Many in Washington have been debating whether Turkey’s governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) could be a model for the Arab Spring , as our neighbors in the Middle East aspire to get rid of totalitarian regimes and become true democracies. But the reality in Turkey makes clear that the AKP model does not hold.

On Nov. 9 I visited the Silivri prison where hundreds of journalists, publishers, military officers, academics and politicians are being held. Trials were opened in 2007 on charges that an ultranationalist underground organization had plotted for years to overthrow the government. Many of those indicted have been detained for years without trial. There has not been a single conviction to date. Justice is at stake — and, so far, has been flagrantly denied. At work is an insidious attack on the rule of law by Turkey’s governing party. These trials could have been an occasion for Turkey to achieve a much-needed catharsis for correcting past wrongs, but they have been turned into instruments to silence the opposition and suppress freedoms.

Among those being held are eight opposition members of parliament. Turkey’s high election board declared that these people were qualified to stand for elections, and all won seats in parliament. That they are incarcerated violates their rights under Turkish law as elected representatives of the people.

A universal norm of the rule of law is that one is innocent until proven guilty. Another is that evidence leads to the arrest of a suspect. In today’s Turkey, however, people are treated as guilty until proven innocent. One gets arrested; then authorities gather evidence to establish an infraction. Presumed guilt is the norm. Sadly, all opponents of the government are viewed as potential terrorists or plotters against the state.

The AKP is systematic and ruthless in its persecution of any opposition to its policies. Authoritarian pressure methods such as heavy tax fines and illegal videotaping and phone tapping are widely used to silence opponents. Even more disturbing is the AKP’s claim that such things are being done in the name of democratic progress. The latest government target is the primary vestige of our democracy, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), which I lead.

While at the Silivri center in November, I likened the conditions to those of a concentration camp and said that prosecutors and judges were not meting out justice and did not deserve to be called upholders of justice. This month, I learned that the prosecutor’s office had opened an inquiry into my comments, contending that I was “seeking to influence a fair trial” and “insulting public officials.” Never mind that not a day passes without some comment by government officials, such as the prime minister, on the process of law and justice. Clearly, an effort to single out the leader of the main opposition party ratchets up the pressures on freedom of expression. Meanwhile, the Constitutional Court penalized our party when we asked for the chief justice to recuse himself from particular cases. Our request was based on ill will, we were told when the $3,000 fine was levied, and the CHP was unnecessarily preoccupying the court’s time.

It all boils down to this: In today’s Turkey, when one criticizes the justice system, one is prosecuted. When one appeals to the courts, one is penalized.

But here is why I stand behind my words: I have the right and duty to be critical of all that is wrong in my country. It is my inalienable right to point to injustices and to ask for justice. If the courts are not performing their duty, one can, and should, stand up and say so. I do not ask for forgiveness. Rather, I want my own immunity as a member of parliament to be lifted so that I can be tried in a court for all to witness the outcome. Righteousness is the ultimate immunity.

Turkey today is a country where people live in fear and are divided politically, economically and socially. Our democracy is regressing in terms of the separation of powers, basic human rights and freedoms and social development and justice. Citizens worry deeply about their future. These points are, sadly, reflected in most major international indexes, such as Human Rights Watch, which rank Turkey quite low in terms of human rights, democracy, freedoms and equality.

Our party stands for democracy, secularism, the rule of law, human rights and freedoms. We envision a progressive Turkey where citizens, regardless of their faith, ethnicity, gender or political view, are equal before the law. Building political, economic and cultural walls between people is not consistent with democracy or social justice. Only a nation at peace with itself can be a model for its neighbors. A nation plagued by multiple forms of division and polarization is doomed to failure.

Tactics such as oppression, preying on fear and restricting freedoms can help sustain a government’s rule for only so long. Never in history has a government succeeded in ruling permanently through authoritarian measures. Oppression does not endure; righteousness does. Turkey will be no exception.

On Monday, the French Senate is scheduled to debate and possibly vote on a bill that would criminalize denial of the Armenian genocide of 1915, along with any other events recognized as genocide in French law. The bill has passed the lower house of Parliament. The Senate should reject it, in the name of free speech, the freedom of historical inquiry and Article 11 of France’s pathbreaking 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen (“The free communication of ideas and opinions is one of the most precious rights.…”).

The question is not whether the atrocities committed against the Armenians by the Ottoman Empire were terrible, or whether they should be acknowledged in Turkish and European memory. They were and they should be. The question is: Should it be a crime under the law of France, or other countries, to dispute whether those terrible events constituted a genocide, a term used in international law? And is the French Parliament equipped and entitled to set itself up as a tribunal on world history, handing down verdicts on the past conduct of other nations? The answer: No and no.

The bill also would criminalize “outrageous minimization” of the Armenian genocide. As Françoise Chandernagor of the Liberté pour l’histoire campaign points out, this introduces a concept vague even by the standards of such memory laws. If Turkish estimates of the Armenian dead run at 500,000 and Armenian estimates at 1.5 million, what would count as minimization? 547,000? And should the Turkish prime minister be arrested for such “minimization” on his next official visit to France? (The bill envisages a fine of 45,000 euros and up to a year’s imprisonment.)

Taking a benign view of human nature and French politics, you might say that this is a clumsy attempt to realize a noble intention. That would be naive. There is a remarkable correlation between such proposals in the French Parliament and national elections, in which half a million voters of Armenian origin play a significant part. What happened to the Armenians was recognized as genocide under French law in December 2001, just before presidential and parliamentary elections. A bill similar to this one was passed in the lower house in 2006 (but rejected by the upper) in the run-up to the 2007 elections. And what’s happening this year? Yes, elections.

Not that all leading politicians of President Nicolas Sarkozy’s party have supported the bill. Foreign Minister Alain Juppé opposes it. But that’s because he’s worried about the implications for France’s relations with Turkey. The Turkish government’s reaction has been predictably vehement.

Thus a tragedy that should be the subject for grave commemoration and free historical debate, calmly testing even wayward hypotheses against the evidence, is reduced to an instrument of political manipulation, a politician’s brickbat.

Meanwhile, Turkish intellectuals who have bravely said that what was done to the Armenians was genocide are liable to be prosecuted in Turkey. What is state-ordained truth in France is state-ordained falsehood in Turkey.

Yet these are increasingly symbolic rather than effective acts. In a country like France, and with rather more difficulty in Turkey, the Internet allows people to find those forbidden views anyway.

So this is but the latest instance of a much wider challenge. What should be the limits and norms of free expression in the Internet age? And who should set them? These are among the questions being addressed in a project called Free Speech Debate (www.freespeechdebate.com) that we have just launched at Oxford University. Among the 10 draft principles we offer for debate, criticism and revision, one is especially relevant to the genocide controversy. It says, “We allow no taboos in the discussion and dissemination of knowledge.”

Memory laws like the one proposed in France clearly fail this test, but they are not the only example. In Britain, science writer Simon Singh had to defend a costly libel action because of his criticism of chiropractic claims. The Church of Scientology uses its copyright of the immortal words of L. Ron Hubbard to prevent people seeing the secrets of the Operating Thetan. (Tip: Search for Operation Clambake.) This week, the English-language Wikipedia site was blacked out for 24 hours to protest a proposed U.S. bill, the Stop Online Piracy Act, that, in the current version, would have a disastrous chilling effect on the free, online dissemination of knowledge.

There are also more genuinely difficult cases. Late last year, the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity asked the journals Science and Nature to redact details of a study about an easily transmitted form of the H5N1 virus, for fear it could be misused by bioterrorists. And what about AIDS denialism? When endorsed by former South African President Thabo Mbeki, this resulted, it has been estimated, in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people who might otherwise have been properly treated. The “no taboos” principle needs to be tested against such hard cases.

France’s opportunistic, misbegotten bill is not a hard case. It’s a no-brainer. Next week, let the French Senate give an example to the U.S. Congress in the defense of intellectual freedom.

As Egyptians and Tunisians vote to replace ousted despots and the Syrian government teeters on the brink, two old imperial powers are competing to exert their political influence over Arab countries in upheaval. And they are not America and Russia. After years of cold-war competition over the Middle East and North Africa, it is now France and Turkey that are vying for lucrative business ties and the chance to mold a new generation of leaders in lands that they once controlled.

This rivalry is nothing new. Since Napoleon invaded Egypt in 1798, France and Turkey have competed for dominance in the Middle East. France’s rise as a Mediterranean power has been an inverse function of Turkish decline around the same sea. As the Ottoman Empire gradually collapsed, France acquired Algeria, Tunisia and, temporarily, Egypt. The French took one final bite from the dying empire by securing control over Syria and Lebanon after World War I.

This rivalry subsided in the 20th century, when Turkey became an inward-looking nation state. During the era of decolonization, France lost political control of lands extending from Morocco in the west to Syria in the east. Paris, however, maintained economic and political clout in the region by supporting large French businesses, which established lucrative ties with the region’s rulers. Even Turkey once looked to France as a model: when Mustafa Kemal Ataturk founded modern Turkey in 1923, he championed the French model of hard secularism, which stipulates freedom from religion in government, politics and education.

While France has dominated much of the region over the past two centuries, that is now changing. And if Turkey plays its cards right, it could match France’s influence or even become the dominant power in the region.

In the last decade, Turkey has witnessed record-breaking economic growth. It is no longer a poor country desperately seeking accession to the European Union. It has a $1.1 trillion economy, a powerful army and aspirations to shape the region in its image. As political turmoil paralyzes North Africa, Syria and Iraq, and economic meltdown devastates much of Mediterranean Europe, Turkey and France have largely been spared. And their growing rivalry is one reason France has objected to Turkey’s bid for European Union membership.

Taken together with France’s efforts to create a European-Mediterranean Union, which Nicolas Sarkozy conceived in 2008 as a way to place France at the helm of the Mediterranean world, one thing has become obvious to the Turks: Paris won’t allow Turkey into the European Union or let it become a powerful player in a French-led Mediterranean region.

Turkey’s newly activist foreign policy has therefore shifted away from Europe. The ruling Justice and Development Party, known as the A.K.P., is now cultivating ties with former Ottoman lands that were ignored for much of the 20th century. Of the 33 new Turkish diplomatic missions opened in the past decade, 18 are in Muslim and African countries.

This has resulted in new commercial and political ties, often at the expense of Turkey’s ties with Europe. In 1999, the European Union accounted for over 56 percent of Turkish trade; in 2011, it was just 41 percent. Over the same period, Islamic countries’ share of Turkish trade climbed to 20 percent from 12 percent.

New trade patterns have led to the emergence of a more socially conservative business elite based in central Turkey, which derives strength from trading beyond Europe and is using its new wealth to push for a redefinition of Turkey’s traditional approach to secularism. Since 2002, Ataturk’s French-inspired model has collapsed; the A.K.P. and its allies have instead promoted a softer form of secularism that allows for more religious expression in government, politics and education. This has made the Turkish model appealing to Arab countries, which for the most part regard French-style secularism as anathema.

Although both countries once coddled dictators — Mr. Sarkozy allowed Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi to occupy central Paris and pitch a tent near the Élysée Palace in 2007, and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan accepted the Qaddafi international prize in 2010 — Turkey threw its support behind the Arab revolts early on, winning fans across the region.

Until it backed Libya’s rebels last year, France had bet on the enduring nature of dictatorships and never forged ties with the democratic forces opposing them; Turkey did so, perhaps unwittingly, by expanding its soft power into Arab countries, building business networks and founding state-of-the-art high schools, run by the Sufi Islam-inspired Gulen movement, to educate the future Arab elite. Now, the Arab Spring is providing Turkey with an unprecedented opportunity to spread its influence further in newly free Arab societies.

As France’s business ties with the old secular elite fray, its influence is waning. It remains a military and cultural power, and will continue to attract Arab elites, even Islamist ones, seeking weapons and luxury goods. However, France will find it hard to market its brand of secularism across the region or match Turkey’s grass-roots business networks, especially in Syria, Lebanon and Iraq, where Turkey already has significant clout.

EVEN so, the road ahead will be rocky. Turkey ruled the Arab Middle East until World War I, and it must now be careful about how its messages are perceived there. Arabs might be drawn to fellow Muslims, but like the French, the Turks are former imperial masters. Arabs are pressing for democracy, and if Turkey behaves like a new imperial power, this approach will backfire. At a recent conference at Zirve University, a gleaming private school in Gaziantep financed by the local businesses that have made Turkey a regional economic powerhouse, Arab liberals and Islamists from various countries disagreed on most matters but agreed on one thing: that Turkey is welcome in the Middle East but should not dominate it.

In September, when Mr. Erdogan landed at Cairo’s new airport terminal (built by Turkish companies), he was warmly met by joyous millions, mobilized by the Muslim Brotherhood. However, he soon upset his pious hosts by preaching about the importance of a secular government that provides freedom of religion, using the Turkish word “laiklik” — derived from the French word for secularism. In Arabic, this term loosely translates as “irreligious.” Mr. Erdogan’s message may have been partly lost in translation, yet the incident illustrates the limits of Turkey’s influence in countries that are far more socially conservative than it is.

Turkey may have the upper hand in soft power, but France has more hard power, as the recent war in Libya and its veto power at the United Nations make clear. And despite Turkey’s phenomenal growth since 2002, the French economy is over twice the size of Turkey’s, and France is still dominant in North Africa.

Turkey’s relative stability at a time when the region is in upheaval is attracting investment from less-stable neighbors like Iran, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. Ultimately, political stability and regional clout are Turkey’s hard cash, and its economic growth will depend on both.

If Turkey wants to become a true beacon of democracy in the Middle East, its new constitution must provide broader individual rights for the country’s citizens, including the Kurds. It will also need to fulfill Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s vision of a “no problems” foreign policy. This means moving past the 2010 flotilla episode to rebuild strong ties with Israel and getting along with the Greek Cypriots who live on the southern part of the divided island of Cyprus (Turkish Cypriots control the north). The conflict there has lasted for decades; poorer Turkish Cypriots want a loose federation and the Greek Cypriot majority wants a strong central government.

The recent discovery of natural gas off the south coast of Cyprus is a major opportunity. Turkey could rise above the fray by proposing unification of the island in exchange for an agreement to share gas revenues. Such a deal, coupled with improved Turkish-Israeli ties, could facilitate cooperation in extracting even larger gas deposits off Israel’s coast; Turkey is the most logical destination for a pipeline from there to foreign markets.

Turkey will rise as a regional power only if it sets a genuine example as a liberal democracy and builds strong ties with all its neighbors. This is Mr. Erdogan’s challenge as he tries to undo Napoleon’s legacy.

Turkey has over the past few weeks become the spearhead of a joint Western-Arab-Turkish policy aimed at forcing President Bashar al-Assad to cede power in Syria. This is quite a turnaround in Turkish policy, because over the past two years the government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had gone out of its way to cultivate good relations with neighboring Syria, with whom it shares a long land border.

This change of course on Syria has also cost Turkey a great deal in terms of its relations with Iran, the principal supporter of Assad’s regime, which Turkey had also cultivated as part of Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s “zero problems with neighbors” policy.

Given these new strains, it is worth recalling that a only few months ago many American leaders were livid at what they perceived to be Turkey’s betrayal. In their view, Turkey had re-oriented its foreign policy toward the Muslim Middle East and away from the West – a shift supposedly reflected in the country’s deteriorating relations with Israel and improving ties with Iran and Syria.

Many American policymakers and publicists, unable or unwilling to distinguish Turkish-Israeli relations from Turkish-American relations, interpreted Erdoğan’s condemnation of Israel’s blockade of Gaza as a bid to cozy up to his Arab neighbors at the expense of Turkey’s relations with not only Israel but with the West in general. Turkey’s attempt to mediate between the major Western powers and Iran concerning the Islamic Republic’s uranium stockpile went unappreciated in the West; indeed, the United States scuttled the effort just as it seemed to be bearing fruit. And Turkey’s subsequent vote in the United Nations Security Council against imposing additional sanctions on Iran seemed to offer further proof that Turkey had adopted an “Islamic” foreign policy.

America’s anxiety assumed that it is a contradiction for Turkey to seek good relations with both the West and the Muslim Middle East, and that Ankara’s decision to improve its relations with its Muslim neighbors was motivated primarily by religious and ideological concerns considered important by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). Turkey’s recent tense relations with Iran demonstrate this assumption’s basic fallacy, and point to a non-ideological foreign policy that caters to Turkish national interests as defined by the country’s political elite – including the post-Islamists in power today.

Disagreement between Turkey and Iran initially centered on their conflicting approaches to the internal rebellion against Assad’s dictatorship. Iran has been heavily invested in the Assad regime, its lone Arab ally and the main conduit for delivering material support to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Turkey, on the other hand, after some initial hesitation, has thrown its weight fully behind Assad’s opponents, including by providing refuge to them, as well as to defectors from Syria’s army. Indeed, Turkey has gone further by helping the divided Syrian opposition to come together on its territory to establish a joint front against the Assad regime and provide a credible alternative to it.

Turkey abruptly shifted its stance on Syria, and aligned its position with that of the major Western powers, for two reasons. First, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) could not afford to be seen as opposing democracy in Syria, given that its own legitimacy rests heavily on its democratic credentials. Second, once Erdoğan’s government concluded that Assad’s regime was bound to fall, it sought to secure its future interests in Syria, which is of strategic importance to Turkey – even at the cost of jeopardizing relations with Iran.

Iran’s displeasure at Turkey’s “betrayal” of Assad was compounded by the Erdoğan government’s recent decision to install a NATO anti-missile early-warning facility – aimed at tracking Iranian missile activity – in Malatya in eastern Turkey. According to Iranian authorities, NATO’s system is designed to neutralize Iran’s deterrent capacity vis-à-vis Israel, thereby increasing the likelihood of an Israeli or US strike against Iranian nuclear facilities. Iranian officials went so far as to warn Turkey that it would make the Malatya facility its first target in retaliation for a Western strike on Iran.

In reality, Israel can track Iranian missile activity from several sites other than Malatya. Iran’s threat, therefore, is an expression more of discontent with Turkey than of genuine concern that the Malatya facility will adversely affect its deterrent capacity.

Iranian-Turkish tensions reflect three larger realities. First, the Arab Spring, and especially the Syrian uprising, exposed the two sides’ underlying rivalry for influence in the Middle East and the Arab world. Second, Turkey’s turn toward the east is not ideologically or religiously inspired, but instead is based on solid strategic and economic calculations; as the fluid situation in the Middle East continues to develop, Turkey will adapt its policies accordingly. Finally, Turkey has invested far too much in its strategic relations with NATO, and with the US in particular, to fritter them away in exchange for uncertain gains in relations with Iran.

This does not mean that Turkey will return to its traditional strategic dependence on the US and its allies, an approach that defined Turkish foreign policy throughout the Cold War and the decade following it. The AKP government is committed to the country’s strategic autonomy and to greater activism in the Middle East. But it is also aware that such policies must not cost Turkey its relationship with NATO and the US.

Turkey is engaged in an intricate effort to preserve its old relationship with the West while building new ties with its Muslim neighbors. Turkey’s leaders understand that the country can best preserve and enhance its leverage with both sides by maintaining good relations with each.

During the last decade many right-wing American and Israeli analysts have described the geostrategic struggles unfolding in the Middle East as a new “Cold War” pitting the United States against Shiite Iran. They have warned of an Arab “Shiite Crescent” — stretching from Lebanon to Iraq — connected to Iran via ties of religion, commerce and geostrategy.

The new year has started with an attempted Shiite power play by Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki to dominate the Iraqi government, and an Iranian demonstration of missile and nuclear fuel-rod capacity coupled with threats to close the Straits of Hormuz if Iranian oil exports are blocked.

These events can be interpreted as ample evidence of Iranian expansionism and combined with fears that Iran will obtain a nuclear weapon, rendering its present regime and regional clients untouchable.

What this view of the Middle East overlooks is the fact that both the United States and Iran are mired in internal political and economic difficulties. Simultaneously, inside the region, both are being outmaneuvered by an ascendant Turkey.

Moreover, Western observers have missed the primary thread of events — namely, the ongoing asymmetric Turkish-Iranian “soft” partition of the Arab republics. Concomitantly, the American position as regional hegemon is vanishing. Today, only the Arab monarchies and Israel continue to look to the United States as their primary patron.

To investigate how these changing dynamics are seen by actors within the region, one of us (Jason Pack) spent his Christmas holidays in Erbil, the capital of the Kurdistan Regional Government, or K.R.G., in Iraq. Following the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, K.R.G. officials bemoaned their need of a regional patron to protect them from dominance by Baghdad.

Landlocked Iraqi Kurdistan also needs a conduit to export its oil to the West. The only country that can fulfill both roles is Turkey. That is why K.R.G. officials, instead of supporting their ethnic brethren inside Turkey, have often sided with Ankara against the separatist Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or P.K.K.

All this explains why the bombing on Dec. 28, in which the Turks killed 35 Kurdish smugglers whom they mistook for terrorists, provoked little outrage in Iraqi Kurdistan. On the streets of Erbil there are no signs of protests against Turkey. Instead, one notices Turkey’s ubiquitous presence in the form of construction, investment, consumer goods and tourists.

Should more pipelines leading from Iraqi Kurdistan to the Mediterranean via Turkey be built, the result will be the de facto creation of an Iraqi-Kurdish buffer state. Dependent on Turkey for its survival, such a state would also form a barrier to Iranian (or American, or P.K.K.) interference in Turkish affairs.

In the southern part of Iraq, the situation is just the opposite. There, a Shiite Arab buffer state, buttressed by Iran as a bulwark against Turkish, American or Saudi encroachments, is being created. The last two weeks’ events have removed any doubt that Maliki is “Iran’s man” in Baghdad. Yet despite this de facto partitioning of Iraq over the last month, Turkey and Iran are not challenging each other’s spheres of influence.

In post-Arab Spring North Africa, too, Turkey and Iran have essentially partitioned the resurgent Islamist movements between themselves. The Turks support the victorious “moderate” Islamists from Tunisia to Egypt. Iran backs the Salafist spoilers, even though they are Sunni. In the Egyptian and Tunisian elections, and in Libya’s inter-militia civil strife, both wings of Islamist opinion have supported each other against Western-backed secularists and neo-liberals.

Since North Africa lacks indigenous Shiite populations and the “moderate” Islamists have now emerged as the main players in the region, it is Sunni Turkey, along with Qatar, that appears to be the rising political and commercial patron in North Africa.

Turkey’s approach to the problem of Israel/Palestine has also been converging with that of Iran. From the 1950s until 2002, secular military elites in Ankara enjoyed a privileged political and economic relationship with the West. They also developed intimate defense ties with Israel and NATO.

Since then, however, Turkey has drifted out of the Western security orbit. First it opposed the 2003 Iraq war; next, after the 2010 Gaza flotilla resulted in the death of nine Turks in international waters, it increasingly switched to the Palestinian side of the conflict.

Only in Syria are Turkey and Iran seemingly on opposite sides of a military conflict. Whereas Iran and its client Hezbollah back the Assad regime, the Turks arm, train and provide safe haven to the Syrian rebels. However, this conflict may be more apparent than real. In a fragmented post-Assad Syria, Turkey will support the Sunnis, while Iran will remain the patron of the Alawites. Moreover, both will surely find a way to protect their strategic and financial interests in whatever regime emerges.

Throughout 2011, the continued Western obsession with the Iranian nuclear menace prevented policy makers from grasping the most salient dynamic at play in the new Middle East. Those who, like Mohammed Ayoob of Michigan State University, have warned that “beyond the Arab democratic wave” lies a “Turko-Persian future” have been mostly ignored.

The Arab Spring has vastly weakened the Arab states, leaving them open to fragmentation, increased federalism and outside penetration. With hindsight, 2011 may come to represent as sharp a rupture in the political landscape of the Middle East as 1919 did.

Back then, following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I, the British and French divided the Arab Middle East among themselves, with Britain as the senior partner. In today’s soft partition of the region, the weaker, less stable partner is Iran. The true victor of the Arab Spring is surely a resurgent Turkey.

There has been much discussion in the U.S. and European media of Turkey as a rising star after its recent stance on Syria and its general support for the “Arab Spring.”

Turkey is viewed as the successful merger of Islam and modernization. The Muslim religious coloring of the ruling Justice and Development Party is not seen as being at odds with its democratic, pro-Western outlook. The government has won popular support in the region, with Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan greeted rapturously on his recent tour of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. Turkey’s vibrant economy contrasts with the economic crises in Europe and the United States.

But whatever the wisdom of a search for the best “Muslim” model for Arab countries, Turkey’s international credibility should be in doubt as long as it fails to address its domestic human rights record.

The lack of rights for the country’s large Kurdish minority remains at the top of the list. Two years ago the government announced a “democratic opening” to extend greater rights to all of Turkey’s ethnic and religious minority groups, easing restrictions on broadcasts in minority languages such as Kurdish. Today the government has replaced that with an approach that bans, suppresses and jails its critics.

Turkey’s Kurdish issue continues to be largely defined for the world by the government’s nearly 30-year conflict with the outlawed, armed Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, during which gross human rights abuses were committed by both sides and 40,000 people died.

At the heart of the issue lie restrictive laws that limit free speech, prevent the teaching of minority languages such as Kurdish in schools and require a political party to secure a whopping 10% of the nationwide vote to gain a seat in parliament. This has meant that Kurdish political parties cannot get into parliament except by standing independent candidates who can then form a minimum 20-seat party grouping once in office.

In the last three years the biggest problem has been the misuse of anti-terrorism laws to bring criminal charges against many ordinary people who engage in legitimate and nonviolent pro-Kurdish or leftist political activity. This crackdown also includes journalists, and it threatens the very fabric of human rights and democracy in Turkey.

Thousands are on trial for membership in the Turkey Assembly of the Union of Kurdistan Communities, or KCK/TM, alleged to be the PKK’s urban wing. Most of the defendants are activist members, officials and serving elected mayors of the legal Peace and Democracy Party, which formed a group in parliament after winning 36 seats as independents in the June general election.

Several defendants are with local branches of the Human Rights Assn., including Muharrem Erbey, head of the Diyarbakır branch, who has been imprisoned for two years awaiting trial. Among the more than 1,000 in prison awaiting trial are 40 lawyers. One is Veysel Vesek, active in fighting for justice for families of the thousands of Kurdish citizens who disappeared or were killed by state perpetrators, such as the Turkish security forces, in the early 1990s at the height of the conflict with the PKK. Abdulcabbar Igdi, a local human rights defender in the southeast town of Cizre, is also in prison. I have worked closely with these people, and their imprisonment is a serious setback for the human rights cause in Turkey.

A new low came in November with the arrests of Ragip Zarakolu, an internationally known publisher and human rights defender; Busra Ersanli, a political science professor who had been advising the Peace and Democracy Party on constitutional reform, and Ayse Berktay, a vocal peace activist.

What is the evidence against all these people? It is mostly wiretaps and information about their political organizing. In most cases there is no evidence of any activity that should or could be described as terrorism. Yet the widely drawn and vague nature of Turkey’s terrorism laws gives zealous prosecutors and judges the ability to imprison and try them as if they were armed members of the PKK.

On Nov. 28, in Izmir, 25 trade union officials and members of a public sector workers’ union confederation were sentenced to six or more years in prison. The court had heard no evidence that any had incited violence or been involved in activities that could constitute terrorism.

There also are dozens of journalists in prison on terrorism charges. Their “crimes?” In most cases writings that have not incited violence. In the case of Ahmet Sik, it involved an unpublished manuscript.

There is an urgent need to revise these flawed, sweeping laws, which make criminals out of the wrong people. But legal reform isn’t enough. The government needs to stop silencing Kurds and other critics.

There is little sign, however, that change is coming. The prime minister and interior minister have repeatedly supported the arrests as the way to defeat the PKK, unconcerned that the democratic process in Turkey may be the principal victim of the crackdown. More chillingly in a climate of mass arrests, the prime minister demonstrated his intolerance of debate when he warned after the arrest of Zarakolu, the publisher, and Ersanli, the professor, that those who criticize such arrests should scrutinize themselves.

The U.S. and European governments support Turkey’s efforts to combat the PKK, but they have been all but silent on the crackdown on legal Kurdish politics. Turkey’s 3-decades-old policies of ban, suppress and jail have failed to solve the Kurdish issue. The U.S. and Europe also should remember that a vibrant economy and popularity in the region are no substitute for basic rights. Without the latter, Turkey risks descent into widespread violence.

Después de un año de revueltas árabes, Turquía es probablemente el actor externo que más ha intervenido. Ankara fue la primera capital que reaccionó al cambio de modelo de la región y que exigió al presidente egipcio, Hosni Mubarak, que dimitiera; definió unos principios claros, presionó para que se hicieran grandes reformas y denunció la represión; evitó lanzarse a una guerra para derrocar en Libia a Muamar el Gadafi y, aun así, acabó en el bando triunfador; contentó a la opinión pública árabe al enfrentarse a Israel y bajar de categoría sus reacciones con el Estado judío, aunque lo hizo por motivos que, en general, no tenían nada que ver con lo demás; y pudo presumir del “modelo turco” como vía hacia adelante, con una indefinición muy conveniente. El premio: el primer ministro turco, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, hizo una gira por el mundo árabe y fue recibido como un héroe.

Ahora bien, la enorme popularidad personal de Erdogan ha oscurecido el hecho de que la política exterior de Turquía ha sufrido un vuelco y que los comentarios de observadores turcos y occidentales sobre el avance triunfal de ese “modelo” son prematuros. La valiosa doctrina turca que lleva el engañoso nombre de “cero problemas” con sus vecinos, basada en la lenta construcción de un diálogo diplomático pragmático con todas las partes, la integración económica y las relaciones personales, sentó las bases para su popularidad actual en la región y transformó su imagen anterior de portaaviones de Occidente atracado en las costas de Oriente Próximo.

Pero el objetivo turco de tener un marco nuevo de cooperación que haga que la región sea más próspera y segura -una proyección de su experiencia con la UE y con la democracia laica- hoy parece idealista, para un futuro lejano y difícil de lograr en medio del tumulto actual de la zona. Al mismo tiempo, el nuevo y repentino deterioro de las relaciones de Turquía con Siria, Irak, Irán e Israel obliga a preguntarse: en un mundo en el que los cambios reales de política exterior suelen ser escasos y lentos, ¿con qué se sustituirá la posición estratégica de Ankara, tan cuidadosamente elaborada y obtenida y que, en términos generales, era muy eficaz?

De ser los mejores amigos de Siria hace un año, los turcos han pasado a estar envueltos en una especie de guerra a través de terceros con Damasco: Ankara apoya públicamente la formación de un consejo de la oposición siria y a una facción disidente del ejército, y Siria está reactivando viejos vínculos con los rebeldes kurdos de Turquía. La llamativa cooperación de Turquía con Irán en 2010, durante la búsqueda de una solución diplomática a las sospechas de Occidente sobre el programa nuclear iraní, se ha convertido en rivalidad, y ahora los dos países están enfrentados por el futuro del régimen sirio, defienden posturas opuestas a propósito del escudo de defensa antimisiles de la OTAN y se disputan la influencia en el mundo árabe. Las cómodas relaciones con Irak también se han visto afectadas, primero cuando Turquía respaldó abiertamente a un candidato que salió derrotado en las últimas elecciones iraquíes y luego como consecuencia de que Bagdad se ha aproximado en parte a Damasco y Teherán. Lo más espectacular ha sido el cambio respecto a Israel, el paso de la cooperación militar y una relación intensa a los contactos diplomáticos mínimos y la retórica sobre enfrentamientos navales por las flotillas de ayuda a Gaza.

Es posible que todo esto haya sido inevitable. Ankara merece elogios por hacer lo que casi ninguno de los demás actores ha hecho: reinventarse ante una era totalmente nueva. No se ha acurrucado para protegerse (como Israel y los restantes regímenes árabes), ni ha apoyado los levantamientos con criterio selectivo (como Al Yazira y el Golfo, que apoyan sobre todo las revueltas suníes, o Hezbolá e Irán, que respaldan a los chiíes en Bahréin), ni ha promovido la democracia pero, al mismo tiempo, ha expresado su temor por el resultado de cualquier votación (como Occidente, que preferiría contener a los islamistas y no ha cambiado en absoluto su actitud ante el conflicto Israel-Palestina).

No obstante, la política exterior de Ankara plantea más interrogantes que respuestas. Aunque las declaraciones de Erdogan en El Cairo y Túnez, en favor de unas constituciones laicas, tuvieron buena acogida en Occidente, los ciudadanos no islamistas de Oriente Próximo sospechan cada vez más que el modelo que propone el AKP no es el de la República Turca sino, más bien, el de los movimientos proislámicos. Unas relaciones cada vez más polarizadas están disminuyendo la capacidad de Turquía de mediar entre todos los actores regionales e internacionales, un factor que daba legitimidad a su papel antes de las revueltas. La crisis siria, cada vez más sangrienta, pone en tela de juicio la eficacia del poder, tanto duro como blando, de Ankara.

Lo más importante es que la tremenda popularidad de Erdogan en la calle árabe puede no durar eternamente, en parte porque surgió de un vacío, mientras la primavera árabe espera a crear sus propios héroes, en parte porque los Gobiernos árabes desconfían de cualquier cosa que huela a gran hermano turco, y en parte porque esa popularidad se basa en que Erdogan esté dispuesto a mantener un enfrentamiento retórico y diplomático con Israel. Tras decenios de estar sometida a propaganda hueca, la opinión pública árabe se cansa enseguida de las bravatas anti-israelíes que no cambian nada sobre el terreno.

En pocas palabras, cuando se calme el aplauso popular, Turquía tal vez se encontrará con una política exterior sin un marco conceptual que integre sus contradicciones: una mezcla insostenible de alianza con Estados Unidos y enfrentamiento con Israel, un modelo socioeconómico construido sobre la convergencia con Europa pero con el proceso de negociación para incorporarse a la UE estancado, un entusiasmo idealista por los demócratas musulmanes pero el mantenimiento de los vínculos con otros dirigentes autoritarios, exhibiciones públicas de devoción musulmana junto al apoyo a constituciones laicas, y debates enconados con todos los que pretenden aprovechar esas contradicciones para arrojar dudas sobre el papel de Turquía en Oriente Próximo, entre ellos los Estados de la UE deseosos de utilizar cualquier pretexto con el fin de retrasar aún más las negociaciones para su adhesión.

