Had the opposition “green movement” been successful with its Feb. 11 attempt to flood the streets of Tehran with hundreds of thousands of protesters on the 31st anniversary of the Islamic Revolution, the illegitimate regime of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad would have been dealt a severe blow.

However, this plan was crushed before it ever got started by the heavy security measures enforced by Mr. Ahmadinejad and the hard-line clerics. The Iranian theocracy has evolved into a classic dictatorship-police state. In so doing, it has revealed serious cracks in its so-called religious underpinnings as it continues its drive to achieve a nuclear-weapon capability.

The opposition is confused and disorganized, lacks leadership and needs support. The key question is what type of support could help revive the green movement. The Obama administration has provided little support to the opposition. Sen. John Kerry’s proposed trip to Iran on behalf of the Obama administration in December to negotiate an end to U.S. sanctions undercut the opposition. We were saved from this folly by Iran, which refused to grant Mr. Kerry a visa.

The administration is now lobbying for tougher economic sanctions. Will tougher sanctions make a difference with a fanatical religious regime? I doubt it. Particularly so now that the Obama administration is proposing to exempt certain countries – China and other permanent members of the U.N. Security Council – from tougher sanctions being proposed by Congress on companies doing business in Iran. What nonsense.

The recent report by the director of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Yukiya Amano, raised serious concern over Iran’s actions to develop a nuclear warhead for its missiles. This report appears to have gotten some traction with the European Union countries, as they are now encouraging companies such as Italy’s ENI and Germany’s Siemens to sever their business relations with Iran.

Some experts support the thesis that it’s up to the Iranian people to force regime change. They are quick to point to successes in the past, such as Corazon Aquino’s “People Power” in the Philippines, which ousted the corrupt regime of Ferdinand Marcos in 1986, or, more recently, the Orange Revolution in the Ukraine. So why couldn’t a combination of economic sanctions and people power work in Iran? In both of these other cases, we were dealing with regimes – no matter how corrupt – that had some form of a rational compass that doesn’t exist with the fanatical Ahmadinejad regime.

It is acknowledged that Iran is the world’s leader of state-sponsored terrorism. For this reason alone, it cannot be permitted to have a nuclear weapon. We need to provide a menu of options that can support the green movement as well as prevent Iran from achieving a nuclear-weapon capability. Such a menu should include:

c The Obama administration, instead of fulfilling its campaign rhetoric of negotiating with a rogue regime, should sponsor a broad democratic conference to encourage Iranian exiles to identify leaders and develop principles for a future democratic, secular government.

c Even though they have not been effective, leave current economic sanctions in place along with new sanctions being proposed by Congress on Iran’s energy sector. Exempting China and other countries from complying with new sanctions that target Iran’s energy sector is a nonstarter.

c Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Michael Mullen, who has just returned from a trip to the Middle East, stated that he is concerned about the “unintended consequences” of a military strike. Nonetheless, the strategy to prevent Iran from achieving nuclear-weapon capability must include a Strategic Strike Plan (SSP), which could be executed on short notice. Phase I of the SSP would be limited to striking the key facilities of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, including the energy grids that support these facilities. It should be communicated to Iran that we will target its strategic oil-exporting and energy-related facilities as well as its industrial-government control centers should it elect to strike the facilities of our friends and allies in the region or interfere with the flow of oil.

Containment as a fallback strategy is not a viable option when you are dealing with the world’s leader in state-sponsored terrorism. This is particularly relevant because Mr. Ahmadinejad is a member of a small extremist sect known as the Twelves that believes “man can play a key role in causing world chaos,” which then would open the door for the return of the “hidden” Twelfth Imam. Mr. Ahmadinejad believes he has been chosen to be that man.

The above sanctions and military strike should be conducted in the announced context of supporting the Iranian people and that we have no territorial objectives. By such an announcement, we should be able to undercut the Ahmadinejad regime’s ability to mobilize the opposition forces to support the regime. With this type of positive action, the green movement will be provided with the game-changing opportunity to achieve its objectives.

As Iran relentlessly moves toward acquiring a nuclear weapons capability, calls will grow for the United States to think seriously about how to contain Tehran. A preventive attack will not work, some will argue, and could unleash a wave of terrorism that would further imperil Iraq and Afghanistan. Conversely, containment will be held up as a way to deter Tehran without having to resort to military force.

But this view draws a false distinction between containment and force. A preventive attack might not end Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Defense Secretary Robert Gates argues that a successful attack would delay the Iranian program by at most a few years. Yet a policy of containment will not save the White House from having to make tough choices about using force. Indeed, Iran can be contained only if Washington is prepared to use force against an emboldened adversary armed with the ultimate weapon.

The rationale for the Iranian nuclear program has changed over time. It began as part of a largely defensive strategy under the moderate presidencies of Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami. Nuclear weapons would provide a way to deter a range of foes while enhancing national prestige.

Today, as Iranian hawks consolidate their power and the Revolutionary Guards emerge as a key pillar of the state, Tehran views nuclear weapons as the means to regional preeminence. A nuclear shield would give Iran freedom to project its power in the Middle East. Such an Iran is unlikely to be subtle about brandishing the nuclear card.

It would take considerable American political skill and will to contain such regional pretensions. Washington would need to be explicit about its red lines: no initiation of conventional warfare against other countries; no use or transfer of nuclear weapons, material or technologies; no stepped-up support for terrorist or subversive activities. Washington would need to be just as explicit about the consequences of crossing those lines: potential U.S. military retaliation by any and all means necessary.

Tehran would probably test U.S. resolve early on, believing that regional dynamics had shifted sharply in its favor. In that case, the United States would face a momentous credibility crisis because it had failed to stop Iran from going nuclear after persistently declaring that such an outcome was unacceptable. Even close U.S. allies would doubt Washington’s security guarantees.

An emboldened Iran would test Washington in several ways. It would probably lend more support to Hezbollah and Hamas and encourage them to act more aggressively against Israel. It might step up subversive activities against the Gulf sheikdoms and demand that they evict U.S. troops from their territory.

A nuclear Iran could also be tempted to transfer nuclear materials and technologies to other countries. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has already declared that “Iran’s nuclear achievements belong to all those countries thinking of peace and welfare, and we are prepared to provide these achievements to those who hate war and aggression.” How would the United States respond to an Iran that transferred advanced centrifuges or nuclear weapon designs to its Syrian ally? Or if it gave fissile material to a terrorist group?

Such dangerous and destabilizing actions cannot be addressed by tough diplomatic talk or yet more U.N. Security Council resolutions. It can be addressed only by a willingness to respond with force. And in the curious logic that governs deterrence, a Tehran that believes Washington will retaliate will be less likely to act aggressively in the first place.

The challenges of making containment work make it far preferable that Iran stop — or be stopped — short of becoming a nuclear power. Efforts to negotiate limits on Iran’s nuclear program must be pursued with vigor, and economic pressure on Tehran must be maintained. Military options should not be taken off the table.

If Tehran remains determined to go nuclear and preventive attacks prove too risky or unworkable to carry out, the United States will need to formulate a strategy to contain Iran. In doing so, however, it would be a mistake to assume that containment would save the United States from the need to make tough choices about retaliation. If Washington is not prepared to back up a containment strategy with force, the damage created by Iran’s going nuclear could become catastrophic.

All is not necessarily lost with respect to Iran. But we must be clear on our objectives, strategy, and tools. There is urgency and opportunity if we do so.

US Objectives: What objectives are core to US national security? First, elimination of the threat posed by the Islamic Republic regionally and globally. This requires elimination of its nuclear, chemical, and biological programs and their means of delivery. It also requires eliminating its support for terrorism.

Second, since all previous efforts to achieve the first objective have failed, we need regime change. With Libya, we achieved change in the most threatening regime behaviors, and thus regime change did not require change in the political structure. The Islamic Republic, however, is a different matter. It would be foolish to continue to hope sanctions alone will persuade the Islamic Republic to abandon WMD and terrorism. A change in the regime sufficient to eliminate the threats posed and enable development of a new Iran is necessary.

Strategy: While the threat posed by a nuclear-armed Islamic Republic is exacerbated by Ahmadinejad and his messianic vision, the threat has been growing since the 1980s, well before he emerged. So-called moderates, like Rafsanjani, directed development of the WMD programs. If Ahmadinejad was the core of the problem, a popular uprising might eliminate the threat. But just as the WMD programs preceded him, his removal will not terminate them.

Clausewitz, the pre-eminent strategist, wrote: the ultimate substance of enemy strength must be traced back to the fewest possible sources, and ideally to one alone. These are centers of gravity, the the point against which all our energies should be directed.

The center of gravity for the threat posed by the Islamic Republic is the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The IRGC leads Irans WMD programs and its Qods forces conduct Irans support for terrorism. While efforts to impose sanctions on IRGC leaders are positive, the IRGCs resources and pernicious web in the political structures and economy will render even very strong sanctions alone unable to eliminate the threat, especially urgently.

