shown in the past, yet the multiplicity of Afghan voices has been lost in the fog of this war.

My father believed that four actions were required to end this war and bring peace and stability.

First, as Muslims, we must realize that this is not a religious war. It is not a war between believers and nonbelievers. Instead, we must acknowledge the bitter reality that our religion, like many others, has been hijacked by extremist, terrorist and intelligence organizations. If we Muslims want to live in peace, we have to reclaim our religion.

Since my father’s assassination all religious scholars in my hometown and the northern region have launched a grass-roots campaign to expel extremist organizations from mosques and other religious organizations. We must strengthen and expand this movement.

Second, as Afghans, we need a comprehensive, consistent and long-term bipartisan strategy from America. The United States needs to re-imagine its policy. If America does in fact want to end the reign of the Taliban, U.S. policy makers will need to think beyond the next two years. The 2014 deadline must be reconsidered in light of the dangers it poses to the region and the world. There is need for a consistent strategy with input from Afghans.

Third, America also needs to acknowledge that the root of this problem lies in Pakistan. The war in Afghanistan has become so complex that we often do not know who is behind these shocking killings and suicide bombings. Sometimes the Taliban claim responsibility and sometimes they do not. In my father’s case, they have not, but we do have intelligence pointing to involvement of the Pakistani military.

The American people might have been surprised to find out that Osama bin Laden lived in Pakistan, but we were not. We have known for years that the Pakistani government has been supporting the Taliban, harboring terrorists on its soil, and using violent extremism as a foreign policy instrument to intimidate Afghanistan, the region and the world. To end this deadly trend, the United States needs to exert meaningful diplomatic, economic and, if necessary, military pressure on Pakistan, especially on the Pakistani military-intelligence wing.

Fourth, over the last 10 years, Afghanistan has achieved a lot with the support of the international community, particularly the United States. I would like to thank the American people for that. We hope that this support continues and, as per my father’s recommendation, that a greater portion of it be allocated for provision of good quality education for the youth of Afghanistan. The costs versus gains of education are much less than military expenditures. Please continue to invest in the education, not just in the militarization of my country.

Ordinary Afghan people are the real victims of terrorism. We have lost countless lives over the decades. But we are clinging to hope and looking forward to a better future.

Tenemos bastante conocimiento sobre el programa nuclear de Irán, y lo que sabemos no es alentador. Sabemos que Irán está enriqueciendo uranio en dos sitios -en parte a niveles del 20%, mucho más allá de lo que se precisa para fines civiles-. La Agencia Internacional de Energía Atómica también informa que Irán está llevando a cabo investigación para desarrollar diseños de cabezas de guerra nucleares. En resumen, los argumentos de los funcionarios iraníes de que su programa nuclear está únicamente destinado a la generación de energía o a la investigación médica carecen de toda verosimilitud.

Sin embargo, todavía es mucho lo que el mundo no sabe. Por ejemplo, no sabemos si Irán está llevando adelante actividades secretas en sitios desconocidos, o cuándo Irán podría desarrollar un arma nuclear cruda -las estimaciones oscilan entre varios meses y varios años-. Tampoco sabemos si el liderazgo dividido de Irán ha decidido desarrollar armas nucleares, o estuvo a punto de hacerlo, teniendo en cuenta que el país podría obtener muchos de los beneficios asociados con tener armas nucleares sin correr los riesgos o incurrir en los costos de realmente hacerlo.

Como sea, las actividades de Irán ponen al mundo frente a elecciones difíciles. Ninguna de ellas está exenta de costos o de riesgos. Es más, ni los costos ni los riesgos son posibles de calcular con precisión.

Una opción sería aceptar y convivir con un Irán nuclear o casi nuclear. Esto supone que se podría disuadir a Irán de utilizar sus armas, lo mismo que sucedió con la Unión Soviética durante la Guerra Fría. Las defensas de misiles se podrían expandir; Estados Unidos podría ampliar las garantías de seguridad de manera que Irán entendiera que la amenaza o el uso de armas nucleares se toparía con una respuesta estadounidense decisiva.

Pero aceptar un Irán con armas nucleares conlleva problemas importantes. Teniendo en cuenta el uso que hace de la subversión y el terrorismo contra sus adversarios, un Irán armado nuclearmente podría ser incluso más autoritario. También podría transferir material, tecnología o armas relacionados con el desarrollo nuclear a sus aliados (la Venezuela de Hugo Chávez, por ejemplo) u organizaciones radicales como Hezbollah y Hamas. Y, en lugar de promover la cautela y la estabilidad en la región, Irán o Israel podrían sentirse tentados de atacar primero en una crisis.

Tampoco se puede suponer que el liderazgo dividido y radical de Irán siempre actuaría de manera racional, o que la proliferación acabaría en la República Islámica. Si Irán desarrolla sus armas nucleares, países como Arabia Saudita, Turquía y Egipto se verían tentados de comprar o desarrollar armas nucleares propias. Un Oriente Medio con demasiados dedos en demasiados gatillos es la mejor definición de pesadilla que existe.

En el extremo opuesto del espectro de opciones políticas está un ataque preventivo: un ataque militar (más probablemente por parte de Israel, Estados Unidos o ambos) contra sitios en Irán asociados con su programa nuclear. El objetivo principal sería interrumpir el surgimiento de una amenaza que todavía se está gestando.

Aquí, nuevamente, se presentan inconvenientes considerables. Hasta un ataque preventivo exitoso en el mejor de los casos retardaría el programa nuclear de Irán unos años. Este, casi con certeza, seria reconstruido, presumiblemente en sitios subterráneos y fortificados que harían que los futuros ataques fueran mucho más difíciles de perpetrar.

Es más, Irán bien podría tomar represalias de inmediato contra blancos que podrían incluir a Arabia Saudita, Irak, Afganistán y otros intereses estadounidenses en todo el mundo -así como sitios en territorio norteamericano-. Hezbollah podría atacar Israel. Si todo esto sucediera, el precio del petróleo se dispararía debido a escaseces y temores, posiblemente arrastrando a gran parte de la economía mundial, que ya se encuentra en una posición precaria, a la recesión. Un ataque armado también podría hacer que el público iraní se aglutinara en torno al gobierno, reduciendo las posibilidades de que pudiera surgir un liderazgo más responsable.

En consecuencia, no sorprende demasiado que Estados Unidos y gran parte del mundo hayan explorado alternativas, que incluyeran un cambio de régimen en Irán. Pero, a pesar de todo lo deseable que esto pudiera ser, ninguna política puede generar este resultado con certeza. Así las cosas, la principal política hacia Irán se centra en la imposición de sanciones económicas cada vez más dolorosas. La argumentación que sustenta esta política es que los líderes de Irán, temerosos de perder el control político si el descontento popular aumenta como resultado de los efectos de las sanciones, recalcularán los costos y beneficios de sus actividades nucleares y terminarán aceptando restricciones negociadas a cambio de una eliminación de las sanciones.

Eso podría suceder. El respaldo internacional a las sanciones es considerable y va en aumento. A Irán (cuya economía depende en gran medida de exportaciones de petróleo de más de dos millones de barriles diarios) le está resultado cada vez más difícil encontrar clientes -y especialmente clientes dispuestos a pagar el precio total-. Mientras tanto, la moneda de Irán se está debilitando, lo que coloca el precio de los bienes importados fuera del alcance de muchos iraníes.

Otros elementos de la política actual que parecen estar surtiendo efecto son los esfuerzos clandestinos destinados a impedir la capacidad de Irán de importar tecnologías sensibles. Virus han infectado computadoras en Irán, reduciendo la eficiencia de las centrífugas esenciales para enriquecer uranio. También es posible que el asesinato selectivo de ciertos individuos haya desacelerado el avance de los esfuerzos nucleares iraníes.

Pero retardar los esfuerzos de Irán no es lo mismo que detenerlos. De modo que un interrogante es si las sanciones existentes se pueden extender y endurecer; aquí, China y Rusia deben determinar sus prioridades. Otro interrogante es si cualquier sanción será suficiente para persuadir a los líderes de Irán de aceptar restricciones verificables a su programa nuclear. Y una tercera cuestión por resolver es cuánto tiempo Israel o Estados Unidos tolerarán los esfuerzos iraníes antes de atacar militarmente.

En realidad, la única certeza tal vez sea que el programa nuclear de Irán será una cuestión internacional importante en 2012 -muy probablemente la más importante.

This week, the European Union went to war against Iran. There was no formal declaration, of course, nor even any undeclared use of military force. But the E.U. decision to place an embargo on Iranian oil imports, ban new contracts, and freeze Iranian Central Bank assets is effectively an act of war and may very well result in the military hostilities that sanctions are meant to forestall.

Oil exports account for over 50 percent of Iranian government revenue and about 80 percent of its hard currency earnings. And the E.U., as a bloc, is Iran’s second-largest customer, taking about a quarter of Iranian exports. Consequently, unless other customers neutralize E.U. actions by stepping up their own purchases from Iran — and indications from China, Japan and South Korea suggest that this is unlikely to be the case — the E.U. decision, coupled with existing American measures, will come close to imposing the “crippling sanctions” that Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton threatened but could not deliver without European cooperation.

If that turns out to be the case, then the Iranian regime, already coping with high inflation and a rapidly depreciating currency, will feel constrained to react. One possibility is that it will capitulate and essentially dismantle its nuclear weapons program. That is obviously the outcome that Europeans and others hope sanctions (or even the credible threat of sanctions) will bring about.

But it is at least as likely that Iran, feeling trapped, will lash out in a desperate attempt to frighten the Europeans into backing down or at least introduce so much hysteria into the oil market that price spikes will allow it to earn the same revenue from a reduced volume of exports.

One form this might take would be an attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz, which Iran has already threatened to do. But that is probably beyond Iran’s capacity for very long and would in any case also shut down Iran’s own ability to export to whatever markets it manages to retain.

Far less complicated would be sabotage or rocket attacks on refineries, pipelines and other facilities in places like Abqaiq and Ras Tanura in Saudi Arabia. These might be carried out as “false flag” operations by local Shiite insurgents concentrated in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province, but nobody would be fooled and the risks of escalation to large-scale conflict with Iran would be significant.

In this scenario, the military confrontation that many Europeans have sought to avoid will become unavoidable, even if Iranian decision makers do not delude themselves into thinking that they would ultimately prevail.

Before such courses of action are discounted as unrealistic scare-mongering or dismissed on grounds that they would be self-defeating, it might be worth recalling that Imperial Japan did not attack the United States because it was physically attacked by the United States but rather because it was being economically squeezed (as Iran may well be squeezed now) to the point where it felt that war was preferable to slow-motion strangulation. And it made no difference that many Japanese military leaders, including Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, chief planner of the attack on Pearl Harbor, believed that Japan’s ultimate defeat was foreordained.

It is difficult to imagine that the E.U. members who adopted the decision on sanctions are unaware of this possible dynamic. Indeed, the very fact that British and French warships accompanied the U.S. aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln on its passage through the Straits and back into the Gulf — in brazen defiance of Iranian warnings — imply the opposite: that E.U. governments, especially the two with the greatest force projection capabilities, are perfectly cognizant of the possible consequences and are prepared to deal with them.

And that suggests that the European Union, notwithstanding its economic travails, is experiencing its own “spring” in foreign and defense policy and that those who tended in the past to dismiss it as a flaccid talking shop capable of little more than vacuous posturing now need to carry out a fundamental reassessment.

How should we measure success in Afghanistan? It’s a crucial question, but there isn’t much agreement on an answer.

In mid-January, this newspaper ran a story on the latest National Intelligence Estimate on Afghanistan, a classified assessment drafted by analysts at more than a dozen U.S. intelligence agencies. According to The Times, the report “warns that security gains from an increase in troops have been undercut by pervasive corruption, incompetent governance and Taliban fighters operating from neighboring Pakistan.”

Those with direct responsibility for the war — top military commanders and the U.S. ambassador to Kabul — reportedly contested the report’s findings in a written dissent. The dispute highlights an ongoing struggle to shape U.S. perceptions on Afghanistan.

Analysts like using numbers to bolster their arguments because numbers seem hard and fast. But they don’t always agree. Last summer, for example, the NATO command in Kabul announced that for the first time since 2006, insurgent attacks were down compared with the previous year. But United Nations agencies and humanitarian organizations were reporting large upticks in violence and its effect on civilians.

Numbers draw their significance from what they count. In this case, the military tallied attacks that insurgents initiated where international troops were present, including improvised bombs that exploded but not ones that had been defused.

Humanitarian groups, by contrast, were tabulating all violence suffered by civilians, no matter who the perpetrator, including kidnappings and shootings at the hands of the militias that the U.S. militaryhas armed to fight the Taliban.

Afghans themselves are attuned to something less tangible: the likelihood of danger. Take last September’s attack by a few militants shooting rocket-launched grenades from a tower in central Kabul, which shut downthe U.S. Embassyand nearby NATO headquarters for 20 hours.

Foreign officials might record such an incident as a single attack. But to Kabul residents, it sent an overpowering message that their city was unsafe, that the terrorists could do what they wanted.

Underlying the current dispute over the intelligence estimate is another, deeper divide. The assessment reportedly acknowledges the hard work by Afghan and foreign troops in driving the Taliban out of many of its strongholds. That success is clearly visible in Kandahar, where I have lived for most of the last decade. But its significance is less clear.

“Yes, we’ve made gains against the Taliban around Kandahar,” a minister and former Kandahar governor told me recently. “But it takes 18,000 men for a single district. We can’t sustain that.”

And there have been other costs. As troops moved into rural districts the Taliban had held, they built dirt roads right through farmers’ vineyards and orchards. I saw the results when I went to visit a friend’s family land. Debris had been shoved into an irrigation channel that once watered the whole village, razor wire had been looped across a road, and buildings where families dry their grapes to make prized raisins had been destroyed.

There were good tactical reasons for inflicting such damage. Many of the buildings had been booby-trapped by the retreating Taliban, or they obstructed the troops’ lines of sight. But the local economy, already one of the most threadbare on Earth, has been badly hurt. Compensation money was paid out, but still, success against the Taliban came at great cost to residents.

They are left with the question: What now? If their grapevines or fruit trees dry out, what should they plant? If insurgents offer poppy seeds, should they accept? And what about the Afghan soldiers who stole the furniture out of the blown-up buildings? Villagers can’t take them to court because the judicial system is deeply corrupt. So who can give them recourse? A sense of justice? Maybe the Taliban.

If, on the other hand, the Taliban does move back in, or if it is given power in some deal negotiated by the United States and an Afghan government most of its citizens don’t view as legitimate, how will the many Afghans who don’t wish to be subjected to Taliban rule react?

The Afghan security forces the United States has been working so hard to build up are largely commanded by viscerally anti-Taliban groups. Is U.S. policy driving Afghanistan back toward civil war?

It is this potential for systemic collapse that the intelligence estimate reportedly highlights, to the dismay of the dissenting officials.

But even if withdrawing on the current schedule brings about Afghanistan’simplosion, that might still be the right thing to do. If the U.S. government chooses not to address the two fundamental political and diplomatic challenges its intelligence estimate is said to highlight — corrupt government and Pakistan’s support for extremist violence — then why waste more blood and treasure? But President Obama must make that decision in full cognizance of the dangers, so he can plan for them and try to mitigate some of them. He needs more divergent views, not fewer.

The aggressive efforts by some to spin perceptions of Afghanistan have grown unseemly as well as dangerous. I’ve seen dissent disappear from interagency documents. I’ve heard officials tell public affairs officers to pressure reporters about their stories.

Though I doubt the nation’s intelligence community can be easily cowed, even by three generals and an ambassador, the impulse to interfere is wrong. Writing problems out of documents won’t make them go away. Obama deserves a clear exposition of competing assessments of national security issues. Then it’s for him to hash out the differences in internal debate.

El siniestro régimen de Irán no parece dispuesto a dar tregua a la comunidad internacional a través de su programa nuclear militar y sus amenazas de bloquear el estrecho de Ormuz.

El pasado 9 de enero, la Agencia Internacional de Energía Atómica (AIEA) confirmó que Irán había comenzado a producir uranio enriquecido al 20% en su central nuclear subterránea de Fordo. Un porcentaje que excede en mucho el 3,5% necesario para uso civil. Nada nuevo: desde febrero del 2010 produce ese tipo de uranio en la central de Natanz. Ambas instalaciones, por cierto, mantenidas en el mayor de los secretos hasta que fueron descubiertas por observadores externos en el 2002 y el 2009. Irán mantiene así con paso firme los procedimientos necesarios para enriquecer uranio al 90%, esto es, el grado necesario para poder utilizarlo en un arma nuclear. Aunque todavía le falta un poco, los técnicos iranís ya dominan y aplican el proceso para producir material nuclear con fines militares. A los ilusos e ingenuos apaciguadores que todavía creen en la versión de Irán del uso civil de su programa nuclear, les recomiendo que lean el informe de noviembre del 2011 de la AIEA, en el cual se recoge que Teherán lleva más de una década realizando secretamente compras de material, actividades y programas con el objetivo de conseguir armas nucleares.

Cada vez falta menos para que uno de los regímenes más perversos de la Tierra se convierta en potencia nuclear. Hay que recordar que estamos hablando de un Gobierno que niega el Holocausto, que llama a la destrucción del Estado de Israel y que se sostiene en el poder represaliando a su población. ¿O acaso nos hemos olvidado ya del ahogamiento en sangre de la revolución verde iraní en el 2009?

Irán no puede bajo ningún concepto tener armas nucleares. A lo sumo, un programa nuclear de uso civil estrictamente controlado por organismos internacionales. Estos deberían empezar inmediatamente con la transformación de todo el uranio enriquecido en combustible para centrales limitadas al suministro de energía a la población. De lo contrario, se estará permitiendo que el agresivo régimen iraní adquiera el estatus de intocable en la zona, generando una carrera de armas de todos sus vecinos y desembocando en una inestabilidad insoportable en el área. No podemos repetir el esquema de la península de Corea, donde un Gobierno terrible y patético sobrevive por el solo hecho de tener armas nucleares y chantajea continuamente a la sociedad global.

También el inicio del 2012 ha sido testigo del nuevo desafío del régimen de Teherán, que ha manifestado en diversas ocasiones su voluntad de cerrar por la fuerza el tráfico marítimo en el estrecho de Ormuz. Cabe recordar que por este punto geográfico transita el 90% del petróleo que se produce en el golfo Pérsico, que a su vez representa un 40% del tráfico global de crudo por mar. A corto plazo, esta podría ser la situación que desencadenara un conflicto de consecuencias difícilmente calculables, pero no parece muy probable que Irán vaya a cruzar esta línea roja, muy claramente trazada por Estados Unidos. Más bien podría tratarse de una maniobra de distracción de la atención sobre el programa nuclear. Aunque no cabe duda de que, en caso de conflicto, el estrecho de Ormuz sería uno de los puntos de represalia principales de los iranís.