Turquía es débil asimismo en otros aspectos más próximos a casa, como las facturas que han quedado sin pagar durante sus incursiones en el mundo árabe. Tras el fracaso de las intermitentes negociaciones de paz con los kurdos turcos, en los últimos cinco meses, la escalada llevada a cabo por los rebeldes ha matado a más de 250 personas, entre ellos 115 miembros de las fuerzas de seguridad y 31 civiles. La economía turca también está en peligro, porque el consumo alimentado por el crédito está llegando a su techo, el déficit de cuenta corriente sobrepasa el 10% del PIB y, tras un sólido comportamiento económico en la primera década del siglo, el Fondo Monetario Internacional predice que el crecimiento de Turquía se reducirá al 2,2% el próximo año. La polarización política interna, el estancamiento del proceso de reforma de la UE, una actitud cada vez más autoritaria ante la libertad de expresión, y las malas notas en igualdad de género, transparencia y educación, significan que Turquía, a veces, refleja tanto ciertos aspectos del pasado del mundo árabe como una vía posible hacia un futuro mejor y más integrado.

La política regional de “cero problemas” que estableció Turquía a mediados de la pasada década tenía unos objetivos espléndidos. A largo plazo, Turquía necesita volver a lo que hizo que esa política funcionara tan bien: unos canales de comunicación abiertos a todos, desde Irán hasta Israel, un tratamiento equilibrado de todos los actores árabes nuevos, sin alinearse con los movimientos islámicos afines, y una reactivación del proceso de adhesión a la UE. Conviene destacar que el año en el que más avanzaron las reformas para entrar en la UE, 2004, fue el periodo en el que el país experimentó su mayor índice de crecimiento desde el comienzo del siglo, un 9,4%. Si Turquía quiere ser un modelo genuino para los demócratas árabes y, de esa forma, establecer una influencia positiva duradera en la región, debería dar un paso atrás y pensar en adoptar lo que mejor le ha funcionado hasta ahora.

Cuando lo interrogaron recientemente sobre un profesor de derecho constitucional que fue arrestado por dar cátedra en un instituto dirigido por el principal partido político pro-kurdo del país, el ministro del Interior de Turquía, Idris Naim Sahin, no pudo ocultar su irritación: “Me está costando mucho entender a aquellos que dicen que un profesor no debería ser arrestado mientras se arrestan a miles de otras personas en Turquía”.

Supuestamente, Sahin quiso decir que un profesor no puede exigir un trato especial bajo el régimen de la ley. Pero, sin darse cuenta, su comentario subrayó la nueva realidad de Turquía, en la que cualquiera a quien se percibe como opositor del actual régimen puede ser enviado a prisión, con o sin pruebas, por terrorismo u otros actos violentos.

Tribunales especiales, encargados de condenar el terrorismo y los delitos contra el estado, han estado trabajando fuera de horario para generar cargos que, muchas veces, son tan absurdos como infundados. Por ejemplo, se encarceló a periodistas por escribir artículos y libros a instancias de una supuesta organización terrorista llamada “Ergenekon”, cuya existencia todavía no ha sido confirmada, a pesar de años de investigación.

De la misma manera, oficiales militares han sido acusados en base a documentos abiertamente fraudulentos -y, de hecho, generados de manera poco profesional- que contienen anacronismos obvios. Un alto comisionado policial actualmente se está pudriendo en la cárcel supuestamente por colaborar con militantes de extrema izquierda a los que se pasó persiguiendo toda su carrera. Estos procesos judiciales han generado una red cada vez mayor en la que quedaron atrapados decenas de periodistas, escritores y académicos, centenares de oficiales militares y miles de políticos y activistas kurdos, entre otros.

La autocensura se ha vuelto moneda corriente. Los directores de los medios, ansiosos por conservar los favores del primer ministro Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, han despedido a muchos de los periodistas que siguen criticando su régimen. Y el control del gobierno hoy se extiende más allá de los medios, el poder judicial y el ámbito académico al mundo de los negocios y el deporte. Organismos regulatorios que antes eran autónomos (como la autoridad de la competencia) han sido subordinados silenciosamente al gobierno, sin debate ni discusión.

Hasta la Academia de Ciencias de Turquía se vio afectada. Un decreto reciente, ampliamente condenado en el exterior, permite al gobierno nombrar a las dos terceras partes de los miembros de la Academia, poniendo así fin incluso a la apariencia de independencia científica.

Erdoğan parece inmune a las críticas. Su éxito a la hora de expandir el acceso a la salud, la educación y la vivienda le permitió ganar tres elecciones generales -cada una de ellas con un porcentaje cada vez mayor del voto popular que la anterior-. Quebrantó el poder de la vieja guardia militar y el predominio de su rancia ideología kemalista -el nacionalismo secular introducido por el primer presidente de Turquía, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk- alterando con esto para siempre la conformación de la política turca. Presidió el surgimiento de una nueva clase vibrante de empresarios anatolianos. Y, en su mandato, Turquía se convirtió en una potencial regional.

Sin embargo, si bien Erdoğan puede parecer estar en el pináculo del poder, son los aliados “gülenistas” de su gobierno los que se han vuelto cada vez más poderosos. Miembros del movimiento transnacional Gülen -inspirados por los seguidores de Fethullah Gülen, un teólogo musulmán radicado en Pensilvania- están ocupando puestos en la policía, el poder judicial, la burocracia y las universidades de Turquía. Los medios gülenistas hoy marcan el nuevo tono ideológico del país, generando una corriente continua de desinformación en su abierto respaldo de los juicios que se llevan a cabo en el país como demostración de poderío.

Por cierto, estos juicios son montados normalmente para satisfacer fines específicamente gülenistas. Detenidos prominentes, como el periodista Nedim Sener y el comisionado policial Hanefi Avci, aterrizaron en la cárcel después de exponer los delitos de la policía y los fiscales gülenistas. Los editoriales en Zaman, el periódico en idioma turco de la red Gülen, ya no andan con rodeos: se está creando una nueva Turquía; los que se interpongan en el camino reciben lo que merecen.

Erdoğan se ha beneficiado enormemente del respaldo gülenista, pero detesta compartir el poder y sigue sospechando del movimiento. En un primer momento, supo explotar los juicios políticos respaldados por los gülenistas para demonizar a la oposición. Pero, a medida que las acusaciones crecieron en alcance e inverosimilitud, los juicios complicaron sus relaciones con los militares, los liberales domésticos y actores externos como los medios extranjeros y la Unión Europea. Es más, individuos cercanos a él y a su administración recientemente quedaron atrapados en la red de manipulación judicial, lo que sugiere que puede estar perdiendo control de la policía y los tribunales especiales.

Dado que la lucha contra el enemigo común, la vieja guardia secularista, ya está definitivamente ganada, un eventual quiebre entre Erdoğan y los gülenistas tal vez resulte inevitable. Desafortunadamente, más allá de cuál sea el lado que surja victorioso, el resultado no será una buena noticia para la democracia turca.

Para los amigos de Turquía en el exterior, es hora de algo de mano dura. Hasta ahora, la Unión Europea y Estados Unidos reaccionaron ante la caída de Turquía en el autoritarismo con declaraciones de preocupación bastante imprecisas. Ningún funcionario pronunció críticas análogas a la condena por parte del secretario de Relaciones Exteriores sueco, Carl Bildt, del juicio montado a la ex primera ministra ucraniana Yuliva Tymoshenko en ese país, o los comentarios francos de la secretaria de Estado norteamericana, Hilary Clinton, sobre la erosión del régimen de derecho del primer ministro ruso, Vladimir Putin. Curiosamente, los informes de progreso de la UE sobre Turquía siguieron calificando a los juicios de Ergenekon, que son fuertemente respaldados por los gülenistas, como una oportunidad para fortalecer el régimen de derecho.

No fue hace mucho tiempo que Turquía parecía ser un faro brillante de democracia y moderación en una región acostumbrada a la autocracia y el radicalismo. Ahora se parece más a un país encaminado hacia el autoritarismo fronteras adentro y que abraza el aventurismo en el exterior.

Es comprensible que los europeos y los norteamericanos no quieran ofender a una potencia regional. Pero jugar el juego de Erdoğan no hace más que reforzar su sensación de invencibilidad. No fomenta la causa de la democracia en Turquía; tampoco hace de Turquía un aliado más confiable.

It was good while it lasted. Designed by Turkey’s newly elected government in 2002, the country’s “zero problems with neighbors” policy helped it to climb into the league of influential regional powers. The policy’s goal – to build strong economic, political, and social ties with the country’s immediate neighbors while decreasing its dependency on the United States – seemed to be within sight. But the Arab Spring exposed the policy’s vulnerabilities, and Turkey must now seek a new guiding principle for regional engagement.

Until the onset of the Arab uprisings, “zero problems with neighbors” meant zero problems with the Middle East’s established autocratic regimes. But, when Arab political opposition began to gain traction this year, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s government faced an unavoidable choice: whether to maintain its policy of engagement with authoritarian Arab leaders, or acknowledge that their countries’ citizens were not having “zero problems.”

The revolt in Libya provided the first concrete challenge to Turkey’s policy. Though Turkey’s Western partners swiftly broke with Libyan leader Muammar el-Qaddafi in support of the opposition, the “zero problems” principle dictated that the Turkish government maintain relations with the old regime. After initially adopting a neutral stance, Turkey soon recognized that its indecisiveness was damaging its image.

Turkey was thus confronted with a fundamental conflict between its cherished policy of uncritical engagement with regional political rulers and the imperative to support the Libyan people’s democratic aspirations. Eventually, the government decided to support the latter over the former, thus effectively ending its “zero problems with neighbors” policy. Turkey became the last NATO member to give its backing to the Libyan rebels.

In many ways, Syria was the poster child for the “zero problems with neighbors” policy. But the Syrian crisis became another nail in the coffin of Turkey’s regional policy. At the end of the 1990’s, Syria and Turkey were on the brink of war, owing to Syria’s support of Kurdish terrorism. But the two governments mended their relationship, even contemplating the creation of a regional common market.

So, when mass protests erupted in Syria in January, Turkey hoped to leverage the relationship of mutual trust that the two countries had presumably developed, actively nudging Syrian President Bashar al-Assad towards democratic reforms. Faced with Assad’s intransigence, however, Erdoğan’s government demonstrated that it had learned from its Libyan experience: this time, Turkey did not hesitate before harshly criticizing Assad. In a clear departure from established Turkish policy, Erdoğan even imposed unilateral sanctions on Syria – all the more remarkable for a country that has typically condemned sanctions. Indeed, as recently as last year, Turkey voted against new sanctions on Iran at the United Nations Security Council.

At the same time, the Turkish government’s rhetoric also changed. Giving their full-fledged support to the Syrian opposition, Turkey’s leaders started to profess their country’s duty to protect the victimized people of the Middle East.

The consequences of this fundamental shift in Turkey’s regional outlook are likely to be profound. After all, Turkey’s new outlook implies that it is intent, for the first time in its history as a republic, on promoting democratic principles in the region.

A more vocal Turkish policy on issues related to fundamental freedoms and democratic reform in the region will necessarily alter Turkey’s relations with its less progressive neighbors. Indeed, if Turkey’s new agenda is to become credible, Erdoğan’s government cannot continue to turn a blind eye to the gross human-rights violations in neighboring Iran, where Erdoğan’s government was the first to congratulate President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad following Iran’s tainted elections in 2009.

An equally important component of the new policy’s credibility will be Turkey’s ability to resolve its own democratic shortcomings, particularly with regard to freedom of expression, non-interference with the media, and minority rights. Progress in these areas will be critical to the success of Turkey’s foreign-policy agenda.

Turkey’s geopolitical role as a country that is at once European and Middle Eastern is more complex than ever. For such a country, there is no such thing as “no problems.” In an environment that is being reshaped in unpredictable ways by the Arab awakening, Turkey will have to redefine what it means to be a good neighbor.

Monsieur le premier ministre, vous disiez hier : “Nous menons une lutte très intense contre le terrorisme. Nous réprimons de manière très décidée. Mais en faisant ceci, nous ne concédons rien de la démocratie, des droits et des libertés. Nous agissons en la matière avec une sensibilité à couper les cheveux en quatre… ”En est-il vraiment ainsi, Monsieur le premier ministre ?

Hier, deux de nos amis, connus pour leur lutte – radicale mais légitime- en faveur de la démocratie et de la liberté, la professeur Büsra Ersanli et l’éditeur Ragip Zarakolu, ont été arrêtés dans le cadre des opérations contre la KCK [NDT : Union des communautés du Kurdistan, réputée être l'émanation urbaine du PKK]. Est-ce cela, “couper les cheveux en quatre”, distinguer la politique de la violence, ne rien concéder de la démocratie et des libertés ? Vous allez dire : “C’est du ressort de la justice, nous ne pouvons intervenir.” Lisez-vous les “informations” de source policière publiées dans la presse, visant à noircir la réputation des personnalités arrêtées comme Ersanli et Zarakolu ? Ne voyez-vous pas que la décision de les arrêter et ces publications ont été simultanées ? Ne vous rendez-vous pas compte qu’avant d’être une initiative de la justice, il s’agit des pratiques de la police – et que ce genre de pratiques façonnent sournoisement votre nouvelle politique kurde ? Qui est responsable de “l’administration” de ce pays ? Peut-être allez-vous dire que Ersanli et Zarakolu ont été arrêtés dans le cadre des opérations contre la KCK, et que la KCK est une organisation problématique. Oui, elle l’est, certes. Comme le précise un ancien dirigeant des services de renseignement, Cevat Ones, “la KCK est l’organisation d’apparence légale du PKK. Une organisation de ce genre est inacceptable”. Nous l’admettons tous. Mais, monsieur le premier ministre, le problème ne se limite pas à cela. Il consiste aussi, comme le précise lui-même Cevat Ones, “dans le fait que ces opérations policières affectent de manière négative la psyché sociale, pour peu que notre approche consiste à veiller à la création des conditions de la paix”.

Ces opérations policières se propagent partout, à tous les niveaux et de toutes les façons. Elles créent un climat sécuritaire. Dans leur ampleur, les opérations contre la KCK commencent à avoir pour fonction de restreindre l’espace civil et politique, aussi bien dans le sud-est que dans le reste du pays. La KCK est tellement bien implantée dans le sud-est que, dans une telle perspective sécuritaire, tous ceux qui y vivent ou qui ont un rapport avec cette région peuvent être arrêtés pour avoir un lien avec cette mouvance. De nombreuses positions, demandes et relations d’ordre politique peuvent ainsi être placées sous contrôle.

La répression de la KCK peut devenir un prétexte pour reproduire un climat d’oppression. Des personnalités comme Ersanli et Zarakolu, qui n’ont aucun rapport avec une organisation terroriste, avec les armes ou avec la violence, n’ont-elles pas été arrêtées dans ce cadre ? Peut-être, aujourd’hui, la politique et la violence sont-elles imbriquées dans le sud-est du pays. Mais votre principale fonction n’est-elle pas précisément de les distinguer et de les dissocier ? Ne consiste-t-elle pas à protéger l’existence de l’espace politique, tout en prenant les mesures de sécurité justifiées ? La démocratie peut-elle avoir un sens sans l’espace et sans la “possibilité” du politique ? Dans les démocraties, ce qui compte, c’est l’existence de l’espace politique, et non l’identité de ceux qui l’utilisent, vous le savez mieux que tout autre.

En juin dernier, on prétendait que des arrestations en masse de civils auraient lieu après le Ramadan, que des listes étaient en préparation, et qu’il soufflerait une vague autoritaire. A cette époque, j’avais affirmé, à chaque occasion qui se présentait à moi, que ces allégations ne pouvaient être vraies, que Tayyip Erdogan et l’AKP ne pouvaient faire marche arrière par rapport à leur “politique de démocratisation et de réforme”, laquelle était indissociable de leur propre existence. Me trompé-je, monsieur le premier ministre ?

Ce pays a plusieurs fois été témoin du fait que les investigations, poursuites judiciaires et opérations policières menées au nom de la lutte contre le terrorisme ont lésé de manière profonde la démocratie, et qu’elles ont reproduit une société silencieuse. Le prétexte a toujours été différent… En même temps qu’elles véhiculent un climat sécuritaire et la violence, la question kurde et celle du mouvement politique kurde sont aujourd’hui le baromètre principal de la démocratie [NDT : en Turquie]. Vous devriez faire plus attention pour la Turquie et l’ordre démocratique.

The recent surge in Turkey’s military actions against the Kurds in northern Iraq is an indication that, somewhat surprisingly – but not entirely unpredictably – Turkish foreign policy has undergone a 180-degree turn in less than two years. The Turkish offensive is also an indication that these changes go beyond the current tensions between Turkey and Israel, which are just one facet of much deeper trends.

Just a couple of years ago, after the European Union slammed the door in Turkey’s face (despite some significant military and penal reforms by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government), Turkey re-oriented its policy away from Europe towards its immediate region. Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s “zero conflicts with neighbors” approach gave this re-orientation its strategic and theoretical foundation.

Opening an impressive new page, Turkey reached out to Armenia; softened its position on Cyprus; tried to draw Iran into a positive dialogue with the West; convinced Syria to settle the two countries’ simmering border dispute; and, as a crowning achievement, launched peace talks between Syria and Israel under Turkish mediation.

Yet these good-neighborhood policies did not work out as intended. Rapprochement with Armenia stalled; no significant progress was made on Cyprus, especially after a less-accommodating leader was elected in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (an entity that only Turkey recognizes); the opening to Iran did not soften the mullahs’ position on nuclear development (and strained relations with the United States); the Syria-Israel talks failed; and Turkey’s participation in the 2010 flotilla to Gaza, and Israel’s brutal response to it, signaled an end to decades of close Israeli-Turkish cooperation.

To top it all off, Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad, ostensibly Turkey’s closest new ally, emerged as the most oppressive and bloody regional tyrant. Assad has now spent the better part of 2011 killing his own people as they demonstrate for liberalization and reform.

Notwithstanding these failures, Turkey’s strategic stature did not suffer, partly because the diminution of US engagement under President Barack Obama enabled Turkey to fill the ensuing regional power vacuum. The Arab Spring, despite its still-inconclusive outcome, greatly weakened Egypt’s role in regional politics and made it possible for Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to position Turkey – and himself – as the leader of a Muslim bloc and a model of co-existence between Islam and democracy. Last but not least, the AKP’s victory in recent parliamentary elections has encouraged Erdoğan to embrace Putinesque ambitions.

All of this exposed the built-in ambivalence in Davutoğlu’s “zero conflict” policy. While initially viewed as pacific and moderate, it was underpinned by an overarching view of Turkey as the hegemonic regional power – as an arbiter of conflicts, but ultimately also as an enforcer of its own views on lesser players. It may be incorrect to call Turkey’s behavior “neo-Ottoman,” but some neighboring countries, after expecting a mediator and facilitator, may now feel faced by a possible bully.

Erdoğan’s policy re-orientation vis-à-vis Israel can be understood as an attempt not only to overcome traditional Arab suspicion of Turkey, given its imperial past, but also to present a more moderate Islamic alternative to theocratic Iran and its unpredictable president. But Erdoğan’s threat to consider using the Turkish navy as a military escort for further flotillas to Gaza already borders on saber rattling, as does his declared willingness to use force to prevent the Republic of Cyprus from exploring for gas in its continental shelf. Indeed, Erdoğan’s has warned of a diplomatic rupture with the EU if Cyprus accedes to the Union’s rotating presidency in 2012.

At the same time, renewed violent incursions into northern Iraq in pursuit of alleged guerillas suggest a reversion to hardline anti-Kurdish policies. The withdrawal of US forces from Iraq only seems to have encouraged Turkey’s will to create a cordon sanitaire on the Iraqi side of the border – and possibly to establish a counterweight to Iran’s influence on a Shia-led government in Baghdad. And, while Turkey’s agreement to host NATO anti-missile radar facilities, and its recent seizure of a Syrian-registered arms ship, may please the West, here, too, its policies are focused on “hard” military power.

Similarly, Erdoğan’s recent visit to Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia brings out the ambivalence of Turkey’s new claim to regional hegemony. While Egypt’s shaky military junta welcomed Erdoğan, many Egyptians were not happy about his hectoring them – and other Arabs – to follow Turkish policies and to regard Turkey as their Muslim leader. A new sultanate? Erdoğan as the new Saladin?

Turkey has an enormously important role to play in the region. It could be a bridge between the West and the East, between Islam and modernity, and between Israel and the Arabs. But it runs the danger of succumbing to the arrogance of power, which has corrupted and sidelined many strong states in the past.

In a Middle East wracked by coupsd’etat and civil insurrections, the Republic of Turkey credibly offers itself as a model, thanks to its impressive economic growth, democratic system, political control of the military and secular order.

But in reality, Turkey may be, along with Iran, the most dangerous state of the region. Count the reasons:

Islamists without brakes: When four out of five of the Turkish chiefs of staff abruptly resigned July 29, they signaled the effective end of the republic founded in 1923 by Kemal Ataturk. A second republic headed by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Islamist colleagues of the AK Party (AKP) began that day. The military safely under their control, AKP ideologues now can pursue their ambitions to create an Islamic order.

An even worse opposition: Ironically, secular Turks tend to be more anti-Western than the AKP. The two other parties in parliament, the CHP and MHP, condemn the AKP’s more enlightened policies, such as its approach to Syria and its stationing of a NATO radar system.

Looming economic collapse: Turkey faces a credit crunch, one largely ignored in light of crises in Greece and elsewhere. As analyst David Goldman points out, Mr. Erdogan and the AKP took the country on a financial binge – bank credit ballooned while the current account deficit soared, reaching unsustainable levels. The party’s patronage machine borrowed massive amounts of short-term debt to finance a consumption bubble that effectively bought it the June elections. Mr. Goldman calls Mr. Erdogan a “Third World strongman” and compares Turkey today with Mexico in 1994 or Argentina in 2000, “where a brief boom financed by short-term foreign capital flows led to currency devaluation and a deep economic slump.”

Escalating Kurdish problems: Some 15 percent to 20 percent of Turkey’s citizens identify as Kurds, a distinct historical people. Although many Kurds are integrated, a separatist revolt against Ankara that began in 1984 recently has reached a new crescendo with a more assertive political leadership and more aggressive guerrilla attacks.

Mr. Erdogan, hero of the Arab street: In the tradition of Gamal Abdel Nasser and Saddam Hussein, the Turkish prime minister deploys anti-Zionist rhetoric to make himself an Arab political star. One shudders to think where, thrilled by this adulation, he may end up.

Looking for a fight with Israel: After Ankara backed a protest ship to Gaza in May 2010, MaviMarmara, whose aggression led Israeli forces to kill eight Turkish citizens plus an ethnic Turk, it has relentlessly exploited this incident to stoke domestic fury against the Jewish state. Mr. Erdogan has called the deaths a casus belli, speaks of a war with Israel “if necessary,” and plans to send another ship to Gaza, this time with a Turkish military escort.

Stimulating an anti-Turkish faction: Turkish hostility has renewed Israel’s historically warm relations with the Kurds and turned around its cool relations with Greece, Cyprus and even Armenia. Beyond local cooperation, this grouping will make life difficult for the Turks in Washington.

Asserting rights over Mediterranean energy reserves: Companies operating out of Israel discovered potentially immense gas and oilreserves in the Leviathan and other fields between Israel, Lebanon and Cyprus. When the government of Cyprus announced its plans to drill, Mr. Erdogan responded with threats to send Turkish “frigates, gunboats and … air force.” This dispute, just in its infancy, contains the potential elements of a huge crisis. Already, Moscow has sent submarines in solidarity with Cyprus.

Other international problems: Ankara threatens to freeze relations with the European Union in July 2012, when Cyprus assumes the rotating presidency. Turkish forces have seized a Syrian arms ship. Turkish threats to invade northern Iraq have worsened relations with Baghdad. Turkish and Iranian regimes may share an Islamist outlook, an anti-Kurd agenda and enjoy prospering trade relations, but their historic rivalry, contrary governing styles and competing ambitions have soured relations.

While Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu crows that Turkey is “right at the center of everything,” AKP bellicosity has soured his vaunted “zero-problems” policy with neighbors, turning it into wide-ranging hostility and even potential military confrontation with Syria, Cyprus and Israel. As economic troubles hit, a once-exemplary member of NATO may go further off-track; watch for signs of Mr. Erdogan emulating his Venezuelan friend, Hugo Chavez.

That’s why, along with Iranian nuclear weapons, I see a rogue Turkey as the region’s greatest threat.

Hace unos días, el Primer Ministro turco, Recep Tayip Erdŏgan dijo a Al Jazeera, la red de televisión panárabe, que recurriría a sus buques de guerra para impedir que comandos israelíes volvieran a abordar barcos destinados a Gaza, como hicieron el año pasado, y en un discurso en El Cairo, declaró que su apoyo al reconocimiento por las Naciones Unidas de un Estado palestino era “una obligación”.

Así, pues, ¿será un “verano turco” el primero, si no el principal, resultado de la “primavera árabe”? ¿Afronta Oriente Medio un irresistible ascenso al poder regional de una Turquía neootomana? ¿Y podría estar presenciando el mundo la “orientalización” de Turquía?

Tras la estruendosa respuesta – “no, sí, pero”– de la Unión Europea a la solicitud de adhesión de Turquía, las revoluciones árabes han reforzado entre los turcos la atracción de Oriente, al tiempo que liberaban su mezcla de impulsos nacionalistas y religiosos. De hecho, Erdŏgan hace más referencias a Dios en sus declaraciones públicas actuales que en el pasado.

En los últimos años, el mundo occidental ha estado preguntándose, con una mezcla de culpa y aprensión, “quién perdió a Turquía”, pero, ¿no será Turquía, cautivada por de sus éxitos económicos y diplomáticos, la que esté corriendo el riesgo de perderse a sí misma?

El Gobierno de Turquía no tuvo mayor clarividencia que los regímenes locales y las potencias occidentales para prever los cambios en el mundo árabe. Al final de 2010, Erdŏgan fue el (último) ganador de un premio de derechos humanos concedido por el coronel Muamar El Gadafi de Libia. Además, Turquía a veces ha intentado a toda costa mantener buenas relaciones con el régimen de Bashar El Asad de Siria, pese al abominable comportamiento del Gobierno sirio.

Las “calles árabes” dieron una mala acogida, por no decir algo peor, a esa postura de Turquía. Una razón importante para la postura más dura de Turquía para con Israel es –sospechamos– el intento de Erdŏgan de reequilibrar el prestigio regional de su país.

Pese a su dificultad para entender la realidad y la profundidad del proceso revolucionario árabe, Turquía es más que nunca un copartícipe principal en la región. Puede no ser un modelo, en el sentido estricto del término, pero al menos es una fuente de inspiración en toda la región, aun cuando gran parte de su ejecutoria sea ambigua en esencia y en acto a un tiempo.

En la Europa de los siglos XVII y XVIII, se utilizaba el “exotismo” del imperio otomano como espejo para proyectar los defectos e inseguridades de los europeos. En Francia, se hablaba de “turquerías”, como, por ejemplo, en la comedia de Molière El burgués gentilhombre.

En la actualidad, es el mundo árabe el que suele utilizar a Turquía como lo hacía Europa en el pasado. Sin embargo, esta vez el motivo de la fascinación no es el exotismo, sino la modernidad, pero, por su tradición secular (que el régimen actual está impugnando ahora), su identidad no árabe, su comportamiento para con la minoría kurda y la ambivalencia del legado otomano, Turquía es tanto un contramodelo como un modelo. Es un espejo en el que el mundo árabe proyecta sus temores, además de sus esperanzas.

En el nivel estratégico, Turquía acierta al pensar que el proceso revolucionario árabe ha debilitado a sus rivales directos. El Irán, por ejemplo, está a punto de perder el socio menor y fiel que tenía en Siria, pero, ¿qué ocurrirá si Turquía tiene que vivir junto a un Irán con armas nucleares?

Asimismo, si bien Egipto está en plena revolución desordenada y debe conceder prioridad al cambio interior, también intenta recuperar un papel más visible e influyente entre los movimientos nacionales palestinos y en la región en conjunto. El “Imperio del Medio” de Oriente Medio dejará de ser un gigante dormido.

Naturalmente, Turquía está menos desestabilizada que sus rivales y socios árabes por un proceso revolucionario que no la amenaza directamente. Al fin y al cabo, es ya una democracia en funcionamiento. Turquía está mucho menos preocupada por su futuro que Israel. Comparada con el Estado judío, Turquía tiene una población en aumento y una profunda conciencia de sus afinidades históricas, religiosas y culturales con sus vecinos. Esos importantes activos hacen de Turquía una “nación indispensable” en la región.

Así, pues, lo que amenaza a Turquía actualmente es la propia Turquía. Turquía no sólo es “asiática” desde el punto de vista de la energía económica y el crecimiento rápido, sino también en un sentido más político, con la tentación en aumento de una forma de “despotismo oriental”. De hecho, durante muchos años los críticos internos del gobierno de Erdŏgan han estado denunciando lo que califican de “putinización” del régimen.

Turquía, no la Unión Europea, está haciendo sentir actualmente su presencia en el mundo, pero el curso de la Historia puede cambiar rápidamente. En realidad, Turquía necesita a Europa tanto como Europa a Turquía. Europa es para Turquía “un principio de moderación” y un aliciente para seguir siendo democrática. Turquía es para Europa, aparte de su demografía, un “principio de energía” y una cura para el pesimismo… aun cuando, como está demostrando Erdŏgan, la autoconfianza puede convertirse fácilmente en orgullo desmedido.

U.S. policy in the Middle East is f loundering. President Obama’s two most important allies in the region are on a collision course. It will not be resolved by the State Department’s injunction to Turkey and Israel to “cool it.”

Turkey’s importance to Washington is clear: its involvement in NATO and its forces in Afghanistan; its strong economic ties to northern Iraq; its ongoing cooperation against terrorism; and, most recently, its role in the NATO missile defense shield. The depth of the U.S.-Turkey alliance makes the crisis in Israeli-Turkish relations one that equally involves the United States.

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has expanded his confrontation with Israel beyond the 2010 Gaza flotilla incident and into a full-scale assault on Israel’s position in the region. He recently declared that the Turkish navy will escort Turkish vessels going to Gaza to provide aid. Washington did not grasp where Erdogan’s sustained verbal attacks on Israel were heading. He now directly challenges our major alliance in the Middle East, and how far he will go is unclear. Obama himself must acknowledge that the situation is a crisis. As the political climates in Turkey and the United States harden, Erdogan and Obama will find it increasingly difficult to compromise.

Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu said years ago that Turkey would construct a new order in the region. Erdogan followed this with criticism of interference in Middle Eastern affairs by “outside” powers, a clear shot at Washington. Erdogan’s rhetoric of late is about reducing Western influence in the region and teaching Israel a lesson for “irresponsible” or “immature” behavior.

Had Erdogan pushed only for an apology over the deaths of Turkish citizens in the May 2010 flotilla incident, Turkey’s actions would be understandable in the face of Israel’s unwise decision not to immediately resolve the problem. The recently leaked U.N. report on the flotilla affair sought to find a way for the sides to reconcile. Erdogan, however, is not interested in repairing the situation with Israel.

Erdogan is calculating that, as a NATO member, a European Union candidate country and the world’s 16th-largest economy, Turkey can move the Middle East in ways no other regional country can. He has significantly expanded Turkey’s trade and investment. He has successfully pivoted away from Libya and Syria, where he had been closely affiliated with the authoritarian regimes. He is wildly popular on the Arab street, and his address to the Arab League last Tuesday could well be a bid for the populist mantle last held by the late Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser. His vigorous battle at the United Nations for a Palestinian statehood resolution is another step in his effort to isolate Israel.

By threatening to militarily contest Israel’s blockade of Gaza — which was deemed legal by the U.N. Palmer Commission — the Turkish government has laid down a serious challenge to American policy. Danger stems not just from potential miscommunication between those two countries but also from third parties with their own agendas, creating conditions for confrontation.

The eastern Mediterranean is already a caldron of competing claims and threatening rhetoric. Turkey’s minister for E.U. affairs warned this month that his country might stop Cyprus’s exploration for gas and oil, saying, “This is what we have the navy for.” Lebanon’s Hezbollah-dominated government is engaged in a verbal war with Israel over the latter’s gas discoveries off the coast at Haifa. Erdogan involved Turkey in negotiations between Cyprus and Israel on joint exploration opportunities when he told al-Jazeera this month that Israel would be prevented from exploiting the eastern Mediterranean’s oil and gas reserves on its own.

Washington is caught between two longtime allies. It cannot deal with the Israelis and Turks separately. Inaction is not a real option, as Israel could become a significant issue in the 2012 presidential campaign, especially if the United States is defeated in its opposition to a General Assembly vote to create a Palestinian state. The situation will generate concern on Capitol Hill and give Republicans another opportunity to attack Obama for not defending American interests and Israel.

Congress could also worsen the fray by reviving legislation regarding the Armenian genocide. A resolution recognizing the 1.5 million Armenians killed by Ottoman Turks has repeatedly failed to garner enough support for a floor vote. But its backers may calculate that the worsening conditions between Israel and Turkey would prompt the powerful Israel lobby to no longer support Turkey on this matter, raising the likelihood that the resolution would pass. Similarly, arms exports to Turkey will face greater scrutiny.

Obama may not have much time to prevent further deterioration. Israel has been seeking to build ties with Asia, Europe and the Americas; while the Arab Spring evolves, Israel is becoming increasingly isolated as countries such as Egypt and Jordan reassess ties. It is also floundering from the Obama administration’s mishandling of the peace process and of Israel in particular.

Obama’s meeting with Erdogan on Tuesday is crucial. He can take a few important steps. He should immediately deploy 6th Fleet ships from Norfolk to the Eastern Mediterranean to signal that the United States will not tolerate even inadvertent naval clashes. He needs to make clear to Erdogan that the United States will not side with Turkey against Israel and that Turkey’s current strategy risks undermining regional stability.

Obama could offer to work with Turkey and Israel to end the partial blockade of Gaza, provided Erdogan can persuade Hamas to abandon, once and for all, missile barrages and violence against Israel. Such a policy course would have wide international backing and give everyone some of what they want.

Erdogan has a choice: He can boost his domestic and regional popularity by deepening the confrontation with Israel or he could think beyond that by engaging in a constructive endeavor that will help regional stability.

Turkey’s expulsion of the Israeli ambassador, the downgrading of its diplomatic relations with Israel, and the Erdogan government’s increasingly firm position on the Israeli attack on the Mavi Marmara signify more than a temporary hiccup in Turkish-Israeli relations. It is a clear signal that Ankara is fed up with Israel’s foot-dragging on the apology and compensation that Turkey has demanded as a precondition for the normalisation of Turkish-Israeli relations. The UN’s Palmer Commission report, which justified the Israeli blockade of Gaza but accused Israel of using “excessive force” against the flotilla, has been rejected by Turkey. Ankara now plans to take the case against the blockade to the international court of justice (ICJ).

Meanwhile, Monday’s visit to Egypt by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey’s prime minister, can be interpreted as an indication both of his support for the emerging democratic process in Egypt (where public anger at Israel runs high) and his solidarity with Cairo over the killing of five Egyptian security personnel by the Israelis in Sinai. His announcement that he intends to visit Gaza is further indication that Turkey is ratcheting up its support for the Palestinian cause, especially in the run-up to the UN vote on Palestinian statehood. What Erdogan does in Egypt will be keenly watched throughout the region.