But pressure on the Islamic Republic is certain to mount as their nuclear program progresses and their population continues to express its discontent. As pressure grows, there is a significant risk the IRGC will strike out against its perceived internal and external enemies. The regime has accused the opposition of being part of a Washington-led anti-Islamic plot. We cannot rule out an external attack, either directly or by employing terrorist proxies. Such an attack could employ chemical, biological or radiological weapons targeting include US forces, neighboring states, Europe or the US. Use of terrorist proxies has been suggested by IRGC Commanders. We do not know Irans plans, but we do know the tools and rationale have been developed and are consistent with the Islamic Republics agenda.

Strategic planning must begin. The IRGC leadership, and all of its known facilities, including WMD facilities and Qods forces, must be put in jeopardy of prompt destruction. Accomplishment would result in regime change sufficient to remove the threat and enable development of a post-Islamic Republic Iran.

Tools of US Power:

Military: The failure of diplomacy and enforcement, have led to calls for military action against the Islamic Republic. Most advocate targeting known nuclear facilities. While this would set back the nuclear weapons program, it is would not necessarily end it and would leave the chemical and biological threat and conventional forces intact. Given the costs, we must destroy both the who and the how. Military planning must ensure that the IRGC leadership, and all of its known facilities, including WMD facilities and Qods forces, are put in jeopardy of prompt destruction. The regular military, IRGC rank and file, and religious and political leadership would not be targeted. In the absence of the IRGC leadership and WMD facilities, the remaining structures may be unpleasant, but would not pose a threat to national security.

The challenges cannot be underestimated. Intelligence regarding the identity and locations of IRGC leadership and facilities must be acquired. A targeting plan that strictly minimizes collateral damage to the population must be developed. An operational plan to include Special Forces has to be developed. Implementation must be swift to preclude IRGC retaliation.

Diplomatic: Diplomatic tools should pursue four goals. First, the Islamic Republic, especially the IRGC, needs to know that the US, with or without allies, is prepared to destroy to IRGC. Second, the Iranian public needs to know they are not our targets and that we support their aspirations. Third, the international community needs to understand they can support our efforts or not, but their inability to address the threat since 2002 has left the US no option but to address the threat as best it can. Finally, diplomacy should support a post-IRGC Iran, especially support for democracy.

Economic: Our economic tools should support the aspirations of the Iranian population. It would be prudent to avoid support for any particular group or individual. But we should communicate US goals and interests and assist all Iranians interested in and willing to establish positive relations. As with the Marshall Plan, we should support a move to an economy freed of the costs and corruption of the regime, the IRGC, and the massive expenditures the regime has invested for over two decades in WMD.

Technology: Communications technology should underscore our other tools. Protests since the June 2009 election have demonstrated the power of email, Twitter, and video cell phones in the hands of Iranians. The regime has sought to deny their use. We should empower the Iranian people by enabling them to overcoming such denial.

Conclusion: Iranian protesters cannot be expected to overthrow the Islamic Republic, particularly the IRGC. The US must begin to develop and use our military to destroy the IRGC, and our diplomatic, economic, and technological tools to support the Iranian people.

The future of a post-IRGC Iran cannot be predicted. We cannot be certain that even a democratically elected post-IRGC Iran would be to our liking, but we know the majority of the Iranian public views the US favorably, and that Iran has a young, well-educated population hungry for change. Freed from the corruption and the massive expenditures for WMD programs, Irans economy holds the promise of an economic powerhouse. Following regime change, we could lend a helping hand. But beyond this, we could leave the future of Iran to Iranians.

Hace 31 años, la revolución iraní derrocó la monarquía de la familia Pahlevi. Nadie había sido capaz de predecir la caída del Sha, que estaba convencido de que era muy popular entre su pueblo. Su mayor tragedia, por consiguiente, fue que el monarca se convirtió en víctima de su propia fantasía.

Hoy, la cuestión fundamental que plantea Irán es dilucidar si el régimen islámico que sustituyó al Sha ha sucumbido al mismo engaño y si está dispuesto a emplear la fuerza para mantener el statu quo y permanecer en el poder.

En la situación actual, surgen varias preguntas importantes. ¿Permanecerá el ayatolá Alí Jamenei en el poder como líder de la revolución? ¿Dará un golpe de Estado la Guardia Revolucionaria? ¿Se convertirá la frustración de la sociedad civil iraní en desencanto y se volverán los reformistas cada vez más radicalizados y violentos? ¿Se hundirá el país, asfixiado por el caos económico e incluso una quiebra bancaria?

La capacidad de aguante del líder supremo -tanto del individuo que ocupa actualmente ese cargo, el ayatolá Jamenei, como del cargo en sí- será un elemento clave para el futuro inmediato del país.

Por supuesto, la pérdida de legitimidad y la disputa por la sucesión del líder cuando fallezca podrían provocar una lucha de poder entre las distintas facciones del régimen iraní que desembocara en un golpe de Estado militar orquestado por la Guardia Revolucionaria y la milicia basij.

El comportamiento de la sociedad civil iraní de aquí a un año podría oscilar entre una amplia oleada de emigración de los jóvenes con estudios y una postura más radical y más partidaria de la violencia.

En cuanto a la economía iraní, no hay duda de que se encontrará en su lecho de muerte, después de una racha prolongada de bajos ingresos del petróleo, escasas inversiones extranjeras, inflación elevada, alto nivel de desempleo y corrupción. La situación podría agravarse con las sanciones políticas, culturales y económicas de Occidente, que son ya prácticamente seguras. Y podría haber un aumento visible de los disturbios entre las minorías étnicas en el país.

Teniendo en cuenta estos indicadores críticos, es de esperar que, en el periodo que se avecina, las fuerzas paramilitares y de seguridad ejerzan una represión aún más dura contra los grupos de oposición.

Para empezar, los altos clérigos del país van a volverse cada vez más críticos respecto a un régimen que ha perdido definitivamente el control de la realidad iraní y se dedica a disparar contra sus oponentes para sobrevivir. La suerte de la política iraní dependerá en parte de las decisiones de los grandes ayatolás de la ciudad santa chií de Qom -que nunca han apoyado las ideas religiosas y políticas del ayatolá Jamenei- y en parte de las de los elementos más duros en el círculo íntimo de este último.

Lo que estamos presenciando es, en el fondo, una disputa fundamental para decidir quién es dueño de la revolución y de los medios para salvaguardar el islam chií iraní. El aparato clerical en Qom seguirá alineándose con quienes pretenden redefinir la República Islámica de Irán y, por consiguiente, se enfrentará abiertamente a la Guardia Revolucionaria.

Si este enfrentamiento se vuelve violento, habría, desde luego, tanto víctimas como beneficiarios. La beneficiaria más probable de una lucha así sería la Guardia Revolucionaria. Con los principales reformistas y opositores en la cárcel y la calle controlada mediante un golpe militar, se acallarían por completo las voces que exigen un cambio radical. Eso podría desembocar en una acción militar exterior contra Irán, que, sin duda, inflamaría toda la región y tendría consecuencias humanas catastróficas, mientras que enriquecería y daría más poder a los elementos violentos y peligrosos del aparato militar y de seguridad del país. Dado que todos los indicios apuntan a una transformación gradual de Irán en una potencia muy militarizada en el plazo de unos meses, esta ideologización afectaría sin duda a las reformas cívicas dentro del país y a su integración en la comunidad internacional.

En política exterior, la repercusión inmediata y fundamental de una toma del poder por parte de los sectores armados sería que la Guardia Revolucionaria iraní seguramente utilizaría la baza nuclear para reafirmar aún más la misión antiimperialista de Irán en el mundo y estimular el orgullo nacionalista dentro de sus fronteras. Eso, a su vez, provocaría una reacción igualmente belicosa de las potencias árabes de la región, que intentarían aumentar su intervención y fomentar las tensiones dentro de Irán mediante el respaldo a los grupos minoritarios suníes.

Dicha situación supondría una enorme presión para las fuerzas militares y paramilitares iraníes, que continuarían aplastando la disidencia interior y, al tiempo, tendrían que proyectar un tono más agresivo de desafío e intimidación respecto a Estados Unidos y otras potencias mundiales.

No son unas perspectivas muy halagüeñas. Lo que es indudable es que nadie puede afirmar con certeza qué sucederá en un Irán gobernado por el más impredecible de los regímenes contemporáneos. Pero, por desgracia, el rumbo que he trazado aquí responde a una lógica innegable.

Desde el final de la Segunda Guerra Mundial no han dejado de producirse en el mundo matanzas donde se ha exterminado a poblaciones enteras. Recordemos, por ejemplo, los casos de Angola, Camboya con los jemeres rojos, la guerra tribal en Ruanda, la guerra de los Balcanes, sin olvidar las atrocidades cometidas bajo el régimen estalinista contra pueblos de la antigua Unión Soviética. Y a pesar de esto, la ONU decidió fijar específicamente un día en recuerdo del holocausto judío en Europa. ¿Por qué? ¿Qué hay de especial en el holocausto?