Ahora bien, ¿qué cabe hacer? Las alertas de la AIEA, las sanciones de EEUU, de la Unión Europea y de la ONU no están obteniendo ningún resultado. Irán cuenta por distintas razones con el apoyo de China y Rusia. Por otro lado, Teherán cuenta también con la probada tendencia a las negociaciones interminables y estériles de los organismos internacionales. Si algo nos ha mostrado la historia es que las políticas de apaciguamiento solo contribuyen a reforzar a los malvados. Para Irán, la voluntad de otros de negociar es un síntoma de debilidad. Y, claro, se trata de no parar de hablar y negociar mientras los oscuros intereses del régimen cobran vida.

Por tanto, si Irán no detiene su programa nuclear militar y no cesa en su actitud agresiva, habría que plantear una acción militar multilateral que detenga sus aspiraciones nucleares y reduzca su capacidad militar convencional de forma sustantiva, para evitar ataques en el estrecho de Ormuz y quizá acelerar la caída del régimen. Esta opción se va dibujando en el horizonte y es más que probable que suceda. Israel ya ha advertido, y con razón -le va su supervivencia en ello-, que no tolerará que su máximo enemigo disponga de capacidad ofensiva nuclear. Ante tal escenario, las monarquías petrolíferas, también amenazadas por los iranís, ya han hecho saber a EEUU que cubrirían la demanda de petróleo y apoyarían un ataque, al igual que algunos países de la UE. El tiempo se agota, Irán no cede y, por supuesto, habría que atacar antes de que disponga de armas nucleares. Por esta razón, ahora más que nunca, Teherán es el objetivo.

As Egypt marks the first anniversary of the Jan. 25 civilian revolt that eventually toppled the 30-year rule of Hosni Mubarak, there’s no agreement — on how to celebrate or even whether rejoicing is in order.

The current military rulers — the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, or SCAF — want to hold parades and aerial jet exhibitions to exult in the revolution, of which their main part was to ease Mubarak out of power. Youth groups and democracy activists who originally engineered the uprising are carrying on a campaign called “The Generals are Liars,” with mini-demonstrations and audiovisual presentations in the streets documenting police and military abuses. Islamic politicians, triumphant in recent parliamentary elections, extol the military’s role while pressing for an eventual transfer of power to civilians.

As for human rights, though, just what do Egyptians have to celebrate? Not all that much — a sad commentary on the uprising in the Middle East’s most populous country, one that is a reference point for regional politics despite its poverty and stagnation.

Yes, Mubarak is on trial for the killings of protesters, which is at least a symbolic repudiation of his oppressive reign. Yes, Egypt held a free election for a new parliament in which Islamic parties prevailed in competition with secular and liberal slates. Yes, independent media work hard to bird-dog government malfeasance.

Yet, much of Mubarak’s repressive legacy has been preserved and even strengthened. SCAF rules in his place and has indicated it should remain a power behind the scenes, as it has for the 60 years since the overthrow of the country’s monarchy.

Egyptians still live under the emergency law — in place since the assassination of President Anwar Sadat in 1981 — that permits bans on public assembly, indefinite detention without charge, prosecution in special courts that allow no appeal process and that are notorious for reliance on confessions obtained under torture. On Tuesday, SCAF’s chieftain, Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, partially lifted the 30-year state of emergency but said Egypt would continue to apply the emergency law to cases of “thuggery.” Tantawi’s gesture is far from sufficient. In the last year, military tribunals have convicted hundreds of peaceful protesters on charges of thuggery.

During almost a year in power, SCAF has liberally referred civilians to military courts, another practice of the Mubarak years, though under him it was reserved for so-called exceptional cases. Sometimes the magistrates have announced a verdict before a trial began.

The military has arbitrarily arrested and convicted peaceful protesters, some of whom remain imprisoned. Measures that date from Britain’s early 20th century domination of Egypt ban assemblies of more than five people “that threaten the public peace.”

Although by international standards, lethal force should be used only when strictly necessary to protect life, under current Egyptian law, police — who are effectively under SCAF control — possess wide scope for shooting at demonstrators. The minister of interior has broad discretion to decide on use of weapons and what warnings need be given demonstrators before firing on them. On Jan. 6, the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, an independent human rights organization, denounced a statement by the interior minister that police will get bonuses for shooting “thugs,” government shorthand for demonstrators.

Police regulations are bad enough, but the actions of security forces — both police and military — have been abominable. In October, soldiers ran over demonstrators with armored cars and shot them, killing 27 marchers at a Christian rally held to protest the burning of a church. In November, at least 40 demonstrators were killed by anti-riot forces during unrest in and around Tahrir Square, the epicenter of protest. Police routinely beat demonstrators, women included. Human Rights Watch has documented torture and abuse of detainees by soldiers. Military personnel carried out abusive “virginity tests” on women in detention. Servile state media demonize opposition groups and non-governmental organizations as subversive tools of dark foreign forces.

Laws endure that make citizens vulnerable to prosecution for “insulting” speech or words “harmful” to morals or tantamount to changing the existing political order. In March, SCAF added a new wrinkle to restrictions on speech and assembly by criminalizing strikes and demonstrations “that impede public works.” In April, a military court sentenced young blogger Maikel Nabil Sanad to three years in prison for “insulting the military establishment” when he criticized army rule on his blog and Facebook page. SCAF said last weekend that Nabil would be pardoned and released along with more than 1,900 other prisoners convicted in military trials. It was a gesture in advance of the Jan. 25 holiday; Nabil shouldn’t have been arrested and convicted in the first place.

Egypt seated a new parliament on Monday. It should act quickly to wipe clean the slate of laws that restrict free speech, association and assembly and that permit police too much latitude to shoot protesters. Members of the parliament should limit military court jurisdiction to military officials and repeal the emergency law. Egypt’s foreign friends — including the aid-giving U.S. government — should wholeheartedly support the reforms and resist suggestions that continued dictatorship means stability.

With Egypt’s revolution in its first stages, the time is now for the parliament to end Egypt’s long-term rule by military fiat.

The fate of one man can sometimes clarify the deepest flaws of a government and of the society it rules. Today in Egypt, on the anniversary of its uprising against Hosni Mubarak, that man is Maikel Nabil Sanad.

Mr. Nabil spent much of the last year in a tiny, fetid cell in El Marg Prison in Cairo, where he went on a hunger strike. He was removed, under guard, to a hospital on New Year’s Day to recuperate. Last week he was pardoned and yesterday he was released. But his fight — and his troubles — are probably not over.

What he has endured already illustrates not just the repressive practices of Egypt’s interim military rulers. It also illuminates a broader challenge facing Egyptian society itself, if it hopes that democracy and pluralism will replace the Mubarak government.

That is because Mr. Nabil, unlike other jailed protesters, is a Coptic Christian by background, an atheist by belief and a pacifist whose rejection of violence has led him even to declare zealously that Israel has a right to live in peace in the region, a sentiment that contrasts with most Egyptians’ grudging acceptance and suspicion of their neighbor.

So while other imprisoned dissidents have become causes célèbres here, Mr. Nabil has not. Still, he has continued to campaign against the interim government, and to preach that until all voices — even unpopular ones like his — can be heard, none will be safe.

The fact that reaction to his persecution has been muted, even among some activists, suggests how hard the struggle for free expression will be in Egypt.

Mr. Nabil’s criticisms of the military predate the uprising. He agitated against conscription in 2009 and refused his call-up notice in 2010. He was detained for that — and detained again on his way to Tahrir Square in February. Military intelligence agents beat him for carrying a placard that said of the state: “We want it civil, not religious or military.”

Then his real troubles started. Shortly after Mr. Mubarak stepped down, Mr. Nabil wrote Facebook and blog posts, including one saying that the army and the people were never one hand — an effort, Mr. Nabil said, to puncture a myth that the military had supported the protesters. (The post ridiculed a chant, “The people and the army are one hand.”)

The post also said, long before other protesters would reach the same conclusion, that the revolution had “so far managed to get rid of the dictator but not of the dictatorship.”

On March 28, Mr. Nabil was arrested, and 13 days later he was sentenced by a military tribunal to three years in prison — later reduced to two — for insulting the army. His summary trial was one of thousands that bypassed guarantees for fair trials.

Relatives said he refused to write a formal apology to the armed forces. Instead, he continued his polemical writings from prison. In an essay, “One Citizen,” that was smuggled out and posted online in December, he implored Egyptians to understand “that all freedom is lost once they allow the wolf to choose the first victim from amongst the herd, that they cannot regain the freedom of society unless every ‘one citizen’ is free.”

Meanwhile, Egypt’s interim military rule has been marked by escalating repression and, ultimately, the use of live ammunition against protesters. Even so, the repression was calibrated. Most of the victims were from vulnerable minorities like revolutionary activists, human rights workers and Christians.

The military clearly believes it has the support of Egypt’s majority, and wants to minimize the risk of losing it. These tactics were in evidence most dramatically in October, when the military forcefully dispersed a largely Coptic demonstration, resulting in 27 deaths. Even Mr. Nabil’s release seems calibrated: it carried no admission of error by the army, and is being read here as an effort to deflate dissidence during the anniversary.

The army’s violent actions last year are more significant. If they were meant to stigmatize a few unpopular opponents in order to justify repression, much of Egyptian society has to some degree been complicit. Majority public opinion has not turned against the generals, who say repression is a defense against “hidden hands” that threaten “stability.”

Some activists have publicly stood up for Mr. Nabil. But his case has received a mere fraction of the attention given the unjustly accused and recently released activist Alaa Abdel Fattah. That divergence exposes how distant Egypt remains from an abiding respect for unorthodox views like Mr. Nabil’s — an essential feature of pluralistic politics. To reach that goal, there will have to be fundamental changes not just in Egyptian law and voting, but in its society.

For now, Egypt’s authorities must release all of their political detainees and retry, in civilian courts, all of the civilians sentenced by military courts. The United States and the international community must make it clear that violations of fundamental rights will hurt Egypt’s relations with the world.

And Egyptian society must come to grips with the broader circumstances that allowed Mr. Nabil’s detention and persecution to go largely unnoticed.

A visitor who saw Mr. Nabil late last year said he was “struck by the weakness of his body compared to the strength of his mind.” Mr. Nabil will need more of that strength. Social change is a gradual process, and widespread social indifference to his fate will not end soon.

But Egypt won’t be a full democracy until its people value the lonely defiance of a man like Maikel Nabil, even when they differ with most of his beliefs.

El conflicto entre Irán y Occidente, que cada día se comportan más como dos boxeadores ciegos en un cuadrilátero, ha tocado algunas líneas rojas en las últimas semanas y, si no se reconduce pronto, puede poner en grave peligro la recuperación económica y la paz mundial.

Esas líneas rojas son la amenaza de Irán con cerrar el estrecho de Ormuz si Occidente le impide seguir exportando petróleo, los 10 días de maniobras militares iraníes en el Golfo que concluyeron el 2 de enero y el comienzo de la producción de uranio enriquecido al 20% en una segunda planta (Fordow), próxima a Qom, que el Gobierno israelí considera un punto inadmisible de no retorno hacia la producción de armas nucleares.

Por Ormuz pasa una quinta parte de todo el petróleo y una cuarta parte del gas licuado que se comercializa diariamente en el mundo. El primer perjudicado en caso de cierre del estrecho sería Irán y, aunque EEUU está preparado para responder a la emergencia, el barril de crudo superaría los 200 dólares durante días o semanas. La economía mundial, sencillamente, no se lo puede permitir.

Conscientes de ello, la primera respuesta de Teherán a las sanciones -reforzadas por la decisión europea del lunes de interrumpir las importaciones de crudo iraní- y a la guerra encubierta que sufre desde hace años, probablemente sería una oleada de atentados en Irak y en las monarquías del Golfo, con un gran número de objetivos de Occidente y de sus aliados.

El asesinato de científicos nucleares iraníes (cuatro en dos años), ataques como el de noviembre contra una de las principales bases de misiles de Irán, que aún no ha reivindicado nadie, los últimos informes de la Organización Internacional de Energía Atómica sobre Irán y la inutilización en 2010 de unos 1.500 centrifugadores con un virus, Stuxnet, son operaciones encubiertas mucho menos costosas y, posiblemente, más eficaces para obstaculizar y encarecer la nuclearización iraní que ataques militares directos como los que Netanyahu y algunos de sus principales asesores defienden.

Hasta ahora sin éxito, pues la Administración Obama y el Gobierno británico, sin abandonar su cantinela oficial -«no renunciamos a ninguna opción»-, descartan por caro, ineficaz y muy peligroso (tal vez porque la verdadera guerra está en marcha desde hace ya tiempo sin anunciarla) un bombardeo de las instalaciones de Irán como el de la planta iraquí en 1981 o el del reactor sirio en 2007.

Las amenazas de Teherán responden a su impotencia para defenderse de la guerra encubierta, al endurecimiento de las sanciones -con efectos económicos internos cada vez más importantes en la inflación, las inversiones, el comercio y el valor del rial- y a su pérdida de influencia regional a causa de los levantamientos populares, sobre todo en Siria, su principal aliado, pérdida que no compensa el probable aumento de su presencia dentro de Irak tras la retirada del ejército estadounidense.

La prohibición por Obama, en la Defense Authorization Act de 31 de diciembre, de cualquier operación con el Banco Central iraní, la gira de su secretario del Tesoro, Timothy Geithner, en los últimos días por Asia para que respalde dicha medida recortando sus transacciones con Irán, y la prohibición de las importaciones de petróleo iraní del 23 de enero por la UE colocan a Irán en una posición económica desesperada. Si el pasado enseña algo, Irán no responderá cediendo a las presiones, sino todo lo contrario.

Las elecciones legislativas en Irán del 2 de de marzo y las presidenciales estadounidenses del 6 de noviembre limitan el margen de maniobra de los dirigentes de Teherán y de Washington para hacer concesiones, y aumentan el riesgo de demostraciones de fuerza por los dirigentes de ambos países para no ser tildados de blandos por sus adversarios. Irán es prácticamente el único asunto internacional al que han prestado atención los candidatos republicanos a la nominación de su partido. Todos ellos han acusado a Obama de apaciguador. En Irán, el pulso entre los nacionalistas dirigidos por el presidente Ahmadineyad y los conservadores religiosos, representados por el líder supremo, Jamenei, con choques casi diarios, imposibilita un cambio de estrategia a corto plazo.

El director de la agencia de noticias iraní (IRNA), Ali Akbar Javanfekr, colaborador próximo a Ahmadineyad, fue condenado el 15 de enero a un año de cárcel y a cinco años de inhabilitación profesional por criticar a Jamenei. El 3 de enero, Faeceh Hashemi, la hija del ex presidente Rafsanjani, líder de la oposición a Ahmadineyad, fue condenada a seis meses de cárcel y a cinco de inhabilitación política por criticar a Ahmadineyad.

Las cárceles están llenas de opositores, el movimiento verde de 2009 ha sido desmantelado y no hay ningún grupo de oposición, como los Hermanos Musulmanes en Egipto o Al Nahda en Túnez, capaz de desafiar en serio al régimen. La Primavera Árabe, si cala en Irán, será de forma muy diferente a lo que estamos viendo desde Túnez a Siria, pasando por Bahrein.

Los levantamientos en Bahrein, país de mayoría chií pero bajo un Gobierno suní desde la independencia del Reino Unido, son otra prueba, para el 99% de los iraníes, de que -en cuanto a libertades o derechos- no pueden creer ni esperar nada bueno de Occidente, pues han visto cómo los tanques saudíes aplastaron las protestas sin que Europa y EEUU movieran un dedo.

Se puede responder con toda razón desde Occidente que la represión de las protestas en Irán tras el pucherazo de junio de 2009 no ha sido menos sangriento, pero este debate no hace sino reforzar la imagen de que todos son unos hipócritas y nadie tiene derecho a dar lecciones a los demás, mucho menos a estrangular la economía de Irán.

La batalla es tan intensa que no podemos descartar, si se impone el núcleo duro, que el régimen presidencialista bicéfalo que instaló Jomeini tras la revolución de 1979 deje paso a un sistema parlamentario, con un primer ministro despojado de muchos de los poderes que tiene hoy el actual presidente iraní.

El objetivo de Ahmadineyad y de quienes, sobre todo desde la Guardia Revolucionaria, su principal soporte, le apoyan es seguir reforzando la presidencia a cuenta de las instituciones o consejos bajo control de los ayatolás con escaso o nulo control ciudadano. Es un pulso entre la vieja teocracia jomeinista y una dictadura cívico-militar de nuevo cuño en un país de 75 millones con la juventud mejor formada de todo Oriente Medio.

La inmensa mayoría de los iraníes, independientemente de su ideología, ve la nuclearización como un derecho nacional. No entiende que ese derecho lo puedan ejercer Pakistán, India o Israel y no ellos, que jamás han iniciado una guerra de agresión contra un país vecino.

Las sanciones -sean para frenar el programa nuclear o para provocar un cambio de régimen- parecen condenadas al fracaso de antemano, pues dentro de Irán se ven como una agresión exterior y, en vez de debilitar al régimen, lo refuerzan, difuminando las enormes diferencias entre sus dirigentes, uniendo a todos los iraníes en defensa de la nación y desviando la atención de los problemas internos, de la desastrosa gestión económica y del derroche de recursos en aliados como Hizbulá y Hamas o en mezquitas e imames por todo el mundo musulmán que compiten con los financiados por Arabia Saudí.

Para que las sanciones tengan algún efecto positivo, deberían acompañarse de incentivos. Una opción sensata para reducir la tensión y recuperar el diálogo es empezar con gestos como el acceso iraní a repuestos de la Boeing para sus aviones civiles, que en nada afectan a su programa nuclear.

Por parte de Irán, ayudaría a aliviar la tensión la liberación inmediata de Amir Mirzai Hekmati, ex marine estadounidense de origen iraní detenido el año pasado durante una visita privada y condenado a primeros de mes a muerte como espía por un tribunal de Teherán. En Afganistán y Oriente Medio, por historia y por cultura, Irán tuvo y tiene suficientes intereses comunes con Occidente para pasar página en poco tiempo a los 33 años de satanización mutua tras la caída del Sha, pero, sin señales claras de buena voluntad por ambas partes, la pelea tiene muchas probabilidades de seguir en tablas o provocar un desastre bélico sin beneficios para nadie.

Señor presidente, le propongo este plan. En los próximos meses, ordena al Departamento de Defensa que destruya la capacidad nuclear de Irán. Sí, ya sé que es año electoral, y algunos dirán que es una medida cínica, una forma de agrupar a todos en torno a la bandera, pero un Irán nuclear es un problema que no puede esperar.