The Turkish mood was summed up by the foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, who stated: “The time has come for Israel to pay a price for its illegal action. The price, first of all, is being deprived of Turkey’s friendship.” While Davutoglu has indicated that an Israeli apology for the flotilla attack and compensation for the dead and wounded could restore normal diplomatic ties, Erdogan has made clear that Israel must end its naval blockade of Gaza for this to happen.

The Israeli prime minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, has declared emphatically that Israel will not tender an apology. While his stance may be dictated by coalition politics, it has created a diplomatic impasse. The Obama administration – worried about the ramifications of a major rift between Israel and Turkey for US strategic interests but afraid of taking on the Netanyahu government for domestic reasons – has not put any pressure on Israel. It thus risks alienating Turkey, a crucial Nato member.

This diplomatic episode has important implications for the future of the Middle East. First, it demonstrates that Israeli dominance of the eastern Mediterranean will no longer go unchallenged. Erdogan has made clear that the Turkish navy will play a more active role in the area, and Turkish sources have indicated that it may even escort flotillas carrying humanitarian aid to Gaza. Any future attempt by Israel to prevent aid from reaching Gaza could spark a military confrontation.

Second, it demonstrates that Israel’s defiance of international law, especially regarding its treatment of the occupied territories, will face increasing challenges in international forums. A referral to the ICJ will bring to the fore Israel’s violation of provisions of the fourth Geneva convention that prohibit the demographic transformation of occupied lands, as well as its responsibility regarding the welfare of the occupied population. The issue of West Bank settlements will again become a topic of heated debate.

Such debate will emphasise that the Obama formula of “land swaps”, in which Israel would keep major Jewish settlements even if a two-state solution were reached, contravenes international law. This, combined with Palestinian efforts to have the state of Palestine recognised by the UN, will add to an already volatile situation in the region.

Third, the Turkish stance, coming in the wake of democratic uprisings in the region, will further align Turkey with mainstream Arab opinion on Palestine and Israeli occupation. This will boost Turkish standing in the Arab world and put increasing pressure upon Arab governments to take a more active role on Palestine. Countries in democratic transition are already under domestic pressure to take a harder line with Israel, and there is talk of Egypt and Jordan withdrawing their ambassadors, following Turkey’s example.

Fourth, it is clear that the current Turkish position would have not been possible without the consolidation of Turkish democracy. Not only must foreign policy now respond more directly to pressure from the electorate, but the elected government can finally pursue its policies without fear of military intervention. The recent resignation of four leading generals and their replacement by officers acceptable to the civilian government is testimony to this fact. Military top brass, who have close relations with Israeli counterparts, have long been Turkey’s primary pro-Israel constituency. Given the historic importance of the military to Turkish politics, a hard line against Israel would have been unthinkable even a few years ago.

Finally, this episode signifies the coming of age of Turkey as a strategic power connecting the Middle East with Europe; it is Ankara’s declaration of independence in terms of its foreign policy. The Middle East will never be the same again.

This calls for a major revamp of America’s policy. A just and speedy solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict is essential if the US is to preserve its strategic interests in the Middle East. Washington must reassess its unconditional support for Israel and adopt a visibly even-handed policy, including a softening of its position on the Palestine resolution in the UN general assembly. Above all, the US must not underrate Turkey’s strategic importance as the emerging pre-eminent power in the region, and as the bridge between the west and the Muslim world.

As the Ottoman Empire vanished after World War I, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk created a new Turkey in the mold of Europe. Controlling all levers of power, including the military, Ataturk implemented his vision by mandating a separation between religion, public policy and government, and by telling his compatriots to consider themselves intuitively Western.

It took a century and a democratic revolution invoked by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) — a coalition of conservatives, reformed Islamists and Islamists that came to power in 2002 — for Turkey’s “Kemalist Occident,” or dalliance with the West, to end. With the mass resignation of Turkey’s military leadership last month, the last standing Kemalist institution, the army, has succumbed to the AKP’s decade-long political tsunami.

This political bookend for Kemalism suggests that AKP leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan is Turkey’s “new” Ataturk. He doesn’t have the cachet of being Turkey’s liberator, but he enjoys as much power as Ataturk once had.

Simply put, the Kemalists had it coming. When Turkey became a multi-party democracy in 1950, various parties sought for decades to maintain Ataturk’s legacy, while the military guarded the system.

Eventually, however, lethargy took hold. Far from remaining the progressive, forward-looking movement of the early 20th century, Kemalism stagnated and then shifted into an ideology for protecting the past. To those of us growing up in Turkey in recent decades, the most visible sign of this process was the emergence of mass-produced Ataturk statues, on almost every town square, after the 1980 coup that ended anarchy on the streets but also gave the country its highly restrictive and military-written constitution.

By turning Ataturk into a cult, the generals also ensured Kemalism’s demise.

Even after Turkey became a democracy in 1982, this process would not be reversed: The governing parties, mostly from the center-right, failed to produce ideas for change. The nascent Islamist parties sensed an opportunity and began building grass-roots networks and incubating a forward-looking vision for Turkey, one that cultivated permeable walls between religion, public policy and government, and that embraced the country’s Islamic identity in foreign policy.

When the dominant center-right parties collapsed after a debilitating economic crisis in 2000 and 2001, the Islamists used a platform of moderation to attract voters. Once in power, the AKP garnered popular support for change, succeeding in part because of the decade of stable economic growth the party has provided. A buoyant AKP established itself as Turkey’s new elite, gradually replacing Kemalist power centers in the media, business, academia, civil society, unions and, after amendments to the constitution last year, the high courts.

The military was the final institution of Kemalism. Since 2007, a court case known as Ergenekon, which alleged that the army was plotting a coup against the government, has crippled the military’s power. The army has been criticized for allegedly planning a vicious takeover bid and accused of planning to bomb Istanbul’s historic mosques to precipitate a political crisis. Although the assertions remain unproven, the effects are clear: The military’s status as the country’s most trusted institution is plummeting. In 1996, 94 percent of Turkish respondents to the World Values Survey said they trusted their military, while in 2011 the same poll found that barely 75 percent do.

Recognizing this and the AKP’s dominance, the military leadership threw in the towel on July 28.

Now, the AKP, as the dominant elite, can repeat the cycle of a powerful force shaping the country.

Just as Ataturk molded Turkey in his rigidly secular and Western image because he could, Erdogan will remake Turkey to match his image of rigid social conservatism and Islamic identity.

Domestically, this means a blend of government-imposed social conservatism and popular will. An example of this occurred days after the AKP’s victory in the June national assembly elections; officials of the AKP-run Istanbul city government raided downtown drinking establishments and banned outdoor tables (and, hence, publicly serving alcohol). The change prevents potential “sins” in the public eye.

Overnight, drinking disappeared from parts of downtown Istanbul.

In Erdoganist Turkey, the line between public morality and religious values will blur, and the government’s popular power will make opposition impossible.

In foreign policy, a Turkey satisfied with its Islamic identity would stop considering itself intuitively Western, especially given the resonance of the notion of a politically defined “Muslim world” since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. This means an increasingly tense relationship between Turkey and NATO, the symbol of all Western institutions. It also means that Turkey will be open to all sorts of non-Western dalliances. An AKP decision to buy Russian weapons, say, or invite the Chinese to a joint naval exercise in the Mediterranean would be applauded by Turks, including the military.

For a century, the Turks emulated Ataturk because his political descendants controlled all power. Now, it is Erdogan’s turn. He has a vision and controls all levers of power. Time will tell how far he is able to shape Turkey in his conservative design.

Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan, once considered a friend to Israel, has had the audacity to demand that Israel apologize for last year’s incident involving the Gaza-bound ship Mavi Marmara. In fact, the Turkish government owes Israelan apology for this attack, along with other recent actions that have threatened the lives of Israeli citizens.

First, Turkey should apologize for encouraging the sending, under false pretenses, of anti-Israel activists into the country’s sovereign territory. These supposedly peaceful activists, who were in fact carrying a cache of illegal weapons, attacked Israeli soldiers without provocation. Furthermore, Turkey has been using the flotilla as an opportunity to establish itself as a superpower within the Muslim world. The Turkish government also should apologize for turning the flotilla incident into a platform intended to present Israel as aggressive and barbaric.

Most of all, Mr. Erdogan should apologize for continuing to support the flotilla and maintain connections with Hamas and other Islamic extremist groups. Hamas has called repeatedly for the destruction of the state of Israel, and the naval blockade was set up specifically to prevent the smuggling of arms into Gaza that could jeopardize Israel’s safety. The flotilla activists seek to circumvent this blockade with the intention of providing weapons to Hamas. Israel has a legal right to defend its borders and will continue to do whatever is necessary to ensure the well-being of its people.

Relations between Israel and Turkey were not always this bad. Less than four years ago, the two countries enjoyed a mutually beneficial diplomatic partnership based on economic, military and cultural agreements. Turkey was a popular vacation destination for Israelis, with more than a quarter-million people traveling to the country annually. In fact, things were going so well that in 2008, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert met with Mr. Erdogan to discuss indirect talks Turkey was mediating between Israel and Syria.

However, Turkey’s current attitude toward Israel should not come as a surprise to those familiar with the Middle East. Since Mr. Erdogan took office, his political agenda has become increasingly clear. His goal has been to flex his country’s muscles and prove its ability to lead the Muslim world. Unfortunately, this has been done at Israel’s expense. As a result, he is positioning Turkey’s relationship with Israel on shaky ground.

The origins of Turkey’s current problems with Israel can be traced back to 2004, when Turkey was rejected for membership in the European Union. Mr. Erdogan warned of a rise in Islamic extremism as a result, stating that if Turkey was not welcomed into the EU, the country would pay a heavy price in continued and escalating violence from the increasingly dangerous terrorist group al Qaeda. When European leaders did not take this threat seriously, the Turkish prime minister sought solace in the arms of the most radical anti-Western, anti-Zionist leader of all, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Mr. Erdogan and Mr. Ahmadinejad have since grown close, as their regimes have found common ground when it comes to their foreign policies toward Israel. This relationship has proved to be a dangerous one for the entire region.

I would argue that Turkey, which once was a diplomatic ally, has become an epicenter of controversy and a foe to Israel. What else would you call a country that publicly gives consent – if not outright support – to a falsely proclaimed “peaceful” flotilla that illegally enters the borders of another country and engages in violence?

By choosing to ally itself with dictatorial regimes throughout the Middle East, including Syria and Iran, the Turkish government is clearly thumbing its nose at the United States and its core democratic and social values. Moreover, Turkey is indirectly endangering the security of Americans by supporting the flotilla and aligning itself with Hamas, which has been shown to have direct ties to al Qaeda.

Turkey’s continued involvement in organizing the activists is a further attempt to delegitimatize Israel and exacerbate the Israeli-Palestinian problem. It is time for the flotilla’s supporters to recognize this deceit and call for an end to its hypocritical campaign against Israel, the only true democracy in the Middle East. To help achieve this goal, the United States and other allies should start by leading the call for Turkey to apologize to Israel for its repeated insults and provocations.

Aún no se sabe a ciencia cierta si la Primavera Árabe será o no el preludio de democracias creíbles en el mundo árabe. Pero, si bien el polvo todavía no se asentó tras meses de agitación en Túnez, El Cairo y otras partes, las revueltas árabes ya tuvieron un impacto masivo en la estructura estratégica de Oriente Medio.

Hasta hace poco, la región estaba dividida en dos campos: una alineación árabe incoherente y debilitada, y un “Eje de Resistencia”, integrado por Irán, Siria, Hamas y Hezbollah, contra los designios norteamericanos e israelíes para la región. Impulsada por una estrategia de “cero problemas” con sus vecinos, la búsqueda de Turquía de un rol preponderante en la política de Oriente Medio la acercó a Siria e Irán.

La Primavera Árabe expuso los cimientos frágiles sobre los que se construyó el Eje de Resistencia, y lo empujó al borde del colapso. El primero en abrirse fue Hamas. Temeroso de las consecuencias de la desaparición de sus patrocinadores en Damasco, Hamas tácticamente se retiró del Eje y permitió que Egipto lo liderara hacia una reconciliación con la pro-occidental Autoridad Palestina, aceptando términos que había rechazado bajo el régimen depuesto de Hosni Mubarak en Egipto.

Turquía está genuinamente interesada en una solución de dos estados para la disputa palestino-israelí y en un sistema regional de paz y seguridad, mientras que Irán y Hezbollah están empeñados en hacer descarrilar a ambos para negarle a Israel el tipo de paz con el mundo árabe que terminaría aislando a Irán. Más allá de su conflicto enconado con Israel, Turquía, a diferencia de Irán, no es un enemigo incondicional del estado judío, y no descartaría un acuerdo con el gobierno de Benjamin Netanyahu. De hecho, actualmente se están llevando a cabo conversaciones entre las partes para restablecer relaciones más normales.

Tampoco Irán y Turquía comparten una visión común con respecto a la región estratégicamente sensible del Golfo. Turquía, cuyo tratado de 2008 con el Consejo de Cooperación del Golfo la convirtió en un socio estratégico de las monarquías de la región, fue claramente enérgica durante la crisis de Bahrain al advertir a Irán que pusiera fin a su intrusión subversiva en los asuntos de la región. La estabilidad e integridad territorial de los Estados del Golfo es una prioridad estratégica para Turquía; claramente no es el caso de Irán.

De la misma manera, cuando se trata del Líbano, Turquía efectivamente no comparte la preocupación de Irán de que se pudiera cortar la cuerda de salvamento de Hezbollah si el régimen sirio colapsara. E Irán y Siria, por su parte, nunca estuvieron demasiado contentos con las aspiraciones del primer ministro Recep Tayyip Erdogan de actuar como un intermediario en el Líbano, al que consideran su patio trasero estratégico. Esto explica el rechazo de Hezbollah de una iniciativa turca-qatarí de actuar como mediadores después de la caída del gobierno libanés de Saad Hariri en enero de 2011.

El compromiso de Turquía con las transiciones democráticas pacíficas en el mundo árabe la aislaron de su aliado sirio, Bashar al-Assad -de cuyas prácticas represivas tanto Irán como Hezbollah son plenamente cómplices-, y hoy está distanciando aún más a Irán y Turquía. Irán se está esforzando por asegurar que elecciones libres abran el camino a regímenes verdaderamente islámicos en el mundo árabe, mientras que Turquía supone que su propia marca política, una síntesis de Islam y democracia con valores seculares, en definitiva prevalecerá.

La fisura refleja no sólo diferencias ideológicas, sino también un desacuerdo sobre el objetivo del cambio de régimen. Irán espera que los nuevos regímenes se alineen detrás de su deseo de cambiar radicalmente la ecuación estratégica de la región a través de una política de confrontación con Estados Unidos e Israel, mientras que Turquía espera que los nuevos regímenes sigan políticas constructivas de paz y seguridad.

La inestabilidad y la confusión en el mundo árabe favorecerían la agenda de un poder de no status quo radical como Irán. La inestabilidad ejerce el potencial de mantener altos los precios del petróleo, beneficiando a la economía iraní. Es más, mientras Occidente está concentrado en los enormes desafíos planteados por las revueltas árabes, a Irán le resulta más fácil desviar la atención del mundo de su programa nuclear, y sortear el régimen de sanciones internacionales destinado a recortar sus esfuerzos por adquirir armas nucleares.

La política exterior de Turquía, a diferencia de la de Irán, necesita un entorno estable para prosperar. La inestabilidad socava su visión regional en su totalidad; ciertamente desafía su estrategia idealista de “cero problemas”. También pone en riesgo la robusta penetración económica de Turquía en los mercados árabes. Y, con el problema kurdo más vivo que nunca, los turcos también saben muy bien que los levantamientos en los países vecinos pueden propagarse en la propia Turquía.

Respecto de la cuestión siria es donde las diferencias entre Turquía e Irán son especialmente evidentes. Turquía prácticamente se resignó a la inevitable caída del régimen represivo Baath de Siria. Para Irán y sus clientes de Hezbollah, la caída de Assad sería algo muy parecido a una calamidad, con consecuencias de amplio alcance. Desprovisto de su alianza siria y alejado de Turquía, Irán se convertiría en una potencia revolucionaria aislada cuya marca fanática de Islam le resulta repulsiva a la mayoría de las sociedades árabes.

Turquía se equivocó al intentar ganar una mayor influencia en Oriente Medio trabajando junto con las fuerzas revolucionarias de la región. Es mucho más inteligente que Turquía haga causa común con las fuerzas responsables de la región.

Un Egipto democrático por cierto sería un socio más confiable. Egipto ya logró alejar a Hamas de Siria y adentrarlo en una reconciliación inter-palestina. En lugar de competir por el papel de un intermediario del poder regional, como sucedió en el gobierno de Mubarak, Egipto puede sumar fuerzas con Turquía -cuyas autoridades fueron prudentemente invitadas por los egipcios a la ceremonia que selló la reconciliación palestina -para promover una paz árabe-israelí y un sistema de seguridad civilizado en Oriente Medio.

In a Hollywood courtroom drama, you know that the hero, set up by the bad guys, will eventually be cleared – but not before the noose tightens around his neck. Just when it looks like the accumulating evidence has condemned him, a sudden turn of events will prove his innocence and expose those who framed him.

If Turkey’s ongoing political-military trials ever find their way to the screen, there will be no shortage of such denouements. In a series of bizarre prosecutions, Turkish courts have jailed hundreds of defendants – military officers, journalists, academics, and lawyers – for allegedly plotting to topple the country’s democratically elected government.

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan promotes the trials as evidence of Turkey’s new turn towards democracy and the rule of law. They are also actively supported by news media belonging to the so-called Gülen group – a powerful ally of Erdoğan’s government made up of followers of the Muslim cleric Fethullah Gülen. In reality, the trials amount to a grave breach of the rule of law, with the judiciary transformed into a political weapon aimed at opponents of the government and the Gülen movement.

The cases are comical – or would be if they were not really happening in a country of 74 million people whose strategic importance is difficult to overstate. In fact, the prosecutions are riddled with such fantastic claims, imaginary conspiracies, outlandish fabrications, obvious set-ups, and credulity-straining plot twists that a Hollywood screenwriter who included them in a script might well be laughed out of the business.

Consider the “Sledgehammer” case. More than 200 military officers are charged with plotting a coup in 2003 to dislodge the then newly elected government. The prosecutors have what looks like solid evidence: detailed plans, ostensibly authored by the defendants, describing a series of ghastly operations to destabilize the country. The officers proclaim their innocence and assert that the coup documents are fabricated, but who is to believe them, given what the prosecutors, government, and major media say?

The trial has already had more than its share of movie-ending moments. Several defendants have shown that they were outside the country and had no access to the computers on which they supposedly authored the plans. Others appear to have misspelled their own names or gotten their titles wrong. Two forensic reports have established that the handwriting on the incriminating CD was forged.

Perhaps most dramatically of all, the coup documents contain much information that could not possibly have been known at the time, including references to companies, NGOs, hospitals, and many other entities that were established years after the plan is supposed to have been hatched.

Imagine the courtroom scene. The defense lawyer points to the key piece of evidence and addresses the prosecutor: “You, sir, claim that this CD containing all the incriminating documents was prepared by my client in 2003. Can you explain how my client could have known the names of officers on a frigate that joined the Navy only in 2005? Or the license plate on a vehicle that was issued in 2006?” The judge turns towards the prosecutor expectantly. Sweating profusely, the prosecutor has nothing to say. The judge brings down his gavel with a loud thump. The case is dismissed.

Or consider the case of a group of young officers charged with organizing a prostitution ring and stealing state secrets. The charges again rest on electronic files, supposedly found in the defendants’ homes. But the police made an elementary error that revealed the set-up: after supposedly receiving an anonymous tip about Ahmet A. (a pseudonym), they mistakenly searched Ahmet B.’s home – and yet somehow found the incriminating files among B.’s possessions. Ahmet B. is obviously not Ahmet A., and the only explanation is that the evidence was planted – in the wrong house. Ahmet B. was eventually released (after nine months), but the case still goes on.

Similar examples abound in other cases. A prosecutor questions a suspect about a plan to intimidate Christians before the police have actually “discovered” it. A journalist is jailed because his notes for an unfinished manuscript on the Gülen movement are construed as instructions from a terrorist organization. A senior police officer who has written an exposé detailing Gülenist prosecutors’ misdeeds is jailed after police find illegal recordings of intercepted calls in his office – which he had vacated days earlier.

Vindication comes quickly in Hollywood movies, but not in Turkey, whose courts have so far seemed oblivious to the glaring problems with evidence presented by police and prosecutors. Ludicrous cases proceed, and more people are being dragged into them. The mainstream independent media do not even report the inconsistencies for fear of provoking the government or the Gülen network.

These cases will eventually collapse under the weight of their collective absurdity. But the damage done will extend far beyond the suffering of hundreds of innocent individuals who have been locked up under false pretenses. The hope that Turkey is finally shedding its authoritarian vestiges and becoming a stable democracy will lie in tatters.

La mayoría de los ciudadanos europeos (por ejemplo, más del 60 por ciento en Francia y Alemania) creen que Turquía no debe pasar a formar parte de la Unión Europea. Hay varías razones para esa oposición, algunas válidas, otras basadas en prejuicios: Turquía es demasiado grande; los emigrantes turcos podrían inundar a los otros Estados miembros; Turquía no tiene una brillante ejecutoria en materia de derechos humanos; Turquía oprime a los kurdos; Turquía no ha resuelto sus problemas con Grecia sobre Chipre.

Pero la razón principal es, sin lugar a dudas, la de que se considera a Turquía, país de mayoría musulmana y gobernado por un partido musulmán, demasiado diferente. Como dijo el ex Presidente francés Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, uno de los autores de la Constitución de la UE: “Turquía no es un país europeo”.

Resulta difícil de aceptar para los miembros de la minoría secular y occidentalizada turca, que han pasado decenios, si no más tiempo, intentando demostrar su bona fides europea. Como dijo recientemente un turco muy instruido que trabaja para una organización internacional: “Jugamos al fútbol con ellos, cantamos canciones con ellos en la televisión, hacemos negocios con ellos, hemos mejorado en materia de derechos humanos y hemos democratizado nuestra política. Hacemos todo lo que nos piden y, aun así, no nos quieren”.

En efecto, dijo, al oírlo, otra turca, hablante de inglés con fluidez y que pasó mucho tiempo en Londres, trabajó para ONG en pro de los derechos humanos y fue encarcelado en el decenio de 1980 por oponerse al régimen militar: “Detesto a Europa. No soy europea y, en cualquier caso, ¿quién necesita a Europa?”

Buena pregunta. Mientras la crisis griega está rompiendo las costuras de la zona del euro, la economía turca está en auge. Desde luego, “Europa” fue durante muchos años un símbolo no sólo de riqueza, sino también de política liberal, sociedades abiertas y derechos humanos. Y la sociedad turca se ha beneficiado en gran medida de su intento –aún no perfecto, aún no completo– de estar a la altura de las normas europeas.

Pero cada vez hay más europeos desilusionados con la Unión. Lejos de ser un modelo de democracia, se asocia a la UE con un mandarinato arrogante y distante que emite normas y edictos con una paternalista y despótica despreocupación por los ciudadanos comunes y corrientes. Y algunos de sus nuevos miembros –Rumania, Bulgaria y Hungría, por ejemplo– no son exactamente parangones de democracia liberal y transparente.

Así, pues, si los europeos ni siquiera creen en su unión, ¿por qué habría Turquía integrarse en ella? En realidad, a la mujer que afirmaba detestar a Europa no por ello dejaría de gustarle mucho que Turquía formara parte de la UE. Su rabia era la de una amante desdeñada.

Los miembros de la minoría secular y proeuropea de Turquía, que gobernó casi continuamente desde que Kemal Atatürk fundó la república en 1923, están empezando a verse ahora presionados desde dos direcciones. Además de verse obstaculizados por la UE, una nueva minora más provinciana, más religiosa y menos liberal, pero no necesariamente menos democrática, una cohorte personificada por el enormemente popular Primer Ministro, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, los está desalojando de sus posiciones de privilegio.

Para esos turcos occidentalizados, la aceptación por la UE representa un salvavidas contra las corrientes del populismo islámico que representa Erdoğan y necesitan aliento, porque los islamistas de este último pueden ser democráticos, pero los secularistas, en conjunto, son más liberales.

Pero la antigua minoría privilegiada no es el único grupo de Turquía a la que puede beneficiar la integración en Europa. Las minorías se encuentran bien en los imperios, sobre todo en los benévolos. Como los catalanes o los escoceses, los kurdos de Turquía son partidarios de la integración en la UE, porque ofrece una protección contra la mayoría de su país.

El propio tamaño de Turquía y su población preocupan a los europeos y con cierta razón, pero ese miedo probablemente sea exagerado. Ahora que la economía turca está prosperando, habrá menos razón para que los turcos pobres busquen trabajo en otros países y menos aún para que los “invadan”. Y, si la enormemente ampliada composición de la UE impidiera la creación de un futuro Estado federal, podría no ser algo negativo. En cualquier caso, la adición de Turquía no constituiría una diferencia decisiva.

Desde la perspectiva de los turcos de mentalidad occidental, el orgullo de la integración en Europea tal vez sea menos importante que el dolor del rechazo, pero lo mismo se puede decir de los europeos. Si la república más occidentalizada, más moderna, más democrática del mundo islámico cayera en un amargo resentimiento antieuropeo, tampoco sería un resultado positivo para Occidente… ni, por lo demás, para el resto del mundo.

Turquía está en buenas condiciones para guiar a otros países musulmanes en una dirección más liberal y democrática. Además, con la posibilidad real de integrarse en Europa, Turquía estaría en mejores condiciones para desactivar tensiones reales y potenciales entre Europa y Oriente Medio. Sin Turquía, la actitud de la UE en Oriente Medio seguirá pareciendo imperialismo occidental.

La perspectiva de la integración de Turquía en la UE disiparía también la anticuada idea de que Europa equivale a cristianismo. No cabe duda de que las religiones cristianas contribuyeron a moldear la civilización europea, pero no todos los ciudadanos europeos son cristianos practicantes. Muchos de ellos en modo alguno son cristianos.

Si una gran democracia, con una mayoría de población musulmana, puede integrarse en la UE, resultará más fácil aceptar a los musulmanes franceses, británicos, holandeses o alemanes como otros europeos más. Quienes creen que los intereses comunes y las instituciones liberales deben caracterizar a la UE se beneficiarían de esa aceptación. Quienes buscan una identidad europea basada en la cultura y la fe le opondrán resistencia.

Lamentablemente, en esta época de crisis, nacionalismo en aumento y populismo cerrado al exterior, las posibilidades de que un país musulmán pase a ser un miembro de la UE son escasas, por no decir algo peor. Semejante proceso no se puede imponer a la población. Insistir en ello, contra los deseos de la mayoría de los ciudadanos europeos, apestaría precisamente al tipo de paternalismo no democrático que ha hecho a muchos europeos volverse ya contra la UE.

Pero la mayoría no siempre acierta y los tiempos podrían cambiar. Además, podríamos llegar a lamentar que no cambiaran con la rapidez suficiente.

Tema: Las recientes turbulencias políticas en el norte de África y Oriente Próximo han dado lugar a preguntas y reflexiones acerca de la posibilidad de que Turquía pueda ser un referente para los procesos de transición de la zona.

Resumen: Las demandas democratizadoras que se están produciendo en la región mediterránea y de Oriente Próximo han planteado numerosos interrogantes para el futuro, entre ellos, si Turquía puede ser un modelo a seguir por estos países. Si bien las experiencias propias de cada país no pueden ser exportadas directamente a otros, sí es cierto que la experiencia turca puede ser una influencia indirecta positiva en fenómenos de transición hacia la democracia en la región. Por otra parte, aunque Turquía ya cuenta con una discontinua experiencia en su proceso democratizador, éste aún no ha terminado y ha de resolver importantes conflictos internos. En este sentido, cabría la posibilidad de que las revoluciones en el mundo árabe influyeran positivamente en la democratización de Turquía, al promover más exigencias democráticas desde el interior del país y aportar, al mismo tiempo, energías renovadas con las que continuar las reformas.

Análisis

El modelo turco

Las recientes turbulencias políticas que han tenido por escenario el norte de África y Oriente Próximo han dado lugar a preguntas y reflexiones acerca de la posibilidad de que Turquía pueda ser un referente a tener en cuenta en los futuros procesos de transición de la zona. El modelo turco suele hacer referencia a la denominada “tríada”: democracia, islam y economía de mercado. Desde la década de los 80, el país puso en práctica toda una serie de medidas neoliberales que promovieron el desarrollo de una economía de mercado abierta al exterior. Si bien las disparidades con ciertas economías europeas son importantes, la filosofía económica es la misma. Por otra parte, en el plano político hemos de plantearnos qué tipo de democracia nos encontramos en Turquía en la actualidad y si verdaderamente está consiguiendo reconciliar las sensibilidades más religiosas con las posturas autóctonas laicistas más rígidas, afrontando así las dos cuestiones más polémicas de la tríada del modelo turco.

En primer lugar, habría que matizar que Turquía no es aún una democracia consolidada, sino que se encuentra en este momento en un proceso de democratización. El país está llevando a cabo una serie de reformas con las que se pretende superar el marco legal que se instauró a partir del golpe de Estado de 1980. El régimen resultante tras ese golpe podría considerarse como una democracia “defectiva”,[1] cuya puesta en marcha dio lugar a importantes restricciones en el ámbito de los derechos. Turquía, por lo tanto, está inmersa en una etapa de cambio y transformación.

Turquía es, por un lado, un país singular y complejo que está luchando todavía por librarse del legado heredado de una política autoritaria marcada por intervenciones golpistas. Por otro lado, Turquía cuenta con experiencias democráticas previas, un rico entramado institucional y una sociedad civil capaz de canalizar propuestas significativas de cambio. Tras el golpe de Estado de 1980, el país experimentó una transición dirigida por el Ejército que aseguró un papel determinante al estamento militar y recortó de manera sustancial los derechos y libertades individuales. Los partidos políticos ilegalizados en 1981 se fueron recomponiendo lentamente a lo largo de una década, pero la debilidad institucional y/o su falta de voluntad y convencimiento impidieron reformas sustanciales del sistema político.

El empuje de la candidatura de Turquía a la UE por parte del Consejo Europeo de Helsinki de 1999 dio pie a unas reformas globales del sistema, impulsadas primero, entre 1999 y 2002, por una difícil coalición de tres partidos y, posteriormente, por el marcado empuje del Partido Justicia y Desarrollo (AKP, en sus siglas en turco, que había surgido en el año 2001 como sucesor de una serie de partidos islamistas ilegalizados) tras las elecciones generales de 2002, que le concedieron la mayoría absoluta. Por primera vez en Turquía, todos los temas a debatir se pusieron sobre la mesa y tanto la elite política como la sociedad parecían coincidir en una sinergia a favor de profundos cambios democratizadores. Sin embargo, reproduciendo la metáfora de Gareth Jenkins, tras la apertura de negociaciones con la UE en 2005, la primavera democrática ha dado paso a un invierno democrático. El desgaste en el empuje democratizador se ha debido a diversos factores, tales como: (1) los mensajes de ciertos gobiernos de la UE descartando la candidatura turca y apostando por otro tipo de relación privilegiada; y (2) las desiguales políticas del partido en el gobierno, el AKP, que si bien ha luchado considerablemente para limitar el poder militar, no ha mostrado la necesaria contundencia para favorecer el pleno desarrollo de la libertad de expresión en el país, materia que preocupa especialmente por la censura en Internet y las causas abiertas contra periodistas. Esta falta de coherencia reformista del gobierno ha convivido con una oposición dividida que no ha sabido hacer suyo el proyecto democratizador.

En lo que respecta al AKP, el politólogo turco Fuat Keyman lo caracteriza como un actor político global, de centro-derecha, activo y reformista, que se encuentra cómodo con la economía de mercado pero al mismo tiempo también con la política filantrópica.[2] Su actitud decidida a favor del cambio, su imagen europeísta y su habilidad de gestión le han concedido victorias electorales en 2002, 2007 y 2011. Sin embargo, como afirma Keyman, dos cuestiones enturbian este proceso, ambas con importantes consecuencias: en primer lugar, el hecho de que el AKP haya igualado democracia con mayoría parlamentaria en un país de marcadas fracturas ideológicas y sociales, y, en segundo lugar, el hecho de que ciertas demandas por parte del propio partido de libertad religiosa hayan recibido prioridad frente a otras demandas de libertades y derechos. El partido ha fallado, por tanto, en establecer un equilibrio adecuado entre su compromiso con la consolidación democrática y su carácter conservador. El resultado es que en la actualidad, si bien la sociedad turca percibe en general al AKP como un partido conservador, hay importantes sectores que se muestran muy escépticos respecto a su compromiso democrático.

Las elecciones generales de junio de 2011 eran especialmente importantes porque una de las principales tareas de la nueva legislatura, si no la más importante, será la redacción de una nueva Constitución que sustituya a la aprobada durante el gobierno de la Junta Militar que lideró el país tras el golpe de Estado de 1980. Con 326 diputados, el AKP tendrá que pactar con las otras fuerzas políticas para llevar adelante este proyecto: el Partido Republicano del Pueblo (CHP, de centro-izquierda), que ha obtenido 135 escaños; el Partido de Acción Nacionalista (MHP, ultranacionalista turco), que ha logrado 53 escaños; y el Partido de la Paz y de la Democracia (BDP, pro kurdo), que ha logrado 36 escaños.

Existe consenso entre las fuerzas políticas a la hora de apoyar la redacción de un nuevo texto constitucional, pero también existen importantes divergencias sobre el contenido del mismo. La nueva Constitución tendrá que reconciliar visiones muy diferentes, como las nacionalistas turcas y kurdas, o las sensibilidades más religiosas y las laicas, entre otras. También se discutirá la propuesta del AKP de promover un sistema presidencial frente al actual sistema parlamentario, la autonomía política de regiones y municipios y la garantía de los derechos y deberes fundamentales. Otra de las propuestas legislativas será reducir el umbral electoral del 10% para acceder al reparto de escaños en las elecciones. Será ésta, por lo tanto, una legislatura que influirá de manera determinante en el proceso de democratización turco.

