Drones are not just for firing missiles in Pakistan. In Iraq, the State Department is using them to watch for threats to Americans. It’s time we used the revolution in military affairs to serve human rights advocacy.

With drones, we could take clear pictures and videos of human rights abuses, and we could start with Syria.

The need there is even more urgent now, because the Arab League’s observers suspended operations last week.

They fled the very violence they were trying to monitor. Drones could replace them, and could even go to some places the observers, who were escorted and restricted by the government, could not see. This we know: the Syrian government isn’t just fighting rebels, as it claims; it is shooting unarmed protesters, and has been doing so for months. Despite a ban on news media, much of the violence is being caught on camera by ubiquitous cellphones. The footage is shaky and the images grainy, but still they make us YouTube witnesses.

Imagine if we could watch in high definition with a bird’s-eye view. A drone would let us count demonstrators, gun barrels and pools of blood. And the evidence could be broadcast for a global audience, including diplomats at the United Nations and prosecutors at the International Criminal Court.

Drones are increasingly small, affordable and available to nonmilitary buyers. For hundreds of thousands of dollars — no longer many millions — a surveillance drone could be flying over protests and clashes in Syria.

An environmental group, the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, has reported that it is using drones to monitor illegal Japanese whaling in the waters of the Southern Hemisphere. In the past few years, human-rights groups and the actor and activist George Clooney, among others, have purchased satellite imagery of conflict zones. Drones can see even more clearly, and broadcast in real time.

We could record the repression in Syria with unprecedented precision and scope. The better the evidence, the clearer the crimes, the higher the likelihood that the world would become as outraged as it should be.

This sounds a lot like surveillance, and it would be. It would violate Syrian airspace, and perhaps a number of Syrian and international laws. It isn’t the kind of thing nongovernmental organizations usually do. But it is very different from what governments and armies do. Yes, we (like them) have an agenda, but ours is transparent: human rights. We have a duty, recognized internationally, to monitor governments that massacre their own people in large numbers. Human rights organizations have always done this. Why not get drones to assist the good work?

It may be illegal in the Syrian government’s eyes, but supporting Nelson Mandela in South Africa was deemed illegal during the apartheid era. To fly over Syria’s territory may violate official norms of international relations, but governments do this when they support opposition groups with weapons, money or intelligence, as NATO countries did recently in Libya. In any event, violations of Syrian sovereignty would be the direct consequence of the Syrian state’s brutality, not the imperialism of outsiders.

There are some obvious risks and downsides to the drone approach. The Syrian government would undoubtedly seize the opportunity to blame a foreign conspiracy for its troubles. Local operators of the drones could be at risk, though a higher-end drone could be controlled from a remote location or a neighboring country.

Such considerations figured in conversations we have had with human rights organizations that considered hiring drones in Syria, but opted in the end for supplying protesters with phones, satellite modems and safe houses. For nearly a year now, brave amateurs with their tiny cameras arguably have been doing the trick in Syria. In those circumstances, the value that a drone could add might not be worth the investment and risks.

Even if humanitarian drones are not used in Syria, they should assume their place in the arsenal of human rights advocates. It is a precedent worth setting, especially in situations where evidence of large-scale human rights violations is hard to come by.

Drones can reach places and see things cell phones cannot. Social media did not document the worst of the genocide in the remote villages of Darfur in 2003 and 2004. Camera-toting protesters could not enter the fields where 8,000 men and boys were massacred in Srebrenica in 1995. Graphic and detailed evidence of crimes against humanity does not guarantee a just response, but it helps.

If human rights organizations can spy on evil, they should.

As Egypt marks the first anniversary of the Jan. 25 civilian revolt that eventually toppled the 30-year rule of Hosni Mubarak, there’s no agreement — on how to celebrate or even whether rejoicing is in order.

The current military rulers — the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, or SCAF — want to hold parades and aerial jet exhibitions to exult in the revolution, of which their main part was to ease Mubarak out of power. Youth groups and democracy activists who originally engineered the uprising are carrying on a campaign called “The Generals are Liars,” with mini-demonstrations and audiovisual presentations in the streets documenting police and military abuses. Islamic politicians, triumphant in recent parliamentary elections, extol the military’s role while pressing for an eventual transfer of power to civilians.

As for human rights, though, just what do Egyptians have to celebrate? Not all that much — a sad commentary on the uprising in the Middle East’s most populous country, one that is a reference point for regional politics despite its poverty and stagnation.

Yes, Mubarak is on trial for the killings of protesters, which is at least a symbolic repudiation of his oppressive reign. Yes, Egypt held a free election for a new parliament in which Islamic parties prevailed in competition with secular and liberal slates. Yes, independent media work hard to bird-dog government malfeasance.

Yet, much of Mubarak’s repressive legacy has been preserved and even strengthened. SCAF rules in his place and has indicated it should remain a power behind the scenes, as it has for the 60 years since the overthrow of the country’s monarchy.

Egyptians still live under the emergency law — in place since the assassination of President Anwar Sadat in 1981 — that permits bans on public assembly, indefinite detention without charge, prosecution in special courts that allow no appeal process and that are notorious for reliance on confessions obtained under torture. On Tuesday, SCAF’s chieftain, Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, partially lifted the 30-year state of emergency but said Egypt would continue to apply the emergency law to cases of “thuggery.” Tantawi’s gesture is far from sufficient. In the last year, military tribunals have convicted hundreds of peaceful protesters on charges of thuggery.

During almost a year in power, SCAF has liberally referred civilians to military courts, another practice of the Mubarak years, though under him it was reserved for so-called exceptional cases. Sometimes the magistrates have announced a verdict before a trial began.

The military has arbitrarily arrested and convicted peaceful protesters, some of whom remain imprisoned. Measures that date from Britain’s early 20th century domination of Egypt ban assemblies of more than five people “that threaten the public peace.”

Although by international standards, lethal force should be used only when strictly necessary to protect life, under current Egyptian law, police — who are effectively under SCAF control — possess wide scope for shooting at demonstrators. The minister of interior has broad discretion to decide on use of weapons and what warnings need be given demonstrators before firing on them. On Jan. 6, the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, an independent human rights organization, denounced a statement by the interior minister that police will get bonuses for shooting “thugs,” government shorthand for demonstrators.

Police regulations are bad enough, but the actions of security forces — both police and military — have been abominable. In October, soldiers ran over demonstrators with armored cars and shot them, killing 27 marchers at a Christian rally held to protest the burning of a church. In November, at least 40 demonstrators were killed by anti-riot forces during unrest in and around Tahrir Square, the epicenter of protest. Police routinely beat demonstrators, women included. Human Rights Watch has documented torture and abuse of detainees by soldiers. Military personnel carried out abusive “virginity tests” on women in detention. Servile state media demonize opposition groups and non-governmental organizations as subversive tools of dark foreign forces.

Laws endure that make citizens vulnerable to prosecution for “insulting” speech or words “harmful” to morals or tantamount to changing the existing political order. In March, SCAF added a new wrinkle to restrictions on speech and assembly by criminalizing strikes and demonstrations “that impede public works.” In April, a military court sentenced young blogger Maikel Nabil Sanad to three years in prison for “insulting the military establishment” when he criticized army rule on his blog and Facebook page. SCAF said last weekend that Nabil would be pardoned and released along with more than 1,900 other prisoners convicted in military trials. It was a gesture in advance of the Jan. 25 holiday; Nabil shouldn’t have been arrested and convicted in the first place.

Egypt seated a new parliament on Monday. It should act quickly to wipe clean the slate of laws that restrict free speech, association and assembly and that permit police too much latitude to shoot protesters. Members of the parliament should limit military court jurisdiction to military officials and repeal the emergency law. Egypt’s foreign friends — including the aid-giving U.S. government — should wholeheartedly support the reforms and resist suggestions that continued dictatorship means stability.

With Egypt’s revolution in its first stages, the time is now for the parliament to end Egypt’s long-term rule by military fiat.

From the streets of Tunis to Tahrir Square and beyond, protests around the world last year were built on the Internet and the many devices that interact with it. Though the demonstrations thrived because thousands of people turned out to participate, they could never have happened as they did without the ability that the Internet offers to communicate, organize and publicize everywhere, instantaneously.

It is no surprise, then, that the protests have raised questions about whether Internet access is or should be a civil or human right. The issue is particularly acute in countries whose governments clamped down on Internet access in an attempt to quell the protesters. In June, citing the uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa, a report by the United Nations’ special rapporteur went so far as to declare that the Internet had “become an indispensable tool for realizing a range of human rights.” Over the past few years, courts and parliaments in countries like France and Estonia have pronounced Internet access a human right.

But that argument, however well meaning, misses a larger point: technology is an enabler of rights, not a right itself. There is a high bar for something to be considered a human right. Loosely put, it must be among the things we as humans need in order to lead healthy, meaningful lives, like freedom from torture or freedom of conscience. It is a mistake to place any particular technology in this exalted category, since over time we will end up valuing the wrong things. For example, at one time if you didn’t have a horse it was hard to make a living. But the important right in that case was the right to make a living, not the right to a horse. Today, if I were granted a right to have a horse, I’m not sure where I would put it.

The best way to characterize human rights is to identify the outcomes that we are trying to ensure. These include critical freedoms like freedom of speech and freedom of access to information — and those are not necessarily bound to any particular technology at any particular time. Indeed, even the United Nations report, which was widely hailed as declaring Internet access a human right, acknowledged that the Internet was valuable as a means to an end, not as an end in itself.

What about the claim that Internet access is or should be a civil right? The same reasoning above can be applied here — Internet access is always just a tool for obtaining something else more important — though the argument that it is a civil right is, I concede, a stronger one than that it is a human right. Civil rights, after all, are different from human rights because they are conferred upon us by law, not intrinsic to us as human beings.

While the United States has never decreed that everyone has a “right” to a telephone, we have come close to this with the notion of “universal service” — the idea that telephone service (and electricity, and now broadband Internet) must be available even in the most remote regions of the country. When we accept this idea, we are edging into the idea of Internet access as a civil right, because ensuring access is a policy made by the government.

Yet all these philosophical arguments overlook a more fundamental issue: the responsibility of technology creators themselves to support human and civil rights. The Internet has introduced an enormously accessible and egalitarian platform for creating, sharing and obtaining information on a global scale. As a result, we have new ways to allow people to exercise their human and civil rights.

In this context, engineers have not only a tremendous obligation to empower users, but also an obligation to ensure the safety of users online. That means, for example, protecting users from specific harms like viruses and worms that silently invade their computers. Technologists should work toward this end.

It is engineers — and our professional associations and standards-setting bodies like the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers — that create and maintain these new capabilities. As we seek to advance the state of the art in technology and its use in society, we must be conscious of our civil responsibilities in addition to our engineering expertise.

Improving the Internet is just one means, albeit an important one, by which to improve the human condition. It must be done with an appreciation for the civil and human rights that deserve protection — without pretending that access itself is such a right.

A months-long campaign against civil-society groups by Egypt’s military leadership came to a head Thursday when Egyptian security forces raided the Cairo offices of Freedom House and several other international and local nongovernmental organizations. These attacks were a major setback to the hopes that emerged this year with the revolution in Tahrir Square. If corrective measures are not taken, the attacks will severely damage Egypt’s long-term stability and prospects for a more democratic future.

The protests in January and February that led to the resignation of Hosni Mubarak offered hope to the Egyptian people for the first time in decades. Coming on the heels of the movement that brought down Tunisia’s longtime ruler, Zine el-Abidine Ben-Ali, the revolution reflected Egyptians’ pent-up frustration with endless human rights abuses, rigged elections and lack of real economic opportunity.

The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces assumed control of the country and earned early praise for its relative restraint amid the massive protests in downtown Cairo. It was not long, however, before the military chiefs engaged in the kinds of human rights abuses common under Mubarak: brutally attacking demonstrators; stirring religious tensions between Muslims and Coptic Christians; prosecuting regime critics in military tribunals; and assaulting female protesters, including through the infamous “virginity tests.” It also maintained the much-hated “emergency law” under which Mubarak had ruled for three decades.

Essentially, the military hijacked the revolution.

Suppression of activists and NGOs, including foreign groups, is standard operating procedure for authoritarian regimes, as events in Russia, Venezuela, Belarus and China show. Governments that constrain NGOs almost invariably impose greater restrictions on the media, political parties and the judiciary. Concerns that, left unchecked, Egypt’s military council would move in that direction are reasonable.

The military rulers have clung to power while seeking to enshrine their political supremacy in law. Protests in Cairo turned violent this month as military and security services employed lethal force to put down demonstrators.

Egyptians who turned out in Tahrir Square months ago have grown increasingly angry with the military council, while the council has searched for scapegoats to argue that foreign forces — particularly civic groups that support civil society and free and fair elections — have sought to launch another revolution and cause turmoil. Freedom House is among the favorite targets of these absurd accusations.

The raids on Freedom House and others — state media report that 17 offices were stormed — constitute an unprecedented assault by Egyptian security forces on international civil-society organizations and their local partners, a number of which have exposed abuses by Egyptian authorities. Not even under Mubarak did we and our partners face such attacks.

The timing is noteworthy. In a few days, Egypt is to conduct the third and final round of elections for the lower house of parliament. In the first two rounds, the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party and the more extreme Salafists secured more than 60 percent of the vote. Military actions against demonstrators and NGOs will weaken liberal, democratic forces, leaving Egyptians with an unpalatable choice between continued military autocracy or a theocratic state.

The military rulers’ actions show that they do not intend to permit the establishment of genuine democracy and that they are, instead, attempting to scapegoat civil society for their failure to effectively manage Egypt’s transition. Put another way: Egypt’s military rulers are responsible for creating the very conditions that could drive the country toward fundamentalism and instability, and they are blocking the accountability and transparency that Egyptian society fought for and that was integral to ending Mubarak’s rule.

Freedom House and similar organizations are in Egypt to respond to the indigenous demand for help in promoting civil society, the rule of law and people-to-people exchanges. The international community — the United States in particular — must respond aggressively to Thursday’s raids. The military’s human rights abuses and appalling treatment of civil society must end immediately. Washington continues to provide the Egyptian military with $1.3 billion annually to fund arms purchases and training. The Obama administration should tell Egypt’s military council unambiguously that assistance will end unless such behavior ceases. The United States must not subsidize authoritarianism in Egypt even as Egypt’s rulers prevent NGOs from implementing democracy and human rights projects subsidized by U.S. taxpayers.

Egyptian authorities must return confiscated property; permit the reopening of all offices of NGOs closed in the raids; and allow the unfettered operation of local and international NGOs as they work to expand respect for human rights and help the Egyptian people’s efforts to form a more just, open and democratic political system. Until those steps, at a minimum, are taken, the hope that arose in Egypt this year will be lost for good.

Watershed moments in Afghanistan happen by stealth. Last weekend — the anniversary of the Soviet invasion 32 years ago — President Hamid Karzai rid himself of his most outspoken critic, a prominent official with one of the few government institutions in Afghanistan that actually performs well — the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission. The move, announced Thursday, seems intended not only to silence a critic but bury the truth about the crimes of the past.

Why now? Ahmad Nader Nadery had anticipated losing his job — he, together with his colleague Ahmad Fahim Hakim, also dismissed, has been a thorn in Karzai’s side for many years. Both had campaigned tirelessly against human rights abuses and electoral fraud. But this sudden move, scheduled while most of the West is on holiday, has a more ominous intent.

For the past several years, Nadery has been heading an effort to document war crimes going back to the time of the Soviet invasion. That effort is nearly done, and the long-anticipated report was scheduled to be released soon. Karzai’s move seems designed to smother the report before it sees the light of day.

Talking about the past has never been popular with the Afghan government or its U.S. ally. Karzai’s cabinet includes Vice Presidents Marshal Muhammad Qasim Fahim and Karim Khalili. Both men have been accused of war crimes in international human rights reports. U.S. State Department officials also have been nervous about the coming report, concerned that the release of details of Taliban atrocities in the late 1990s could upset delicate negotiations to get peace talks underway. “Now is not the right time,” one U.S. official recently told me. The Americans fear rocking the boat just at the moment they are trying to hammer down a deal — and leave.

Sadly, not rocking the boat has been the American mantra for the past decade, and has only worsened insecurity. From the outset, the military campaign in Afghanistan reflected the narrow U.S. objective of defeating the Taliban and Al Qaeda and creating a government able to maintain stability following a troop withdrawal. Washington chose its allies among anti-Taliban forces, mostly comprising Northern Alliance warlords and their militias. The Pentagon consistently rebuffed concerns that these commanders, most with long records of war crimes, might prove to be a destabilizing factor. Ten years later, stability in Afghanistan is still an elusive goal.

But the past is not just the past in Afghanistan. In October, the United Nations published a report on rampant torture in Afghan government detention facilities. As a Western official who investigated torture under the Communist regime told me, just “replace 2011 with 1979 and guess what?” Things have barely changed. It is no surprise that the National Directorate of Security is known today by it’s acronym from Soviet times, Khad. The practice of torture is the same, though it is not yet as pervasive.

That the past is repeating itself is no surprise to Afghans: When I was in Kabul in the late 1990s, people told me time and again that the only thing they feared more than the Taliban was that the warlords of the Northern Alliance might return to power.

The U.S. promise to build a democratic Afghanistan with respect for human rights seems all but forgotten, but it is still possible to salvage some measure of human rights protection. To start, the Obama administration and its European allies should raise concerns immediately with the Karzai government about the termination of the Human Rights Commissioners’ appointments, and express strong support for the work Nadery and his colleagues have done.

Washington should urge that their replacements be people with strong track records in human rights. And the U.S. should encourage and welcome human rights documentation that seeks to bring to light the truth about the past, including via the commission’s yet-to- be-published report. To paraphrase Martin Luther King, the great tragedy of this period in Afghanistan is the appalling silence of those who do not speak out for what is right.

Cuando asumí el puesto de embajador israelí en Suráfrica, en 1992, la historia estaba ya cambiando en favor de la democracia. Sin embargo, seguían en vigor numerosas leyes del apartheid, aunque ya no se aplicaban de forma estricta. Recuerdo, en especial, las leyes concebidas para incapacitar a la sociedad civil, destruir las organizaciones de la comunidad y sofocar los derechos humanos. Entre ellas estaban las que impedían la llegada de fondos a las organizaciones de derechos humanos. Recuerdo lo absurdo que me pareció todo eso en aquel momento.

Hoy, esos recuerdos han vuelto a agolparse. Las leyes que están a punto de aprobarse en la Knesset son increíblemente parecidas a las de la Suráfrica del apartheid. El Comité Ministerial Legislativo ha aprobado unas enmiendas que pretende restringir los fondos de otros Estados destinados a grupos locales de derechos humanos. La puesta en práctica de esta ley congelaría la democracia en Israel y lo que queda de nuestra sociedad.

En Suráfrica, el proceso empezó con la Comisión Schlebusch de Investigación sobre Ciertas Organizaciones. La diputada israelí Kirshenbaum propuso hace poco un comité similar para “investigar las finanzas y la legitimidad de las organizaciones israelíes de derechos humanos”. Ese suele ser el comienzo. Lo siguiente que hizo el Parlamento surafricano fue aprobar la Ley de Organizaciones Afectadas, cuyo fin era “impedir la injerencia de países extranjeros en el escenario político interno” y “la ayuda económica extranjera para promover cualquier opinión concreta”. El objetivo era cualquier grupo que se considerase una “organización afectada”. Las enmiendas israelíes utilizan un lenguaje idéntico, al hablar de “asociaciones restringidas”.

La ley surafricana, al menos, ofrecía ciertas garantías procesales, porque no se podía calificar a un grupo de “organización afectada” mientras no lo declarase el presidente del Estado, después de una investigación por un tribunal de tres magistrados. La ley propuesta en Israel no prevé ninguna garantía procesal equivalente. Se limita a declarar que “una asociación restringida no recibirá donaciones de una entidad estatal extranjera”. Eso incluye cualquier grupo que se niegue a cumplir cualquier parte del servicio militar o promueva cualquier tipo de boicot.

El peligro de intentar aislar un país del resto del mundo es algo que entendía muy bien la única voz de la conciencia en el Parlamento surafricano, una mujer judía y amiga personal, Helen Suzman, que dijo: “Suráfrica está cayendo bajo el control de un grupo cada vez más amplio de hombres secretos, que llevan a cabo investigaciones e informes secretos”. Pero un parlamentario nacionalista alegó que la ley era necesaria para bloquear el dinero destinado a estudiantes que “se alinean con los negros”. La táctica del miedo funcionó y el proyecto fue aprobado.

Igual que en Israel, la ley surafricana no estaba dirigida a grupos involucrados en actividades violentas o ilegales. Sus objetivos eran las voces de la conciencia incansables que se habían convertido en un problema para el régimen. El ministro de Justicia incluyó entre las organizaciones afectadas a la Unión Nacional de Estudiantes Surafricanos, representantes oficiales de todos los universitarios. “Lo que se ataca”, declararon los estudiantes, “es el derecho de los jóvenes a definir lo que está mal en la sociedad y emprender programas creativos para contrarrestar sus problemas y abrir la puerta a la posibilidad de un futuro positivo”.

En su defensa de la Ley de Recaudación de Fondos de 1978, el ministro de Justicia, Jimmy Kruger, dijo que “la ley se utilizará para tomar medidas contra las actividades de recogida de fondos dirigidas a debilitar la autoridad o amenazar la seguridad del Estado”, y dijo que su Gobierno sabía que llegaba a Suráfrica mucho dinero extranjero “destinado a garantizar nuestra destrucción”.

Nuestros políticos israelíes justifican sus actos con idénticos temores. El fundamento de la Ley Kirshenbaum-Akunis es que “unas organizaciones que suelen calificarse a sí mismas de organizaciones de derechos humanos”, en realidad, tienen “el único propósito de hacer daño y alterar el discurso político de Israel desde dentro”. Sin embargo, la verdad es que las organizaciones que se verán más afectadas son las que luchan para preservar lo que queda de la democracia israelí y la interpretación progresista de la declaración de independencia.

Mi experiencia en Suráfrica me enseñó que esas leyes acaban por fracasar. Fracasan porque un país democrático no puede aislarse del mundo sin destruirse a sí mismo. La ley pretende proteger la imagen pública de Israel, pero lo que consigue es que la imagen pública de Israel quede dañada. La aplicación de una ley así resta legitimidad a Israel y pone más de relieve la importancia de esas organizaciones.

Esta ley fracasará porque matar al mensajero no sirve de nada. El mundo conoce la ocupación. Las oleadas de crítica e indignación por ese crimen pasarán por encima de cualquier barrera que pretendamos erigir. Es necesario que Europa y el resto de la comunidad internacional dejen claro a Israel que el mundo no va a dejar de ayudar a los israelíes que luchan para encontrar una solución basada en los derechos humanos y la justicia.

There has been much discussion in the U.S. and European media of Turkey as a rising star after its recent stance on Syria and its general support for the “Arab Spring.”

Turkey is viewed as the successful merger of Islam and modernization. The Muslim religious coloring of the ruling Justice and Development Party is not seen as being at odds with its democratic, pro-Western outlook. The government has won popular support in the region, with Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan greeted rapturously on his recent tour of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. Turkey’s vibrant economy contrasts with the economic crises in Europe and the United States.

But whatever the wisdom of a search for the best “Muslim” model for Arab countries, Turkey’s international credibility should be in doubt as long as it fails to address its domestic human rights record.

The lack of rights for the country’s large Kurdish minority remains at the top of the list. Two years ago the government announced a “democratic opening” to extend greater rights to all of Turkey’s ethnic and religious minority groups, easing restrictions on broadcasts in minority languages such as Kurdish. Today the government has replaced that with an approach that bans, suppresses and jails its critics.

Turkey’s Kurdish issue continues to be largely defined for the world by the government’s nearly 30-year conflict with the outlawed, armed Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, during which gross human rights abuses were committed by both sides and 40,000 people died.

At the heart of the issue lie restrictive laws that limit free speech, prevent the teaching of minority languages such as Kurdish in schools and require a political party to secure a whopping 10% of the nationwide vote to gain a seat in parliament. This has meant that Kurdish political parties cannot get into parliament except by standing independent candidates who can then form a minimum 20-seat party grouping once in office.

In the last three years the biggest problem has been the misuse of anti-terrorism laws to bring criminal charges against many ordinary people who engage in legitimate and nonviolent pro-Kurdish or leftist political activity. This crackdown also includes journalists, and it threatens the very fabric of human rights and democracy in Turkey.

Thousands are on trial for membership in the Turkey Assembly of the Union of Kurdistan Communities, or KCK/TM, alleged to be the PKK’s urban wing. Most of the defendants are activist members, officials and serving elected mayors of the legal Peace and Democracy Party, which formed a group in parliament after winning 36 seats as independents in the June general election.

Several defendants are with local branches of the Human Rights Assn., including Muharrem Erbey, head of the Diyarbakır branch, who has been imprisoned for two years awaiting trial. Among the more than 1,000 in prison awaiting trial are 40 lawyers. One is Veysel Vesek, active in fighting for justice for families of the thousands of Kurdish citizens who disappeared or were killed by state perpetrators, such as the Turkish security forces, in the early 1990s at the height of the conflict with the PKK. Abdulcabbar Igdi, a local human rights defender in the southeast town of Cizre, is also in prison. I have worked closely with these people, and their imprisonment is a serious setback for the human rights cause in Turkey.

A new low came in November with the arrests of Ragip Zarakolu, an internationally known publisher and human rights defender; Busra Ersanli, a political science professor who had been advising the Peace and Democracy Party on constitutional reform, and Ayse Berktay, a vocal peace activist.

What is the evidence against all these people? It is mostly wiretaps and information about their political organizing. In most cases there is no evidence of any activity that should or could be described as terrorism. Yet the widely drawn and vague nature of Turkey’s terrorism laws gives zealous prosecutors and judges the ability to imprison and try them as if they were armed members of the PKK.

On Nov. 28, in Izmir, 25 trade union officials and members of a public sector workers’ union confederation were sentenced to six or more years in prison. The court had heard no evidence that any had incited violence or been involved in activities that could constitute terrorism.

There also are dozens of journalists in prison on terrorism charges. Their “crimes?” In most cases writings that have not incited violence. In the case of Ahmet Sik, it involved an unpublished manuscript.

There is an urgent need to revise these flawed, sweeping laws, which make criminals out of the wrong people. But legal reform isn’t enough. The government needs to stop silencing Kurds and other critics.

There is little sign, however, that change is coming. The prime minister and interior minister have repeatedly supported the arrests as the way to defeat the PKK, unconcerned that the democratic process in Turkey may be the principal victim of the crackdown. More chillingly in a climate of mass arrests, the prime minister demonstrated his intolerance of debate when he warned after the arrest of Zarakolu, the publisher, and Ersanli, the professor, that those who criticize such arrests should scrutinize themselves.

The U.S. and European governments support Turkey’s efforts to combat the PKK, but they have been all but silent on the crackdown on legal Kurdish politics. Turkey’s 3-decades-old policies of ban, suppress and jail have failed to solve the Kurdish issue. The U.S. and Europe also should remember that a vibrant economy and popularity in the region are no substitute for basic rights. Without the latter, Turkey risks descent into widespread violence.

Saturday marked both International Human Rights Day and one year since Chinese intellectual Liu Xiaobo received the Nobel Peace Prize for his work promoting human rights and democracy in China. Human Rights Day, which commemorates the 1948 adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), is an occasion to affirm our commitment to advancing the values of human rights common to us all. Nobel Laureate Liu’s continued imprisonment in a Chinese jail is a stark reminder of the urgency of this task.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights enshrines fundamental human rights standards, such as the freedoms of expression, association and religion and freedom from arbitrary detention. The Chinese government – a signatory to the declaration – disregards its obligations to uphold those rights and continues to punish citizens who defend them. Mr. Liu is a case in point.

Chinese authorities took Mr. Liu into custody in December 2008, one day before Chinese citizens released Charter 08, a treatise calling for political reform and human rights protections in China. Authorities cited Mr. Liu’s involvement in the charter and six essays he had written as the basis for sentencing him in 2009 to 11 years in prison for “inciting subversion of state power,” the longest known sentence for that “crime.” The case was marred by severe violations of due process under both Chinese and international law.

Mr. Liu’s “crime” was speaking out against Chinese government repression and promoting peaceful reform. Other Chinese citizens are held in prison or under house arrest for acts such as worshipping in house churches, organizing labor protests, petitioning against official abuses or challenging China’s barbaric one-child-per-couple policy.

Chinese citizens who aim to defend their rights, promote reform or advocate on behalf of others – actions that embody the very spirit of the UDHR and Human Rights Day – have been particularly vulnerable in the past year. As democracy movements brought new freedoms in other parts of the world, Chinese authorities launched one of the harshest crackdowns in recent memory against lawyers and activists.

Other rights advocates, like Mr. Liu, were the victims of earlier repression and continue to suffer in detention, their whereabouts unknown, or under illegal house arrest. Authorities “disappeared” lawyer Gao Zhisheng in 2009 for his efforts defending workers and religious believers. Local authorities currently hold blind, self-trained legal advocate Chen Guangcheng under extralegal house arrest following more than four years in prison for his work to expose abuses and the coercion inherent in the one-child-per-couple policy. Mongolian activist Hada, who had organized peaceful protests for minority rights, suffers in a similar legal limbo as he remains in custody a year since his 15-year prison sentence expired.

Other Chinese citizens escape direct harassment or detention, but no one is free from the state’s far-reaching policies of control. No Chinese citizen enjoys the right to worship freely in accordance with international human rights protections for religion. No woman in China may make decisions about her family size, free from the restrictions of China’s invasive one-child-per-couple policy, which includes forced abortion and forced sterilization. No worker in China may organize into independent unions to defend labor rights. Uighurs, Tibetans, Mongols and other ethnic groups face additional curbs on how they preserve their cultures and express their identity.

The Congressional-Executive Commission on China, for which I serve as chairman, continues to monitor these ongoing rights violations. Recent commission hearings have addressed the toll of China’s censorship policies and conditions for political prisoners. Along with our annual report issued each October, the commission hearings serve as an important mechanism for documenting China’s actions.

Despite China’s brutal suppression of human rights, Chinese authorities claim to uphold the values of the UDHR and other human rights instruments. The government announced several months ago that it would issue a National Human Rights Action Plan for the coming years, following on the heels of a similar action plan issued in 2009. The earlier plan showed the Chinese government has improved its rhetorical strategy for asserting compliance with human rights standards but has improved little else. In the end, the plan has done nothing to better human rights conditions in China, which actually have regressed.

If we are to give real substance to human rights, we must hold China accountable to its obligations to abide by the values enshrined in the UDHR and to guarantee fundamental human rights. By keeping a constant spotlight on China’s behavior, ensuring the Chinese government faces consequences for its actions and supporting Chinese citizens in their rights defense efforts, we can give real meaning to International Human Rights Day and the values of freedom and democracy championed by Liu Xiaobo.

The Chinese government often tolerates, and even encourages, abuses of power and extrajudicial punishments by law enforcement officials. These are the underlying evils that sustain a regime that values its own preservation above all else, including human rights and the rule of law.

But how is this possible in a world where outsiders feel free to criticize China’s human rights record? Why does the Chinese government respond to some forms of protest, while stonily ignoring others? The answer can be found in the way the Chinese leaders, at all levels, think about their authority, their reputations and their power.

Consider the case of Chen Guangcheng, a human rights advocate who has been under house arrest with his family in Shandong Province. Recently, the public received news that his 6-year-old daughter would be allowed to leave the house to attend school, a concession that seemed to signal more lenient treatment.

But then, on Oct. 23, a group of Internet activists who had set out to visit him were brutally attacked by a local mob. Witnesses who described the attack on the Internet said it appeared to have been well planned — a sign that Mr. Chen’s ordeal was not yet over.

Why won’t the authorities simply let Mr. Chen and his family go? The most critical reason is mianzi, or “face,” as it is usually translated in English.

The authorities know that what they have been doing is unjust and illegal. But they saw the gathering of activists as an affront, and responded harshly because the government could not afford to lose face — which would undermine its power in the public’s eyes.