Nuestro ataque preventivo, denominado Operación Yes We Can, incluirá bombardear la planta de conversión de óxido de uranio de Isfahán, las instalaciones de enriquecimiento de uranio en Natanz y Fordo, el reactor de agua pesada en Arak y varias plantas de fabricación de centrifugadoras cerca de Natanz y Teherán. La planta de Natanz está enterrada bajo 10 metros de hormigón reforzado y rodeada de defensas antiaéreas, pero nuestro nuevo destructor de búnqueres, el Penetrador de Artillería Pesada, con sus 15.000 kilos de peso, convertirá el sitio en un montón de escombros. Fordo es más complicado, pero, con un número suficiente de ataques, podemos sacudir las centrifugadoras. ¿Cómo dice? ¿Eso es todo? Que sepamos, sí.

¿Bajas civiles? No muchas, señor, dada la extraordinaria precisión de nuestros misiles dirigidos. Irán intentará granjearse las simpatías de todos mostrando cadáveres y viudas desconsoladas, pero la mayoría de las víctimas serán militares, ingenieros, científicos y técnicos de las instalaciones, que se lo tendrían bien merecido.

Los críticos dirán que estos ataques quirúrgicos podrían desencadenar una guerra regional. Le dirán que la Guardia Revolucionaria responderá contra objetivos de EE UU y sus aliados. Y el régimen podría cerrar la crucial ruta de transporte de petróleo del estrecho de Ormuz. No se preocupe. Podemos hacer muchas cosas para mitigar esas amenazas. Para empezar, podemos asegurar al régimen iraní que solo queremos acabar con sus armas nucleares, no derrocar el Gobierno, y, como es natural, nos creerán, si sabemos cómo transmitir el mensaje. ¿Quizá podemos colgarlo en Facebook?

Podríamos dejar que sean los israelíes los que bombardeen. Cada día tienen más nervioso el dedo de darle al gatillo. Pero es probable que no puedan hacer el trabajo hasta el final sin nosotros, y acabaríamos teniendo que intervenir. Así que, por qué no hacerlo bien y hacer que se nos reconozca. De verdad, ¿qué problema habría?

La situación descrita está extraída de un artículo de Matthew Kroenig en el último número de Foreign Affairs (la actitud sarcástica es mía). Kroenig, un profesor que pasó un año como asesor en el Departamento de Defensa con Obama, aspira, al parecer, a ser un superhalcón. Sus antiguos colegas de Defensa se quedaron horrorizados por el artículo, que presenta la perspectiva más alarmista posible de la amenaza nuclear iraní y la más optimista sobre la capacidad de EE UU de resolverla. (¿Les recuerda a alguna otra guerra preventiva en un país que también empezaba por I?).

Es una de las posturas del debate de política exterior del que más se está abusando en este año de elecciones. La contraria, que también es horrible, es la perspectiva de vivir con un Irán nuclear. En ese caso, el miedo de la mayoría de los expertos estadounidenses no es que Irán tome la decisión de reducir Israel a cenizas (Irán no quiere suicidarse). Los peligros más realistas son que una guerra convencional en una región tan propensa a los conflictos pudiera derivar en un apocalipsis, o que Irán ampliara su paraguas nuclear hasta proteger a aliados tan peligrosos como Hezbolá, o que los vecinos árabes se sintieran obligados a entrar en la carrera nuclear.

Por ahora, la política estadounidense vive entre estos dos extremos de atacar y aceptar, en el terreno de los cálculos inciertos y las opciones imperfectas. ¿Y el próximo presidente?

En el campo republicano tenemos a un candidato (Rick Santorum) que es el más próximo a bombardear, y cuanto antes mejor; otro (Ron Paul) que está por dejar a Irán en paz, y a Mitt Romney y Newt Gingrich que están en medio. Romney condena a Obama por hacer más o menos lo mismo que él haría.

Aunque existen muchas cosas borrosas sobre la teocracia iraní, los especialistas de dentro y de fuera del Gobierno están bastante de acuerdo en varias hipótesis.

Primero, por mucho que lo niegue, el régimen iraní está decidido a obtener armas nucleares o la capacidad para fabricarlas con rapidez. Considera que tener la opción nuclear es una cuestión de orgullo persa y supervivencia nacional frente a los enemigos (EE UU), que están empeñados en derrocar el Estado islámico. El programa nuclear es popular, incluso entre la oposición admirada en Occidente. La situación real del programa no está clara, pero los cálculos más fiables son que, si el ayatolá Alí Jamenei ordenase acelerar el proyecto, podrían tener un arma en las manos en el plazo aproximado de un año.

La política de EE UU ha sido la misma durante los mandatos de Bush y Obama: (1) un Irán nuclear es “inaceptable”; (2) una mezcla de sanciones y suministro de combustible nuclear industrial a cambio de que se olviden de las armas; (3) inspecciones internacionales no restringidas; (4) negativa a descartar las opciones militares; (5) un esfuerzo concertado para contener a Israel e impedir un ataque unilateral, más allá de la supuesta campaña de sabotajes y asesinatos; y (6) el deseo de que el núcleo duro iraní sea sustituido por un régimen más benigno. Estos puntos forman también el guión de la postura de Romney, por más que llame apaciguador a Obama.

La estrategia de Obama promete ser más dura que la de Bush. Como Obama empezó con una oferta de negociaciones directas -que los iraníes despreciaron-, la opinión pública mundial se inclinó en nuestro favor. Ahora quizá contamos con apoyos para la única medida que les haría verdadero daño, un boicot al crudo iraní. Washington y Bruselas, con la ayuda de Arabia Saudí, están trabajando para convencer a grandes clientes del petróleo iraní como Japón y Corea del Sur para que cambien de proveedores. Los iraníes se toman esta amenaza a su sustento económico en serio. De ahí, la posibilidad de un choque naval en el estrecho de Ormuz. No es imposible que tengamos una guerra incluso sin haber bombardeado sus instalaciones nucleares. Pero ese no es el único inconveniente de la estrategia actual -llamémosla la estrategia de Obamney-.

El objetivo de imponer unas duras sanciones es obligar a los iraníes a sentarse a negociar. Pero la desconfianza está tan arraigada y las presiones para actuar con viril decisión son tan intensas en un año electoral, que es difícil pensar que el Gobierno vaya a sentirse libre de aceptar ninguna apertura de Teherán. Los guerreros de salón presentarían cualquier cosa que no fuera una concesión unilateral y humillante iraní como una derrota de Obama. Y si Israel decide atacar por su cuenta, Bibi Netanyahu sabe que el candidato Obama sufrirá enormes presiones para ayudarle.

Esta paradoja inmediata trae otra a largo plazo: un ataque contra Irán uniría al pueblo con los mulás y haría que el líder supremo redoblara sus esfuerzos nucleares, solo que más a escondidas. En el Pentágono, a veces, lo expresan así: bombardear Irán es la mejor forma de garantizar exactamente lo que estamos tratando de evitar.

Tema: La amenaza del cierre del Estrecho de Ormuz al tráfico de petróleo es la respuesta iraní a las sanciones que preparan EEUU y sus aliados para impedir que Irán se convierta en una potencia nuclear.

Resumen: EEUU y sus aliados están preparando nuevas sanciones que se añadan a las existentes para forzar al régimen de los ayatolás a abandonar su programa nuclear. En respuesta, los Guardianes de la Revolución aprovecharon sus maniobras de enero de 2012 para amenazar con cerrar el Estrecho si se aplican esas sanciones. Este ARI estudia los riesgos militares y los energéticos en una aproximación basada en las fuentes abiertas disponibles hasta el momento y que integra en dos escenarios. En un primer escenario, de tensión, Irán mantendría esa amenaza de corte como instrumento de presión en su enfrentamiento con las potencias occidentales y regionales. La inestabilidad duraría todo el tiempo –años– que queda para completarse o cancelarse el programa nuclear iraní y se podría traducir en demostraciones de fuerza o acciones encubiertas que no reducirían la oferta de crudo procedente del Golfo pero que elevarían su precio por encima del precio normal de mercado. En el segundo escenario, de enfrentamiento armado, cualquier intento de cerrar el Estrecho o perturbar el derecho de paso de los buques daría lugar a una rápida escalada militar para controlar el espacio naval y aéreo y restablecer el tránsito de petroleros. La duración de este escenario dependería de la magnitud del intento de cierre, desde unos días en caso de un bloqueo limitado seguido de una reacción rápida hasta semanas en caso que la reacción fuera tardía y el bloqueo total. El cierre y el enfrentamiento provocarían un salto inmediato en el precio del petróleo que se reduciría o se incrementaría en función de la evolución de las expectativas sobre el tiempo necesario para reabrir el Estrecho.

Análisis: EEUU y sus aliados sostienen un pulso con Irán para que desista de su intención de disponer de armas nucleares. Para evitarlo, se han ido sucediendo medidas de disuasión y de distensión que no han conseguido el efecto deseado. A las medidas diplomáticas siguieron los embargos de tecnología para evitar o retrasar el acceso a medios nucleares y tecnología de misiles y, también, aunque se desconoce su autoría, se han sucedido acciones encubiertas en los dos últimos años en suelo iraní que han causado la muerte de científicos o militares asociados al programa de enriquecimiento del uranio o al desarrollo de los misiles balísticos. En reciprocidad, Irán le ha puesto las cosas difíciles a EEUU y a sus vecinos del Golfo estos últimos años utilizando a los movimientos terroristas a los que subvenciona, a sus fuerzas especiales (quds) o a sus seguidores étnicos o religiosos, tal y como lo ha venido haciendo en Irak, Afganistán, Líbano, Arabia Saudí, Yemen y Bahrein, entre otros países. Viendo que el programa nuclear avanza de forma inexorable, el presidente Obama firmó a finales de 2011 nuevas medidas que penalizan la colaboración con empresas y bancos iraníes, incluido su Banco Central, y la UE está ultimando sanciones sobre sus exportaciones de petróleo. En respuesta, los Guardianes de la Revolución pusieron en marcha unas maniobras destinadas a preparar el cierre del Estrecho de Ormuz y amenazaron con bloquearlo en cualquier momento.

Las nuevas sanciones estadounidenses y la inminencia de las europeas, previstas primero para el 30 de enero y luego adelantadas al 23 para no hacerlas coincidir con un Consejo Europeo que quiere centrarse en la crisis de la eurozona, tensionaron inmediatamente el mercado del crudo. El precio del petróleo tipo Brent de referencia en Europa pasó de moverse en el nivel de los 108 dólares por barril a finales de diciembre de 2011 a tantear los 114 dólares en las primeras semanas de 2012 (a 16 de enero se situaba en el entorno de los 111 dólares), lejos de los máximos alcanzados por el conflicto libio a principios de abril de 2011 (casi 130 dólares) pero cerca de los existentes en septiembre tras la caída de Gadafi. El West Texas Intermediate (WTI), de referencia en EEUU, se situó a principios de enero en 104 dólares por barril, en máximos desde mayo de 2011, para luego descender hasta el entorno de los 100 dólares. Además, el descenso de las importaciones chinas de crudo iraní, que en enero se redujeron casi a la mitad –y que se prevé que sigan disminuyendo el próximo mes– ha provocado que algunas refinerías chinas se hayan empezado a abastecer de crudo del Mar del Norte, volviendo a hacer rentable el arbitraje entre Europa y Asia, con el probable aumento de los precios del crudo en los mercados asiáticos.

EEUU mantiene un enfrentamiento con el régimen de los ayatolás desde su nacimiento y en los últimos años se ha impuesto entre los dirigentes iraníes la percepción de que EEUU no desea normalizar sus relaciones con Irán sino cambiar un régimen teocrático e islamista por uno democrático y secular. Esta percepción se ha consolidado tras constatar que EEUU ha cambiado mediante la fuerza los regímenes de los talibán y de Sadam Hussein, así como el de Gadafi –tras renunciar éste a desarrollar su capacidad nuclear– mientras no ha podido hacerlo con el de Corea del Norte porque sí dispone de capacidad nuclear. Por otro lado, Irán sostiene un pulso geopolítico por la hegemonía regional con los gobiernos y comunidades suníes de la zona, pretende acabar con Israel y no ha conseguido erradicar el riesgo latente de los separatismos kurdos y baluchis. Por eso, el desarrollo del programa nuclear es vital para la supervivencia del régimen iraní, para que sus dirigentes puedan demostrar a su población que han sido capaces de convertir a Irán en una potencia nuclear contra todo y contra todos y para disuadir a sus rivales de cualquier tentación de cambio de régimen por la fuerza.

El creciente impacto de las sanciones comerciales y, sobre todo, su mala gestión económica, obligaron al régimen iraní a reducir abruptamente los subsidios a los combustibles y los alimentos en diciembre de 2010 para evitar una crisis fiscal. Los precios aumentaron de manera fuerte e inmediata, y el régimen hubo de silenciar a los medios de comunicación y realizar un despliegue importante de sus fuerzas de seguridad para controlar el descontento popular. Estas medidas acabaron con el último mecanismo de distribución de rentas del petróleo a la población iraní y, por tanto, con su ya escasa legitimación económica. Como resultado, se ha registrado un empobrecimiento social debido al desvío de recursos económicos a fines nucleares y militares, los problemas de suministro y la carestía de bienes y servicios básicos –que se agravarán aun más con las próximas sanciones–. No obstante, el régimen iraní se las ha arreglado bien para sobrellevar las sanciones comerciales y sacar adelante su programa nuclear, aunque todavía no se sabe cuál es el efecto real sobre el mismo de las sanciones comerciales ni el de las acciones encubiertas. También ha sabido suprimir cualquier oposición que pueda avivar los rescoldos de las movilizaciones del Movimiento Verde en 2009 o articular una versión chií de la “primavera árabe”, hasta el punto de que podría encontrarse sin oposición que concurra a las próximas elecciones de marzo.

En el bando contrario, EEUU y sus aliados europeos, las monarquías del Golfo e Israel se ven contra las cuerdas frente a un Irán camino de la bomba nuclear y han optado por decidido ampliar las sanciones a los flujos financieros y a las importaciones de petróleo, un tipo de sanciones mucho más efectivas pero que pueden conducir a situaciones indeseadas como un cierre del Estrecho que obligue a usar la fuerza contra Irán. Este riesgo, en un contexto de crisis económica y financiera internacional, y con los riesgos de recesión que afrontan los países europeos, causaría un choque de oferta difícil de asumir a corto plazo. La recuperación europea se ve dificultada por un nivel de precios actual por encima de los 100 dólares por barril, y aunque la crisis y los altos precios tienden a destruir la demanda occidental de energía, el precio no baja porque la demanda asiática sigue al alza (según la última previsión de la US Energy Information Administration, el consumo mundial de petróleo aumentará en 1,3 millones de barriles/día durante 2012 y en 1,5 millones en 2013 debido sobre todo al aumento de la demanda asiática). Con los fundamentales del mercado –demanda y oferta– ajustados, cualquier escalada de la tensión geopolítica en la zona puede tener efectos muy negativos sobre el precio del crudo y la economía mundial.

Además de la importante caída causada en su capacidad de producción y de exportación, las futuras sanciones podrían causar la paralización de buena parte de sus proyectos de exploración y producción de hidrocarburos, por ejemplo en el campo gasista de South Pars donde –hasta ahora– participan empresas europeas. También pondrán en riesgo el estatus de los Guardianes de la Revolución y su capacidad de influencia, ya que quienes más guardan la revolución son también quienes acaparan la mayor parte de sus beneficios económicos e industriales (su conglomerado económico incluye construcción, ingeniería, telecomunicaciones, energía, automoción y construcción naval, entre otras que la sitúan en influencia económica sólo por detrás de la Compañía Nacional de Petróleo y el Legado del Imán Reza) y quienes menos se han visto hasta ahora afectados por las sanciones. La amenaza iraní tiene que enmarcarse en un contexto donde los gobiernos llamados a aplicar nuevas sanciones están sopesando sus riesgos y oportunidades y parece más orientada a sembrar dudas y divisiones entre quienes piensan aplicar las sanciones que a materializarla. Sin embargo, una vez que las sanciones se adopten y, sobre todo, según cómo se adopten, los dirigentes iraníes podrían tomar en serio la opción de cierre del Estrecho.

Ormuz y el mercado mundial del petróleo

El estrecho de Ormuz es el principal cuello de botella (choke point) del comercio mundial de crudo. En 2011, cerca del 35% del petróleo transportado por rutas marítimas pasó por Ormuz, lo que constituye aproximadamente el 20% del comercio mundial de crudo. El tránsito ha aumentado con fuerza desde los 16 millones de barriles/día (mbd) en 2010 hasta alcanzar los 17 mbd en 2011. Este aumento es debido en su práctica totalidad al aumento de producción de Arabia Saudí y, en menor medida, de otros emiratos del Golfo para compensar la pérdida de producción libia en los mercados internacionales. Eso supone un tránsito medio por Ormuz de 14 petroleros cargados al día, y un número similar de buques vacíos en busca de carga. De ellos, unas dos terceras partes son superpetroleros de más de 150.000 toneladas, que por su estructura compartimentada y medidas de seguridad debidas al tipo de carga que transportan constituyen objetivos más resistentes y difíciles de dañar de lo que se suele pensar.

Mapa 1

Como se puede ver en el Mapa 1, la parte más estrecha tiene 45 km y por ella existen dos canales de tránsito de 3,2 km de ancho con una zona de separación de igual medida entre ellos. El grueso de ese tránsito, más de un 85%, tiene como destino los mercados asiáticos, básicamente Japón, la India, China y Corea del Sur. Sin embargo, varios países europeos reciben una parte significativa de sus importaciones de crudo –y en el caso español, de gas– a través de rutas que transitan por Ormuz. En 2010, aproximadamente el 15% de las importaciones de crudo de la UE-27 y el 4% de las de gas transitaron por Ormuz. Para España, el papel estratégico del Estrecho es mayor que para el conjunto de la UE porque con datos de la Corporación de Reservas Estratégicas (CORES), España importó entre septiembre de 2010 y octubre de 2011 más del 35% de sus importaciones de crudo de los principales productores del Golfo (14,7% de Irán, 14% de Arabia Saudí y 6,4% de Irak). Las importaciones españolas de gas de Qatar representaron el 13% de las totales en ese mismo período y un 0,5% adicional provino de Omán.