De todo este proceso interno, se ha de tener en cuenta para los procesos de democratización de países vecinos que, tras la transición y la instauración de un primer gobierno democrático, viene un segundo proceso, no menos importante, que es la consolidación democrática, tal como explica el académico Guillermo O’Donnell. En este segundo proceso, que es donde se encuentra Turquía, hay que estar muy atento a que las elites dejen de lado tics autoritarios y no ayuden a perpetuar instituciones no democráticas que les puedan ser útiles para sus propios intereses. También hay que asumir que los conflictos sociales soterrados bajo el silencio autoritario saldrán a la luz. Por ello, se requiere de una enorme voluntad de inclusión y de sinergias entre los moderados de las diferentes tendencias para evitar que se recurra a medios no democráticos para perseguir sus fines. Por último, el papel de organizaciones o terceros países, aunque siempre difícil, porque puede ser percibido como injerencia, puede ser positivo y hasta necesario. Se puede contribuir no sólo a aportar una determinada experiencia en el funcionamiento de ciertas instituciones democráticas, sino a ofrecer un apoyo material y no material que impulse las reformas políticas y a los grupos que las apoyan.

Turquía y el mundo árabe

Una encuesta realizada en julio de 2009 por el think tank turco TESEV en Egipto, Jordania, Territorios Palestinos, Líbano, Arabia Saudí e Irak demostraba que Turquía contaba con una imagen positiva en estos países. Se trata de una imagen que ha mejorado en los últimos años debido, entre otros factores, a la llegada al poder del AKP en 2002, la decisión del Parlamento turco de evitar el despliegue de tropas estadounidenses en su territorio para invadir Irak en 2003, la candidatura de Turquía a la UE, la respuesta de Turquía a los bombardeos de Gaza en 2009 y el enfrentamiento del primer ministro Recep Tayyip Erdoğan con el presidente de Israel, Simon Peres, en Davos ese mismo año. Junto a estas cuestiones, el informe de TESEV señalaba que las recientes transformaciones políticas y económicas de Turquía, como su nueva política exterior más activa en Oriente Próximo, habían despertado un nuevo interés por este país, el cual se había traducido en una mejor imagen para el mismo. La nueva actitud de Turquía hacia la región ha fomentado el estrechamiento de relaciones diplomáticas y comerciales con los países vecinos.

Un nuevo informe realizado por este mismo think tank en 2010, antes de las revueltas árabes, confirmaba que la imagen de Turquía en esos países incluso había mejorado respecto al año anterior. Incluyendo Irán en esta nueva investigación, el 85% de los encuestados respondieron que percibían a Turquía de manera favorable o muy favorable. Según la académica Meliha Altunisik, esta imagen se debe no sólo a lo que Turquía “hace” sino a lo que Turquía “es”. Es decir, al hecho de que haya puesto en marcha uno de los sistemas más democráticos de la región. En cualquier caso, habría que diferenciar la visión de la opinión pública de la de sus líderes políticos, los cuales pueden ser reacios a la influencia de Turquía en la región. Por otro lado, la imagen de Turquía no es monolítica: para los sectores más liberales o progresistas, el acento positivo se pone en su proceso secularizador, en su proceso de modernización y en su apertura política, mientras que los islamistas dieron la bienvenida a la victoria del AKP en las urnas en 2002 como muestra de que Turquía retomaba con fuerza su componente islámico.

La renovada victoria en 2007 y la actitud reformista e integradora mantenida por el AKP hasta ese momento incitaron a ciertos grupos islamistas de Egipto a Marruecos a sentirse identificados con esa tendencia, sugiriendo que ellos podrían llevar a cabo procesos similares en sus respectivos países. La experiencia positiva del AKP podría disminuir el miedo a lo “islámico”. Así, Essam El-Arian, de los Hermanos Musulmanes en Egipto, declaró que el éxito del AKP demostraba “que los islamistas pueden tener puntos de encuentro con Occidente y que los éxitos económicos del AKP y su relación con otros partidos políticos y tendencias en Turquía debían ser tomadas en cuenta”. Por su parte, el secretario general del Partido de Justicia y Desarrollo (PJD) de Marruecos, Saad Eddine Al-Othmani, declaraba para el periódico Le Monde que él tomaba al AKP como ejemplo.[3] En esta línea y más recientemente, tras las revueltas en Túnez, el líder del movimiento islamista Ennahda, Rached Gannouchi comentó en una visita a Estambul en marzo que la experiencia turca “inspira al mundo árabe” y que “los derechos humanos, las libertades democráticas y el progreso económico en Turquía, son los grandes apoyos que Turquía da al mundo árabe”. Si bien las experiencias propias de cada país no pueden ser exportadas directamente a otros, sí es cierto que la experiencia turca puede ser una influencia indirecta positiva en procesos de transición hacia la democracia en la región. Pero, para ello, Turquía ha de ser consecuente con su propio proceso democrático. El conocido académico Tariq Ramadan afirmaba que “Turquía debía ser una inspiración para nosotros los observadores” a la hora de facilitar la integración democrática de los Hermanos Musulmanes en la política egipcia. Será interesante analizar en el futuro las relaciones transnacionales de estos partidos con el AKP.

Ante las revueltas en sus países vecinos, Turquía se encuentra ante un dilema. La política exterior del AKP, abanderada por su ministro de Asuntos Exteriores, Ahmet Davutoğlu, se ha caracterizado por evitar la confrontación y fomentar la cooperación. Esta política de “cero problemas con los vecinos” tenía por contrapartida establecer buenas relaciones con regímenes de carácter autoritario. En estos momentos de inestabilidad política, Turquía se encuentra ante el dilema de apoyar o bien a los líderes de regímenes autoritarios o bien a las manifestaciones democráticas de sus ciudadanos. Si bien Erdoğan finalmente se acabó posicionando del lado de los manifestantes egipcios en las recientes revueltas, se le ha reprochado que no hiciera lo mismo con los manifestantes contra Mahmud Ahmadineyad tras las elecciones en Irán de 2009, o su relación con el presidente de Sudán, Omar Al Bashir, acusado de genocidio y buscado por la Corte Penal Internacional.[4]

En el caso libio, en un primer momento el gobierno turco se posicionó en contra de ser arrastrado a la intervención militar en el país, acusando a países como Francia de perseguir intereses petroleros. Hay que tener en cuenta que las relaciones franco-turcas son tensas por la oposición del presidente francés, Nicolás Sarkozy, a la entrada de Turquía en la UE. La desestabilización en el país norteafricano ponía en peligro inversiones considerables llevadas a cabo por más de 200 firmas turcas, que contaban con más de 25.000 trabajadores en la zona, los cuales fueron rápidamente evacuados. La intervención militar de la OTAN eliminaba el liderazgo de Francia en la gestión de la crisis libia y Turquía se mostró, finalmente, favorable a las operaciones de la OTAN. En mayo se decidió cortar los lazos con la administración del coronel Muammar Gaddafi, con la que se había intentado buscar una salida negociada al conflicto. El Consejo Nacional Transitorio Libio liderado por Mustafa Abdul-Jalil fue recibido en Turquía por el presidente, el primer ministro y el ministro de Asuntos Exteriores, lo que significó el reconocimiento a los rebeldes.

Respecto a Siria, el gobierno turco se encontró ante una situación aún más complicada. Las relaciones con el país vecino habían mejorado notablemente en los últimos años y se había eliminado la necesidad de visado entre estos dos países. Además, Turquía medió en las negociaciones entre Israel y Siria hasta la operación militar israelí en Gaza en enero de 2009. Erdoğan y el presidente sirio Bashar al Asad tenían buenas relaciones personales. Sin embargo, ante las revueltas sirias, el primer ministro turco ha ido endureciendo progresivamente su discurso y ha calificado de “salvaje” la represión de las mismas. También se ha posicionado públicamente a favor de las reformas que los manifestantes han demandado en Siria. Tras las elecciones generales celebradas en Turquía en junio, un representante del régimen sirio, Hassan Turkmani, fue recibido por Erdoğan. La prensa apuntó a que el primer ministro turco le habría explicado su oposición a la violencia del régimen sirio, su apoyo a las reformas políticas y su preocupación e irritación por el creciente número de refugiados sirios que había traspasado la frontera turca, que se elevaba a más de 10.000 a finales de junio. Sin duda, a Turquía le preocupa la caída del gobierno sirio y la incertidumbre que pudiera cernirse sobre el país, con el que comparte 800 km de frontera y un importante volumen de negocios, así como el interés por mantener la integridad territorial frente a futuras demandas kurdas en la zona.

Una influencia a la inversa

Por último, cabe plantearse la posibilidad de que las revoluciones en el mundo árabe influyan positivamente en este proceso democratizador turco. La UE ha perdido su posición de modelo democrático al que aspirar, una pérdida de credibilidad que no sólo se ha experimentado en Turquía, sino también en el resto de países de la región donde existe un desencanto con el papel jugado por la UE en los procesos de democratización de terceros países. Con todo ello, no hay que desvalorizar su peso concreto en el proceso de democratización turco, el cual se traduce en el día a día de las negociaciones de cara a la posible adhesión.

Sin embargo, la gélida mirada de la UE hacia las reformas democratizadoras turcas podría ser compensada por los nuevos aires de democratización que se respiran en los países vecinos, insuflando dentro de Turquía una revisión crítica y global del proceso en el que está inmersa. Como ejemplo de esta actitud está la crítica al AKP por parte de ciertos sectores de la prensa y del principal partido de la oposición, el CHP, ante la actuación de las fuerzas de seguridad frente a una protesta no autorizada junto al Parlamento en Ankara a principios de febrero de este año. En esa ocasión, cerca de 10.000 personas se manifestaron en la capital turca para protestar por un nuevo borrador de ley que podría endurecer las condiciones laborales para los trabajadores, siendo reprimidos con gas pimienta y cañones de agua. Inevitablemente, la prensa y el principal partido de la oposición aprovecharon este ejemplo para criticar la actitud de apoyar a los manifestantes egipcios, por un lado, y no escuchar a los manifestantes turcos, por otro.

Por otro lado, días antes de las elecciones de junio se convocó una acampada en Taksim –plaza emblemática de Estambul– por parte de jóvenes universitarios, entre cuyos eslóganes se encontraba: “Túnez, Tahrir, Madrid y ahora Estambul”. La acampada no tuvo apenas repercusión, pero es sintomática de que, sin duda, lo que está ocurriendo en los países vecinos se sigue en Turquía y podría tener un impacto específico en el futuro.

Al mismo tiempo que sectores de determinados países árabes van a evaluar los logros de sus transiciones en base a algunos criterios que provengan de la experiencia turca, como la presencia de partidos de origen islamista en las elecciones, o los logros conseguidos hasta el momento en el ámbito de la igualdad de género, en Turquía, inevitablemente, las reformas democráticas que tengan lugar en países de su entorno servirán de acicate para los sectores más reformistas dentro del país. Estos sectores pueden hacerse acopio de redes transnacionales que les apoyen y fortalecer sus argumentos con el ejemplo de lo que ocurra en los países vecinos.

Finalmente, no hay que dejar de lado otro posible escenario, una influencia a la inversa negativa. Es decir, si las revueltas árabes no avanzan con éxito y el clima que se extiende por el Mediterráneo y Oriente Próximo es uno de incertidumbre y desestabilización, el recurso de fomentar la seguridad a expensas de las libertades podría afectar a esta región, incluida Turquía, como ocurrió con los países europeos y EEUU después del 11-S.

Conclusión: Turquía no cuenta todavía con una democracia consolidada. Se trata de un país que está llevando a cabo su propio proceso de democratización, si bien se encuentra muy avanzado en ciertas cuestiones respecto a otros países del entorno, por lo que puede servir como referente. La igualdad legal de la mujer en este sentido es notable, por ejemplo. Cuenta también con una larga experiencia en política multipartidista y en la puesta en marcha de elecciones que ofrecen alternativas de cambio real en el poder. Sin embargo, aún debe gestionar la resolución democrática de importantes conflictos internos como las relaciones civiles-militares, la cuestión kurda o las restricciones a la libertad de expresión, que son ciertamente preocupantes.

Para convertirse en un referente democrático de la región, Turquía ha de afrontar antes sus propios desafíos políticos. Analistas turcos como Soli Ozel temen que, “la calidad de la democracia en Turquía corre el riesgo de ser eclipsada por la imagen de una Turquía democrática”. Es decir, un triunfalismo excesivo sobre los notables logros conseguidos en importantes aspectos del proceso de democratización turco puede relegar la necesidad de seguir profundizando en las reformas, dando lugar al mantenimiento de estructuras y actitudes no democráticas que envicien de manera severa dicho proceso. En esta línea, advierten que, ante los acontecimientos de la zona, sería negativo que se vuelva a dar prioridad a la estabilidad frente a la democracia, y que la UE y EEU vuelvan a apoyar a regímenes que están lejos de implementar democracias plenas y reales.

Si bien las experiencias de democratización no se pueden exportar de un país a otro, puesto que las nuevas instituciones deberán responder a la idiosincrasia propia de cada Estado, no hay que desdeñar el efecto contagio que se pueda dar lugar en estos procesos. El papel de Turquía en todo caso no puede ser el de la injerencia ya que causaría rechazo en los nuevos líderes. El AKP está llevando a cabo una activa diplomacia en la zona, un contacto constante con los partidos islamistas de los países vecinos que puede tener una influencia positiva en la normalización de estos partidos dentro del juego democrático. A su vez, el establecimiento de redes transnacionales a través de la sociedad civil puede fortalecer las demandas internas de democratización en los diferentes Estados.

Turquía puede servir como referente en determinadas cuestiones para los procesos de transición iniciados en el mundo árabe. También podría ser positivo el fortalecimiento de redes a favor de las reformas democráticas en el ámbito político y social con otros países de la zona, pero finalmente y no menos importante: la primavera árabe podría ser beneficiosa para Turquía si le aporta energías renovadas para su proceso democrático.

[1] Inmaculada Szmolka Vida (2010), “Regímenes políticos híbridos. Democracias y autoritarismos con adjetivos. Su conceptualización, categorización y operacionalización dentro de la categoría de regímenes políticos”, Revista de Estudios Políticos, nº 147, enero-marzo, pp. 103-135.

[2] Fuat Keyman (2010), “Modernization, Globalization and Democratization in Turkey: The AKP Experience and its Limits”, Constellations, vol. 17, nº 2, 2010, pp. 313-326.

[3] Citados en Meliha Altunisik (2010), “Turkey: Arab Perspectives”, Istanbul, TESEV, http://www.tesev.org.tr/UD_OBJS/PDF/DPT/OD/YYN/ArabPerspectivesRapWeb.pdf.

[4] Crisis Group (2010), Turkey and the Middle East: Ambitions and Constraints, Crisis Group Europe Report N° 203, 7/IV/2010, p.7; Nicholas Birch (2011), “Turkey: Erdogan Weighs in on Egypt, Ankara Confronts Democratization Dilemma”, 1/II/2011, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/62807.

Dans un contexte toujours marqué par une crise dont l’issue peine à se faire sentir, la Fondation Jean-Jaurès et la Fondation Friedrich Ebert, en examinant les réponses économiques susceptibles d’y être apportées et les propositions politiques de part et d’autre du Rhin, font émerger des pistes de réflexion fortes et initient un débat nécessaire.

Cet essai rassemble les interventions de Jérôme Fourquet, Jérôme Cahuzac et Joachim Poß lors d’un séminaire organisé conjointement par la Fondation Jean-Jaurès et la Fondation Friedrich Ebert sur le thème “Crise de l’euro, crise de l’Europe ? Regards franco-allemands” le 2 février 2011. Il s’agissait d’examiner à la fois les réponses économiques susceptibles d’être apportées à la crise et les propositions politique socialistes de part et d’autre du Rhin.

Les répercussions de la crise financière, qui a touché de plein fouet certains pays de la zone euro, ne cessent de se faire sentir en Grèce, premier pays à avoir bénéficié d’aides de l’Union européenne pour le rétablissement de sa solvabilité. Ces répercussions ont d’abord été sociales, notamment avec les contraintes salariales ressenties durement par les fonctionnaires, puis se sont vite traduites en termes politiques. Aujourd’hui, la stabilité du gouvernement grec se joue dans sa capacité à gérer ces ricochets de la crise en limitant la casse économique et sociale pour la population. Entre les plans d’austérité drastiques qui conditionnent l’octroi de nouveaux prêts et la dégradation de la note de la dette grecque par les agences de notation, les Grecs ont des raisons d’être pessimistes sur l’avenir financier de leur pays : dans ces circonstances, l’Europe n’a-t-elle pas une formidable carte à jouer ? La crise de l’euro ne permettrait-elle pas paradoxalement de donner une issue à la crise de l’Europe, que le traité de Lisbonne ne paraît pas avoir permis de surmonter ?

Si la mise en place prochaine d’un mécanisme permanent de solidarité dans la zone euro semble être une avancée non négligeable dans l’apurement collectif des effets de la crise, les sommes mises en jeu autant que les réticences des Etats à accorder ces aides conduisent à relativiser les espoirs dans l’amélioration future de la gouvernance économique européenne. Un peu partout en Europe s’élèvent des discours allant jusqu’à remettre en cause l’appartenance à la zone euro, accusée d’avoir été impuissante face aux perturbations économiques. Mais si la solution consistait précisément en plus d’Europe, en un approfondissement des mécanismes de solidarité et en l’élaboration de politiques coordonnées capables de pallier les défaillances de marchés ?

Jérôme Fourquet (directeur adjoint du département Opinion et stratégies d’entreprise de l’Ifop) se livre ici à l’analyse d’une enquête exclusive réalisée par l’Ifop pour les deux Fondations Jean-Jaurès et Friedrich Ebert. Cette enquête se penchait sur les opinions des Français et des Allemands sur la crise et l’Europe et montrait ainsi des convergences réelles dans l’inquiétude face à la crise de la part des deux populations, mais également de sensibles divergences quant aux mécanismes de solidarité entre les membres de l’Union ou du rôle attendu des institutions telles que la Commission européenne ou la Banque centrale européenne. L’analyse se présente comme un préalable aux réflexions politiques qui la suivent et lui répondent.

Jérôme Cahuzac (président de la Commission des finances de l’Assemblée nationale) revient sur l’origine de la crise de l’euro et son caractère symptomatique de la défaillance des marchés : en effet, si certains pays de la zone euro peuvent être accusés de n’avoir pas respecté les critères de Maastricht visant à garantir des finances publiques saines et un déficit soutenable, on ne saurait limiter à cette seule explication les causes de la crise connue au sein de la zone. Devant la preuve des limites du marché, il s’agit donc à présent de réfléchir à la mise en place d’une nouvelle gouvernance solidaire de la zone euro, qui ne soit pas une substitution du rigorisme aveugle des Etats à la myopie des marchés. Jérôme Cahuzac donne ici des clés d’analyse et des propositions concrètes dans la perspective de cette nouvelle dynamique institutionnelle.

Joachim Poß (vice-président du groupe parlementaire du SPD au Bundestag chargé des finances et du budget) s’interroge quant à lui sur les caractéristiques réelles de la crise que traverse l’euro et sur sa nouveauté. Il porte un regard critique sur les solutions politiques encore trop disparates apportées par les Etats. Son appartenance au SPD lui permet en outre de revenir sur la spécificité réelle ou supposée du regard allemand sur la crise et de questionner la possibilité d’une position social-démocrate franco-allemande commune, tant face aux diagnostics qu’en termes de solutions concrètes à apporter à la crise de l’euro.

Les trois exposés permettent ainsi d’interroger les différentes facettes de la crise de l’euro : ses origines et causes, mais aussi ses prolongements économiques et politiques et les réponses auxquelles elle a donné lieu aux différents niveaux institutionnels. La perspective franco-allemande permet d’éclairer les contrastes dans les réactions des opinions publiques et des décideurs des deux côtés du Rhin, et de dessiner les contours de diagnostics et de solutions partagés par la famille sociale-démocrate. En présentant les conditions d’un rapprochement des analyses, l’essai porte ainsi l’espoir de voir le couple franco-allemand redevenir un moteur imaginatif dans la conception de solutions européennes innovantes face aux situations potentielles de crise en Europe.

Pour lire l’intégralité de la note, rendez-vous sur le site de la Fondation Jean-Jaurès

Turkey often presents itself to the world as a model Muslim democracy, but it is in fact denying basic democratic rights to almost 20 percent of its population. The Turkish prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, was re-elected on Sunday by a large margin, and he now faces a major domestic challenge. Despite Turkey’s impressive economic growth and increasing international profile during Mr. Erdogan’s eight years in power, his government has ignored the country’s most important and politically explosive issue: Turkey’s oppressed Kurdish minority.

Kurds have been struggling for freedom and autonomy in Turkey for decades — often in the face of violent state repression. We will no longer accept the status quo. We are demanding democratic freedoms, the right to speak our own language in schools and mosques and greater political autonomy in Kurdish-majority regions.

Since Mr. Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party, known as the A.K.P., came to power in the 2002 elections, Turkey has deepened its diplomatic and economic ties with governments across the Middle East, and Mr. Erdogan’s public denunciations of Israel have made him a popular figure throughout the region. But while the prime minister frequently expresses his sorrow over the deaths of Palestinian children, he has not so much as mentioned the Kurdish children who have been killed by the army and the police in Turkey.

Last week, as Syrian refugees fled across the border into Turkey, Mr. Erdogan condemned the Syrian government’s violent crackdown on protesters. He neglected to mention the Turkish government’s use of tear gas, bullets and water cannons to disperse Kurdish protesters in April. Until Mr. Erdogan gets his own house in order, he is in no position to criticize his neighbors.

Indeed, it is impossible for pro-democracy movements in Egypt, Syria or Libya to trust the Turkish government when it neglects its own opposition, suppresses protests and denies the legitimate demands of the Kurdish people.

Mr. Erdogan’s government can follow one of two paths. It can seriously consider these demands, include Kurdish lawmakers in the process of drafting Turkey’s new Constitution, provide constitutional guarantees for the collective rights of the Kurdish people and accept our demand for autonomy that will allow for self-government and bring peace. Or it can insist on the policy of violent suppression that it has pursued to date. If the second path is taken, Turkey could enter a more intense period of conflict than ever before.

Unfortunately, Mr. Erdogan’s recent comment that he would have hanged Abdullah Ocalan, the imprisoned Kurdish nationalist leader, had he been in power when Mr. Ocalan was arrested in 1999 gives the impression that he is leaning toward the second path.

It was not always so. In a 2005 speech in Diyarbakir, Mr. Erdogan declared, “The Kurdish problem is my problem.” It seemed that he had accepted the failure of Ankara’s heavy-handed security policy and was setting a new process in motion. This “Kurdish opening” seemed like a step in the right direction; it offered the possibility of greater language rights, more autonomy and amnesty for antigovernment Kurdish militants.

However, it soon became clear that Mr. Erdogan was not sincere. Despite the Turkish public’s approval of the opening, the A.K.P. did not take serious steps toward resolving the Kurdish problem. On the contrary, it stepped up military operations, banned the leading Kurdish party, the D.T.P., and arrested Kurdish politicians, including me. (I was arrested in November 2006 and spent nine months behind bars, until I was elected to Parliament from prison and granted immunity in July 2007.)

Since then the government has largely ignored the Kurdish people’s grievances. Under the guise of an opening, it has continued the traditional nationalist politics of denial. Rather than meeting the demands of the Kurdish people, it seems that the A.K.P. is now dragging Turkey toward a new confrontation. The election of 36 pro-Kurdish deputies to Parliament will be the most effective check on the A.K.P.’s destructive policy.

As Turkey’s various political parties debate the drafting of a new Constitution, the resolution of the Kurdish issue will be of paramount importance — and this will require the active participation of Kurdish members of Parliament.

The unjustified arrests and military operations must come to an end and Turkey’s Kurds, after decades of struggle, must be granted the right to learn and pray in our own language and exercise self-government in our cities and towns.

Since 2002, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) has been governing Turkey with remarkable success in economic terms. Indeed, its record is almost unique in Turkey’s modern history, comparable only with the rule of the Democratic Party (DP), which came to power in the 1950’s, at the start of multi-party parliamentary democracy in Turkey, and ran the country for a decade.

The era of DP rule is ingrained in Turkey’s public consciousness as one of phenomenal growth and expanding freedoms. With the mandate it received in the June 12 election, and almost 42 years after the DP was deposed by a military junta, the AKP has emerged to set new benchmarks in Turkey’s development.

Indeed, unlike the DP’s leader, Adnan Menderes, who was brutally executed following a sham military trial, the AKP’s Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who will now begin his third term as Prime Minister, appears to have secured democratic political control of Turkey’s military and bureaucracy. Both institutions’ ability to challenge the results of elections appears at an end.

Turkey’s latest transformation began with the severe economic, political, and social turmoil of 2001, which then-Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit called a “crisis of the Turkish state.” That year marked the last gasp of the authoritarian/bureaucratic regime that emerged in the early 1920’s, and that had become so isolated from the public that its legitimacy had evaporated.

Over the years, that system had been captured by self-interested rent-seekers. Tension, and at times open confrontation, between a modernizing elite and ordinary people regarding the nature, function, and design of the state undermined the very capacity to govern. A political pendulum of reform and reaction, and of populist and pragmatic cabinets, weakened the republic for most of its history.

Unlike Japan, for example, with its de facto one-party government for most of the period since 1945, the lifespan of Turkish governments averaged around 14 months between 1960 and 2000. Whereas political stasis supported a development miracle in Japan, the inertia created by Turkey’s self-interested establishment resulted in a discouraged society with unfulfilled expectations.

With much of its immediate neighborhood convulsed in revolutionary change and in search of a viable road forward, understanding how Turkey moved from cronyism to economic dynamism is vitally important.

First, Erdoğan’s government recognized that change can deliver greater stability than inertia, which invariably breaks down chaotically as economic decline and political infighting take hold. Second, Turkey shows that an external anchor, such as membership in the European Union or pressure from the International Monetary Fund, can be decisive in triggering change and, therefore, in enhancing prosperity.

But the best way to understand what Erdoğan’s government has gotten right is to examine what went wrong in the “lost decade” of the 1990’s. That decade was characterized by low and unstable growth; low per capita GDP, at around $3,400 dollars; dramatically low productivity; an unsustainable fiscal and financial position in both the public and private sectors; average annual inflation of 70% for more than two decades; a lack of competitiveness, reflected in 10% unemployment; and widespread corruption.

Partly as a result of these factors, Europeans tended to refer to Turkey as “too big, too poor, and too unstable” for full EU membership.

Weary with crisis, Ecevit’s administration embarked on a comprehensive reform package– spearheaded by Minister for the Economy Kemal Dervis – that included a flexible exchange-rate system with a dedicated inflation-targeting regime. With this macroeconomic groundwork laid, greater economic, and soon political, stability followed.

In 2003 came the formation of the AKP’s first single-party government, which enthusiastically backed the country’s IMF-based stabilization program. Turkey’s adoption of a road map for full membership in the EU also created a strong impulse to follow through on painful reforms. Exceptionally favorable economic conditions worldwide at this time no doubt helped significantly, but the real credit must go to a government that stuck to its liberalizing instincts.

This consistency has paid off. From 2002-2007, Turkey experienced its longest period of uninterrupted economic growth, which averaged 6-7% year on year, while annual inflation has plummeted (it now stands at 3.9%). Moreover, the economy proved resilient following the global financial crisis, with growth recovering rapidly.

Indeed, annual real GDP rose by 9% in 2010. And, despite Turkey’s fast-growing population, per capita GDP has tripled since 2002, reaching $10,500 in 2010. As a result, Turkey is projected to graduate from “middle-income” status and enter to the league of rich countries by 2012.

Not surprisingly, Turkey’s capacity to attract foreign direct investment is now comparable to other fast-growing emerging-market economies. But serious problems remain. The ever-rising current-account deficit (6.8% of GDP in 2010) will require a second round of reforms. And unemployment remains stubbornly high, though employment is now more widespread than it has ever been.

For the first time in its modern history, Turkey not only resisted a serious global economic crisis, but also decoupled itself from the rest of Europe by rebounding strongly in 2010. This economic prowess, together with the government’s “zero problem” foreign policy, have helped make Turkey a leading regional power.

Turkey’s achievements form a case study in successful economic development. The question now is how Turkey will use its rapidly growing economic power.

Turquía se unió a la OTAN a principios de la Guerra Fría para obtener la protección de Estados Unidos en caso de un ataque soviético. En aquel entonces, Turquía se puso claramente en la primera línea; hoy, sin embargo, sus dirigentes están impulsando activamente una política exterior y de seguridad independiente, y su creciente confianza está poniendo a prueba la cohesión de la Alianza.

Mientras tanto, la cooperación entre la OTAN y la Unión Europea sigue estancada, debido a la disputa con Turquía sobre el Chipre dividido. Más aún, en agudo contraste con la mayoría de los miembros de la OTAN, Turquía sostiene que Irán y Siria no deben ser vistos como una amenaza. Y, en el punto álgido de la crisis de Libia, mientras los funcionarios de la OTAN preparaban planes operativos de intervención, el Primer Ministro de Turquía Recep Tayyip Erdogan hacía declaraciones en contra de la acción militar.

Como resultado, algunos dicen ahora que Turquía está dando la espalda a Occidente. Pero sería más exacto decir que Turquía está ampliando su alcance. Turquía, de hecho, puede generar tensiones dentro de la OTAN, pero su posición representa un astuto equilibrio entre la lealtad a la Alianza y el cuidado apropiado de sus propios intereses nacionales.

Cambios geopolíticos como el final de la Guerra Fría y, últimamente, el impulso a la democracia en el Oriente Medio, junto con el deseo de tener “cero problemas” con los países vecinos de Turquía, han creado nuevos objetivos para los estrategas de política exterior turca. De hecho, los líderes turcos están reduciendo la importancia de los problemas de seguridad de “poder duro” en favor de aumentar el poder blando del país, aprovechando al mismo tiempo las oportunidades económicas.

Una consecuencia principal de esta “des-securitización” de la política exterior de Turquía ha sido una alteración del equilibrio de poder entre las instituciones militares y civiles del país. Una consecuencia no menos importante es el cambio en la relación entre Turquía y Occidente.

En los últimos años, la colaboración para la defensa constituía un pilar de las relaciones de Turquía con Occidente. Pero se trataba de una relación asimétrica, en la que Turquía, como consumidor de seguridad, dependía en gran medida de Occidente. Las opciones de política exterior de Turquía se veían limitadas por la necesidad de mantenerse alineada con la de su proveedor de seguridad.

Hoy en día, sin embargo, la disminución de las percepciones de amenaza han modificado de manera fundamental este punto de vista y han reducido la necesidad de Turquía de actuar al unísono con Occidente. Por otra parte, la menor preocupación de Turquía por su integridad territorial ha disminuido considerablemente la influencia de Occidente. El aflojamiento de la relación de seguridad ha dado una mayor libertad a Turquía en política exterior.

Sin embargo, sería erróneo afirmar que Turquía se está alejando de la OTAN. Turquía sigue siendo un miembro activo e influyente, y espera beneficiarse lo más posible de ser parte de la alianza. Tiene un compromiso con la OTAN y su presupuesto militar cumple más o menos el criterio de gasto de defensa de la OTAN del 2% del PIB. También compromete tropas a las operaciones de la OTAN, en particular para la operación ISAF en Afganistán. El papel de Turquía en la Alianza es más activo que el de la gran mayoría de los demás Estados miembros.

Turquía está presionando a la alianza para adaptarse a los nuevos retos de seguridad y, sin embargo, se mantiene firme en su adhesión a las políticas de uso compartido de recursos nucleares de la OTAN. Turquía es uno de los seis países de la OTAN que han albergado armas tácticas nucleares de los EE.UU. por más de 40 años, incluidas 90 bombas de gravedad B61. La disponibilidad de las armas nucleares que hay en su territorio -una cuestión de semanas o meses en lugar de horas- ofrece poco valor estratégico. Sin embargo, Turquía siempre ha argumentado que una capacidad de disuasión nuclear creíble de la OTAN es vital para la defensa colectiva de la alianza.

En efecto, la posición de Turquía se encuentra en contradicción con los tres países de Europa Occidental – Bélgica, Alemania y los Países Bajos – en la actualidad piden una retirada de las armas nucleares de los EE.UU. de su territorio. Turquía insiste en que tales decisiones no se pueden tomar de manera unilateral, y que es necesario un consenso de la OTAN en su conjunto para cambiar este elemento fundamental de la disuasión nuclear de la alianza.

Turquía también participa activamente en la revisión en curso de las capacidades de disuasión de la OTAN, cuyo objetivo es lograr un equilibrio entre las capacidades nucleares y convencionales de la Alianza, y también apunta a aclarar el papel de defensa antimisiles en este contexto. Las autoridades turcas dicen que no se opondrían a un programa que fortalezca la seguridad de la OTAN. Pero temen el despliegue de un sistema de defensa antimisiles dirigido exclusivamente a los vecinos de Turquía.

Como resultado, los líderes turcos han establecido tres condiciones para aceptar dicho programa. En primer lugar, el sistema debe tener en cuenta los riesgos de seguridad actuales, basándose en la capacidad de misiles existentes de los países que no pertenecen a la OTAN. En segundo lugar, debe cubrir todo el territorio de Turquía. Por último, ya que Turquía no tiene ningún deseo de ser un estado en “primera línea de conflicto” en Oriente Próximo, como lo fue durante la Guerra Fría, se opone vigorosamente a que Irán y Siria sean identificados como amenazas directas.

Hoy en día, Turquía considera su pertenencia a la OTAN como sólo un aspecto de su política de seguridad más amplia. Su gobierno busca desempeñar un papel importante en los asuntos mundiales y, en consecuencia, sus políticas no siempre coinciden con las de la mayoría de los miembros de la OTAN. En última instancia, sin embargo, los líderes turcos no tienen ninguna intención de socavar la cohesión y eficacia de la OTAN. Por el contrario, su objetivo es afirmar la posición de Turquía en la OTAN para que la Alianza refleje mejor sus propios objetivos.

Les élections législatives qui se déroulent ce dimanche 12 juin en Turquie ont donné lieu à la campagne la plus tendue et violente depuis des années : affrontements lors de meetings, débats à la limite de l’échange d’insultes entre les dirigeants des principaux partis politiques, démissions suite à des scandales sexuels… Le jeudi 2 juin à Hopa, une personne a trouvé la mort durant un meeting du Premier ministre Recep Tayyip Erdogan qui a viré à la catastrophe lorsque les forces de l’ordre ont ouvert le feu et lancé des bombes lacrymogènes sur des manifestants.

Ce climat d’extrême tension peut sembler étonnant pour des élections dont les résultats ne seront vraisemblablement guère différents de ceux de 2002 et de 2007 qui ont porté, à deux reprises, l’AKP (Parti de la justice et du développement) seul au pouvoir. En effet, le parti d’Erdogan est donné vainqueur dans tous les sondages, avec des intentions de vote autour des 40%. Le parti kémaliste (CHP – Parti républicain du peuple) devrait encore une fois se classer deuxième et retrouver sa place de principal parti d’opposition, alors que le parti nationaliste du MHP (Parti de l’action nationaliste) essaiera de se maintenir au dessus du barrage électoral des 10%. Le parti pro-kurde du BDP (Parti de la paix et de la démocratie) présente, quant à lui, uniquement des candidats indépendants pour contourner ce même barrage électoral. Tout d’abord un premier constat s’impose : la décennie sous le gouvernement de l’AKP n’a pas favorisé l’apparition d’un mouvement politique alternatif, à gauche comme à droite. Alors que la Turquie a très souvent connu des gouvernements de coalition avec un grand nombre de partis (libéraux, centre droite, sociaux-démocrates…) depuis la fin des années 1980 et tout au long des années 1990, le paysage politique depuis 2002 s’est considérablement figé et stabilisé.