Petty cruelties and crackdowns are everyday occurrences in today’s China. Officials, especially low-level ones, have never cultivated respect for the rule of law, due process or habeas corpus.

If they were held accountable for strictly following the law in all cases, most would probably lose their jobs, bringing the state apparatus at the local level to a halt and endangering the system of government control. That is why, even though the powerful know what lesser officials do, they usually turn a blind eye — as long as they can cover up the misdeeds and the public doesn’t become outraged.

When public outrage does ensue, another mechanism of control — intervention by senior officials — sometimes occurs. That happened in September 2010 after a man set himself on fire to protest a building demolition in Jiangxi Province. High-level leaders fired a party boss and mayor for negligence.

But the case of Mr. Chen evidently didn’t qualify for such intervention, because another rule of power in China came into play: Never seem to bend to the demands of foreign powers. In such cases, it is the central government that digs in its heels, and the louder the outcry grows, the worse the situation becomes. In the government’s eyes, there is a stark difference between a homegrown problem like the one in Jiangxi and a case like Mr. Chen’s, in which the government perceives foreign meddling.

Congress has passed an amendment expressing support for Mr. Chen, and Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton recently criticized his house arrest in a speech. China saw these developments as an intolerable slap in the face.

Beijing does not indiscriminately reject all such “interference”; China and the United States conduct a dialogue on human rights through diplomatic channels. But Chinese leaders believe such dialogue belongs behind closed doors.

The Chinese are saying to Americans, if you grant me face, I can be reasonable; if solving the problem will help me, I’ll consider it. But don’t expect me to make concessions under pressure.

Such concessions would call into question the regime’s legitimacy. And once the issue is survival, the government is in effect cornered, leaving it no choice but to resort to drastic measures from which nothing — sense, humanity or law — can dissuade it.

The problem turns into one of “sovereignty,” which in the Chinese government’s vocabulary means the absolute, non-negotiable right to rule over a billion subjects. When sovereignty is in play, there is no longer a right or wrong side of an issue, just winning or losing.

A similar logic was involved 22 years ago at Tiananmen Square. The protesters there asked for nothing more than dialogue, but the government stubbornly refused because it didn’t want to set a precedent. To Chinese leaders, “governing” means absolute control. Allowing the people to become a rival to the government might bring down the system.

The same is true in Mr. Chen’s case, but with an important difference: in 1989, the government refused to set a precedent of yielding to popular demand at home. Today it refuses to set a precedent of yielding to American pressure.

China and the United States have been discussing human rights issues for so many years that it is baffling that American leaders remain so clueless about the Chinese government’s mind-set. Previous high-profile cases were resolved behind the scenes. Mr. Chen’s case should have been approached this way, too — not through public pressure.

I welcome American politicians’ concerns about China’s human rights situation. But I have one request: please be a bit more considerate, a bit more flexible, and a bit more tactful about our leaders’ mind-set. That way, you — and we — might have more success.

Last weekend, representatives of 54 countries, mostly heads of government, attended the bi-annual Commonwealth Meeting. High on the agenda was a report by the Eminent Persons Group (EPG), established to reinvigorate the Commonwealth, strengthen its Secretariat, and transform its approach to human rights. The group included  former Australian High Court Justice Michael Kirby, former British Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind, former Malay Prime Minister Tun Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, and Mozamibique’s former first lady (and wife of Nelson Mandela) Graça Machel, among others. The group’s recommendations were unanimous.

But the Commonwealth’s assembled leaders ignored the report’s key recommendation, which concerned the establishment of a Human Rights Commissioner to oversee and report on the actions of member governments. The human-rights performance of Commonwealth countries, both developed and developing, needs improvement in many areas. Unfortunately, some African governments regarded the report as targeting developing countries, though the recommendations would have been just as relevant to certain developed countries that, especially since the terrorist attacks of 2001, have violated basic human-rights protections.

The record of the Commonwealth countries in regard to ethnic minorities can also be substantially improved. In too many countries, minorities, especially indigenous groups, are treated heavy-handedly. Similarly, as refugee flows have altered direction over the last 15 or 20 years, treatment of refugees – enshrined since 1951 in the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees – needs to be re-examined.

Many Commonwealth countries live on the edge of these particular problems. Some have large refugee camps within their borders. Others receive entire families fleeing persecution and terror in their own countries. More light needs to be shed on this problem.

The standards enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights need reinvigorating. Openness, transparency, and better knowledge of conditions in particular countries would do much to raise the level of debate – and thus to ensure greater progress. In too many countries, there is an incipient reversion to racism.

The second major issue for the meeting concerned the civil war in Sri Lanka and whether both the government and the Tamils had committed war crimes in the conflict’s final years. The question, however, was virtually ignored. A United Nations Human Rights Commission report suggests that there is substantial evidence of major war crimes by both the government and the Tamil Tigers, especially in the last 2-3 years of the conflict. A separate and entirely independent report by the International Crisis Group came to much the same conclusion.

Indeed, there is now sufficient evidence to justify a full international inquiry into the actions of both sides, potentially leading to indictments before the International Criminal Court. But the Commonwealth leaders suggested that the matter should be managed bilaterally, rather than by the organization as a whole.

This failure to debate what happened in Sri Lanka may have consequences for the Commonwealth down the line. Indeed, several weeks ago, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper spoke strongly against the lack of action in Sri Lanka, and indicated that if the next Commonwealth meeting is held there, as currently planned, he will not attend. He may not be the only leader to take such a stand when the time comes.

Human rights should be a matter on which the Commonwealth stands united, with firmness, resolution, and determination. The Commonwealth should be at the forefront of the continuing struggle to promote accountability for violations whenever and wherever they occur. That opportunity has been lost.

The advancement of human rights has taken many different forms. For example, Admiral Lord Michael Boyce, Chief of the Defense Staff of the British Armed Services at the start of the Iraq war, told Prime Minister Tony Blair that he would not order troops to invade unless he was assured unequivocally that the war was legal under British and international law. Unfortunately, the British government’s response was extraordinarily deficient, and did not in any sense constitute a valid legal opinion.

The Commonwealth has taken substantive action in the past, especially in relation to Apartheid-era South Africa. Most members of the Commonwealth have signed on to the International Criminal Court, perhaps the most important institutional change in the international legal architecture since the establishment of the UN itself.

The Commonwealth’s people deserve much better than what their leaders delivered at the Australia summit. If the Commonwealth is to become the vital international body that its national leaders wish it to be, it needs a different temper and more coherent and effective leadership, as envisaged by the Eminent Persons Group’s report. It needs the Human Rights Commissioner. But most of all it needs national leaders who are prepared to act on the basis of conviction and steadfastness of purpose, rather than evading and shirking their responsibilities when divisive issues arise.

Eleven years ago, the U.S. Congress passed Public Law 106-286, granting permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) with China. I was among the vocal opponents of this legislation, citing concerns about China’s egregious human rights record and the risks to U.S. businesses when trading with a country that plays by its own rules instead of abiding by the rule of law.

As chairman of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, a bipartisan body established to monitor and address the human rights concerns raised during the debates on PNTR, I know these concerns remain as relevant today as ever. However, in the years since the granting of PNTR, China has continued to abuse the fundamental human rights of its citizens while failing to establish a fair and transparent legal system. Indeed, as I wrote these words, Nobel Laureate Liu Xiaobo was languishing in a Chinese prison for promoting peaceful democratic reforms, but he is just one of 1.3 billion Chinese who live under the Chinese state’s repression.

On Oct. 11, our commission issued its 10th annual report on China’s progress in human rights and rule of law. A decade since our inaugural report documented China’s failings and stagnancy in these areas, China’s human rights record remains grim and has regressed in many respects.

The 2011 report notes that China’s leaders have tightened their grip on Chinese society and grown more aggressive in disregarding the very laws and international standards that they claim to uphold. The government’s campaign to “disappear” numerous lawyers and activists following pro-democracy protests elsewhere in the world – one of China’s harshest crackdowns in recent memory – is but one example.

The commission’s 2011 report also documents ongoing abuses in the areas of religious freedom. Protestant house church members, “underground” Catholics and Falun Gong members continue to risk detention and abuse for attempting to worship freely. Tibetans and Uighurs face harsh curbs on their cultures and languages in addition to religious repression.

China’s implementation of the one-child-per-couple policy remains one of the most brutal and barbaric attacks against women and children ever. Through coercion, financial penalties and the use of forced abortion and sterilization, the Chinese government continues its population control program and limits the number of children women may bear. It is no coincidence that according to the World Bank and the World Health Organization, approximately 500 women committed suicide a day in China in 2009. The Nuremberg Nazi war crimes tribunal properly construed forced abortion as a crime against humanity, but nothing in human history compares to the magnitude of China’s 30-year assault on women and children.

Women bear the major brunt of the one-child policy not only when they become mothers. Because of the male preference in China’s society and the limitation of the family size to one child, the policy has directly contributed to what is accurately described as gendercide, the deliberate extermination of a girl – born or unborn – simply because she happens to be female.

It has been noted that the three most dangerous words in China today are “It’s a girl.”

China’s workers lack freedom of association and the right to form independent unions, while poor working conditions and low wages remain rampant. The report also documents incidences of forced and child labor. And 10 years since China joined the World Trade Organization, China’s disregard for the rule of law and unfair trade practices also brings harm to U.S. companies. Tragic cases of political imprisonment abound in the report. “Disappeared” lawyer Gao Zhisheng, Catholic bishop Su Zhimin, and Mongol activist Hada are but a few of the prisoners mentioned.

The report draws on the work of the commission’s political prisoner database, a publicly available resource that documents more than 6,600 cases of political imprisonment in China. Given China’s controls over the free flow of information and lack of transparency, the true number of political prisoners in China is certain to be much higher. But our database is not simply about numbers. Each record tells the story of a person targeted by authorities for daring to exercise his rights – including lawyers, activists, religious leaders, farmers, parents, teachers and factory workers.

The Chinese government has long claimed that our report amounts to anti-China rhetoric and interference in its internal affairs. We are not, however, holding China to a unique measure but simply monitoring its compliance with the same universal human rights standards that apply to all countries. As China adopts a rhetorical strategy of claiming it abides by international law, we also hold China to its stated acceptance of international norms.

Moreover, the point of our report is not simply to single out problems, but to extend a hand to the Chinese people in their efforts to seek reform and defend their rights. To that end, each report includes recommendations for advancing the rule of law and human rights in China. They include support for legal cooperation, training for advocates to promote religious freedom, and dialogue on advancing commercial rule of law. In addition, where we see areas of potential progress, including recent reforms in the areas of criminal law and legal aid, our report notes them.

In the end, however, the good news is far outweighed by the bad, reminding us of the importance of sustained monitoring of China’s human rights record. As a nation committed to freedom, democracy and the rule of law, the United States must redouble its efforts, work harder to hold China accountable for its actions and ensure that any push for enhanced economic ties with China does not come at the expense of our own economy, national security and our commitment to help the Chinese people secure human rights protections from their own government.

Wednesday’s Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing to consider the nomination of Michael McFaul as the next U.S. ambassador to Russia highlights one of three steps that Congress should take this fall related to Russia and U.S.-Russian relations.

The Senate should confirm McFaul, who has served as President Obama’s top adviser on Russia at the National Security Council. Second, both the House and Senate should waive the Cold War-era Jackson-Vanik Amendment, which deals with emigration of Soviet Jews as it applies to Russia, and third, they should replace it with an up-to-date bill that would sanction Russian officials responsible for gross human rights abuses. These moves would strengthen McFaul’s hand as he heads to Moscow.

Notwithstanding some serious concerns we have had with Obama’s “reset” policy — we think the administration has oversold its successes, essentially ignored Russia’s neighbors and done too little on human rights concerns — McFaul is a renowned Russia expert, a strong proponent of democracy promotion (he recently wrote a book on the subject) and deserves the Senate’s support.

He regularly meets with representatives and activists from Russia’s neighboring states, even though those countries technically fall under a different directorate at the NSC. He also meets with Russian opposition figures and civil society activists in Washington and every time he travels to Russia. If he gets confirmed, we are confident that Russia’s deteriorating human rights situation will receive high-level attention at the U.S. Embassy. It would be particularly good to have McFaul in Moscow before Russia’s elections (for parliament in December and for the presidency next March), even if they will be flawed, so that he can offer a frank, on-the-ground assessment.

McFaul’s efforts would be enhanced if Congress both repealed the Jackson-Vanik amendment and in its place adopted the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2011. Passed in 1974, Jackson-Vanik denied permanent normal trade relations status to countries such as the then-Soviet Union for restricting Jewish emigration. Every year since 1994, however, Russia has complied with Jackson-Vanik requirements. That it remains on the books is a source of endless irritation to Russian officials and activists. Accordingly, graduating Russia from Jackson-Vanik was supported by the Bush administration and is a top priority of the Obama administration. Fifteen countries have been graduated from Jackson-Vanik, a piece of legislation that served its purpose but has outlived its utility.

Yet Congress is reluctant to lift Jackson-Vanik for Russia. For starters, few members of either the House or the Senate are strongly advocating its demise. Second, other issues have become attached to Jackson-Vanik, such as Russia’s overall record on human rights. Finally, some members of Congress believe Jackson-Vanik offers a sliver of leverage by which to register concerns about Russia’s trajectory.

That’s where the Magnitsky legislation comes into play. Sponsored by Sen. Benjamin Cardin (D-Md.) with 21 Senate co-sponsors (nine Democrats, 11 Republicans and one independent), the legislation would impose a visa ban and asset freeze against Russian officials responsible for serious human rights abuses, such as the 2009 death of 37-year-old Sergei Magnitsky. Jailed unjustly after alleging that officers of Russia’s Interior Ministry took part in a $230 million tax fraud against his client, Hermitage Capital Management, Magnitsky was murdered in jail by being denied medical treatment despite endless pleas for help.

Like no other initiative in memory, this legislative push in both Congress and in Europe (the Dutch parliament in July unanimously endorsed a Magnitsky-like effort, and the European parliament has done the same) has struck a chord in Moscow and forced Russian authorities to reopen the Magnitsky case. Several prison officials where Magnitsky had been held are now the focus of investigations. In the absence of accountability and rule of law in Russia, American and European parliamentarians have made it clear that if Russian officials engage in major human rights abuses, they and their immediate families cannot enjoy the privilege of traveling to, living or studying in the West, or doing their banking in Western financial institutions.

This draft bill has already done more for the cause of human rights in Russia than anything done by the Obama administration (or by the Bush administration before it). It also caused the State Department to ban certain Russian officials implicated in the Magnitsky case, though this is not sufficient, and these individuals should also be added to an asset-freeze list.

Threats from Russian officials that passage of the Magnitsky legislation would sink the reset policy and end cooperation on issues such as Iran, North Korea and Afghanistan are hollow. Russia presumably is cooperating with us on these strategic challenges because it is in their interest to do so, not because they’re doing us favors.

By waiving Jackson-Vanik for Russia and passing the Magnitsky bill in its place, Congress would be arming the next ambassador to Russia with critical bipartisan support for advancing the cause of freedom and human rights in Russia

The media circus generated by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s annual visit to the U.N. General Assembly in New York is a source of great frustration for many Iranians, who wish Western journalists would ask tougher questions about Ahmadinejad’s domestic practices. The following questions are culled from Iranian democracy and human rights activists who don’t have a chance to query the president directly:

Your boss, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was selected by a few dozen clerics more than 20 years ago. Do you believe that he — as his office has asserted — is the prophet’s representative on Earth?

Khamenei hasn’t left Iran since 1989. Nearly half of Iran’s population was born after 1989. Do you think this provides him with a good understanding of the modern world in which they live?

One of your key clerical backers, Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, proclaimed after your contested reelection in 2009 that obeying you was akin to obeying God. More recently he has asserted that you are under the influence of Satan. What explains Mesbah Yazdi’s, or God’s, fickleness?

There is evidence that your chief adviser, Rahim Mashai, helped secure loans for the leading suspect in a $2.6 billion bank fraud case, the largest embezzlement scandal in Iranian history. You came to office vowing to “cut off the hands” of the corrupt; how will you deal with Mashai?

Your opponents in 2009, Mir Hossein Mousavi, 69, and Mehdi Karroubi, 73, have been held incommunicado for nearly a year. On what basis are they confined? If they have no influence, as you have said, why are they under house arrest?

Somayeh Tohidlou, a 32-year-old female sociology PhD student, recently received 50 lashes in prison for having “insulted” you by campaigning for Mousavi in 2009. Do you believe that men lashing women for their political views is an appropriate form of punishment?

You said last September that “freedom is a divine right.” Does that apply to Iran’s Bahais, who are persecuted for practicing their faith, discriminated against in the workplace and imprisoned for attempting to educate their youth, who have been barred from university?

In March you claimed that Iran is “the best example for asserting human rights in the world.” So why has your government refused to allow the U.N. special rapporteur for human rights in Iran, Ahmed Shaheed, to visit your country and investigate allegations of human rights violations?

In a BBC survey of 27 countries, including non-Western nations such as China, Nigeria and the Philippines, Iran ranks as “the most negatively viewed of all countries rated,” even below North Korea, with just a 16 percent favorability rating. Why?

According to a recent Zogby poll, popular support for Iran in the Arab world has recently “plummeted.” Qatari Prime Minister Hamad Bin Jasim al-Thani described his country’s relationship with your government as “they lie to us, and we lie to them.” Why do you believe that you are “a source of inspiration” to Arabs?

Nongovernmental organizations, including Transparency International, Freedom House and the World Bank, have said that Iran’s rates of corruption, economic malaise and repression during your tenure are higher than those of Hosni Mubarak’s Egypt and Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali’s Tunisia. Are you confident you won’t share their fate?

Iran’s closest ally since the 1979 revolution, Syria, has brutally killed more than 2,600 citizens this year — including children — who were protesting for greater political freedoms. How do you reconcile your country’s close friendship with Bashar al-Assad’s regime, given your claim to stand for justice and the oppressed?

The anti-government protests in Iran on June 15, 2009, were significantly larger than any protests in the Middle East this year, yet you referred to the protesters as “dust and dirt.” Do you regret using that term?

In leaked diplomatic cables, a senior Iraqi tribal leader asserted that your government has provided him and other Iraqi officials “short-term marriages” with Iranian women in order to garner influence. Does Iran use prostitution as a form of statecraft?

During your presidency Iran has had the highest per capita execution rate in the world, including recent public executions and executions of people accused of being homosexual. Are you proud of this record?

Ali Vakili Rad, who was convicted by the French in 1991 for the brutal stabbing death of 77-year-old Iranian democracy activist Shapour Bakhtiar in Paris, was given an official hero’s welcome at the Tehran airport upon his release from prison last year. Why does your government glorify assassins?

American filmmaker Michael Moore has asked for permission to travel to Iran to attend Cinema Verite, an Iranian international festival for documentary films, according to Mehr News, the mouthpiece news agency of Iran’s Islamic regime.

In a big-headlined story in the Iranian media, Mr. Moore is quoted as saying he wants to visit Iran to do research about the country. In addition, he is an opponent of U.S. government policies, and he wants to show his objection by traveling to Iran.

Mr. Moore, who has directed several well-known documentaries, has always claimed to take the side of ordinary people and has portrayed himself as someone who stands up for the rights of the abused.

It is this reputation that makes Mr. Moore’s proposed visit to Iran a betrayal of the very principles he claims to stand for.

Since the 1979 revolution, the Islamic regime of Iran has executed tens of thousands of Iranian youths without giving them the right to a defense. During the summer of 1988 alone, about 30,000 young people were executed and buried in mass graves because they were accused of being “mohareb” – enemies of Allah – all because they objected to the harsh rule of the clerics.

Mr. Moore should know – he should understand – that Iranian citizens have no rights. Women are subjected to flogging for failing to wear the Islamic hijab; men are beaten for drinking, even in the privacy of their home. People suffer amputation for stealing; they are stoned for adultery; and rape, torture and hanging are common for speaking out against the clerics. Thousands of Iranian girls, boys, poets, writers, activists, teachers, artists and others from every walk of life remain in Iranian prisons without the right to defend themselves. Iranian officials are routinely sanctioned for violating human rights in Iran.

The very cinema festival that Mr. Moore wants to endorse is subjected to extreme censorship by the Guidance Ministry, which decides which films will be shown and which will be banned. Many movies don’t make it to the screen because they promote free thinking or give a hint of what freedom really means. Many directors and actors end up in prison because they try to defend the rights of the people.

More recently, one of the most influential Iranian filmmakers, Jafar Panahi, was imprisoned – because he supported the aspirations of the Iranian people for freedom and had sympathized with the youths who had protested the fraudulent 2009 presidential elections. The secret police arrested him in March of 2010 along with his wife, children and friends. He was sentenced to prison and barred from making movies for 20 years.

Mr. Panahi stated in an open letter on the occasion of the 2011 Berlin International Film Festival, Berlinale (which he was barred from attending) “The reality is that they have deprived me of thinking and writing for twenty years; however, I cannot avoid dreaming that in twenty years the inquisition and intimidation will be abolished. … They have condemned me to 20 years of silence. However, in my dreams, I scream for a time when we can tolerate each other, respect each other’s opinions, and live for each other.”

Many before Mr. Moore have traveled to Iran to show their opposition to the policies of America, the very country that has provided them the opportunity of free thinking and free will.

Mr. Moore fails to understand what endorsing evil does. He fails to understand that any affirmation, any recognition of the radicals ruling Iran is a direct insult to all the Iranians who have paid dearly with their blood to have what Mr. Moore takes for granted.

Instead of traveling to Iran, where the Islamic government will use him as a means for its propaganda, as it has done with others, Mr. Moore should make a documentary about the aspirations of the Iranian people for freedom and democracy – a documentary about the injustices done to young people, middle-aged people, old people who want nothing more than their rights as human beings.

Libya stands on the brink of a new future, one that holds out the promise of democracy and freedom after 40 years of oppression. One of the most important tasks facing the interim government is the prevention of reprisals. That is why David Cameron and I have urged the National Transitional Council to exercise restraint and respect for human rights.

Britain has a proud history of international leadership on human rights. It was our political leadership and legal expertise that led to the creation of the European convention on human rights in 1950, a convention modelled on centuries of English law. That leadership matters now more than ever.

Yet something strange has happened in recent years: while governments have continued the call for greater rights abroad, they have belittled the relevance of rights at home. The Labour government that passed the Human Rights Act then spent years trashing it, allowing a myth to take root that human rights are a foreign invention, unwanted here, a charter for greedy lawyers and meddlesome bureaucrats.

This myth panders to a view that no rights, not even the most basic, come without responsibilities; that criminals ought to forfeit their very humanity the moment they step out of line; and that the punishment of lawbreakers ought not to be restrained by due process.

The reality is that those who need to make use of human rights laws to challenge the decisions of the authorities are nearly always people who are in the care of the state: children’s homes, mental hospitals, immigration detention, residential care. They are often vulnerable, powerless, or outsiders, and are sometimes people for whom the public feels little sympathy. But they are human beings, and our common humanity dictates that we treat them as such.

There is, of course, a sensible discussion to be had about the details of how the act operates. In November the UK takes over the chairmanship of the Council of Europe, and the government wants to take the opportunity to advance the reform of the European court of human rights, for example to improve the timeliness and consistency of its decision-making. At home, the government has set up a commission to investigate the case for establishing a UK bill of rights. It has long been my party’s policy to use a bill of rights to deepen our commitment to the protections of the Human Rights Act, and also to protect other British liberties, such as the right to jury trial.

But the biggest problem with the Human Rights Act is not how it operates in the courts, nor how it interacts with other rights. It is how it is manipulated not just by the media but by overcautious officials. It was, for example, of no help to anyone when police spokespeople blamed human rights for a decision to deliver a KFC meal to a fugitive on a roof: this had nothing to do with the Human Rights act. There is no human right to fried chicken.

So, as Cameron has said, we need to “get a grip on the misrepresentation of human rights”. Too many people have succumbed to a culture of legal paranoia where common sense decisions are questioned – not by the courts, but by overcautious lawyers and officials. This creates an ever-worsening cycle: the more we perpetuate the myth that, in the words of Jack Straw, human rights are a “villains’ charter”, the more those dealing with lawbreakers curtail their behaviour because of a general sense that rights trump common sense. The friends of human rights have the most to gain if we get a grip on this. We must give public officials back the confidence that reasonable decisions taken in the public interest will be defended by the courts – as they usually are when they actually reach the courts.

Court judgments themselves tend to tell a very different story about our rights culture than tabloid papers. The Human Rights Act and the European convention on human rights have been instrumental in preventing local authorities from snooping on law-abiding families, in removing innocent people from the national DNA database, in preventing rapists from cross-examining their victims in court, in defending the rights of parents to have a say in the medical treatment of their children, in holding local authorities to account where they have failed to protect children from abuse, in protecting the anonymity of journalists’ sources, and in upholding the rights of elderly married couples to be cared for together in care homes.

Some of these cases were decided in Strasbourg; many others were resolved by British courts thanks to the incorporation of the convention into domestic law under the Human Rights Act. I believe that was a hugely positive step which has done three things: it has ended the long delays people used to experience before they could get a hearing at Strasbourg, embedded the principles of the ECHR in our own courts, and sent a powerful message to the rest of the world about the value we place on human rights. So as we continue to promote human rights abroad, we must ensure we work to uphold them here at home. We have a proud record that we should never abandon.

Now that Congress is returning from the August recess with plans to vote on pending free-trade agreements, partisan bickering must not be allowed to kill the U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement (FTA). The Colombia of President Juan Manuel Santos is a far different country from the Colombia of his predecessor, Alvaro Uribe. Liberals should recognize that some progress has been made on human rights concerns that kept them from supporting the agreement for nearly five years. It is time for the United States to recognize that progress by passing the bilateral FTA, which virtually eliminates tariff and other trade barriers between the two countries. Equally important is the political seal of approval that is perceived to go with it, which also might stall attacks on Mr. Santos‘ reforms.

Until now, labor unions and human rights activists, both with strong Democratic Party links, have conditioned support for the FTA on protections for labor leaders and progress on human rights. They had good reasons for this, given a staggering 2,800 murders of trade-union members in the past 25 years.

Since his inauguration, Mr. Santos has signed and wholeheartedly endorsed a victims law that includes reparations and the return of land to those who have been displaced by Colombia’s four decades of civil war. Breaking with Mr. Uribe, he defined victims not only as those attacked by the paramilitary, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and National Liberation Army (ELN), but also by Colombia’s security forces. All told, the law covers more than 4 million people. Mr. Santos also has demonstrated respect for the judiciary and ended official slandering of human rights activists.He and his vice president have supported labor rights protections and approved additional resources for the country’s attorney general to investigate and prosecute those responsible for abuses of labor and human rights.

Human rights groups acknowledge the changed tone and the importance of those new laws but disagree about how much actual progress has taken place on the ground over the past 10 months. They challenge the government to do more to protect activists. The question is what would be the best strategy to encourage further progress. When I traveled to Colombia several months ago, it already was clear that traditional political spoilers were organizing to undermine Mr. Santos‘ changes. The best way to encourage Mr. Santos to take further steps to end impunity and protect activists, political candidates and indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities is to approve the FTA, which his predecessor was denied.

I am a convert. Passing the FTA was never simply about trade and labor rights – as fundamental as they are – but also includes a broader relationship between the United States and Colombia, where extrajudicial executions, torture, impunity and violation of human rights are not acceptable. Colombia’s past failure to make sufficient progress on these issues raised legitimate questions about approving the FTA, but the balance has shifted.

Congress had postponed voting on the 5-year-old Colombia FTA, along with the Panama and Korea agreements, until a deal was worked out to allow separate votes on trade-adjustment aid and on the FTAs themselves. Democrats should join in ratifying the Colombia pact, and they should credit progress on human rights.

But that is just a start, and much more needs to be done. Mr. Santos should support faster civilian prosecutions of those in the armed forces responsible for massacres and extrajudicial executions, expose government officials with links to paramilitary and criminal and drug-trafficking groups, invigorate the early-warning system to protect human rights defenders and ensure that those displaced by the conflict who are given back their homes and land are protected under the law from new attacks. The risks here over the next several months are real, and close monitoring, hopefully, has been agreed to by the two governments.

During my trip, I traveled to the “consolidation zone” of Barrancabermeja. Community leaders there were still living with security threats from new illegally armed groups and guerrillas. They told me that victims who already had returned to their lands were still particularly vulnerable. Protecting these beneficiaries requires a major comprehensive strategic effort by the government.

Drug trafficking still benefits violent illegal actors, including the Cold War remnants in Colombia’s internal armed conflict. While rarer than in the past, abuses by government security forces still threaten human rights, and the few convictions for extrajudicial killings underscore the persistent impunity that undermines the rule of law. Gaps remain in protecting indigenous and Afro-Colombian rights and in strengthening the capacity of the attorney general’s office.

However, in a short amount of time, Mr. Santos has changed the direction of the state. Now is the time to act to prevent more conservative, dark forces from pushing him off course.

As Syria continues to burn under leader Bashar Assad’s Hama 2.0 operation, all hope seems fixed solely on the United Nations Security Council. However, far from New York, the world’s newest human rights organization is in a position to take the next pivotal move to defuse the crisis if it so chooses.

Receiving little attention in June, the 57-member Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), formerly known as the Organization of the Islamic Conference, set up its new human rights body, the OIC Commission on Human Rights (OICCHR). Having sorted out its ministerial minutiae as late as July, the fledgling 18-member commission faces an urgent and unmistakable legitimacy test: naming and shaming the ongoing violence Mr. Assad is perpetuating against his own people.

Casual observers of institutions like the OIC are correct to frown at the chances of this happening. The OIC resolution calling for the creation of the OICCHR contains a dizzying array of limitations, claw-back clauses and torturous language that appears to shield human rights violators rather than expose them. One clause, for instance, pointedly advocates “the non-use of the universality of human rights as a pretext in the state’s internal affairs and diminish their national sovereignty.” Another ostensibly backward clause calls upon OIC member states to work together to “increase Islamic solidarity to confront any initiative that may lead to use of human rights as a means of exercising pressure on any member state.” Add the fact that Iran and Sudan are charter members of the OICCHR, and it is easy to think the organization will be stuck in neutral – at best.

But an OICCHR move on Syria may not be as hopeless as it seems.

On the procedural level, the OICCHR statute permits the organ to call “extraordinary meetings” at the request of any member state outside of the body’s limited biannual schedule. Next, while the statute mandates that its decisions be consensus-based, a two-thirds majority can be used if the former “is not possible.” Luckily, Syria was not one of the first 18 OIC member states to land a representative on the OICCHR.

Next, all the talk of so-called Islamic unity against interference in members’ domestic affairs is more window-dressing than policy. There are many extremely timely examples of this.

For one, the Arab League gave the crucial thumbs-up for a no-fly zone over Libya, which the U.N. Security Council ultimately authorized. While it helped that Col. Moammar Gadhafi was already considered the black sheep of the Arab world, Mr. Assad’s reputation definitely is not trending these days. In fact, the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) already have condemned the violence taking place in Syria. Every member of the Arab League and GCC is also a member of the OIC.

OIC member Saudi Arabia, which has every political incentive to pile on its geopolitical nemesis Syria but also has a number of skeletons in its own human rights closet, has publicly criticized Syria’s actions. Yes, it really was Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah who publicly declared, “Any sane Arab, Muslim or anyone else knows that this has nothing to do with religion, or ethics or morals; spilling the blood of the innocent for any reasons or pretext leads to no path to … hope.” Kuwait and Bahrain have joined Saudi Arabia in recalling their respective ambassadors from Damascus.

Finally, while imposing a no-fly zone in Syria or even booting Syria out of the OIC may be a bridge simply too far for the inchoate OICCHR, the commission is far from powerless.

If the OICCHR were merely to issue a statement condemning the ever-worsening macabre apparatus of death Mr. Assad is launching against the Syrian people, it would take a huge and indisputable step toward establishing its fundamental legitimacy and contributing to the growing international isolation of Mr. Assad. With an effective, regional, institutional hat trick – Arab League, GCC, and OICCHR – coming out against him, Mr. Assad may very well start looking for a way out.