Mapa 2

El problema del cierre radica en que no existen rutas alternativas con capacidad suficiente para mantener abastecidos a los mercados (véase el Mapa 2). Arabia Saudí tiene un oleoducto que atraviesa el país de este a oeste (Petroline) que está operando casi al límite de su capacidad de unos 5 mbd. El crudo iraquí podría transportarse a través del oleoducto que une Kirkuk con el puerto mediterráneo de Ceyhan en Turquía, pero el oleoducto norte-sur iraquí está cerrado por las diferencias entre el gobierno kurdo y el gobierno central iraquí y es objeto de atentados insurgentes. Los otros tres oleoductos existentes están cerrados: el Tapline que une Arabia Saudí con Líbano (0,5 mbd), el Iraqi Pipeline across Saudi Arabia (IPSA) y el que conectaba el oleoducto norte-sur iraquí con Siria.

A corto plazo, no sería posible desviar el flujo energético a través de dichos oleoductos y sólo podrían liberarse las reservas estratégicas de los países miembros de la Agencia Internacional de la Energía, como ya ocurrió el verano de 2011 para reducir las tensiones del mercado del petróleo a causa de la interrupción de suministros libios. No obstante, ello sólo supondría una ayuda –limitada– si el bloqueo resultase parcial o la interrupción se limitara en el tiempo. Los países consumidores podían buscar suministradores alternativos, pero dada la fungibilidad del mercado del crudo y la importancia de los productores de la región, ello implicaría irremediablemente un fuerte aumento de precios, además de considerables problemas logísticos para la industria. A medio plazo se podría intentar reactivar el oleoducto IPSA y transportar algunas cantidades de crudo adicionales por el Petroline, aun cuando sólo representarían una fracción mínima de los 17 mbd en tránsito naval por el Estrecho, pero para reactivar o reparar algunas de las infraestructuras existentes o acelerar otros proyectos en curso habría que esperar a un plazo más largo (está prevista la apertura en mayo de 2012 de un nuevo oleoducto, el Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline, que llevaría el petróleo hasta el puerto omaní de Fujariah).

Quienes no creen que Irán llegue a cerrar el Estrecho lo argumentan en el elevado coste que le representaría, tanto por los ingresos que dejaría de recibir como por el desabastecimiento marítimo o el coste económico asociado a la destrucción de infraestructuras en una confrontación militar. Sin embargo, las nuevas sanciones pueden alterar drásticamente esa lógica porque si se aplican de forma inmediata, inflexible y completa, Irán tampoco podría realizar sus exportaciones e importaciones como hasta ahora, por lo que las sanciones pueden reducir los incentivos para mantener abierto el Estrecho. Parece que las sanciones aprobadas por EEUU incorporan cierta flexibilidad, dando seis meses a los países y empresas afectadas para reajustar su cadena de suministros. También contemplan excepciones cuando éstas se argumenten en términos de seguridad energética, además del waiver con que cuenta el presidente por razones de seguridad nacional. La discusión en Europa parece reflejar también preferencias disímiles por parte de los Estados miembros en función del peso de sus importaciones de crudo iraní. Resulta difícil pensar que el embargo petrolero decretado por la UE vaya a ser inmediato y total en su aplicación, y ya se manejan plazos de seis meses para aplicarlo. Tampoco parece que los importadores asiáticos vayan a prescindir totalmente de Irán como fuente de suministros. El margen de actuación entre el statu quo previo, con unas sanciones que hasta hace poco apenas han afectado económicamente al país en comparación con los errores de política económica del régimen y su mala gestión, y un embargo y bloqueo completos es suficientemente amplio como para calibrar y modular bien los incentivos, evitando errores de cálculo difíciles de revertir. Una aplicación gradual y flexible de las sanciones, que aumente su coste progresivamente sin llegar a impedir la obtención por parte de Irán de unos ingresos mínimos, reduce el incentivo de un bloqueo de Ormuz al ser su coste relativo mayor que el de unas sanciones menos restrictivas.

Preparando el cierre: la apuesta iraní por la estrategia de combate asimétrica

La amenaza de cerrar el Estrecho es una práctica habitual del régimen iraní desde la época de los años 80 y ha recurrido a ella cada vez que ha sido objeto de presión internacional, tanto por su apoyo al terrorismo internacional en los 90 como por su programa nuclear en la última década. A diferencia de entonces, Irán cuenta ahora con capacidad militar para denegar el tránsito por el canal, al menos temporalmente. La configuración actual de la estructura de fuerzas navales iraníes obedece a las lecciones aprendidas del pasado cuando EEUU se hizo cargo de la protección de los petroleros kuwaitíes durante el conflicto irano-iraquí (la tankers war de 1987-1988). Su enfoque simétrico, tratando de combatir como los estadounidenses, demostró ser un fracaso cuando EEUU puso en marcha la operación “Mantis Religiosa” en abril de 1988 como represalia por la colocación de minas iraníes en el estrecho. La operación tuvo una fase anfibia de asalto sobre las instalaciones militares iraníes costeras e insulares y una fase de combate aeronaval que acabó con la destrucción de varios buques iraníes sin que las fuerzas estadounidenses se vieran afectadas por los misiles y torpedos lanzados contra ellas. Por el contrario, el enfoque asimétrico ensayado entonces –emplear unidades ligeras y minas contra las fuerzas convencionales estadounidenses– dio mejores resultados (las minas empleadas ralentizaron el tránsito naval, dañaron a petroleros e, incluso, a la fragata USS Samuel B. Roberts) aunque no fue suficiente para garantizar el cierre del Estrecho. La evidencia de la inferioridad iraní llevó a sus dirigentes a poner en marcha un programa de reestructuración asimétrica destinado a reforzar las capacidades contra buques, reforzar las defensas costeras y multiplicar las plataformas de actuación sobre el Estrecho para infligir el mayor daño posible a la Armada estadounidense en lugar de pretender combatir con ella.

Irán ha sustituido los misiles anti-buque Harpoon de origen estadounidense por los Yingyi-82 (C-802) chinos, menos vulnerables que aquellos a las medidas electrónicas y a la interceptación, además de producir sus propios misiles cuya cantidad o calidad no se conoce exactamente pero que respaldan sus amenazas (las últimas maniobras en el Estrecho en enero de 2012 sirvieron para presentar a varios tipos de misiles y equipos de tecnología propia o bajo licencia). También ha multiplicado el número de lanchas rápidas y de plataformas desde las que se puede sembrar minas o atacar a las unidades navales aprovechándose de su cantidad para aumentar sus posibilidades de éxito. Finalmente, las fuerzas se han desplegado sobre las bases y plataformas más próximas al Estrecho, incluyendo la ocupación de algunos islotes sobre el canal (Irán ocupó en 1992 las tres pequeñas islas de Abu Musa, Tung as Sughra y Tunb al Kubra, estratégicamente situadas a ambos lados de los canales de acceso, una ocupación a la que los Emiratos Árabes Unidos –EAU– sólo han reaccionado por vías diplomática y jurídicas) y se han reforzado las guarniciones, fortificado y artillado las instalaciones y mejorado la coordinación de las operaciones de ambas marinas con un nuevo sistema de mando y control.

Irán cuenta con dos marinas unidas bajo el control de los Guardianes de la Revolución: la tradicional Marina de la República Árabe Islámica (MRAI) y el Cuerpo de Marina de la Guardia Revolucionaria Islámica (CMGRI). La primera cuenta con unos 20.000 miembros, incluidos 5.000 marines, y equipo poco avanzado distribuido en mueve bases. Disponen de corbetas anticuadas y un centenar de buques rápidos de distinta configuración armados con misiles chinos anti-buque (CSS-N-4) de una generación anterior a los Yingji-82 (C-802) de los que disponen la CMGRI y otros tipos de misiles anti-buque más antiguos. Operan los submarinos iraníes: tres convencionales de origen ruso, 12 submarinos de bolsillo de patente norcoreana y ocho capaces de colocar minas y fuerzas de operaciones especiales.

Por su parte, el CMGRI cuenta con unos 20.000 miembros, de ellos 5.000 marines, y dispone de unos 40 patrulleros rápidos de armados con misiles anti-buque de distintos tipos incluidos los más avanzado (C-802), junto a otras 50 lanchas rápidas de fabricación nacional, china y norcoreana armadas con gran diversidad de sistemas anti-buque, así como varios centenares de embarcaciones ligeras. El CMGRI dispone de mayor capacidad de fuego y medios más avanzados que la MRAI, incluidas sus propias baterías de misiles (unas 12-18 con unos 200-300 misiles CSS-C-3 de 100 km de alcance) y su despliegue está centrado en el Estrecho, donde operan desde la base de Band-e-Abass y las islas de Abu Musa, Sirri y Larak, lo que les coloca en primera línea de cualquier operación de bloqueo del Estrecho, tanto para colocar minas sobre los canales de paso, incluidas minas de proximidad y acústicas, como para atacar los buques petroleros, a sus escoltas o a los que participen en la limpieza de minas.

Irán dispone de la suficiente variedad y cantidad de medios para denegar el tránsito –al menos temporalmente– para lo que sólo tiene que colocar minas sobre los canales de paso del Estrecho o frente a los puertos de carga del Golfo. Puede hacerlo desde prácticamente cualquier tipo de buques a submarinos pasando por buceadores, con lo que sería difícil evitar su colocación inicial y posterior. Tampoco necesita bloquear el tránsito completamente, porque le bastaría colocar algunas minas para perturbarlo, obligando a operaciones de limpieza y ralentizar el tránsito de buques. También podría disparar algún misil sobre cualquier buque en tránsito o provocar un incidente que afectara a la seguridad marítima. Lo anterior sería suficiente para disparar los precios del petróleo y subir el coste de seguros y transportes al menos hasta que se volviera a reabrir con garantías. No obstante, para causar efectos similares le bastaría amenazar con hacerlo, lo que genera dos escenarios de desestabilización y de enfrentamiento según exista una amenaza creíble o la constatación del cierre, respectivamente.

Escenario de desestabilización y tensión

En el primero escenario, de desestabilización, Irán mantendría la amenaza de corte, realizaría acciones o gestos destinados a reforzar la credibilidad de su amenaza para evitar las sanciones o para castigar a quienes las apoyaran. En función de la evolución de las sanciones o de la situación interna y regional, Irán podría recurrir a maniobras, demostraciones de fuerza, sabotajes, acciones irregulares o encubiertas, actuar directamente o mediante terceros y manejar la escalada de la tensión de forma ambigua para dificultar la respuesta a la misma de los afectados. Este tipo de actuaciones se prolongaría en el tiempo mientras dure el pulso entre la consecución del programa nuclear y las sanciones para evitarlo, un escenario que duraría años y que terminaría cuando las sanciones colocaran al régimen de los ayatolás en una situación insostenible o fracasaran en su aplicación. En el primer caso –y teniendo poco que perder– Irán podría aventurarse a materializar su amenaza, mientras que en el segundo se desmovilizaría la presión internacional sobre Teherán. Para desestabilizar el mercado de petróleo y la economía internacional, Irán puede articular una estrategia de propaganda y de actuación que le permita mantener la credibilidad de su amenaza y la ambigüedad sobre sus intenciones.

En el plano militar, la respuesta no puede ser otra que reforzar el despliegue militar en la zona para prevenir el cierre y preposicionar los medios necesarios para su limpieza y reapertura. De momento, EEUU ha duplicado el número de grupos de combate en la zona y contará con cuatro para esas funciones, pero deberá completar el poder aeronaval con la incorporación de unidades navales contra minas que están ubicadas a semanas de navegación tanto de las costas estadounidenses como de las de sus aliados con esos medios. El despliegue demostraría a Irán la credibilidad de una respuesta militar y reduciría las posibilidades de éxito de un cierre anunciado pero su presencia multiplicaría las posibilidades de un enfrentamiento o accidente que pudiera poner en marcha la escalada. Sin embargo, las unidades navales deben preservarse a distancia para evitar convertirse en blancos fáciles (siguiendo la suerte de la corbeta israelí hundida por Hezbolá en 2006 frente a las costas de Líbano).

En el plano energético, este escenario mantendría el patrón creado en enero de 2012, situando el precio del petróleo por encima del precio normal de mercado y la variación de la oferta dependería de la eficacia y alcance de las sanciones sobre la exportación iraní y de la capacidad de los países del Golfo para compensar la disminución iraní. Unas sanciones flexibles y graduales como las que se manejan podrían gestionarse por el sector petrolero con cierta facilidad, pero a condición de que la capacidad ociosa de Arabia Saudí se llevase a límites inexplorados hasta la fecha. Los más de 2 mbd exportados por Irán son en su mayoría crudo pesado, de sustitución relativamente fácil por petróleo saudí, a diferencia de lo ocurrido con el crudo ligero libio, pero sería complicado que Arabia Saudí compensase íntegramente la salida del mercado del tercer mayor exportador mundial de crudo. Los mercados permanecerían tensionados por el aumento de la prima de riesgo geopolítico, pero los precios podrían no ir mucho más allá de lo visto en 2011.

Anunciar la disposición a liberar reservas estratégicas por parte de la Agencia Internacional de la Energía y, en su caso, llevarla a cabo como se hizo en el verano de 2011 para mitigar el impacto de la crisis libia, podría ayudar a relajar los mercados. En paralelo, se podrían adoptar medidas a medio plazo para diversificar la ruta de Ormuz y presionar a Irán. Probablemente, la opción de menor coste y tiempo sería complementar la capacidad del oleoducto en construcción a través de Emiratos que, además, optimiza la diversificación de las rutas destinadas a Asia. Lo mismo se podría hacer con el oleoducto Petroline aunque su rendimiento depende de la capacidad del canal de Suez y del oleoducto Suez-Mediterráneo (Sumed), en el caso de los corredores destinados a Europa, o de los costes de reconducir el cargamento hacia los mercados asiáticos del Mar Rojo al Golfo de Adén a través de otro choke point: Bab el Mandeb.

Escenario de enfrentamiento y escalada

Si se produce un intento deliberado de cierre, el escenario cambiaría a uno de enfrentamiento armado cuya intensidad y duración dependería de varios factores que se analizan a continuación, pero que representarían un salto cualitativo en las repercusiones militares y energéticas. En líneas generales, cualquier intento de cerrar el Estrecho o perturbar el derecho de paso de los buques daría lugar a una rápida escalada militar para controlar el espacio naval y aéreo y restablecer el tránsito de petroleros. La duración de este escenario dependería de la magnitud del cierre, desde unos días en caso de un bloqueo limitado seguido de una reacción rápida hasta semanas en caso que la reacción fuera tardía y el bloqueo total. El cierre y el enfrentamiento provocarían un salto inmediato en el precio del petróleo que se reduciría o se incrementaría en función del tiempo necesario para reabrir el Estrecho.

En el plano militar hay que resaltar la rapidez en la escalada militar motivada tanto por la necesidad de evitar el cierre como por la tensión acumulada en el escenario anterior (por no añadir la posibilidad de que Israel o EEUU aprovechen la ocasión para atacar instalaciones nucleares iraníes). Cualquier acción iraní encaminada al cierre desencadenaría la respuesta de las fuerzas estadounidenses desplegadas y vigilantes para evitar que Irán pudiera realizar un minado intensivo y prolongado y porque su inhibición se interpretaría por los dirigentes iraníes como un signo de debilidad –una debilidad que han visto en su retirada iraquí y afgana– por lo que se verían incentivados para subir el nivel de sus provocaciones.

EEUU corre ahora mayores riesgos para desplegar sus grandes unidades, ya que los Guardianes de la Revolución (el CMGRI) pueden llevar a cabo ataques simultáneos de muchas unidades navales pequeñas y veloces o disparar misiles anti-buque, por lo que tendría que atacar las bases e instalaciones militares, los sistema de mando y control y los radares, algo para lo que ahora cuentan con más inteligencia, fuerzas especiales y medios no tripulados que en el pasado. Las acciones aeronavales sobre esas instalaciones son necesarias tanto para evitar nuevos minados como para proceder al desminado, sin que se pueda descartar la ocupación de algunos de los de los islotes estratégicos sobre el Estrecho. Para ello han estado conduciendo juegos de guerra durante los últimos años y han realizado ejercicios –las maniobras Arabian Gauntlet–con sus aliados árabes en la zona y con potencias occidentales como el Reino Unido, Francia y Australia según los años, destinadas a mejorar la capacidad de prevención y respuesta frente a acciones de cierre de estrecho dentro de operaciones de seguridad marítima.

EEUU también podría anticiparse a cualquier minado una vez que sus medios de inteligencia detectaran los preparativos iraníes al efecto. EEUU podría actuar sobre instalaciones portuarias en la zona, evitando que salieran sus buques o destruyéndoles junto con las instalaciones de radar para evitar el minado del canal o el lanzamiento de misiles. Sin embargo, parece poco probable que EEUU vaya a realizar este tipo de ataque anticipatorio porque aunque existiera la amenaza de cierre inminente, usar la fuerza primero reforzaría el victimismo y la propaganda iraníes, debilitaría la oposición interna y generaría simpatías externas al discurso iraní de resistencia contra una agresión imperialista, además de indisponer a China, la India y Rusia, entre otros, contra EEUU. En este escenario sin escalada, donde el enfrentamiento no pasa de la provocación y su respuesta, el período comprendido entre la detección del inicio del minado y la anulación de las capacidades de defensa anti-buque podría durar –según las estimaciones disponibles en fuentes abiertas– días, si el minado es limitado y el desminado selectivo (abriendo un canal de paso o Q-route), y hasta un mes si el minado es significativo y el desminado exhaustivo (eliminando todas las minas).

Si las dos partes reproducen el patrón de comportamiento del pasado, su comportamiento será contenido y progresivo para evitar la escalada. Pero en un contexto de tensión como el actual, la escalada se puede producir deliberadamente, siguiendo una estrategia controlada, o de forma involuntaria, por un error de cálculo, una imprudencia (dado el nivel de fanatismo y animosidad de los pasdaran del CGRMI) o por una concatenación de sucesos. El escenario de escalada comprende tanto la reiteración del escenario anterior en un ciclo continuado de provocaciones y respuestas como el salto a nuevas medidas y contramedidas de mayor intensidad militar. Irán podría escalar recurriendo a una estrategia de cierre intermitente, retrocediendo cada vez que se le opongan medios militares, para volver a intentarlo apenas se hayan retirado del escenario esas capacidades. Pero esa estrategia justificaría una escalada de EEUU hacia objetivos más estratégicos y menos tácticos para mantener su credibilidad, incluso imponiendo un embargo naval a Irán y una zona de exclusión aérea para proteger el tránsito por el Estrecho.