Pour autant, cette stabilité et l’apparente prévisibilité des résultats peuvent être trompeuses. Les élections du 12 juin qui renouvèleront la totalité des 550 sièges de députés à la Grande assemblée nationale turque comportent des enjeux capitaux pour l’avenir du pays. Une éventuelle grande réforme constitutionnelle, au cœur des débats, notamment depuis la révision partielle réalisée par référendum le 12 septembre 2010, constitue l’élément le plus important qui fait de ces élections législatives, de facto, une élection pour une assemblée constituante. Au pouvoir depuis bientôt dix ans, l’AKP a plusieurs fois déclaré qu’il procéderait à l’élaboration d’une Constitution entièrement nouvelle, qui enterrerait par conséquent celle en vigueur, élaborée par la junte militaire en 1982, deux ans après le coup d’Etat du 12 septembre 1980. Bien qu’aucun groupe politique ne conteste la nécessité d’une nouvelle Constitution “civile”, le premier désaccord concernait le calendrier de sa réalisation. Au lendemain du référendum constitutionnel de septembre 2010, le CHP et le BDP avaient exprimé leur volonté de procéder aussitôt à l’élaboration d’un nouveau texte, mais le parti de la majorité a préféré attendre les élections législatives et la composition de la prochaine assemblée. Cette décision correspond à une tactique assez simple et qui donne toute son importance au scrutin du 12 juin : au lendemain des élections l’AKP pourrait disposer d’un nombre de députés suffisant pour préparer et voter la nouvelle Constitution sans passer par l’accord d’aucun autre parti politique. En effet, la Constitution actuelle prévoit qu’elle peut être révisée avec l’accord d’une majorité des deux tiers des députés. Pour l’AKP, l’objectif ambitieux consiste donc à rassembler 367 sièges. Cependant, ce pari d’Erdogan a relativement peu de chances de réussir compte tenu des scores des deux dernières élections et des sondages d’opinion. Un seul scénario semble pouvoir créer une telle configuration : celui qui verrait les nationalistes du MHP rester en dessous du barrage électoral. Dans ce cas précis où dans une circonscription un parti remporte la majorité des suffrages, mais n’est pas en mesure d’obtenir un siège à cause du barrage des 10%, c’est le parti arrivé en deuxième position qui obtient un député (à condition qu’il ait dépassé, lui, les 10% à l’échelle nationale). Or, dans la plupart des villes où le MHP arrive en tête, le deuxième parti est quasi-systématiquement l’AKP. Reste à savoir si le parti nationaliste de Devlet Bahçeli va réussir à se maintenir dans l’Assemblée. Force est de constater que cette formation s’est affaiblie depuis 2007, particulièrement à cause du discours de plus en plus nationaliste du Premier ministre. Les résultats du référendum du 12 septembre 2010 étaient l’illustration de ce phénomène (seul parti à soutenir le “oui”, l’AKP avait atteint ses objectifs avec 58% de résultats favorables au changement constitutionnel, y compris dans de nombreuses circonscriptions considérées comme les bastions des nationalistes) et ont permis à Erdogan d’entrevoir sérieusement la possibilité de récupérer un grand nombre de suffrage du MHP.

C’est dans cette configuration de calculs politiques complexes qu’est survenu, courant mai, un important scandale qui a secoué le MHP, en poussant dix de ses responsables à la démission. Même si c’est un courant nationaliste se disant alternatif qui a revendiqué la diffusion des vidéos compromettantes, le leader d’extrême droite a de suite crié au scandale et accusé l’AKP d’avoir monté un complot visant à affaiblir le MHP. Dans tous les cas, soit le coup de théâtre n’a pas eu un grand impact sur le parti d’extrême droite, soit celui-ci a compensé la perte d’électeurs due à cette affaire de mœurs par le gain de nouveaux sympathisants qui y ont vu un complot. En effet, dans les intentions de vote, le score potentiel du MHP n’a presque pas changé et gravite très légèrement au dessus des 10%.

D’autre part, ces élections seront un véritable test pour le “nouveau CHP” et son leader Kemal Kiliçdaroglu. Celui que ses sympathisants surnomment “Gandhi Kemal” et qui a succédé à Deniz Baykal le 22 mai 2010, a radicalement changé le discours de son parti. L’ère Baykal avait vu le CHP se cantonner à une ligne réduite à la promotion de valeurs républicaines et laïques autoritaires, militaristes et nationalistes, et une absence flagrante de discours économique et social qui l’avait coupé du peuple, notamment des couches défavorisées. Kiliçdaroglu pour sa part, semble vouloir renouer avec la social-démocratie, censée être une composante historique du CHP. Depuis son arrivée à la tête du parti, il se range systématiquement du côté des ouvriers et des syndicats, tend la main aux Kurdes, semble plus tolérant sur la délicate question du voile dans les universités et propose un visage beaucoup plus humble et moins élitiste que son prédécesseur. C’est sans doute en partie grâce à l’influence de Kiliçdaroglu que, pour la première fois depuis 2002, les thèmes déterminants de la campagne ont été la pauvreté, le chômage, la corruption, etc. Autrement dit, le CHP propose un discours de gauche. Mais celui-ci est-il sincère ? Pourrait-t-il s’agir d’une politique concrète qui irait au-delà des déclarations d’intentions ? C’est pour ces raisons que les élections du 12 juin sont primordiales pour le CHP de Kiliçdaroglu. Même s’il n’a aucune véritable chance de les remporter, le parti kémaliste pourrait, s’il obtenait de meilleurs résultats par rapports aux précédentes (19% en 2002 et 20% en 2007), s’installer dans le rôle d’une opposition de gauche sociale-démocrate crédible, sûrement beaucoup plus menaçante pour l’AKP.. En effet, bien qu’étant un parti libéral de droite, et en l’absence du moindre parti de gauche efficace, ce dernier avait su remporter une grande partie des suffrages des couches populaires et défavorisées. Cette possibilité rend d’ores et déjà optimiste une partie de l’électorat turc de gauche. En revanche, ce scénario n’apparaît pas acquis pour autant. Kiliçdaroglu a procédé, dès sa prise de fonctions, à un changement assez radical concernant les dirigeants du parti. Malgré cela, il ne fait pas l’unanimité chez tous les cadres du parti. Même si ces opposants font profil bas pour l’instant, ils sont présents et il suffirait d’une contreperformance du CHP pour que l’avenir de “Gandhi Kemal” s’assombrisse. Certains proches du parti évoquent même un possible retour de Baykal, en cas d’échec aux prochaines élections.

Concernant la future Constitution, le CHP a émis un certain nombre de propositions très concrètes, qui constituent une rupture claire avec la ligne de Baykal : suppression ou baisse considérable (5% au maximum) du barrage électoral, révision de la législation sur la dissolution des partis politiques, voire même un débat sur l’objection de conscience pour le service militaire. Ces propositions ne sont pas si loin de celles du BDP. Le parti pro-kurde avait publié, à l’occasion du référendum constitutionnel en 2010, un modèle de Constitution. Ironiquement, le seul parti qui ne donne pratiquement aucun indice sur ses projets constitutionnels demeure celui qui se chargera (avec ou sans besoin de passer par un compromis avec les autres partis) vraisemblablement de sa rédaction : l’AKP. Le Premier ministre Recep Tayyip Erdogan continue d’exprimer sa volonté de passer à un régime présidentiel – et donc de se faire élire président de la République aux prochaines élections présidentielles –, mais cette réforme divise même au sein de son parti, le Président actuel Abdullah Gül y étant opposé. L’AKP a aussi plusieurs fois déclaré qu’il n’était pas favorable à la baisse du barrage électoral, qu’il considère comme un danger pour la stabilité politique et économique. A part ces éléments, aucune proposition concrète n’a pour le moment été exprimée par le gouvernement. Dimanche 12 juin, les électeurs turcs ne voteront pas seulement pour élire leurs députés mais de fait, une Assemblée constituante (même si malgré toutes les déclarations, il n’est pas garanti qu’il y aura une nouvelle Constitution).

Le grand absent de cette campagne mouvementée aura sans aucun doute été la question de l’adhésion de la Turquie à l’Union européenne. Assurément, dix ans après l’arrivée au pouvoir de l’AKP et six ans après l’ouverture des négociations, ce sujet ne fait plus partie des préoccupations majeures de l’électorat turc. Alors qu’au début des années 2000 existait un véritable engouement, le gel des négociations et l’opposition farouche de certains leaders européens, notamment Nicolas Sarkozy, ont créé un sentiment de désillusion et d’indignation dans l’opinion publique turque.

Désormais, les partisans d’une adhésion ne dépassent pas les 45%. Mais ce sentiment traduit une conviction que l’UE ne voudra jamais de la Turquie et pourrait évoluer rapidement si les Etats européens envoyaient des signaux positifs à Ankara. De son côté, dans une démarche populiste, Erdogan s’est servi de ce sentiment de désenchantement en multipliant les sorties intempestives contre la France et l’UE afin d’assurer son statut de leader courageux et charismatique.

Ces élections législatives seront déterminantes pour l’avenir politique de la Turquie, à court et moyen termes. Après dix années passées à gouverner seul, l’AKP connaît une nette dérive autoritaire (de nombreux journalistes en prison, censures de plus en plus importantes de sites internet) et tente de centraliser le pouvoir autour du gouvernement (accaparation de fait du système judiciaire). Même s’il semble acquis que, le 12 juin, le parti d’Erdogan sera une nouvelle fois victorieux, un recul du nombre de sièges serait un premier signe d’épuisement pour ce parti qui, depuis sa fondation en 2001 (juste avant les élections de 2002), a toujours été au gouvernement et augmenté son score à chaque élection. Si la configuration politique ne devrait vraisemblablement pas être modifiée à l’Assemblée, jamais les petits calculs n’auront eu une telle importance. L’intensité de la campagne électorale ne fait finalement que refléter l’importance des enjeux du scrutin.

Hace tan sólo cinco meses, Osama ben Laden estaba vivo, Hosni Mubarak tenía un dominio firme de Egipto y Zine El Abidine Ben Ali gobernaba Túnez con mano de hierro. Hoy, la rebelión popular y el cambio político se han extendido por toda la región. Hemos presenciado una represión brutal de las protestas en Siria y el Yemen, la entrada de tropas saudíes en Baréin y una batalla aún no concluida por Libia.

Para Europa, la “primavera árabe” debe hacer que se vuelva a centrar la atención en una cuestión en gran medida pasada por alto en los últimos meses: los beneficios de la adhesión plena de Turquía a la Unión Europea. Dadas las tremendas oportunidades que ofrecen las circunstancias actuales, las ventajas para Europa de la adhesión de Turquía han de resultar evidentes.

Como Recep Tayyip Erdoğan ha sido elegido para un nuevo mandato como Primer Ministro de Turquía y Polonia, país muy consciente de la importancia de la posición estratégica de Europa en el mundo, ocupará la presidencia de la UE al final de este mes, ahora es el momento de que la Unión y Turquía reanuden y recompongan sus negociaciones sobre la adhesión de Turquía.

El beneficio que Turquía puede aportar a Europa resultaba visible aun antes de la “primavera árabe”. Europa es, por definición, culturalmente diversa, por lo que la diversidad es el destino de la UE y, para que Europa pase a ser un activo protagonista mundial, y no un museo, necesita las nuevas perspectiva y energía del pueblo de Turquía.

En la actualidad Europa es a un tiempo mayor y diferente en comparación con la Europa de 1999, cuando se invitó a Turquía a iniciar el proceso de adhesión. También está experimentando una profunda crisis económica, que estalló hacia el momento en que se aprobó por fin el Tratado de Lisboa para adaptarse a la ampliación de la UE. Si se hubiera aprobado ese tratado en 2005, como se pretendía, ya se habría estado aplicando durante seis años y la presión ejercida por la crisis en la gobernación económica de la UE, tan visible en los recientes problemas de la zona del euro, habría sido mucho más abordable.

Pero la UE siempre afronta problemas, los resuelve y sigue avanzando. Hoy, no tenemos un Ministerio de Economía, pero estamos a punto de tener algo similar. Asimismo, el Banco Central Europeo tiene hoy capacidades que nadie imaginaba en 1997, pongamos por caso.

Un importante imperativo que Europa debe abordar aún es el de la migración, que sólo llegará a ser un problema mayor con el tiempo. De aquí a 2050, la fuerza laboral de Europa se reducirá en 70 millones. Para mantener nuestra economía, es necesaria la migración y unas fronteras de la UE abiertas… y afrontar los movimientos populistas en Europa deseosos de excluir a “los de fuera”.

La Turquía de hoy también ha cambiado espectacularmente desde 1999, tanto política como económicamente, cosa que tiene mucho que ver con el proceso de adhesión a la UE. De hecho, sin la atracción de la UE –su poder “blando” –, esos cambios no se habrían producido.

Económicamente, Turquía está ahora en el G-20 y está desempeñando un papel eficaz en él y, políticamente, Turquía ha surgido como una potencia con iniciativa regional, papel que se toma extraordinariamente en serio.

Concluidas las recientes elecciones parlamentarias y a punto de aprobarse una nueva constitución, Turquía está acercándose a un momento que hará época. Yo fui miembro de la Comisión Constitucional española que formuló la Constitución española en 1975 y 1976, tras la muerte de Franco, por lo que sé lo que es pasar de una dictadura a la democracia y lo importante que es que se formule una constitución por consenso.

La relación Turquía-UE comenzó con un acuerdo de asociación firmado en 1963. Ahora han comenzado las negociaciones sobre la adhesión y hay que iniciar el examen de 35 “capítulos”, que abarcan desde la agricultura hasta la energía, pasando por la competencia, el medio ambiente, el empleo, la política social y demás. Ya hemos iniciado el de 19 capítulos… menos de los que nos gustaría, pero el verdadero problema estriba en que sólo hemos dado por concluido uno y, lo que es peor, el ritmo de las negociaciones se ha aminorado. En realidad, en la segunda mitad de 2010, nada sucedió. Espero que en 2011 se logren avances sólidos.

Turquía y la UE se necesitan mutuamente. Ahora corresponden a la UE el 75 por ciento de toda la inversión extranjera en Turquía y la mitad, aproximadamente, de sus exportaciones y turismo procedente del exterior. Asimismo, la seguridad energética de Europa depende de la cooperación con Turquía en materia de tránsito del petróleo y del gas natural procedentes del Asia central y de Oriente Medio.

También nos necesitamos políticamente. Los vecinos de Turquía son nuestros vecinos; sus problemas, nuestros problemas. Los beneficios en materia de seguridad y las ventajas estratégicas para la UE de tener como miembro a Turquía serían numerosos, comenzando por la relación entre la UE y la OTAN, de la que Turquía es miembro desde hace mucho.

Asimismo, la participación de la UE en la resolución de los problemas actuales de la región mediterránea sería mucho más fácil gracias a la concertación con Turquía. En Bosnia-Herzegovina, la cooperación UE-Turquía es fundamental para lograr una solución duradera.

En 1999, Turquía no quiso pasar a ser un candidato a la adhesión, porque sus dirigentes consideraron que las condiciones serían demasiado duras. Yo estaba allí, hablé con el Primer Ministro Bülent Ecevit a medianoche y después con el Presidente Süleyman Demirel y, dos días después, Ecevit estaba en Helsinki para declarar oficialmente el deseo de Turquía de llegar a ser miembro de la UE y dijimos: Turquía será miembro de la UE. Yo apoyé la firma de aquel documento; lo mismo haría ahora.

En estos tiempos, difíciles e imprevisibles, pero cargados de esperanza, el mundo necesita que Turquía y la UE colaboren juntos. Eso no significa reunirse de vez en cuando y después decidir cómo abordar determinado problema. Significa algo mucho más profundo y muy concreto. Significa la adhesión de Turquía a la UE. Ése es mi sueño y seguiré luchando por hacerlo realidad.

Turkey’s election in 2007 was preceded by threats of a military coup. The 2002 one was overshadowed by an economic meltdown. This year’s poll, scheduled for June 12, could have signaled a move toward political normality. However, a nasty sex-tape scandal and a flare-up of violence in the Kurdish southeast have not only poisoned the political atmosphere but also fueled allegations that the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) wants to grab ever more power.

Polls have left little doubt that the AKP will win its third consecutive election in June as voters reward Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan for presiding over years of economic growth, relative political stability and Turkey’s growing international stature.

But Erdogan wants not only to stay in government, he wants to gain enough seats in the Parliament to push through a new constitution without having to compromise with the opposition. Since the AKP’s share of the vote stands at around 43-45 percent, Erdogan can hope for a supermajority only if the smaller of the two main opposition parties, the rightist Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) fails to pass the 10 percent bar for entry to the Parliament.

Once commended for his initiatives to make up with Armenia and to give Turkey’s Kurds more minority rights, Erdogan has now adopted a nationalist tone to lure voters away from the MHP.

His chances of doing so seemed to increase in late May when videos appeared on the Internet showing leading MHP politicians in compromising situations. There is no indication that the AKP was involved, but the fact is that the party could be the main beneficiary.

Meanwhile, the electoral commission sought to bar a handful of leading Kurdish politicians from running, which led to widespread demonstrations in the southeast and raised doubts how many seats the Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) would be able to gain.

While Erdogan is moving to the right, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, leader of the main opposition party, the nationalist-secularist People’s Republican Party (CHP) is trying a different gamble. Rather than accusing the AKP of seeking to Islamize Turkey, Kilicdaroglu has campaigned on economic opening and social safety. He has even mooted more autonomy for the Kurdish regions — something that may not go down well with the CHP’s traditional electorate.

Against the background of scandals, violence and shifting party programs, it is hard to predict whether Erdogan’s reach for a supermajority will succeed. For the sake of Turkish democracy, it would be better if it did not.

Turkey does need a new, more democratic constitution. But if the AKP gains 330 of the 550 seats, it will be able to push through a constitutional draft without support from the opposition and put it straight to a referendum. (If the AKP gained 367 seats, it could even to adopt the constitution in a parliamentary vote.) A “one-party” constitution would lead to further divisions in Turkey’s already-polarized political system. The opposition parties, together representing half of Turkey’s electorate, might well boycott a constitutional process dominated by the AKP.

Even among AKP supporters there might not be much debate: Erdogan has single-handedly struck 220 of the current 334 AKP MPs off the candidates’ list and replaced them with little-known loyalists. In a party that was once proud of its local roots, the top-down sweep has left many members cross.

Many observers suspect that Erdogan’s main objective in the new constitution is to move Turkey from a parliamentary to a presidential system along French lines. Already, the AKP has amended the current Constitution so that future presidents will no longer be elected by Parliament but by the people. The new constitution would presumably give the presidency bigger powers, commensurate with its popular mandate.

Most Turks expect that Erdogan himself will want to become president when Abdullah Gul’s term expires.

In Turkey’s already highly centralized system, a move toward a presidential system does not look like a good idea. It could lead either to rivalry and paralysis between a strengthened president and a traditionally powerful prime minister, both backed by a popular mandate. Or it could further erode checks and balances and reinforce autocratic tendencies.

In either case, Turkey’s chances of getting through its daunting to-do list, from improving the judiciary to creating jobs for an eager young population, would diminish. So would its hopes of entering the European Union, which would require a strengthening of democracy and many of economic and legal reforms. Sex scandals and local violence should not distract from the fact that Turkey’s future might be at stake at this election.

As the Arab Spring enters its fourth month, it faces challenges but also presents opportunities. Despite setbacks in Libya, Yemen, and Syria, the democratic wave has already begun to change the Middle East’s political landscape.

The national reconciliation agreement in Palestine between Fatah and Hamas, signed in Egypt on May 3, is one of the major results of this sea change. Other substantial developments are certain to follow – and Turkey stands to gain from them. Indeed, the Arab Spring strengthens rather than weakens Turkey’s position in the Arab world, and vindicates the new strategic thrust of Turkish foreign policy.

Turkey’s policy of engaging different governments and political groups in the Arab world has transformed Middle Eastern politics. Turkish officials have stated on various occasions that change in the Arab world is inevitable and must reflect people’s legitimate demands for justice, freedom, and prosperity. Moreover, change must occur without violence, and a peaceful transition to a pluralist democracy should be ensured.

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan sought to achieve this in Libya before the ongoing fighting in that country broke out. Erdoğan’s quiet, behind-the-scenes diplomacy sought to ensure a peaceful transition to a post-Qaddafi era. This gradualist approach complements Turkey’s principled position on the need for reform in the Arab world, including Syria, with which Turkey shares a 900-kilometer border.

Over the last decade, Turkey has developed different types of relationships with the countries of the Middle East, targeting improved relations with both governments and the public. Indeed, Turkey is probably the only country that has been able to promote relations at the two levels in the Arab world.

This engagement policy has paid off in several ways, in the process raising Turkey’s profile in the region. Arab intellectuals, activists, and youth leaders of different political inclinations have taken a keen interest in what some describe as the “Turkish model.” Turkey’s stable democracy, growing economy, and proactive foreign policy have generated growing appreciation of the country’s achievements, which has augmented its “soft power” in the region.

This is reflected in the Arab world’s lively debate about how Turkey has been able to reconcile Islam, democracy, and economic development. That debate, more importantly, is about how Arab countries should restructure themselves in the twenty-first century. The growing gap between governments and people in the Arab world has become an unsustainable deficit – a point that has gained new significance as the Turkish experience has gained greater salience in these countries.

As the Arab Spring unfolds at different speeds in different countries, Turkey continues to urge Arab governments to undertake genuine reform. Arabs deserve freedom, security, and prosperity as much as any other people, and Turkey stands to gain from a democratic, pluralist, and prosperous Arab world.

A democratic era promises to give the Arab world a chance to be the author of its own actions. It will also enable Arabs to develop a new paradigm for relations with the West, based on equality and partnership – a position that Turkey has come to symbolize.

Finally, Turkey’s policy of engaging various actors in the Middle East – repudiated by some as controversial, extreme, and even terrorist – has played a significant role in bringing at least some of these forces into mainstream politics. Given the new political realities in Egypt, Tunisia, and the Palestinian territories, as well as in Lebanon, Libya, and elsewhere, the more important of these actors are no longer secret or illegal organizations.

Simply put, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Nahda Movement in Tunisia, and Hamas in Palestine will all play important and legitimate roles in the political future of their respective countries. This means that Americans and Europeans will need to engage these groups publicly and directly, as Turkey has done. After all, they are now part of the emerging political order in the Arab world,

A democratic and prosperous Arab world will make Turkey’s standing in the region stronger, not weaker.

Imagine if back in the days of Watergate, Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein had been put on trial for being part of the very conspiracy they were trying to uncover. Then suppose a large section of the Washington press corps proceeded to pat federal prosecutors on the back for a job well done.

Such is the life of a journalist in today’s Turkey — a world in which the justice system punishes the innocent while the Fourth Estate turns a blind eye. Turkey now holds the dubious record for being the country with the most imprisoned journalists — 57 according to a report by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. There are as many as 1,000 other cases pending against journalists, many of whose only crime was rigorous reporting.

Yet Turkey is also Europe’s fastest growing economy, a candidate country for membership in the European Union, and a nation publicly committed to rooting out the antidemocratic and militaristic forces that have marred its recent past. Turkey should be a beacon to its fellow Muslim-majority nations in North Africa and the Middle East trying throw off the yoke of authoritarianism. But it cannot set an example so long as its own government refuses to tolerate criticism and a cowed media looks the other way.

Turkey has countless capable reporters and photographers eager to do their jobs. For years, these journalists treated the occasional encounter with the country’s antediluvian penal code as a professional rite of passage. I myself stood in the dock more than 10 years ago, charged with “insulting the army” in my column for a Turkish-language paper. I was eventually fired after the chiefs of staff — upset about my reporting on the Kurdish issue, pressured my editors to give me the boot.

But state repression is not the only problem; the jelly-like backbone of Turkey’s Fourth Estate is also to blame. Sadly, the most effective censor in Turkey today is the press itself. To adopt a stance critical of current policies is to position oneself in opposition to the government — and editors only do so as a calculated risk. Columns exposing corruption or criticizing the government’s sprawl-inducing environmental policies are simply spiked.

When Turkish newspapers try to speak their mind, they often discover their advertisers dropping out, explaining apologetically that they have “come under pressure.”

Some of the journalists currently behind bars have been charged in connection with a long-running conspiracy trial intended to dismantle what state prosecutors describe as a well-organized network — codenamed Ergenekon — that intended to provoke a military coup. Others are charged with defying onerous reporting restrictions on court proceedings, including the Ergenekon trial itself.

Most of the Ergenekon suspects are serving or retired military officers charged with plotting or carrying out violent acts in order to turn public opinion against the governing AK Party, which has its roots in an Islamic movement.

But recently, prosecutors ordered the detention of two respected journalists, Nedim Sener and Ahmet Sik, who were once supporters of the Ergenekon trial.

Sener’s reporting revealed that the police had stopped short of finding those really responsible for the murder in 2007 of the Turkish-Armenian newspaper editor Hrant Dink because the trail might have led back to the police themselves. Sik’s unpublished manuscript, which the police tried and failed to ban before it began freely circulating on the Internet, pointed a finger at a prominent religious group known as the Gülen movement. Sik’s book alleged that the group’s members, who have close ties with the AK Party, had penetrated the police force.

Last month, in my regular column for an English-language edition of the daily Zaman — which is affiliated with the Gülen movement — I argued that the government’s fight against antidemocratic forces was taking a decidedly undemocratic turn.

Though I am not a member of the Gulen movement, I believed that Zaman, like the Christian Science Monitor in the United States, could provide a platform for differing points of view. So I argued the obvious, that as a newspaper we had an obligation to defend Sik’s freedom of expression in order to protect our own integrity. The article cost me my job.

My former editor published a column justifying my dismissal, claiming that I had fallen prey to “strong and dark propaganda.” I am not the only one: Cuneyt Ulsever of Zaman’s rival Hurriyet had his column axed after being unofficially censored for months by a colleague who demanded that he revise passages the government might not like.

So this week, as we mark World Press Freedom Day, let us hope that those journalists languishing in Turkish prisons will be freed until the courts prove them guilty — and that their colleagues on the outside throw off their shackles to engage in proper journalism.

Syrian President Bashar Assad is in deep trouble. His murderous use of deadly force against his own citizens, reportedly killing hundreds, has not quelled the growing defiance to his regime. Images from Syria tell gruesome stories of snipers and security forces shooting unarmed demonstrators. About 200 members of his Baath Party have resigned in protest.

Assad’s troubles, however, also spell trouble for neighboring Turkey. Its prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, had embraced Syria and its inexperienced leader. Turkey may be able to help itself and Syria, but it will need to work closely — and may even have begun to do so — with Washington.

At Erdogan’s initiative, Syria and Turkey in 2009 abolished visas for their citizens traveling between the countries, held joint cabinet meetings and conducted small-scale military exercises. Turkish exports to Syria are booming. This type of integration has been the cornerstone of Turkey’s much-heralded “zero problems with neighbors” policy.

But the Arab Spring has caught Ankara off guard. Self-styled champions of democracy and human rights, Turkish leaders have been slow to criticize the murderous rampages of Moammar Kadafi in Libya and now Assad in Syria. Unsure whether Kadafi would survive, Ankara hedged its bets. On Tuesday, Erdogan finally called for Kadafi to step down.

Syria, though, holds a unique place in Erdogan’s imagination. He has genuine affection for Assad and has made a friend of a country that Turkey almost went to war with in 1998. The demise of Assad’s regime could undermine those gains. Moreover, the unraveling of Syria would not be pretty. It is a deeply sectarian country in which the small Alawite minority controls all the levers of power — the army, the intelligence and other security services, the sole political party (the Baath) and much of the economic base. There would be many scores to settle. With no visa requirement, tens of thousands of Syrians could end up at Ankara’s doorstep if the conflict escalates or gets out of control. All this makes continuing Turkey’s current policy very difficult.

Although such a policy may be understandable for primarily economic reasons in the region, Erdogan and Turkey risk losing much credibility. Turkey’s popularity with its neighbors is a function of the stridency with which Ankara has criticized Israel. Ankara’s silence in light of massacres in the Libyan city of Misurata and Homs in Syria has disillusioned many and made it look opportunistic. And ordinary Turks were shocked to see crowds of Libyans gather in Benghazi to protest at the Turkish consulate, burn the Turkish flag and accuse Ankara of being in league with Kadafi.

In the West, Turkey’s stand does not win it many friends. On Libya, the French and Turks openly clashed in public as recriminations abounded in both directions. In the United States — especially on Capitol Hill, where doubts about Turkish foreign policy have ruled the day — Ankara’s silence has been further proof of Erdogan’s insincerity and blatant one-sidedness.

Despite its imperfections, a democratic Turkey represents Syria’s antithesis, and Ankara could easily have taken a more principled stand. Erdogan has said that he has urged Assad to relax his iron grip. He sent his intelligence chief and foreign minister to Damascus to no avail. But he needs to do much more.

Erdogan might be sorry to see his “brother Bashar” leave, but he must also understand that a Rubicon was crossed when Syrian tanks invaded civilian neighborhoods. It is in the interest of Turkey and the United States that an orderly transition to a post-Assad era begin soon. The White House’s measured statements on Syria indicate that the Obama administration is worried that a bloodbath may follow any sudden collapse of the regime.

This is where Turkey can potentially play a crucial role by working closely with the West, and the U.S. in particular. There already are some signs of that. It is not a coincidence perhaps that Erdogan’s first, though still muted, personal criticism of Assad came after a telephone conversation with President Obama.

Few in the region can match Ankara’s assurances to Assad, who does not want to see a repeat of the Hosni Mubarak saga in Egypt. He needs a dignified exit strategy that ensures his family’s and the Alawite leadership’s well-being. This will require time to arrange — while Ankara works on this with the U.S. and Europe — and careful orchestration, because if hard-liners in Syria were to smell a sellout, they are quite capable of turning on Assad.

Turkey also possesses an important card to play with Assad. Were Erdogan to turn on the Syrian leader, the psychological and material impact on the regime would be dire. Turkey’s relationship with Syria had provided an isolated Damascus with additional breathing room and an alternative to sole reliance on its traditional ally Iran. Turkey, therefore, has an opportunity to demonstrate that its new clout is real and can be deployed for the greater good.

Introduction

Turkey’s EU accession negotiations completed their fifth year on 3 October 2010. However, despite annual declarations on the Turkish side that each new year would be ‘the year of the EU’, negotiations seem to be progressing very slowly and the prospects for their timely completion look dim. In fact, with 18 chapters out of the picture due to a variety of obstacles and the blocking of the provisional closure of any chapters until Turkey fulfils its obligations deriving from the Additional Agreement, the situation looks grim indeed.

The first aim of this paper is to provide the necessary background for placing the accession negotiations with Turkey within the proper context. To accomplish this, it first provides an overview of EU-Turkish relations, starting with Turkey’s initial application to become a member of the EEC. The overview aims to help put things into perspective by providing an account of relations from the start, including the establishment of a Customs Union between Turkey and the EU.

Secondly, the course of the negotiations themselves will be analysed, along with the reasons for the current impasse. In this section, the focus will not be to put the blame on one side or the other but rather to provide a list of the problems contributing to the deadlock. The section will also look into the deeper underlying issues.

In addition to the slowdown in the negotiations, new Turkish foreign policy initiatives have also caused some concern in both Turkey and the EU as to whether they imply a shift in foreign policy that could endanger its accession goal. Consequently, this paper considers the future of Turkey’s accession goal as the anchor of its foreign policy. Furthermore, the effects of Turkey’s foreign policy on the EU’s are briefly discussed with respect to contemporary developments in the Middle East and North Africa.

A Short Overview of EU-Turkey Relations

Turkey has decidedly looked towards the West since the declaration of the Republic in 1923. Europe was adopted as the model from the last years of the former Ottoman Empire and its foreign policy record is a clear reflection of this alignment. Turkey is a founding member of the United Nations (1945), a member of NATO (1952), the Council of Europe (1949), the OECD (1960) and the OSCE (1973) and was an associate member of the Western European Union (1992).

On 31 July 1959, shortly after the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1958, Turkey made its first application to join the newly-established organisation. The EEC’s Council of Ministers responded to Turkey’s application in 1959, suggesting the possibility of an association. The ensuing negotiations resulted in the signing of the Ankara Agreement on 12 September 1963, which entered into force on 1 December 1964 and marked the beginning of Turkey’s relations with the EEC.

The aim of the Ankara Agreement, as stated in Article 2, was ‘to promote the continuous and balanced strengthening of trade and economic relations between the Parties, while taking full account of the need to ensure an accelerated development of the Turkish economy and to improve the level of employment and living conditions of the Turkish people’. Article 28 provides the final target of the association: ‘as soon as the operation of this Agreement has advanced far enough to justify envisaging full acceptance by Turkey of the obligations arising out of the Treaty establishing the Community, the Contracting Parties shall examine the possibility of the accession of Turkey to the Community’.

The Ankara Agreement envisaged a progressive model of integration with Turkey, namely the establishment of a Customs Union (CU) made up of three phases: preparation, transition and the final phase’. The first phase, which aimed to reduce economic differences between the parties, started on 1 December 1964 when the Agreement came into force.

The ‘preparation phase’ was completed and the conditions for the ‘transitional phase’ were established by the signing of the Additional Protocol on 1 January 1973, which laid out how the Customs Union would be implemented. It provided that the EEC would abolish tariff and quantitative barriers to its imports from Turkey upon the entry into force of the Protocol, whereas Turkey would do the same in accordance with a timetable containing two calendars set for 12 and 22 years, respectively, and called for the harmonisation of Turkish legislation with that of the EC in economic matters. Furthermore, the Additional Protocol envisaged the free circulation of persons between the parties in the next 12 to 22 years. Moreover, Turkey was obliged to comply with EU trade policy and align its policies on competition and intellectual property with EC legislation.