Es especial no sólo por su amplitud y crueldad, sino sobre todo porque no se debía a ninguna de las razones que motivaron las masacres ocurridas en el siglo XX. Yes que los judíos no fueron exterminados por los nazis por querer conquistar un territorio (los judíos carecían de él), ni por razones religiosas (los nazis y sus aliados eran declaradamente ateos), ni por cuestiones ideológicas (los judíos nunca tuvieron una ideología específica común), ni por motivos económicos (la mayoría de los judíos eran pobres y aquellos con dinero no habrían dudado en darlo por salvar la vida); los nazis ni siquiera buscaban convertirlos en esclavos. Los judíos, a los ojos de los nazis, pasaron a ser unas “bacterias” que había que exterminar, y en esta tarea de exterminio los alemanes obtuvieron en ocasiones la ayuda o el visto bueno de los pueblos que iban invadiendo.

Por eso, el mecanismo demoniaco que condujo al holocausto no quedó liquidado con la caída de los nazis y esto hace que haya que estar en guardia para impedir que este mecanismo se ponga en marcha de nuevo contra los judíos o cualquier otro pueblo, pese a que hayan transcurrido ya 65 años desde la liberación del campo de exterminio de Auschwitz. De ahí que la ONU fijara un día en conmemoración del holocausto judío como hecho único en la historia.

Los líderes israelíes que participaron en distintas capitales europeas en las ceremonias en recuerdo del holocausto lo hicieron para fortalecer a los que se oponen a los brotes de antisemitismo que surgen en diversos lugares del mundo, pero también para pedir apoyo político contra el programa nuclear de Irán y sus brutales amenazas.

Irán no es la Alemania nazi, ni por su régimen político, ni por su ideología, ni desde luego por su potencial económico. Tampoco se parece el Israel actual a esas dispersas comunidades judías de Europa con más bien poco poder. Hoy en día Israel no sólo se puede defender, sino ocasionar graves daños a sus enemigos. Sin embargo, pese a la diferencia evidente entre la Alemania nazi e Irán, es curioso que el Gobierno iraní defienda y aliente una oposición tan total a la existencia del Estado judío, capaz de hacer que se active el mismo mecanismo que provocó ese odio visceral que estalló en la época nazi. Y cuando cuente con armamento nuclear puede, pese a su debilidad y vulnerabilidad, verse arrastrado por la misma locura nazi y causar un tremendo daño a Israel.

Nadie puede estar seguro de que a través de las sanciones que prepara la comunidad internacional Irán deje su carrera por conseguir armamento nuclear. Y proceder por la vía militar podría arrastrar a Israel a una lucha prolongada y agotadora que haría que los otros enemigos de Israel se sumasen a esa lucha. Por eso, son muchos los que creen que hay otra forma más correcta y ética de neutralizar la amenaza iraní, y esta sería alcanzando la paz con los palestinos.

Hace unas semanas el ministro de Asuntos Religiosos palestino dio un discurso esperanzador en Ramala, en presencia de las principales autoridades palestinas, en el que delante de las cámaras lanzó durísimas críticas a la intromisión iraní en el conflicto israelí-palestino. Su mensaje vino a decir: ¿Qué nos une a vosotros? No necesitamos vuestra protección ni vuestra ayuda. Lo único que hacéis es agravar el conflicto en vez de ayudarnos a israelíes y palestinos a resolverlo de la forma ya aceptada por todo el mundo: dos pueblos, dos estados. En cambio, alentáis el extremismo de Hamas y con ello radicalizáis la postura israelí y torpedeáis la posibilidad de alcanzar la solución que todos deseamos. Vosotros, los iraníes, por razones ajenas al conflicto, deseáis encender la llama del odio. Nunca un soldado iraní dio su vida por nuestro pueblo, como en cambio sí lo han hecho miles de soldados de Egipto y Jordania, países que precisamente han firmado la paz con Israel.

Los líderes palestinos saben muy bien que si Irán ataca Israel con armamento nuclear también los palestinos israelíes y de los territorios sufrirían las tremendas consecuencias.

La paz entre israelíes y palestinos neutralizaría el aguijón envenenado de odio de Irán hacia Israel y anularía el mecanismo diabólico que presenta a Israel como un “pequeño demonio” al que hay que exterminar a cualquier precio. También podría ayudar a que el pueblo iraní se rebelase contra el fanatismo religioso de los dirigentes de esa gran nación que hasta hace no mucho mantenía relaciones formales con Israel. Poner fin al conflicto israelo-palestino sería mucho más eficaz que emprender una acción militar israelí o norteamericana que sólo provocaría más dolor y sufrimiento en la región.

In Iran the clock is ticking. In fact, three clocks are ticking simultaneously — in the country’s nuclear laboratories, at the negotiating table and on the streets. Its future depends on which clock ticks fastest.

Demonstrations filled the streets yesterday, accompanied by the clear sound of a political crackdown as the regime’s supporters and opponents squared up. But for all the sound and fury the two sides were like boxers circling in the ring. It was not a decisive moment. The political clock is still ticking.

On the nuclear front matters appear to be moving faster. Iran now has thousands of centrifuges enriching uranium 24 hours a day, seven days a week. The uranium has certainly been enriched to a concentration (approximately 4 per cent) suitable for producing electricity. But yesterday, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad claimed Iran had produced uranium enriched to a concentration of 20 per cent, only days after announcing that as an ambition. Is this just bluster? We cannot be sure. What we do know is that from there it is only a short step to the 90 per cent concentration required to produce fuel for nuclear weapons. Iran appears to have encountered technical problems enriching large amounts of uranium, but it could still generate significant quantities of weapons-grade fuel in one to three years, if not sooner.

It is not yet clear whether Iran intends to go so far as to produce, test and field nuclear weapons. Iranian officials might decide to halt their programme just short of that, calculating that Iran could garner most of the benefits of being perceived as a nuclear weapons state without incurring most of the costs. Either outcome — Iran as an actual nuclear weapons state or a “threshold” one — would have profoundly destabilising consequences for the region and the world.

Not that the current situation is stable. Iran could provoke an Israeli or American preventive military strike against its nuclear facilities even before that line is crossed — something sure to prompt Iranian retaliation throughout the region. Oil supplies could well be disrupted at a time when world economic recovery remains fragile. An Iranian nuclear weapon would almost certainly lead several of Iran’s neighbours to develop or acquire nuclear weapons of their own, leaving the Middle East perched uneasily on a nuclear precipice. In terms of global risk, Iran is now centre stage.

Around the negotiating table the clock is ticking more slowly. Talks between Iran and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council — the US, Great Britain, France, Russia and China — plus Germany have failed to produce an accord, even though the precondition that Iran suspend all enrichment has been dropped. What they want is for Iran to halt its independent enrichment programme, and place all its uranium and associated technology and facilities under international supervision. In exchange, Iran could expect the relaxation of existing economic sanctions, access to nuclear power and any number of political and strategic benefits.

That argument is rational, but the incentives don’t appear to be working. It is time to get tougher. Many in Washington back additional sanctions that target the Revolutionary Guard, the elite force of about 100,000 that increasingly dominates Iran’s politics, security policy and economy. Indeed, 31 years after the Islamic revolution that established an unprecedented fusion of clerical and political rule, Iran increasingly resembles a traditional authoritarian state where security forces dominate most aspects of public life.

Russia and China are likely to resist anything too muscular lest they alienate Iran’s Government. And we cannot be sure what effect sanctions will have on the regime’s stability or decision making. This last point may be the most telling. The history of economic sanctions shows that they do not produce significant policy changes (and certainly not quickly) in areas that governments judge to involve their vital national interests.

Which brings us to the politics of regime change. Resistance to clerical rule has long existed, but it increased dramatically in the aftermath of the fraudulent June 12 presidential elections. The more the protests were repressed, the greater they grew, culminating in the Green Movement, which now poses a serious challenge to the Government.Yesterday gave further evidence of the Government’s determination to retain the upper hand. Iran’s rulers upped the intimidation, arresting opponents, shutting down internet access and deploying baton-wielding thugs.

It is time the West made it clear that it is on the side of the protesters. Neither European governments nor the United States can usher in fundamental reform, but they can energise and lend rhetorical support to the opposition, helping it to communicate with the outside world and stay abreast of what is going on.

It is anything but clear that these three timelines — the nuclear, the diplomatic and the political — will work out in a way that serves the world’s interests. It is quite possible that Iran’s nuclear work may progress faster than negotiations. Indeed, Iran’s policy may be to play for time while its scientists overcome their technical difficulties. Similarly, it might take months to gain international support for more robust sanctions and even then years for them to have an impact. Again, lab work is likely to outpace diplomacy.