Como se ha visto en Libia, EEUU tiene capacidad para iniciar una escalada pero si se prolonga necesitaría organizar una coalición sobre la marcha que le apoyara y buscar la legitimación internacional de la escalada. En ella podría participar los países árabes del Golfo si son atacados directamente por Irán pero es poco probable que lo hagan sin una provocación mayor aquellos países que, como Arabia Saudí, son vulnerables a la subversión iraní en sus territorios. Otros socios potenciales son el Reino Unido y Francia, que tienen presencia en la zona y acuerdos de colaboración bilateral con algunos países del Golfo pero no parece que pudieran justificar una intervención militar para defender la seguridad energética del Estrecho salvo que fueran objeto de un grave ataque o que el coste del cierre movilizara a sus gobiernos y opiniones públicas. Ese ataque, otros o un agravamiento de la crisis económica podrían llevar a esos aliados y a EEUU a utilizar a la OTAN en “modo libio”para una intervención internacional amparada en la ilegalidad del cierre de los estrechos. La participación de los países europeos sería más probable en la medida que se participara en las sanciones, ya que tendrían que asumir su cuota de solidaridad en el coste militar de sus decisiones.

En esta situación, y anulada la capacidad iraní para cerrar el estrecho por la fuerza, el régimen de los ayatolás podría –también en “modo libio”– intentar atrapar a las fuerzas de la coalición en una guerra de desgaste o en una operación aeronaval de exclusión prolongada en el tiempo. También podría movilizar su influencia sobre Hezbolá o Hamás para abrir un conflicto con Israel o a sus seguidores chiíes para desestabilizar gobiernos como los de Yemen, Bahrein o Arabia Saudí, pero al igual que las sanciones económicas, las acciones subversivas tardan en producir resultados y, mientras tanto, sirven para legitimar a quienes las padecen. Por el contrario, parece que no va a poder seguir presionando directamente a EEUU con su apoyo a las insurgencias iraquí y afgana como hasta ahora, una vez que se ha producido la salida americana de Irak y está anunciada la retirada de Afganistán.

No resulta fácil predecir el impacto energético de un escenario con tantas combinaciones posibles de escalada militar. Una escalada de ese tipo provocaría, sin duda, una gran convulsión en los mercados internacionales de crudo, proporcional a su alcance, intensidad, duración y, sobre todo, a sus resultados. Pero si se produjese un intento de cierre creíble, o si se produjese una perturbación del tránsito, la prima de riesgo geopolítico aumentaría con fuerza. Por no hablar del impacto sobre los precios que tendría una escalada que afectara a la estabilidad interna de Arabia Saudí o Irak.

Un cierre efectivo dispararía los precios y todas las predicciones aportadas por los gurús del sector: 150, 175 o 200 dólares no son más que especulaciones porque el precio real del barril dependería del tiempo necesario para reabrir el Estrecho y de la evolución de las acciones militares. La liberación rápida y en cantidad de reservas estratégicas por la Agencia Internacional de la Energía debería ser acompañada de medidas similares concertadas previamente con otros consumidores como China y la India. En el supuesto de que la reapertura fuera rápida, el impacto del shock de oferta sería temporal y podría gestionarse por el conjunto del sector y el recurso a las reservas estratégicas. Si tras la reapertura persistiera el riesgo de cierre, entonces se volvería a la situación descrita en el escenario de tensión, con un sobreprecio debido a esa probabilidad y al aumento del coste del tránsito en seguros y fletes.

Conclusiones: El cierre del Estrecho puede mantenerse dentro del escenario actual –más factible– de tensión aunque también puede derivar en otro más peligroso –pero menos probable– de enfrentamiento. Ambos tienen efectos militares y energéticos de importancia, pero los actores disponen también de instrumentos para modular su evolución. En ambos escenarios pierden todas las partes enfrentadas, por lo que se debería sopesar bien los riesgos de una escalada hacia el escenario de enfrentamiento armado.

Si Irán fuera un actor simétrico a los occidentales tendría en cuenta el coste económico de sus iniciativas, pero el régimen iraní se enfrenta a su propia supervivencia y manejará la escalada según evolucionen sus posibilidades de sobrevivir. Sus cálculos se establecerán sobre la repercusión interna y externa de sus iniciativas, por lo que hará todo lo posible por preservar su narrativa victimista de conspiración imperialista-sionista-suní y su discurso nacionalista de soberanía y orgullo frente a los agresores. Controlando los medios de comunicación, puede reforzar esa narrativa hacia dentro, pero sus acciones pueden acelerar una conjunción de todos los enemigos a los que se está enfrentando por separado que podría ser fatal para el régimen de los ayatolás.

Hasta ahora, los mercados parecen confiar en que las probabilidades de cierre del Estrecho de Ormuz son limitadas, en que Irán se comportará como un actor racional y en que EEUU y sus aliados serán capaces de mantener el Estrecho abierto. Han acusado la inestabilidad creada por las amenazas de cierre pero se preocupan más por las posibles reducciones de las exportaciones de crudo iraní debido a las sanciones. Por eso resulta crucial la forma en la que se aplican las mismas, ya que una modulación y secuencia inapropiadas privarían a Irán de los incentivos necesarios para mantener abierto el Estrecho y facilitarían su paso de una estrategia de tensión a una de enfrentamiento armado. Los márgenes de cálculo se están estrechando para el régimen de los ayatolás y resulta difícil conocer cuando se producirá el punto de ruptura con el escenario actual, por lo que es necesario evaluar con atención cómo se deben aplicar las sanciones y prever los mecanismos energéticos necesarios para minimizar el impacto de una perturbación del tráfico por el Estrecho de Ormuz.

Recientemente, la oficina de la Comisión Independiente de Derechos Humanos del Afganistán (CIDHA) de la provincia de Kudoz informó del rescate de una joven que había estado presa en una mazmorra de sus suegros durante siete meses. Sahar Gul, de quince años de edad, fue obligada a casarse con un hombre mayor que presta servicio en el ejército afgano. Después la familia de su marido la mantuvo en la mazmorra y la torturó brutalmente durante meses, porque se negó a trabajar de prostituta.

En los diez últimos años, la CIDHA ha recibido más de 19.000 denuncias relativas a violencia contra las mujeres. Pese a haber logrado algunos avances en la investigación de dichas denuncias y su remisión al sistema judicial, además de haber contribuido a la sensibilización a ese respecto, las dificultades siguen siendo enormes.

Desde 2002, se han adoptado muchas medidas para mejorar la vida de las mujeres en el Afganistán. El país ha promulgado varias leyes nuevas y ha establecido un marco jurídico bastante avanzado para poner fin a la discriminación contra las mujeres, incluida una nueva ley que tipifica como delito cualquier acto que entrañe violencia contra las mujeres.

Pero las leyes y las políticas no son suficientes por sí solas para proteger a las mujeres de unos horrendos malos tratos domésticos. De hecho, el caso Gul no es el único del que se ha hablado mucho públicamente. También hubo el de Gulnaz, una joven que fue encarcelada como adúltera después de haber sido violada por un pariente (recientemente ha sido liberada tras concedérsele un perdón presidencial, pero puede verse obligada a casarse con su atacante). El marido de otra joven, Aisha, le cortó la nariz y los oídos, cuando se escapó de su casa.

La violencia contra las mujeres en el Afganistán persiste por muchas razones. En primer lugar, el país ha heredado una tradición patriarcal tribal que da por sentada la inferioridad de las mujeres. Así, pues, las mujeres están privadas de sus derechos y libertades básicos.

En segundo lugar, hay un fuerte incentivo político para la privación a las mujeres de sus derechos. Los grupos radicales reciben un apoyo inmenso del gran porcentaje de la población que se opone a los derechos de las mujeres. Los talibanes, por ejemplo, han recurrido constantemente a una política contra las mujeres para atraerse a la población tribal y rural.

En tercer lugar, se consideran más importantes el orgullo y el honor de la familia que el bienestar y la seguridad individuales de una mujer. Por ejemplo, si los familiares golpean o maltratan a una mujer, ésta dispone de pocas opciones. Con frecuencia, la única es permanecer callada o correr el riesgo de desacreditar a la familia. Si denuncia el caso a las autoridades, se puede afirmar casi con toda seguridad que nunca se investigará apropiadamente ni se procesará a los autores. Gul, por ejemplo, denunció ante la policía a sus maltratadores suegros, pero, cuando algunos de los contactos influyentes de estos últimos intervinieron, se la obligó a volver con la familia.

En cuarto lugar, con frecuencia se aplican las leyes arbitrariamente y la sharia (la ley islámica) muchas veces tiene prelación sobre la legislación civil, a consecuencia de lo cual existe una impunidad generalizada en el caso de los delitos de violencia contra las mujeres. Por ejemplo, en octubre de 2010, el Tribunal Supremo del Afganistán resolvió que se podía acusar del delito de prostitución a las mujeres que escapasen de su casa, a no ser que se presentaran ante la policía o en la casa de un familiar cercano. Esa mentalidad es la que propició la victimización de Gul.

Por último, si bien los talibanes perdieron el poder hace diez años, la discriminación y la violencia contra las mujeres ha existido en la sociedad afgana durante siglos. Así, pues, pese a la consecución de algunos avances, la sensibilidad pública y oficial ante la violencia contra las mujeres va surgiendo muy lentamente.

El Gobierno del Afganistán debe adoptar varias medidas para proteger plenamente a las mujeres. Por encima de todo, se debe procesar y juzgar conforme a la ley a los autores de violencia contra las mujeres, para lo que será necesario fortalecer el Estado de derecho y acabar con la tradicional impunidad prevaleciente.

Para ello, será necesario, a su vez, educar mejor al público en materia de derechos humanos y derechos de las mujeres mediante libros de texto, cursos de educación permanente y una campañas sólidas en los medios de comunicación.  También será necesario persuadir a los representantes y a las autoridades para que formulen políticas y asignen ingresos presupuestarios a la lucha contra la violencia que padecen las mujeres y formar a la policía y a los jueces para que se ocupen de los casos de violencia contra las mujeres sin ceder ante las alegaciones relativas al honor de la familia. Tal vez lo más importante de todo sea fiscalizar, si no prohibir pura y simplemente, los sistemas judiciales no constitucionales, como la sharia.

En cuanto a Sahar Gul, se debe investigar exhaustivamente su caso y la policía y la judicatura deben comprometerse a llevar a sus torturadores ante la justicia. Además, se deben estudiar el caso de Gul y otros similares para entender las raíces de semejantes delitos. Mientras los dirigentes del Afganistán no empiecen a abordar ese problema en serio, nuestro país seguirá llevando la cicatriz de la violencia contra las mujeres en su rostro.

A year ago, Egyptians of all ages and religions took to the streets and, in just 18 days of relatively peaceful protests, removed a regime that had ruled over them with an iron fist for 30 years. Empowered by an impressive yet leaderless movement – largely of young people – the country’s citizens overcame decades of fear to reclaim a voice in their future.

While much has been achieved since those euphoric times, Egypt’s revolution today is, unfortunately, incomplete and imperfect – so much so that some now doubt whether it will fully succeed. I believe that the doubters will be proven wrong.

Over the last year, Egyptians have voted in their first free and fair parliamentary elections. They have discovered and used freedom of expression in a way that, not so long ago, would have been deemed unthinkable. Participation in civic activities is on the rise. And Egyptians are learning a lot about who they are as a society, and what they can achieve collectively.

For the first time in decades, millions of Egyptians now feel that they “own” their country, and that they are directly responsible for its well-being, and for that of future generations. This is a priceless accomplishment for a country that had underachieved on so many fronts for so many years, in the process losing its self-confidence, failing to meet its considerable economic and social potential, and falling in international development rankings.

But greater ownership does not translate into full contentment. Dissatisfaction today is high and rising, and understandably so. Institutions are failing to adapt quickly enough. The legal system lacks sufficient legitimacy and agility. Everyday security, while improving, is still far from adequate.

Not surprisingly, the economy is struggling, and it will likely get worse in the months ahead. Growth is sluggish, amplifying alarmingly high youth unemployment. Shortages of some goods have started to appear, and the country is turning to the International Monetary Fund and other creditors for emergency financing.

So it is no less surprising that Egyptians now feel that, after an exhilarating start, their revolution has become stuck in a muddled purgatory. Moreover, many now believe that the future is as uncertain as ever, which is naturally fueling frustration with anyone deemed responsible for the lack of forward movement. Indeed, with increasing domestic tensions diverting energy from forward-looking initiatives, some Egyptians are even beginning to wonder whether it would not have been better to stick with the prior system.

What Egyptians are experiencing today is not new; it is familiar to many countries that have gone through a fundamental systemic change. After all, revolutions go far beyond popular uprisings and the overthrow of old regimes. They are dynamic processes that must navigate a number of critical pivot points, including, most importantly, the move from dismantling the past to establishing the basis for a better future.

Some contend that Egypt will not be able to undertake this shift. But, while I acknowledge their arguments, I think that they misunderstand what is fundamentally at play in the country today.

Doubters note that what remains of Egypt’s internal and external institutional anchors serve to retard the revolutionary process rather than to refine and accelerate it. They believe that the country’s growing economic malaise will strengthen the argument for sticking with what Egyptians know, rather than opting for a more uncertain future. Finally, they point to the wait-and-see attitude of Egypt’s friends and allies.

These are all valid and important considerations, but they are not overwhelming. Rather, they are headwinds that can and will be overcome, for they fail to capture a reality that is evident from the sentiments of a broad cross-section of society. Egyptians will not settle for an incomplete revolution – not now, and especially not after all of the sacrifices that have been made.

Completing their revolution will be not an easy, quick, or smooth process, but it will happen. Egyptians’ collective determination will ensure that, in the revolution’s second year, the country will get a new constitution, hold proper presidential elections, and benefit from a functioning and representative parliament. Having completed the transition, the armed forces will return to their barracks and to safeguarding the country from foreign threats.

Any attempt to divert this legitimate process will be met by millions of Egyptians taking to the streets in protest. Make no mistake: Egyptians are committed to completing their impressive revolution, and they will.

Parece aproximarse un enfrentamiento militar en el golfo Pérsico. De hecho, ya tiene lugar un cierto tipo de guerra. Los virus informáticos han dañado los sistemas iraníes; EE.UU., Europa y Japón han impuesto un embargo sobre el petróleo iraní y varios científicos implicados en la elaboración de una bomba iraní han sido asesinados. Los iraníes han amenazado con cerrar el estrecho de Ormuz, por donde pasa la quinta parte del tráfico petrolero mundial. Varios turistas estadounidenses han sido detenidos en Teherán, y uno condenado a muerte.

El estrecho de Ormuz tiene 50 kilómetros de ancho, pero los petroleros han de surcar las aguas más profundas en puntos que miden solamente seis kilómetros de anchura. No sería difícil, por tanto, imponer un bloqueo. La Marina iraní no merece especial mención, pero posee pequeñas embarcaciones capaces de lanzar cohetes (acción que puede realizar también desde tierra). Un tiro afortunado podría causar daños importantes en un buque de guerra estadounidense. Los estadounidenses podrían a su vez lanzar represalias no necesariamente en el lugar de referencia, sino en cualquier punto de Irán.

La última vez que alguien impuso un bloqueo naval en Oriente Medio no terminó bien; fue Naser quien en mayo de 1967 cerró los estrechos de Tirán en el mar Rojo, punto de acceso al puerto israelí de Eilat. Tal iniciativa, entre otros factores, daría paso a una guerra que perdió Egipto. Naser murió de un ataque al corazón en 1970. Su nombre se menciona escasamente en nuestra época.

Pero Teherán está convencido de que esta vez será distinto. EE.UU. acusa debilidad por la crisis económica y posiblemente no se atreva a emprender una acción militar en año electoral. Europa y Japón se hallan sumidos en una crisis aún más profunda; dependen de las importaciones de petróleo y no pueden hacer frente a un aumento del precio del 50% o incluso del 100%. Los israelíes muestran cobardía, así que no se atreverán a hacer nada contra una potencia fuerte como Irán.

Es indudable que Washington quiere impedir un enfrentamiento militar con Irán casi a cualquier precio. Hace años que somete a consideración el asunto. La mayoría de los analistas son contrarios a una intervención militar, con argumentos de calado (entre otros, las graves consecuencias que se derivarían, no sólo la subida del precio del petróleo). No obstante, no han considerado con suficiente claridad y precisión las implicaciones de un Irán nuclear capaz de ir a la guerra.

Por todo ello, el presidente Obama ha pensado en la posibilidad de entablar conversaciones con los iraníes (por canales no oficiales) para solucionar la crisis de manera pacífica. Según parece, tienen ya lugar conversaciones en Turquía y, tal vez, en otros lugares aunque sin muchas posibilidades de éxito. Han tenido lugar en el pasado y no han llevado a ninguna parte porque las diferencias son demasiado grandes. Los iraníes –con bastante razón– dan por sentado que el objetivo de Occidente es un cambio de régimen porque, mientras los Ahmadineyad y Jamenei estén en el poder, perseguirán objetivos que tanto Washington como el resto de capitales occidentales no pueden admitir; es decir, no sólo figura la cuestión del armamento nuclear, sino el auge de Irán como potencia dominante en Oriente Medio. Los iraníes persiguen la victoria del eje chií sobre los suníes: los países árabes e incluso Turquía. Quieren imponer sus planes a los países del Golfo y a Arabia Saudí. Y tal propósito sólo puede alcanzarse si poseen bombas atómicas. Por eso no desistirán aunque ahora lo pasen mal.

Las sanciones económicas han infligido grave daño a Irán. El valor de su moneda baja continuamente y será interesante observar cómo influye el empeoramiento de la situación económica en las elecciones en marzo. Irán está aislado. Los árabes sienten creciente suspicacia, e incluso hostilidad, tal vez con la excepción de Iraq que, enzarzado en un enfrentamiento civil, no cuenta mucho. Siria, el aliado tradicional de Teherán, se halla en graves apuros y nadie sabe lo que durará el Gobierno actual. Incluso Turquía ya no muestra una actitud amistosa.

China e India, que dependen del suministro de petróleo de Irán, han echado algún cable diplomático, pero han empezado a comprender que la política iraní es susceptible de acarrear mayores problemas de modo que no puede arriesgarse a depender de los suministros iraníes. En consecuencia, buscan fuentes alternativas para sus importaciones. Rusia se ha pronunciado por una solución pacífica. Pero Moscú sabe también que, si se interrumpe el suministro iraní, el precio del petróleo subirá, algo de lo cual Rusia sacará buena tajada… y últimamente necesita ingresos. ¿Hasta qué punto es Rusia de fiar?

Irán, en otras palabras, se ha quedado aislado, pero sus líderes creen que todo esto cambiará cuando el país posea armamento nuclear. Se trata de una apuesta y los líderes iraníes han sido jugadores prudentes con anterioridad. ¿Ha cambiado esto? Nadie sabe si el fanatismo y la ambición política, o bien la prudencia, se impondrán en Teherán. Mi opinión es que, probablemente, Irán avanzará impunemente hacia la producción de un puñado de bombas atómicas, no este año pero sí en el plazo de uno o dos años. Sin embargo, las consecuencias serán muy distintas de lo que espera el actual Gobierno iraní. Puede sonar como el oráculo de Delfos o bien como una profecía de Nostradamus; pero, dadas las incertidumbres que reinan en Oriente Medio, no cabe ir más allá sin riesgo mayor.