Turkey-EU relations entered a period of instability that lasted from the beginning of the 1970s to the second half of 1980s due not only to Turkey’s political and economic condition but also to a shift in the Atlantic Alliance and the global economic downturn that hampered European growth. Following the military coup of 12 September 1980, the relations between Turkey and the Community virtually froze. The coup also altered the nature of the relations between them in that before the coup they were largely economic while after it democratic conditionality became more important.[1] In the first Association Council after the political crisis, in 1986, Turkey stated its intention to apply for full membership, which it did on 14 April 1987 on the basis of the EEC Treaty’s Article 237, the ECSC Treaty’s Article 98 and the EURATOM Treaty’s Article 205. The Council forwarded Turkey’s application for membership to the European Commission for its Opinion, duly issued on 18 December 1989, where it basically underlined Turkey’s eligibility for membership yet deferred an in-depth analysis of the application until the emergence of a more favourable environment. The country’s economic and political situation, as well as its poor relations with Greece and the Cyprus problem, were pointed out as reasons for the right conditions not being present. The Commission also mentioned that Turkey’s accession was also hindered by the EC’s own situation on the eve of the Single Market’s completion, as it prevented any considerations of further enlargement. The Opinion went on to underline the need for a comprehensive cooperation programme in order to facilitate the integration of the two parties and added that the Customs Union should be completed in 1995 as envisaged.

Under these circumstances, Turkey chose to give priority to completing the envisaged Customs Union with the Community and further strengthened its efforts. Talks began in 1994 and were finalised on 6 March 1995 at the Turkey-EU Association Council, with the adoption of decision 1/95 on the completion of the Customs Union between Turkey and the EU in industrial and processed agricultural goods by 31 December 1995. With this decision, the second stage of the association relations was completed and the so-called ‘final phase’ was initiated. With the Customs Union decision, Turkey-EU relations entered a totally new dimension as it was one of the most important steps for Turkey’s EU integration objective.

Having completed the Customs Union, membership became one of the priority issues on Turkey’s agenda and it attached particular importance to the EU’s current enlargement process. Despite all these positive developments, the Commission excluded Turkey from the enlargement process in its report titled Agenda 2000, issued on 16 July 1997. While the report highlighted the fact that the Customs Union with Turkey was functioning at a satisfactory level and that Turkey had demonstrated its ability to adapt to EU norms in many areas, it noted the same political and economic arguments against Turkey as in its 1989 opinion, while making no reference to the full membership objective, partly because Turkey had trouble fulfilling the Copenhagen political criteria. Following this, at the Luxembourg European Council Summit of 12-13 December 1997, where Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and enlargement issues were discussed, the approach was in line with the contents of the Commission’s Agenda 2000. In the document released at the end of the Summit, while Turkey’s eligibility was reconfirmed by the Heads of States and Government of the EU’s Member States, the EU decided on a strategy to prepare Turkey for the development of closer ties with the EU and to create a special procedure to review any progress made. With these decisions, the development of Turkey-EU relations was made conditional on certain economic, political and foreign policy questions, with the Commission being asked to submit suitable proposals to enhance them. The Turkish Government’s reaction to the EU’s attitude was highly critical: although it stated that the goal of full membership and association would nevertheless be maintained, it said that the development of bilateral relations would depend on the EU honouring its commitments and that it would not discuss with the EU any issues that were outside the contractual context of the bilateral relations as long as the EU did not change its attitude. This was a reaction to being left out of the enlargement to a further 12 countries and to the inclusion of Cyprus among the six initial countries with which negotiations would commence.

The Helsinki European Council Summit held on 10-11 December 1999 was a breakthrough in Turkey-EU relations. Set against a changing political situation that included factors such as the subsidence of terror in Turkey following the capture of the PKK’s leader Abdullah Öcalan, the adoption of a more inclusive enlargement policy by the EU –aimed at stabilisation following the Kosovar crisis– and the assumption of office by the Social Democrats in Germany, the Helsinki Summit proved to be a crucial turning point. At the Summit, Turkey was officially recognised, without any preconditions, as a candidate state at an equal level with the others. The Presidency Conclusions of the Helsinki European Council clearly stated that Turkey would reap the benefits from a pre-accession strategy to stimulate and support its reforms. This would also include an Accession Partnership, which would be drawn up accordingly, combined with a National Programme for the adoption of the acquis communautaire. Turkey would participate in Community programmes open to other candidate countries and agencies. It would also be invited to the meetings between candidate states and the Union in the context of the accession process. A single framework for coordinating all sources of EU financial assistance for pre-accession would be created. Lastly, the Commission would monitor Turkey regularly with its Progress Reports, a procedure it had started to implement in 1998.

The recognition of Turkey as a candidate for accession at the Helsinki European Council marked the beginning of Turkey-EU relations with the prospect of membership. As foreseen in the Helsinki European Council Conclusions, the first Progress Report on Turkey was published by the Commission in 1998. The report was also the basis for the first Accession Partnership Document.

As noted in the Helsinki European Council’s conclusions, the Commission started to prepare an Accession Partnership for Turkey which was approved by the Council on 8 March 2001. Meanwhile, the framework regulation designed to furnish the legal basis for the Accession Partnership was adopted by the General Affairs Council on 26 February 2001. The regulation combined all EU financial assistance under a single programme. This was followed by the presentation of Turkey’s first National Programme for the implementation of the Accession Partnership to the Commission on 26 March 2001. The adoption of these two documents finalised an important institutional procedure concerning Turkey’s accession strategy.

The Accession Partnership for Turkey, an important instrument of the Commission formed in line with its enlargement policy, was prepared within the framework of Turkey’s ability to fulfil the Copenhagen political criteria. The document comprises the short- and medium-term targets that Turkey has to fulfil in order to comply with the Copenhagen political criteria. The Accession Partnership Document is updated when deemed necessary by the Commission.

After the approval of the Accession Partnership by the Council and the adoption of the Framework Regulation, the Turkish Government announced its first National Programme for the Adoption of the EU acquis on 19 March 2001. The National Programme was submitted to the Commission on 26 March 2001. It was produced with a careful appreciation of the short- and medium-term priorities to be fulfilled.

The Copenhagen European Council Summit of 12-13 December 2002 marked another important turning point in the EU’s enlargement process. After the accession of 10 candidate states to the EU had been declared, the Copenhagen European Council resolved that if the December 2004 European Council –on the basis of a recommendation from the European Commission– should decide that Turkey fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria, the EU would open accession negotiations without delay. Meanwhile, the leaders of the EU Member States agreed to extend and develop cooperation on the Customs Union and provide the Turkish government with increased pre-accession financial assistance at the Summit.

Progress towards accession continued along the path set by the National Programme in the post-Helsinki period. The most crucial target at this stage was the opening of accession negotiations, which depended on ‘sufficient’ fulfilment of the Copenhagen political criteria. Turkey took a number of important steps to meet that conditionality clause. The most important among them were a major review of the Turkish Constitution, with two Constitutional reform packages and eight harmonisation packages adopted between February 2002 and July 2004. These eight reform packages modified 218 articles of 53 different laws. Compared to this marathon run of legislative change on diverse issues, from the abolition of the death penalty to extending cultural rights for minorities, subsequent reforms were bound to look somewhat limited in scope.

The European Commission’s Report and Recommendations were in line with the decisions taken at the 2002 Copenhagen European Council and were published on 6 October 2004. After thoroughly analysing the steps taken by Turkey, the Commission recognised that Turkey had sufficiently complied with the Copenhagen political criteria and advised the Member States to start accession negotiations.

The Presidency Conclusions on Turkey of 17 December 2004 were a historical landmark. Based on this recommendation, the European Council of 16-17 December 2004 reaffirmed the decisions taken at the 1999 Helsinki and 2002 Copenhagen Summits, as the Council took note of the resolute steps taken by Turkey in pursuing a comprehensive reform process and decided to open accession negotiations in the framework of paragraph 23 of the Presidency Conclusions. Accordingly, negotiations started with Turkey on 3 October 2005. However, both the Commission’s recommendation to open negotiations and the negotiation framework document include certain peculiarities, such as the stress on ‘negotiations being an open-ended process whose outcome cannot be guaranteed beforehand’[2] and the search for methods to ‘fully anchor Turkey in European structures’.[3] From the outset these measures gave rise to a certain sense of caution and were perceived as discriminatory by the Turkish public.

Negotiations: Impasse?

Screening was the first step of the negotiations but before long it became clear that the process was foundering under serious pressure. Despite the large-scale political and social support for membership in Turkey in early 2006, some major problems emerged that were to dominate accession talks in the following years. Instead of blaming one side or the other, the following section of this paper concentrates on the main reasons that contributed to slowing down Turkey’s accession process by trying to analyse the developments both in Turkey and in the EU.

The Cyprus Issue

An additional obstacle faced by Turkey is the Cyprus issue. Over the last few years, the Cyprus problem has poisoned Turkey-EU relations, partly due to the actions of the Republic of Cyprus as a Member State[4] and largely because other EU Member States support or hide behind this issue to block or slow down Turkey’s accession. On the other hand, Turkey’s accession negotiations, which are currently proceeding at a slow pace, risk grinding to a halt because of the chapters directly or indirectly blocked by the Cyprus conflict. In December 2006 the EU leaders decided unanimously not to open negotiations in eight chapters and not to provisionally close any chapters until Turkey fulfils its obligations deriving from the Additional Agreement –which basically implies extending the Customs Union to the Republic of Cyprus–. However, the situation is further complicated by the fact that Turkey claims that has fulfilled the obligations imposed by the Additional Agreement in the sense that there are no restrictions on goods produced in the south of the island per se. Turkey insists it is only blocking transport originating from the ports of the Republic of Cyprus.[5] The EU, on the other hand, insists that there is no practical difference.

This has brought Turkey to the point of making a choice between taking one-sided steps or not since the EU has failed to fulfil its promises to Turkish Cypriots in return for their cooperation in resolving the conflict under the auspices of the United Nations (the Annan Plan).[6] The EU’s unbalanced approach to the Cyprus issue, as stated by Ziya Öniş,[7] has reinforced widely-held perceptions among the Turkish public that Cyprus was being used as an excuse to place yet another obstacle in the path of Turkey’s membership. The Turkish-Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat and the Greek-Cypriot President Demetris Christofias have been negotiating the unification of the island under the guidance of the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon. However, despite claims that there is a commitment to find a comprehensive solution, there are certain key issues on which nobody wants to compromise.

The EU’s Internal Problems and Concerns

In a parallel process, The EU’s internal problems, such as the current financial and economic crises, have led to an increased ambiguity the in messages relayed to Turkey. Moreover, the messages are often championed by strong personalities or important leaders, such as Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel, who are in principle opposed to Turkish membership. The important point here is that more often than not the public in Turkey regards the EU as a monolithic entity and negative attitudes of some of it leaders, Member States and/or institutions are perceived as the EU’s real and unitaryposition towards Turkish entry.

Looking beneath the surface, the negative stance of some Member States rests on political concerns that can be explained by the fear of the Union fragmenting as a result of Turkey’s accession. This is accompanied by economic and cultural fears, massive migration from Turkey resulting in the loss of jobs and the erosion of European citizenship.[8] The issue of migration is a cause of great concern to many EU citizens, giving rise to much debate whenever Turkish membership of the EU is discussed.

In the 1960s Western Europe, headed by Germany, was in dire need of workers to continue the process of economic recovery after the War and Turkey was the solution. The first immigrants or ‘guest workers’ from Turkey were followed and joined by their family members. Today third- or fourth-generation Turkish immigrants have finally managed to integrate into the respective societies they live in. Turkey is no longer classified as a source of immigration but rather as a transit country for other migrants trying to reach Europe. Furthermore, as the latest enlargement demonstrated, people tend to stay in their own countries when domestic conditions start improving due to EU integration, despite the much better conditions next door.

There are numerous studies showing the number of prospective migrants for specified periods of time in the future. As an example, a simulation based on a reasonable methodology points to between 1.0 to 2.1 million for the 2004-30 period, but to 2.7 million for the same period if the accession process is endangered.[9] When the aging factor is incorporated into the data, the same study predicts that the total number of immigrants in the period would be reduced by around 300,000.[10] In addition, Turkey’s educated young population might come into demand soon enough, as population growth in the EU is stagnant. The EU’s population is getting older and there could soon be a need for a greater working-age population to support social security systems in the face of drastic demographic change. The report ‘Project Europe 2030 – Challenges and Opportunities’, prepared by the Reflection Group, claims that without immigration and with a constant rate of labour participation, by 2050 the labour force should decline by around 68 million workers and the EU will need approximately 100 million people to fill the gap since not all immigrants actively participate in the work force.[11]

In fact, Turkey has a young population whose growth rate has been steadily decreasing. The ratio of young adults to the total population is currently at 65% and will approach 70% in 2025 before starting to decline –a phenomenon known as ‘the population window of opportunity’.[12] Even if the fear of migration is one of the most striking arguments of the opponents of Turkey’s entry, immigration might even become a necessity.

The recent political and economic crises (constitutional deadlock, the lengthy approval process of the Lisbon Treaty and the world-wide economic and financial depression) created the current political environment in which opponents of enlargement have become much stronger and more vocal. In this regard, the rise of a right-wing populism that maintains that Turkey ‘does not belong in the EU’ has become a major element in the accession-talks’ slowdown. Bearing in mind that the precursor of modern Turkey, the Ottoman Empire, became a member of the Concert of Europe in 1856 and given the close involvement of Turkey in European affairs for centuries, these arguments are far from self-evident in any case. However, at this point it should be emphasised that questions relating to Turkey’s accession are most likely the reflections of deeper uncertainties and fears in the EU deriving from the pressures of globalisation.[13] Moreover, in the aftermath of the constitutional treaty process some segments of the EU elite have tried to cut corners by aiming to accomplish the impossible: namely, determining clear-cut borders for European integration. Historically, Europe’s borders have always been fuzzy and open to interpretation and such an effort to try and fit Europe into a preconceived geographical space has mainly been interpreted in Turkey as an effort to keep it out, among other things.

In this framework, another obstacle in Turkey’s path to full EU membership is ‘enlargement fatigue’ as a result of the dramatic increase in the number of Member States from 15 to 27 in less than three years. This has been the most complex enlargement phase in the Union’s history. Furthermore, the EU may soon find itself in the midst of a new wave of enlargement involving the accession of the Western Balkan countries. However, the responsibility for overcoming the fatigue and improving its ‘integration capacity’ lies with the Union itself and not with the candidate countries. It is often pointed out that enlargements have tended to strengthen the Union, foster its economic growth and reinforce its role in the world. Nevertheless, when it comes to Turkey’s membership, it is often argued that the country’s size, large population and economic development would disrupt institutional, financial and political balances within the Union. The EU, in order to ensure its integration capacity and to be able to honour its commitments, must first decide on the reforms it should undertake. Constitutional settlement following the coming into force of the new treaty, the revision of the financial framework and the redefinition of some of its policies are necessary steps that come to mind. Also, efforts by European leaders to communicate enlargement to the public and counter misconceptions should be strengthened if the accession process is to pick up its pace once more.

Last but not least, one of the EU’s primary concerns is the economic situation of Europe today. Europe was heavily affected by the world-wide economic and financial crises as a whole. The packages that were designed to help Member States are widely regarded as stopgap measures and the future of the Monetary Union is under discussion. In short, the EU is focused on its internal problems, with other issues such as enlargement being put aside for the moment.

Turkey: A Whole Range of Internal Problems

Since 2005 Turkey has also seemed to have succumbed to lethargy concerning the accession process. There are various reasons for this slowdown, but to analyse them at length is beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, the problems can be categorised under several mutually interrelated headings.

The first concerns the reform and harmonisation process itself. Turkey has undertaken so many reforms in such a short time that the country is still adjusting to the changes. Therefore, a certain lag between the formal adoption of harmonisation packages and their implementation is evident. The infamous article 301 on freedom of expression is a case in point.[14] In addition, the economic cost of adaptation of newly-opened chapters –the environment, for instance– is considered to be too much to expect unless membership is a certainty.

Thus, it is clear that reform in Turkey is a slow process that often moves forward by trial and error. In addition, such a comprehensive process is bound to create resistance, especially in society that is polarised on a number of issues. However, it should be borne in mind that polarisation is not between pro- or anti-democrats. Rather, back in 2004 there was strong cross-party support for EU reforms; yet, once the process intensified, a considerable part of public got the perception that the EU was starting to focus on welfare for only certain segments of society and on parochial interests rather than on the overall economic and social good.

Turkey’s latest ‘yes’ vote in the referendum on constitutional reform on 12 September 2010 has been taken as a positive sign by EU officials. With a participation rate of 73.71%, 57.88% of the voters said ‘yes’ while 42.12% said ‘no’.[15] There was a considerable debate about the content of the package and its implications, which is beyond the scope of this paper. However, it is no mistake to say that Turkey still needs many other changes in its constitution.

Secondly, as explained in the previous sections, the EU’s ambiguous messages have affected public opinion. Although public support for EU membership still remains relatively high (but down to around 50% from 70% in 2005), most people do not really believe that Turkey will become a member anytime soon. This decline in public confidence in EU membership has inevitably affected the government’s political will. Already facing resistance from parts of the elite, the government downplayed its EU accession rhetoric and allowed the process to split into two tracks, the political and the technical, to prevent the negotiations from coming to a grinding halt. While the political track has not moved since 2006, the technical track has progressed, although slowly. Moreover, the Turkish Secretariat General for EU Affairs has declared that it aims to complete harmonisation in all chapters by 2014. With this goal in mind, the National Programme for the harmonisation of the acquis was revised in 2009, a new chief negotiator was appointed and the Secretariat General itself was strengthened considerably through the recruitment of hundreds of new experts.

Third, Turkey’s focus has splintered into multiple issues since its internal agenda has become so complex. The country’s reforming energies are being taken up by minorities and Kurds, discussions about secularism and religion and the never-ending, seemingly all-encompassing, Ergenekon case.

Lastly, the fading-away of EU accession as a realistic political goal and the subsequent decline in public interest in the issue has led the government to stall on issues such as minority rights and even backtrack in certain areas, including freedom of expression and the existence of an independent press. Ratified this month, the European Parliament report penned by Ria Oomen-Ruijten also includes strongly-worded comments on these issues. Amendments relating to the recent arrests of journalists and the curtailment of freedom of expression have clearly underlined the need for a further effort.[16]0

All in all, including the last chapter opened by the Spanish Presidency, there are 13 chapters open with one provisionally closed. The Council decided not to open eight chapters and not to provisionally close any chapter until Turkey complies with its obligations under the additional protocol. Even if not officially declared, five chapters are blocked by France and six by the Republic of Cyprus (some of which are overlapping).[17] For the coming Presidency, only three chapters remain to be opened (Public Procurement, Competition Policy and Social Policy and Employment) if Turkey complies with the opening benchmarks.

It is clear that Turkey’s EU accession negotiations are not progressing effortlessly. The previous sections have provided a summary of the reasons for the slowdown in the negotiations. Yet, some commentators, both inside and outside Turkey, consider these reasons insufficient and provide another and more structural factor for the deceleration. It is claimed that Turkey has a new foreign policy and that, consequently, the EU membership goal is no longer the priority. The following section will look at these and assess whether policy priorities have been altered.

The New Turkish Foreign Policy and the EU

Since the first half of 2009 there has been increasing talk of a change in Turkey’s foreign policy in which EU membership is no longer the priority. The slowdown in the negotiations has affected both the public’s expectations and the government’s rhetoric and this has, in turn, led to genuine dissatisfaction with the EU. This is certainly reflected in both public discourse and some policy preferences.

In addition, there is another, more structural reason behind these comments. In May 2009, Ahmet Davutoğlu, a professor of international relations, was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs. A former foreigb affairs advisor to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Davutoğlu had long considered that Turkey needs to conduct its relations with other countries through a multi-pronged approach. In a book he wrote in 2001 he commented Turkish-EU relations, starting by providing a framework for the EU’s general perception of Turkey –with the caveat that a ‘single Europe’ does not exist–:[18]

‘[Europe] regards Turkey culturally as part of the Islam-centred East, economically and politically as an extension of the South. Because of this, Europeans regard Turkey as a hard-to-absorb element, and avoid saying “yes” to full membership, while keeping relations in limbo by calculating the potential costs of saying “no”’.[19]

Although written before the start of the accession talks with Turkey, the subsequent lull in the negotiations has reinforced this perception of Europe in Turkey. According to Davutoğlu, the remedy is to ‘strengthen Turkey’s geocultural identity depth and thus create fertile ground for new opportunities’.[20]

It is thus possible to analyse Turkey’s new foreign policy initiatives from a perspective of diversification. Consequently, ‘while Turkey pursues a policy of constructive engagement in its neighbourhood and beyond, full integration with the EU is and will remain the priority’.[21] In other words, it is only by establishing policy alternatives that membership can become possible for Turkey. This is the lens through which Turkey’s relations with its neighbours and other countries of the region should be looked at. Turkey’s recent track record of foreign policy initiatives also supports this discourse.

However, it should not be forgotten that Turkey’s foreign policy since the end of the Cold War has inclined towards diversification. In fact, a former Foreign Minister, İsmail Cem, summed up this discourse by stressing that ‘Turkey’s history was moulded in Kosovo, Bosnia, Edirne and Manastır, or any other Turkish European centre as well as in Bursa, Kayseri, Sivas, Van or any major Turkish city in Asia’.[22] Previously, much of this diversification went unnoticed because the global system was largely unipolar. The first sign of the change in policy was Turkey’s initiatives in the former Soviet Central Asian countries and, to a lesser extent, the Balkans. With recent changes in the global system and the rising importance of the Middle East, Turkey’s foreign policy has also begun to adapt to the new global parameters.

Even if the vast majority of Turkish experts working on foreign policy find the axis shift argument an ‘exaggeration and crude characterisation’,[23] it can be claimed that the recent changes have made Turkey’s foreign policy more independent and self-confident. Starting with a ‘zero problems with neighbours’ approach, it has continued with a more assertive stance, with Turkey effectively playing its foreign policy card. The attitude of Prime Minister Erdoğan at the Davos meeting of the World Economic Forum (January 2009) can be taken as a striking turning point.[24] His open defence of the Palestinian cause, the Gaza flotilla crises with Israel, the ‘no’ vote to the proposed sanctions to Iran at the United Nations Security Council in June 2010 and joint declaration by Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria to set up a free-trade area in June 2010 are all considered by many scholars to be examples of the axis-shift towards a more eastern-oriented approach.

But this diversification in Turkey’s foreign policy should not necessarily be seen as a threat to its European orientation. Moreover, Turkey’s new foreign policy initiatives should be considered an asset for the EU if they contribute to the resolution of crises and conflicts in the region. In this context, Turkey’s relations with its neighbouring countries can be interpreted as an alternative channel for the EU to exert influence.

This is also reflected in the recent report of the European Parliament, that underlines the need for an active policy and for further coordination regarding the mutual benefits to the Union and Turkey. In addition, it highlights the possible inspiration Turkey might provide to the democratisation and development processes in the Middle East and North Africa.[25]

Today, when analysing the developments in the Middle East and North Africa, it is clear that Turkey’s new foreign policy can prove to be an asset to the EU. Recently, Catherine Ashton, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security, was accused of being too ‘passive’ with regard to the crises in Tunisia and Egypt,[26] while Turkey’s reaction to the current events was praised and Turkey is presented as a ‘modern democracy’ and a role model to all these countries.[27]

In summary, good neighbourly relations are often cited as a requirement for Turkey’s accession and hence, from the perspective of the accession negotiations, the diversification of Turkey’s foreign policy is a necessity rather than a whim. Finally, it should not be forgotten that while Turkey’s recent foreign policy activism is an adjustment to global and regional developments, it has also partly been triggered by the EU pushing Turkey away and delaying its integration, hindering rather than facilitating the accession process.

Conclusion

This paper has attempted to provide an outline of the state of Turkey’s EU accession process. After giving an account of Turkey’s history with the EU and established that there has been a slowdown in the accession negotiations, it has explained the reasons for such a development. The current impasse has both the EU and Turkey to blame. The EU, suffering from enlargement fatigue and concerned about the challenges of integrating a big country like Turkey has been dragging its feet for some time. In addition, fighting economic crises is currently a full-time job, keeping other issues away from the agenda.

Turkey, on the other hand, struggling with reforms, distracted by internal affairs and affected by the EU’s lack of enthusiasm has contributed to the creation of a vicious circle,[28] fed by a mutual lack of political will. In fact, the slowdown in Turkey’s reforms and the move towards diversification in its foreign policy have raised concerns in both the EU and Turkey about whether EU membership is losing its appeal for the Turkish government. This diversification, however, is a separate process that has been in progress since the end of the Cold War. Moreover, the diversification of Turkey’s foreign policy does not necessarily constitute an obstacle to its EU membership goal. In fact, with the right decisions, it could even contribute to the process and benefit the EU itself.

Turkey’s geographical position and historical connections to the Balkans, the Black Sea, Russia and Central Asia should provide the EU with a greater say in the global arena. Also, as for its important role in NATO, Turkey’s EU membership should help consolidate both the military and civilian aspects of the EU’s common policies, especially the CFSP and the newly rechristened CSDP. An EU including Turkey will be more efficient in tackling global political and economic issues, ranging from the threat of terrorism to illegal immigration and drug trafficking. Turkey’s accession should also enhance the EU’s position in regions close to its immediate neighbourhood. In this respect, Turkey’s role in diversifying energy resources and connecting different routes to the EU will be an important contribution. Last but not least, the dynamism Turkey’s membership can provide should help to balance the EU’s internal equilibrium, which has at times seemed unsteady after the 2004 enlargement.

Appendix I. Turkey’s Accession Negotiations: Current Situation (February 2011)

Bibliography

Cem, İsmail (2000), Turkey in the 21st Century, Rustem, Nicosia, p. 16.

Cuperus, Rene (2008), ‘Europe’s Revolt of Populism and the Turkish Question: Perceptions and Misperceptions in the EU and Turkey, Stumbling Blocks on the Road to Accession’, Centre for European Security Studies (CESS) & Turkey Institute, Leiden, The Netherlands.

Davutoğlu, Ahmet (2001), Stratejik Derinlik, Küre Yayınları, İstanbul, p. 536

Davutoğlu, Ahmet (2009), Turkish Foreign Policy and the EU in 2010, Turkish Policy Quarterly, vol. 8, nr 3, p. 11-17.

Erzan, Refik and Kemal Kirişçi. (2004), ‘Turkish Immigrants: Their Integration within the EU’. Turkish Policy Quarterly, vol. 3, nr 3.

Erzan, Refik, Umut Kuzubas & Nilüfer Yıldız. (2004), ‘Growth and Immigration Scenarios: Turkey – EU’, Turkey in Europe Monitor, nr 12, CEPS, p. 123.

Independent Commission on Turkey (2009), ‘Turkey in Europe: Breaking the Vicious Cycle’.

Öniş, Ziya. (2008), ‘Turkey-EU Relations: Beyond the Current Stalemate’, Insight Turkey, vol. 10, nr 4, p. 35-50.

Öniş, Ziya (2011), ‘Multiple Faces of the “New” Turkish Foreign Policy: Underlying Dynamics and a Critique’, Insight Turkey, vol. 13, nr 1, p. 47-65.

Reflection Group Report (2010), ‘Project Europe: Challenges and Opportunities’.

Rodríguez López, Carmen (2007), Turquía, la apuesta por Europa, Los Libros de la Catarata, Madrid
[1] For more information, see Carmen Rodríguez López (2007).

[2] http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52004DC0656:EN:HTML.

[3] http://www.abgs.gov.tr/files/AB_Iliskileri/Tur_En_Realitons/NegotiatingFrameowrk/Negotiating_Frameowrk_Full.pdf.

[4] Turkey contends that since a legitimate government representing the whole island does not exist in Cyprus, Turkey does not recognise the Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus (GASC), which is referred to as the ‘Republic of Cyprus’.

[5] Turkey claims that if the blocking of transport of goods constitutes a violation of the obligations of the Customs Union, so does the arbitrarily-imposed quotas on Turkish trucks.

[6] In the referendum for settling the Cyprus dispute in 2004, 64.9% of the Turkish-Cypriot community voted ‘Yes’ to the Annan Plan while 75.83% of the Greek-Cypriot community voted ‘No’. Since the implementation of the plan was dependent on its approval by both communities, it was void (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cypriot_Annan_Plan_referendum,_2004).

[7] Ziya Öniş (2008).

[8] Rene Cuperus (2008).

[9] Refik Erzan, Umut Kuzubas & Nilüfer Yıldız (2004), p. 123.

[10] Ibid., p. 124.

[11] http://www.reflectiongroup.eu/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/reflection_en_web.pdf.

[12] Refik Erzan & Kemal Kirişçi (2004).

[13] Öniş (2008).

[14] The article was originally part of the new penal code prepared with the aim of bringing Turkey’s standards in line with the EU’s. However, the article led to some very controversial interpretations by parts of the judicial establishment. Facing both domestic and international criticism, the government at first advocated a wait-and-see policy, claiming that once the necessary case-law was established, the accusations under the article would dry up. However, the establishment of a viable body of case-law is a lengthy process. On 5 November 2006 government officials and civil society representatives met to discuss article 301. Consequently, several amendments to the controversial article were presented in early 2007. Finally, on 30 April 2008 the article was changed by an amendment to modify ‘Turkishness’ to ‘the Turkish Nation’. Also, a new amendment makes it obligatory to obtain the approval of the minister of Justice to file a case related with article 301.

[15] www.ysk.gov.tr.

[16] http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=MOTION&reference=B7-2011-0156&format=XML&language=EN.

[17] See Appendix for more information.

[18] Ahmet Davutoğlu (2001), p. 536.

[19] Ibid., p. 549.

[20] Ibid., p. 546.

[21] Ahmet Davutoğlu (2009), p. 11-17.

[22] İsmail Cem (2000), p.16.

[23] Ziya Öniş (2011), p. 47-65.

[24] Ibid.

[25] http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=MOTION&reference=B7-2011-0156&format=XML&language=EN.

[26] http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Eurocamara/arremete/Ashton/dejar/pasar/tren/historia/Egipto/elpepuint/20110203elpepiint_6/Tes.

[27] http://www.elpais.com/articulo/opinion/Turquia/democratica/modelo/elpepiopi/20110210elpepiopi_11/Tes.

[28] Independent Commission on Turkey (2009).

This is my last column for a while. I am off to become Chairman of the BBC Trust – the strategic authority of one of the greatest broadcasting organizations in the world. So I have to take a Sicilian vow of omerta on controversial issues for the term of my chairmanship. That makes for boring commentary: better to put down my pen.

It’s in my hand on this occasion as I look out over the Bosphorus on a glittering March morning. Yesterday, there were flurries of snow in Istanbul. But today the sun glints across the water to the Asian coastline of the city; the seagulls bank in the breeze; a great liner sails majestically north towards the Black Sea. It’s a “good-to-be-alive” sort of day.

But I always feel like that in Istanbul, a great city where so much world history has been forged. And it’s the city where Europe’s future may be shaped – Istanbul, not Brussels, Paris, or Berlin. Let me explain.

Europe’s current political identity emerged from its recent history. In the nineteenth century, the Continent’s share of the world’s population increased from one-fifth to one-quarter. That helped European countries dominate the century as expansionist colonial powers. But it also created competitive pressures for living space, with much of the struggle crystalizing in the antagonism between France and an emerging Germany.

The result was three wars in 70 years. You can see the consequences in the sprawling cemeteries of northern and eastern France and the borderlands of central Europe. And we dragged others into our struggles. Look at all the Indian names carved on the memorial arches in Picardy. I recall the war memorial in a tiny village north of Queenstown in the heart of “Lord of the Rings” country on the South Island of New Zealand. Thousands of miles from the bloody fields of France, 26 young New Zealanders who died there are remembered on a granite cross.

So, in the days when Europe worshipped Mars, the God of War, the rest of the world was often drawn into our continental battles. We Europeans were dangerous to each other, and it was often even more dangerous to be one of our friends.

The creation of the European Union was how we Europeans tried to prevent another war. France and Germany were joined at the hip – economic cooperation was meant to lead to closer political union. Around this historic compromise other countries circled, including those, like the United Kingdom, that were originally skeptical of the entire enterprise. We were already all drawn toward it, and our peace and prosperity were consolidated.

It worked far better than the doubters ever imagined was possible – indeed, perhaps even better than its progenitors expected. A vast single market was created. Sovereignty was shared and transformed in areas like trade and the environment. A union with 7% of the world’s population produced 22% of its output, a larger share than the United States, almost twice that of China, and 4-5 times that of India.

The European economic giant aspired to a global political role, but here reality swept in. The Mars of the twentieth century is a lot less sure of itself in the twenty-first. Until the United Nations-backed Libyan intervention, Europe seemed increasingly a bystander in international affairs, and even its participation in Libya is largely a Franco-British affair, with Germany opting out and choosing a quiet life.

So what is the point of Europe today? Tell my children that the EU is there to prevent us from fighting one another again, and their reply is blunt: “Of course we are not going to fight.” Europe’s moral purpose today is an existential question that all Europeans must consider.

For me the answer is to be found in Turkey. Europe with Turkey as a member would naturally be a more dynamic economy. Turkey is a regional energy hub. It has clout and respect in its own region with formidable fighting forces. And, above all, Turkey is now a role model for other Islamic societies striving to accommodate democracy, civil liberties, the rule of law, an open economy, pluralism, and religion.

As an EU member, Turkey would add a new dimension of massive historic importance. Europeans would show that we could embrace an Islamic democracy and build a strong bridge between Europe and Western Asia.

That, in turn, would create a new European identity and narrative, a new reason for the EU to exist in this century, a way of rejecting the divisive politics of old. I hope that by the time I take up my pen again, we will be on our way to this destination. If not, then many of us will find it increasingly difficult to see Europe as anything more than a glorified customs union with political ambitions that are far too big for its boots.

¡Cuánto ha cambiado en un año el debate sobre el papel de Turquía como modelo para sus vecinos de Oriente Próximo! El verano pasado, los expertos occidentales discutían si el “modelo turco” era o no un régimen islamista que podía ser pernicioso, volverse en contra de sus socios de Occidente o forjar una alianza anti-Israel con un Irán nuclearizado. Hoy, los comentaristas valoran los méritos de Turquía como modelo de estabilidad laica y democrática, un ejemplo para una región que intenta encontrar la forma de salir de una tempestad de opresión y rebeliones.

La rapidez de este cambio demuestra lo superficiales que pueden ser estos debates. Ni Occidente ni Oriente Próximo se dan cuenta de que el “modelo turco” no puede amoldarse a un solo bloque ni un solo marco. Hace mucho que el país es muchas cosas y ninguna: negocia la integración en la UE, pero tiene cada vez menos esperanzas de que llegue pronto; es un país musulmán, dirigido por un primer ministro devoto y exislamista, pero en el que las instituciones laicas y la sociedad representan un factor de equilibrio fundamental.

Eso no significa que no pueda cambiar nada, solo que el cambio ha sido lento desde que Turquía inició un firme camino de modernización en 1923. Oriente Próximo tardará mucho en ponerse al día, y ni Turquía ni ningún otro país puede servir de modelo único para la transformación de la zona. Pero tanto los nuevos movimientos políticos como las viejas clases dirigentes de muchos países pueden y quieren aprender unas cuantas cosas fundamentales de la experiencia turca.