This is why the West can no longer remain on the sidelines. Our leaders must speak out for the Iranian people who seek change. The goal must be to accelerate the political timeline, If we don’t the work in Iran’s laboratories will force Europe, the United States and Israel to choose between two distinctly unattractive choices: accepting a nuclear Iran or attacking it.

It was a cold autumn day in 1978 in Los Angeles when I saw on the evening news that Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini had gone to the Paris suburb of Neauphle-le-Chateau from exile in Iraq. To a young student activist in the anti-shah movement, it seemed like the opportunity of a lifetime. Having studied theories of social change as a sociology student at UCLA, I really wanted to be part of the revolution that was about to sweep my country.

I took the next available flight to Paris, where I stayed for two months at Khomeini’s makeshift “headquarters,” helping out as an interpreter. I saw firsthand how the mullahs close to Khomeini continuously connived to monopolize power and how young people, especially the college-educated, were being marginalized. Any discussion of the most prominent opposition groups in Iran at that time also was banned.

The experience was enough for me to grow completely disillusioned about Khomeini and his retinue. My older brother Hossein, a prolific writer and an anti-shah activist in Los Angeles before he returned to Iran in January 1979, was executed two year later by his former U.S. colleagues, who by then had assumed key posts in the new theocratic state. He was 29.

The conventional wisdom of social change is that a generation cannot make two revolutions. If the past eight months are any indication, it seems my generation is going to be an exception – and a new opportunity for freedom looms on the horizon in Iran.

Three decades after the ayatollahs set up a theocracy under the guise of Islam, they seem to have reached the end of the line, as widespread demands for democratic change permeate the gamut of society.

Several indications are not in dispute:

c The regime clearly has grown weaker. Supreme Leader Ayatolla Ali Khamenei has failed to mend widening rifts within his regime because they are too deep and he is too weak to make concessions. This explains why President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, while boasting Thursday that Iran was now “a nuclear state,” ordered the resumption of uranium enrichment.

c The protesters’ demands no longer are about electoral fraud. As evidenced in the protests Thursday and on Dec. 27 (Ashura), the underlying demand of 31 years ago has resurfaced: insistence on a democratic and secular republic and the rejection of theocracy. The slogan “Down with the principle of the velayat-e faqih” (absolute clerical rule) captures that.

c Mr. Ahmadinejad’s rivals have lost crucial ground. On Jan. 1, Mir Hossein Mousavi offered a five-point reconciliation plan but was quickly rebuffed, demonstrating both Ayatollah Khamenei’s stubbornness as well as Mr. Mous avi’s diminishing political influence. Two days later, reformist Mehdi Karroubi announced that he recognized Mr. Ahmadinejad’s presidency.

c And Thursday, on the Revolution’s anniversary – despite the fact that the regime undertook extraordinary measures, mustered all of its repressive forces and resorted to widespread beatings and citizen arrests – fearless and resolute Iranians defied the brutal crackdown. The regime’s total illegitimacy as well as the opposition’s determination to continue – as leading Iranian opposition figure Maryam Rajavi put it – “will lead to the realization of freedom and democracy in Iran.”

The big question now is: Can the people finally overcome the what President Obama called the regime’s “iron fist of brutality”? A lot rides on the West’s attitude toward the organized opposition.

In 1997, as a “goodwill gesture” to Tehran’s tyrants, the Clinton administration blacklisted the main Iranian opposition group, People’s Mujahedin-e Khalq (PMOI). That decision only emboldened the mullahs in their repressive and terrorist ways. Even the offering of a package of enticements during President George W. Bush’s second term did nothing to bring around the turbaned tyrants of Iran.

President Obama’s remarks in his State of the Union address revealed that this administration’s approach is weighed down by unpromising rhetoric, discernible indecisiveness and inattention toward Iran’s growing opposition, ostensibly because anything to the contrary may appear to be interfering in Iran’s internal affairs.

Ironically, keeping the PMOI on the Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) list is a clear example of interference that serves the interests of the clerical regime, even if unwittingly. The mullahs consider the PMOI their archnemesis, which explains why they continue to point their sword toward it. The most senior regime officials now say, for example, that the PMOI “commanded the Ashura uprising” or “Slogans posted on the [PMOI] Web site were chanted by the protesters.”

On Jan. 18, during a kangaroo trial, a prosecutor in Tehran demanded the death penalty for five protesters charged with “colluding with the ‘terrorist’ [PMOI].” There is hardly any doubt that both the diverse opposition and unorganized masses rely on the PMOI’s capabilities and experience to thrust the movement to a higher phase. With the largest organized social network inside Iran, PMOI activists and supporters, who have lost 120,000 of their loved ones to the regime’s onslaught in years past, are instrumental in strengthening and steering the protests.

In their struggle “to exercise their universal rights,” as President Obama put it, Iranians have asked Washington for nothing but to stop any interference that has been working in favor of the mullahs and impairs the opposition. That obviously would serve the interests of the uprising and the opposition inside Iran, but it also can benefit America’s long-term goals for a more stable and democratic order in the Middle East.

Who knows exactly what happened in Iran during the demonstrations Thursday marking the anniversary of the Islamic revolution? Thousands of images and stories have leaked out of the country since the disputed presidential election last June. But it is extremely difficult to verify information. Those foreign reporters who get visas are forbidden to cover opposition demonstrations. As for the local reporters who have not been jailed or fled the country, their main concerns are how to be efficient, now that a dozen newspapers have been closed since June. As of this month, Iran is imprisoning more journalists than any other country.

Last summer, a prominent photojournalist was summoned by judicial authorities in Tehran just as government security forces had been rounding up hundreds of journalists, opposition members and protesters in the wake of the disputed election. He had been covering the election for the French photography agency SIPA and Andisheye Now, a newspaper owned by Mir Hossein Mousavi, one of the candidates for president. But this photojournalist’s ties to an opposition paper were not the cause of the regime’s concerns — at least not at first. Authorities were furious because he had filed photos of the protests to his employer in France, an action they contended was akin to spying and participating in a conspiracy against the government.

Over the weeks that followed, two of his colleagues were picked up on similar charges, Andisheye Now was shut down, and its editor, Amir Hossein Mahdavi, was imprisoned. Fearing arrest at any moment, he left the country with only a small bag and his camera. He arrived in Iraqi Kurdistan on Aug. 4, and after overcoming various bureaucratic hurdles at the office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, he secured a visa for France.

Such stories are, sadly, increasingly common. Many Iranian reporters see exile as the only means to guarantee their safety. At least 50 journalists have fled the country since June, the largest exodus of the sort since the 1979 revolution. One journalist had to flee because she spoke to the BBC about Neda Agha Soltan, the young woman who became a symbol of the opposition after she was fatally shot during the protests. One photojournalist fled after one of his images was prominently used by a major international media organization. A third had to leave after blogging about the situation of prisoners.

This list grows longer every day.

The state’s reaction to the spread of information has been repression. When the vice minister for culture and Islamic orientation describes news media publications and Web sites as “means used in an attempt to overthrow the state,” it is clear that the regime is ridding itself of unwanted witnesses to its human rights abuses.

More than seven months after the election, 48 Iranian journalists are still being detained in difficult conditions. On Nov. 20, a U.N. General Assembly committee accused the government of stepping up its use of torture and other forms of cruel and inhuman punishment, and expressed concern about “serious ongoing and recurring human rights violations.” Despite such clear condemnations from the United Nations, Iranian authorities continue to detain journalists without any accountability.

Sasan Aghaei of the daily newspaper Farhikhteghan was picked up Nov. 22 after intelligence ministry officials carried out a search of his Tehran home. Aghaei, who also edits the blog Azad Tribun, is the third Farhikhteghan journalist to be arrested since the election. The other two, Masoud Bastani and Reza Norbakhsh, the newspaper’s editor, have both been given six-year jail sentences.

Even media professionals who remain free cannot escape government surveillance and intimidation. Their persecution is part of a wider harassment campaign carried out by security forces, designed to protect President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei from internal dissent and to limit the information leaving the country. To an extent, the strategy has succeeded.

During the “Green Revolution” last summer, the power of social networking sites as an alternative to other media amazed the world. The regime took notice. Iran’s Revolutionary Guards are now directly involved in online censorship, blocking thousands of news Web sites and blogs every day.

Censored in Iran or forced into exile, journalists often no longer have a platform or means to openly discuss the political and human rights situation in their home country. By making these journalists choose between repression or flight, the regime has succeeded in tightening its grasp over information. The exodus of Iranian journalists is not just a human tragedy but also increases the risk of a news blackout.

The international community must continue to denounce the conditions that have led journalists to flee Iran, as well as ensure that exiled journalists have the means to continue their work in a safe environment. Failing to do so could be disastrous for the Iranian people and the global community.

No cabe duda de que Irán está atravesando días duros en los que se está trazando su destino y, por esta misma razón, cualquier opinión, declaración, decisión o iniciativa por parte de todos cuenta con mucha importancia y responsabilidad, ya sea por parte del Gobierno, por parte de los que están bajo las garras de la violencia gubernamental o por parte de cualquier persona amante de la patria y de la libertad y que tenga su alma arraigada en la amada tierra de nuestro país.