A social revolution began in Saudi Arabia this month, and it has little if anything to do with the Arab Spring. Women are going to work in lingerie shops.

The Ministry of Labor is enforcing a royal decree issued last summer ordering that sales personnel in shops selling garments and other goods, like cosmetics, that are only for women must be female. More than 28,000 women applied for the jobs, the ministry said. Anywhere else in the world, it would not be news that sales assistants in shops selling panties and bras were female. In Saudi Arabia, where women have always been excluded from the public work force, it is a critical breakthrough. This is not just about intimate garments; this is a milestone on the arduous path to employment equality for women in a country where they are systematically excluded from retail activity.

Saudi Arabia’s economic planners recognize that if women are going to be educated at public expense, as they now are in increasing numbers, they will expect to work and the country will need their economic output. Society has increasingly accepted the idea that women will work outside the home. They have long been employed in medicine and education. Retail commerce, however, has generally remained closed because such work usually requires interaction with men, which is prohibited. The lingerie shops are breaking that taboo.

One of the oddest sights in Saudi Arabia is that of fully veiled women, hidden from others by their enveloping garments, going into the Saudi equivalent of Victoria’s Secret stores in the many upscale malls and being greeted and assisted exclusively by male sales clerks, most of whom are from South Asia. This absurd situation so embarrassed many women that they waited until they were out of the country to buy their underwear and nightgowns.

The campaign to change the rules began several years ago, and was led by Reem Asaad, a fashion-conscious financial adviser who speaks flawless English and is comfortable with the Western media. It appeared to have succeeded in 2006 when the government ordered that the sales jobs be transferred to women. But social conservatives and the religious establishment objected, arguing that Islam prohibited women from working outside the home and that putting women in retail shops would expose them to the view of any passing stranger. If the sales clerks were female, the shop windows would have to be covered, the opponents said.

Shop owners objected, too, saying that no women were trained to do such work. In addition, the 2006 decree failed to address the transportation problem: if women were going to work in those shops, they would need a man to drive them because they are prohibited from driving. Saudi cities have virtually no public transportation. So the decree was never enforced. Ms. Asaad then used Facebook to organize a boycott of the shops, and arranged for some women to be trained in retail work.

This time, King Abdullah has put his personal authority behind the new decree. Last year he also installed a new minister of labor, Adel Fakieh, who had embraced the idea of employing women at a supermarket chain owned by his holding company. Under the new rules, the country’s thousands of lingerie and cosmetics shops have until June to replace their male employees with women. The feared religious police, who are really the behavior police, have been ordered to cooperate.

King Abdullah generally supported an expansion of opportunities for women, but steps in this direction can’t be traced to any burst of enlightenment within the royal family. They are happening because the kingdom’s women need and want jobs and are learning how to make themselves heard — and because, in an increasingly expensive country, their husbands often want them to work.

Over the coming generation, this is likely to be the farthest-reaching transformation in Saudi society. While women are still constrained by law, religion and custom, more and more are likely to enter the work force. They will be better educated than their predecessors, will marry later and will have fewer children. The range of jobs and professions open to them will expand. The Ministry of Labor is already compiling a list of jobs women will be permitted to hold. It won’t include all jobs — no female miners or construction workers here — but it will be a much longer list than in the past, including some positions in law enforcement.

These changes will meet entrenched opposition, but the economic and demographic forces behind them seem irresistible. The transition would be easier if women were permitted to drive (the 2011 decree failed to address that issue), but that is bound to come, too — if not this year, then soon, if only because growing ranks of employed women will build pressure for it. Thousands of Saudi women have driver’s licenses issued by other countries; they will be ready when the day comes.

“Please help us.”

Those were the first words that my client, Gulnaz, said when I met her inside the Kabul prison that was home to hundreds of women, many of whom, like her, were locked away for so-called moral crimes — adultery or running away from home. The frail 20-year-old clung to her baby, who was conceived through rape and born on the prison floor, where mother and child had lived for nearly two years.

Tearfully, Gulnaz recounted the story of the assault that took place in 2009. The attacker, nearly twice her age, pinned her down, tied her up and then savagely raped her. She described going to the police with her disabled, widowed mother to report the rape. There she was instantly imprisoned for reporting the crime. With no male head of household present, the two women were not taken seriously.

After years of advocacy by human rights groups and other activists, and a decade of war by the United States and its allies — a war in which the need to uphold the rights of women has often been invoked — Afghan women remain trapped in a legal system that often punishes them for being the victims of brutal crimes.

My illiterate client told me of her experience going to court with her illegitimate daughter and not understanding the legal process. She was forced to represent herself after her Afghan lawyer failed to show up, yet the judges who presided over the case refused to allow her to speak. Instead, they berated Gulnaz for lying, insisting that women cannot get pregnant by having sex just once. This assertion was the basis for the 12-year sentence that was imposed, with a wrenching caveat: Marrying her attacker would allow her to be “free.”

Unfortunately, Gulnaz’s case is not an anomaly but represents the situation that more than half of the imprisoned women in Afghanistan find themselves in — locked up for moral crimes, according to a recent studyby the United Nations.

I submitted a pardon application for Gulnaz, accompanied by a petition with more than 6,000 signatures. She had no family willing to take up her cause, but the world, as we discovered, supported her release.

Standing up for the rights of women like Gulnaz was part of the reason the United States went to Afghanistan in the first place. In 2001, one of the key political arguments that President George W. Bush’s administration used to support the military deployment was stopping the terrorists, for whom “the brutal oppression of women” was “a central goal.” In November 2001, Congress passed a bill noting Taliban oppression of women and stressing the need for Afghan women and children to have better access to health care and education.

International attention to the fate of women in Afghanistan has been an issue throughout the war. In 2009, the Afghan government focused on violence and human rights when it passed the Elimination of Violence Against Women Law. Though this measure garnered substantial support worldwide, oversight has been limited. The law is largely ignored in Afghanistan’s justice system, and abused women are routinely imprisoned as a result. While Gulnaz’s case brought international media attention to the plight of Afghan rape victims, inside Afghanistan, gross violations of basic human rights are often business as usual.

In Gulnaz’s case, after we submitted the pardon application, President Hamid Karzai formed a judicial committee with members from the Ministry of Justice, the Supreme Court and the attorney general’s office. They were to investigate Gulnaz’s case and, reportedly, the cases of all other women imprisoned in Kabul. The formation of this committee was an unprecedented step for the government: It was directly confronting the realities of women imprisoned for moral crimes.

Ultimately, Karzai’s investigation found that Gulnaz’s conviction was based on oppressive, misogynistic interpretations of Islamic sharia law. These views were in part remnants of the Taliban regime’s swift and unforgiving justice system. A more contemporary interpretation of sharia law, Afghan laws and international conventions supported her exoneration.

On Dec. 14, 2011, Karzai acted upon the pardon application and exonerated Gulnaz. He acknowledged that the charge of adultery against her was a “misjudgment” and that the cultural norms leading to her imprisonment were long overdue for an overhaul. This decision has the potential to set a precedent for other rape victims seeking justice and is a significant recognition of the persecution that Afghan women have long endured under the veil of cultural appeasement.

After 10 years of foreign assistance, it should not have taken the president of Afghanistan to overturn the decisions of three Kabul courts that receive vast amounts of international funding. It should not have taken international media attention to embarrass the Afghan government into finally doing the right thing. And it should not have taken a Western lawyer to give Gulnaz legal representation to achieve exoneration.

According to an October report by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, which works to monitor aid spending there by various U.S. governmental agencies, almost $73 billion has been appropriated to Afghanistan since 2002. This money needs to be used more wisely.

Rule-of-law initiatives, particularly on women’s rights, have a better chance of success if the international community exercises more oversight and makes a greater effort to understand how the Afghan justice system really works. At present, I am the only Western lawyer in Afghanistan taking on such cases. Gulnaz’s case came to me through concerned people who knew of the miscarriages of justice that she endured. I took it to advocate for her and other women in Afghanistan’s legal system.

Although her case has a suitable ending, it took agitating for attention at the highest levels in the country to get a rape victim out of prison. The laws intended to protect her, and the international initiatives meant to do the same, did nothing.

Clearly most of the responsibility should lie with the Afghan government. Prosecutors and judges perpetuate human rights abuses on women, especially in cases involving domestic abuse, with little to no accountability. Because the justice system has failed to deter people within the government from committing human rights abuses, more than half of the women imprisoned in Afghanistan continue to be prosecuted for moral crimes.

The government should establish a standing committee within the attorney general’s office and the judiciary to ensure that cases of women charged with moral crimes never make it to court — or at the very least, that women are not prosecuted for being victims of violence. From one “misjudgment” could come a real chance to save other women from similar suffering.

I realize that it may take years, if not generations, for significant improvements on women’s rights in Afghanistan. I am optimistic, however, that Gulnaz’s case can serve as a turning point to encourage changes that can protect other women enduring her same plight.

One pardon, one release, one woman, is not good enough.

Is it possible for a religious demand for modesty to be about anything other than men controlling women’s bodies? From recent events in Israel, it would certainly seem that it is not.

Last month, an innocent, modestly dressed 8-year-old girl, Naama Margolese, living in Beit Shemesh, described being spat on and vilified by religious extremists — all men — who believed that she did not dress modestly enough while walking past them to the religious school she attends. And more and more, public buses in Israel are enforcing gender segregation imposed by ultra-Orthodox riders in and near their neighborhoods. Woe to the girl or woman who refuses to move to the back of the bus.

This is part of a larger battle being waged in Israel between the ultra-Orthodox and the rest of Israeli society over women’s place in society, over their very right to have a visible presence and to participate in the public sphere.

What is behind these deeply disturbing events? We are told that they arise from a religious concern about modesty, that women must be covered and sequestered so that men do not have improper sexual thoughts. It seems, then, that a religious tenet that begins with men’s sexual thoughts ends with men controlling women’s bodies.

This is not a problem unique to Judaism. But the Talmud, the basis for Jewish law, offers a perhaps surprising answer: It places the responsibility for controlling men’s licentious thoughts about women squarely on the men.

Put more plainly, the Talmud says: It’s your problem, sir; not hers.

The ultra-Orthodox men in Israel who are exerting control over women claim that they are honoring women. In effect they are saying: We do not treat women as sex objects as you in Western society do. Our women are about more than their bodies, and that is why their bodies must be fully covered.

In fact, though, their actions objectify and hyper-sexualize women. Think about it: By saying that all women must hide their bodies, they are saying that every woman is an object who can stir a man’s sexual thoughts. Thus, every woman who passes their field of vision is sized up on the basis of how much of her body is covered. She is not seen as a complete person, only as a potential inducement to sin.

Of course, once you judge a female human being only through a man’s sexualized imagination, you can turn even a modest 8-year-old girl into a seductress and a prostitute.

At heart, we are talking about a blame-the-victim mentality. It shifts the responsibility of managing a man’s sexual urges from himself to every woman he may or may not encounter. It is a cousin to the mentality behind the claim, “She was asking for it.”

So the responsibility is now on the women. To protect men from their sexual thoughts, women must remove their femininity from their public presence, ridding themselves of even the smallest evidence of their own sexuality.

All of this is done in the name of the Torah and Jewish law.

But it’s actually a complete perversion. The Talmud, the foundation of Jewish law, acknowledges that men can be sexually aroused by women and is indeed concerned with sexual thoughts and activity outside of marriage. But it does not tell women that men’s sexual urges are their responsibility. Rather, both the Talmud and the later codes of Jewish law make that demand of men.

It is forbidden for a man to gaze sexually at a woman, whether beautiful or ugly, married or unmarried, says the Talmud. Later Talmudic rabbis extended this ban even to “her smallest finger” and “her brightly colored clothing — even if they are drying on the wall.”

To make these the woman’s responsibility is to demand that Jewish women cover their hands, and that they not dry their clothes in public. No one has ever said this. At least not yet.

The Talmud tells the religious man, in effect: If you have a problem, you deal with it. It is the male gaze — the way men look at women — that needs to be desexualized, not women in public. The power to make sure men don’t see women as objects of sexual gratification lies within men’s — and only men’s — control.

Jewish tradition teaches men and women alike that they should be modest in their dress. But modesty is not defined by, or even primarily about, how much of one’s body is covered. It is about comportment and behavior. It is about recognizing that one need not be the center of attention. It is about embodying the prophet Micah’s call for modesty: learning “to walk humbly with your God.”

Eight-year-old Naama could teach her attackers a thing or two about modesty.

Lo malo de los juegos de guerra es que a cualquiera se le puede escapar un tiro y entonces se lía la de San Quintín. Resulta, pues, muy alarmante que Estados Unidos e Israel, en un rincón del cuadrilátero, e Irán, en el otro, libren ya una feroz guerra secreta (espionaje, atentados y asesinatos) a cuenta del programa nuclear del régimen de los ayatolás, galleen en el embudo de Ormuz y vayan subiendo el volumen de sus tambores de guerra. Pueden ir de farol, pero juegan con fuego. Y en una de las zonas más inflamables del planeta.

La buena noticia es que Obama no quiere esa guerra, que, según observa Antonio Caño desde Washington, ya se habría producido con cualquier otro político en la Casa Blanca. Obama demuestra así tener bastantes más luces que los halcones israelíes y norteamericanos: una guerra en Irán sería un desastre para la comunidad internacional tan grande o mayor que el de Irak.

Si esa guerra se limitase a un ataque aéreo a determinadas instalaciones iraníes, tal vez conseguiría retrasar el programa nuclear de los ayatolás, pero lo haría a costa de reforzar la legitimidad interna de su régimen y darle un aura de martirio a escala regional y en el conjunto del mundo musulmán; dos regalos del cielo para los herederos de Jomeini. Y si incluyese una invasión terrestre, tendríamos que prepararnos para años de sangrientas turbulencias adicionales en el planeta.

El régimen iraní es hoy más débil que en ningún otro momento de sus tres décadas de historia. Lo inteligente es adoptar una estrategia que acelere su agonía, no una que le regale oxígeno suplementario.

Hasta ahora, el jomeinismo es uno de los grandes derrotados de la primavera árabe. Perdió cualquier tipo de legitimidad con el pucherazo electoral de 2009 y las manifestaciones en Teherán de aquel año confirmaron que resulta terriblemente casposo para la juventud urbana iraní. Dos años después, las revoluciones seculares de Túnez y Egipto redujeron aún más sus aspiraciones de convertirse en un referente ideológico y político que vaya más allá del mundo chií, de las comunidades chiíes de Irak, Bahréin y Líbano.

La República Islámica de Irán celebrará elecciones legislativas el próximo marzo y presidenciales en 2013. Su situación interna es de estrecheces económicas para la mayoría de la población y divisiones políticas en el seno del mismo régimen. Al enfrentamiento entre los reformistas y conservadores de 2009 se le han añadido las querellas en el seno de estos últimos, y en concreto, el pulso entre el presidente Ahmadineyad y el líder supremo, el ayatolá Jamenei.

Tampoco es boyante su situación internacional. Puede que Ahmadineyad haya sido recibido cordialmente en Caracas y La Habana, pero la cotización del régimen que preside ha bajado muchos enteros en Oriente Próximo. La primavera árabe le ha quitado atractivo al modelo jomeinista incluso en los sectores islamistas y ha colocado contra las cuerdas a su único aliado árabe: la dictadura siria de los Asad. Entre los árabes, el influjo de Irán va limitándose a los chiíes (y sus parientes alauíes) mientras crece el de Turquía.

El Irán jomeinista es un país de unos 70 millones de habitantes, con grandes riquezas petroleras, un Estado sólido para la media de Oriente Próximo y una hábil diplomacia. Su ascenso regional en la primera década del siglo XXI fue fruto tanto de una astuta combinación de fuerza y prudencia como de toda una racha de buena suerte. El hundimiento de la Unión Soviética le quitó de encima la amenaza comunista; la invasión de Afganistán por Estados Unidos le eliminó al incómodo vecino talibán, y el mismo Estados Unidos derrocó a su gran rival, Sadam Husein, y le abrió las puertas de la mayoritaria comunidad chií de Irak.

Pero el viento cambió para la República Islámica a partir de 2009. El pucherazo electoral de Ahmadineyad y su entonces valedor, el ayatolá Jamenei, desencadenó una oleada de manifestaciones juveniles en Teherán que anticiparon las tunecinas y egipcias de 2011. La diferencia más significativa de aquellas protestas en relación con otras anteriores, la que comenzó a cavar la tumba del régimen, aunque la defunción tar-de algunos años en producirse, fue que Jamenei y Ahmadineyad demolieron la principal legitimidad del jomeinismo al ordenar a sus sicarios que dispararan contra las muchedumbres que en las tórridas calles y terrazas de Teherán exclamaban Alá Uakbar y exhibían el color verde del islam.

En el verano de 2009 no cabía imaginar el inmediato colapso de un régimen que aún contaba con cierto soporte popular y que había probado su fortaleza sobreviviendo a una devastadora guerra con el Irak de Sadam y a 30 años de hostilidad estadounidense y aislamiento internacional. Y, en efecto, ese colapso aún no se ha producido, aunque, ciertamente, la primavera árabe no ha sido una buena noticia para Jamenei y Ahmadineyad. Confirma a los iraníes que es posible conseguir la democracia a partir de un combate doméstico.

En esas circunstancias, un ataque exterior -israelí, norteamericano o conjunto- reforzaría al búnker jomeinista al permitirle apelar a la unidad nacional en torno tanto al islam como al nacionalismo persa agredidos. Además, una acción de ese tipo podría provocar una crisis petrolera mundial, extender las llamas del terror y la guerra por Oriente Próximo y más allá, y afectar negativamente a la primavera árabe, restando visibilidad a los luchadores por la democracia y concediéndosela a aliados de Irán como la Siria de los Asad y los movimientos Hezbolá y Hamás. No es eso, precisamente, lo que necesita en 2012 nuestro deprimido mundo.

Desde su nacimiento en 1979, tras derrocar a ese vasallo de Washington en la zona que era el sah, el régimen de los ayatolás ha vivido en el constante temor a ser agredido directamente por los norteamericanos. Es posible que piense que tener armas nucleares es su única garantía para evitarlo. Pero resulta difícil imaginar que, incluso aunque las tuviera, sería el primero en usarlas contra Israel. No solo mataría a muchísimos palestinos, sino que se expondría a consecuencias devastadoras. Y los ayatolás no están tan locos.