La más importante es que Turquía parece haber alcanzado un equilibrio entre ideologías que está ausente en la mayor parte de la región. El autoritarismo, el militarismo, el estatalismo, el fundamentalismo religioso y el nacionalismo están compensados por las instituciones democráticas, la tradición de Estado, la economía de libre mercado y la apertura creciente al mundo. Cuando una tendencia se acentúa demasiado, surge una fuerza opuesta para contrarrestarla: a veces en forma de partidos políticos, como grupos empresariales, en los medios de comunicación e incluso en la sociedad civil.

Un elemento que garantiza este sistema de controles y equilibrios en Turquía es su legitimidad democrática. El país ya no es un sistema autoritario, sino un sistema multipartidista, en una trayectoria difícil pero continua desde hace 60 años. Queda mucho por hacer: por ejemplo profundizar la democracia interna de los partidos, bajar el límite del 10% de votos para que un partido acceda al Parlamento y dar más eficacia a la labor legisladora de la Cámara. Pero las elecciones son, sin lugar a dudas, libres, limpias y legítimas.

Turquía ha conseguido asimismo reducir el papel del Ejército. Hace solo cuatro años, los militares intentaron impedir que tomara posesión el presidente escogido por el AKP (el partido Justicia y Desarrollo, en el poder), pero, cuando el partido decidió convocar unas elecciones anticipadas para resolver la cuestión, el 47% de los turcos votó a su favor. Los países vecinos, que durante mucho tiempo habían considerado Turquía como un país gobernado por un Ejército laico, impío y apoyado por Estados Unidos, observan hoy con admiración de qué forma tan clara, genuina y pacífica puede ejercer el poder político un Gobierno representativo de la mayoría religiosa.

La base que ha facilitado esta evolución es el sólido crecimiento económico del país, que ha pasado de ser una economía controlada por el Estado a tener un enérgico sector privado, mientras que Estambul se ha convertido en un centro económico regional que rivaliza con las capitales europeas.

El modelo turco, pues, es una mezcla de muchos elementos. Pero no es fácil copiarlo debido a tres factores específicos. En primer lugar, las reformas se han beneficiado enormemente de un proceso de integración en la UE al que no puede aspirar ningún otro país de Oriente Próximo. Segundo, la economía no ha tenido más remedio que desarrollarse sin los ingresos del petróleo, bendición y maldición de tantos Gobiernos de la región. Y tercero, Turquía se sostiene sobre la profunda lealtad al complejo Estado heredado del Imperio Otomano, una situación a la que solo se aproximan Egipto e Irán.

En busca de nuevas oportunidades, Turquía se ha ido abriendo a la región. Ankara sufrió durante mucho tiempo la subversión política y beligerante de sus vecinos, y, sobre todo desde finales de los años noventa, ha intentado cerrar brechas, promover la estabilidad y así adquirir nuevos mercados para su economía en expansión. El AKP aportó nuevas energías a este compromiso cuando llegó al poder en 2002 y proclamó una política exterior de “cero problemas”.

El esfuerzo más consciente del AKP de servir de modelo es su intento, desde 2009, de promover la interdependencia regional, siguiendo de forma explícita las lecciones sobre resolución de conflictos extraídas de la integración europea tras la II Guerra Mundial. Ankara está eliminando las restricciones de visados, organizando reuniones bianuales entre ministros, construyendo infraestructuras complementarias, simplificando los puestos fronterizos y negociando áreas de libre comercio que pronto pueden ser multilaterales si se desarrolla plenamente un acuerdo entre Turquía, Siria, Líbano y Jordania.

Algunos idealistas como el ministro de Exteriores turco, Ahmet Davutoglu, han ido más allá y hablan de una región en la que las comunidades vuelvan a unirse después de las divisiones artificiales de los periodos colonial y poscolonial. Existe también una dimensión emocional, porque los dirigentes del AKP comparan la cálida acogida que reciben de sus homólogos musulmanes con los desaires e incluso insultos mutuos que se han vuelto habituales en las relaciones de Turquía con Europa.

Además, Ankara da muestras de una nueva independencia de ideas que resulta atractiva para el resto de la región. Los líderes del AKP hablan sin reparo de las injusticias contra los palestinos, negaron permiso a las tropas estadounidenses para cruzar el territorio turco con el fin de invadir Irak en 2003 y han tratado de contrarrestar el azote de las sanciones económicas de Occidente que parecen castigar a los pueblos de Oriente Próximo más que a los regímenes autoritarios que constituyen su objetivo. Sin embargo, al mismo tiempo, Turquía mantiene su capacidad de expresar estas opiniones desde su cercanía a la UE y su pertenencia a instituciones clave como la OTAN.

Sin embargo, la agitación de los últimos meses en Oriente Próximo ha dejado claro que, la realpolitik sigue siendo tan importante para Ankara como las frases grandiosas sobre hermandad regional y democracia. Turquía ha pronunciado palabras intachables de apoyo a los manifestantes, pero, en la práctica, ha reaccionado de distintas formas según los casos. En Irán, donde Turquía confiaba en obtener ventajas comerciales, el AKP se apresuró a felicitar al conservador que ganó las elecciones de 2009 pese a las amplias protestas populares. En cambio, en Egipto, donde el AKP llevaba tiempo sufriendo fricciones con el presidente Hosni Mubarak, se puso del lado de quienes pedían que este dimitiera. Y en Libia, al principio, parecía que quería proteger como fuera sus intereses comerciales mientras criticaba a Occidente por ocultar su verdadero motivo, el petróleo, pero ahora está cooperando con las operaciones militares de sus socios occidentales.

Sea un modelo o no, hay una cosa evidente: Turquía ha encontrado una vía de progreso, mientras sus vecinos siguen buscándola. No siempre fue así. La primera vez que entré en Turquía, por su frontera oriental, en 1980, la opinión general era que el país era tal desastre y estaba en una situación de tanta pobreza que mis acompañantes sirios llenaron el maletero del coche de pan, té, cigarrillos y café. Hoy, la situación es la contraria, y las empresas turcas están llevando a cabo una auténtica invasión de Siria. Ahora bien, para tratar de averiguar hacia dónde se dirige el modelo turco, lo mejor es recordar que los visitantes que llegan a Turquía procedentes de Europa suelen pensar que han llegado a Oriente, y los de los países vecinos, que han llegado a Europa.

C’est avec les bouleversements géopolitiques du Moyen-Orient comme toile de fond que le président français, Nicolas Sarkozy, sera à Ankara, le vendredi 25 février. Il ne s’agit là que d’une visite de travail dans le cadre de la présidence française du G20, mais ses hôtes ne manqueront pas de faire valoir l’importance de la Turquie comme stabilisateur régional et donc l’intérêt de sa candidature à l’Union européenne.

Entre Asie et Europe, le Moyen-Orient demeure un “nœud gordien” et c’est à juste titre que les révoltes arabes suscitent l’inquiétude. Dans un tel contexte, la référence au “modèle turc” s’impose, et bien des regards se tournent vers Ankara. La chose n’est pas nouvelle et c’est avec continuité que les administrations américaines auront apporté leur appui à la Turquie. Dans le contexte présent, Ankara pourrait être l’élément moteur d’un triangle entre la Turquie, l’Irak post-Saddam et une “nouvelle Egypte”, avec pour axe directeur la libéralisation du Moyen-Orient. Pour autant, le scénario optimal est parfois mis en échec. S’il faut développer une vision dynamique des situations, il serait erroné de s’installer dans le temps de la finalité accomplie.

L’idée même d’un “modèle turc” doit être questionnée. Fait-on référence au rôle historique des militaires et de l’establishment kémaliste dans la genèse de la Turquie moderne ? Ainsi, l’armée égyptienne aurait à jouer un rôle similaire dans une transition ordonnée et pacifique vers une démocratie de marché active et prospère. Compris de cette manière, le “modèle turc” pose problème. D’une part, le recours aux militaires comme force modernisatrice, selon une logique inspirée par le kémalisme, était celui du “socialisme arabe” et du panarabisme. On en connaît le triste bilan. D’autre part, cette “démocratie dirigée”, sous tutelle de l’armée, s’efface aujourd’hui au profit d’une nouvelle Turquie emmenée par Recep Tayyip Erdogan et le Parti de la justice et du développement (AKP), présentés en Occident comme des “islamo-conservateurs”.

Une realpolitik étroite

Ce syncrétisme entre islamisme, opportunisme politique et affairisme est un succès sur le plan électoral comme en termes de croissance. Encore faudrait-il que M. Erdogan résiste à la tentation de concentrer les pouvoirs entre ses mains et de “faire” dans l’islamo-populisme. Par ailleurs, la diplomatie moyen-orientale d’Ahmet Davutoglu, le ministre des affaires étrangères, est bousculée par les événements. Il s’agit plus de jouer dans les interstices du statu quo régional, pour accompagner la percée commerciale et l’expansion des séries télévisées turques, que d’anticiper l’avenir pour mettre en oeuvre une sorte de “néo-ottomanisme”. La remise en cause des pouvoirs établis suscite beaucoup de prudence à Ankara, où l’on est conscient que la Turquie n’a pas les moyens politiques et économiques de rassembler les Etats de la région. Les populations arabes appellent-elles seulement un leadership turc ? On constate bien une certaine fascination pour ce Proche-Occident, mais cela ne va guère au-delà du consumérisme et du bashing contre Israël.

Il n’y a donc pas de puissance agissant par procuration pour l’Occident dans ce Grand Moyen-Orient dont les bouleversements auront des retombées sur différents plans. Si la prudence s’impose, les enjeux sont tels que les puissances occidentales ne sauraient s’abstraire de cette zone. Les portes d’accès doivent être maintenues ouvertes et les alliances renouvelées. Enfin, une realpolitik étroite réduisant la politique étrangère à un simple calcul d’intérêts, sans point de référence transcendant le politique, mènerait à prétendre maintenir un statu quo qui n’existe plus.

Les puissances occidentales doivent identifier les points d’équilibre entre valeurs, intérêts et responsabilités. Il leur faut déployer un art de la manoeuvre, accompagner les changements et se garder du syndrome de la “forteresse assiégée”. La chose peut sembler difficile pour des pays vieillissants, bousculés sur le plan géoéconomique, dont les polyarchies électives sont cahotantes. Du moins pressent-on que le sinistre “consensus de Pékin”, combinaison de verrouillage politique et d’ouverture économique sous contrôle, n’est pas une formule d’avenir. D’autres puissances scrutent avec plus d’anxiété les évolutions moyen-orientales.

I started reading the fiction of the Egyptian writer Naguib Mahfouz with a delay that embarrasses me, not until my early 30s. In the Turkey of my formative years, he was not well-known. His famous “Cairo Trilogy,” published in the 1950s, wasn’t widely available in Turkish until 2008.

We were far more interested in Russian literature — Dostoyevsky, Gogol, Chekhov and Tolstoy — and European literature — Balzac, Hugo, Maupassant and Dickens — than in Arab literature. Western classics had been widely translated into Turkish since the late 19th century. A number of them were even published as supplements in children’s magazines, and I remember devouring them eagerly.

Paris, London and Moscow seemed closer in spirit to Istanbul than Cairo was. We saw our own writing as part of European literature, even as our country waited and waited to become a full member of the European Union.

So Mahfouz, the Nobel Prize-winning author of dozens of novels, remained at the periphery of our vision — despite the strong historical, cultural and religious ties between Turkey and Egypt. There is a saying that “the Koran is revealed in Mecca, recited in Cairo and written in Istanbul.”

Recently, however, the Turkish elite has started paying much more attention to Egypt. A few years ago the governments of Turkey and Egypt signed a memorandum of understanding to endorse cooperation and broaden military relations.

And today Turks are closely watching what is happening in Cairo. At the height of the protests, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan gave a speech that was broadcast live to the protesters in Tahrir Square. “No government can remain oblivious to the democratic demands of its people,” he said. “There isn’t a government in history that has survived through oppression.”

When Hosni Mubarak finally stepped down, there was widespread celebration in Turkey. It’s a topsy-turvy world. The Europe we loved and admired for so long has looked down on Turkey, but the Middle East we ignored is suddenly looking up to us as a force to be reckoned with. Now there is much talk of Turkey serving as a model for a new Egypt.

Considering all this, it has been rather disconcerting to hear politicians and talking heads in the United States speak about Turkey as if it is in thrall to radical Islamists. Even President Obama has described our country as an “Islamic” democracy. But what does it mean to be an Islamic democracy?

Turkey defies clichés. Turkish society is a debating society, with some people passionately in favor of the governing Justice and Development Party and some passionately against it. At a recent event I heard an academic applaud the government for curtailing the power of the military, while a journalist criticized it for conducting groundless trials against army officers and restricting the press.

Whenever I have a book signing in Istanbul, I cannot help but notice the diversity of the people. Professional women wearing modern clothes stand in line next to women in head scarves and young men with long hair or piercings. The crowds include leftists, liberals, feminists, Kurds, conservative Muslims, non-Muslims, religious minorities like Alevis, Sufi mystics and so on. But it is not only the variety of people that is striking; it is the extent to which they intermingle. While Turkey’s political system is polarized and male-dominated, the society is, thankfully, far more hybrid. It is this complexity that outsiders fail to recognize, perhaps because they are too busy watching the leading political actors to see the people.

A society with a multiethnic, multilingual, multireligious empire under its belt and 80 years of experience as a constitutional republic, Turkey has managed to create its own passage to democracy, however flawed.

Around the same time as Mahfouz was writing his Cairo trilogy, a Turkish novelist, literary critic and poet named Ahmet Hamdi Tanpinar was probing the way Turkey straddled an uneasy gap between East and West. “Our most important question is where and how we are going to connect with our past,” he wrote. In other words, how could we blend Islamic and Eastern elements with a modern, democratic, secular regime?

His question is as vital today as it was yesterday — for Egypt, Tunisia and many other countries in the Arab world — but Turkey has already provided many answers.

Groupthink that portrays “dangerous” as “innocuous” has led to censorship by omission. The Muslim Brotherhood, according to the conventional wisdom on the left, is now a responsible Egyptian political organization that will compete in the first free elections Egypt has known since the late 1940s.

Until now, the Brotherhood has done well under a different name and still managed to pull 20 percent in elections rigged to favor the now-deposed President Hosni Mubarak’s party. Now the Brotherhood plans to enter candidates under its own name, and straw polls indicate it may muster up to 40 percent.

Not to worry, says the Brotherhood‘s liberal admirers in the United States and other Western countries. Brotherhood members have reformed; they are no longer religious extremists. The fact that they burned down or trashed about 300 buildings in Cairo on Jan. 26, 1952, was then, and this is now.

Like Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Brotherhood has camouflaged its strategic objectives in charitable social work, sports clubs and prayer meetings. Its messages also are tailored to disarm its critics. The Brotherhood‘s disinformation arsenal contains the political equivalent of dental laughing gas, designed to elicit lightheadedness as well as warm and fuzzy feelings.

Conveniently overlooked in what was described as the Brotherhood‘s Western-style demand for freedom are these inconvenient facts:

c Sheik Yusuf al-Qaradawi, 84, the Brotherhood‘s chief theoretician, banned in the United States and Britain, advocate of violence against Israel as well as U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, returned to Egypt after a 50-year absence to address a million-plus crowd in Cairo’s Liberation Square. State TV said it was 2 million. He also reaches tens of millions worldwide on Al Jazeera, the Doha, Qatar-based Arab network.

c The Brotherhood’s motto: “Allah is our objective. The Prophet is our leader. The Koran is our law. Jihad is our way. Dying in the way of Allah is our highest hope.”

c Muhammad Badie, the Brotherhood‘s supreme guide, said upon his elevation in September that the Brotherhood‘s objectives could only be attained “by raising a jihadi generation that pursues death just as the enemies pursue life.”

c In 1989, the Brotherhood‘s Islamic Action Front won 23 out of 80 seats in Jordan’s parliament. King Hussein tried to check their influence by changing election laws. But in 1993, they became the largest group in parliament – and strongly opposed the Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty in 1994.

c Despite a rigged vote that gave Mr. Mubarak‘s followers almost 80 percent of the seats in the parliament that was dissolved by the new supreme military authority in mid-February, the Brotherhood still garnered 20 percent.

c The Brotherhood’s official website says jihad is Islam’s most important tool in a gradual takeover, beginning with the Muslim nations, moving on to restoring the caliphate over three continents for a conquest of the West, with a global Islamic state as the ultimate objective.

c For the immediate future, the Brotherhood remains closely linked to Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Brotherhood‘s second in command, Rashad al-Bayumi, said in a recent interview that the Brotherhood would join a transitional Egyptian government with one objective: Canceling the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel.

c The Brotherhood’s platform says government rule in Egypt “must be republican, parliamentary, constitutional and democratic in accordance with Islamic Shariah law that ensures liberty for all.”

c The Brotherhood’s supreme guide – it has more than one – Muhammad Mahdi Akef said the Brotherhood opposes American democracy because “it is corrupt, serves the American agenda and wants to destroy the Islamic nation, its faith and tradition.”

c Mr. Akef says the United States spends billions of dollars “and endlessly plots to change the Muslim way of life [by waging] war on Muslim leaders, the traditions of its faith and its ideas. They even wage war against female circumcision, a practice current in 36 countries, which has been prevalent since the time of the Pharaohs.”

c Jihad has a global strategy beyond self-defense: Attack every “infidel rule” to widen the global caliphate until all mankind lives under the Islamic flag.

For Egypt‘s new government, whatever it turns out to be, accommodation with the Brotherhood is bound to be the line of least resistance. Whether 1 million or 2 million were on Cairo’s Tahrir Square to listen to the Brotherhood‘s Sheik al-Qaradawi in his first public appearance in Egypt in 50 years is irrelevant. Countless millions the world over listen to his politico-religious sermons.

More important, the hero of Egypt‘s latest revolution, Wael Ghonim, the Doha-based head of Google marketing in the Middle East, whose Tweets and Facebook entries were credited with laying the groundwork for the popular uprising, was barred from the stage in Tahrir Square. Sheik al-Qara-dawi’s bodyguards elbowed the cyber-activist to the exit ladder.

“The Yuppie revolution in Egypt is over, the Islamist Revolution has begun,” captured the essence of Egypt‘s 18-day upheaval. It was what Cornell Law School’s William A. Jacobson’s blog called a “Legal Insurrection.”

The Brotherhood‘s greatest asset: gullible Westerners – on both sides of the Atlantic.

It is the same syndrome that enabled the same segment of Western opinion to applaud Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s moderation as he gave daily press conferences near Paris in 1978 while waiting for his religious revolutionaries and their yuppie helpers to overthrow the shah.

For those with a little more memory, there also is the case of Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge, described for years as a group of moderate agrarian reformers. No sooner were they in power than they established the “killing fields.” By their own reckoning, they slaughtered 2 million of their own people.

(Versión en inglés)

En los libros de texto de cuando yo era niño, en los años cincuenta y sesenta, Europa era una tierra de promesa y de leyenda. Es cierto que, al construir su nueva república sobre las ruinas del Imperio Otomano, que había quedado aplastado y fragmentado en la I Guerra Mundial, Mustafá Kemal Ataturk luchó contra el Ejército griego, pero después, con el apoyo de sus propios militares, introdujo numerosas reformas de modernización social y cultural que no eran antioccidentales sino todo lo contrario. Para dar legitimidad a dichas reformas, que contribuyeron a reforzar a las clases dirigentes del nuevo Estado turco (y fueron objeto de contención en Turquía durante los 80 años siguientes), nos pidieron que adoptáramos e incluso imitáramos un sueño europeo occidentalista y lleno de optimismo.

Los manuales escolares de mi niñez eran textos diseñados para enseñarnos por qué había que trazar una línea entre Estado y religión, por qué había sido necesario cerrar las logias de los derviches y por qué habíamos tenido que abandonar el alfabeto árabe para adoptar el latino y, al mismo tiempo, estaban llenos de preguntas que pretendían desentrañar el secreto del poder y el éxito de Europa. “Describe los fines y los resultados del Renacimiento”, preguntaba el profesor en el examen. “Si en nuestro suelo hubiera tanto petróleo como en los países árabes, ¿seríamos tan ricos y modernos como los europeos?”, decían los más ingenuos de mis condiscípulos.

En mi primer año de universidad, cuando surgían en clase esas preguntas, todo el mundo se preguntaba, preocupado, por qué “nunca tuvimos una Ilustración”. El pensador árabe del siglo XIV Ibn Haldun decía que las civilizaciones en declive se mantenían vivas imitando a sus vencedores. Como los turcos no han sido jamás colonizados por una potencia extranjera, la tendencia a “venerar Europa” o “imitar a Occidente” nunca ha tenido los matices condenatorios y humillantes que describen Franz Fanon, V. S. Naipaul o Edward Said; mirar hacia Europa era un imperativo histórico o incluso una cuestión técnica de adaptación.

Pero ahora este sueño de una Europa maravillosa, que era tan poderosa que incluso nuestros pensadores y políticos más antioccidentales creían secretamente en ella, se ha desvanecido. Tal vez sea porque Turquía ya no es tan pobre como antes. O quizá porque ya no es una sociedad campesina gobernada por el Ejército, sino una nación dinámica con una sociedad civil fuerte… Y en los últimos años, por supuesto, ha influido el hecho de que se hayan frenado las negociaciones entre Turquía y la Unión Europea sin que haya una solución a la vista. Ni en Europa ni en Turquía existe una esperanza realista de que se produzca la incorporación a la UE en un futuro próximo. Reconocer que hemos perdido esta esperanza sería tan demoledor como ver que las relaciones con Europa se rompen por completo, por lo que nadie ha tenido valor ni para pronunciar esas palabras.

Que Turquía y otros países no occidentales están desencantados con Europa es algo que sé por experiencia propia, por mis viajes y conversaciones. Una de las principales causas de tensión entre Turquía y la UE fue sin duda la alianza establecida por un sector del Ejército turco y varios grandes grupos de comunicación con los partidos políticos nacionalistas, con el consiguiente éxito de su campaña para sabotear las negociaciones de ingreso.

Esa misma iniciativa es la que desencadenó la persecución que sufrimos muchos escritores, yo incluido, y provocó los tiroteos contra otros y el asesinato de misioneros y sacerdotes cristianos. Además están las reacciones emocionales, cuya importancia se comprende sobre todo si se piensa en el ejemplo de Francia: durante el pasado siglo, sucesivas generaciones de la élite turca han seguido el modelo francés y se han inspirado en su interpretación del laicismo y en su forma de entender la educación, la literatura y las artes… Por eso, que Francia se haya convertido, en los últimos cinco años, en el país que con más vehemencia se opone a que Turquía entre en Europa ha sido tremendamente decepcionante y desgarrador.

Sin embargo, la mayor desilusión en los países no occidentales, y en Turquía, la constituyó la participación de Europa en la guerra de Irak. El mundo vio cómo Bush engañaba a Europa para que se uniese a esa guerra cruel e ilegítima y cómo Europa se había mostrado muy dispuesta a dejarse engañar.

Al observar el panorama de Europa desde Estambul o más allá, lo primero que se ve es que Europa (como la Unión Europea) está confundida sobre sus problemas internos. Es evidente que los pueblos europeos tienen mucha menos experiencia que los americanos en vivir con personas que tienen una religión, una piel y una identidad cultural diferentes de las suyas, y que no acogen de buen grado la perspectiva; esa resistencia hace que los problemas internos de Europa sean más difíciles de resolver. Los recientes debates sobre integración y multiculturalismo en Alemania son un buen ejemplo.

A medida que se intensifique y se extienda la crisis económica, es posible que Europa se vuelva sobre sí misma y logre así posponer la lucha para proteger lo “burgués”, en el sentido que da Flaubert al término, pero eso no resolverá el problema. Cuando veo Estambul, que cada año es un poco más compleja y cosmopolita, y que ya atrae a inmigrantes de todos los rincones de Asia y África, no me cuesta nada llegar a esta conclusión: no es posible mantener indefinidamente fuera de Europa a los asiáticos y africanos pobres, desempleados e indefensos que buscan nuevos lugares para vivir y trabajar. Construir muros más altos, endurecer los requisitos para los visados y aumentar el número de barcos que patrullan las fronteras son medidas que solo servirán para aplazar el momento de la verdad. Y lo peor es que la política anti-inmigración y los prejuicios están destruyendo ya los valores fundamentales que constituyen la esencia de Europa.

En los libros de texto de mi infancia turca no se hablaba de democracia ni de los derechos de las mujeres, pero en los paquetes de Gauloises que fumaban (o eso creíamos) los intelectuales y artistas franceses, estaban impresas las palabras “liberté, égalité, fraternité”, y esos paquetes tenían una gran circulación. Fraternité se convirtió en el símbolo del espíritu de solidaridad y resistencia que promovían los movimientos de izquierda. Sin embargo, mostrarse hoy crueles ante los sufrimientos de los inmigrantes y las minorías y hostigar a los asiáticos, africanos y musulmanes que están viviendo con dificultad en las periferias de Europa -incluso culpándolos de todos los males- no es “fraternidad”.

Es comprensible que Europa sufra ataques de ansiedad e incluso pánico en su intento de proteger sus grandes tradiciones culturales, beneficiarse de las riquezas que busca con codicia en el mundo no occidental y conservar las ventajas obtenidas a lo largo de tantos siglos de lucha de clases, colonialismo y guerras intestinas. Ahora bien, para protegerse ¿es mejor que Europa se vuelva sobre sí misma, o tal vez debería recordar sus valores esenciales que en otro tiempo la convirtieron en el centro de gravedad de todos los intelectuales del mundo?

(Versión en español)

In the schoolbooks I read as a child in the 1950s and 1960s, Europe was a rosy land of legend. While forging his new republic from the ruins of the Ottoman empire, which had been crushed and fragmented in the first world war, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk did fight against the Greek army, but with the support of his own army he later introduced a slew of social and cultural modernisation reforms that were not anti- but pro-western. It was to legitimise these reforms, which helped to strengthen the new Turkish state’s new elites (and were the subject of continuous debate in Turkey over the next 80 years), that we were called upon to embrace and even imitate a rosy-pink – occidentalist – European dream.

As much as the schoolbooks of my childhood were texts designed to teach us why a line was to be drawn between the state and religion, why it had been necessary to shut down the dervish lodges, or why we’d had to abandon the Arab alphabet for the Latin, they were also overflowing with questions that aimed to unlock the secret of Europe’s great power and success. “Describe the aims and outcomes of the Renaissance,” the middle school history teacher would ask in his exam. “If it turned out we were sitting on as much oil as the Arabs, would we then be as rich and modern as Europeans?” my more naive classmates at lycee would say. In my first year at university, whenever my classmates came across such questions in class, they would fret over why “we never had an enlightenment”.

The 14th century Arab thinker Ibn Khaldun said that declining civilisations kept going by imitating their victors. Because there has never been a time when the Turks were colonised by a world power, “worshipping Europe” or “imitating the west” has never carried the damning, humiliating overtones described by Franz Fanon, VS Naipaul, or Edward Said; to look to Europe has been seen as a historical imperative or even a technical question of adaptation.

But this dream of a rosy-pink Europe, once so powerful that even our most anti-western thinkers and politicians secretly believed in it, has now faded. This may be because Turkey is no longer as poor as it once was. Or it could be because it is no longer a peasant society ruled by its army, but a dynamic nation with a strong civil society. And in recent years there has of course been the slowing down of talks between Turkey and the European Union, with no resolution in sight. Neither in Europe nor in Turkey is there a realistic hope that Turkey will join Europe in the near future. To admit to having lost this hope would be as crushing as to see relations with Europe breaking down entirely, so no one has the heart even to utter the words.

That Turkey and other non-western countries are disenchanted with Europe is something I know from my own travels and conversations. A major cause of the strain in relations between Turkey and the EU was most certainly the alliance forged by a sector of the Turkish army and leading media groups with nationalist political parties, and their successful campaign to sabotage negotiations. The same initiative triggered the prosecutions launched against me and many writers, the shooting of others, and the killing of missionaries and Christian clerics. There are also the emotional responses whose greater significance can best be explained by taking France as an example: over the past century, successive generations of the Turkish elite have faithfully taken France as their model, drawing on its understanding of secularism and following its lead on education, literature and art … so to have France emerge over the past five years as the country most vehemently opposed to the idea of Turkey in Europe has been hugely heartbreaking and disillusioning. It is, however, Europe’s involvement in the war in Iraq that has caused the keenest disappointment in non-western countries and, in Turkey, real anger. The world watched Europe being tricked by Bush into joining this illegitimate and cruel war, while showing immense readiness to be tricked.

When looking at the landscape of Europe from Istanbul or beyond, the first thing one sees is that Europe (like the European Union) is confused about its internal problems. It is clear that the peoples of Europe have a lot less experience than the Americans when it comes to living with those whose religion, skin colour, or cultural identity are different from their own, and that they do not warm to the prospect: this resistance makes Europe’s internal problems all the more intractable. The recent discussions in Germany on integration and multiculturalism are a case in point.

As the economic crisis deepens and spreads, Europe may, by turning in on itself, postpone its struggle to preserve the “bourgeois”, in Flaubert‘s sense of the word, but that will not solve the problem. When I look at Istanbul, which becomes a little more complex and cosmopolitan with every passing year, and which now attracts immigrants from all over Asia and Africa, I have no trouble reaching this conclusion: the poor, unemployed and undefended of Asia and Africa who are looking for new places to live and work cannot be kept out of Europe indefinitely. Higher walls, tougher visa restrictions and ships patrolling borders in increasing numbers will only postpone the day of reckoning. Worst of all, anti-immigration politics and prejudices are already destroying the core values that made Europe what it was.

In the Turkish schoolbooks of my childhood there was no discussion of democracy or women’s rights, but on the packets of Gauloises that French intellectuals and artists smoked (or so we thought) were printed the words “liberté, égalité, fraternité” and these were much in circulation. “Fraternité” came to stand for the spirit of solidarity and resistance promoted by movements of the left. But being callous about the sufferings of immigrants and minorities, and castigating the Asians, Africans and Muslims now leading difficult lives in the peripheries of Europe – even holding them solely responsible for their woes – is not “brotherhood”.

One can understand how Europe might suffer anxiety and even panic as it seeks to preserve its great cultural traditions, profit from the riches it covets in the non-western world, and retain the advantages gained over so many centuries of class conflict, colonialism and internecine war. But if it is to protect itself, would it be better for Europe to turn inwards, or should it perhaps remember its core values, which once made it the centre of gravity for all the world’s intellectuals?

• Translated by Maureen Freely

Although Palestinian survival has been largely sustained by Arab countries, it is the Turkish government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan that has emerged as the Palestinians’ most resolute spokesman. By backing its rhetoric with diplomatic muscle, Turkey most recently influenced Brazil and Argentina to recognise an independent Palestine. Other Latin American countries will soon follow. In addition, Turkey is actively harnessing international support to end the Israeli blockade of Gaza.

Despite general public sympathy for the plight of Palestinians, Turks are not united on ways of showing this support. Secular Turks allege that religiously inspired NGOs, with government encouragement, exploit the Palestinian cause to promote and strengthen themselves domestically and abroad. The recent flotilla fiasco off Gaza provides a prime example.

It is common in the Middle East to attribute Arabs’ misfortunes to western colonialism and nearly four centuries of Ottoman rule. While significant antipathy toward the west persists, there has been a considerable shift in Arab public opinion toward Turkey in recent years. Turkey is increasingly looked upon by Arabs as “what we should be”.

It has garnered enormous respect for its achievements and growing influence in the region. Although a majority Sunni state, Turkey thus far has been able to rise above the Sunni-Shia divide evident in many Arab and Muslim-majority states – shrewdly converting it into valuable political and diplomatic capital.

After several false dawns, the Arab street remains largely cynical and frustrated. While pride in ancestors’ achievements provides some comfort, it is usually overwhelmed by current realities.

Few if any leaders provide inspiration. Slow strides in Iraq seemed destined to be followed by greater slowness and fewer strides. Despite transparent elections, Palestinian infighting undermines real hope. After decades of martial law, ambiguity surrounding Egypt’s succession hangs like a dagger over its future. Assad’s fiddling with free markets and tight grip in Syria provides no vision or certainty for the next generation. Considerable progress in Jordan is difficult to replicate beyond its borders as its ability to influence others is limited by internal challenges and regional realities. Despite apparent progress, Lebanon remains a fragile powder-keg that could explode at any moment. The resource-rich pre-emerging market of Libya remains subject to the whims of an ageing autocrat whose stability is questioned clandestinely at home and openly abroad.

The constantly recurrent question in western policy circles is whether Turkey can serve as a model for Arab states.

While Turkey can serve as an inspiration and provide useful lessons, it cannot be a model. The unique dynamics and historical context within which the modern Turkish republic developed cannot be replicated. Contemporary Turkey is still evolving democratically. Internal power struggles, the Kurdish issue and the broader path to reform are just some reminders of the arduous road ahead. The government must strike a balance. With enormous challenges at home, it must avoid overreach abroad.

With the overwhelming majority of Arab populations under the age of 30 confronting a bleak future, a demographic timebomb is ticking in the region. This further underscores the need for Turkey’s leadership to encourage its private sector to seize the initiative in the Middle East and unleash its potential. By creating opportunities it can help relieve regional pressures and contribute to a soft landing.

Change in the broader Middle East will occur most effectively through an evolutionary process marked primarily by economic growth and not imposition of external designs. Gradually, over time, the potential for further reforms will increase. When needed, Turkey’s politicians should provide a gentle touch but leave it to its businessmen to produce results. After all, Turkey’s most effective ambassadors come from its private sector.

For four centuries ending with the first world war, major decisions dictating the course of Arab history were largely made from Istanbul. History will not repeat itself. However, after nearly a century of absence, the return of real Turkish influence to Arab capitals, in a more benign form, must be welcomed. It is also fundamentally essential to the gradual transformation of a region whose instability poses a constant threat to global order.

A trial that would shame any democracy is now in its fourth week in Diyarbakir, Turkey. Named the KCK trial, its processes have been widely condemned by the several hundred independent observers who attended during its first few days.

Charged with “violating the unity of the state” and “abetting terrorism” are 151 Kurdish politicians, lawyers, mayors and leaders of Kurdish civil society. Of these, 103 have already been in detention for the past 18 months, but details of the charges were not disclosed until 12 weeks ago.

This Friday is “crunch day” when the judge will decide whether to accept the defence team’s argument that there is no case to answer and release those detained, or to let the trial continue with the “suspects” remaining in prison or released on bail.