Lo que hemos visto en el día de Ashura [tradicional fiesta chií] es mucho más duro y doloroso de lo que podría relatar aquí. La sangre de los valientes jóvenes de esta tierra ha teñido de rojo las calles apedreadas: uno de nuestros iraníes murió atropellado por un coche con un grito de libertad en su boca; otro, durante el día de luto por el imam Hussein, fue arrojado al vacío desde un puente en su búsqueda de la justicia y otro fue asesinado. Una vez más se oía el clamor y el lamento de los corazones. En verdad, ¿qué pecado has cometido para que te hayan matado?

Los iraníes siempre han repudiado las guerras y la violencia. Los amantes de la libertad en Irán han buscado la paz cada vez que se ha derramado sangre en cualquier parte del mundo. Sin embargo, ahora, y de manera insólita, son testigos de la violencia y la agresión en su propia casa y entre sus propios hermanos.

¿Acaso el conductor del coche y los terroristas y oficiales armados que mataron a sus conciudadanos no eran iraníes? Desafortunadamente, nuestros hermanos y hermanas no han muerto por mano de extraños, sino entre los dedos de sus propios hermanos iraníes.

Hermanas y hermanos compatriotas:

Que días tan difíciles estamos viviendo. En otra época nos atacó Sadam: centenares de miles de iraníes murieron de las maneras más atroces y millones de madres iraníes lloraron en su luto, pero es más duro ver cómo mueren nuestros jóvenes a manos de una minoría de nuestros compatriotas. No hay duda de que el pueblo iraní está turbado y conmocionado por estos hechos tan violentos.

Para nosotros, los iraníes, ya era insoportable ver cómo el dolor llevaba a un joven palestino a apedrear con tanto odio al enemigo ante la imagen de su propio conciudadano bañado en sangre, pero más agonizante resulta ver cómo los jóvenes iraníes llevan las manos cargadas de piedras mientras contemplan con sus propios ojos a los amigos ahogándose en su propia sangre tras haber participado de manera pacífica en una protesta.

No hay duda de que todos sabéis que desde las elecciones hasta la fecha las protestas del pueblo iraní eran pacíficas, civiles y legales, y que de ninguna manera se puede demostrar que hayan sido lo contrario; y lo que ha hecho que estas protestas aumenten y se consoliden ha sido la respuesta unilateral (lejos de ser justa) de algunos responsables del Gobierno. La detención de un creciente número de personas, la oleada de privaciones de estudio y expulsiones de los jóvenes universitarios, el aumento de las destituciones de los activistas sociales, la prohibición ilegal de muchos medios de comunicación, la creciente limitación de la libertad de expresión, la cancelación de las actividades políticas, culturales y sociales, el enfrentamiento con las instituciones civiles, el uso de la violencia, el insulto, el abuso físico y el asesinato, el empleo de palabras obscenas y oprobiosas contra los participantes en las protestas (incluidas las mujeres iraníes), el asesinato de un grupo de jóvenes detenido ilegalmente en las cárceles y no procesar a los responsables de estos delitos, la subjetividad de los medios de comunicación estatales, la presión a los líderes del movimiento verde y popular y a otros activistas políticos, sociales y culturales, artistas, estudiantes, mujeres, minorías religiosas y raciales, etc… son algunas de las muchas actuaciones que han provocado el aumento de las protestas de la gente, hechos que han influido mucho en el aumento de la presión económica y cotidiana sobre las personas. Y nos preguntamos: ¿acaso frente a sus protestas el pueblo iraní, que de manera pacífica y completamente civil muestra su desacuerdo con el Gobierno, tiene que recibir balas, provocaciones y amenazas desde las tribunas de los representantes del Gobierno? ¿Han servido de algo las actuaciones de los que comenzaron a tocar la campana de la violencia el 13 de junio y lo han seguido haciendo hasta la fecha?

Un grupo del propio Gobierno y de la oposición, críticos y pensadores, ha sugerido vías para el diálogo con el pueblo para poder así dar por terminada esta etapa de violencia y tensión, pero desgraciadamente parece que la voz de los reformistas y pacifistas se ha perdido entre los gritos y el escándalo de los partidarios de la guerra y la violencia.

La continuidad de esta política ha dado lugar a lo que no debería haber pasado. Es decir, matar al hermano. Y esto, si bien es un hecho proveniente de una minoría que desea y busca la violencia dentro del Gobierno, también es muestra de la falta de preparación de alguno de ellos y de su incapacidad para estar a la altura de los acontecimientos, lo que ha creado grandes y serias dudas en la opinión pública; en un futuro muy cercano, la Historia se encargará de esclarecer estas dudas.

Queridos compatriotas:

Todos nosotros, los iraníes, tenemos una gran responsabilidad. Unámonos para que cualquiera de nosotros, sea cual sea su papel en la sociedad, haga lo posible por dar pasos hacia la paz. Nosotros somos un pueblo amante de la paz que ahora debe usar medios civiles y contrarios a cualquier tipo de violencia para mostrar nuestro desacuerdo, crítica, oposición y disensión, para de este modo no caer en las garras de los que buscan la coacción y la violencia.

Debemos convencernos de que lo que el pueblo pide es su derecho y el pueblo iraní, para alcanzar lo que por derecho le corresponde, no requiere los instrumentos de la violencia y sólo los que usan la tiranía y la agresividad para sus actuaciones ciegas son los que saben que no tienen derecho.

A los jóvenes conscientes de mi país:

Hay que ser firmes y resistir, y ante las balas, los tanques y las armas no lanzar siquiera una piedra. Alcanzar la democracia, la justicia, la libertad y los derechos humanos requiere que plantemos flores y no ríos de sangre. Por esta razón, la Organización para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos, confiando en las demandas civiles y legales del pueblo iraní, anuncia que: nosotros, los defensores de los Derechos Humanos, estamos en contra de la continua violencia en la sociedad iraní y pedimos que se haga todo por parte de la sociedad iraní para frenar esta ola de violencia y agresión. Con todo el respeto para el noble pueblo de Irán, en esta declaración demandamos:

A los representantes y responsables de la respetada República Islámica de Irán:

No hay duda en la sensibilidad y la importancia de la responsabilidad y el papel de los responsables en el futuro de Irán. Lo que se espera de ustedes como responsables del poder es que aseguren las derechos recogidos en la Constitución de Irán y respeto por la Justicia. Ahora no sólo el pueblo iraní, sino muchos otros en muchas partes del mundo observan sus actuaciones y declaraciones para poder juzgarles mañana.

Reformar las políticas erróneas del pasado y de la actualidad y escuchar el deseo de la sociedad y sus demandas está entre sus principales responsabilidades, pero ante todo deben detener cualquier acto violento contra la gente y, en caso de que continúen con sus políticas tiranas e injustas, serán primero los iraníes y después la opinión pública de un mundo unido los que les pedirán cuentas.

A los hermanos pasdaran y basiyi:

En las condiciones actuales es muy difícil dirigirnos a ustedes. Lo que hemos atestiguado estos días es lo que hace tan duro hablar con ustedes. El pueblo iraní recuerda que muchos de los hermanos pasdaran y basiyi fueron los que defendieron los derechos de la gente frente los ataques de los enemigos de esta tierra. Sin embargo, hoy en día vemos con asombro como un grupo de este poder popular se ha enfrentado a la gente con sus balas, pistolas y porras y con cada disparo, un grupo de sus compatriotas se ponía de luto.

Nosotros, los defensores de los Derechos Humanos, os pedimos a vosotros, los hermanos basiyi -que gracias a este mismo pueblo habéis llegado a ocupar el puesto que detentáis ahora- no manchéis con sangre a vuestros hermanos y hermanas, no vistáis con vuestros actos a los padres de negro y no hagáis que un grupo cada vez mayor de personas tengan que ir a llorar a los mártires de hoy.

En conclusión:

La Organización de los Defensores de los Derechos Humanos, teniendo en cuenta la situación violenta por la que está atravesando la sociedad iraní, declara que cualquier paso, iniciativa o actuación por parte de cualquier grupo deben ser para asegurar y establecer los principios universales de los Derechos Humanos en Irán, ya que el pueblo de Irán no aceptará nada menos que su cumplimiento.

On Thursday, the birthday of the Islamic Republic of Iran, we will see whether the democratic opposition movement has been driven underground by the increasingly brutal harassment from the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Iranian society has become like molten rock under high pressure: more eruptions are inevitable. And if the dissidents can take to the streets, they will.