Even if Mr. Assad ignores such a move by the OICCHR, he will have suffered a substantial international rebuke from an institution once considered a safe haven. Moreover, independent OICCHR action will place the U.N. Security Council in a much better political position to use additional diplomatic or other coercive tools to put an end to his reign of terror.

Expecting the OICCHR to take this kind of action, regardless of the fact that it is an infant in terms of its institutional development, is admittedly asking a lot. Nevertheless, as Mr. Assad continues to employ tanks and gunships against the Syrian people, it is do-or-die time for the new organization.

The case of Sergei Magnitsky has come to symbolize the rampant and often violent corruption plaguing the Russian state. Sergei, a 37-year-old tax lawyer, husband and father working for an American firm in Moscow, blew the whistle on the largest known tax fraud in Russian history. For that he was arrested in 2008 by those he accused, and he was imprisoned under torturous conditions for nearly a year. He was denied medical care and beaten by prison guards; he died alone in November 2009 in an isolation cell as doctors waited outside his door. These facts are accepted at the highest levels of Russia’s government, yet those implicated in his death remain unpunished, in positions of authority. Some have even been decorated and promoted.

Sergei joins a heartbreaking list of Russian heroes who lost their lives because they stood up for principle. These ranks include Natalya Estemirova, a brave human rights activist whose
bullet-riddled body was found on a roadside in 2009 in the North Caucasus; Anna Politikovskaya, an intrepid reporter shot in Moscow in 2006 while carrying home groceries; and too many others.

While many aspects of Sergei’s and other cases are difficult to pursue in the United States, there are steps we can take.

In April 2010, I called upon the State Department to implement a travel ban against 60 Russian officials involved in Sergei’s torture and death. Last month, State effectively did just that, putting dozens of Russian officials on a visa blacklist. This is a major step, but it doesn’t go far enough.

Sergei’s case is but one of many gross violations of human rights going unpunished in Russia. Additionally, kleptocrats are well aware of the threat to their fortunes from corrupt colleagues and seek financial havens abroad. The Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act, which I co-sponsored along with 20 other senators, is a broad human rights bill that would invoke a travel ban against serious violators of human rights, freeze any U.S. assets they may possess and publish their names — a powerful deterrent for those craving respectability and legitimacy in the West.

This bipartisan effort sends the unambiguous warning that even if your home country looks the other way as you violate human rights and trample the rule of law, the United States will not stand by as an unwitting accomplice in your crimes. The legislation provides moral support to those who suffer or risk their safety to fight for justice. It will also go a long way in protecting American companies active in the Russian market that risk falling prey to raiding schemes and that may fear reprisal for speaking out.

Shortly after Sergei’s death, the American founding partner of the firm that employed him fled Russia, fearing for his life after evidence surfaced that a similar scheme was about to be perpetrated against other U.S. clients. We know that some of the money stolen from the Russian treasury in the fraud Sergei exposed passed through correspondent accounts at two major U.S. banks. Some involved in this case are known to have links with international arms smugglers and drug cartels.

The threats and cynical reaction to my legislation further expose the character of those who hold power in Russia, where, despite occasional rhetoric from the Kremlin, authorities have failed to take meaningful action to stem the rampant corruption or bring perpetrators of human rights abuses to justice. Their bluster contrasts sharply with the strong support on the Russian street for serious action against corruption and impunity.

We must be willing to see beyond the veil of sovereignty that corrupt officials often hide behind. They use courts, prosecutors, police and international instruments such as Interpol or mutual legal assistance treaties as weapons of intimidation, hoping that outsiders are given pause by their trappings of office and lack of criminal records. We must also protect our financial system from those who would use it to launder ill-gotten gains.

While I support President Obama’s efforts to improve U.S.-Russian relations, we must not abandon American values in the process; nor should we minimize the power of our influence and example. Our president has made clear that Russia’s economic success depends heavily on whether Russia can modernize and liberalize politically. I agree and see a strong, stable Russia that is prosperous and free as a valuable partner in a dangerous world. But we must first make clear that the rule of law and respect for human rights advance better relations and increased trade, and they are not distant goals.

The coming year promises to be an interesting one for bilateral relations, with elections in Russia and the United States. Let’s take the long view and remember our true friends in Russia — in and out of government — and stand with them in the universal cause of liberty and human dignity.

Why not Iran?

Egypt and Tunisia have overthrown repressive regimes. Citizens in Syria, Yemen and other Middle East countries are demanding change. Yet in Iran, where a wave of 2009 demonstrations helped spark the movements we are now witnessing elsewhere in the Middle East, the populace is strangely silent.

What accounts for the relative quiet in Iran? The answer, at least in part, is that one of the great human rights tragedies of the modern era is underway in Iran.

From the moment the first protesters hit Tahrir Square in Cairo, Iran’s leadership has cracked down hard, instituting a brutal campaign of terror against its own people. The most gruesome manifestation of this repression has been a wave of public executions.

Since January, Iran has been on an execution binge. In February, the United Nations reported that the rate of executions in Iran had increased threefold in 2011 over the previous year. Amnesty International reported that Iran is the only country this year known to have executed juvenile offenders, a violation of international law. And though exact numbers are difficult to come by, it is now estimated by human rights organizations that more than 140 people have been executed in Iran so far this year, a rate that, if continued, would push the number far past the total for 2010.

What is perhaps most disturbing, and provides clear evidence of Iran’s effort to intimidate and terrorize its own population, is the growing number of executions in Iran taking place in public. Amnesty International estimates that as many as 13 people had been hanged in public by the end of April, compared to a total 14 in all of 2010. In a number of instances, those executed have been left hanging high in the air on construction cranes for all to see.

As an Amnesty official noted in an April report: “It is deeply disturbing that despite a moratorium on public executions ordered in 2008, the Iranian authorities are once again seeking to intimidate people by such spectacles, which not only dehumanize the victim but brutalize those who witness it.” Only a month later, Iran Human Rights, a leading human rights group on Iran, reported that the regime put 54 people to death in May, with 15 of the executions carried out publicly.

The international community needs to call for an end to this kind of barbarism and highlight more broadly the deteriorating human rights situation in Iran.

In response to Iran’s brazen attempts to intimidate and terrorize its own people, United Against Nuclear Iran has launched a Cranes Campaign. The goal is to educate crane manufacturers worldwide about the Iranian regime’s clear misuse of their products and how such use can tarnish their brand image. We know that these companies — including the Swiss company Liebherr, China’s XCMG and the Japanese firms Tadano and UNIC — do not in any way condone the use of their cranes to stage public executions. That is why they should take the principled stand of renouncing their business ties with the regime until Iran becomes a civilized member of the international community. Already, some companies are doing just that. U.S. construction manufacturers Terex Corp. and Caterpillar and Japan’s Komatsu have all ended their business ties with Iran.

Severing business dealings sends an unequivocal message to leaders in Iran that the international community finds their activities abhorrent. But that is just a start. Governments from around the world need to scrutinize the worsening human rights situation and call Iran to account.

It’s no coincidence that Iran’s increased staging of public executions came at the same time protest movements were gaining steam throughout the Middle East. What better way to keep Iranians from having “dangerous ideas” like those of their neighbors? And it should come as little surprise that Iran is now aiding other governments in the region, notably Syria, in their efforts to suppress and quash domestic uprisings.

The lesson Iran learned from the uprisings of 2009 — and the one it is trying to impart to other leaders in the region — is that the way to quash peaceful dissent is through a public display of brute force, terror, intimidation and humiliation. The proper response to that from the international community must be resolute and firm: Iran’s behavior is unacceptable and far outside the boundaries of civilized society. Civilized nations, and the businesses based in them, should never be complicit.

Al presidente Hu Jintao le gustaría ser recordado por su compromiso con la armonía como principal seña de identidad de su mandato. La sociedad armoniosa que predica, formulada como objetivo a materializar en 2020, se basa, según rezan los documentos oficiales del Partido Comunista de China (PCCh), en la democracia y el Estado de derecho, la justicia, la estabilidad, la honestidad y la solidaridad y el respeto al medio ambiente. Dicha formulación ha sido presentada como una muestra del esfuerzo por perseverar en la modernización del país, a modo de una sinización de ideas y conceptos occidentales, de forma que, asiendo tal bandera, el PCCh pudiera seguir cumpliendo su misión de garantizar la persistencia de la unidad partidaria y social y la ausencia de conflictos, e incluso ganarse una mayor respetabilidad ante los Estados occidentales, recelosos del ambiguo rumbo del gigante oriental. Pero ¿despeja dudas la armonía de Hu Jintao? ¿Cómo encajar aquellas bases con la exacerbación de la rigidez política y la manifiesta intolerancia, por ejemplo, con la más elemental libertad de expresión?

El presidente chino ha dejado entrever que su apuesta por la armonía social no alcanza a una reforma de tipo occidental (pluripartidismo o separación de poderes). No está claro que Wen Jiabao, el más “progresista” de los actuales dirigentes a juzgar por sus declaraciones, apueste tampoco por un cambio político que alargue las experiencias democráticas, si bien parece reclamar una apertura capaz de digerir un control independiente del sistema, sin el cual las reformas no podrían avanzar a buen ritmo. De este modo, en la China actual parece asumirse que el mercado o las desigualdades son fenómenos aceptables del capitalismo, pero no así el ejercicio de los derechos fundamentales o las libertades públicas, que no podrían incorporarse al “socialismo”.

Las reformas introducidas por Hu Jintao enfatizan por igual la importancia del desarrollo científico o de la armonía como estrategias para lograr un nuevo equilibrio entre las políticas económicas y sociales, tratando de atraerse la complicidad de las capas más desfavorecidas. Ello mediante la reivindicación de un papel benefactor y mediador para el PCCh, revitalizando una función mejorada de la Administración, más comprometida con la virtud y la justicia, a través de una democratización limitada de los procesos internos y la incorporación parcial de aquellos grupos socioeconómicos tradicionalmente marginados en el curso del proceso de reforma y que podrían haber perdido toda esperanza de verse realmente beneficiados por el crecimiento. Pero hasta ahora, el paternalismo al uso solo mostró una pequeña quiebra con la incorporación de personalidades independientes o reducidas manifestaciones de transparencia que no han podido soslayar la persistencia del monopolio y la opacidad más recalcitrantes.

Aunque solo fuera a efectos cosméticos, cabría esperar una actitud más tolerante respecto a la sociedad civil emergente, lo que ayudaría a calmar las contradicciones sociales. Pero tampoco ha sido así. Más que la comprensión de la necesidad de una mayor participación de la sociedad, indispensable para mejorar el funcionamiento del sistema, tal como reclama el primer ministro Wen Jiabao, pesa la idea de que toda expresión de autonomía es factor de disturbios y vocacionalmente desestabilizadora, primando los mecanismos de control para desactivar cualquier atisbo de disconformidad. Tal visión restrictiva impide la construcción de una sociedad armoniosa y convierte en ilusoria cualquier esperanza de reforma política, quedando supeditada a la exigencia de una cohesión disciplinada.

La formulación del ideal de la sociedad armoniosa parece perseguir la actualización de valores morales singulares, en buena medida correctores de los cambios individualizadores que hubieran podido derivarse de la presencia de manifestaciones de orden capitalista, hoy más presentes en la sociedad china en virtud de la reforma. Así, la reivindicación de una mayor justicia social, aceptable para el sistema, no deriva necesariamente en la admisión de un debate de ideas más libre, lo cual devendría peligroso. La sociedad armoniosa no es, pues, expresión de una voluntad liberalizadora: está orientada a encarrilar las manifestaciones de descontento en un nuevo equilibrio entre eficiencia y bienestar.

Conceptos como el Estado de derecho, las libertades individuales, etcétera, aspiran a ser reinterpretados en China, contribuyendo a legitimar un modelo basado en la originalidad de sus valores diferentes y pretendidamente culturales que operan de filtro de aquellos en los que se fundamentó el contrato social de las democracias modernas. Dicha adaptación, además, alimenta la ilusión de encontrarnos, paradójicamente, ante la expresión de un nuevo “humanismo”, un paradigma que evidenciaría la genialidad del poder chino también en lo político, capaz de hacer pasar su autoritarismo por una utopía democrática con particularidades propias.

La complejidad de la sociedad china actual aconsejaría abrir generosos espacios para una auténtica reforma política. Es ilusorio pensar que las disfunciones del sistema y el consiguiente aumento de las contradicciones sociales pueden resolverse prescindiendo del abordaje de los obstáculos estructurales que ensombrecen la modernización.

On May 28, 1961, British lawyer Peter Benenson penned a passionate article in the London Observer, drawing attention to the plight of two Portuguese students who had delivered a toast calling for democratic reform in their country and were promptly carted off to prison for defying dictator Antonio de Oliveira Salazar. Benenson wrote in that article: “Open your newspaper any day of the week, and you will find a report from somewhere in the world of someone being imprisoned, tortured or executed because his opinions or religion are unacceptable to his government…. The newspaper reader feels a sickening sense of impotence. Yet if these feelings of disgust all over the world could be united into common action, something effective could be done.” That summer, Benenson went on to co-found Amnesty International.

Today, across the Muslim world, the annual “prisoners of conscience” day — from a phrase in Benenson’s article — finds scores of political dissidents languishing in jail, their only crimes being peaceful expressions of opposition to the undemocratic regimes under which they live.

Their situation is particularly dire in Iran, where on May 17 in the city of Isfahan — home also to one of the country’s nuclear installations — jailers executed brothers Abdollah and Mohammad Fathi Shoorbariki, after subjecting Abdollah to beatings and threats of rape. Their parents were never shown the charges against their sons. According to the International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran, Bijan Fathi said, “I still don’t know whether my sons’ charge was moharebeh (enmity against God) or robbery. I don’t believe they were at war with the regime or with God.”

Last weekend Iran’s semiofficial Fars News Agency reported that Iran had arrested 30 people whom the country accuses of spying for the United States. It’s not yet clear whether the charges hold water, but even if they don’t, like so many other Iranians who stand accused of crimes against the regime, the detained face the death penalty.

In Iran, 29-year-old Iranian Kurdish university student Habibollah Latifi also faces extrajudicial execution on charges of “enmity against God” — a claim Tehran frequently invokes to silence political dissent. Latifi awaits his fate on Iran’s death row with at least 16 other known Iranian Kurds, as part of a massive wave of internal repression amid the demonstrations across the Middle East. The victims of Iran’s judicial system have no recognized rights to defend, and their trials, when they exist, are show trials at best.

According to an Amnesty International investigation last month, there has been “a sharp rise in the rate of executions in public in Iran — which have included the first executions of juvenile offenders in the world this year. Since the start of 2011, up to 13 men have been hanged in public, compared to 14 such executions recorded by Amnesty International from official Iranian sources in the whole of 2010.” Eight of those executions have taken place in the last month alone.

The plight of homosexuals, who face widespread state-sanctioned murder and violent repression, was the subject of last year’s Human Rights Watch report, “We Are a Buried Generation: Discrimination and Violence Against Sexual Minorities in Iran.” The investigatory report noted that trials based on moral charges in Iran are usually held in private. As a result, it is a herculean task to assess whether the defendants were killed for their sexual orientation.

As Iran continues its brutal crackdown on prisoners who seek the freedom to elect a government of their choosing, Western governments have swept its human rights violations under the rug, in hopes that dialogue and negotiations will somehow force its rulers to stop repressing their people.

President Obama, to his credit, has come to the realization that words alone will not change the Iranian leaders’ behavior, and he has enacted a range of sanctions against the regime as recently as this week. “Hundreds of prisoners of conscience are in jail” in Iran, Obama said in his annual address to the Iranian population on the country’s Nowruz holiday in March.

In a sharp break from his administration’s previous posture, Obama attached names to the nebulous statistics of brave Iranians promoting democracy at the risk of their livelihoods.

“We have seen Nasrin Sotoudeh jailed for defending human rights; Jafar Panahi imprisoned and unable to make his films; Abdolreza Tajik thrown in jail for being a journalist. The Bahai community and Sufi Muslims punished for their faith; Mohammad Valian, a young student, sentenced to death for throwing three stones,” Obama said.

Although the United States and the European Union have enacted human rights sanctions against Iran’s leaders, they have done little to prevent the ongoing persecution of Iran’s pro-democracy activists.

To inform the 50th anniversary of prisoners of conscience day with something more potent than symbolic speeches and commemoration events, the Obama administration must match words with actions. For starters, the president could help fast-track the one-two punch of human rights and economic sanctions legislation working its way through the House and Senate.

The new congressional measures contain a range of innovative penalties to crack down on Iranian officials responsible for human rights abuses, including targeting their assets and rejecting visas for their travel to the United States. The measures also punish foreign companies for their lucrative business deals with Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, including the sale of products used to repress Iran’s people, and the purchase of crude oil from Revolutionary Guard-controlled companies, which are the dominant force in Iran’s petroleum trade.

In southern Europe, prisoners of conscience made enormous sacrifices to bring freedom and representative government to their countries. Portugal’s fascist regime, for example, finally met its demise in 1974, as democracy began to take root. The Iranian people, who have suffered under their nation’s theocratic dictatorship for far too long, deserve no less.

In the midst of China’s worst spike in official repression in more than a decade, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao spoke out April 14 about the need for his government to “encourage people to speak truthfully.” The irony of Mr. Wen’s words would not be lost on the globally recognized activist-artist Ai Weiwei, just one of dozens of artists, lawyers, civil society activists and bloggers detained, arrested or missing since mid-February. The crackdown, sparked by official fears of a possible Middle Eastern-style “jasmine revolution” that could threaten the Chinese Communist Party’s 61-year monopoly on power, shows no sign of abating.

Mr. Ai’s case is emblematic of the increasingly thuggish tactics of security forces tasked with smothering dissent in recent weeks. Mr. Ai disappeared into police custody at Beijing Capital Airport on April 3 and has been incommunicado ever since. Government explanations of Mr. Ai’s fate consist of a single sentence – issued April 7 through Xinhua – that Mr. Ai had been detained for unspecified “economic crimes.”

Mr. Ai emerged as an outspoken advocate of truth in China in August 2007 when he disparaged the upcoming 2008 Beijing Olympics as the “fake smile” of a repressive government.

Since then, his pursuit of truth has ranged from conducting an independent tally of the child victims of the massive May 2008 Sichuan earthquake to publicly demonstrating support for Chinese human-rights defenders. But Mr. Ai’s stature as the son of a renowned revolutionary poet and his own artistic accomplishments didn’t make him immune from state reprisals. His activism reaped surveillance, harassment and a police beating in August 2009 that required emergency brain surgery a month later. In a September 2010 interview, Mr. Ai described his activism as an explicit challenge to the “ethics” of an authoritarian regime in which “everything is secret, everything is not speakable.”

But Mr. Ai is just one of dozens of Chinese citizens persecuted by their government over the past two months for doing what Mr. Wen urged and for demanding that the government uphold its constitutional and international obligations. Since mid-February, Chinese security forces have “disappeared” at least 18 others, denying them their right to due legal process and contact with loved ones and legal counsel, and heightening their vulnerability to torture while in custody. Dozens of other have been officially detained, arrested or received sentences of up to two years in re-education labor camps.

Those who have disappeared include the Guangzhou-based human rights lawyer Li Shihui, who was abducted after being brutally beaten at a bus stop Feb. 20. Those individuals who have re-emerged after disappearing, including Beijing-based human rights lawyer Teng Biao, who reappeared April 29 after a 69-day disappearance, appear to have been intimidated – or worse – into silent seclusion.

Chinese officials stonewalled U.S. government efforts to get clarity on these disappearances during the annual two-day U.S.-China Bilateral Human Rights Dialogue in Beijing on April 27 and 28. Assistant Secretary of State Michael Posner told reporters at the conclusion of the dialogue, “There was no sense of comfort from the response or the lack of response” from Chinese government officials regarding Mr. Ai’s whereabouts or well-being.

The contrast between Mr. Wen’s call for “truth” and his government’s attack on citizens who take him at his word is nothing new. Both Mr. Wen and President Hu Jintao have, in recent months, expressed a degree of support for universal human rights. Just more than a month after Chinese writer Liu Xiaobo became the world’s sole imprisoned Nobel Peace Prize winner, Mr. Hu stated at a joint news conference with President Obama on Jan. 19, “China is always committed to the protection and promotion of human rights [and] China recognizes and also respects the universality of human rights.”

In an Oct. 3, 2010, interview with CNN, Mr. Wen expressed strong support for basic human rights and asserted that “we should not only let people have the freedom of speech, we, more importantly, must create conditions to let them criticize the work of the government.” Chinese government censors blocked all transmission of that interview and forbade circulation of the transcript within the country.

The glaring disconnect between the rhetoric of China’s leaders on rule of law and the far grimmer reality on the ground should be a matter of urgent concern for all nations banking on a stable, mutually beneficial diplomatic and financial relationship with an increasingly confident and economically powerful China. In Washington earlier this week, U.S. officials, including Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Vice President Joseph R. Biden, spoke with refreshing candor about the “vigorous disagreement” between the two countries on human rights. Those U.S. officials owe it to Ai Weiwei, Li Shihui and the many other casualties of the Chinese government’s hostility to dissent to ensure that their sacrifice for truth and respect for universal rights and freedoms are an important part of the agenda for all bilateral discussions in the months and years ahead.

Just before the Beijing Olympics in 2008, a group of young Chinese activists was evacuated to the United States for safety reasons. Chinese officials were harassing and detaining people they thought might embarrass them during the Olympics. Three of the activists flew to Philadelphia that summer and slept on mattresses on my dining room floor.

Ironically, they brought Olympic souvenir chopsticks as gifts. “We’re not against the Olympics; they are a great thing for China,” one of them said very seriously. “We’re against the oppression by the government.”

One of my guests in particular was especially excited about visiting America. Chang Kun, an AIDS activist and online organizer, was thrilled to see Philadelphia, try American food, meet American girls and exchange ideas with other activists.

Chang has a giant online following. He writes with exclamation points and pure outrage. His visit to the United States made a deep impression; he was moved by what he described as an atmosphere of freedom, tolerance and cultural exchange. When he returned home to Anhui province in eastern China, he established the AIBO Youth Center, a small community organization with a free library and free Internet access, a place where young people could learn about the wider world.

Recently, during a conference at the youth center, in front of scores of activists, thugs broke into the room where Chang was speaking, knocked him from the podium and beat him severely. Police did nothing to stop the assault, which left him hospitalized. He is slowly recovering.

I wish I could say I was surprised. But after working with Chinese activists for nine years, I recognize the government’s treatment of Chang Kun as routine. In fact, China deploys human rights abuses on a massive scale — beatings, torture and imprisonment of activists and critics, broad censorship of the news, and the increasingly effective blocking of independent channels of communication. These are not mistakes or areas for improvement; they are the fundamentals of the government’s power. Negotiating for small concessions on rights cannot change this equation.

In 2009 and 2010, in response to an uprising by Muslims facing harsh discrimination, the government cut off Internet access to the vast Xinjiang region for 10 months. Now it is slowly strangling the Internet for everyone in China, blocking access to Web sites it can’t control and intensifying online surveillance.

The human cost of this repression is steep. In recent months, Chinese security forces have detained scores of activists, reportedly tortured to death three Falun Gong members, publicly arrested the architect-activist Ai Weiwei (who, ironically, designed the Olympic Bird’s Nest stadium in Beijing), detained hundreds of Christian worshippers (while they prayed) and even broke up their Easter Sunday service.

The State Department, which is holding an annual human rights dialogue with China this week, recently released a report that describes “black jails” throughout China where activists, their families and others who oppose the government are punished. Many detainees are beaten and tortured.

Chinese leaders have been in power so long that we may forget that no one elected them. Their regime is no more legitimate than those of Libya or Yemen. If elections were held tomorrow, the leaders might all be swept away. But there are no elections on the horizon. For decades, the U.S. government has aided the regime by supporting China’s economic aspirations, including permanent normalized trade relations, which have allowed it to reap huge profits — enriching the Central Committee and the unelected elite.

Many observers believe that China is becoming an economic powerhouse that has no intention of becoming a democracy. In 20 years, China may be emboldened even further to violently repress its own people.

Given this record, at what point do we stop seeing China as a flawed but dynamic nation on the road to democracy and start seeing the Chinese government as a violent, destabilizing, and autocratic regime on the order of, say, Iran?

Where do we, the American people, draw the line?

We have to stop deluding ourselves. China is governed by a violently repressive regime. And the United States, through its economic policies, is helping it stay that way.

On April 3, the Chinese Communist authorities secretly detained the well-known artist Ai Weiwei. Neither his family nor friends were notified of what happened to him, why he was seized or where he was. Like everyone else, they have now learned from the Xinhua News Agency that he is under investigation for “economic crimes.”

This action against one of China’s most well-known cultural figures recalls the opening shots of the Cultural Revolution, when the Maoist regime removed ideologically inconvenient artists, writers and intellectuals from the scene at will without any pretense to legal procedures.

After the long march toward the rule of law China has been tentatively treading since the end of the Mao era, this return to outright lawlessness is shocking even to a hardened dissident like me. If the authorities can detain a figure of such stature arbitrarily and hold him incommunicado as long as they want with no access to family or legal counsel, then no one in China is safe from the whims and anxieties of those in power.

This episode reveals not only the essence of a system where the individual has no rights, but also the evolution of a new brand of repression: the perverted “rule by law” instead of the “rule of law.” In other words, the application of legal loopholes to violate human rights instead of protect them.

“Residence under surveillance” — where one is detained with no habeas corpus rights — is one of those legal loopholes.

A little background on the evolution of this tool of “rule by law.” In the spring of 1994, the Chinese Communist Party was facing sanctions from the United States. At that time, the Clinton administration was preparing to ease the sanctions by de-linking trade and human rights, which encountered strong resistance in Congress. The opinions of the Chinese dissidents became the key bargaining chip.

President Jiang Zemin sent his police to detain me for negotiations. They even initiated a few conditions to improve human rights and the rule of law in exchange for me not to speak out against the de-linking of trade and human rights. I did not agree at first. But, eventually, the compromise reached was that in exchange for releasing dissidents and also opening freedom of expression and loosening up on some union activities, I would keep silent on the issue of human rights and trade.

This agreement encountered great resistance within the Communist Party factions that opposed Jiang’s initiative. As a result, I was seized again, with a certificate of summons for interrogation. Held incommunicado for two days, I protested with no recourse.

I said: “First, in accordance with the Criminal Procedure Law, a summons for interrogation is just to talk to me. You have violated the law by interrogating me for more than 24 hours. Second, the continued interrogations should not be more than three times, and today is the last time. If you cannot produce a document that meets legal procedures to arrest or detain me, then I am sorry but I must be free to leave.”

Concerned about the impact if I bolted and exposed the deal, they assured me: “Do not worry, we will go get the right document from the Procuratorate now and give it to you tomorrow.”

The following day, I asked: “Is the document here yet? If not, I am ready to go home.”

The old policeman said with hesitation: “Yes, it is here and you cannot go home yet.”

When he handed over that piece of paper, I laughed. It was a certificate of “residence under surveillance.” So I said: “Look, without evidence, you cannot even get a detention warrant from the Procuratorate.”

He replied: “This ‘residence under surveillance’ (which allows continuous detention without charge) writ by the Public Security Bureau also works.”

I said, “This is illegal detention. I will be looking for lawyers to file against you.” We had a quarrel. Then the authorities who had negotiated with me requested to talk to me alone.

I was told that the situation within the party leadership was very complicated. The anti-Jiang faction wanted trouble. If Jiang Zemin did not carry out the already reached agreement, or if there were unexpected protestations from my side, it would cause the breakdown of the deal with President Clinton. They told me that on the outside, the implementation of the agreement was still in effect, and the people I asked to be release were released.

People like Wang Dan were still active, and the authorities had not arrested them despite pressure. So they hoped that I would not resist my detention, be patient, and give some face to Jiang Zemin for the sake of the country.

I weighed the pros and cons, and decided to accept their “residence under surveillance” document — while maintaining my rights of suing them for illegal detention at a later time.

After that, Bill Clinton successfully de-linked trade and human rights.

When the authorities later took me to court, it turned out that even the court would not recognize that my detention had been legal under the Criminal Procedure Law requiring the approvals of the court and Procuratorate to deprive people of their freedom. But, they held, detaining a person without charge under “residence under surveillance” was a legal act.

Since then, depriving people’s personal freedom in the name of “residence under surveillance” became “legal.” It is now routine under this public security tool for the state to deprive personal freedom arbitrarily. The law serves the authoritarian state, not the individual.

The Ai Weiwei case once again reveals the essence of the Chinese state for all the world to see. This is China’s legal system today: the rule by law for the authorities instead of the rule of law for the people.

The great Turbine Hall at London’s Tate Modern, a former power station, is a notoriously difficult space for an artist to fill with authority. Its immensity can dwarf the imaginations of all but a select tribe of modern artists who understand the mysteries of scale, of how to say something interesting when you also have to say something really big. Louise Bourgeois’s giant spider once stood menacingly in this hall; Anish Kapoor’s “Marsyas,” a huge, hollow trumpet-like shape made of a stretched substance that hinted at flayed skin, triumphed over it majestically.

Last October the Chinese artist Ai Weiwei covered the floor with his “Sunflower Seeds”: 100 million tiny porcelain objects, each handmade by a master craftsman, no two identical. The installation was a carpet of life, multitudinous, inexplicable and, in the best Surrealist sense, strange. The seeds were intended to be walked on, but further strangeness followed. It was discovered that when trampled they gave off a fine dust that could damage the lungs. These symbolic representations of life could, it appeared, be dangerous to the living. The exhibition was cordoned off and visitors had to walk carefully around the perimeter.

Art can be dangerous. Very often artistic fame has proved dangerous to artists themselves. Mr. Ai’s work is not polemical — it tends towards the mysterious. But his immense prominence as an artist (he was a design consultant on the “bird’s nest” stadium for the Beijing Olympics and was recently ranked No. 13 in Art Review magazine’s list of the 100 most powerful figures in art) has allowed him to take up human rights cases and to draw attention to China’s often inadequate responses to disasters (like the plight of the child victims of the 2008 earthquake in Sichuan Province or those afflicted by deadly apartment fires in Shanghai last November). The authorities have embarrassed and harassed him before, but now they have gone on a dangerous new offensive.

On April 4, Mr. Ai was arrested by the Chinese authorities as he tried to board a plane to Hong Kong. His studio was raided and computers and other items were removed. Since then the regime has allowed hints of his “crimes” — tax evasion, pornography — to be published. These accusations are not credible to those who know him. It seems the regime, irritated by the outspokenness of its most celebrated art export, whose renown has protected him up to now, has decided to silence him in the most brutal fashion.

The disappearance is made worse by reports that Mr. Ai has started to “confess.” His release is a matter of extreme urgency and the governments of the free world have a clear duty in this matter.

Mr. Ai is not the only Chinese artist in dire straits. The great writer Liao Yiwu has been denied permission to travel to the United States to attend the PEN World Voices Festival of International Literature, which begins in New York on Monday, and there are fears that he could be the regime’s next target. Among the others are Ye Du, Teng Biao and Liu Xianbin — who was sentenced last month to prison for incitement to subversion, the same charge leveled against the Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo, now serving an 11-year term.

The lives of artists are more fragile than their creations. The poet Ovid was exiled by Augustus to a little hell-hole on the Black Sea called Tomis, but his poetry has outlasted the Roman Empire. Osip Mandelstam died in a Stalinist work camp, but his poetry has outlived the Soviet Union. Federico García Lorca was killed by the thugs of Spain’s Generalissimo Francisco Franco, but his poetry has survived that tyrannical regime.

We can perhaps bet on art to win over tyrants. It is the world’s artists, particularly those courageous enough to stand up against authoritarianism, for whom we need to be concerned, and for whose safety we must fight.