Israel tiene armas nucleares y todo el mundo lo sabe. Está muy bien contado en el libro The worst kept secret (El secreto peor guardado), de Avner Cohen. Ahora Israel habla de la “amenaza existencial” que le supondría un Irán con armas nucleares, pero cabría recordar que Estados Unidos y la Unión Soviética vivieron con esa espada de Damocles durante décadas y solo el derrumbamiento del régimen totalitario de Moscú les dio a ambas potencias (y al resto del mundo) un respiro razonable. Las democracias (aunque resulte generoso calificar así lo de Putin) no se hacen la guerra.

Lo cabal sería plantear la cuestión de otro modo. ¿Y si, en vez de lanzar una acción militar que termine prestigiando a nivel interno y regional al régimen jomeinista, las democracias apuestan por un verdadero compromiso con la extensión de las libertades y los derechos en el mundo árabe y en el propio Irán? ¿Y si apoyan de veras la democratización de Egipto, la caída de la tiranía siria de los Asad y el nacimiento de un Estado palestino? ¿Dónde está escrito que a la primavera árabe no puede seguirle una primavera persa?

Puede que esta sea, más o menos, la visión de Obama. Pero como ya se ha demostrado a propósito del caso palestino, el presidente norteamericano tiene las manos atadas en Oriente Próximo (y en muchas otras cosas). Aunque no desee una guerra contra Irán, los ultras de Israel están haciendo lo posible para arrastrarle. En su última columna en The New York Times, el analista Roger Cohen sugiere la posibilidad de que Israel lance un ataque por su cuenta en los próximos meses. Sus muchos amigos en Estados Unidos aplaudirían enfervorizados y Obama se encontraría así desautorizado y frente al hecho consumado. Desde el mismo título de su columna, Don’t do it, Bibi, Cohen exhorta a Netanyahu a no emprender esa vía. También para Israel sería una calamidad.

A recent 10-day naval exercise by Iran was intended to display a capability to close the strategic Strait of Hormuz should further sanctions be imposed that would affect Iran’s oil industry. The exercise was accompanied with the usual bluster, even threatening some unspecified action should the attack carrier USS John C. Stennis return to the Persian Gulf. Suffice it to say, the U.S. Navy will continue to operate its ships in international waters, which includes the Persian Gulf, whenever necessary to carry out its mission.

A more recent report indicates that Iran’s parliament is preparing a bill that would prohibit all foreign warships from entering the Persian Gulf unless they first request and receive permission from the Iranian navy. Such a flagrant violation of the internationally recognized “freedom of the seas” concept was likely sanctioned by the fanatical Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. It should be made patently clear to the Iranian theocracy that any interference with the peaceful movement of civilian vessels or warships in or out of the Persian Gulf will be considered an “act of war” and be dealt with promptly.

There should no doubt of our resolve and the U.S. Navy’s capability, along with our allies, to protect freedom of the seas and keep the Strait of Hormuz open. Soon the United States will have three carrier battle groups in the region: the USS Abraham Lincoln, USS Carl Vinson and the John C. Stennis. This awesome capability is similar to three battle groups we had assembled in August 1987, when we were prepared to shut Iran down for its aggressive actions in the Gulf reflagged tanker war, but could not get authorization to execute our plans. Had we attacked, we would not be in the position we are in today.

Now that all troops are out of Iraq, we still must not only address Iran’s latest maritime threats, but its expansionist agenda and its drive to achieve a nuclear weapons capability. The liberal foreign policy establishment has already leaped on the mistakes of the Bush administration for its controversial decision to invade Iraq as well as its conduct of the war. The case is being made that we should have learned our lessons and not forget the more than 4,400 American lives lost as well as the tens of thousands injured and the almost trillion dollars expended. They have a point. However, Iran was always the main threat.

There is no question that the bastion of democracy did not materialize in Iraq as the Bush administration has hoped. Instead, we now have an Iraqi administration, dominated by Iran, helped by the ineptness of the Obama administration.

The liberal foreign policy establishment thinks a wiser course for resolving our issues with Iran should be diplomacy rather than military action. They acknowledge that President Obama tried to engage the Iranian leadership with no preconditions, but was not only rebuffed, but ridiculed. Further, two letters said to have been sent to the Iranian leadership went unanswered.

The establishment should remember that Iran has been at war with the United States for more than 30 years. Its direct involvement in the bombing of our U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut in October 1983, as well as the Khobar Towers bombing of June 1996 in Saudi Arabia and the direct assistance it provided the Sept. 11 hijackers, cannot be dismissed. Nor can their direct assistance to the Iraqi militias, which accounted for many of the more than 4,400 fatalities we suffered.

With the latest Iranian bluster threatening U.S. warships, plus moving to declare de facto control over the entire Persian Gulf, the United States is being directly challenged. In the past when we have been challenged by the fanatical Iranian leadership, our leadership – from the Carter administration to the current one – has backed down. It is to be hoped that this great nation will not be let down again.

With our continued groveling, a window might be opened for direct negotiations, but what would it really mean? We are viewed by the fanatical mullahs as “infidels,” and therefore, any agreement would be meaningless. Furthermore, if our apparent negotiations with the Taliban are any indication of how the Obama administration would approach the Iranians, I fear “appeasement” would be the least of our concerns. Capitulation would most likely be the outcome.

At the end of the day, our issues with Iran can only be resolved by regime change. Our diplomatic and military actions must be coordinated to bring about such a change. They must include as a minimum the following:

c Bring action before the U.N. Security Council to condemn Iran’s latest potential intentions to interfere with either civilian or military ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz.

c Have the Security Council announce a declaration to keep the Strait of Hormuz open by all means available.

c Support the European Union in imposing sanctions on Iran’s oil industry both for exported and imported fuels.

c The U.S. and its allies should be prepared to enforce the “freedom of seas” concept throughout the Persian Gulf.

c The U.S. and its allies should be prepared to implement a coordinated strike plan against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. Iran’s oil industry infrastructure should be held hostage to limit Iran’s response.

c The U.S. and its allies should be prepared to assist the “Green Revolution” opposition force uprising against the regime by both covert and overt means, including financial support.

Keeping the Iranian theocracy in power cannot be an option if any sense of stability is to be achieved in the Middle East. Further, any resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict cannot be achieved with the Iranian theocracy remaining in power.

If Pakistan’s chief justice, Iftikhar Chaudhry, manages to press his charges of corruption against the president, Asif Ali Zardari, he will bring down the existing Pakistani government. If he extends his anti-corruption campaign to the political elites as a whole, he will bring down the entire existing political system – and replace it, his critics say, with a dictatorship made up of an unelected (and equally corrupt) judiciary.

The corruption charges against Zardari date back to the governments of his late wife, Benazir Bhutto, in the 1990s. Charges against him, the present prime minister, Yusuf Raza Gillani, and other leading politicians and former officials were dropped under the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) of 2007: the product of a deal – allegedly brokered by the Bush administration – between the then military ruler, President Pervez Musharraf, and Bhutto in late 2007, which allowed her to return from exile and take part in elections.

In December 2009, the supreme court declared the NRO unconstitutional. The two years since have seen a slow-motion tug of war between the supreme court and the government. The main opposition party, the Pakistan Muslim League of Nawaz Sharif (PMLN), for quite a while did not push this issue very hard, in part as the result of a truce between its provincial government in Punjab and the Zardari government in Islamabad – but also, it is widely thought, because, given its own record, the PMLN has good reasons to fear judicial activism. The only leading opposition politician consistently to have backed the chief justice’s campaign has been Imran Khan – and he has never been in government.

The truth is that Pakistani politics revolves in large part around politicians’ extraction of resources from the state by means of corruption, and their distribution to those politicians’ followers through patronage. Radically changing this would mean gutting the existing Pakistani political system like a fish. Nor is it at all certain how popular the process would really be with most Pakistanis.

For while the greater part of this process of extraction and redistribution is illegal according to Pakistani law, how much of it is immoral in Pakistani culture is a much more complicated question. Every Pakistani politician accuses his rivals of corruption but, equally, the perception that he himself is “generous” and “honourable” to his own supporters is likely to be central to his own local prestige. If a public monument is ever erected to the Ideal Pakistani Politician, the motto “He dunks but he splashes”, originally coined by Mayor Richard Daley of Chicago, should be inscribed on its pedestal.

And this is not just a matter of cynical politics. It also obeys a fundamental moral imperative of local culture to be loyal to one’s followers and, above all, one’s kinfolk. The politician who is really despised is the kleptocrat who both steals immoderately and does not share the proceeds. As a result, a good deal of the proceeds of corruption does get distributed through parts of society, thereby helping to maintain what until recently has been the surprising underlying stability of the Pakistani political system.

The military is widely seen as relatively immune to corruption, and when it comes to its own internal workings, this is largely true – though it usually ceases to be true when generals go into politics. However, it is vitally important to note that this is in large part because for many decades the military as a whole has acted as a kind of giant patronage network, extracting a huge share of Pakistan’s state resources via the defence budget and other concessions, and spending them on itself. Because – to its credit – it has distributed the resulting benefits in an orderly if hierarchical way among its generals, officers, non-commissioned officers and even to a degree privates, it has managed to keep a lid on corruption within the military itself. However, a belief is growing among ordinary soldiers, not just that the generals’ perks are immoderate but that in some cases their families are using their connections to make huge corrupt fortunes outside the military.

As for Zardari, it seems highly doubtful that he can hang on much longer. The chief justice is pursuing him with bulldog determination and the letter of the law is on his side. The military has been infuriated by what it believes are his attempts to ally with Washington against it. It does not want another military government, but it does want a civilian regime that is much more responsive to its wishes. And the opposition want him out before, not after, senate elections that might just enable him to cling to the presidency even if as expected his Pakistan People’s party is defeated in general elections due by early 2013. Whether getting rid of Zardari will fundamentally change Pakistani politics, however, is a very different matter.

Nearly 30 years ago, Greg told me how it was, cutting the ears off dead men.

I had sought out Vietnam veterans to interview for a story about a pop song that was inspired by the war, “19″ by Paul Hardcastle. Greg gave me an earful.

He explained how it is when the skin rots right off your foot. How it is when children are rigged to explode, so your first instinct is to shoot them when they come running up to you. How it is when the sight of an Asian face or the sound of a helicopter is enough to flash you from city streets to Vietnamese jungles. How it is living haunted days and nightmare nights, craving suicide but lacking “the guts.” And, yes, how it is that guys used to collect the ears from dead enemy soldiers as souvenirs, sometimes stringing them together and wearing them like grisly necklaces.

I think of Greg whenever it is time to pass judgment on the things soldiers do.

As it happens, much of the nation is now passing judgment on something a group of Marines did. In a video that has sparked international outrage, four of them are seen apparently urinating on the corpses of Taliban fighters. The White House is embarrassed, there is speculation this will derail peace talks with the Taliban, and the four Marines are being both defended and reviled by the usual media and political figures.

Here’s a newspaper editorial bemoaning the damage to U.S. interests. Here’s a radio pundit saying she would gladly do as the Marines did. Here’s the White House calling the video deplorable. Here’s a presidential candidate reminding us these Marines were kids, not criminals.

But with Greg in mind, I can say only this: Your average, well-adjusted person does not go about with a necklace made of body parts, nor urinate on corpses, nor otherwise desecrate the bodies of the dead — even the dead and reviled. Your average, well-adjusted person would be repelled by the thought.

The point being, war is a different universe. What seems acceptable there is appalling here. It is not too much to say that war is a form of madness.

This is not to suggest those Marines ought not be criticized — not only for doing an awful thing but also, frankly, for being dumb enough to allow it to be recorded and posted online. It is not to suggest the government ought not be chagrined or that the rest of us should not be asking the White House pointed questions about indiscipline in the ranks — especially given that this comes in the wake of multiple scandals involving military mistreatment of enemy combatants, including the debacle at Abu Ghraib. It is not to suggest military service is a moral Get Out of Jail Free card.

No, this is only to suggest that our judgment be tempered by a recognition that these people have been in a place where the rules are different, that not every wound you carry out of such places is visible, and that in their way, the invisible wounds may be the costliest ones.

Greg spoke to me in a voice I can still hear all too clearly, a whisper soft and matter of fact as he recounted atrocities committed upon enemy soldiers — and the consequent degradation of his own soul.

I suspect he’d see this video as a reminder: War maims the body, yes. But it brutalizes conscience too.

The narrative of contemporary Iraq is becoming etched in stone: United States troops are leaving, and the country is falling apart. Iraq, we are told, is once again on the brink of dictatorship, this time under the Shia politician Nuri al-Maliki, who has been prime minister since 2006.

The notion that Iraq’s ongoing political problems were caused by America’s departure, or that they could be improved by its return, is something that only a solipsistic American could believe. In fact, not everything that happens in Iraq reflects the presence – or absence – of US troops.

Iraq’s political problems are of Iraq’s making, and need to be resolved by Iraqis. Outside mediation can help. But no one should be under the illusion that foreign troops, engaged for eight years as a post-invasion occupying force, are ideal for this task.

“Urban bias” is a term often used to explain the phenomenon by which city dwellers receive a disproportionate share of a society’s resources and benefits. But it can refer to something else: an outsider’s understanding of a country that is based on disproportionate interaction with the urban population at the expense of those who live in harder-to-reach rural areas.

In Iraq, spending time in Baghdad reveals that Sunni and Shia Iraqis have learned to live together, that intermarriage is common, and that the issues that concern people are more secular than sectarian. But not all Iraqis live in Baghdad. Trips outside of the capital to Sunni-dominated Anbar or Shia-controlled southern Iraq often reveal a country much more focused on, and animated by, the Sunni-Shia divide. And this phenomenon did not begin with the US-led invasion. It had a thousand-year head start.

How people group themselves in a society – by tribe, sectarian identity, ethnicity, region, the urban-rural distinction, or attitudes concerning the role of government – is the essence of politics. Obviously, political identities change as modernization increases the salience of socio-economic factors. Iraq will not be immune to such shifts in political identities.

But, for now, the reality of Iraq is that most people, especially outside of cosmopolitan Baghdad, see themselves as Sunni or Shia. And that reality is further shaped by the following fact: for decades, Iraq was brutally and not very effectively ruled by the minority Sunnis, whose last leader was Saddam Hussein. The Shia, understandably, don’t want them back.

In preparation for the 2010 elections, the Sunnis set aside their internal differences and united under a single political party called Iraqiyya (the Iraqi National Movement). Of course, its organizers are loath to describe it as a Sunni party. Rather, it is described as a national party that invites people of all orientations to participate. That vision has great appeal among those who want to see a less sectarian-based form of politics in Iraq. But, within Iraq, there are very few people – Sunni or Shia – who do not see Iraqiyya as a party dedicated to restoring Sunni leadership.

The results of the March 2010 general election gave Iraqiyya 91 parliamentary seats, two more than the second-place finisher, Maliki’s State of Law coalition. But Iraqiyya was unable to forge a government coalition; indeed, it failed to attract a single additional MP, let alone the 72 that would be necessary to control a 163-seat majority in the 325-seat legislature. Meanwhile, Maliki, with 89 seats, was able to reach out to other Shia parties and the Kurds, eventually assembling a “national unity” government to gain a second term as prime minister.

Iraq’s economy is stumbling in the right direction, as are its security conditions, notwithstanding the recent attacks on Shia pilgrims (mostly likely carried out by al-Qaeda of Mesopotamia and other Sunni extremists). But Iraq’s politics remain problematic, and its leaders will have to rise to the occasion.

For starters, Maliki should do something that hasn’t been done in the Middle East for a long time: now and again, he should turn the other cheek and resist the temptation to come after his adversaries.

The Sunnis, for their part, need to get used to being mere members of a coalition, rather than its leaders. Shia majority rule is an immovable fact of life, at least for as long as Iraq’s citizens tie their political identities to sectarian affiliations. Iraqiyya’s leaders would be well advised to demonstrate more competence in governance rather than inflaming tensions, as Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, a Sunni hardliner, has been fond of doing by pronouncing Maliki another Saddam. (Shias, even those who dislike Maliki, do not appreciate hearing that from a Sunni.)

Other Arab states, where Sunnis tend to dominate, can help by coming to terms with Shia majority rule in Iraq. They worked to reconcile differences within the Iraqi Sunni community. Perhaps they can facilitate Sunni-Shia reconciliation as well, and stop insinuating that Iraqi Shia are Iranian proxies. Embracing Iraq, rather than undermining it, would be a good way to start.

For months now, it has been clear that no peaceful, even satisfactory, resolution of the conflict in Syria is possible without external intervention. Paradoxically, too many Syrian civilians have been tortured, wounded, and killed to stop the demonstrations seeking the ouster of President Bashar al-Assad. The victims’ families, friends, and neighbors simply will not accept the Assad regime’s continuation in any form. So what will happen?

One possibility is that the regime will greatly escalate the killing. If it kills ten or 20 times as many as have died thus far, perhaps it will succeed in creating so much terror that the protests will stop. Though this is far from certain, it is hard to imagine that maintaining the current level of violence will make Syrians bow to the regime, given that so many have refused to do so up to now.

Another possibility is that Assad, his family, and his top associates flee the country. But, even in that case, their flight probably would not end the strife. The Syrian armed forces have so much blood on their hands that those who have suffered losses or sympathize with the victims of repression are sure to demand that the killers be held accountable. Without a mechanism in place to see that justice is meted out in a fair and orderly way, Assad’s departure, by itself, will not end the violence.

If an even greater catastrophe than what is now taking place is to be avoided, external intervention is essential. Yet there are many good reasons not to intervene militarily – including the undesirability of doing so again so soon after NATO’s intervention in Libya, which would create the impression that such actions are becoming routine.

Indeed, many in the Arab world questioned even the Libyan intervention, because the United States-led invasion of Iraq years earlier had discredited the use of military force against a dictator. And, of course, it is difficult to discern who would contribute military resources for intervention in Syria, how great a commitment would be required, and how to ensure the least possible additional loss of life.

One way to intervene with the aim of securing legitimacy and minimizing further bloodshed would be for the Arab League to establish a tribunal modeled on the International Criminal Court (ICC). Such a tribunal would have Arab judges, prosecutors, investigators, and defense attorneys, and it would conduct its proceedings in Arabic. It would have jurisdiction over the crimes that are spelled out in the ICC’s statute, and it would operate in accordance with the ICC’s procedures.

The ICC itself does not have jurisdiction over Syria, because the country is not a party to the treaty that established and governs the Court. Moreover, it seems likely that Russia, perhaps joined by China, would use its veto power in the United Nations Security Council to block referral of Syria to the ICC.

Though it would take time for an ad hoc Arab tribunal to be formed and to reach the point at which it could issue indictments, Syrian military commanders would immediately be put on notice that they could face prosecution for their actions against protesters. Indeed, the Arab League could strengthen the incentive to end the killings by determining that priority would be given to prosecuting those who commit additional crimes after the adoption of a resolution to establish such a tribunal.