In any case, the fraudulent June 12 presidential elections and the subsequent internal tumult ought to make us wonder what would happen if Iran actually went democratic. President Obama and his advisers — still devoted to engagement and the hope that Iran’s nuclear-weapons program can be peacefully derailed (despite Tehran’s stepping up of its enrichment program this week), and probably skeptical that Ayatollah Khamenei and his Revolutionary Guards Corps could lose power — have likely spent little time envisioning a region where the Islamic Republic as we have known it no longer exists. At least, nobody from the administration’s foreign-policy brain trust has laid out any plans for that contingency.

But given the troubles facing Ayatollah Khamenei, the near certainty that the clerical regime is going to get a lot nastier soon and the momentous possibilities of a democratic Iran, the White House should give it some thought. Mr. Khamenei is confronting a democracy movement that has grown larger despite an almost total lack of organization and charismatic leadership.

Iran’s militarized theocracy will survive or perish depending on the strength of the Revolutionary Guards, the praetorian branch of the military that has become a self-sustaining fundamentalist conglomerate. Yet many guardsmen and their children, like the children of the clerical elite, are graduates of Iran’s best universities. And if there is one factor that has inclined Iranians toward the opposition, it has been higher education — a point the regime has surely noted when it comes to the probable loyalties of the country’s nuclear physicists.

In fact, many rank-and-file guardsmen voted for Mohammad Khatami, the reformist candidate, in the 1997 presidential election, even though their senior officers detested him. It’s likely this schism remains.

The funeral in December of the regime’s bête noire, Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, where hundreds of thousands turned out, suggests the regime may also be encountering resistance from the clerical establishment.

The senior clergymen of the holy city of Qum have never had any regard for Ayatollah Khamenei’s religious credentials and political pretensions; their quiescence has been achieved through intimidation by the regime and their inability to see any political alternative. But part of Ayatollah Montazeri’s appealing dissent, which has been echoed by other Shiite clerics since his death, is that the Islamic Republic doesn’t have to change much for the differences to be telling. Just freeing the Parliament from unelected clerical oversight would be a revolutionary step.

We will likely know in the coming months if the opposition can draw into the streets larger numbers of the mostazafan, “the oppressed poor,” who have been the popular bedrock of the regime since the 1979 revolution. The economic “reforms” that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has planned will probably worsen Iran’s already debilitating inflation and unemployment. An opposition combining the young mullahs, college-educated bureaucrats within Iran’s bloated civil service and a significant slice of the urban poor could be too diverse for the guards, a partly conscripted force, to suppress.

The guards rose to prominence defending the homeland against an Iraqi invader; they have not yet shown that they have the fortitude to kill their countrymen like the Russian secret police or the Chinese Red Guards. Note how much time and effort the regime has spent to deflect blame for the killing of one young woman, Neda Agha-Soltan, in the post-election rioting last summer. A self-confident regime would have killed unapologetically. Senior guardsmen may want to unleash a bloodbath to preserve the status quo, but Ayatollah Khamenei, who lacks the cold-blooded will of the state’s founder, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, doesn’t seem to want to slaughter Iranians or make himself a hostage of his henchmen.

When regimes start to crack, the unthinkable becomes thinkable. Ayatollah Khamenei’s supporters could start to wonder whether their influence could survive in a more open political system. Iranian journalists are reporting that former guardsmen who’ve joined the opposition are signaling their one-time brothers that they could have a soft landing in a new order. However much the regime has worked to brainwash its security force (“the bulwark against disbelief”), if more Iranians are killed, rank-and-file guardsmen may suspend their belief and choose not to shoot.

A democratic revolution in Tehran could well prove the most momentous Mideastern event since the fall of the Ottoman Empire. A politically freer Iran would bring front and center the great Islamic debate of our times: How can one be both a good Muslim and a democrat? How does one pay homage to Islamic law but give ultimate authority to the people’s elected representatives? How can a Muslim import the best of the West without suffering debilitating guilt?

To an extent seen in no other country, Iran’s intellectuals have battled and evolved over these questions. For a century, the country has been trying to develop constitutional government. For 30 years, dissident clerics and lay intellectuals have struggled to reassert the democratic promise in the revolution.

Especially for religious dissidents, democracy is now seen as a keystone of a more moral order, where the faith can no longer be used to countenance dictatorship. An operating assumption of President Obama’s speech to the Islamic world in Cairo last year is that Washington can work with authoritarian regimes against extremism — that Muslims don’t need to be politically free to tame religious militancy. But the evolution of Christianity, which never had Islam’s deep fusion of church and state, tells us something different: that it has been the West’s political evolution — from autocracy to democracy — which has, more than anything, depoliticized Christianity.

The same process is happening to Islam in Iran, but at a much faster pace than anything seen in the West. As a result, millions of Iranians — the sons and daughters of once faithful revolutionaries — have secularized. Whereas secularizing Westernized autocracies like the shah’s prompted upwellings of religious radicalism, Iran’s religious dictatorship has produced a softening secularization that is likely to last, since both nonreligious and faithful Iranians increasingly see representative government as indispensable to their values.

The impact of all this on Muslims everywhere is likely to be profound. In the Middle East, the Iranian Revolution catapulted Islamic fundamentalism into the foreground. An Iranian democratization couldn’t help but shake Sunni fundamentalists who, too, have wrestled with the tension between the Holy Law and voting. Sunni Arabs often like to pretend that they live in a different world from their Shiite Iranian cousins, but the truth is the opposite: cross-fertilization has been enormous. With Iranian democracy growing, liberal Arabs and Sunni Islamists would become much bolder in their demands.

Iran’s transformation would also remind Turkey’s ruling Islamist Justice and Development Party, whose commitment to democratic values has been increasingly shaky, that an authoritarian path creates revolt. And an Iranian democracy would powerfully affect Iraq, whose elected government has struggled with its own Tehran-backed demons. A democratic Iran would have little sympathy for Iraqis who prefer autocracy and religious militancy.

A democratic Tehran would also likely reduce its aid to Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Baathist dictatorship in Syria. Palestinian fundamentalists who now receive substantial Iranian financing would also likely be a subject of heavy debate in a free Parliament, as would aid to other radical Sunni groups throughout the Middle East and Tehran’s disconcerting contacts with Al Qaeda (which were detailed by the 9/11 commission report). Iran could easily become what Ayatollah Khomeini had wished — the model that transforms the Middle East — albeit not in the manner he hoped for.

Last, a democratic Iran would bring the reopening of the American Embassy, a symbolic measure of the highest significance that has long been popular among ordinary Iranians. The “Great Satan” would be no more.

President Obama has nothing to lose by moving away from engaging Ayatollah Khamenei and toward a vigorous engagement with the Iranian people’s quest for popular sovereignty. Rhetoric, sanctions aimed at cutting off Iran’s gasoline imports and intelligent covert aid to dissidents should be harnessed to the democratic cause. President Obama has an openly willing partner in the French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, to make Iranian liberté a trans-Atlantic affair.

The administration should have no illusions: Ayatollah Khamenei’s regime is irretrievably paranoid. In its eyes, Western states, which have so far done next to nothing to help the democracy movement, are as culpable as the dissidents for Iran’s troubles. The supreme leader will seek ways to get even. And he isn’t going to give up his nukes. But a democratic Iran probably would.

Without the bogeyman of a Great Satan and the militant dream of regional hegemony, a Persian Parliament, overwhelmed with the people’s demands, would find much better things than enriched uranium to spend the nation’s money on. And if the clerical regime cracks, Mr. Obama will get credit. In no other endeavor, foreign or domestic, is the president likely to earn as much.

Dear Ayatollah Ali Khamenei,

Your government and supporters think of you as God’s representative on earth. Your official title is “Supreme Leader,” so you are responsible for all the wrongs and rights that happen in our country.

You have also been called the “No. 1 enemy of journalists in the world” because your government has arrested dozens of them since the presidential elections in June 2009. More than 60 are still in your prisons.

I was unfortunate enough to know firsthand how your agents treat journalists. I was kept in your jail for 118 days simply for being a reporter. For much of that time I was tortured.

But I do not hold any grudges. I am writing out of concern for my colleagues and the future of our country.

“Our future society will be a free society and all the elements of oppression, cruelty, and force will be destroyed.” It is not I who am saying this. It was your predecessor, Ayatollah Khomeini, who said those words to a reporter from Der Spiegel on Nov. 7, 1978. The only accusation against many reporters who are languishing in Iranian jails is that they held a mirror to the actions of the Iranian government. They did not want to overthrow it. They never took up arms. All of them did their job as peacefully as journalists elsewhere around the world.

Your government issued me a press card. But I was coerced to make a false televised confession admitting that I was acting as an agent of evil Western media. I was forced to say the media are trying to overthrow the Islamic government. I was beaten and threatened with execution to make that confession. I was beaten again after the show because I did not perform as well as my interrogator would have liked. Yes, Ayatollah Khamenei, I had to apologize to you on television to stop my torturer from punching me in the head.

I had no personal animosity against you or any other Iranian official. I reported peaceful demonstrations in the streets of Iran because it was the news of the day. Neither I, nor any of my colleagues, instigated the demonstrations against your president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Our job as journalists is to report the truth as accurately as we can. Even if some of us made mistakes, our punishment should never have been jail and torture.