Not all writers or artists seek or ably perform a public role, and those who do risk obloquy and derision, even in free societies. Susan Sontag, an outspoken commentator on the Bosnian conflict, was giggled at because she sometimes sounded as if she “owned” the subject of Sarajevo. Harold Pinter’s tirades against American foreign policy and his “Champagne socialism” were much derided. Günter Grass’s visibility as a public intellectual and scourge of Germany’s rulers led to a degree of schadenfreude when it came to light that he had concealed his brief service in the Waffen-SS as a conscript at the tail end of World War II. Gabriel García Márquez’s friendship with Fidel Castro, and Graham Greene’s chumminess with Panama’s Omar Torrijos, made them political targets.

When artists venture into politics the risks to reputation and integrity are ever-present. But outside the free world, where criticism of power is at best difficult and at worst all but impossible, creative figures like Mr. Ai and his colleagues are often the only ones with the courage to speak truth against the lies of tyrants. We needed the samizdat truth-tellers to reveal the ugliness of the Soviet Union. Today the government of China has become the world’s greatest threat to freedom of speech, and so we need Ai Weiwei, Liao Yiwu and Liu Xiaobo.

Theme: The establishment of a human rights monitoring mechanism in the Western Sahara, preferably through an expansion of MINURSO’s mandate, would change the underlying dynamics of the conflict and allow for progress in the negotiation process.

Summary: The focus on human rights in the Western Sahara has increased the visibility of the conflict and the pressure to resolve it, creating opportunities to break the current impasse that third parties should seize. A human rights monitoring mechanism, preferably as part of MINURSO, could serve as a confidence-building measure. Moreover, a firm position regarding the parties’ human rights obligations would set a precedent for an international mediation with more muscle, thus changing the conflict’s underlying dynamics. Close coordination between Spain and the UK to establish a human rights monitoring mechanism would neutralise French opposition to it, alter the balance of forces within the Group of Friends of the Secretary General on Western Sahara (the ‘Group of Friends’) and give rise to the conditions necessary to increase its efficiency. At the upcoming April session, a Security Council decision to set up a human rights monitoring mechanism would allow for progress in the negotiation process, bringing closer the resolution of the Western Sahara conflict.

Analysis: In the last two years,theneed to establish a human rights monitoring mechanism together with the possible expansion of the current mandate of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) were the primary focus of the Security Council debates on Western Sahara. Unless prior agreement on the matter is reached, the debate is likely to resume with even greater intensity at the upcoming Security Council meeting to be held in April 2011. At this meeting, the Council will convene to consider the next report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Western Sahara and decide on the extension of MINURSO’s mandate.

This year Spain is not a Security Council member. However, as a member of the EU, and the ‘Group of Friends’ in particular, Spain will inevitably be drawn into the debate and will have to face demands for it to adopt a clear stance on the matter. As far as Spanish diplomacy is concerned, this is not only a challenge but also an opportunity to show leadership in multilateral settings by establishing alliances and launching initiatives that contribute to resolving a situation that is widely considered unsustainable. In Resolution 1920 of 30 April 2010, the Security Council also recognised that ‘the consolidation of the status quo is not acceptable in the long term’.

Human rights: A Stumbling Block on the Road to Peace?

There is concern that the increased focus on human rights might distract the attention of the Security Council from the political issues that are at stake in Western Sahara. Another criticism is that rather than being a demand driven by true concern, the Polisario Front’s insistence on the human rights issue is a tactical ploy to attack Morocco.

The focus on human rights in the Security Council debate on the Western Sahara must be seen in a wider context. Since the end of the Cold War, it has been the practice of the Security Council to link human rights to the maintenance of international peace and security. By way of example, Security Council Resolution 688 (1991) condemned ‘the repression of the Iraqi civilian population’, demanded that Iraq put an end to it ‘as a contribution to remove the threat to international peace and security in the region’ and expressed hope that a dialogue would ‘ensure that the human and political rights of all Iraqi citizens are respected’.

A more recent example is Security Council Resolution 1970 (2011).[1] After deploring ‘the gross and systematic violation of human rights, including the repression of peaceful demonstrators’, the resolution refers the situation in Libya since 15 February 2011 to the International Criminal Court (ICC) and underlines ‘the need to respect the freedoms of peaceful assembly and of expression, including freedom of the media’. Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, Resolution 1970 calls for ‘steps to fulfil the legitimate demands of the population’ and urges the Libyan authorities ‘to allow immediate access for international human rights monitors’ and to ‘immediately lift restrictions on all forms of media’.

Ignoring the human rights situation in Western Sahara and failing to examine it by the standards applied to Libya at the upcoming April session would expose the Security Council to allegations of selectivity in the application of universally-recognised norms. This could seriously undermine its credibility and thus affect its capacity to maintain peace and security in the region.

Furthermore, by putting on the table of the Security Council the expansion of MINURSO’s mandate, the Polisario Front has integrated into its diplomatic strategy a recommendation made years earlier by international human-rights organisations (Amnesty International’s campaign goes back as far as 1992). Be that as it may, a Security Council decision to give a mandate to MINURSO to monitor human rights in Western Sahara and the Tindouf refugee camps (on Algerian territory) would require the consent of Morocco, the Polisario Front and Algeria, putting to the test the commitment to human rights of all three parties.

The Focus on Human Rights: Effect Rather than Cause of Conflict Irresolution

In 2006 the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) concluded in a confidential report leaked to the press[2] that almost all violations against the people of Western Sahara stemmed from the non-implementation of the right to self-determination. This suggests that rather than being the cause, the focus on human rights is an effect of the failure to find a political solution that allows self-determination. Against the background of broken promises to hold a referendum, the lack of viability of the armed struggle and a stalled diplomatic process, the right to self-determination has become a major campaign theme for Sahrawi activists on the basis of Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1966.

In order to repress their activities and to intimidate the population of Western Sahara, the Moroccan authorities have used legislation prohibiting attacks on Morocco’s ‘territorial integrity’. In this context, violations of the rights of expression, association and assembly have occurred as well as unfair trials, ill-treatment, torture and police violence. Morocco has further restricted media access and expelled international observers. A 2008 Human Rights Watch (HRW) report[3] concluded that the ‘limits to Morocco’s progress on human rights are apparent in the way authorities suppress opposition to the officially held position that Western Sahara is part of Morocco’.

Human rights violations linked to the lack of a resolution of the conflict have also been documented in the Tindouf camps administered by the Polisario Front. For example, in September 2010, the police officer Mostafa Salma Sidi Mouloud was arbitrarily detained after publicly expressing support for the Moroccan autonomy proposal –which excludes a referendum with an independence option as advocated by the Polisario Front– and announcing that he would further promote it in the Tindouf camps.

Increasing the Visibility of a Forgotten Conflict

In a 2004 interview to the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS), the former US Secretary of State and Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara from 1997 to 2004, James Baker, pointed out that its low profile in the international order made the resolution of the Western Sahara conflict difficult to achieve. It would therefore seem fair to conclude that by raising its profile on the international agenda and making it more visible[4] the focus on human rights has added pressure to resolve the conflict, and thus the chances that it this might occur.

Three major events have strengthened international solidarity on the basis of the human rights discourse: the 2005 Sahrawi uprising (intifada), Aminetu Haidar’s defiance in resisting her expulsion from El-Ayoun through a hunger-strike in 2009 and the actions linked to the Gdeim Izik protest camp in November 2010. The challenge is to design diplomatic strategies that take advantage of the pressure and interest that the human rights issue has aroused to transform the relations between the stakeholders and break the impasse. In this endeavour, third parties play a key role.

The Need to Create New Dynamics to Make the Diplomatic Process Advance

The 2007 International Crisis Group (ICG) report, ‘Out of the Impasse’, anticipated that without a change in the underlying dynamics of the conflict, efforts to find a negotiated solution on the basis of the proposals submitted by Morocco and the Polisario Front were doomed to fail. Since then, several rounds of informal talks have not even yielded an agreement on the framework for negotiations: each party continues to reject the proposal of the other as the sole basis for future negotiations even though the Polisario Front has signalled its willingness to seriously engage with Morocco’s proposal if there is reciprocity.

In a letter addressed to the ‘Group of Friends’, dated 18 June 2010, that was subsequently leaked to the press[5] and which provided a glimpse of his frustration with Morocco’s attitude and lack of progress in the talks, the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara, Christopher Ross, asked for support to overcome the current stalemate in the negotiations. Based on the assumption that in order to achieve this goal a change in the underlying dynamics of the conflict is required, three questions shall be briefly analysed: (1) the underlying dynamics of the conflict; (2) the potential role of third parties in changing these dynamics; and (3) the way in which human rights can fit into a strategy to break the impasse.

The Current Dynamics: The Same that Caused the Failure of the Baker II Plan

The failure of the Baker II Plan provides an insight into the dynamics that have undermined peacemaking efforts such as ‘the Security Council’s refusal to bring pressure to bear at crucial moments’.[6] As a matter of fact, in view of the Council’s lack of political will to back his peace plan with the determination needed to implement it, in June 2004 Baker resigned as Personal Envoy. Resolution 1541 gave stronger support to the search for ‘a mutually acceptable political solution’ than to the Envoy’s peace plan. Following a phase of autonomy, the Baker II Plan provided for a true referendum of self-determination –including an independence option– even though voter identification favoured Morocco’s political objectives. While acknowledging the power relations between the parties, the plan was a compromise proposal that sought to salvage basic principles of international law. Despite its initial reluctance, the Polisario Front accepted it but Morocco, the stronger party, flatly rejected the peace plan, stating that ‘the final nature of the autonomy solution is not negotiable’. Demonstrating a clear lack of impartiality, in 2007, the Security Council showed its preference for the Moroccan autonomy plan: Resolutions 1754 and 1783 welcome the ‘serious and credible Moroccan efforts to move the process forward towards resolution’ without referring, in a similar way, to the initiatives of the Polisario Front. In its statement on Resolution 1783, South Africa, a key diplomatic ally of the Polisario Front, warned that praising one proposal over the other would undermine negotiations.

By strongly supporting Morocco’s proposal in advance, the Security Council has ‘disincentivised’ its will to compromise and accentuated the power differential between the parties, transforming it into an asymmetric conflict with implications for the negotiating process: the Council has neither persuaded Morocco of the need to make concessions to achieve its objectives nor has it won the trust of the Polisario Front to engage in negotiations. In an interview published in March 2010,[7] Julian Harston, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara and head of the MINURSO from 2007 to 2009, confirmed that the international community had mainly put pressure on the Polisario Front. Against this backdrop, it seems fair to conclude that the Security Council and the ‘Group of Friends’ need to review their approach if they want to break the current stalemate.

Respect for Human Rights as a Confidence-building Measure

Security Council Resolution 1920 (2010) stresses the importance of ‘making progress on the human dimension of the conflict as a means to promote transparency and mutual confidence’. However, the confidence-building measures currently in place are aimed at facilitating exchanges between Sahrawis from the Tindouf camps and their relatives in the Western Sahara for humanitarian reasons and thus very limited in scope. In contrast, an effective human-rights monitoring mechanism that improves the well-being of the population could help build confidence between the parties to the conflict. Greater freedom of expression, association and assembly could open up spaces for a debate on the political options available without fear of reprisals, which could help build a climate of trust conducive to a more fruitful dialogue.

Albeit with different options, both the Moroccan peace plan and the one introduced by the Polisario Front foresee a referendum. However, without guarantees for the scrupulous respect for the rights of expression, association, assembly and movement, it is unlikely that a fair and free referendum can be held whose result will be accepted as legitimate by the population of Western Sahara. A human-rights monitoring mechanism could help restore confidence among the Sahrawi population in the UN-sponsored process, increasing the chances for a peaceful resolution of the conflict, easing tensions on the ground and creating hope in future opportunities. Moreover, the establishment of a human-rights monitoring mechanism could serve as a precedent to manage and negotiate other issues.

Supporting the establishment of a human-rights monitoring mechanism would be in Morocco’s interest, as well as in that of those partners, such as the US, France and Spain, who have strongly supported its autonomy proposal. While autonomy may be a valid option to fulfil the right to self-determination, it seems unrealistic to expect the Sahrawi people to accept any autonomy plan proposed by Morocco without ample, firm and credible guarantees of respect for human rights, power-sharing and democratic participation. As Bernabé López García pointed out in an article published last November,[8] without democracy, there will be no way out of the Western Sahara problem –and neither will it be solved without respect for human rights–.

The Human-rights Debate: A Turning Point for Change in Conflict Dynamics?

So far, the human-rights debate has followed the same dynamics that have driven the conflict. The positions between the parties are ‘quasi-irreconcilable’, as the Personal Envoy van Walsum used to say; the Security Council lacks the political will to impose solutions while advancing the goals of the stronger party in an asymmetric conflict; and the UN Secretariat lacks the courage and determination to assume its responsibilities and defend the principles it stands for, undermining, as a result, the otganisation’s credibility. As far as the Security Council is concerned, it has subjected the establishment of a human-rights mechanism to a consensus between the parties to the conflict. By taking this approach, the Security Council has provided Morocco with a veto power with regard to the protection of the human rights of a population living in a Non Self-Governing Territory that is under Morocco’s effective control without international legal recognition.

A more effective approach to protect the human rights of the Sahrawi population and to ensure progress in the diplomatic process would be to clarify that the defence of human rights is non-negotiable. The Council could create new dynamics that could mitigate the effects of the conflict’s asymmetric structure, set a precedent for a more forceful mediation and enhance the prospects of success in negotiations.

There is concern that Morocco might leave the negotiating table if pressured on the human-rights issue. But, so far, progress in the negotiation process has been dim anyway. Christopher Ross himself has warned that without greater political will, continuing the talks will only serve to discredit the UN. The protest actions at the Gdeim Izik camp and the forceful demands for economic, social, civil and political rights coming from Western Sahara and many parts of the Arab world suggest that any political solution must include respect for human rights if it is to achieve sustainable peace and regional stability.

What Can Third Parties do in April at the UN?

There is little to lose and much to win. Two concrete examples of how third parties could show a firm attitude with regard to human rights in April are: (1) a recommendation by the Secretary-General to set up a human-rights monitoring mechanism; and (2) a specific proposal for its implementation by the ‘Group of Friends’.

(1) The Secretary-General’s report: perhaps to avoid taking a clear stance vis-à-vis a divided Security Council, to date the Secretary-General has not included in his reports the recommendation made in 2006 by the OHCHR –which is also part of the UN Secretariat– that the UN should explore ‘the best way to ensure adequate and continuous monitoring of the human rights situation in the region’. In a report with obvious gaps, in April 2010 the Secretary-General recognises the duty of the UN ‘to uphold human rights standards in all its operations’ but does not provide any details on how MINURSO is complying with this duty. He reports allegations of human rights violations by both sides, which he forwards to OHCHR, but does not inform on any follow-up action. Neither does he mention the existing legal controversy with regard to the exploitation of natural resources in Western Sahara. Finally, he points out that MINURSO does not have a specific human rights mandate, but fails to indicate whether the mission should have one.

Perhaps the intention of the Secretary-General is to provide a semblance of impartiality. However, as elucidated in the 2000 Brahimi Report, impartiality in UN peace operations does not mean neutrality, but rather an unbiased adherence to the principles of the UN Charter, which include the respect for human rights.

A stronger commitment to human rights would be consistent with the special responsibility of the UN towards the population of a Non Self-Governing Territory which has been effectively deprived of the protections afforded by Article 73 of the UN Charter since Spain unilaterally withdrew from there as the administering power in 1976. In a conference on Western Sahara organised in 2007 by several universities in Madrid, Francesco Bastagli, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the MINURSO from 2005 to 2007, argued that until the right to self-determination of the Sahrawi people materialises, the UN should act as its ‘defence lawyer’ in matters such as human rights and the exploitation of natural resources. In line with this approach, the next report of the Secretary-General on Western Sahara should take up the recommendations brought forward by the OHCHR in 2006, making them in this way a point of reference at the upcoming Security Council meeting.

(2) Is the Group of Friends unable to fulfil its functions? During the last two years, by ignoring the human-rights issue, the drafts prepared by the ‘Group of Friends’, rather than facilitating the process, have been divisive and controversial. The resolutions were only unanimously passed after hours of intensive debate aimed at finding a compromise language that would make it possible to include a reference to human rights but without using the term as such. This state of affairs brings into question the ability of the ‘Group of Friends’ to fulfil its functions. As a matter of fact, in their explanations of the vote on Resolution 1920, Nigeria, Uganda, Mexico and Austria advocated a review of the drafting process to make it more inclusive and transparent.

The drafts prepared by the ‘Group of Friends’ in 2009 and 2010 had to be re-negotiated when they reached the Council. In 2009, pressure by Costa Rica, Mexico, Nigeria and Uganda, together with a favourable British position, led to the introduction of a paragraph in the preamble of Resolution 1971 that used the term ‘human dimension’ to refer to human rights –an anomaly within the UN system–. Following threats by Mexico, Uganda and Nigeria in 2010 to abstain from voting, 18 hours of negotiations at the ambassadorial level and US mediation were required to add three lines to Resolution 1920 that, under a ‘constructive ambiguity’, remind the parties of their human-rights and international cooperation obligations. Importantly enough, the persistent and active diplomacy used by these non-permanent Security Council members opened spaces to negotiate the establishment of a human-rights monitoring mechanism.

Outlook and Options

The events related to the Gdeim Izik protest camp and the revolts in the Maghreb region have increased the pressure on the Security Council to establish a human-rights monitoring mechanism. As far as the incidents related to the Gdeim Izik camp are concerned, the difficulty in verifying conflicting reports on the number of victims without access to the territory, the press restrictions imposed by the Moroccan authorities and the impact of the raid on the camp on the political process suggest that a permanent UN human-rights monitoring presence is needed to ensure that the Security Council receives timely and reliable first-hand information of developments on the ground. The case of Gdeim Izik shows that currently MINURSO is not in a position to fulfil that role mainly for two reasons: (1) the absence of a specific human-rights mandate authorising the mission to investigate and verify allegations of violations; and (2) the obstacles (eg, restrictions on access) the mission faces in the implementation of its operations.

There are indications that things might move forward. In its explanation of the vote on Resolution 1920 (2010), the US urged the parties ‘to work with the international community to ensure full respect for human rights in both Western Sahara and in the Tindouf camps’. Presumably, in order to avoid further divisions within the Security Council on the expansion of MINURSO’s mandate and to build consensus, the UK has circulated a non-paper outlining alternative options. With a toll of 12 members of the security forces killed in events related to the raid on the Gdeim Izik camp, Morocco might reconsider its opposition to the deployment of international human rights monitors. Given the ongoing revolts in the region, the French veto to the term ‘human rights’ only serves to discredit its government. Criticism of its silence and collusion towards the revolts in Tunisia and Egypt suggest that France might have to review its diplomatic strategy. As a matter of fact, in an article recently published in Le Monde, a group of French diplomats demanded a more coherent foreign policy that should be developed with due regard to values of democracy and solidarity.[9]

Also in Spain, increasingly more voices recommend a review of the current diplomatic strategy for the Maghreb region (see, for example, the op-ed “Bucle marroquí” published in El País, 7/XII/2010).[10] Clearly, there is a gap between the political strategy and public statements on Western Sahara, which is narrowing down the scope for manoeuvre of Spanish diplomacy.

According to diplomatic sources, in the Group of Friends ‘the silence of Spain is deafening’. However, at a session of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Spanish Congress of Deputies (Congreso de los Diputados) held on 18 November 2010, the Foreign Minister Trinidad Jiménez stated that Spain had requested a year earlier the expansion of MINURSO’s mandate in the field of human rights.[11] In a different instance, at a press conference held in Bolivia on 8 November 2010, the Spanish Foreign Minister suggested, in relation to the Gdeim Izik events, that the UK Presidency could convene the Security Council. However, the informative meeting of the Security Council on the matter, which was held on 16 November, took place at the sole request of Mexico.

In order to develop a more coherent foreign policy and increase Spain’s leadership capacity in international forums, a two-pronged approach could be helpful: on the one hand, a serious debate should take place in Spanish society to build the necessary consensus to close the gap between public statements and political strategy; on the other hand, different ways should be explored to translate the stated political strategy into diplomatic action. Regarding the latter, a possible course of action could be joining forces with the UK in its efforts to establish a human-rights monitoring mechanism, thus neutralising any possible opposition to it (including by France) and changing the balance of forces within the ‘Group of Friends’. By taking such an approach, Spain could contribute to making the ‘Group of Friends’ more balanced and therefore more able to prepare a draft resolution in April that is acceptable to all Security Council members and to play a constructive and relevant role to help resolve the conflict.

Which Human-rights Monitoring Mechanism?

It appears that the expansion of MINURSO’s mandate is no longer the central issue, but one of the available options to set up a human-rights monitoring mechanism. Even though MINURSO continues to be the preferred option (eg, by the Polisario Front and civil society organisations), there is also a willingness to negotiate an alternative mechanism as long as it is established as a permanent field-presence under the mandate of the Security Council. One of the relevant options discussed in this context is the opening of a Regional Office by the OHCHR.

(1) Restoring the credibility and legitimacy of MINURSO: currently only a few UN peace operations with a traditional cease-fire monitoring mandate (eg, UNFICYP in Cyprus) lack a human-rights component. In contrast, in addition to a cease-fire monitoring mandate, MINURSO also has the mandate to organise a referendum in accordance with the 1990 Settlement Plan. Comparatively, the UN mission deployed in Southern Sudan (UNMIS), where a self-determination referendum took place in January 2011, has a human-rights component with a specific mandate. In fact, MINURSO’s mandate implicitly contains human-rights responsibilities, such as maintaining law and order to ensure the necessary conditions for a free and fair referendum during the transitional period. Providing the mission with an explicit human rights mandate would bring that approach to its logical conclusion. In addition, such a mandate could help MINURSO –a mission discredited for its inability to implement a major part of its mandate– to restore its credibility and legitimacy, which are considered success factors in any UN mission. In terms of the available resources and knowledge of the ground, MINURSO would still be seen as the best option for effective human-rights monitoring. As a matter of fact, the OHCHR strongly supports the integration of human-rights components in all UN peace operations without MINURSO being an exception.

(2) A OHCHR Regional Office: The advantage of this option is that it would allow the issue to be framed as a measure to improve the human-rights situation in the context of regional development and modernisation. In contrast to expanding MINURSO’s mandate, establishing a Regional Office would avoid the contentious issue of the special status of Western Sahara, and thus, presumably, be more appealing to Morocco. However, usually OHCHR’s Regional Offices do not monitor the human-rights situation, but focus on technical assistance. Another concern is that the OHCHR lacks the power and leverage of the Security Council to negotiate agreements and ensure appropriate political follow-up of the issues identified. In fact, the OHCHR has been unsuccessfully negotiating for over two years in order to open a Regional Office in Rabat that would undertake capacity-building activities. Obtaining consent for effective human-rights monitoring in the Western Sahara and the Tindouf camps would be much more difficult.

Protecting Human Rights Through a Wide Interpretation of MINURSO’s Mandate

Until a human-rights mechanism with a specific and explicit mandate is established, MINURSO should explore different ways to increase the protection of the population of Western Sahara under its current mandate. The third parties should also work to ensure that MINURSO can implement its operations without access restrictions.

An interesting precedent is the expansion of MINURSO’s activities to support UNHCR’s family-visits programme without a change in the mandate. Moreover, the question arises whether a UN mission really requires an explicit human-rights monitoring mandate in order to report to the Security Council on the violations it might witness during its operations. In a 1993 report,[12] the understanding of the Secretary-General was that ‘while MINURSO’s current military mandate is strictly limited to the monitoring and verification of the cease-fire, MINURSO, as a United Nations mission, could not be a silent witness to conduct that might infringe the human rights of the civilian population’.

Conclusions: The third parties should use the current focus on human rights to make progress towards a resolution of the Western Sahara conflict. Separating the human-rights issue from its political context bears the risk of the conflict again falling into oblivion once the ‘technical’ human-rights questions are dealt with as part of a conflict management rather than conflict resolution strategy.

This year, South Africa, a traditional ally of the Polisario Front, is on the Security Council and will likely take a firm position in the debate. If the Group of Friends wants to avoid further damage to its credibility and legitimacy, it will have to propose a human-rights monitoring mechanism in its draft resolution in April. The most effective option to monitor human rights and change the underlying dynamics of the conflict would be to provide MINURSO with a human-rights component. In order to produce a balanced and useful draft resolution, this point of view should be represented in the ‘Group of Friends’. Spain would be the member the best placed to take on that role. It could do it as part of an independent foreign policy that takes into consideration Spain’s historical responsibility with regard to the Western Sahara conflict, its interests and strategic priorities, as well as universally-recognised legal principles. In this endeavour, the Spanish government would not only have the backing of public opinion but also a democratic mandate from the Congress of Deputies and several Autonomous Parliaments.

Notas:

[1] See http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/245/58/PDF/N1124558.pdf?OpenElement.

[2] See http://www.arso.org/OHCHRrep2006en.pdf.

[3] See http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2008/12/19/human-rights-western-sahara-and-tindouf-refugee-camps-0.

[4] See Salka Barca & Stephen Zunes (2009), ‘The Nonviolent Struggle for Self-determination in Western Sahara’, in Maria Stephan (Ed.), Civilian Jihad, Nonviolent Struggle, Democratization, and Governance in the Middle East, Palgrave Macmillan, New York.

[5] See http://www.elpais.com/elpaismedia/ultimahora/media/201008/20/espana/20100820elpepunac_1_Pes_PDF.tiff.

[6] Anna Theofilopoulou & Jacob Mundy (2010), ‘Why the UN Won’t Solve Western Sahara (Until it Becomes a Crisis)’, Middle East Channel of Foreign Policy, 12/VIII/2010.

[7] See http://www.elimparcial.es/mundo/espana-nunca-ha-mostrado-una-voluntad-real-para-solucionar-el-conflicto-del-sahara-58880.html.

[8] ‘El suicidio de Marruecos’, El País, 9/XI/2010.

[9] See ‘La voix de la France a disparu dans le monde’, Le Monde, 23/II/2011.

[10] See http://www.elpais.com/articulo/opinion/Bucle/marroqui/elpepiopi/20101207elpepiopi_1/Tes.

[11] See http://www.senado.es/legis9/publicaciones/html/maestro/index_CO_658.html.

[12] ‘The Situation Concerning Western Sahara’, Report by the Secretary-General, 26/I/1993 (S/25170).

It has taken the arrest of Ai Weiwei, one of China’s best-known contemporary artists and an outspoken critic of the Chinese government, for the world to take notice that Beijing is in the midst of the largest crackdown on dissent in over a decade — one that differs ominously in scope, tactics and aims from previous campaigns.

The authorities are clearly casting a wider net over all advocates of “global values”— the code word in China for human rights, the rule of law and freedom of expression. Everyone from veteran dissidents to lawyers, rights activists, NGO coordinators, journalists, writers, artists and even ordinary netizens are being targeted.

In the past six weeks, Human Rights Watch has logged over a hundred cases of detention for advocacy across the country. Eight of China’s top human-rights lawyers were arrested in mid-February and have not been heard from since. Up to 20 people are facing prosecution for the loosely defined crime of “inciting subversion,” which includes criticism of the Communist Party. Writers, bloggers and critics have been threatened with arrest.

The authorities’ methods are also distinctive this time around. Gone is the reliance on short-term detention and house arrest; instead, the Public Security’s Bureau No. 1 branch — the secret police in charge of “Domestic Security” — have opted for a mix of arrests on state security charges and extrajudicial tactics such as disappearances, physical intimidation or beatings by plain-clothes thugs, as well as threats of torture and retaliation against family members and work associates.

This shift to extrajudicial tactics was tacitly acknowledged by the authorities when a government spokesman warned on March 3 that “the law was not a shield” for people “creating trouble for China.”

The aims of the current repression also differ from previous campaigns. Rattled by the revolts of North Africa and the Middle East, and yielding to the demands of a security apparatus that has been radically empowered since the staging of the 2008 Olympic Games, the Chinese leadership has launched an assault against all government critics in an attempt to reassert control over an increasingly assertive civil society.

The lesson Beijing has taken from the Middle East uprisings is that the Internet can be the starting point of large-scale popular protests and that it has indeed contributed to the spread of “global values,” such as freedom of expression and human rights. In the minds of the leadership, these factors generate an urgent need to reassert control.

Over the past few years nothing short of a communication revolution has taken place in China. Thanks to the Internet, social networks and microblogging, a new generation of Chinese citizens — particularly those courageous enough to try to evade censorship and surveillance — has had the opportunity to access information and experiment with genuine freedom of expression.

When bloggers see their Web site “harmonized” — the euphemism for being shut down by the authorities — they simply open another one elsewhere.

Even the Great Firewall is not entirely effective: Blocked in China, Twitter has been widely used to share information and build a sense of community among previously isolated activists.

The transformative dimension of this revolution on the expectations of China’s polity is an enormous challenge to the one-party system. It also highlights the growing divergence between two visions of China’s political future.

One is of a society that Chinese citizens want to build now that their country has emerged as a global power and the second-largest economy in the world — a social order that doesn’t necessarily preclude the Communist Party, in some leadership role.

The other is the Party’s vision of what is necessary to not only secure its leadership, but preclude a split in its own ranks. That view is grounded not in confidence, but in insecurity, distrust of civil society and fear as to the consequences of an embrace of global values.

In this sense, the current crackdown is more than the routine weeding out of critics; it is an effort to redefine the limits of permissible expression and roll back the advances made by Chinese civil society over the past decade.

The voice of the international community at this juncture is crucial because Beijing will weigh that response before deciding on a course of action. The silence in the early weeks of the crackdown has emboldened the authorities and was probably decisive in the decision to go after someone as prominent as Ai Weiwei.

“Quiet diplomacy” was tried when Liu Xiaobo, the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize laureate, was arrested in December 2008. He is now serving an 11-year sentence in prison; his wife is entering her fourth month of house arrest.

Unambiguous messages to Beijing that its conduct is unacceptable and illegal may not guarantee this new crackdown will stop, but a failure to speak up will ensure it continues.

I should be writing this from Tashkent, where for 15 years Human Rights Watch has maintained a field office. Until last month.

Last Christmas Eve, the Uzbek government denied me accreditation to work in the country, and now it has forced us to close our office there, the first time in Human Rights Watch’s 33-years of operation that a government has shut down one of our offices.

The government hasn’t cited any official grounds, but the matter seems to have been decided long ago. It has been clear for years that the government does not want anyone reporting on human rights violations. For the last six years, it has denied or delayed visas and work accreditation to every one of our Tashkent representatives.

In July 2008, the government barred our researcher from the country. The next year, one of my colleagues was deported upon her arrival, and a few months later another was attacked during a short visit, while attempting to meet with human rights activists. After that, I was allowed in for only two months in 2010 before being told to leave.

The Uzbek government has tried to close off not just Human Rights Watch, but any scrutiny of its rights record. Only one active domestic rights group, Ezgulik, is registered, but it faces constant persecution. Uzbekistan’s activists carry on their work despite daily harassment and the constant danger of surveillance, de facto house arrest, beatings, denial of exit visas, punitive civil or criminal charges — or worse.

Thirteen rights advocates and numerous political activists and journalists are in prison. Many are in very poor health and some have been tortured or mistreated. I spent an afternoon with the wives of two of them who were willing to describe their husbands’ situations though we were being watched by security agents. One told how her husband was forced to stand in freezing temperatures for nearly four hours to force him to sign a confession. They implored me not to let the world forget them.

Since 2004 the government has kicked out almost every international nongovernmental organization. It has prevented most international news agencies from reporting in the country, and the few remaining local independent journalists work under threat of defamation cases that can result in crippling fines or prison time.

For years the government has persecuted and imprisoned thousands of people for alleged “fundamentalism,” and tortured many of them. It forces thousands of schoolchildren, some as young as 10, to work on the cotton harvest for two months a year. And torture and ill-treatment are widespread and systematic in pretrial detention and prisons. Yet very recently at the United Nations, the government pointed to habeas corpus reforms as evidence that it is combating torture.