Experience over the past two decades with ad hoc tribunals in other parts of the world demonstrates that they have a good record in apprehending those whom they indict. When the UN established the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in 1993, its many detractors claimed that it would go nowhere because it could not compel the appearance of defendants. In fact, however, the ICTY has succeeded in bringing before it every defendant that it indicted from all parties to the post-Yugoslav wars of the 1990’s.

It is impossible to predict that establishment of such a tribunal, whether by the Arab League or some other international body, would suffice to halt the bloodshed. More may be required. But setting in motion a process to bring the perpetrators of heinous crimes to justice seems appropriate in its own right. And it seems worth trying such an approach before attempting to fight violence with violence.

The debate over how to handle Iran’s nuclear program is notable for its gloom and doom. Many people assume that Israel must choose between letting Iran develop nuclear weapons or attacking before it gets the bomb. But this is a false choice. There is a third option: working toward a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Middle East. And it is more feasible than most assume.

Attacking Iran might set its nuclear program back a few years, but it will most likely encourage Iran to aggressively seek — and probably develop — nuclear weapons. Slowing Iran down has some value, but the costs are high and the risks even greater. Iran would almost certainly retaliate, leading to all-out war at a time when Israel is still at odds with various Arab countries, and its relations with Turkey are tense.

Many hawks who argue for war believe that Iran poses an “existential threat” to Israel. They assume Iran is insensitive to the logic of nuclear deterrence and would be prepared to use nuclear weapons without fear of the consequences (which could include killing millions of Palestinians and the loss of millions of Iranian civilians from an inevitable Israeli retaliation). And even if Israel strikes, Iran is still likely to acquire nuclear weapons eventually and would then be even more inclined to use them.

Despite all the talk of an “existential threat,” less than half of Israelis support a strike on Iran. According to our November poll, carried out in cooperation with the Dahaf Institute in Israel, only 43 percent of Israeli Jews support a military strike on Iran — even though 90 percent of them think that Iran will eventually acquire nuclear weapons.

Most important, when asked whether it would be better for both Israel and Iran to have the bomb, or for neither to have it, 65 percent of Israeli Jews said neither. And a remarkable 64 percent favored the idea of a nuclear-free zone, even when it was explained that this would mean Israel giving up its nuclear weapons.

The Israeli public also seems willing to move away from a secretive nuclear policy toward greater openness about Israel’s nuclear facilities. Sixty percent of respondents favored “a system of full international inspections” of all nuclear facilities, including Israel’s and Iran’s, as a step toward regional disarmament.

If Israel’s nuclear program were to become part of the equation, it would be a game-changer. Iran has until now effectively accused the West of employing a double standard because it does not demand Israeli disarmament, earning it many fans across the Arab world.

And a nuclear-free zone may be hard for Iran to refuse. Iranian diplomats have said they would be open to an intrusive role for the United Nations if it accepted Iran’s right to enrich uranium for energy production — not to the higher levels necessary for weapons. And a 2007 poll by the Program on International Policy Attitudes found that the Iranian people would favor such a deal.

We cannot take what Iranian officials say at face value, but an international push for a nuclear-free Middle East would publicly test them. And most Arab leaders would rather not start down the nuclear path — a real risk if Iran gets the bomb — and have therefore welcomed the proposal of a nuclear-free zone.

Some Israeli officials may also take the idea seriously. As Avner Cohen’s recent book “The Worst-Kept Secret” shows, Israel’s policy of “opacity” — not acknowledging having nuclear weapons while letting everyone know it does — has existed since 1969, but is now becoming outdated. Indeed, no one outside Israel today sees any ambiguity about the fact that Israel possesses a large nuclear arsenal.

Although Israeli leaders have in the past expressed openness to the idea of a nuclear-free zone, they have always insisted that there must first be peace between Israel and its neighbors.

But the stalemate with Iran could actually delay or prevent peace in the region. As the former Israeli spy chief, Meir Dagan, argued earlier this month, Israel’s current stance might actually accelerate Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons and encourage Arab states to follow suit. Moreover, talk of an “existential threat” projects Israel as weak, hurts its morale, and reduces its foreign policy options. This helps explain why three leading Israeli security experts — the Mossad chief, Tamir Pardo, a former Mossad chief, Efraim Halevy, and a former military chief of staff, Dan Halutz — all recently declared that a nuclear Iran would not pose an existential threat to Israel.

While full elimination of nuclear weapons is improbable without peace, starting the inevitably long and arduous process of negotiations toward that end is vital.

Given that Israelis overwhelmingly believe that Iran is on its way to acquiring nuclear weapons and several security experts have begun to question current policy, there is now an opportunity for a genuine debate on the real choices: relying on cold-war-style “mutual assured destruction” once Iran develops nuclear weapons or pursuing a path toward a nuclear-weapons-free Middle East, with a chance that Iran — and Arabs — will never develop the bomb at all.

There should be no illusions that successfully negotiating a path toward regional nuclear disarmament will be easy. But the mere conversation could transform a debate that at present is stuck between two undesirable options: an Iranian bomb or war.

En un primer momento nos embargó el desconcierto y después comenzaron a emerger, por todos lados, las preguntas sobre la visita de Mahmud Ahmadineyad a Latinoamérica. Hasta el día de hoy aún no nos han llegado las certezas. Porque ese fue -sin dudas- un viaje inusual, apenas anunciado y realizado en una coyuntura internacional turbulenta en la que cualquier gesto toma connotaciones desproporcionadas, impredecibles.

Tras de sí, el líder persa nos dejó la estela de un conflicto de difícil pronóstico como el que se gesta entre Irán y varias potencias occidentales. Su estancia en La Habana nos conectó con un peligro que a pesar de mostrarse cada noche en los noticiarios, era percibido como a 1.000 millas de distancia de nuestra enmarañada cotidianidad. Con su llegada obligó al Gobierno cubano a tomar partido en público, a apurar -frente a las cámaras- la elección de un bando.

El miércoles pasado cuando Ahmadineyad bajó del avión, no había ninguna alfombra esperándolo y al pie de la escalerilla estaba el vicepresidente Esteban Lazo. En la puerta del aeropuerto José Martí ni una sola demostración de recibimiento o rechazo aguardaba por él. Tampoco se veían grupos defensores de los derechos de los gays protestando por el tratamiento a los homosexuales en Irán y la oposición interna estaba más preocupada por las detenciones policiales que por la llegada del controvertido dignatario. Tanta indiferencia debió resultarle inusual a alguien acostumbrado a despertar a su paso las más encendidas pasiones. En el aula magna de la Universidad de La Habana, rodeado de los académicos más oficiales -o de los oficiales más académicos- le entregaron un doctorado honoris causa en Ciencias Políticas que acompañó con una conferencia. En su voz sonaron sumamente paradójicos los llamamientos a buscar “un orden nuevo, una mirada nueva, que respete a todos los seres humanos”, pero ninguno de los presentes levantó la mano para cuestionarlo. Tanto el aplauso final de aquella tarde como el galardón concedido recayeron sobre este hombre de ojos diminutos que podría hacer detonar la próxima guerra mundial. Raúl Castro lo recibiría unas horas después en el palacio de la Revolución para reafirmar su apoyo al programa nuclear de Teherán. Y así Ahmadineyad pudo hacerse finalmente la foto de familia con su par cubano, esa validación pública que había venido a buscar a Latinoamérica.

Sin embargo, en la instantánea de su gira por nuestro continente hay “parientes” y “parientes”. Tanto Hugo Chávez como Rafael Correa pueden ofrecerle no solo apoyo político, sino también acuerdos económicos necesarios para aliviar las sanciones económicas impuestas a Irán. En tanto Cuba aparece en ese retrato familiar como el niño pequeño, sin voz ni voto, pero que aún así debe ser captado por la lente.

El plato fuerte de la estampa habanera resultó el encuentro con Fidel Castro, que fue narrado por el visitante a la prensa extranjera antes de su partida. “Ha sido motivo de gran alegría para mi ver al comandante Fidel sano y salvo”, afirmó, mientras trataba con esas palabras de disolver los rumores del fallecimiento del Comandante en Jefe que recorren las redes sociales. También Ahmadineyad necesitaba este contacto diplomático para aplacar el aislamiento internacional que lo ha rodeado en los últimos meses y La Habana contribuyó a sus planes, con honoris causa incluido.

Sin embargo, en los cálculos hechos sobre su estancia entre nosotros no se tuvo en cuenta el costo negativo que esta tendría para Raúl Castro. A menos de tres semanas de comenzar la primera Conferencia Nacional del Partido Comunista, el general presidente necesitaba un escenario de mayor distensión, con menos ojos puestos sobre él. Pero de pronto el estrecho de Ormuz comenzó a latir en el mar Caribe y los cuestionamientos contra Teherán y La Habana se unieron en un solo coro. El gobernante iraní nos colocó en un punto de mira que hubiera sido más sabio evitar. A cambio de esa exposición, la prensa oficial cubana confirmaba que la visita buscaba estrechar la colaboración comercial entre ambas naciones. Intercambio que en 2007 se plasmó en la firma de acuerdos por un valor de 525 millones de euros.

Solo con el pasar de las semanas se podrá evaluar el impacto de la estancia de Ahmadineyad en nuestra región y especialmente su breve presencia en Cuba. Terminados los destellos de las cámaras, las conferencias en la universidad y los titulares en la prensa, se logrará percibir su verdadero efecto. Comprobaremos entonces si el Gobierno cubano -como el niño travieso de la fotografía- se sale del encuadre lentamente para centrarse en sus propios problemas internos. O si, por el contrario, prefiere seguir sosteniéndole la mano a Teherán, desafiar a muchos con ese abrazo y alejar con ello la vista de las dificultades nacionales.

As the United States and its allies ratchet up economic sanctions against Iran in an effort to get the regime to abandon its nuclear program, it’s important to remember that such sanctions rarely work. It is doubtful that increased sanctions against Iran will work any better.

The United States already prohibits most transactions between U.S. and Iranian financial institutions, imposes penalties on companies that provide assistance to the Iranian petroleum industry and prohibits most trade with Iran, including the import of Iranian products, such as rugs, caviar and pistachio nuts.

Fearing that Iran is getting ever closer to producing a nuclear weapon, many U.S. and European policymakers want to tighten the sanctions – by cutting off Iranian oil exports, for example – even if this leads to higher oil prices.

For the United States, which already imports no petroleum from Iran, the new sanctions are intended to impair the ability of other countries to buy Iranian oil. This would be accomplished by imposing sanctions on entities from those nations that complete transactions with Iran’s central bank, which provides the payment mechanism for oil purchases.

While supporters of the tightened sanctions see the measure putting additional economic pressure on the Iranian government, Iran’s long-term revenue losses from oil exports probably would be minimal. For example, despite the existing sanctions on Iran’s petroleum sector, the country exported some $71.6 billion worth of petroleum products in 2010, according to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The Iranian government reports that 2011 was even better – calling it a record year of oil sales.

The problem with all sanctions is that they erode over time as the target nation redirects its products to countries that aren’t participating in the sanctions or finds ways to trade illegally with entities in the sanctioning countries. With such market “reordering” and outright evasion, the target country is rarely starved of export revenues.

Sanctions on Iranian oil, for example, are bound to fail because rapidly growing countries in the developing world, such as China and India, care less about Iran’s nuclear program than about getting cheap oil. Iran probably will oblige them by selling its oil at a discount, thus allowing it to recoup otherwise lost sales. More important than the likely economic effects of the sanctions are the likely political effects. Yet sanctions are fundamentally an economic tool for achieving political ends.

The purpose of sanctions is not just to ratchet up economic pressure for its own sake but to achieve some stated political objective. Yet the history of sanctions shows they not only typically fail to achieve their economic objectives but also rarely achieve their political goals, such as getting a country to abandon its nuclear program or causing a regime to fall.

Consider North Korea and Iraq. Despite harsh international economic sanctions, North Korea probably has created several nuclear weapons. In Iraq, the most universal and biting economic sanctions in world history could not induce Saddam Hussein to withdraw his invasion forces from Kuwait in the early 1990s.

The Iranian nuclear program appears to have widespread public support across the Iranian political spectrum because it is seen as an issue of national prestige. Also, Iran has hostile neighbors such as Israel, which likely has hundreds of nuclear weapons, and Saudi Arabia, which may have a secret nuclear program. So the Iranian government is not likely to abandon its nuclear program.

In fact, the Iranian government – weakened by the fraudulent elections of 2009 – is using the specter of economic hardship resulting from externally imposed sanctions to rally public support.

Thus, the harsher sanctions, even in the improbable event that they could put significant long-term economic pressure on Iran’s economic linchpin and main source of external revenue – oil exports – are unlikely to achieve the ambitious political goals of ending Iran’s nuclear program or bringing about “regime change.”

If anything, the sanctions are likely to increase support for the regime as Iranians, like other people in similar circumstances of external pressure, rally around their flag.

La crisis siria ha entrado en una fase de estancamiento perjudicial que puede prolongarse durante la mayor parte del año en curso. Presiones externas y desafíos internos han continuado y continúan caracterizando la situación. Es evidente que el régimen no ha podido sofocar la revuelta y es muy improbable que lo consiga en lo que resta de año. Pero la oposición –tanto en el exilio como el grueso de ella en el interior del país– parece asimismo incapaz de unirse y cohesionarse o de ampliar el alcance de su radio de acción y de poner a punto nuevas medidas de presión para reforzar sus posibilidades de hacer frente al régimen a fin de desgastarlo y debilitar sus recursos coercitivos.

La misión de los observadores de la Liga Árabe en Siria está condenada al fracaso, aunque puede morir de muerte lenta. La Liga Árabe ha advertido que, en último término, puede volver a imponer el boicot económico que declaró el pasado mes de noviembre o bien adoptar otras medidas tales como imponer un bloqueo del transporte aéreo civil a Siria y desde Siria como, asimismo, recabar alguna iniciativa de las Naciones Unidas. No obstante, la imposición de un nuevo boicot puede representar semanas o meses.

El régimen sirio sigue teniendo un considerable margen de maniobra, lo cual obedece en parte al hecho de que el Consejo de Cooperación del Golfo, que ha liderado hasta ahora las gestiones de la Liga Árabe frente a Siria, no parece disponer de un plan bien trazado ni tampoco ha optado por impulsar un traspaso de poder, a diferencia del caso de Yemen, en que tal fue su objetivo declarado desde un principio.

No es menos importante dejar constancia del endurecimiento de la actitud rusa y china contra la política estadounidense, y occidental en general, hacia Siria, que promete impedir una acción eficaz a cargo de las Naciones Unidas y procurará que Iraq se incline a suministrar a su homólogo sirio un balón de oxígeno.

El factor esencial radica en que no se producirá una intervención militar externa capaz de catalizar una caída interna del régimen o de acelerar el fin del apoyo con que este pueda contar de parte de la clase media para, en último término, lograr inclinar la balanza del equilibrio interno de fuerzas en Siria. Ni Estados Unidos ni la Unión Europea repetirán su actuación en Libia por varias razones y, aunque Turquía está dispuesta a apoyar sanciones económicas más duras, no asumirá la losa de una intervención militar. No habrá una zona de exclusión aérea ni refugios bajo protección militar a lo largo de las fronteras o

pasillos humanitarios para socorrer a la sitiada población siria. Frente a algunas afirmaciones que circulan últimamente, no es cierto que el régimen sirio pueda caer sólo con un empujoncito.

Sigue controlando firmemente Damasco y Alepo, donde, pese a que la situación económica se está haciendo más difícil, la clase media sigue dando escasas muestras de intranquilidad y menos aún de una posible acción colectiva. Las fuerzas y servicios de seguridad, sin duda, acusan los efectos de la situación, pero siguen siendo leales al sistema y mantienen su cohesión. Prosigue el goteo de deserciones en el seno de las fuerzas armadas, pero se aprecian escasos signos de que vaya a convertirse en un torrente.

Las milicias del Ejército Libre Sirio no pueden representar una amenaza militar estratégica sin contar con zonas seguras bajo protección militar externa. Parece claro que el régimen ha decidido renunciar a controlar determinadas zonas rurales poco pobladas y mantener acuarteladas el grueso de las fuerzas armadas, y dedicar las unidades más leales a garantizar el control de las ciudades principales y de las fronteras.

El régimen sirio puede sobrevivir aún durante cierto tiempo en las actuales circunstancias. Mucho se ha especulado sobre la desastrosa caída del 30% del PIB en el 2011, pero otras experiencias del mundo árabe muestran que este factor no basta para echar abajo un régimen: Iraq sufrió un desplome mucho mayor en 1990 y la Autoridad Palestina tuvo una caída del 40% respecto de los niveles de 1999 tras el estallido de la segunda intifada: Libia, por su parte, de economía dependiente de la exportación de petróleo, sobrevivió a una década y media de sanciones. Diversas realidades explican que Siria –el país, y no sólo el régimen– pueda resistir una notable presión: la porosidad de sus fronteras y el auge de la economía sumergida basada en el contrabando, la diversificación de su economía y el relativo nivel de desarrollo de su sector privado. Además, Iraq votó contra el boicot económico árabe, Líbano se abstuvo y Jordania votó a favor pero solicitó una exención de su aplicación; incluso Turquía, que aprobó el acuerdo de la Liga Árabe, ha de cerrar aún su frontera.

El estancamiento que se está produciendo se ve reforzado también por el hecho de la transformación de la crisis siria en una nueva contienda geopolítica entre los principales protagonistas de la región y las potencias globales. Tal circunstancia aumenta el riesgo de violencia de bajo nivel entre facciones, pero reduce el de abierta guerra civil.

Cabe referirse a dos posibilidades. En primer lugar, ciertos elementos de la comunidad alauí –tal vez sus líderes tradicionales y religiosos y posiblemente los mandos militares procedentes de círculos exteriores cercanos a la familia y el clan de El Asad– pueden llegar a la conclusión de que sólo pueden perder en el caso de un conflicto o una guerra civil prolongados, de modo que presionan a Bashar el Asad para negociar mientras este posea suficiente poder como para tratar de alcanzar un acuerdo en términos favorables.

Ahora bien –segunda posibilidad–, si ello no tiene lugar o bien se intenta pero sin éxito, el régimen se verá privado de base gradualmente hasta la llegada de un momento crítico en que su poder empiece a desmoronarse a lo largo y ancho del aparato del Estado y se desencadene una cascada de deserciones y abandonos al constatar tanto las fuerzas armadas como la población de las ciudades principales que el régimen ya no puede resistir o contraatacar. Pero este aspecto puede llevarnos más allá del 2012.