Ayatollah Khamenei, next time you see a reporter confessing to his or her “crimes” and asking you for mercy on your television, remember: He or she has been tortured in your jails.

Many a time my torturer told me that he kicked me to make you happy. He told me, “Each time I slap you I can feel that the Master is smiling at me.” Ayatollah Khamenei, I think you are responsible for what happened to me.

It is getting late for you to repair the damage done to our country. But it is still not too late. You can start by releasing imprisoned journalists.

I know that I will make many people who are fed up with your regime — especially my fellow Iranians in the diaspora — angry by saying this, but most Iranian journalists are not interested in a regime change. Most journalists, even those who are very critical of the current government, believe they can live and work in Iran even under censorship.

Many of us were frustrated with your Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance. We did not like to see our press cards revoked and to be barred from reporting one event or another. We accepted these restrictions as occupational hazards. We knew that we were not in a Western democracy. Our only request to our government was not to imprison, torture or kill us.

You must be aware of the lengthy sentences for imprisoned journalists. You must know that your judges are charging journalists with “fighting against Allah.”

I have heard that you read a novel a week. You must have read George Orwell’s “1984.” It is quite a popular book in Iran. Some of the sentences imposed by your judges on my colleagues are right off the pages of that book. How can you justify six years imprisonment, five years of internal exile and a lifetime of deprivation of social and political activities imposed on Ahmad Zeidabadi, a freelance journalist? I am sure the judge who imposed the sentence wanted to make you happy because Mr. Zeidabadi wrote a few articles in which he criticized you.

Ayatollah Khamenei, you may aspire to become as popular as Ayatollah Khomeini was in February 1979 when he triumphantly returned to Iran. People would not have adored him as they did had he called for mass arrests and mass trials of his enemies, as you have. He became popular for telling a Reuters reporter on Oct. 26, 1978, “The foundation of our Islamic government is based on freedom of dialogue and will fight against any kind of censorship.”

Do you think you can stop dissent by throwing those who report it in jail? I’m not sure what your advisers are telling you. But we live in an era in which you cannot stop the flow of information.

Even though your government has banned satellite television, a great number of Iranians still get their news from the BBC and Voice of America by using illegal satellite dishes. Currently your police may be able to find and punish dish owners. But soon the dishes will become smaller and cheaper and everyone will be able to have one in the safety of their homes.

By arresting accredited journalists your government has made every Iranian a citizen journalist. Your government has blocked most Web sites that are critical of your government, but Iranians have learned to use filter-busters to access them. Your government has narrowed the Internet bandwidth and has passed cyber crime laws, but that has not stopped your compatriots from using the Internet to inform the world about the situation of their country. YouTube, Twitter and Facebook are full of the latest news about the crimes of your regime.

You may feel safe in your modest house, protected by thousands of revolutionary guards. But beyond them the world is changing. Iran is changing. In 1978, as the shah was doing his best to stifle his people, Ayatollah Khomeini promised that “in an Islamic Iran the media will have the freedom to express all Iran’s realities and events.”

Hoping they could realize that promise, Iranians rose up and overthrew the shah. Ayatollah Khamenei, those who forget the lessons of history are doomed to repeat it.

Iran’s nuclear activities – this week ramped up with fresh plans to expand uranium enrichment – and its sponsorship of international terrorism pose an ever-growing threat that must be dealt with by the international community. A year after President Obama took office, his administration talks little of a policy of rapprochement toward Iran, and indeed, he has decided to strengthen the U.S. fleet in the Persian Gulf to counter what he clearly sees as a heightened threat. However, both the European Union and the Americans have wasted much time pursuing a policy of appeasement, which clearly has failed. If we had listened to the right people, we might not have wasted that time.

Maryam Rajavi, president-elect of the main opposition coalition, the National Council of Resistance of Iran, announced during a visit to the European Parliament in December 2004 that Iran was like a volcano ready to erupt. That statement was made more than five years ago, and indeed, the volcano has erupted. Iranians have proved they are ready for change. Perhaps we should have listened a little more to Mrs. Rajavi.

The solution to the problem has, in fact, been spelled out by the people of Iran, who have visibly shown that they want internal democratic change. The question we need to ask ourselves is what the West should do to assist in that process as the regime prepares to battle renewed protests expected to launch on Thursday’s anniversary of the 1979 revolution.

Ethical issues and economic weapons should be the key factors to pointing the way forward. War clearly is not a viable option. Nor is continued appeasement, not least because the mullahs’ regime is incapable of making the concessions required to arrive at an acceptable agreement. Indeed, Iranian officials have admitted that in the current domestic situation, with an increasingly fragile regime, one step back could lead to the government’s collapse. So the policy of appeasement we have so consistently pursued has become increasingly irrelevant.

We should, therefore, look to a third option, which has been proposed consistently by the Iranian opposition in exile as the way forward. The third option can be summed up very simply in two short phrases. First, world leaders should lift all political restrictions placed on the Iranian opposition. Second, we should impose a more restricting regime of tougher, comprehensive, targeted but binding sanctions on the mullahs’ Iran.

There have long been arguments to the effect that sanctions would be disastrous for the Iranian people, to say nothing of Western businesses. However, those arguments need to be examined in more depth. Let’s take the case of a comprehensive oil embargo.

First, the Iranian people are not benefiting from the oil revenues at present because Iran’s leaders increasingly are using them to support international terrorism, a clandestine nuclear weapons program and a rigid policy of domestic repression. And who is to say how much has been lodged in Swiss bank accounts?

Second, the government pays a fortune to the paramilitary Basij forces, whose primary purpose is to instill fear by beating up people in the streets. Indeed, it could well be that the reduction of oil revenues could dry up the finances available for internal terrorism and would be welcomed by the millions who have demonstrated in recent months.

The potential effect of sanctions on the people of Iran should be seen in the context in which the Iranian people have been willing to take to the streets and risk losing their lives for freedom. Many of them will tell you that sanctions are a price worth paying.

In other words, the thought that sanctions could lead to war is, on balance, both wrong and self-deceiving. Many are convinced that tougher sanctions are, in truth, the only feasible way to avoid going to war with Iran over its nuclear defiance. To stop Iran’s move toward a nuclear bomb is best attempted by cutting off the finances that support the project.

Many also would argue that sanctions do indeed have a proven record of success. They would say sanctions worked in South Africa against apartheid. They also might say that sanctions worked in Libya and helped persuade Libyans to abandon their nuclear ambitions. They even worked in Iraq by bringing an end to Iraq’s nuclear weapons program, although this fact conveniently has been forgotten following the dodgy dossier that led to war.

Finally, tougher sanctions on Iran are economically much less costly than war. They would assist the Iranian people’s desire for change, and they also would suit our own national interest. So why the hesitation? They are economically viable, ethically right and morally sustainable. Most of all, many Iranians tell me sanctions are the most effective way of helping them get rid of the evil regime that controls their county.

Unless we improve our strategy, the world will awaken very soon to the headline, “Iran has the nuclear bomb.”

For many years, the United States and other world powers have tried various tactics to halt the nuclear ambitions of Tehran’s clerical elites. They have, in essence, litigated Iran’s case in the United Nations Security Council. They have imposed several rounds of economic sanctions. And they have tried to engage Iran with diplomacy, most recently with a deal that could have begun the long process of normalizing relations.

But through all this, Iran’s leaders have not blinked as they have moved closer and closer to the ability to make a nuclear bomb on short notice.

Tehran doubts the collective resolve of world powers. It’s not difficult to see why. European corporations continue to do business with Iran. Russia exploits the international row over Iran’s nuclear program for its own geopolitical gain. In the maneuvering, China seeks to profit. The international deadlock over Iran’s nuclear intransigence certainly seems bleak.

In the past six months, however, something unforeseen has happened in Iran. Something that has stunned leaders in Tehran. Something that could help us eventually transcend the international deadlock.

In June, everyday Iranians started taking to the streets to protest the presidential election’s controversial outcome. In Tehran alone, crowds of demonstrators swelled up to the hundreds of thousands.

The protests were nothing short of remarkable. Indeed, Iran had not seen demonstrations like this since 1979, the infamous year when the current regime seized power.

Iran’s leaders initially were caught flat-footed by the protests, but they quickly mounted a counteroffensive. Over the following days and months, Tehran’s crackdown became ever more brutal.

YouTube enabled the world to witness the barbaric shooting in broad daylight of female demonstrator Neda Agha-Soltan. News networks broadcast in real time the violent clashes between regime-sponsored militias and protesters. The international media reported the shocking slayings of opposition figures on the Islamic holy day of Ashura in late December. Among those killed that day was Ali Mousavi, nephew of the man whom the opposition views as the rightful winner of the contested presidential election.

Yet the Iranian regime’s escalating violence only emboldened the Iranian people’s resolve. What had started out as a series of protests quickly became something else. It became a movement.