Habeas corpus — judicial review of detention — is considered a crucial bulwark against torture in pretrial detention, but true habeas corpus exists neither in theory nor in practice in Uzbekistan. The Uzbek version doesn’t allow the court to examine whether there’s sufficient evidence to hold someone in jail before trial. And although habeas corpus means “show the body,” not only are the hearings closed to observers, but sometimes the detainees aren’t even present. Even when they are, judges simply rubber stamp detention, routinely ignoring any allegations of ill-treatment or abuse of due process.

One year after adopting the much-vaunted “reform,” the government transferred the power to license attorneys from independent bar associations to the Justice Ministry. The result: Numerous independent lawyers were disbarred, including many who had represented defendants in politically sensitive cases.

Part of the reason Uzbekistan has been able to get away with all this is that the West, which is increasingly pursuing a policy of re-engagement because of Uzbekistan’s border with Afghanistan and deposits of natural gas, thinks the Uzbek government has gained the upper-hand. Human Rights Watch’s expulsion is only further proof.

Office or not, visas or not, we will continue reporting about Uzbekistan’s human rights failings. Recent events in the Middle East show that unconditional support for “friendly autocrats” is short-sighted and counterproductive. The United States and the European Union should rethink their positions and send a clear message to Uzbekistan that brutalizing its own people and stonewalling international reporting comes at a price.

With the world’s attention on the uprisings in the Middle East, repressive regimes elsewhere are taking the opportunity to tighten their grip on power. In China, human rights activists have been disappearing since a call went out last month for a Tunisian-style “Jasmine Revolution.” I know what their families are going through. Almost a year ago, the Chinese government seized my husband and since then, we have had no news of him. I don’t know where he is, or even if he is alive.

In 2001, the Ministry of Justice listed my husband, Gao Zhisheng, as one of the top 10 lawyers in China. But when he began representing members of religious groups persecuted by the government, he became a target himself. His law license was revoked, and our family placed under constant surveillance. In 2006, he was convicted of inciting subversion based on a confession he made after his interrogators threatened our two children. He received a suspended sentence, but was briefly detained again a year later for writing an open letter to the United States Congress documenting human rights abuses in China.

Zhisheng wouldn’t give up his work, and yet he was frightened for me and our children, so I fled with them to asylum in the United States. Soon after we left, in February 2009, he was seized by security officials, and that time held without charges for more than a year. International pressure persuaded the government to release him. But two weeks later, as soon as the world’s attention moved elsewhere, he was abducted again. That was last April. No one has heard from him since.

We have good cause to fear that he is suffering. My husband has been tortured many times. In 2007, officials subjected him to electric shocks, held lighted cigarettes up to his eyes and pierced his genitals with toothpicks. In 2009, the police beat him with handguns for two days. He has been tied up and forced to sit motionless for hours, threatened with death and told that our children were having nervous breakdowns.

Though his treatment has been especially harsh, my husband is only one of many political prisoners in China. Among them are Liu Xiaobo, the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize laureate, who is serving an 11-year sentence for subversion, and his wife, Liu Xia, who is under house arrest. A human rights group reports that more than a hundred bloggers and rights advocates have been interrogated or detained in connection to the “Jasmine Revolution.” And especially ominous have been the disappearances of other prominent human rights lawyers, like Jiang Tianyong, Teng Biao and Tang Jitian.

In President Obama’s speech to the United Nations last year, he said that “freedom, justice and peace for the world must begin with freedom, justice and peace in the lives of individual human beings.” The Chinese government must not be allowed to claim that China is a nation operating under the rule of law while persecuting those who try to ensure that it respects the law. And when the government silences dissent, the international community must speak up.

Indeed, I am excited to have just learned that the United Nations has demanded that my husband be released, and hopeful that it will take a stand for the other prisoners as well. I appeal to Mr. Obama — a father, lawyer and leader of the country that has become my family’s new home — to make sure it does so. At the very least, he should ask President Hu Jintao to let Zhisheng contact us.

If he has been killed, we should be allowed the dignity of laying him to rest.

La “Maison du cinéma” iranien comprend 5 000 cinéastes, 29 classes d’école de cinéma, des acteurs, des administrateurs, une association de scénaristes, une association de travailleurs des industries techniques. Depuis deux ans, la crise du cinéma iranien est relatée dans la presse. Cette crise n’est pas propre à l’Iran. A l’instar d’autres pays similaires, lorsque la presse est étouffée, soit les cinéastes expriment leur désaccord, soit ils arrêtent de produire et gardent le silence.

La politique du régime est de maîtriser et surveiller tous les mouvements citoyens comme les partis politiques, les syndicats, mais également le monde des arts (cinéma, musique, sculpture), afin de neutraliser l’opposition. Le régime a donc mis sous contrôle la Maison du cinéma, en stoppant les subventions et en interdisant les mécènes privés.

Le ministère de la culture a créé une Haute Instance du cinéma qui a pour objet de contrôler toutes les institutions cinématographiques du pays. Il a également voulu prendre le contrôle de la Maison du cinéma. La Maison du cinéma, dont le règlement intérieur spécifie pourtant l’interdiction de travailler avec une instance extérieure, a été contrainte de collaborer avec cette institution pro-gouvernementale qui forme des artistes et des cinéastes pro-gouvernementaux.

Cette Haute Instance du cinéma est constituée d’un président, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad lui-même, d’un vice-président en la personne du ministre de la culture et de six cinéastes acquis à la cause du gouvernement. Jusqu’à présent, en Iran, 100 films étaient produits chaque année. Le gouvernement a augmenté la production de films à 200. Tous ces films sont des films de propagande gouvernementale et islamique. Il existe 255 salles de cinéma en Iran, dont 80 à Téhéran. Parmi elles, 40 seulement ont le droit de diffuser des films. Les autres cinémas n’ont pas cette autorisation. Les dirigeants pensent en effet que la diffusion de 40 films par an, est suffisante.

Dans toutes ces salles, sont diffusés uniquement les films commerciaux iraniens et des films qui ont passé la censure. Les autres films sont censurés et ne sont donc pas diffusés. Même les films produits en Iran et censurés, qui sont diffusés dans des festivals à l’étranger, sont condamnés.

Les Iraniens aiment particulièrement le cinéma. Les acteurs ont un rôle important et sont influents dans le pays. La télévision est totalement sous le contrôle de l’Etat. Le régime souhaite profiter de l’intérêt du peuple pour le cinéma, en le mettant sous contrôle pour asseoir sa propagande.

L’ÉTOUFFEMENT DU CINÉMA INDÉPENDANT

Les cinéastes ont eu un rôle important, avant et après l’élection du président Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, pour dénoncer l’ampleur de la fraude électorale ; ils ont été sévèrement réprimés par les forces de l’ordre. Beaucoup de cinéastes ont été interrogés et torturés. L’un d’entre eux s’appelait Sihaq Saïd Amani. Il était vice président du ministère de l’information sous le gouvernement d’Ali Akbar Hachemi Rafsandjani. Toute sa famille a subi des menaces. Le gouvernement a divisé les cinéastes en deux parties, les pro-gouvernementaux et les anti-gouvernementaux. La police secrète fabrique de faux documents et fournit de faux témoignages pour accuser les cinéastes anti-gouvernementaux, afin de les faire condamner. La collaboration du ministère de la culture, du ministère de l’information islamique du gouvernement iranien et de la télévision iranienne ainsi que tous les organes de propagande islamique ont permis l’étouffement du cinéma indépendant.

Le ministère de la défense et le ministère de la propagande contrôlent indirectement toute la production culturelle iranienne, et le cinéma est également victime de cette politique. Aucun film religieux ou film de guerre anti-gouvernemental n’est diffusé. De ce fait, tous les producteurs et réalisateurs sont condamnés à disparaître.

En réalité, dans le monde du cinéma, ceux qui ne suivent pas ou ne respectent pas la politique corrompue du gouvernement de Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, sont traités comme au Moyen Age. Par exemple, des réalisateurs comme Jafar Panahi, Mohammad Rasoulof, Mohammad Ali Chirzadi, Mohammad Nourizad, sont assignés à résidence. Le documentariste Mojtaba Mirtahmasb et la célèbre actrice célèbre de cinéma Fatima Aria ont été condamnés, par les autorités du régime dictatorial d’Iran.

Une des premières décisions du début de leur mandat, qui montre bien la politique de ce régime iranien, est d’avoir condamné à mort le réalisateur Hadi Hossein Zadeh, le poète et metteur en scène Saïd Sultan Poor. La seule faute qu’ils avaient commise était d’avoir dénoncé la corruption du gouvernement.

Les directeurs de cinéma sont tenus d’organiser des séminaires avec l’ensemble des acteurs et réalisateurs pour échanger avec des représentants de l’Etat, montrant ainsi leur allégeance au gouvernement. Tous ceux qui ne participent pas à ces rencontres, sont surveillés et privés de nombreux avantages. Ils sont également menacés par les services secrets iraniens.

En même temps, ceux qui prennent contact avec les cinéastes en prison, sont durement réprimés.

Le seul moyen de pression sur le gouvernement est de signer des pétitions pour montrer son opposition ; les cinéastes iraniens en ont bien conscience. Cependant s’ils font une pétition pour défendre par exemple les cinéastes iraniens Mohammad Rasoulof et Jafar Panahi actuellement en prison, ils savent qu’ils seront poursuivis, surveillés et réprimés. S’ils prennent contact avec la famille de Mohammad Nourizad ou la famille de Mohammad Ali Chirzadi, ils peuvent s’attendre à subir des menaces de la Haute Instance du cinéma et à ce qu’on ouvre un dossier sur leur compte, si ce n’est déjà fait.

A toutes ces difficultés qui ont profondément durci les conditions de travail des cinéastes en Iran et qui sont liées à la situation insupportable que l’on vient d’évoquer, s’ajoutent en outre la crise économique et le chômage. Toutefois, les cinéastes iraniens expérimentés, ont conscience de cette situation et s’autocensurent. En tout état de cause, le gouvernement continue de craindre le cinéma indépendant et ses idées.

Depuis des décennies, un très grand nombre de conventions et de pactes en faveur des droits humains ont été inscrits dans les normes internationales. Mais avec la possibilité ou non pour les Etats d’y déroger dans des circonstances exceptionnelles. Découlant directement des principes de la Déclaration universelle des droits de l’homme, ces règles ne sont pas contraignantes. Il semble que les révolutions en Tunisie, en Egypte et en Libye qui ont imposé radicalement le respect des droits humains ont influencé le Conseil des droits de l’homme de l’ONU. La majorité des Etats qui le composent avait une fâcheuse tendance à vider de leur substance les principes qu’il est censé promouvoir. Cette fois, le Conseil a réagi rapidement et positivement et retrouvé une partie de sa crédibilité. Le Conseil des droits de l’homme a adopté par consensus la suspension de la Libye du Conseil.

Mais les violations sont toujours au cœur de l’actualité. Très souvent les mécanismes d’application de ces droits légitimes n’ont pas l’incidence espérée en matière de dignité, et la plupart des normes empêchant leur déni et leur dénigrement sont magistralement ignorées.

Il est de la responsabilité de la communauté internationale de s’assurer que les droits de l’homme soient respectés comme des normes juridiques contraignantes et absolues, il faut éviter qu’ils ne deviennent de vagues références qui laissent la porte ouverte au relativisme où se sont engouffrés des Etats et des particularismes puissants.

Heureusement, l’affaiblissement de l’application des normes est compensé momentanément par les révolutions pacifiques et citoyennes du «Printemps arabe». Puissent-elles devenir exemplaires pour supprimer les pires violations, il faut que celles-ci ne se reproduisent plus. Ce sont des signes forts contre les pessimismes et les renoncements.

Les citoyens, qu’on croyait assoupis et désorientés par un débat où dominent des conceptions juridiques complexes se sont soudain réveillés. Les peuples en Tunisie et en Egypte, tels des tsunamis, ont submergé et défait des dictatures qu’on croyait indéboulonnables. Comme on le voit, aujourd’hui les droits humains sont irrésistiblement contagieux. Cela au grand dam de certains diplomates et autres observateurs qui ont rangé le drapeau des droits de l’homme au nom du réalisme politique; ces gardiens de la realpolitik qui raillaient les «droits-de-l’hommiste» ont été démentis par les peuples. Comme le disait l’ancien ministre des Affaires étrangères allemand Joschka Fischer: «On peut serrer la main à des dictateurs mais on n’est pas obligé de les embrasser.»

Les peuples viennent de le démontrer, ils aspirent aux valeurs universelles, à la liberté et au respect des droits humains. La créativité du cœur des citoyens en mouvement peut créer une onde de choc au sein même du Conseil des droits de l’homme de l’ONU, le «bloc» des Etats qui voulaient nous faire croire que la démocratie est une fadaise «impérialiste» s’est fissuré. Par des actes, les peuples leur ont signifié que l’aspiration à la démocratie n’est pas occidentale mais universelle. Les Etats du Conseil des droits de l’homme de l’ONU doivent désormais tenir compte de cette nouvelle donne, ils ne doivent plus faire des compromis avec les régimes prédateurs comme l’Iran, la Chine et bien d’autres. La suspension de la Libye par le Conseil crée un précédent exemplaire. Il faut profiter de cette dynamique et exiger des institutions onusiennes qu’elles rendent contraignante l’application des conventions et des résolutions qui condamnent toutes atteintes à la dignité humaine.

Tema: El establecimiento de un mecanismo de vigilancia de los derechos humanos en el Sáhara Occidental, preferentemente mediante la ampliación del mandato de la MINURSO, cambiaría la dinámica subyacente del conflicto, permitiendo avances en el proceso negociador.

Resumen: El foco sobre los derechos humanos en el Sáhara Occidental ha aumentado la visibilidad del conflicto y la presión para resolverlo, abriendo oportunidades de superar el estancamiento actual que las terceras partes deberían aprovechar. Un mecanismo de supervisión de los derechos humanos, preferentemente por la MINURSO, serviría como medida de fomento de la confianza entre las partes del conflicto. Además, una posición firme respecto a las obligaciones de las partes en materia de derechos humanos sentaría un precedente para una mediación internacional más vigorosa, cambiando la dinámica subyacente del conflicto. Una estrecha coordinación de España con el Reino Unido para establecer un mecanismo de supervisión de los derechos humanos neutralizaría la oposición de Francia y equilibraría la relación de fuerzas dentro del “Grupo de Amigos del Secretario General para el Sáhara Occidental” (Grupo de Amigos), creando condiciones para aumentar su eficacia. Una decisión del Consejo de Seguridad a tal efecto en abril de 2011 permitiría avanzar en el proceso negociador para resolver el conflicto del Sáhara Occidental.

Análisis: En los dos últimos años, el debate del Consejo de Seguridad sobre la situación en el Sáhara Occidental se ha centrado, por una parte, en la necesidad de establecer un mecanismo independiente para vigilar el respeto de los derechos humanos y, por otra, en la demanda de ampliar el mandato de la Misión de Naciones Unidas para el Referéndum en el Sáhara Occidental (MINURSO) a tal efecto. A no ser que se llegue a un acuerdo previo, todo apunta a que este debate se reanudará, con mayor intensidad si cabe, en la reunión que el Consejo de Seguridad celebrará en abril para considerar el próximo informe del Secretario General sobre la situación en el Sáhara Occidental y decidir sobre la renovación del mandato de la MINURSO.

Este año España no es miembros del Consejo de Seguridad. Sin embargo, como miembro de la UE y, en particular, del Grupo de Amigos, inevitablemente se verá implicada en este debate y se enfrentará a las exigencias de definir claramente su posición al respecto. Para la diplomacia española, esta situación supone, además de un reto, la oportunidad de mostrar su capacidad de liderazgo estableciendo alianzas e impulsando ideas en foros multilaterales que contribuyan a resolver una situación considerada por muchos como insostenible. En la Resolución 1920 del 30 de abril de 2010, el Consejo de Seguridad también reconoció que “la consolidación del statu quo no es aceptable a largo plazo”.

Los derechos humanos, ¿una piedra en el camino hacia la paz?

En vista de la importancia que está cobrando la defensa de los derechos humanos en el territorio del Sáhara Occidental, existe la preocupación de que la atención del Consejo de Seguridad se desvíe de las cuestiones políticas esenciales. También se critica que el énfasis sobre los derechos humanos no obedece a una preocupación sincera, sino que es una estratagema del Frente Polisario para atacar a Marruecos.

La atención a la cuestión de los derechos humanos ha de situarse en un contexto más amplio. Desde el final de la Guerra Fría, el Consejo de Seguridad ha vinculado el respeto a los derechos humanos al mantenimiento de la paz y la seguridad. Un ejemplo es la Resolución 688 (1991) condenando “los actos de represión perpetrados contra la población civil iraquí”, exigiendo que Iraq pusiera fin a los mismos “a fin de contribuir a eliminar la amenaza a la paz y la seguridad internacionales”, y promoviendo el diálogo “con miras a garantizar que se respeten los derechos humanos y políticos de todos los ciudadanos iraquíes”.

Otro ejemplo más reciente es la Resolución 1970, que remite la situación imperante en Libia desde el 15 de febrero de 2011 a la Corte Penal Internacional e impone un embargo de armas tras deplorar “la grave y sistemática violación de los derechos humanos, incluida la represión de manifestantes pacíficos”.[1] Aprobada bajo el capítulo VII de la Carta de la ONU, esta resolución subraya “la necesidad de respetar las libertades de reunión pacífica y de expresión, incluida la libertad de los medios de comunicación”, pide que “se tomen medidas para satisfacer las demandas legítimas de la población” e insta a las autoridades libias a “permitir el acceso inmediato de veedores internacionales de derechos humanos” y “levantar inmediatamente las restricciones impuestas a los medios de comunicación de todo tipo”. Si en el próximo mes de abril el Consejo de Seguridad no abordara la situación de los derechos humanos en su debate sobre el Sáhara Occidental y no la examinara con el mismo baremo que ha aplicado en Libia, estaría haciendo una excepción que comprometería seriamente su credibilidad y, por tanto, su capacidad para mantener la paz y la seguridad en toda la región.

Por otra parte, al poner sobre la mesa del Consejo de Seguridad la ampliación del mandato de la MINURSO, el Frente Polisario ha integrado en su estrategia diplomática una recomendación formulada años antes por las organizaciones internacionales de derechos humanos. De hecho, la campaña de Amnistía Internacional (AI) se remonta a 1992. En todo caso, la decisión del Consejo de Seguridad de autorizar a la MINURSO a vigilar el respeto de los derechos humanos en el Sáhara Occidental y en los campamentos de Tinduf (en territorio argelino) requeriría el consentimiento de Marruecos, del Frente Polisario y de Argelia, poniendo a prueba el compromiso con los derechos humanos de todas las partes.

El foco sobre los derechos humanos: efecto y no causa de la falta de resolución del conflicto

En 2006, la Oficina del Alto Comisionado para los Derechos Humanos de la ONU (OACDH) concluía en un informe confidencial filtrado a la prensa[2] que casi todas las violaciones de derechos humanos tenían su origen en la falta de realización del derecho a la autodeterminación del pueblo saharaui. En vista de una promesa de referéndum incumplida, de la inviabilidad de la lucha armada y del escaso éxito de las iniciativas diplomáticas, la defensa del derecho a la autodeterminación se ha convertido en un eje importante de las campañas de los activistas saharauis sobre la base del Artículo 1 de los dos Pactos Internacionales de Derechos Humanos, adoptados por la Asamblea General de la ONU en diciembre de 1966.

Para reprimir sus actividades e intimidar a la población del Sáhara Occidental, las autoridades marroquíes han utilizado leyes que prohíben ataques contra la “integridad territorial” de Marruecos, lo que ha conllevado violaciones de los derechos de expresión, asociación y asamblea, además de procesos sin garantías judiciales, maltrato, torturas y violencia policial. Marruecos también ha impuesto restricciones a los medios de comunicación y expulsado a observadores internacionales. En un informe de 2008, Human Rights Watch (HRW) concluía que los límites a los avances que Marruecos ha realizado desde los años 90 en materia de derechos humanos se manifiestan en la represión de posiciones contrarias a la tesis de que el Sáhara Occidental forma parte de Marruecos.

También en los campos de refugiados de Tinduf en Argelia, administrados por el Frente Polisario, existen violaciones de derechos humanos vinculadas a la falta de resolución del conflicto. Por ejemplo, en septiembre de 2010, el policía Mostafa Salma Sidi Mouloud fue detenido arbitrariamente tras expresar públicamente su apoyo a la propuesta de autonomía marroquí –que excluye un referéndum con la opción de la independencia reclamada por el Frente Polisario– y anunciar que la promovería en los campos de Tinduf.

Aumentando la visibilidad de un conflicto olvidado

En una entrevista de 2004 ofrecida al Public Broadcasting Service (PBS), el antiguo secretario de Estado estadounidense y enviado personal del secretario general de la ONU para el Sáhara Occidental de 1997 a 2004, James Baker, opinaba que una de las dificultades para resolver el conflicto provenía de la escasa importancia que se le atribuye en el orden internacional. El foco sobre los derechos humanos ha hecho el conflicto más visible y lo ha devuelto a la agenda internacional, aumentando así la presión para resolverlo.

Destacan tres acontecimientos que, sobre la base del discurso de los derechos humanos, han reforzado la solidaridad internacional: el levantamiento (intifada) saharaui de 2005, el desafío de Aminetu Haidar al oponer resistencia a su expulsión de El Aaiún mediante una huelga de hambre en 2009 y las acciones de protesta vinculadas al campamento de Gdaym Izzik en 2010. El reto estriba, pues, en diseñar estrategias diplomáticas que aprovechen la presión y el interés generados por las cuestiones de derechos humanos como revulsivo para transformar las relaciones y salir del estancamiento. En este cometido, el papel de las terceras partes es clave.

La necesidad de crear dinámicas nuevas para avanzar en el proceso diplomático

En un informe del International Crisis Group publicado en 2007 bajo el título Superar el Estancamiento, se vaticinaba que si la dinámica subyacente del conflicto no cambiaba, los esfuerzos por encontrar una solución negociada sobre las base de las propuestas presentadas por Marruecos y el Frente Polisario estaban abocados al fracaso. Desde entonces, sucesivas rondas de consultas informales bajo los auspicios de la ONU ni siquiera han logrado producir un acuerdo previo sobre el marco de las negociaciones: cada una de las partes continúa rechazando la propuesta de la otra como base de negociaciones futuras, aunque el Frente Polisario se ha mostrado más proclive a considerar la propuesta de la otra parte si hay reciprocidad.

En una carta al Grupo de Amigos, enviada en junio de 2010 y más tarde filtrada a la prensa,[3] el enviado personal del secretario general para el Sáhara Occidental, Christopher Ross, dejaba entrever su frustración con la actitud de Marruecos y la falta de avances y pedía apoyo para salir del estancamiento. Si para lograr este objetivo resulta necesario crear dinámicas nuevas, cabe analizar, en primer lugar, las dinámicas existentes actualmente; en segundo lugar, el papel que podrían jugar las terceras partes para cambiarlas; y, por último, la manera de encajar la cuestión de los derechos humanos en una estrategia diseñada a tal efecto.

La dinámica actual: la misma que provocó el fracaso del Plan Baker II

El fracaso del Plan Baker II es un buen ejemplo de las dinámicas que bloquean los esfuerzos por resolver el conflicto. En junio de 2004, Baker dimitía de su cargo de enviado personal tras constatar la negativa del Consejo de Seguridad de respaldar su plan de paz con la fuerza necesaria para ponerlo en práctica: la Resolución 1541 daba mayor apoyo a la búsqueda de “una solución política mutuamente aceptable” que al plan de paz del enviado personal. Tras una fase de autonomía, el Plan Baker preveía un auténtico referéndum de libre determinación –incluida la opción de la independencia– con una identificación de votantes que favorecía los objetivos políticos de Marruecos. Si bien reconocía la relación de poder entre las partes, era una propuesta de compromiso que intentaba salvar principios básicos del Derecho Internacional. Con dificultades, el Frente Polisario la aceptó, pero Marruecos, la parte más fuerte, la rechazó tajantemente afirmando que “el carácter definitivo de la solución de autonomía no [era] negociable”. Dando claras muestras de parcialidad, en 2007 el Consejo de Seguridad ponía de manifiesto su preferencia por el plan de autonomía marroquí: las resoluciones 1754 y 1783 hacen referencia a “los esfuerzos serios y creíbles” de Marruecos –pero no del Frente Polisario– de encontrar una solución. En su declaración relativa a la Resolución 1783, Sudáfrica, gran aliado diplomático del Frente Polisario, advertía que elogiar una propuesta por encima de otra minaría las posibilidades de negociar un acuerdo.

Al apoyar la propuesta de Marruecos de antemano, el Consejo de Seguridad ha “desincentivado” su voluntad de compromiso y acentuado el diferencial de poder entre las partes en un conflicto asimétrico con implicaciones para el proceso negociador: ni ha persuadido a Marruecos de la necesidad de hacer concesiones para alcanzar sus objetivos, ni se ha ganado la confianza del Frente Polisario para negociar. En una entrevista publicada en marzo de 2010,[4] Julian Harston, representante especial del secretario general para el Sáhara Occidental y jefe de la MINURSO entre 2007 y 2009, confirmaba que la comunidad internacional había presionado principalmente al Frente Polisario. Ante esta perspectiva, si el Consejo de Seguridad y el Grupo de Amigos quieren ayudar a desbloquear la situación, tendrán que revisar sus planteamientos.

El respeto a los derechos humanos como medida de fomento de la confianza

En la Resolución 1920 (2010), el Consejo de Seguridad destaca “la importancia de lograr avances respecto de la dimensión humana como medio de promover la transparencia y la confianza mutua”. Sin embargo, las medidas que se aplican actualmente se limitan a facilitar reuniones entre saharauis de los campos de Tinduf y sus parientes en el Sáhara Occidental por razones humanitarias. Un mecanismo eficaz de supervisión de los derechos humanos podría contribuir a mejorar el bienestar de la población fomentando la confianza entre las partes del conflicto. Así, una mayor libertad de expresión, asociación y asamblea podría abrir espacios para un debate sereno sobre las diferentes opciones de futuro sin temor a represalias, creando un clima de confianza más propicio al diálogo.

Además, aunque con opciones diferentes, tanto el plan de paz de Marruecos como el del Frente Polisario proponen un referéndum. Sin una garantía de respeto escrupuloso a los derechos de expresión, asociación, asamblea y movimiento será imposible celebrar un referéndum libre y justo cuyo resultado sea aceptado por la población saharaui como legítimo. Por tanto, un mecanismo de supervisión de los derechos humanos ayudaría a restablecer la confianza del pueblo saharaui en el proceso auspiciado por la ONU, fomentando la posibilidad de una resolución del conflicto por la vía pacífica, relajando la tensión sobre el terreno y creando esperanza en las oportunidades de futuro. Por otra parte, un acuerdo sobre un mecanismo de vigilancia de los derechos humanos serviría de precedente para negociar y gestionar otras cuestiones.

Marruecos y los socios que han apostado por su propuesta de autonomía, como EEUU, Francia y España, deberían, por su propio interés, apoyar el establecimiento de un mecanismo de supervisión de los derechos humanos Si bien la autonomía es una opción válida para realizar el derecho de autodeterminación, no es realista pensar que el pueblo saharaui la aceptará sin garantías amplias, firmes y creíbles de respeto a los derechos humanos, división de poderes y participación democrática. Como afirmaba Bernabé López García en un artículo el pasado noviembre,[5] “sin democracia, no habrá salida alguna al problema del Sáhara”; sin respeto a los derechos humanos, tampoco.

El contencioso en torno a los derechos humanos, ¿un punto de inflexión para cambiar la dinámica del conflicto?

El debate sobre los derechos humanos ha seguido la misma dinámica que ha marcado el conflicto. Las posiciones entre las partes son “cuasi-irreconciliables”, como decía el antiguo enviado personal van Walsum, el Consejo de Seguridad carece de voluntad política para imponer soluciones sobre la base del Derecho Internacional, favoreciendo los objetivos de la parte más fuerte en un conflicto asimétrico, y la Secretaría General de la ONU muestra excesiva timidez a la hora de asumir sus responsabilidades y hacer valer los principios que enarbola, minando la credibilidad de la organización. En lo que respecta al Consejo de Seguridad, éste ha supeditado el establecimiento de un mecanismo de vigilancia de los derechos humanos al consenso entre las partes. Ha dado así poder de veto a Marruecos en cuestiones relativas a la protección de los derechos humanos de una población en un Territorio No Autónomo que, en gran parte, se halla bajo su control efectivo sin reconocimiento legal.

Un enfoque más eficaz para proteger los derechos humanos de la población saharaui y asegurar avances en el proceso diplomático consistiría en dejar claro que la defensa de los derechos humanos no es negociable. De este modo se crearían dinámicas nuevas que mitigarían los efectos de la estructura asimétrica del conflicto, se sentaría un precedente para una mediación más vigorosa y aumentarían las perspectivas de éxito en las negociaciones.

Existe la preocupación de que Marruecos abandone la mesa de negociaciones si recibe presiones pero, por otra parte, no hay grandes avances en el proceso diplomático. El propio Christopher Ross ha advertido que sin una mayor voluntad política, continuar las conversaciones sólo servirá para desacreditar a la ONU. Las protestas organizadas desde el campamento de Gdaym Izzik y las vehementes demandas de derechos económicos, sociales, civiles y políticos que provienen del Sáhara Occidental y gran parte del mundo árabe muestran que, para lograr una paz sostenible y estabilidad regional, cualquier solución política tendrá que incluir el respeto a los derechos humanos.

¿Qué se puede hacer en abril desde la ONU?

Hay poco que perder y mucho que ganar. Dos ejemplos concretos de cómo las terceras partes podrían mostrar una actitud firme en relación con los derechos humanos en el mes de abril serían: (1) una recomendación del secretario general de establecer un mecanismo de supervisión de los derechos humanos; y (2) una propuesta concreta del Grupo de Amigos para ponerla en práctica.

(1) El Informe del secretario general de la ONU: consciente de las divisiones en el Consejo de Seguridad, el secretario general todavía no ha recogido en sus informes la recomendación realizada en 2006 por la OACDH –que forma parte de su propia Secretaría– de que la ONU explore la mejor manera de establecer un mecanismo de vigilancia de los derechos humanos en la región.En un informe con lagunas, en abril de 2010, el secretario general reconoce el deber de la ONU de promover las normas de derechos humanos en todas sus operaciones, pero no explica cómo la MINURSO está cumpliendo con ese deber. En dicho informe, el secretario general menciona denuncias de violaciones de derechos humanos por ambas partes y dice haberlas transmitido a la OACDH, pero no explica qué seguimiento se les ha dado desde allí. Tampoco menciona la controversia legal que existe en torno a la explotación de los recursos naturales en el Sáhara Occidental. Por último, señala que la MINURSO no dispone de un mandato en materia de derechos humanos, aunque no indica si lo debería de tener.

Quizá el secretario general pretenda proyectar una imagen de imparcialidad. Sin embargo, desde el Informe Brahimi (2000), la imparcialidad en las operaciones de paz no se entiende como neutralidad, sino como adhesión a los principios de la Carta de Naciones Unidas, lo cual incluye el respeto a los derechos humanos.

Un mayor compromiso con la defensa de los derechos humanos se correspondería con la responsabilidad especial de la ONU con la población de un Territorio No Autónomo que, tras la retirada unilateral de España como potencia administradora en 1976, se ha quedado de facto sin las protecciones que le confiere el artículo 73 de la Carta de Naciones Unidas. En una conferencia sobre el Sáhara Occidental organizada por las universidades públicas de Madrid en 2007, Francesco Bastagli, representante del secretario general y jefe de la MINURSO de 2005 a 2007, recomendaba que, hasta que se materialice el derecho a la autodeterminación, la ONU actúe como “abogado defensor” del pueblo saharaui en temas como los derechos humanos o la explotación de los recursos naturales. Siguiendo esta línea de pensamiento, el informe del secretario general de 2011 debería adoptar las recomendaciones de la OACDH, marcando pautas para el debate del Consejo de Seguridad.