By year’s end, demonstrators throughout Iran were not calling for a mere recount of the June election. They were directly challenging the legitimacy of Tehran’s clerical authoritarian regime.

While Washington focuses on a new round of sanctions, many Iranian people continue to risk their lives in the country’s growing protest movement. They continue to brave the regime’s fists, clubs, water hoses and bullets to take to the streets. They continue defiantly to hold signs and chant slogans not just in Farsi, but in English so that the whole world might know their calls for justice and dignity.

With their growing mass-protest movement, everyday Iranians already have accomplished what sanctions and other forms of multilateral pressure aim to do: create the conditions for change in Tehran.

While I support new sanctions, it is time for the White House, Congress and the entire international community to elevate the Iranian people’s struggle to the center of the world stage.

The Iranian people deserve a more moderate, reasonable and just government in Tehran. They also may be the last and best hope for halting Iran’s drive to nuclear weapons capability. And it may be the Iranian people who help the world avoid a nuclear arms race in the Middle East.

With Iran having notified the United Nations nuclear watchdog agency that it is now enriching its stockpile of uranium to a higher level, we should admit that Washington’s approach to countering the Islamic Republic is leading nowhere. What’s needed, however, may be less of a change of plan than a change in how we view the threat of a nuclear-armed Iran.

Believe it or not, there are some potential benefits to the United States should Iran build a bomb. (I’m speaking for myself here, and in no way for the Air Force.) Five possibilities come to mind.

First, Iran’s development of nuclear weapons would give the United States an opportunity to finally defeat violent Sunni-Arab terrorist groups like Al Qaeda. Here’s why: a nuclear Iran is primarily a threat to its neighbors, not the United States. Thus Washington could offer regional security — primarily, a Middle East nuclear umbrella — in exchange for economic, political and social reforms in the autocratic Arab regimes responsible for breeding the discontent that led to the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.

Until now, the Middle East autocracies have refused to change their ways because they were protected by the wealth of their petroleum reserves. A nuclear Iran alters the regional dynamic significantly, and provides some leverage for us to demand reforms.

Second, becoming the primary provider of regional security in a nuclear Middle East would give the United States a way to break the OPEC cartel. Forcing an end to the sorts of monopolistic practices that are illegal in the United States would be the price of that nuclear shield, bringing oil prices down significantly and saving billions of dollars a year at the pump. Or, at a minimum, President Obama could trade security for increased production and a lowering of global petroleum prices.

Third, Israel has made clear that it feels threatened by Iran’s nuclear program. The Palestinians also have a reason for concern, because a nuclear strike against Israel would devastate them as well. This shared danger might serve as a catalyst for reconciliation between the two parties, leading to the peace agreement that has eluded the last five presidents. Paradoxically, any final agreement between Israelis and Palestinians would go a long way to undercutting Tehran’s animosity toward Israel, and would ease longstanding tensions in the region.

Fourth, a growth in exports of weapons systems, training and advice to our Middle Eastern allies would not only strengthen our current partnership efforts but give the American defense industry a needed shot in the arm.

With the likelihood of austere Pentagon budgets in the coming years, Boeing has been making noise about shifting out of the defense industry, which would mean lost American jobs and would also put us in a difficult position should we be threatened by a rising military power like China. A nuclear Iran could forestall such a catastrophe.

Last, the United States would be able to stem the flow of dollars to autocratic regimes in the region. It would accomplish this not only by driving down the price of oil and increasing arms exports, but by requiring the beneficiaries of American security to bear a real share of its cost. And in the long run, a victory in the war on terrorism would save taxpayers the tens of billions of dollars a year now spent on overseas counterinsurgency operations.

What about the downside — that an unstable, anti-American regime would be able to start a nuclear war? Actually, that’s less of a risk than most people think. Unless the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khameini, and his Guardian Council chart a course that no other nuclear power has ever taken, Iran should become more responsible once it acquires nuclear weapons rather than less. The 50-year standoff between the Soviet Union and the United States was called the cold war thanks to the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons.

There is reason to believe that the initial shock of a nuclear Iran would soon be followed a new regional dynamic strikingly like that of cold-war Europe. Saudi Arabia and Iraq would be united along with their smaller neighbors by their fear of Iran; the United States would take the lead in creating a stable regional security environment. In addition, our reluctant European allies, and possibly even China and Russia, would have a much harder time justifying sales of goods and technology to Tehran, further isolating the Islamic Republic.

Iran may think its enrichment plans will put fear into the hearts of Americans. In fact, it should give us hopes of a renaissance of American influence in the Middle East.

On June 20, a young Iranian woman was shot dead at one of the mass protests that followed the contested re- election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Millions of people around the world watched video of Neda Agha-Soltan hemorrhaging on Tehran’s Karegar Street, and hers became the tragic, beautiful and galvanizing face of the reform movement in Iran.

Witnesses implicated a member of the Basij, the governmental militia, in Agha-Soltan’s death. But an Iranian ambassador and ayatollah quickly pinned her shooting on the CIA and her fellow protesters, while a broadcasting official — and a government-sponsored documentary that aired last month — said the death had been simulated by the Western news media and by Agha-Soltan herself.

Thirty years ago, another iconic image of a shooting death in Iran raced round the world. It too triggered a cycle of public protests and creative denials by the then-new Islamist government of Iran.

Those denials foreshadowed how the leaders of the Islamic Republic would react to Agha-Soltan’s death. And they demonstrate how the lies of a government can do nothing to suppress the power of an image.

In August 1979, seven months after the ouster of the shah, the euphoria of revolution had given way to the realities of Islamic fundamentalism — black chadors, broken wine bottles, censorship, public executions. Protests in Tehran were drawing enormous crowds, while in Kurdistan, separatists were demanding an independent Kurdish state. On Aug. 16, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini dispatched Iranian troops to put down the movement.

The troops had been killing Kurds for 11 days when, on Aug. 27, 11 more “counterrevolutionaries” were sentenced to die in Sanandaj.

Among the condemned were Ahsan and Shahriar Nahid. Ahsan, an engineer in Tehran, had joined a Kurdish separatist organization after the revolution and moved to Sanandaj. Shahriar, a medical student, had been visiting his brother when the two were arrested at a military checkpoint.

Their mother, Monir, raced from Tehran to try and help her sons. She found them under guard in an army hospital and an airport control tower. But when she returned to the latter with a change of clothing, she learned that the young men and nine others had been shot by a firing squad on a dirt airfield. She threw down the Koran she carried in her blouse.

“Min itr Musulman nim,” she said in Kurdish. “I am no longer a Muslim.”

The next afternoon, a photograph of the execution ran in Ettela’at, Iran’s oldest paper. Suddenly, the estimated 500 victims of the ayatollah’s firing squads had a face. Newsstands in Tehran sold out. The next day, the photo ran on the front pages of papers around the world.

A week after the Nahid brothers were buried in Talah Cemetery in Sanandaj, their brother, Farhad, spent his savings to photocopy the picture of their execution; he and friends canvassed Tehran with it. Their mother then brandished the photograph at meetings with Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan, cleric Mahmoud Taleghani and essayist Haj Seyyed Javadi.

The government did not respond as Monir Nahid had hoped. Sadegh Khalkhali, the judge who had sentenced her sons to death (and granted permission to the Ettela’at photographer to take the photograph), declared on state TV that she had fabricated the photo and that she was related to the sister of the deposed shah. (She wasn’t.) Later, the judge went back on television and declared that the photograph had been forged by Israel. And on Sept. 9, Ahmad Azari Qomi, the prosecuting attorney of the Islamic Revolutionary Council, issued a statement that cited the famous image. It began:

“Following the order of Imam Khomeini . . . journalists should refrain from insertion of bold phrases and headlines, evocative pictures which could incite people.”

On Oct. 8, one day after the brothers’ mother addressed a crowd of students at Tehran University, the police raided her apartment one story above Seyyed Khandan Street. But she had flown at 6 a.m. to Germany on a passport registered under her maiden name. Twenty days later, she flew to the United States. She now lives in Los Angeles.

In April 1980, the photograph won the Pulitzer Prize. The prizewinning photographer, Jahangir Razmi, remained anonymous until, with his permission, I told his story in the Wall Street Journal in 2006. The next year, at a dinner in New York, Nahid embraced the man who had captured her sons’ deaths on film.

Six months ago, Nahid, then 84 years old, watched video of the death of Agha-Soltan and listened to the lies that followed. She says that just as after the deaths of her sons, Iranians today know their government is lying — and the government knows its people know the truth.

But, she notes, there is a difference. In 1979, the Iranian people wanted to believe the lies that followed her sons’ deaths because they came from a government the people had recently ushered into power. Today, she says, the lies that followed Agha-Soltan’s death have fallen on deaf ears because they came from a government so many Iranians had voted to remove from power — only to see their votes ignored. And so, says Nahid, the government has reason to be scared.