(2) ¿Es incapaz el Grupo de Amigos de cumplir con sus funciones?: en los dos últimos años, en lugar de agilizar el proceso, los borradores del Grupo de Amigos han sido objeto de controversia por ignorar las cuestiones relativas a los derechos humanos Las resoluciones sólo pudieron ser aprobadas por unanimidad tras horas de intenso debate dedicado a acordar fórmulas de compromiso que hicieran referencia a los derechos humanos, pero sin mentarlos por su nombre. Esta controversia cuestiona la capacidad del Grupo de Amigos para cumplir con sus funciones. En sus intervenciones relativas a la Resolución 1920, Nigeria, Uganda, México y Austria abogaron por una revisión del proceso de redacción con el objetivo de hacerlo más inclusivo y transparente.

Tanto en 2009 como en 2010, los borradores preparados por el Grupo de Amigos tuvieron que ser renegociados a fondo en el Consejo. En 2009, la presión de Costa Rica, México, Nigeria y Uganda, junto con la posición favorable del Reino Unido, llevaron a la inclusión de un párrafo en el preámbulo de la Resolución 1871 que hace referencia a los derechos humanos por medio del término “dimensión humana”, lo cual no deja de ser una completa anomalía en el sistema de Naciones Unidas. En 2010, tras las amenazas de México, Uganda y Nigeria de abstenerse en el voto, fueron necesarias 18 horas de negociaciones a nivel de embajadores y la mediación de EEUU para añadir a la Resolución 1920 tres líneas en las que, con una fórmula de “ambigüedad constructiva”, se observa la necesidad de que las partes respeten los derechos humanos y cooperen con la OACDH. La diplomacia activa de algunos miembros no permanentes del Consejo lograba así abrir espacios para negociar el establecimiento de un mecanismo de supervisión de los derechos humanos.

Perspectivas y opciones

La ola de revueltas en el Magreb y los acontecimientos relativos al campamento de Gdaym Izzik han incrementado la presión sobre el Consejo de Seguridad de establecer un mecanismo de supervisión de los derechos humanos. Las dificultades de contrastar las cifras de víctimas sin acceso al territorio, el bloqueo informativo impuesto por Marruecos y las repercusiones políticas del desmantelamiento del campamento mostraron la necesidad de una presencia permanente de la ONU en el territorio que proporcione al Consejo información de primera mano sobre la situación de los derechos humanos. Actualmente la MINURSO no está en condiciones de cumplir con esa función por dos razones: (1) la falta de un mandato explícito de protección de los derechos humanos para investigar y contrastar datos; y (2) los obstáculos a los que se enfrenta a la hora de llevar a cabo sus operaciones.

Todo parece indicar que las fichas se están moviendo. La explicación del voto de EEUU en la Resolución 1920 pide a las partes que cooperen con la comunidad internacional para garantizar el respeto a los derechos humanos. A fin de evitar que el contencioso sobre la ampliación del mandato de la MINURSO vuelva a dividir al Consejo en abril, el Reino Unido ha iniciado un proceso de consulta para explorar otras opciones. El balance de 12 agentes muertos tras el desalojo del campamento de Gdaym Izzik podría hacer recapacitar a Marruecos sobre la conveniencia de desplegar observadores internacionales. Y con los vientos de revuelta y libertad que soplan en el Magreb, el veto de Francia al término “derechos humanos” es una fuente de descrédito para su gobierno. Las críticas recibidas por el silencio y la connivencia ante las revueltas en Túnez y Egipto sugieren que Francia tendrá que revisar su estrategia diplomática. De hecho, en un reciente artículo publicado en Le Monde, un grupo de diplomáticos franceses planteaba la necesidad de desarrollar una política exterior más coherente, que tenga en cuenta valores democráticos y de solidaridad.[6]

También en España hay cada vez más voces que aconsejan una revisión de la estrategia diplomática para el Magreb (véase, por ejemplo, el editorial “Bucle marroquí”, publicado en El País, 7/XII/2010).[7] Claramente, con respecto al Sáhara Occidental, existe una brecha entre las declaraciones públicas y la estrategia política que limita el margen de maniobra de la diplomacia española.

Fuentes diplomáticas comentan que, en el Grupo de Amigos, “el silencio de España es ensordecedor”. Sin embargo, ante la Comisión de Asuntos Exteriores en el Congreso de los Diputados, la ministra de Exteriores y de Cooperación, Trinidad Jiménez, declaraba el 18 de noviembre de 2010 que “el gobierno pidió hace un año… que se ampliara la vigilancia y el componente de derechos humanos en… la MINURSO. Siempre hemos sido igualmente exigentes con la defensa de los derechos fundamentales, de las libertades; y lo seguimos siendo ahora y se lo hemos dicho al gobierno de Marruecos desde el primer día”.[8] Asimismo, en relación a los acontecimientos de Gdaym Izzik, el 8 de noviembre de 2010, la ministra opinaba en una rueda de prensa celebrada en Bolivia que la Presidencia británica podría convocar al Consejo de Seguridad. Sin embargo, la reunión informativa del Consejo, que tuvo lugar el 16 de noviembre, se celebró a petición de México.

Para proyectar la imagen de una política exterior más coherente y aumentar su capacidad de influencia y liderazgo en foros internacionales, España debería, por una parte, abrir un debate serio y profundo en la sociedad española para lograr un consenso que permita ajustar las declaraciones públicas a la estrategia política y, por otra parte, traducir la posición declarada del gobierno en acción diplomática. Una opción sería sumarse a los esfuerzos del Reino Unido por establecer un mecanismo de supervisión de los derechos humanos, neutralizando cualquier oposición (incluida una eventual oposición de Francia) y alterando el equilibro de fuerzas dentro del Grupo de Amigos. Con esta estrategia, España aumentaría la capacidad del Grupo de Amigos de presentar en abril un borrador apto para el consenso y, por tanto, de desempeñar un papel constructivo y relevante en la resolución del conflicto.

¿Qué mecanismo de vigilancia del respeto a los derechos humanos?

La ampliación del mandato de la MINURSO ha pasado de ser la demanda principal a constituir una de las opciones para establecer un mecanismo de supervisión de los derechos humanos A pesar de la preferencia por la MINURSO, existe también la voluntad de negociar un mecanismo alternativo, siempre que éste se establezca bajo la autoridad del Consejo Seguridad y tenga una presencia permanente sobre el terreno. Una de las alternativas más importantes que se barajan es una Oficina Regional de la OACDH.

(1) Restableciendo la credibilidad y legitimidad de la MINURSO: actualmente, las pocas operaciones de mantenimiento de la paz de la ONU que no vigilan los derechos humanos tienen un mandato tradicional de supervisar el alto el fuego (como UNFICYP en Chipre). En cambio, la MINURSO se estableció además para organizar el referéndum previsto en el Plan de Arreglo (1990). En Sudán, donde se celebró un referéndum de autodeterminación en el sur en enero de 2011, UNMIS tiene observadores de derechos humanos. También el mandato de la MINURSO contiene implícitamente responsabilidades relativas a los derechos humanos, como la supervisión del orden público para garantizar las condiciones necesarias para un referéndum libre e imparcial durante el período de transición. Dotarla de un mandato explícito de derechos humanos sería la conclusión lógica de esta fórmula. Tal mandato ayudaría a la MINURSO –desprestigiada por no haber cumplido gran parte de su mandato– a restablecer su credibilidad y legitimidad, factores clave para el éxito de una misión de paz. Además, los generosos recursos de los que dispone y su excelente conocimiento del terreno la convierten en la mejor plataforma para vigilar eficazmente los derechos humanos De hecho, la OACDH apoya fuertemente la integración de observadores de derechos humanos en las misiones de paz de la ONU y considera que la MINURSO no debería constituir una excepción.

(2) Oficina Regional de la OACDH: una Oficina Regional permitiría situar la problemática en el contexto de los esfuerzos por mejorar la situación de los derechos humanos como parte del desarrollo y la modernización en la región. Se evitarían así los escollos del estatuto específico del Sáhara Occidental –que se plantea con la opción de la MINURSO– facilitando el consentimiento de Marruecos. Sin embargo, habitualmente las Oficinas Regionales no supervisan los derechos humanos sino que prestan asistencia técnica. Además, la OACDH carece del poder del Consejo de Seguridad para negociar acuerdos y garantizar un seguimiento político de los problemas. De hecho, la OACDH lleva negociando –sin éxito hasta la fecha– más de dos años para abrir una Oficina Regional que realice tareas de capacitación y cooperación en Rabat. Obtener el consentimiento para una supervisión eficaz de los derechos humanos en ambos lados, sería mucho más difícil.

Proteger los derechos humanos mediante una interpretación amplia del mandato de la MINURSO

Hasta que se establezca un mecanismo de derechos humanos especializado, la MINURSO debería explorar vías de proteger mejor a la población saharaui y las terceras partes deberían hacer gestiones para que la misión pueda llevar a cabo sus operaciones sin restricciones de movimiento.

Un precedente interesante es la ampliación de las actividades de la MINURSO para apoyar el programa de visitas del ACNUR sin cambiar el mandato. Por otra parte, cabe preguntarse si realmente es necesario un mandato explícito en materia de derechos humanos para que cualquier misión de paz transmita al Consejo de Seguridad las violaciones que observe durante sus operaciones, o si implícitamente dicha tarea de información forma parte de su mandato. En un informe de 1993,[9] el secretario general entendía que “si bien su actual mandato militar se limita estrictamente a la vigilancia y verificación de la cesación del fuego, la MINURSO, en su condición de misión de la ONU, no podría ser testigo mudo de conductas que pudieran violar los derechos humanos de la población civil”.

Conclusiones: Las terceras partes deberían aprovechar el foco sobre los derechos humanos para avanzar en la resolución del conflicto del Sáhara Occidental. Separar la protección de los derechos humanos del contexto político encierra el peligro de que dentro de una estrategia de gestión –que no resolución– de conflicto, una vez arreglado el tema “técnico” de los derechos humanos y aminorada la presión de actuar, el conflicto del Sáhara Occidental vuelva a caer en el olvido.

Este año, Sudáfrica, tradicional aliado del Frente Polisario, es miembro no permanente del Consejo de Seguridad y es de esperar que tome cartas en el asunto. Por su parte, si quiere evitar más daños a su credibilidad y legitimidad, el Grupo de Amigos tendrá que proponer un mecanismo de supervisión de los derechos humanos. En este sentido, la opción más eficaz para proteger los derechos humanos de la población saharaui y crear nuevas dinámicas sería la ampliación del mandato de la MINURSO. Por otra parte, para presentar un proyecto de resolución útil al Consejo, es importante que este punto de vista esté representado en el Grupo de Amigos. España es el único miembro que podría hacerlo como parte de una política exterior con señas de identidad propia, que tenga en cuenta su responsabilidad histórica y responda tanto a intereses definidos por la realpolitik como a principios legales. Para ello contaría, además de con el apoyo de la opinión pública, con un mandato democrático que emana del Congreso de los Diputados y de varios parlamentos autonómicos.

Notas:

[1] Véase http://www.un.org/es/comun/docs/?symbol=s/res/1970%20(2011).

[2] Véase http://www.arso.org/OHCHRrep2006en.pdf.

[3] Véase http://www.elpais.com/elpaismedia/ultimahora/media/201008/20/espana/20100820elpepunac_1_Pes_PDF.tiff.

[4] Véase http://www.elimparcial.es/mundo/espana-nunca-ha-mostrado-una-voluntad-real-para-solucionar-el-conflicto-del-sahara-58880.html.

[5] “El suicidio de Marruecos”, El País, 9/XI/2010.

[6] “La voix de la France a disparu dans le monde”, Le Monde, 23/II/2011.

[7] http://www.elpais.com/articulo/opinion/Bucle/marroqui/elpepiopi/20101207elpepiopi_1/Tes.

[8] Véase http://www.senado.es/legis9/publicaciones/html/maestro/index_CO_658.html.

[9] “La situación en el Sáhara Occidental”, Informe del Secretario General, 26 de enero de 1993 (S/25170).

While the world’s attention is riveted on the Middle East, democracy continues to struggle to take root in other regions.

Only last summer, Vietnam and the United States celebrated the 15th anniversary of the reestablishment of diplomatic relations. The resumption of ties has proved profitable for Vietnam: The United States is its largest foreign investor, the countries have more than $15 billion in annual bilateral trade, and 13,000 Vietnamese nationals are attending college in America.

Despite these developments, a U.S. official in Vietnam was manhandled by a crowd last month while police stood by. Christian Marchant, a political officer attached to the U.S. Embassy in Hanoi, was roughed up when he attempted to visit a dissident Roman Catholic priest.

The meeting between Marchant and Nguyen Van Ly had been arranged in advance. Ly told Radio Free Asia that police prevented Marchant from entering his house and pushed him to the ground when he tried to pass them.

Some witnesses said a car door was slammed on Marchant’s leg before he was taken away by police. A State Department spokesman said that day that Marchant’s injury was not serious but that he was limping after the incident.

The U.S. ambassador in Hanoi, Michael Michalak, called the incident “a flagrant violation of international law.” A spokesman for Vietnam’s Foreign Ministry has said an investigation is being conducted – but warned that foreign diplomats should observe the laws of their host country.

Perhaps it is Vietnam, though, that needs to familiarize itself with international law. The Vienna Convention in particular makes clear that it is the responsibility of host countries to prevent assaults on foreign diplomats.

Factors contributing to Vietnam’s behavior predate the signing of a bilateral trade agreement, Vietnam’s entry into the World Trade Organization or even the resumption of diplomatic relations with Washington. At each juncture, Vietnam has promised to respect human rights and comply with international law. Each time, however, Vietnam has learned that it can reap all the benefits without honoring any of its promises.

Two days before the January incident, the hometown paper of Marchant’s parents published a profile noting that he was to share the State Department’s Human Rights and Democracy Award in February. The article cited a State Department news release calling Marchant “a persuasive advocate for Vietnam’s beleaguered dissident community, tirelessly serving as a conduit for imprisoned dissidents, their families, and the outside world.”

In the profile, Marchant speaks about his attempts to find common ground with the Vietnamese. But he made clear that the United States could not be silent about abuses. In the past year, he told the paper, 25 Vietnamese have been jailed for criticizing their government.

“The big difference between the two countries,” he said, “is that if people in a position of authority in the United States abuse an individual, they go to jail.”

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton has warned Hanoi that while the United States would like to deepen bilateral relations, including trade, Vietnam’s human rights record remains a stumbling block. These sorts of statements make officials unpopular with Communist authorities. But the people of Vietnam are grateful to have friends who speak out.

I met Marchant in 2009, when we discussed at length the worsening of human rights violations in Vietnam and what the United States might do. He struck me as an active, dedicated diplomat with a soft voice, a humble heart and a friendly bearing. As a Vietnamese, I am ashamed at what this man has had to endure for doing his job.

A larger question is why 15 years of closer relations have apparently not made an impression on Vietnam’s Communist leaders. Their approach is clear: Take American trade and investment, but keep democracy and human rights at bay.

I wonder how the American people will respond to one of their diplomats being roughed up with the apparent approval of Vietnamese authorities. I hope Americans see this for what it is. Why should anyone expect a government that doesn’t respect its citizens to respect foreigners? Other governments are watching, wondering how America will respond to this insult.

As for the communists here, the truth is that Hanoi needs Washington much more than Washington needs Hanoi. Vietnam’s leaders may live to regret allowing an American official to be treated so badly. But today Vietnam looks out at a re-militarized China and an ongoing dispute in the South China Sea, not to mention domestic woes that include a sluggish economy and an outdated education system.

And if Washington is looking to Vietnam for a long-term partner for peace and regional stability, America would do well to recognize publicly that only a Vietnam that is free and democratic can provide one.

A year ago, my colleagues and I organized an unprecedented news conference in Tripoli to release our report assessing Libya’s human rights record and steps toward reform. We invited victims of government abuses to join us and speak about what they had suffered.

Seif Islam Kadafi, one of the sons of Libya’s ruler, was primarily responsible for persuading officials to allow us to hold the news conference. As the semi-sanctioned internal voice for reform, his “private” foundation had pushed publicly for changing the country’s laws and freeing political prisoners, and it helped establish two private newspapers that sometimes criticized government policies. We had a sense that, with Seif Islam’s support, some genuine political liberalization was possible and civil society might be able to breathe more freely.

Yet early Monday, the same Seif Islam told the world that he and his father’s government would fight to the “last bullet” to keep themselves in power. And true to his word — this time — the Libyan authorities attacked their own people, declaring “major military operations” against “pockets of terror.” As of this writing, the death toll since protests began has reached the hundreds. Doctors have told us that many deaths were from gunshot wounds to the head, neck and shoulders. Seif Islam, who might have led Libyans to a peaceful transition, has become an advocate for policies leading to their deaths.

Seif Islam in fact abandoned his nascent reform agenda long before the past week’s demonstrations rocked “Brother Leader” Moammar Kadafi’s rule. With no progress on any institutional or legal reforms, and a stalemate with the old guard over his efforts to rein in the country’s notorious security forces, Seif Islam last year announced his withdrawal from political life and said that his foundation would no longer focus on human rights and political affairs. His two newspapers, press agency and radio stations were closed for various periods of time, and scores of journalists who were the least bit critical were suspended and even arrested.

For sure, most Libyans we spoke with never had much faith that Moammar Kadafi would learn new tricks, or that the announced reforms were anything more than an endless loop of promises made and broken. What is awe-inspiring and heartening is the Libyans’ stand today, against deadly force and against decades of stifling oppression that has kept their society in despair and disrepair.

Libyans stand almost alone among other Arabs for the extreme isolation they experienced not only under Kadafi’s iron-fisted rule but over a decade of international sanctions for the country’s role in the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. Until a few years ago, Internet communications were virtually nonexistent and the only local news source was state media. Satellite television, especially Al Jazeera, had opened Libyan eyes to developments in the world and region, but reports about Libya by international or independent journalists had been a rarity.

Libyans thus had little opportunity to assemble components of civil society. Political associations, human rights organizations, independent professional associations or trade unions were all strictly proscribed, and organized opposition to the “ideology of the 1969 revolution” was punishable by death. On my first visit to Libya in 2005, the specially selected “civil society representatives” permitted to talk with us, and even government officials we met, displayed anxiety about expressing any opinions outside their sanctioned talking points. They literally recited chapter and verse of the Green Book, Kadafi’s small manuscript on governance. The performance was unmatched by anything I had seen in Syria and Iraq.

This atmosphere improved, and we heard more criticism and debate, during the brief opening Seif Islam heralded. No doubt wider access to the Internet has had the greatest effect, making available not just independent news about Libya — particularly from opposition websites such as Libya Alyoum — but also communication among Libyans. Witnessing the collapse of their neighbors’ strongmen — Tunisia’s Zine el Abidine ben Ali and Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak — doubtless bolstered Libyans’ newfound confidence that such a transformation was within their reach.

In December 2009, I recorded our meeting with a young Libyan activist outside Tripoli who told us about the arrests, beatings and torture he and his brothers had endured after security forces discovered that they had planned a demonstration in the capital’s central square. I asked him why he risked so much to organize at best 100 demonstrators who would probably be crushed within an hour of assembling. “It could be like the time the Americans landed on the moon,” he replied, “a small step for us but a big step for Libya.”

This week, Libyans had their moon landing. We owe it to them to help ensure that their journey has not been in vain.

When the White House invited me to the state dinner for Chinese President Hu Jintao, I knew that I was being used as a symbol — to signal a tougher approach on human rights. The Obama administration was widely seen as having flubbed the November 2009 summit in China. In the lead-up to his visit, President Obama had refused to meet the Dalai Lama, and Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton had insisted that human rights “can’t interfere” with other U.S. interests in China. The administration hoped this soft approach would win points that could be cashed in at the summit, but instead it looked weak and unprincipled.

This time, the administration was determined to do better. Before the summit, Clinton gave a strong speech defending civil society and Internet freedom, and Obama met with human rights experts for advice. During the summit, Obama stood at Hu’s side and stressed the “universal rights of all people.” Mentioning freedoms of speech, press, association and religion, he anticipated the false claim that these rights are foreign impositions by noting they are all “recognized in the Chinese constitution.” In response, Hu did not announce prisoner releases or offer concrete reforms, but he did repeat the party line that “a lot still needs to be done in China in terms of human rights.”

The administration’s decision to extend me an invitation reflected this new and more assertive approach — another statement that human rights should be a normal part of the U.S.-China conversation. That’s what I wanted too, but I must admit I didn’t have high hopes for the evening.

And things didn’t start off auspiciously. As I approached Hu, I couldn’t help feeling misgivings about meeting him in such glitzy circumstances. After all, this was a man whose government has launched an intensifying crackdown on dissent that began in the run-up to the Beijing Olympics and continues to this day. But I donned my diplomatic facade, explained that I represented Human Rights Watch and said that I hoped human rights groups could discuss abuses with the Chinese government in the same way we do with governments around the world, including the United States. He returned a blank smile, as if my comments were lost in the translation. The pace of the receiving line kept our conversation perfunctory, and he wasn’t to be found during the cocktail hour.

But when it came time for dinner, I was pleasantly surprised. Rather than being relegated to one of the dinner’s satellite rooms, I found myself seated in the main State Dining Room, at a table with the White House China director, Jeffrey Bader; the U.S. ambassador to China, Jon Huntsman Jr.; and China’s ambassador to Washington, Zhang Yesui. This was another statement, and a strong one.

At the table, the conversation became more serious. I spent most of the evening immersed in a lengthy discussion with Zhang. This in itself was surprising. A prospective future foreign minister, Zhang had avoided meeting with Human Rights Watch during his tenure in Washington and, before that, while he was China’s ambassador to the United Nations. Rather than blanch at having me as his dinner partner, he launched into a spirited defense of China’s imprisonment of the Nobel Peace Prize winner Liu Xiaobo, who was the principal drafter of the pro-democracy Charter 08 and is now serving an 11-year prison term.

I said I found it puzzling that the Chinese government would prosecute a writer for merely expressing his peaceful views on reforming China. Zhang tried to convince me that Liu was dangerous, citing various positions that Liu had allegedly taken, none of which amounted to advocating, let alone inciting, violence. If the Chinese government does not like Liu’s views, I suggested, it should rebut them, not make them criminal. Zhang insisted that these ideas, and Liu’s promotion of them, endangered China’s stability.

Neither of us convinced the other, but I came away knowing that, with the Obama administration’s backing, I had been able to explain to a senior Chinese official why his government’s treatment of Liu was a clear violation of the right to freedom of expression.

The conversation about Liu led to a broader discussion about human rights conditions in China: the progress that China has made; the great distance it still has to go. I accepted Zhang’s point that critical observers must be conscious of China’s context, but I noted that it would help if the Chinese government accepted more regular exchanges with human rights organizations. Zhang didn’t dismiss this idea out of hand, but it was clearly a matter that would require assent from people above his pay scale.

After dinner, as I waited in the East Room for the superb jazz concert led by Herbie Hancock, I had a chance to chat further with Obama. I thanked him for being more outspoken on human rights in China and for finding a way to discuss the issue that was genuine and heartfelt.

But, of course, talk is only the beginning. Ultimately, the test of a dialogue’s productiveness is a change in behavior. Given China’s increasingly tough restrictions on basic freedoms, there is still a lot of work to be done.

Dear Mr. President:

I understand that when you meet Chinese President Hu Jintao this week, you will engage on some of the most complex international matters facing our two countries. Trade, currency exchange, peace on the Korean Peninsula, and arms sales to and relations with Taiwan are but a few of the urgent issues.

I want to respectfully point you toward an even more fundamental complexity in the relationship that must be addressed. Assuming it is the goal of both countries to improve and expand on the political and economic foundation for a mutually beneficial relationship, this issue simply will not go away.

It is the matter of how Mr. Hu’s government treats its citizens.

Today, Liu Xiaobo, the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize laureate, and thousands, if not tens of thousands, of other Chinese citizens are in prison simply for expressing their opinions.

Mr. President, as a fellow Nobel Peace Prize laureate, you above all others must appreciate the profound incongruity of representing one population – a people who benefit from guaranteed democratic rights and privileges enshrined in the U.S. Constitution – while attempting to co-exist, do business with and grow alongside a population denied such fundamental rights.

Whatever the progress on short-term matters, if the long-term issues surrounding China’s need for progress on human rights and its democratization are not addressed, an increasingly difficult and unanswerable series of problems will evolve into a situation that cannot be avoided.

The question, then, is when to raise discussion about the long road ahead, rather than focusing on more immediate crises. Here is one suggestion.

At some point during this visit, even over dinner at the White House tonight, you might privately ask the Chinese president about his feelings as the son of someone who was found to be a bad element by a previous iteration of his party. Hu’s father was denounced by the Communist Party during the Cultural Revolution.

Clearly, Hu knows that without democracy – what Lech Walesa called a government’s conversation with its people – anyone can end up on the wrong side of a political debate. Perhaps at that point you might note that Liu Xiaobo would be just the latest example of the consequences of that missing conversation. You should then ask Hu, politely but firmly, to free Liu Xiaobo and fellow political prisoners such as Gao Zhisheng, Liu Xianbin and Wang Bingzhang.

Hu is said to have a nearly photographic memory. Yet even he will not be able to recall any section of Chinese law that permits the detention of individuals without cause. You might ask why Liu Xiaobo’s wife, Liu Xia, continues to be held under house arrest by Beijing authorities even though she has not been accused of committing a crime at any time.

Pressing the leaders of China’s government to move along a democratic path is not just in the best interest of both the United States and China. Given the size and importance of the Chinese population, it is in the interest of all humanity. Moving China toward democracy starts with the release of its dissenters and political prisoners and with the removal of restrictions on innocent civilians such as Liu Xia. The more humanitarian the Chinese regime becomes, the lower the cost to Chinese men and women of standing up against remaining repressions, such as arbitrary detention, harassment, unfair wages, media censorship and the one-child policy. Gradually, the heroic work of dissidents will become the more common practice of everyday people.

This process can be facilitated by your willingness to face this reality. Equally critical, as the statesman Edmund Burke noted, is the fact that all it takes for evil to triumph is for good people to do nothing.

Yes, it will be awkward to use this visit to raise these issues. Hu, the leader of a resurgent China, of course may be reluctant to hear from you on these topics, privately or publicly. But this is your opportunity, Mr. President. I respectfully urge you not to let the moment pass you by.

If President Obama can raise just one human rights issue at the summit this week with Chinese President Hu Jintao, he should speak for China‘s disappeared.

On Dec. 19, 2009, 20 Uighurs – a Muslim ethnic minority in China who have long suffered from state discrimination and other abuses – were forced onto a Chinese government plane in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, flown back to China and effectively disappeared into official custody. Since then, the only whisper of the fate of the deported Uighurs – who included two infants – was an unconfirmed report in mid-January 2010 that some of them had been sentenced by a Xinjiang court to verdicts that included the death penalty.

The group – which had sought refugee status in Cambodia – had been issued “persons of concern” letters by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees; under international law, those documents should have provided them protection from deportation. The Chinese government insisted that the 20 Uighurs were “criminals” to whom those protections did not apply. The Cambodian government ignored the high likelihood that the Uighurs would face torture, disappearance and/or arbitrary detention upon return to China, and under pressure from Beijing, Cambodia forced the Uighurs to return. Shortly after their plane left, Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping touched down for a high-profile state visit to Cambodia, suggesting that Phnom Penh prioritized Beijing’s demands over Cambodia‘s obligations under international law.

In a report released Jan. 11 on the failures of China‘s first human rights “action plan,” Human Rights Watch documented an alarming variety of enforced disappearances in China. Ongoing efforts to locate dozens of Uighur men and boys disappeared by security forces in Urumqi in the wake of the July 2009 protests there have yielded virtually no information as to their status or well-being.

Enforced disappearances are a favorite tool for purging China‘s petitioners – rural residents seeking legal redress for abuses of power at the local level. Every year in Beijing alone, thousands of petitioners are abducted, detained and subjected to appalling abuses in a network of secret, illegal detention facilities known as “black jails.” Despite a recent spate of Chinese state media reports of these abuses, the government has failed to publicly decry such violations or take decisive actions to halt them or punish the perpetrators.

China‘s high-profile dissidents are also subjected to enforced disappearances. Gao Zhisheng, a lawyer who took on some of China‘s most controversial causes, including defending miners and religious minorities like the Falun Gong and underground Christians, was the victim of an enforced disappearance in February 2009. Mr. Gao re-emerged in his Beijing apartment in early April 2010 but vanished again days later, apparently back into official custody. Mr. Gao‘s location, health and circumstances remain unknown.

Rights-respecting governments have made regular inquiries about all of these kinds of cases, only to be told not to “interfere in internal affairs.” The deportation of the Uighurs and the recent events in Oslo serve as a stark reminder of the Chinese government‘s greater willingness to try to use its rising economic power and growing diplomatic heft to exempt itself frominternational human rights standards, no matter how shrill and crude those tactics appear.

Just six days after the Uighurs’ deportation, a Beijing court sentenced Chinese writer Liu Xiaobo to an 11-year prison term on spurious “subversion” charges for his role in drafting the online petition Charter ’08. That document calls for peaceful political change and rights embodied in China‘s constitution. As expectations grew that Mr. Liu would win the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize, the Chinese government dispatched no less than its deputy foreign minister to Oslo to threaten that honoring Mr. Liu would harm bilateral China-Norway relations. After his selection was announced, the Chinese government vociferously denounced the award. Early last month, it issued explicit warnings to foreign governments not to attend the Dec. 10 Nobel Peace Prize ceremony in Oslo on the basis that Mr. Liu was a “criminal.” While 45 nations ignored that pressure, a total of 19 countries – including China‘s close allies Pakistan, Russia and Cuba – chose to stay away.

Mr. Obama will meet with the leader of an assertive government ever more willing to use its rising influence to obtain international silence for its abuse of human rights. The onus is on Mr. Obama to express the same support for universal human rights and freedoms as he did on Dec. 10, when he praised Mr. Liu‘s Nobel Prize victory and urged his immediate release.

Mr. Obama must use the occasion of his summit with the Chinese president to reiterate U.S. government expectations that a rising China must respect universal rights and freedoms rather than undermine them. Failure to do so will only ensure that more innocent Chinese citizens will join those lost 20 Uighurs in the ranks of China‘s disappeared.

Les événements qui ont embrasé El-Ayoun, la capitale du Sahara occidental, le 8 novembre, devraient convaincre la diplomatie française de changer de cap sur un dossier peu connu, mais qui embarrasse jusqu’aux plus aguerris de ses diplomates. Depuis plusieurs années, à l’abri des portes closes du Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU, la France use du pouvoir de dissuasion que lui confère son droit de veto pour tenir les Nations unies à l’écart des questions touchant au respect des droits de l’homme dans le territoire annexé par son allié marocain en 1975.

Faute d’un mandat approprié, la mission de l’ONU au Sahara Occidental (Minurso) est restée aveugle tout au long des événements qui ont opposé le mois dernier les forces de l’ordre marocaines aux militants sahraouis – les troubles les plus graves depuis le cessez-le-feu de 1991. Le Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU, en charge de la paix internationale, s’est vu dans l’incapacité de faire la part des choses entre le mouvement indépendantiste du Front Polisario, qui a dénoncé sans preuve le massacre de 36 manifestants pacifiques, et le Maroc qui prétendait, sans plus de crédibilité, libérer les milliers de civils sahraouis soi-disant retenus en otage par des “ criminels ” dans un camp érigé en signe de protestation à proximité de El-Ayoun.

Si ces événements s’étaient déroulés en République démocratique du Congo, en Haïti ou au Soudan, des experts en droits de l’homme de l’ONU auraient immédiatement été dépêchés sur place pour établir une version objective des événements et informer le Conseil de sécurité, contribuant ainsi à apaiser les tensions. La présence d’observateurs de l’ONU aurait aussi pu s’avérer dissuasive pour les forces de sécurité marocaines qui ont à plusieurs reprises, selon notre enquête, passé à tabac des personnes arrêtées à la suite des troubles.

Toutes les missions de maintien de la paix de l’ONU établies depuis 1991 disposent de ces mécanismes, qui reposent sur le constat que toute paix durable s’appuie sur le respect des droits de l’homme. Partout ailleurs, du Darfour au Timor Leste, en passant par le Kosovo, la France soutient pleinement l’intégration croissante des questions touchant aux droits de l’homme dans les missions de l’ONU. Il n’y a que sur le dossier sahraoui que Paris s’arc-boute, persistant à défendre une anomalie historique.

Cette obstination française a un coût. L’ambassadeur de France à l’ONU, Gérard Araud, l’a appris à ses dépens, le 30 avril dernier, lorsqu’il a dû faire face aux pays du Conseil de sécurité tels que le Royaume-Uni, l’Autriche, l’Ouganda, le Nigeria ou le Mexique, qui sont favorables à un élargissement du mandat de la Minurso aux questions de droits de l’homme. A quelques heures de l’expiration du mandat de la mission de l’ONU, selon plusieurs témoins, le ton est monté.

Comment la France, qui se prétend le berceau des droits de l’homme, pouvait-elle s’opposer à toute mention des droits de l’homme dans la résolution, a demandé un ambassadeur occidental ? Son homologue chinois, un rien ironique, s’est réjoui de constater que Paris partageait désormais les réserves de Pékin sur tout débat des droits de l’homme au Conseil de sécurité. Après une vive réponse de l’ambassadeur français, suivie d’excuses toutes diplomatiques, la France a obtenu gain de cause, non tant par la force de ses arguments que par celle de son droit de veto.

Les diplomates français se défendent en affirmant que la question des droits de l’homme est devenue un chiffon rouge pour le Maroc, qui y voit une ruse du Polisario et de son soutien officiel algérien, pour embarrasser le Royaume chérifien. A en croire Paris, cette question est une diversion, qui ne fait que braquer Rabat, sans faire avancer les pourparlers entre les deux camps, par ailleurs enlisés depuis des années.

Mais au lieu de s’aligner sur Rabat, la France devrait convaincre le Maroc qu’il a tout à gagner à améliorer les conditions dans lesquelles vivent les Sahraouis sous son contrôle, souvent muselés et harcelés par les forces de l’ordre marocaines lorsqu’ils osent se prononcer pour l’indépendance. Les observateurs onusiens seraient aussi d’un grand secours pour les réfugiés sahraouis qui vivent près de Tindouf, en Algérie, dans des camps où le Front Polisario règne en maître et intimide ceux qui soutiennent le plan d’autonomie marocain – une situation mainte fois dénoncée par Rabat.

Le renouvellement du mandat de la Minurso, en avril 2011, offre à la diplomatie française une chance de corriger la situation. Il est temps que Paris reconnaisse que, sans un strict respect des droits des Sahraouis, garanti par l’ONU, les deux camps continueront à se livrer à des campagnes de désinformation qui ne font que compliquer les efforts du Conseil de sécurité en faveur d’une solution politique.

No existe nada comparable a estar allí. A falta de eso, lo mejor es un enlace de vídeo. De pronto, aquí tenemos a Aung San Suu Kyi, en una pantalla delante de nosotros, en directo desde el 54 de University Avenue en Rangún. Está sentada con la espalda muy tiesa, tranquila, elegante con su blusa blanca, y vagamente divertida, tras más de siete años de aislamiento, por las nuevas y poco familiares tecnologías de la comunicación a larga distancia. “Estoy muy contenta de poder comunicarme con ustedes”, dice, “es un gran progreso para mí”, y el enlace de vídeo se cae.

Poco después vuelve a entrar en contacto con el auditorio de la London School of Economics, lleno de estudiantes y especialistas, mediante una terrible conexión de teléfono. A ratos no puede descifrar lo que le preguntamos y a ratos nosotros no podemos descifrar lo que responde ella, con su voz distorsionada que nos atruena desde un altavoz. Después de que un alumno intente hacerle varias veces una pregunta ligeramente complicada, Suu Kyi dice: “Dígame una palabra clave”. “¡Compañías multinacionales!”, gritamos. “¡Inversiones en Birmania!”. Se ríe, nos reímos, por el tono casi cómico de estas conversaciones a larga distancia. “Tenemos años de práctica de hablar sin obtener respuesta”, dice en un momento dado, pensando que se ha cortado la conexión. Práctica de hablar con los generales que están llevando su país a la ruina, claro.

No creo que ninguno de esos estudiantes olviden jamás el día que pudieron hacerle una pregunta directamente a Aung San Suu Kyi. A pesar de las dificultades técnicas, su personalidad y su mensaje traspasan las barreras. El mensaje es decidido, pero también conciliador. Subraya en varias ocasiones que confía en trabajar con las autoridades militares, no en contra de ellas. Por lo que podemos descifrar de su respuesta, parece acoger con precaución la idea de una comisión internacional que investigue la situación de Birmania, y hace hincapié en que no debe considerarse en absoluto “un proceso a los generales”.

Tras siete años y medio de arresto domiciliario, en los que obtenía noticias de su propio país solo a base de escuchar constantemente programas de radio internacionales, es evidente que Aung San Suu Kyi quiere darse un tiempo para aclararse las ideas. ¿Podrá revivir su debilitada Liga Nacional para la Democracia? ¿Podrá reagrupar a los que se apartaron o formaron un nuevo partido con la esperanza (vana) de obtener un número significativo de escaños en las últimas elecciones? ¿Qué pasa con los monjes budistas que transmitieron tanta energía y disciplina al movimiento pacífico de protesta en 2007? Y otra cosa importante: ¿podrá establecer vínculos con los representantes de las minorías étnicas que constituyen aproximadamente un tercio de la población del país? Es lo que hizo su padre, Aung San, en 1947, en la conferencia de Panglong que ayudó a preparar el terreno para la independencia de Birmania. Hoy, ella dice que confía en que haya “un segundo Panglong”.

Al pedirle que diga cuáles son sus fuentes de inspiración, responde: “En primer lugar, mis padres”. Luego menciona al arzobispo Desmond Tutu. Después, cuando la conversación vuelve sobre la idea de una comisión de la verdad y la reconciliación, como la que presidió Tutu en Sudáfrica, explica que las cosas son más complicadas en Birmania. “Ojalá fuéramos todos negros”, piensa a veces, porque entonces los birmanos y las minorías étnicas reconocerían que forman, todos ellos, una mayoría oprimida. Como indica el especialista en Birmania Maung Zarni, en la versión birmana del apartheid, los militares hacen el papel de los blancos.

Es una conversación estimulante, que supera todos los obstáculos. Todo me empuja de forma instintiva a enmarcarla en un relato de liberación, gradual, a menudo frustrada, pero al final triunfante. “Porque la batalla de la libertad, una vez comenzada… aunque a menudo frustrada, siempre se gana”: estas grandes palabras del poeta inglés del siglo XIX Byron aparecieron clavadas en una cruz de madera ante los astilleros Lenin de Gdansk, durante el nacimiento del movimiento polaco Solidaridad hace 30 años. Hoy, la batalla de la libertad se libra y se frustra con las armas de Internet, el satélite y el teléfono móvil. Algunos las llaman “tecnologías de la liberación”.

Desmond Tutu ha hecho una reflexión optimista sobre la “maravillosa” conversación telefónica que tuvo él mismo con Suu Kyi (“parecía constantemente a punto de estallar en carcajadas”) a principios de este mes: “Cuando pienso en la situación que había en Sudáfrica, recuerdo muchos momentos en los que parecía que nunca íbamos a ver la libertad en nuestro país, cuando nuestros opresores parecían invencibles. Pero, como digo siempre, este es un universo moral y la injusticia y la opresión acaban derrotados al final”.

Sin embargo, un análisis frío muestra una combinación de fuerzas menos favorable en torno a Birmania que en Sudáfrica, o en Polonia, o en Filipinas, o en Chile, o en todos los otros casos en los que la libertad ha resultado triunfadora en los últimos 30 años. No solo por la debilidad y las divisiones del movimiento de oposición, después de decenios de opresión brutal y la estrategia del régimen de “divide y vencerás”. Eso puede cambiar, con tiempo, una dura labor sobre el terreno y unos líderes inspirados.

Es, sobre todo, un problema del contexto exterior. Algunos lectores recordarán que hace un mes me preguntaba en esta columna si la mayor democracia del mundo, India, podría ser más fiel a sus valores en relación con su pequeño y vapuleado vecino oriental. El presidente Barack Obama, nada menos, planteó una pregunta similar durante su visita oficial a dicho país. Me da la impresión de que, hasta el momento, la respuesta ha sido un rotundo silencio. India no está preparada para discutir la cuestión con las otras grandes democracias mundiales, ni mucho menos para cambiar su forma de actuar. Mientras los vecinos asiáticos de Birmania, incluidas Tailandia y, por supuesto, China, sigan comportándose de esta forma, poniendo sus intereses comerciales y estratégicos por encima de las vidas de los sufridos habitantes del país -y por delante de lo que les interesa a largo plazo, que es tener un vecino próspero y estable-, los generales estarán encantados.

Birmania no es el único caso en el que el entorno exterior es desfavorable. Este es el mundo posoccidental. Si las cosas siguen así, Internet, los satélites y los móviles nos permitirán asomarnos a la jaula, pero no abrir la puerta. Podremos ver con más claridad a los amigos de la libertad asediados, pero no podremos ayudarles mejor. Cuando el ganador del Premio Nobel de la Paz de este año, Liu Xiaobo, salga libre, quizá tengamos la oportunidad de hablar también con él por un enlace de vídeo, aunque, por ahora, está bloqueado incluso el teléfono de su mujer. Podemos observar al multimillonario ruso Mijaíl Jodorkovski, injustamente encarcelado, tras las rejas, pero él sigue encerrado.

Tenemos ante nosotros una versión política del dramático espectáculo de los mineros chilenos. Los vimos gracias a una cámara de vídeo cuando todavía estaban atrapados bajo tierra, pero si sus propios esfuerzos y la perforación de la roca no hubieran dado fruto, ese vídeo solo habría servido para verlos morir.

Esta no es una opinión dictada por la desesperación, sino por el realismo. En Birmania, como en todas partes, las tecnologías de la comunicación, por sí solas, no ponen a nadie en libertad. A las personas las liberan otras personas.

Dostoievski, en Los hermanos Karamazov, describe un proceso judicial que tiene en vilo a toda Rusia: ¿qué hará el juez: dejará a Dmitri Karamazov en libertad, o lo enviará a Siberia? Con parecidas ansias el pueblo ruso está esperando el veredicto que debía pronunciarse el pasado día 15 y, por causas sin especificar, se pospuso para el 27.

Cuando en octubre de 2003 arrestaron a Mijaíl Jodorkovski, el dueño de la empresa petrolera Yukos, los rusos soltaron un suspiro de satisfacción: ¡por fin se ha hecho justicia a un oligarca! (En 2005, Forbes publicó que la fortuna personal de Jodorkovski, entonces ya reducida, aún se cifraba en casi 500 millones de dólares). ¿Por qué, siete años más tarde, los rusos desean ardientemente que Jodorkovski sea liberado?

Tras el arresto, la condena y la encarcelación del magnate, poco a poco ha ido quedando claro que el motivo real del castigo no fue la corrupción, sino el hecho de que, a diferencia de los demás oligarcas, Jodorkovski hizo caso omiso de las advertencias del presidente Putin y se puso a apoyar partidos políticos adversos al poder político central. Jodorkovski recientemente declaró que, ya antes de su arresto, Putin le había soltado en un argot de los bajos fondos: “Va a pudrirse en la cárcel durante ocho años”. Curiosamente, la predicción de Putin erró en poco.

A lo largo de los años que ha durado la condena de Jodorkovski y otros altos ejecutivos y trabajadores de Yukos, entre ellos Platon Lebedev, diversas organizaciones de derechos humanos observaron que ese caso se centra más en la política que en la alegada corrupción. “Jodorkovski apoyaba activamente a los partidos de oposición”, escribió Freedom House en 2004. En 2005 Václav Havel escribió una carta a Putin en la que afirmaba: “Este caso es un ejemplo de que su Gobierno intenta silenciar a sus críticos y eliminar opositores de la vida política y del diálogo social en Rusia”.

En marzo de 2009, cuando faltaba poco para que Jodorkovski quedara libre, empezó en Moscú un nuevo proceso contra él alegando nuevos fraudes. Se supo que Jodorkovski y su socio Lebedev podían ser condenados hasta a 22 años de cárcel. En abril de 2009, los líderes de ocho grupos occidentales de derechos humanos enviaron una carta abierta al presidente ruso Dmitri Medvédev, en la que expresaron su preocupación por el deterioro de la justicia y los derechos humanos en Rusia. En junio de 2010, en las vísperas de la reunión en la que Medvédev y Obama tuvieron que tratar el caso Jodorkovski en la Casa Blanca, el escritor Elie Wiesel, premio Nobel de la Paz, organizó en Nueva York un almuerzo, al que asistieron notables diplomáticos y dignatarios, para lanzar una campaña a favor de la liberación de Jodorkovski, a quien llamó “preso político”.

También muchos rusos, entre ellos la asesinada periodista Anna Politkóvskaya, las estrellas del ajedrez Gari Kaspárov y Lev Ponomariov, además de conocidos periodistas como Yulia Latynina, sostienen que el caso demuestra una y otra vez el vacío legal reinante en su país.

¿Por qué tanto odio si Jodorkovski ya es un hombre roto? No existe explicación racional. Muchos hablan de unas ansias de venganza, ese envenenamiento que persiste en Rusia y en otros países postotalitarios desde la época comunista. Como un hueso a un perro, el poder le ofreció al magnate que pidiera clemencia. No obstante, este se dio cuenta de la trampa: la clemencia se le concede a uno que reconoce la propia culpa. Jodorkovski declaró que prefería quedarse toda la vida detrás de las rejas antes de autoinculparse de algo que no ha cometido.

Al igual que el juez que juzgó a Dmitri Karamazov -y por propia vanidad acabó enviando a ese inocente a Siberia-, también el juez del caso Yukos, Viktor Danilkin, en esas últimas semanas ha sido el centro de todas las miradas. En la última audiencia Jodorkovski le dirigió las siguientes palabras: “Comprendo lo difícil de su situación. Le deseo que tenga valor. Su decisión entrará en la historia de Rusia”. Y uno de los más intrépidos periodistas rusos, David Gay, le pregunta a Danilkin en un reciente artículo: “Distinguido señor juez: su conciencia le dictará la decisión. Si opta por las medallas, nunca más conocerá la paz. ¿Y, entonces, qué mirada le dirigirá a su hijo que acaba de terminar la carrera de derecho?”.

El poder político y judicial ruso están ante la oportunidad de lanzar un mensaje claro a sus conciudadanos y al mundo: 1. Respetamos la división de poderes y el Estado de derecho, con lo que nos acercamos a los valores democráticos e ilustrados, o bien: 2. No nos importa la opinión de nadie, no somos un Estado de derecho ni nos molestamos en parecerlo; la ley dice lo que dice el poder.

Mientras ni Estados Unidos ni Europa tienen suficientes armas para pedir nada a Rusia, esta parece ser partidaria de pasar por alto las exigencias democráticas. Cada vez más, poderes económicos y políticos gigantescos como Rusia y China alardean sin reparos de sus convicciones autoritarias y de la manipulación de las instituciones. Y ello, que ya tiene sus aprendices en Europa (véase Berlusconi), puede ser un modelo tentador para muchos otros países.

La Historia y la Geografía barajan sus cartas para seleccionar y repartir sus ases de corazones. Entremezclan naipes de amor y de paz, forjada a golpes de hambre y de esperanza. Así las cosas, en cualquier momento llegaré a preguntarme: ¿Cuba se halla en la India? ¿Santa Clara en Ponbandar? ¿Cuándo irrumpió a la vida: en 1869 o en 1962? Lo mismo me ocurre con los nombres. Cómo debo llamarlo: ¿Mohandas Fariñas o Guillermo Gandhi? Es solo un lapsus mentis. Me basta con desempolvar la memoria para que enseguida broten mis recuerdos personales, y vea la imagen magra del Premio Sajarov del 2010.

A Guillermo Fariñas lo conocí cuando era casi un desconocido. Antes había oído hablar de él. Fue cuando a mediados de los 90 protagonizó una acción cívica frente al Hospital Pediátrico Pedro Borrás, en La Habana, donde trabajaba como psicólogo.

Con aquella protesta denunciaba la corrupción en un centro médico. Nada más. Es cierto que se trataba de una actitud valiente en un país donde discrepar significaba amputarse el futuro, y hasta la libertad. Sin embargo, aún su motivación no trascendía a una injusticia laboral casi doméstica. Todavía el árbol frondoso era una simiente mínima. Ni siquiera se trataba de una promesa, de un buen augurio.

De modo que Guillermo Fariñas era un nombre y un apellido más en mis cuartillas de periodista independiente, en aquel mundo proscrito y noticioso, contemporáneo y cubano; o sea, casi clandestino.

Después, su imagen se escapó del papel y de la tinta, para tornarse en piel y en sangre. Para adentrarse en mis ojos como un ser de carne y sueño. En un ser híbrido de dos razas, pero sobre todo de la más importante: la del alma, en la cual conviven su hambre de justicia -casi con sabor a rabia- con una ternura inmensa y útil.

Mas entonces no sospechaba siquiera la grandeza de espíritu de aquel mulato de ojos enormes, que miraba al futuro sin pedir permiso. Tampoco imaginaba que muy pronto lo llamaría El Coco, como lo apodó la familia, como le decimos los amigos; y, mucho menos, que 13 años después su última huelga de hambre estaría vinculada a mi primer día de libertad.

Recuerdo bien por qué nos conocimos. Transcurría el verano de 1997 cuando un grupo de militantes del Partido Pro Derechos Humanos, afiliado a la Fundación Andrei Sajarov, inició un ayuno cívico en Santa Clara, a 300 km al este de La Habana, para apoyar a su líder Daula Carpio Mata, a quien la policía política había citado para interrogarla.

El ayuno se realizó en una casa particular. A los pocos días agentes de la seguridad del Estado irrumpieron en la vivienda y arrestaron a los ayunantes. Fariñas, quien ya gozaba de mucho prestigio, sirvió como mediador entre las autoridades y los disidentes.

Todo parecía haberse solucionado tras 105 días de ayuno. La única condición del Gobierno era que comenzaran a comer y que ingresaran en el hospital Arnaldo Milián. Solo entonces serían liberados sin juicio.

El Coco y los ayunantes lo consideraron un buen trato, pues el Gobierno había accedido a su demanda de que los excarcelaran, y aceptaron. La capacidad de Guillermo Fariñas como negociador acrecentó su prestigio.

Mas el Gobierno rompió el pacto. A Daula y a los demás los alimentaron a la fuerza y a través de la nariz, con una comida líquida y hervorosa. Sintieron un volcán en sus estómagos. Después los arrestaron y los enviaron a prisión. Esta traición de las autoridades radicalizó aún más la actitud del Coco Fariñas.

En esa época yo trabajaba en Cuba Press, una agencia tan pequeña como prohibida, y se me encomendó informar día a día sobre la situación de Los Ayunantes de Santa Clara, como pronto se les llamó. Mi comunicación con Fariñas era cada vez más frecuente, hasta que nos conocimos personalmente, y su nombre dejó de ser para mí de tinta y de papel, para tornarse en sangre viva y en la piel de un corajudo.

Por eso, en julio del 2010, cuando me hallaba en prisión y me faltaban pocas horas para ser excarcelado, aproveché una oportunidad y desde la cárcel telefoneé al Coco. Nos despedimos como hermanos. Yo iría a España. Él permanecería en Cuba para proseguir la lucha, pacífica y generosa, venciendo sus propios miedos por amor a la libertad, como actúan los héroes.

Bertolt Brecht, en su obra Galileo, escribió que Andrea Sarti, discípulo del hereje arrepentido, repudia a su maestro con estas palabras: «Desgraciada la tierra que no tiene héroes». A lo que Galilei responde: «No. Desgraciada la tierra que necesita de héroes».

La disidencia cubana ha merecido tres veces el Premio Sajarov, y no han faltado propuestas para el Nobel de la Paz. Quizá un 10 de diciembre, lejano o no, en Oslo sean aplaudidos Oswaldo Payá, Las Damas de Blanco y Guillermo Fariñas.

Como no soy profeta no me atrevo a asegurarlo. Solo sé que la Historia, la Geografía y los nombres barajan sus naipes, y reparten sus ases de corazón.

Le gouvernement de la Chine, de sa propre volonté, a ajouté à la constitution de son pays l’engagement à “respecter et protéger les droits humains”. C’était en 2004. En 1998, il avait signé la Convention internationale sur les droits civils et politiques ; et en 2008 il a annoncé la mise en place d’un “plan d’action national pour les droits humains”. On ne peut reprocher ces engagements à des gouvernements étrangers. Ni au Comité du prix Nobel de la paix. Ni à Liu Xiaobo. Il est l’ancien président du Centre PEN chinois indépendant, mais il est en prison aujourd’hui parce qu’il a cru aux engagements de la Constitution de la Chine et du gouvernement de la Chine.

Un cri de plus en plus fort va se faire entendre : “Libérez Liu Xiaobo”. Ce cri vient de tous les continents. Il faut ajouter à ces mots : “libérez sa femme, Liu Xia, assignée à résidence”. Et une fois partis, libérez la quarantaine d’autres écrivains incarcérés dont le nom apparaît sur la liste des écrivains emprisonnés de PEN international. Et cessez de harceler les citoyens loyaux, dont plusieurs sont membres du PEN chinois indépendant. Ils ne font rien d’autre qu’exercer leurs droits constitutionnels.

Liu Xiaobo décrirait probablement toutes ces arrestations et tous ces harcèlements comme des tensions superficielles venues d’une crise profonde. Pour une raison ou une autre, Beijing n’arrive pas à voir que ses actions minent sa propre crédibilité en Chine. Le mandat venu du ciel, dont jouissaient les dynasties impériales chinoises, a été perdu par ceux qui en disposaient. Ils le perdent quand ils cessent d’assurer que justice est rendue. Quant à l’influence que les autorités chinoises cherchent à exercer dans le monde, elle est elle aussi ébranlée. Ce sont là des blessures que la Chine s’est infligées à elle-même.

Le leadership et l’influence ont besoin d’un poids économique ou militaire. Mais ils dépendent aussi en grande partie d’un élément de confiance. Et l’échec de Beijing quand il s’agit d’appliquer la transparence qui sied à la liberté d’expression et aux droits de la personne nuit constamment à son effort d’inspirer confiance ailleurs dans le monde.

L’appel que lance Liu Xiaobo est clairement inscrit dans la Charte 08 qui a à ce jour été signée par des milliers de citoyens chinois qui vivent en Chine. Quand Beijing tente de dénigrer la charte en prétendant qu’elle correspond à des influences occidentales, elle manifeste une naïveté surprenante. Ces principes de liberté d’expression, de droits humains et d’égalité sont des normes auxquelles on aspire tout aussi bien en Asie qu’en Europe, dans les Amériques et en Afrique. La forme peut bien sûr en varier selon la société, mais ces normes sont clairement affirmées dans la constitution chinoise et elles sont ancrées de longue date dans l’histoire de la Chine.

Mao Zedong l’a affirmé clairement dans son essai Contradictions (1957). Le romancier préféré de Mao, Lu Xun, se gaussait de dirigeants autoritaires qui tentaient de contrôler la population en l’empêchant de s’assembler et en lui défendant de parler : “Le principal problème, c’est qu’on ne peut empêcher les hommes de penser”. Il y a des échos de Lu Xun dans le style vif et mordant de Liu Xiaobo. Confucius lui-même aurait probablement signé la Charte 08 : “Qu’y a-t-il de remarquable chez un homme qui manque de tolérance alors qu’il occupe une position élevée ?” La réalité est la suivante. Il y a à l’intérieur de la Chine une division classique entre les réformateurs et les autoritaires. Plusieurs réformateurs se retrouvent à l’extérieur de la structure du pouvoir, comme Liu Xiaobo. Il y en a plusieurs à l’intérieur. Ils peuvent souhaiter des types et des quantités distincts de réformes. Peut-être qu’ils ne se connaissent pas bien les uns les autres, ou qu’ils ne s’aiment guère. Mais ils ont en commun le désir d’une société plus égale et plus ouverte.

De l’autre côté, on trouve les hommes du pouvoir, effrayés par le changement. Ils semblent agir sous la protection des forces de sécurité et d’une certaine partie du système juridique.

Que ce soit à l’intérieur ou à l’extérieur du pouvoir, les réformateurs représentent une force importante. Le prix pour la paix de Liu Xiaobo peut à première vue sembler avoir provoqué des mesures de répression. Mais en octobre, le Comité central a tenu sa réunion annuelle et c’était comme si le prix avait fait éclater l’illusion totalitaire que la Chine pourrait gagner le respect international sans réforme politique ou sociale.

LES AMIS DE LA CHINE

Les autorités chinoises continuent à affirmer que les Occidentaux s’acharnent sur elles, que ce prix de la paix n’en est qu’un nouvel exemple. Mais c’est le contraire qui est vrai, en fait. Partout à travers le monde les gens veulent devenir les amis de la Chine. Et pas seulement pour des raisons économiques. Prenez les dizaines de milliers d’écrivains dans plus de cent pays qui appartiennent au PEN. Pourquoi ne souhaiterions-nous pas entretenir une relation active et amicale avec l’une des plus grandes cultures de la planète ? Le rôle de la Chine dans tous les domaines – environnemental, militaire, d’aide au développement – est essentiel.

La question qui se pose est de savoir ce que nous voulons dire par amitié. Selon la terminologie en usage pendant la guerre froide, on était pour ou contre la Chine. L’amitié correspondait à une sorte de loyauté aveugle ; aucune critique de part et d’autre. Pour ceux d’entre nous qui admirons la Chine et y avons vécu, c’est une approche tout à fait insatisfaisante.

De plus en plus de personnes, comme l’Australien Kevin Rudd, soulignent qu’en chinois, le concept entier d’amitié – un véritable ami – est zhengyou : quelqu’un qui est ouvert et honnête, qui ne craint pas de critiquer, ce à quoi on peut s’attendre d’un ami personnel de longue date. En fait, ce prix Nobel de la paix peut être vu comme un geste d’amitié envers la Chine.

Permettez-moi de rendre tout ceci avec les mots d’un écrivain. Ceux que le régime emprisonne sont en général ses meilleurs amis ; susceptibles et mal à l’aise, comme de bons écrivains et de vrais amis. De nombreuses personnes au gouvernement souhaitent qu’il y ait moins de corruption, un meilleur traitement pour les travailleurs, moins d’accidents dans les mines, un système d’éducation publique plus approprié, un système de santé publique correct. Ils veulent une société plus juste. Toutes choses qui sont très présentes dans le message des écrivains qu’on arrête.

Il y a une vérité bien établie qui est liée à ces messages. La liberté d’expression, même si elle ne peut rien garantir, est néanmoins ce qui rend les réformes possibles.

C’est la raison pour laquelle une voix courageuse comme celle de Liu Xiaobo doit être célébrée. Le premier geste de cette célébration, ce serait de le libérer.

El Gobierno chino está desorientado por el premio Nobel que ayer recibió Liu Xiaobo: años de propaganda comunista en China y dirigida al resto del mundo resultan de repente inútiles. El Partido trataba de persuadirnos de que los chinos solo aspiraban al desarrollo económico, de que alababan al régimen por la tasa de crecimiento, que no deseaban la democracia y que esta idea era occidental y ajena a la civilización china. Sin embargo, Liu Xiaobo lleva veinte años diciendo lo contrario y es totalmente chino: no es un invento de Occidente, sino un ilustrado clásico, arraigado en una antigua tradición china de resistencia a la tiranía. La propia valentía de Liu Xiaobo y de su mujer Liu Xia se enmarca en la continuidad confucionista: antaño el ilustrado prefería suicidarse a ejecutar una orden injusta. Liu Xiaobo, que podría haber abandonado China, decidió en 1989 —año de la revuelta de los estudiantes en Tiananmen— que había que luchar contra la injusticia in situcon las armas del ilustrado: la escritura y la aceptación del sufrimiento. Hay que destacar que ni los años de cárcel —después de Tiananmen, donde fue un líder pacifista— ni la perspectiva de volver a ella han alterado jamás el carácter apacible de Liu Xiaobo, y tampoco su jovialidad. Por lo tanto, no le podemos reprochar al comité de Oslo el haber seleccionado a un intelectual aislado, a imagen y semejanza de los disidentes occidentales de antaño en Polonia y Rusia.

Si bien Liu Xiaobo está familiarizado, como lo están los intelectuales chinos desde hace dos siglos, con el pensamiento occidental, y aunque se ha inspirado a menudo en las formas de resistencia occidentales, no es un producto de Occidente, ni tampoco está hecho a imagen y semejanza de Occidente. Los propios intelectuales chinos nos lo dicen: como era evidente, desde hace dos o tres años, que el premio Nobel de la Paz se concedería a un disidente chino, Liu Xiaobo fue designado por la comunidad intelectual democrática de Pekín como el más representativo de todos: el jurado del Nobel se ha sumado a la decisión tomada en la propia China. Muy a su pesar, los dirigentes chinos también habían designado a Liu Xiaobo al condenarle a once años de cárcel, el día de Navidad de 2008, por «atentar contra la seguridad del Estado». Sin embargo, lo que preocupaba al Partido Comunista no era tanto la Carta democrática «colgada» en la Red por Liu Xiaobo: desde hace varios años, no ha dejado de publicar sus críticas al régimen y sus llamamientos a la libertad política en la Red, el único medio al que tenía acceso. No, lo que desató los temores del Partido y la encarcelación de Liu fue el éxito de su carta. En veinticuatro horas, diez mil firmantes se sumaron a ella antes de que se cerrara el sitio. Esto echaba por tierra otra mentira del Partido: el supuesto aislamiento y la falta de representatividad de los disidentes. «¿Cómo pueden interesarse por una única persona que solo se representa a sí misma?», nos repetían machaconamente los portavoces del régimen cada vez que tratábamos de reunirnos con Liu Xiaobo. Resulta que este hombre se presentaba como el líder de hecho de un amplio movimiento de opinión en el propio seno de la población urbana e instruida, la misma que el régimen creía haber anestesiado con la tasa de crecimiento. Más allá de Pekín, ¿qué importancia tiene Liu Xiaobo? De hecho, hasta el premio Nobel, casi todos los chinos ignoraban su nombre: pero la torpeza con la que el régimen ha tratado de ocultar la noticia del premio ha hecho que la gran mayoría de ellos lo conozcan ahora. Nada como la censura de internet para que los teléfonos móviles y el boca a boca griten lo que se quería prohibir. ¿Se reconocen estos chinos en Liu Xiaobo? La mayoría no mantienen una retórica elaborada sobre las instituciones de la democracia, pero constantemente, fuera del Partido e incluso a veces en su propio seno, se reclama la libre elección de los dirigentes, con la esperanza de contener la arrogancia del Partido Comunista y la corrupción de sus representantes. Más que democracia clásica, lo que reclaman los chinos, y simboliza Liu Xiaobo, es la justicia: la justicia como sentimiento moral. El mensaje que Liu Xiaobo ha hecho llegar a los chinos y al mundo a través de Liu Xia, que pudo reunirse con él en su cárcel, es extraordinariamente significativo: les dedica su premio (y la suma que lleva aparejada) a las «almas olvidadas» de Tiananmen.

Desde Tiananmen, fecha de nacimiento histórica del movimiento democrático en China, las autoridades niegan que hubiera víctimas, a pesar de que la Cruz Roja haya contado seis mil muertos. Se desconocen los nombres, los cuerpos han desaparecido: los familiares nunca pudieron celebrar las exequias, y las almas —según la religión china— vagan sin paz. Liu Xiaobo es de los que, a pesar de la censura más absoluta sobre este tema, tratan de recoger testimonios para elaborar la lista de fallecidos y salvar su memoria y su alma. Los fondos se destinarán, por lo tanto, a la Asociación de las Madres de las Víctimas de Tiananmen. Ninguna tasa de crecimiento puede borrar esta injusticia.

¿Tomará conciencia el Partido Comunista de su error de apreciación? De momento, reina la confusión: Liu Xia, a la que no permitían reunirse con su marido, encarcelado en secreto lejos de Pekín, fue repentinamente conducida hasta él por la Policía. Pero cuando salió de esta visita la sometieron a un arresto domiciliario, y le han prohibido cualquier contacto con el exterior. Algunos dirigentes chinos han amenazado a Noruega con represalias, sin llegar a entender que el jurado del Nobel es independiente —la idea de pensamiento independiente en las sociedades libres sigue siendo ajena a los dirigentes chinos, no porque sean chinos, sino porque son prisioneros de su ideología totalitaria.

¿Evolucionará esta ideología bajo el efecto del crecimiento económico y gracias a la llegada de una nueva generación a la cúpula del Estado? Hace diez años que los sinófilos de Occidente, mimados por el régimen de Pekín, nos anuncian esta evolución «natural» hacia la democracia. Pero, como no vemos llegar nada que se le parezca, el jurado del Nobel ha constatado la terrible estabilidad de la dictadura.

¿Vendrá el cambio del exterior de China? Occidente ejerce en China más influencia de la que los dirigentes chinos quieren admitir: China necesita legitimidad internacional para proseguir su expansión comercial. Si por casualidad su reputación se viera perjudicada hasta el punto de que los occidentales boicotearan todo lo que es Made in China, el «milagro» económico chino se vendría abajo y el Partido Comunista, que no tiene más fundamento que la tasa de crecimiento, perdería hasta su razón de ser. Por eso, el mensaje de Liu Xiaobo se dirige también a Occidente. Nos dice: «Dejen de confundir al Partido Comunista con el pueblo chino. Sepan que el partido no es ni el presente de China ni su futuro. Sepan que los chinos no son un pueblo exótico, sino que compartimos los mismos valores y que aspiramos exactamente a las mismas libertades que los occidentales». Unos días antes del anuncio del premio Nobel, Liu Xia me decía en Pekín: «Los disidentes chinos somos como los judíos en la Alemania nazi: nos persiguen, nos amenazan de muerte, y los occidentales no os percatáis de ello. Cuando hayamos desaparecido todos, será demasiado tarde para que os preguntéis qué nos ha sucedido y por qué no habéis intervenido antes». Al final, hemos escuchado: solo falta que no lo olvidemos.

Cette année, une chaise vide trônera à la cérémonie de remise du Prix Nobel de la paix. Lors de cet événement plus que centenaire, célébré en grande pompe devant un parterre d’un millier d’invités et de personnalités réunis pour l’occasion, la chaise du lauréat de l’année 2010, Liu Xiaobo, restera vide.

Liu Xiaobo aurait pris place sur le podium, aux côtés des membres du Comité du Prix Nobel de la paix, dans l’immense hôtel de ville d’Oslo, pour recevoir la récompense en hommage à son inlassable plaidoyer pacifique en faveur des droits fondamentaux en Chine.

Il aurait délivré son discours, reçu sa médaille et son diplôme et renouvelé son appel en faveur d’une réforme politique et juridique pacifique en Chine. Il aurait posé pour les photographes, accordé des interviews, goûté brièvement le sentiment de reconnaissance internationale et serait rentré chez lui.

Mais Liu Xiaobo se trouve derrière les barreaux. Il purge une peine de 11 ans d’emprisonnement pour «incitation à la subversion de l’Etat», car il est l’un des principaux auteurs de la Charte 08, manifeste qui appelle au respect des droits humains en Chine. Liu Xiaobo n’a cessé de faire valoir que sa condamnation bafouait tant la Constitution chinoise que les droits les plus élémentaires. Pourtant, comme beaucoup qui font en Chine le choix de s’exprimer, il a été sévèrement sanctionné.

Le règlement du Prix Nobel veut qu’il soit remis en personne au lauréat ou à un membre de sa famille proche. Liu Xiaobo ne pouvant être présent, pour la première fois depuis 1938, le Prix Nobel de la paix ne sera pas remis lors de la cérémonie. Son épouse aurait pu le recevoir en son nom, si elle n’avait été arrêtée par les autorités chinoises et placée en résidence surveillée à Pékin. Des dizaines de personnes qui souhaitaient assister à la cérémonie ont également été placées en détention ou se sont vu interdire de quitter la Chine.

Le gouvernement chinois croit sans doute avoir remporté une victoire, mais il se fourvoie. En dépit d’une campagne intense de pressions politiques, d’intimidations et de menaces, il n’a pas infligé de défaite à Liu Xiaobo, pas plus qu’au Comité Nobel. En effet, la chaise vide de Liu Xiaobo, dans l’hôtel de ville bondé à l’occasion de cette ­cérémonie, incarnera bien davantage que l’absence d’un seul homme.

Cette chaise vide évoquera les milliers de prisonniers politiques et de prisonniers d’opinion qui croupissent actuellement dans les geôles chinoises ou sont assignés à résidence, victimes de poursuites judiciaires et de persécutions pour avoir simplement eu le courage d’exprimer leurs opinions.

A l’instar de Tian Xi, pris au piège d’une faille juridique qui peut lui valoir d’être incarcéré pour une durée illimitée parce qu’il s’est battu pour obtenir des indemnités, après avoir contracté le VIH et l’hépatite lors d’une transfusion sanguine, alors qu’il était enfant.

Ou à l’instar de Zhao Lianhai, qui purge une peine de deux ans et demi de prison parce qu’il a cherché à obtenir justice pour les bébés tombés malades après avoir bu du lait frelaté.

Ou encore du militant des droits humains Chen Guangcheng, non voyant, maintenu en résidence surveillée de manière officieuse après avoir purgé une peine de quatre ans de prison pour avoir tenté d’intenter une action en justice contre les autorités qui avaient mené une campagne de stérilisations et d’avortements forcés dont ont été victimes des milliers de femmes de la province du Shandong.

Cette chaise vide ne manquera pas d’évoquer les efforts déployés par la Chine pour saboter la remise du Prix 2010, par le biais de pressions politiques, de menaces et de chantage économique, visant à inciter la communauté internationale à boycotter la cérémonie.

Force est de constater qu’en dépit des pressions et des menaces, la Chine n’a réussi à amadouer qu’un petit nombre de pays, ce qui témoigne du caractère inacceptable de ses sollicitations. Les gouvernements et les institutions internationales ne doivent pas céder face à ce type de pressions.

Ce 10 décembre, à l’occasion de la Journée des droits humains, les agissements de la Chine contribueront à braquer l’attention du monde entier sur son épouvantable bilan: des millions de citoyens contraints de quitter leur foyer en raison de projets de construction pharaoniques; les événements tragiques de la place Tiananmen; les violations des droits humains au Tibet; et les persécutions ciblant le mouvement Falungong.

On peut s’étonner qu’une nation aussi puissante que la Chine se sente menacée par un seul homme. La vérité est que Liu Xiaobo ne se résume pas à un seul homme. Il incarne les idéaux du Prix Nobel de la paix et les espoirs et les aspirations de millions de Chinois bâillonnés par la politique répressive de leur gouvernement.

Le gouvernement chinois a peut-être réussi à faire en sorte que Liu Xiaobo n’assiste pas à cette cérémonie mais, en son absence, sa chaise vide en dit long.

By awarding the Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo, the Nobel Committee has sent a blessing from afar to China. It is a heartwarming message of support for Mr. Liu, one we hope he has been able to hear even from his prison cell, and for all of us who support him and his goals.

Mr. Liu’s aim in drafting the Charter 08 manifesto was to promote human rights, and his way was through nonviolent struggle. “Rights for all, through peaceful means”: This is the purpose of Charter 08 and we believe it is the only way to a modern and civilized society in China.

The centennial of China’s 1911 Revolution is approaching. This revolution, fought to bring an end to the imperial Qing Dynasty, resulted in the founding of the Republic of China and later the People’s Republic of China. For both state entities, legitimacy has rested on the idea of a “republic,” the only form of government universally accepted by all Chinese.

The early revolutionaries often misguidedly chose the path of violence for social change. Mao Zedong elevated violent revolution to the level of a universal truth: “The seizure of power by armed force, settling an issue by act of war, is the central task and the highest form of revolution. This Marxist-Leninist principle of revolution holds well universally, for China and for all other countries.” This supreme order changed the fate of China.

Having been a subject of both Chinese republics, I can use my own experience as testimony that the People’s Republic of China is even further removed from the ideals of a republic than the Republic of China was before our so-called “liberation.”

Under the C.C.P., elections provide only one candidate, and the executive, legislative and judiciary branches all submit to the party. Social institutions and industries are mere instruments and extensions of the party. All media organizations must toe a defined party line. Though freedom of thought, religion, expression, assembly and the right to protest and hold demonstrations are unequivocally protected by the Constitution, in reality, imprisonment for religious and political beliefs is commonplace.

This is the Chinese model and the Chinese system. If this can be called a republic, it is not the kind of republic that is universally recognized, but rather a “republic with Chinese characteristics.”

Liu Xiaobo and I got to know each other under the party-state’s constant surveillance. He and his wife, Liu Xia, twice attempted to visit me at my home; once about 10 years ago, and once in the fall of 2007. In both instances they were blocked by police officers supposedly exercising “rule of law.” Since the authorities blocked these two citizens from being guests in my home, the three of us went to a tea house.

The police allowed this — in all their magnanimity — and sat surrounding us. Going out for tea once or twice a month became a habit, and we continued to do so for more than a year. Then, in 2008, Mr. Liu was “legally” taken away. As he could no longer come for tea, Liu Xia came alone. After Oct. 8th of this year, when the announcement came that Mr. Liu had been awarded the Nobel prize, Liu Xia and I have been forbidden to have tea together, “according to the law.” In fact, our personal freedom has been taken away by an authority that is constantly “improving” the art of governance according to “rules” that have never been revealed to anyone.

But I really hate bringing up such trivial matters when, compared to the era when some 40 million people were starved to death, we seem indeed to be living in the best of times for human rights under the People’s Republic of China, even though this is a republic without an elected government or the proper institutions of a republic.

The drafters of Charter 08 have learned that violence cannot build a modern civilized society. In order for the idea of basic rights to take root in China, we must take the path of reason and peace. There is no other way.

We do not agree with “power from the barrel of a gun,” blessed by Mao as a universal truth. We are willing to observe the principles of peaceful, nonviolent and legitimate struggle for a very simple reason: Using uncivilized means cannot achieve civilized ends.

Indeed, our belief is not the belief of all. Some citizens believe they need only pay lip service to opposing special privileges, while actually maintaining these privileges for those “made of special material.” We believe, on the contrary, that we must take action to abolish these privileges, to realize Article 33 of the Constitution: “All citizens of the People’s Republic of China are equal before the law.”

We promote basic rights for all Chinese: rich or poor, Han or other ethnicity, official or common citizen. A society is never homogenous. By nature, there will be distinct interest groups. There may be a few “men made of special material,” but there are definitely many common men. Whether strong or weak, all citizens must have their basic rights respected.

Mao created “Six Standards,” Deng Xiaoping established “Four Cardinal Principles,” and their successor announced “Three Represents.” These ideologies that come in sixes, fours or threes may be right or wrong, and naturally there will be people who agree, disagree or are vehemently opposed. There will always be those who are left, right or neutral. All should have equal rights.

Farmers forced off their land, and urban residents forced from their homes should be given their basic rights. Victims of past injustices and those subjected to “reform through labor” (laogai) by the police through extra-judicial means should be given their basic rights. People suspected of being in “prostitution or criminal gangs” should be given their basic rights. Party members under internal investigation for corruption should be allowed their basic rights. Convicted prisoners should also have their rights respected: There should be no disappearances, torture or unlawful accusations. Even the “Gang of Four” should have been allowed the same rights, including the right to petition and reveal open or secret directives from Mao to show the extent of their responsibilities. Judges and prosecutors should not be allowed to prohibit a person from defending himself in court in their attempt to maintain the party’s glorious image.

Some people have accused Mr. Liu and the rest of us who have signed Charter 08 of “subverting the People’s Republic of China.” But what is a republic? A republic is a form of government that puts the political rights of its citizens above all others, as defined in the Constitution. This is also the purpose of Charter 08. We are resolved to protect the republic, not to subvert her.

There are indeed people who have subverted the People’s Republic of China, and two quite famously. The first was Mao, who boasted of being “bound by no laws or heavenly constraints.” Another was Deng, who initiated and led the Tiananmen crackdown. “All power belongs to the people” — the guarantee of rights for over a billion people — was made entirely meaningless. No one in their right mind can count the Cultural Revolution and the Tiananmen Massacre as products of republicanism. The People’s Republic of China has long ago been subverted by Mao and Deng, denying others any chance of subverting her.

Mr. Liu was convicted for attempting to save the republic after its principles and ideals had been stripped away. That is all.

Some people have thereby deemed the act of saving the republic “subverting the Communist Party.” However, the party charter states that “the Communist Party must conduct its activities within the boundaries of the Constitution and the law.” How could it be deemed “subversion” to demand that the Communist Party honestly and concretely realize its own charter?

Mr. Liu has been branded “an enemy of the state.” Even so, at his trial he declared: “I have no enemies.” What could he have meant by this? He was declaring that he totally rejects the antiquated thinking of Mao and Deng that divides the country into “people” versus “enemies.” Mr. Liu is declaring that “all citizens of the People’s Republic of China are equal before the law.”

What Mr. Liu represents is not hatred, but the hope of realizing rights for all through peaceful means. Even though we are currently living under clouds of hostility, I still believe that those who have suffered and all Chinese people will eventually see a brighter day of rights and peace.

Only a country that protects the rights of all its citizens can be trusted to be truly responsible for the protection of world peace.

We no longer live in a unipolar world. Western nations do not enjoy a monopoly on economic and political power. This is an encouraging shift and one that is bringing greater equality and prosperity to the world. With this progress, developing countries are increasingly influential and, in this regard, China reigns supreme. While China’s economic and geopolitical progress over the past three decades is cause for celebration, its support for abusive regimes and the brutal force with which it crushes dissent within its own borders demonstrates that substantial reform is needed if China is to be viewed within the international community as a true leader.

In short, the world must strenuously object to the Chinese model for development which decouples economic and political reform by unapologetically asserting that anything, including domestic and international oppression, can be justified if it is viewed to enable economic growth.

International scrutiny of the Chinese government’s widespread violation of fundamental rights at home and abroad is not meddling in its “internal affairs”; it flows from its legal commitments to respect the inherent dignity and equality of every person.

Though he is just one of 1.3 billion, the story of this year’s Nobel peace prize laureate, Dr Liu Xiaobo, is sadly emblematic of the Chinese government’s intolerance to individual expression.

Dr Liu, a former literature professor, first found himself on the sharp end of the government’s policies after negotiating the peaceful retreat of student protesters from Tiananmen Square in the summer of 1989.

One year ago, the government sentenced him to 11 years in prison for co-authoring Charter 08, a call for peaceful political reform in China, eventually signed by 10,000 Chinese citizens before the government removed it from the internet in China.

On 8 October, the Norwegian Nobel Committee awarded Dr Liu its peace prize in recognition of his “long and non-violent struggle for fundamental human rights in China”. Like its response to Charter 08, the Chinese government’s reaction to the Committee’s announcement demonstrates its extreme sensitivity to criticism and the lengths it is prepared to go to prevent it, both inside and outside China.

Most alarming, the government detained Dr Liu’s wife, Liu Xia, in her Beijing home an hour after the announcement of the prize. She has been isolated from the outside world and is being held under house arrest, without charge, trial and conviction, let alone any legal justification. Others throughout the country, who have associated with Dr Liu or are suspected of sharing his vision for China, are harassed, interrogated and detained.

The Chinese government is also flexing its muscles internationally. Before the announcement, China tried to intimidate Nobel officials in Oslo. In the wake of the Norwegian Nobel Committee’s decision, China responded by calling the award a “blasphemy” and threatening relations with Norway.

It has since postponed negotiations with Norway on a free-trade agreement. As the Nobel Peace Prize award ceremony approaches, it has warned other nations to boycott the events or ominously “face the consequences”.

China doesn’t just violate the human rights of its citizens, it coddles and supports brutal dictatorships around the world. The authoritarian regimes in Burma, Sudan and North Korea, whose actions continue to threaten international peace and security, remain free to commit mass atrocities against its peoples because of bilateral support and billions of dollars of weapons supplied by Beijing.

The Chinese government’s willingness to assert itself internationally shows its increasing confidence on the world stage, but its extreme sensitivity to criticism demonstrates its lack of confidence domestically.

This lack of confidence ultimately only serves to further undermine the credibility of the government among its people.

China now has the unique opportunity to chart a new course, one that appropriately claims the mantle of being a world leader in every respect, including an embrace of its obligations to promote and protect of human rights. But such an approach must begin by China respecting its obligations under its constitution and international agreements.

The first step must be the unconditional release of Liu Xiaobo and his wife, Liu Xia, before the Nobel peace prize award ceremony on Friday.

As someone who has seen firsthand China’s progress over the last two decades, I have been deeply disappointed in Beijing’s treatment of Liu Xiaobo since he won the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize.

The China I live in is one that has increased personal freedom and accepts greater public discourse than ever before. Yet the face that China presents to the outside world does not resemble the modern and dynamic society that it is working to become.

Many of my American friends do not realize that today Chinese people are allowed to express themselves, publicly and privately, in ways unheard of 20 years ago. While clear restrictions remain, Chinese citizens can now vent online, protest in public, appeal to government for redress, and litigate in court. The vast majority of China’s people live, work, migrate, vacation and entertain themselves relatively unfettered. This is a dramatic transformation.

Yet the government’s overriding concern for social stability has too often been the sole priority. When China took a hard line on Liu Xiaobo following the Nobel Committee’s decision, it obscured from international view real areas of progress. For example, public debate on the Internet has been a major breakthrough in China, even if it falls short of American or European openness. Control remains heavy handed on topics deemed “sensitive.” One result is that far more people outside of China know about the country’s Nobel Prize winner than in his home country.

Despite these tight controls, there are green shoots of further political reform. Recently, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao talked publicly about the introduction and improvement of democratic principles in governmental institutions, and the enforcement of laws governing respect for human rights and civil liberties.

These pronouncements have raised both hope and skepticism. If talk of reform is sincere, there is still much work ahead for the Chinese leadership to demonstrate full respect for a diversity of views. The leadership has yet to get comfortable with the understanding that robust debate, even when uncomfortable, is a healthy component of a dynamic and durable civil society.

Clearly, insecurity remains about discussions of political reform, no matter how tepid they may be.

There is an irony that China continues to demonstrate self-doubt about its own domestic political control at a time of American hand-wringing over China’s relative strength.

Even as China has come out of the financial crisis stronger than ever, Beijing’s leaders remain vigilant about any perceived dissent by people like Liu Xiaobo.

If China still needs to learn how to become comfortable with dissent, conversely, American and European leaders should understand that stridency with Beijing can backfire. Chinese nationalistic factions frequently use Western criticism to attack the moderate voices that drive economic and political reform. For example, voices in China calling for currency appreciation to ease inflation were drowned out this fall by hard-liners who argued that Beijing could not yield to U.S. pressure. The backlash problem is amplified on the sensitive issue of political reform.

Nonetheless, there are actions the West can take to support China’s peaceful democratic transition.

First, Western leaders should appreciate that open and frequent government-to-government dialogue and legal, cultural and commercial exchanges are the most effective tools. China came out of its shell three decades ago due to vigorous engagement with, not lectures from, Washington and Brussels.

Second, we should give Beijing credit where credit is due. Those that deserve credit are the moderate voices that have taken bold steps to lead China down a path of reform. Unfortunately, few elected officials in the United States would even consider giving the Communist leadership praise for its accomplishments. Acknowledging progress on problems like poverty helps build credibility on more contentious issues.

Third, it is important to keep in mind the internal struggle between moderate and conservative voices within China. The Chinese people continue to view with suspicion any attempt to impose Western values on China. Liberal institutions need to be nurtured, rather than thrust upon Beijing. Keeping this tension in mind serves as a framework for productive engagement.

There is an established historical pattern for real change in China. Over the past 30 years, change has come slowly but steadily.

Political reform is coming to China and Western politicians should avoid prolonging the process through strident remarks and posturing that only give ammunition to Chinese hard-liners. Instead, we should encourage Beijing as it becomes more comfortable with its place as a modern, and increasingly open, power.

Last month’s announcement of a Nobel peace prize for the Chinese writer Liu Xiaobo, together with the approaching award ceremony on 10 December, have driven official tolerance for peaceful dissent in China to a new low.

Just ask Zhao Lianhai. On 10 November, a Beijing court sentenced Zhao to a two-and-a-half-year prison term on charges of “provoking disorder” for exposing the government failure to assist the thousands of child victims of China’s melamine-tainted milk scandal of 2008.

Zhao’s crime? Helping to establish a grassroots advocacy group, Kidney Stones Babies, which rallied parents of victims to demand compensation and the designation of an official day of remembrance for the six deaths and approximately 300,000 children sickened by tainted dairy products.

Zhao isn’t alone. The nongovernmental organisation Chinese Human Rights Defenders has documented at least 100 incidents since October 2010 in which Chinese citizens have been harassed, interrogated or detained in connection with their support for Liu’s Nobel victory. They include Liu Xiaobo’s wife, Liu Xia, who has been silenced since 18 November, when the government cut her internet and phone links. On 9 November, Beijing police prevented China’s leading human rights lawyer Mo Shaoping and legal scholar He Weifang from boarding a flight to an international legal conference The reason? Fears they would attend the Nobel peace prize award ceremony in Norway.

The appointments of President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao in 2003 raised hopes that a new generation of leadership would spur greater liberalisation. The opposite has occurred. China’s prisons are littered with high profile dissidents. Some don’t even get the relative protection of a jail sentence.

Gao Zhisheng, a lawyer who took on some of China’s most controversial causes including defending miners and religious minorities like the Falun Gong and underground Christians, was the victim of an enforced disappearance in February 2009. Gao re-emerged in his Beijing apartment in early April 2010 but vanished again days later, apparently back into official custody. Gao’s location, health, and circumstances remain unknown.

In China today, even activists who serve out prison terms on politically-motivated charges can be denied freedom. Chen Guangcheng, convicted in December 2006 on trumped-up criminal counts after he led a campaign to stop forced abortions and sterilisations in Shandong province, completed his sentence on 9 September. Chen returned home to house arrest, banned from receiving visitors and subjected to intrusive electronic surveillance.

These proliferating abuses have overshadowed the cases of once-high-profile political prisoners. Take Hu Jia, a civil society activist sentenced to three-and-a-half years’ imprisonment in April 2008 for “incitement to subvert state power” and for activities including co-writing a letter in September 2007 entitled “The Real China and the Olympics“. The letter detailed specific and wide-ranging government human rights violations and urged the international community to hold Beijing to the human rights commitments it made when bidding to host the Games.

These cases don’t just expose the government’s empty rhetoric about its commitment to the rule of law. They are also a reminder of the narrowing space available to Chinese activists and whistleblowers who seek the rights, freedoms and protections embodied in China’s laws and constitution.

Why is this happening? Growing intolerance could be a sign of increasing confidence and arrogance as China’s economy continues to roar and its international status grows. The leadership is also likely concerned about the 100,000-odd annual public protests, the sharp criticism of government policies that go viral via the internet, and the growing urban-rural wealth gap.

The relentless squeeze on civil society activists has occurred while the US, EU and others have downgraded human rights in their dealings with China. Human right issues are increasingly an afterthought, marginalised by bilateral dialogue on trade, broader economic issues, and negotiations on vexing international issues including Iran or North Korea. But the US and others are taking the most short-sighted approach. The US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, learned this early in her tenure when she announced that the US would no longer allow human rights issues to interfere with other issues on the US-China agenda.

But both the US and the EU have been unable to avoid raising difficult cases such as Liu Xiaobo and have praised Liu’s Nobel peace prize despite the Chinese government’s furious insistence that routine stifling of constitutionally guaranteed rights and freedoms are an “internal affair.” Such dismissals ignore the fact that Zhao Lianhai’s efforts, and those of other brave Chinese whistleblowers, aim to both protect Chinese consumers from toxic products as well as keep them out of the export chain

As President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao prepare to hand the reins of power of the ruling Chinese Communist party to new leaders in 2012, they need to be pressed to recognise the wisdom of allowing citizens to speak uncomfortable truths rather than to silence them. Just days after the announcement of Liu Xiaobo’s Nobel peace prize, a group of 23 senior Communist party officials and intellectuals issued a public letter that praised the Nobel committee’s “splendid choice” of Liu for a Nobel peace prize, urged his immediate release and an end to the “invisible black hand” of official censorship.

The Chinese government would be wise to heed these calls.

(Versión en inglés)

Aung San Suu Kyi es la activista más famosa del mundo en defensa de la democracia y ahora, gracias a usted querido lector, está en libertad. Su prolongado arresto domiciliario ha llegado a su fin debido a la incansable presión ejercida de un extremo al otro del planeta por millones de personas que creen que ninguna injusticia dura para siempre. Sin embargo, el levantamiento de su arresto domiciliario, bajo el que ha pasado 15 de los últimos 21 años, representa tan solo una victoria parcial porque su liberación y la del pueblo birmano no serán completas mientras Suu Kyi no recupere su condición de legítima dirigente de su país.

Las recientes elecciones birmanas constituyeron un ejercicio de relaciones públicas, no de participación pública. La Constitución traída por los generales consagra el principio de que el presidente, que no es responsable ante el Parlamento, debe ser un militar, ya sea retirado o en servicio activo, y encabezar un Gobierno que no es necesario que incluya a un solo miembro electo del Parlamento. La decisión de poner en libertad a Suu Kyi demuestra que la Junta es consciente de que tener una única referencia simbólica de la resistencia le resulta contraproducente, pero no nos consta ninguna prueba de que tengan la más mínima intención de ceder un ápice y permitir una genuina reforma democrática.

A lo largo de dos décadas he ofrecido a Suu Kyi y a su familia todo el apoyo que he podido prestarles y le he escrito en numerosas ocasiones para decirle que hasta en el último rincón de Gran Bretaña hay personas que la tienen en su pensamiento y en sus oraciones. Mantuve una reunión con su marido, Michael Aris, que posteriormente murió de cáncer sin que le permitieran volverla a ver, y le prometí que haría todo lo que estuviera en mi mano.

Durante más de 20 años, la familia de Suu Kyi ha soportado el dolor de la separación y su fuerza nos ha servido de inspiración a todos. Su sostén ha sido no sólo la valentía de los monjes y de otros contestatarios birmanos que han desafiado la represión para proclamar públicamente su lealtad a la causa democrática sino también la solidaridad mundial promovida por organizaciones como Birmania Campaign UK, avaaz.org y otras.

El pasado fin de semana, cuando a invitación de mi mujer hice de editor de sus mensajes de Twitter para promover que se conociera más la grave situación de Suu Kyi, me sentí abrumado por cómo muchísimas personas de todos los rincones del mundo consideran ésta una de las causas definitorias de nuestra época. Por supuesto, hay injusticias graves en otros lugares, como la continua pérdida silenciosa de vidas que la pobreza extrema causa a diario a miles y miles de personas. Sin embargo, eso no debería servir jamás de excusa para que volvamos la espalda a infracciones tan grotescas de los derechos humanos como las que se han infligido a la dirigente democrática de Birmania. Un tweet enviado desde Amnesty fue especialmente aleccionador: «Nadie por debajo de 38 años (la mitad de la población de Birmania) ha votado hasta ahora». Que una población en su conjunto pueda llegar a la edad adulta sin haber ejercido jamás el voto y que luego se le ofrezca exclusivamente una sola papeleta en la que no aparece el principal partido de oposición del país representa todo un testimonio del enquistamiento de la Junta en el poder y de su brutalidad.

La democratización de Birmania no va a ser nada fácil, pero no es imposible. La Red es nuestra arma. A través de ella, las personas de buena voluntad pueden organizarse y aplicar esa forma de presión que dio lugar a la liberación del sábado. Sin embargo, y exactamente igual de importante, gracias a las nuevas tecnologías los activistas de Birmania pueden contar al mundo lo que está ocurriendo. En ningún otro medio queda este hecho más patente que en la película Birmania VJ, realizada por periodistas que han conseguido sacar de contrabando todas las imágenes fuera del país. En el avance de la película, hay una secuencia escalofriante en la que alguien que se encuentra al teléfono está contemplando desde una ventana la agresión a unos manifestantes y explicándosela a un amigo.

«¿A quién han disparado?», pregunta el amigo. La respuesta es la siguiente: «A un chico con una cámara».

Los generales tienen miedo de que se les observe, miedo de las pruebas, miedo de la solidaridad. En pocas palabras, tienen miedo de usted. La liberación de Suu Kyi es una de las grandes victorias del poder de la gente en nuestra época. Ojalá consigamos que la siguiente liberación sea la de su país.

(Versión en español)

Aung San Suu Kyi is the most famous democracy campaigner in the world and today – thanks to you – she is free. Her prolonged period of house arrest has come to an end because of the unremitting pressure applied by millions of people around the world who believe that no injustice can last forever. But her release from house arrest – where she has spent 15 of the last 21 years – is only a partial victory, because her liberation and that of the Burmese people will not be complete until she is able to take up her position as the rightful leader of her country.

Last Sunday’s Burmese elections were an exercise in public relations, not an exercise in public participation. The constitution, brought in by the generals, enshrines the idea that the president, who is not accountable to parliament, must be either a former or serving soldier, and head a government which need not include a single elected MP. The decision to free Aung San Suu Kyi shows the junta realise that having a single iconic focus for resistance is counterproductive, but we have no evidence that they have any intention of weakening their own position or allowing genuine democratic reform.

During two decades I have offered Aung San Suu Kyi and her family all the support I could give and have written to her many times to say that all over Britain there are people who hold her in their thoughts and prayers. I met with her husband Michael Aris – who later died from cancer without ever being allowed to see her again – and I promised him that I would do whatever I could to be of help.

For more than 20 years Aung San Suu Kyi’s family have endured the pain of separation, and their strength is an inspiration to us all. They have been sustained not only by the bravery of monks and other Burmese protestors who have defied the repression to swear public allegiance to the democratic cause, but also by the global solidarity which has been marshalled by the Burma Campaign UK, Avaaz.org and others.

Last weekend, when I guest-edited my wife Sarah’s Twitter stream to raise awareness of Aung San Suu Kyi’s plight, I was overwhelmed by how many people from all over Britain and the world see this as one of the defining causes of our time. There are of course grave injustices elsewhere, and we must never forget the agonies in Darfur, the brutality in Zimbabwe, and the steady silent loss of life that extreme poverty inflicts on thousands of people every day. But that there are many draws on our compassion should never excuse turning our back on such a grotesque abuse of human rights as that inflicted on Burma’s democracy leader. One tweet from Amnesty was particularly sobering: “No one under 38 – half of Burma’s population – has voted before.” That an entire population could reach middle age without ever casting a ballot – and then be offered only a voting paper without the country’s main opposition party – is a testament to the staying power and brutality of the junta.

The democratisation of Burma will be hard, but it is not impossible. The web is our weapon. Through it people of good conscience can organise and apply precisely the sort of pressure which brought about today’s release. But just as importantly, through it and other forms of new technology activists in Burma can tell the world about what is happening. That is nowhere more apparent than in the brilliant film Burma VJ, made by video journalists who smuggled footage out of the country. In the trailer there is a chilling sequence where somebody on the phone is watching an attack on protesters out of a window and explaining it to his friend: “Who did they shoot?”

“A guy with a camera.”

The generals fear scrutiny, evidence, solidarity. In short, they fear you.

The liberation of Aung San Suu Kyi is one of the great victories of people power in our time – let us together ensure that the liberation of her country is the next.