The manner of gathering evidence and procedures in the courtroom breach all international and European standards on human rights and fair trials. I was a member of the independent UK delegation that attended the first week of this trial. It could last for months, even years. It is vital that those in prison are released on bail, and that the prosecutions are dropped for this is a “political trial”, not a legal one.

The pro-Kurdish political parties, and recently the PKK, have made repeated attempts to obtain a resolution of the 30-year-old conflict through democratic dialogue and negotiations rather than violence. The PKK has called for “ceasefires” on several occasions, and has just now declared that the present ceasefire, due to expire at the end of the month, will continue until the elections taking place next June.

But time and again the authorities have closed down pro-Kurdish political parties, imprisoned Kurdish political leaders and declared Kurdish civil society and human rights organisations illegal. Peaceful protests and demonstrations calling for an end to armed conflict and respect for human rights are subject to brutal harassment by the police.

The Democratic Society party (DTP) was the last of several parties to be closed in 2009. Today, legal-democratic Kurdish politics continues under the roof of the newly named BDP (Peace and Democracy party). Not only have many of its members been arrested and imprisoned, but its distinguished chair, Ahmed Turk, has been banned from all political activities for the next five years, and the brilliant and charismatic mayor of Diyarbakir, Osman Baydemir, faces not only prosecution but also assassination threats as he continues to speak out on behalf of the Kurdish population whose lives are wracked by persecution, extrajudicial killings, torture, displacement and extreme poverty.

Some 5,000 Kurds are in prison on charges of supporting terrorism, but this trial will reveal Turkey’s true status in the context of democracy, justice and the rule of law.

This trial of the 151 “suspects” is the most repressive action yet to shut down the lawful and democratic activities of Kurdish organisations and eliminate all political activity. The manner by which the evidence in the trial was gathered gives cause for extreme concern.

It is clear from the 7,500-page indictment and so-called supporting evidence that there are no grounds for suspecting any actual crimes have been committed, such as references to weapons, acts of violence, or conspiracy for terrorism. Most of the evidence is based on (unlawful) wiretapping and bugging to draw conclusions from private daily conversations, or on routine political propaganda and secret statements by anonymous prosecution witnesses.

Innocent conversations, for example, referring to the purchasing of “tomatoes” or “bread”, are construed as codes for bombs and grenades and have found their way into the indictment, along with intimate and personal conversations between family members and friends.

To prepare for this event, and accommodate not only the 151 defendants, but their 250 lawyers, the press, the many relatives of the accused, the members of foreign observer delegations, and more than 60 armed prison police, the Turkish government built a vast new courthouse in the yard between existing courts.

The joke went round that everyone should be grateful to the Kurds for this new courtroom, and will probably need to thank them again for a new prison. Security has been intense. There were more than 1,500 armed police on duty around the building and armed snipers on the surrounding rooftops. It took ages to get into the court, going through body searches and scanning. My purse containing some Turkish lira in coins was confiscated because I might “use them as missiles to throw at the judge”.

Many of the accused are lawyers. One is Muharrem Erbey, head of the IHD (Human Rights Commission), who has continually spoken out on the need for diplomacy and dialogue to end the conflict.

The trial began with the judge, Menderes Yilmaz, dismissing the defence lawyers’ submissions – firstly, that the defendants should be able to defend themselves in their Kurdish mother tongue.

On these opening days the accused lawyers argued ferociously and passionately that these proceedings were in fact a show trial, a political trial, that there were no victims of the alleged crimes, that the evidence was based on hearsay, and that the trial should be abandoned.

There is still time for Turkey’s AKP government to acknowledge that this trial has no basis in law, and order its closure and the immediate release of those detained.

Martin Kettle’s claim that Turkey is “held hostage by the atavistic parochialism of a Greek Cypriot statelet of fewer than one million people and with a declining GDP of $23bn” is far from the truth.

Kettle concerns himself with “the big issues” facing Europe such as its shrinking population and integration as well as energy and security. But it is frequently stated that Europe is a community of values, and on this basis the Cyprus question must be seen as a principle issue.

Kettle mentions that Europe and Turkey have common interests, agreements worth making and promises to keep. However, it is precisely because Turkey has reneged on its commitment in July 2005 to extend the customs union to the Republic of Cyprus that the European Council in December 2006 decided to block the opening of eight negotiating chapters.

In 1965 Turkey ratified the Hague convention of 1954 for the protection of cultural property in the event of armed conflict, but nevertheless after its intervention and subsequent occupation of Cyprus in 1974 it has been responsible for the devastation, vandalism and looting of the island’s cultural heritage on a scale unworthy of any civilised nation, let alone a prospective member of the EU.

Despite UN security council resolutions calling on Turkey to withdraw its forces from northern Cyprus – and that of the European parliament in February this year – Turkey has stubbornly refused to do so. In fact, Turkey has declared on more than one occasion that if it has to make a choice between its accession to the EU and Cyprus, it will choose Cyprus. So far, this intransigence has been rewarded, for example, with a seat on the UN security council as a non-permanent member and both the US and Europe are prepared to turn a blind eye to Turkey’s depredations. The security issue looms large for many European politicians, and the fear is that Europe will do to Cyprus what it did to the Sudetenland in 1938.

Turkey’s justification for retaining control is legally indefensible, as it constantly refers to the treaty of guarantee from 1960, which gave it the right to take unilateral action after the Greek junta’s coup against Archbishop Makarios in 1974. However, the exercise of this right is limited by the aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the treaty – that is, to recognise and guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus. This Turkey has manifestly failed to do but has instead created a Turkish state in northern Cyprus not only to the detriment of the Greek Cypriots, whose property was confiscated by the self-styled “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”, but also the Turkish Cypriots, who have suffered under Turkish rule.

In violation of Article 49.6 of the Geneva convention of 1949, which stipulates that the occupying power shall not transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies, Turkey has transferred several hundred thousand settlers from Anatolia to northern Cyprus. The 90,000 or so Turkish Cypriots who remain are, according to Mehmet Cakici, chairman of the Turkish Cypriot Social Democracy party (TDP), “facing the danger of being annihilated, both with their demographic structure and their culture and social structure”.

For example, the Turkish Cypriot primary school and secondary school teachers’ unions (KTOS and KTOES) have protested against the imposition of Sunni Islam and Qur’an classes, which reflect the ideology of the current Turkish government. There is also the fact that over the past years more mosques than schools have been constructed in northern Cyprus (there are 162 schools and 181 mosques). The crime rate has soared because of the uncontrolled immigration from Turkey and education and health services are overburdened.

Northern Cyprus is de facto Turkey’s 82nd province, and the TRNC is regarded by the European court of human rights as “a subordinate local administration” under Turkish jurisdiction. The TRNC’s economy is also underpinned by Turkey and in a once fertile area 80% of the need for fruits and vegetables is met by Turkey. As a Turkish commentator put it last year: “[Northern] Cyprus is like a water mill that cannot run without hand-carried water.”

This is why Turkey is desperate to open direct trade with northern Cyprus, both to relieve its financial burden and as one step towards international recognition of the separatist state. Turkey perennial self-justification for maintaining its presence on the island is to consolidate the security of the Muslim Turkish community but this excuse is wearing thin.

The most convincing reason has been advanced by the architect of Turkey’s multi-dimensional foreign policy, the present foreign minister, Professor Ahmet Davutoglu, in his book Strategic Depth from 2001. Here Davutoglu states clearly: “Even if there was not one single Muslim Turk over there, Turkey would have to maintain a Cyprus question. No country could possibly be indifferent to an island like this, placed in the heart of its vital space.”

This is why reunification talks are getting nowhere, however hard Dimitris Christofias, the Greek Cypriot president, tries. The new Turkish Cypriot leader, Dervis Eroglu, unlike the former leader, Mehmet Ali Talat, is simply not interested that they should go anywhere, and takes his orders directly from Ankara. As Martin Kettle writes about the prospect of Turkey’s EU membership: “the failure is predictable, disgraceful and incredibly shortsighted”. And it’s Turkey’s fault.

Turkish President Abdullah Gul, who led his nation’s delegation to the U.N. General Assembly this week, sat down with The Post’s Lally Weymouth to discuss Turkey’s relations with the United States, Israel and Iran. Excerpts:

Q. In June, Turkey voted against the U.S.-sponsored U.N. sanctions [against Iran]. . . . Wasn’t this a break in relations between Turkey and the West?

A. We are a NATO member and we are against nuclear weapons in our region. We believe the solution must come through diplomatic channels and diplomatic means. If there is a war in the region, that will affect us as, for example, the war in Iraq has affected us.

I think the [permanent members of the Security Council] and President Obama and Secretary [of State Hillary] Clinton feel very strongly that the only way to get Iran to stop building a nuclear program is to put tighter sanctions on the Iranians.

This is not correct [that we have not cooperated]. When there are binding sanctions, we abide by those binding sanctions.

There was a Reuters story published [Monday] that Turkey is allowing an Iranian bank to operate [on its soil]. Reportedly, this bank is key to building Iran’s nuclear program and it is only allowed to operate in Turkey because sanctions have been put on the bank elsewhere.

I did see that report. But if it falls within the sanctions not to permit it, it wouldn’t have happened.

It does fall within the sanctions to not permit it.

That means it is not going to happen.

Don’t you think that Iran is building nuclear weapons?

Iran is a member of the [International Atomic Energy Agency] and is also party to the [Non-Proliferation Treaty]. The issue here is for Iran to be more transparent. That is where there is a problem. . . . There shouldn’t be any question mark in your mind that Turkey in any way would look favorably upon Iran having a nuclear weapon. . . . The issue here is to see whether or not nuclear weapons are being produced and that has to be understood through diplomatic means.

What is going on between Turkey and Israel?

Relations between Turkey and Israel in the region are important. We have done many things in common in the past. Where we are today is not our choice and it is not our doing, either. It is up to Israel.

Why would you back the flotilla going to Gaza when you know that Israel has an embargo?

This embargo is against human rights of the people.

Why is it against human rights?

Not only Turkey — President Obama, Madame Clinton, all the European countries — they called on Israel to lift this embargo.

You know very well that you have Hamas in Gaza, which is very hostile to Israel and has been sending rockets to Israel that have been killing Israelis for eight years.

The flotilla was organized by a non-government organization. . . . They were attacked in international waters. Nine people were killed, one being a Turkish-U.S. citizen. Not a single weapon was found on board the ships. All they found was food and clothing and other items of aid. This is not a crime — to have organized that. But to attack ships in international waters, to kill people — those are crimes. That is why I say that there are things that Israel needs to do to change the situation.

So what do they need to do?

That would involve apologizing and admitting that a mistake was made and it also involves compensating the families of the people who lost their lives.

I read that you are meeting with President [Mahmoud] Ahmadinejad of Iran.

I will have a meeting with the Iranian president. . . . No country other than Turkey can speak to them the way that we can . . . and I don’t think that is very appreciated.

What will you tell them?

We tell them to be more conciliatory. We tell the Iranians that since there are certain question marks in people’s minds, it is up to them to try to overcome these concerns, to act openly and transparently so that these concerns can go away.

You feel your relationship with the U.S. is good?

U.S.-Turkish relations are very important to us. We are allies and that fact in itself is very important. On the Iranian nuclear issue, we have the capacity to help and I believe the U.S. administration has understood that, and they want us to continue to go that route.

Do [Iranian leaders] listen to you and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan?

I would say that yes, there are times when they do listen to us.

How do you see the power structure in Iran?

There are different power bases in Iran. For example, I am a person who can speak to the president of Iran and to the supreme leader, very openly and honestly on the topics we talked about, and they listen to me.

So you have met the supreme leader? What is he like?

Yes, very extensively. I have spoken to them about all the things that I believe to be right and true and they have listened and they consider what I say.

Do you believe they are united or hold different views?

I would not want to speak to the domestic relations in Iran. We are neighbors after all.

Prime Minister Erdogan said that you want to triple your trade with Iran in the next five years.

Economic relations are important for every country.

Is there anything that you think the American readers should know?

They should know that we don’t have any intention to undermine the American alliance. We are helping it; we are contributing to the progress. We need to trust each other

Muchos turcos tienen la convicción de que la Unión Europea en particular y Occidente en general les están tomando el pelo. Llevan muchos años negociando con Bruselas el ingreso de su país en la Unión Europea y realizando reformas democráticas, sociopolíticas y económicas que aquella (correctamente) les exige, pero se encuentran ante una muralla levantada por algunos Gobiernos que imposibilita un avance significativo.

Hay que señalar que esos Gobiernos (Francia, Alemania, Austria) están apoyados por un amplio sector de la opinión pública europea, contraria por diversos motivos (racismo incluido) al ingreso. Y que Gobiernos y opinión pública tienen donde apoyarse para mantener el rechazo, en concreto en la (inadmisible) posición turca de sostén de la ilegal República del Norte de Chipre, reconocida únicamente por Turquía.

Ahora bien, mucho me temo que, solucionando ese grave escollo (que hay que hacer desaparecer por ilegal, arbitrario y opuesto a la racionalidad política), la oposición al ingreso continuaría en gran medida siendo la misma. Y eso es algo que los turcos -cuyo ingreso en la OTAN hace décadas fue automático e “imprescindible para contribuir a la lucha contra el comunismo totalitario soviético”- tienen atragantado.

Doble rasero. Antes sí, ahora no. Integración militar sí, integración socioeconómica no. Buenos soldados anticomunistas y antirrusos y buenos consumidores (de productos alemanes) son aceptados por Occidente y la UE, pero una supuesta invasión de ciudadanos (¿o meros súbditos?) turcos tras la adhesión es un peligro para la Unión, sostienen determinados círculos de poder, que ofrecen a Ankara una “asociación privilegiada” con Europa. Merkel y Sarkozy -erigidos en portavoces de una fórmula miope que ofende a los turcos- se niegan a aceptar que el interés estratégico de la Unión Europea y de Occidente consiste en atraer y ligar a una Turquía democrática al proyecto europeísta.

Estamos perdiendo un tiempo precioso en perjuicio de una Turquía democrática y en beneficio de una posible Turquía ganada para el fundamentalismo islámico. Ahora la cuestión no es tanto ya si la Unión Europea rechaza a Ankara cuanto si esta ha comenzado a rechazar a la UE. Kemal Davis, fino analista, lo expresa así: “la riqueza de los países del Golfo arábigo-pérsico supone un apetecible entorno para Turquía, al tiempo que el papel emergente del G-20 hace que las amistades en este nuevo mundo sean más importantes que la pertenencia a clubes diversos, UE incluida”.

Si Ankara llega a convencerse de que un “club cristiano” nole abrirá las puertas, cambiará de rumbo definitivamente. Las reformas internas emprendidas (ya se han producido algunos retrocesos en el ámbito de la libertad de expresión) quedarán estancadas y la consolidación de un frente islamista en el interior y de una política exterior con ribetes fundamentalistas devendrán realidades peligrosas para la estabilidad interna y del Oriente Próximo en su conjunto, a las que Occidente tendrá que hacer frente.

Todo lo contrario a lo que una Turquía dentro de la UE (con identificación creciente con los valores europeos) podría aportar de cara a las relaciones con el islam. Europa debe tener en cuenta que al día de hoy, en diversos campos y desde luego en el de las relaciones internacionales, Turquía puede aportarnos más que nosotros a ella. Que está teniendo éxito donde nosotros hemos fallado y que lleva a cabo una política exterior independiente que goza del beneplácito de todos aquellos que no son superpotencias.

En concreto, Ankara está acertando en un área sensible para nosotros y donde nuestras carencias son palpables. Me refiero a los Balcanes. El pasado 24 de abril y tras meses de intensa actividad diplomática entre Ankara, Belgrado y Sarajevo (que la mayoría de la prensa europea no reflejó), el presidente turco, Abdula Gül, reunió en Estambul al presidente de Serbia y al de Bosnia-Herzegovina. No menor ha sido el acierto turco en acercar posiciones entre Serbia y Croacia. Todo ello es especialmente significativo (y dice mucho en favor de la diplomacia de Ankara) si recordamos la antigua dominación del imperio otomano en la zona y que la resistencia antiotomana es un acendrado ingrediente histórico de la identidad nacional serbia.

Si estos logros de la política exterior turca han pasado prácticamente desapercibidos en los medios de comunicación occidentales, todo lo contrario ha ocurrido respecto a la iniciativa turco-brasileña para facilitar la contención nuclear de Irán. Iniciativa absurdamente criticada por Washington, principal valedor del ingreso de Turquía en la UE, y por esta misma. Da la impresión de que en las relaciones internacionales las superpotencias sospechan -o al menos contemplan con cierta suspicacia- de las iniciativas que impulsan algunos países emergentes. Pareciera que recelaran de ideas y métodos distintos de los por ellos establecidos, aunque aquellos pudieran aportar soluciones que convienen a todos.

Y, sin embargo, Ankara representa un factor de moderación en las relaciones internacionales de la zona. Se trata de un país democrático y estable, de economía próspera (el FMI le calcula en 2010 un crecimiento del 6,25%), con relaciones diplomáticas con Israel, pero que -como ha quedado demostrado- sabe reaccionar ante la violación por aquel del derecho internacional. Es un aliado de cultura islámica, precisamente el más adecuado para contrarrestar a Irán, y de cuya posible capacidad nuclear recela. Un país cuyo liderazgo medio-oriental ha hecho que, preguntados los palestinos sobre cuál consideran el país extranjero que más les apoya, respondan (43%) que Turquía, mientras que tan solo un 6% considera que es Irán.

¿Puede en un mundo como el actual permitirse la Unión Europea no integrar a un país de las características de Turquía? Aun cuando pasen todavía unos años hasta que cumpla todos los requisitos exigibles a cualquier candidato, Ankara debe encontrar su lugar en la Unión, por el bien de esta, de la política exterior europea y de la estabilidad en Oriente Próximo.

El no de Turquía del mes pasado (al que se sumó Brasil) a las nuevas sanciones contra Irán aprobadas por el Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas muestra su grado de distanciamiento de Occidente. ¿Estamos siendo testigos de la llamada política exterior neo-otomana del Partido de la Justicia y el Desarrollo (AKP) en el gobierno, que supuestamente pretende regresar a las raíces orientales islámicas del país? Pienso que estos temores son exagerados. Si las cosas funcionaran así, ello se debería más a una profecía de Occidente que se cumple a sí misma que a las políticas turcas.

De hecho, la política exterior turca, que tiene como objetivo resolver los conflictos existentes con y dentro de los Estados vecinos, de ningún modo entra en conflicto con los intereses occidentales. Todo lo contrario. Pero Occidente (y Europa en particular) tendría que tratar a Turquía como un socio serio, y dejar de verla como un Estado vasallo.

Turquía es y debe ser un miembro del G-20 porque con su población joven, que crece rápidamente, se convertirá en un Estado económicamente muy fuerte en el siglo XXI.

Cuando el secretario de Defensa de EE UU, Robert Gates, criticó a los europeos por haber contribuido con su conducta hacia Turquía a este distanciamiento, su franqueza causó gran agitación en París y Berlín. Sin embargo, Gates dio en el clavo. Desde que cambiaron los gobiernos, de Jacques Chirac a Nicolas Sarkozy en Francia y de Gerhard Schroder a Angela Merkel en Alemania, la UE ha decepcionado a Turquía.

En el caso de Chipre, la UE ni siquiera se abstuvo de romper compromisos previos asumidos con Turquía o de cambiar unilateralmente reglas acordadas en común. Además, si bien los europeos han cumplido formalmente su decisión de iniciar negociaciones de adhesión con Turquía, han hecho poco para que avancen. Apenas ahora, la UE está dispuesta a abrir un nuevo capítulo en las negociaciones (lo que demuestra que el motivo del estancamiento era de naturaleza política).

Sobra decir que Turquía está situada en una ubicación geopolítica muy sensible, particularmente en lo que se refiere a la seguridad de Europa. El Mediterráneo oriental, el Egeo, los Balcanes occidentales, la región del Caspio y el Cáucaso meridional, Asia central y Oriente Próximo son regiones en las que Occidente no logrará nada, o logrará muy poco, sin el apoyo de Turquía.

Esto se aplica no solo a la política de seguridad, sino también a la energética, si se trata de buscar alternativas a la creciente dependencia de Europa de los suministros rusos.

Occidente, y Europa en particular, no puede darse el lujo de ofender a Turquía. La seguridad de Europa en el siglo XXI se determinará en gran medida en el sureste del continente, exactamente donde Turquía resulta crucial. Pero en lugar de vincular a Turquía lo más estrechamente posible a Europa y Occidente, la política europea está empujándola hacia Rusia e Irán.

Este tipo de política es absurda y miope. Durante siglos, Rusia, Irán y Turquía han sido rivales regionales, nunca aliados. No obstante, la ceguera política de Europa parece ignorar ese hecho.

Por supuesto, también Turquía es muy dependiente de la integración con Occidente. Si no lo logra, ello debilitaría drásticamente su propia posición frente a sus socios (y rivales) regionales potenciales a pesar de su ubicación geopolítica ideal. La negativa de Turquía a imponer nuevas sanciones contra Irán seguramente resultará ser un error importante, a menos que el primer ministro Recep Tayyip Erdogan logre un cambio real en la política nuclear iraní. Ello es muy improbable.

Además, puesto que la confrontación entre Israel y Turquía ha fortalecido a las fuerzas radicales en Oriente Próximo, ¿qué espera la diplomacia europea (tanto en Bruselas como en las capitales nacionales)? Ni Occidente ni los propios Israel y Turquía pueden permitirse de ninguna manera una ruptura permanente entre los dos Estados, a menos que el resultado deseado sea que la región siga su camino hacia una desestabilización duradera. Ya es tiempo de que Europa actúe.

Lo que es aún peor es que, si bien la apatía de Europa resalta más en el caso de Turquía y Oriente Próximo, esta triste situación no se limita a esa región. Lo mismo sucede en el Cáucaso meridional y en Asia central, donde Europa, con la aprobación de los pequeños países proveedores de la zona, debería perseguir firmemente sus intereses energéticos y reafirmarse frente a Rusia, y también frente a Ucrania, donde la participación europea debería ser más activa. La crisis económica global ha puesto en marcha muchos acontecimientos nuevos en toda esa región, y un nuevo actor, China (que planifica a largo plazo), ha entrado en la escena geopolítica.

Europa corre el riesgo de que se le acabe el tiempo, incluso en su propio vecindario, porque en todos esos países no hay una política exterior europea activa ni un compromiso firme de la Unión Europea. Como dijo Mijaíl Gorbachov, ese gran estadista ruso de las últimas décadas del siglo XX: “La vida encuentra la forma de castigar a los que llegan demasiado tarde”.

Du Caire à Bagdad, les Arabes sont soumis à une double “offensive de charme” régionale, due à la dévaluation de leur rôle stratégique : ils ont le choix entre un alignement sur Téhéran ou sur la “nouvelle Turquie” – le Maghreb étant davantage tourné vers l’Europe, tout en restant très sensible au sort des Palestiniens. En effet, la Turquie islamiste de l’AKP a progressivement reformulé son concept stratégique, grâce à son ministre des affaires étrangères, Ahmed Davutoglu. Ayant perdu de son importance dès la fin de la guerre froide, et vexée par les freins mis à son intégration dans l’Union européenne, la Turquie est engagée par cette nouvelle “doctrine Davutoglu” à s’investir dans son environnement naturel, arabe et islamique. L’objectif est à la fois de collectionner les cartes géopolitiques, de valoriser son rôle auprès de l’OTAN et surtout de frapper aux portes de l’Union européenne avec plus de vigueur et de poids.

Ainsi, Ankara a inauguré une nouvelle diplomatie d’ouverture, d’apaisement et de développement à l’égard de son voisinage arabe, kurde et iranien, tout en tournant progressivement le dos à son ex-partenaire israélien. Désormais, les visas sont supprimés entre la Turquie et plusieurs pays arabes, dont la Syrie. Une tentative de réconciliation avec les Kurdes a été entamée, conduisant même le ministre turc des affaires étrangères à passer une nuit à Erbil, la capitale du Kurdistan irakien. Enfin, la Turquie parraine (avec le Brésil) l’échange sur son territoire de l’uranium faiblement enrichi par l’Iran avec de l’uranium enrichi à 20 % et fourni par les grandes puissances – prêtant ainsi à Téhéran une bonne foi qui lui manque à l’évidence.

Ce positionnement se décline sur la question centrale qui mobilise Arabes et musulmans : celle de la Palestine, qui les touche au plus haut point parce qu’elle atteste de leur humiliante impuissance à s’affirmer face à Israël depuis soixante-deux ans. Le jeu d’Ankara est très subtil : tout en soutenant le programme nucléaire civil de l’Iran, il cherche à lui disputer la “rue arabe” qui ne sait plus à quel saint se vouer. Cette “rue” se trouve tiraillée entre deux puissances régionales : Téhéran-la-chiite et Ankara-la-sunnite. Et, dans la mesure où l’Iran a réussi à couper l’herbe sous le pied des régimes arabes en faisant de la surenchère et en réussissant sa greffe idéologique auprès du Hezbollah et son implantation militaire au Liban, la Turquie semble bien décidée à conquérir la rue en usant d’un verbe moins brutal et plus politique.

Ainsi le premier ministre turc Erdogan a-t-il réagi de façon spectaculaire, au forum de Davos de janvier 2009, aux bombardements israéliens infligés à Gaza, en surprenant par sa vigueur le président israélien, Shimon Pérès, assis à ses côtés. Les relations n’ont pas cessé de se détériorer entre les deux pays, sur tous les plans. Les généraux turcs, qui perdent jour après jour de leur influence, n’y pourront rien. Ils sont invités à quitter la scène politique et à regagner leurs casernes. Grâce à la légitimité du suffrage universel, les islamistes de l’AKP déclinent progressivement leurs valeurs, tant en matière de politique intérieure qu’internationale. Et ce en dépit des dégâts qu’ils infligent aux relations très denses entre les armées israéliennes et turques.

Duel à peine feutré

Pour les Arabes, notamment pour leur majorité sunnite, la Turquie apparaît comme un moindre mal. Reconnaissant leur incapacité à faire face à Israël, ils préfèrent aux Perses le voisin sunnite de Turquie, héritier d’un empire qui a régné près de quatre siècles sur leurs terres, et qui déploie une politique compatible avec leurs aspirations. L’Iran, elle, tient à leur égard un discours aussi arrogant et menaçant qu’envers Israël.

La question est de savoir si la Turquie veut jouer ses cartes seulement pour détacher les Arabes conquis par le discours iranien ou si elle cherche aussi à s’inscrire dans une surenchère qui plaît tant à la base politique de l’AKP, à l’approche des élections en Turquie.

Dans ce duel à peine feutré, un pays se trouve particulièrement au premier rang des perdants : l’Egypte de Moubarak. Usé par un règne qui n’en finit plus, défié à sa frontière de Gaza, et défié une deuxième fois par la Turquie, qui a envoyé des ONG à bord de bateaux pour briser le blocus israélien de Gaza, Le Caire n’a eu le choix que de lâcher du lest, en entrouvrant le poste frontière de Rafah !

Aujourd’hui, les peuples ont le choix entre l’offre belliqueuse iranienne et son substitut, plus politique, de la Turquie. Ces deux pays promettent de prendre la relève des Etats arabes qui ont, de facto, abandonné la partie sans le crier sur tous les toits, estimant qu’ils ont suffisamment payé pour les Palestiniens, sans parvenir à des résultats probants. La question est de savoir quelle suite la Turquie de l’AKP compte donner à la dynamique enclenchée depuis janvier 2009 et lequel d’Ankara ou de Téhéran signera un “Yalta” avec Washington sur la région, au détriment des Arabes.

Quelle que soit l’évolution de cette compétition irano-turque, il est un constat qui s’impose : jamais auparavant Israël n’a été aussi isolé sur la scène internationale et jamais le Hamas de Gaza ne s’est senti aussi proche de la fin d’un blocus qui a étranglé ses administrés. La Turquie y aura été pour beaucoup.

Turkey’s “no” last month (a vote cast together with Brazil) to the new sanctions against Iran approved in the United Nations security council dramatically reveals the full extent of the country’s estrangement from the west. Are we, as many commentators have argued, witnessing the consequences of the so-called “neo-Ottoman” foreign policy of Turkey‘s Justice and Development party (AKP) government, which is supposedly aimed at switching camps and returning to the country’s oriental Islamic roots?

I believe that these fears are exaggerated, even misplaced. And should things work out that way, this would be due more to a self-fulfilling prophecy on the west’s part than to Turkey’s policies.

In fact, Turkey’s foreign policy, which seeks to resolve existing conflicts with and within neighbouring states, and active Turkish involvement there, is anything but in conflict with western interests. Quite the contrary. But the west (and Europe in particular) will finally have to take Turkey seriously as a partner – and stop viewing it as a western client state.

Turkey is and should be a member of the G20, because, with its young, rapidly growing population it will become a very strong state economically in the twenty-first century. Even today, the image of Turkey as the “sick man of Europe” is no longer accurate.

When, after the UN decision, the United States secretary of defence, Robert Gates, harshly criticised Europeans for having contributed to this estrangement by their behaviour towards Turkey, his undiplomatic frankness caused quite a stir in Paris and Berlin. But Gates had hit the nail on the head.

Ever since the change in government from Jacques Chirac to Nicolas Sarkozy in France and from Gerhard Schröder to Angela Merkel in Germany, Turkey has been strung along and put off by the European Union. Indeed, in the case of Cyprus, the EU wasn’t even above breaking previous commitments vis-à-vis Turkey and unilaterally changing jointly agreed rules. And, while the Europeans have formally kept to their decision to begin accession negotiations with Turkey, they have done little to advance the cause.

Only now, when the disaster in Turkish-European relations is becoming apparent, is the EU suddenly willing to open a new chapter in the negotiations (which, incidentally, clearly proves that the deadlock was politically motivated).

It can’t be said often enough: Turkey is situated in a highly sensitive geopolitical location, particularly where Europe’s security is concerned. The eastern Mediterranean, the Aegean, the western Balkans, the Caspian region and the southern Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Middle East are all areas where the west will achieve nothing or very little without Turkey’s support. And this is true in terms not only of security policy, but also of energy policy if you’re looking for alternatives to Europe’s growing reliance on Russian energy supplies.

The west, and Europe in particular, really can’t afford to alienate Turkey, considering their interests, but objectively it is exactly this kind of estrangement that follows from European policy towards Turkey in the last few years.

Europe’s security in the 21st century will be determined to a significant degree in its neighbourhood in the southeast – exactly where Turkey is crucial for Europe’s security interests now and, increasingly, in the future. But, rather than binding Turkey as closely as possible to Europe and the west, European policy is driving Turkey into the arms of Russia and Iran.

This kind of policy is ironic, absurd, and shortsighted all at once. For centuries, Russia, Iran, and Turkey have been regional rivals, never allies. Europe’s political blindness, however, seems to override this fact.

Of course, Turkey, too, is greatly dependent on integration with the west. Should it lose this, it would drastically weaken its own position with regard to its potential regional partners (and rivals), despite its ideal geopolitical location. Turkey’s “no” to new sanctions against Iran in all likelihood will prove to be a significant error, unless Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan can deliver a real turnaround in Iran’s nuclear policy. This, however, is highly unlikely.

Moreover, with the confrontation between Israel and Turkey strengthening radical forces in the Middle East, what is European diplomacy (both in Brussels and in European capitals) waiting for? The west, as well as Israel and Turkey themselves, most certainly cannot afford a permanent rupture between the two states, unless the desired outcome is for the region to continue on its path to lasting destabilisation. It is more than time for Europe to act.

Worse still, while Europe’s listlessness is visible first and foremost in the case of Turkey and the Middle East, this lamentable state of affairs is not limited to that region. The same applies to the southern Caucasus and Central Asia, where Europe, with the approval of the smaller supplier countries there, should firmly pursue its energy interests and assert itself over Russia, as well as Ukraine, where Europe should also become seriously involved. Many new developments have been set in motion in that entire region by the global economic crisis, and a new player, China (a long-term planner), has entered the geopolitical stage.

Europe risks running out of time, even in its own neighbourhood, because active European foreign policy and a strong commitment on the part of the EU are sorely missed in all these countries. Or, as Mikhail Gorbachev put it: “Life has a way of punishing those who come too late.”

El fiasco mortífero de la flotilla de la paz que encabezada por Turquía se dirigía a Gaza puso de relieve las crecientes tensiones de la alianza israelo-turca. Sin embargo, ayudó principalmente a mostrar las razones subyacentes del cambio de la orientación occidental de Turquía enfocada a convertirse en un actor fundamental en Oriente Próximo, en alianza con los regímenes rebeldes de la región y con actores radicales no estatales.

La política exterior no se puede separar de sus fundamentos internos. La identidad de las naciones, su espíritu, siempre ha sido un motivo en la definición de sus prioridades estratégicas. Por supuesto, los errores de Israel también desempeñaron un papel en la erosión de su alianza con Turquía. Sin embargo, el colapso de su vieja “alianza con la periferia”, incluida Turquía, el Irán del Sha y Etiopía, tiene más relación con los cambios revolucionarios en estos países -el ascenso al poder del ayatolá Jomeini, el fin del régimen del emperador Haile Selassie y ahora el cambio islámico del primer ministro turco Recep Tayyip Erdogan- que con las políticas de Israel.

La crisis actual pone de manifiesto la profundidad del complejo de identidad de Turquía, su oscilación entre una herencia kemalista orientada a Occidente y su legado otomano oriental. Rechazada por la Unión Europea, la Turquía de Erdogan está inclinando la balanza hacia lo último.

El kemalismo siempre consideró al legado otomano como una carga, un obstáculo para la modernización. En la visión de Erdogan, la modernización no excluye un retorno de Turquía a sus raíces islámicas, ni supone un abandono de su destino como potencia de Oriente Próximo, incluso si eso significa ignorar las políticas encabezadas por Estados Unidos en la región.

En efecto, Erdogan respondió positivamente a las condiciones de Europa para la adhesión turca a la UE. Sus reformas -liberalización económica, cooperación con el Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos, mejora de los derechos de la minoría kurda y debilitamiento de las ambiciones pretorianas del Ejército- son avances importantes en la historia de la República Turca.

Con todo, Erdogan también ha estado dispuesto a utilizar los requisitos de Europa como pretexto para frenar la capacidad del Ejército de controlar su revolución islámica. La elección de su aliado político, Abdullah Gul, como presidente, contra la voluntad del Ejército -en efecto, contra toda la tradición kemalista- es un ejemplo de ello.

Para bloquear una medida destinada a prohibir el Partido de la Justicia y el Desarrollo (AKP), Erdogan también sometió al Tribunal Constitucional de Turquía -que junto con el Ejércitoes uno de los guardianes del kemalismo- cambiando arbitrariamente su composición. Ahora, una reforma constitucional que supuestamente tiene el objetivo de “promover la adhesión de Turquía a la UE” reducirá más el papel del Ejército como guardián del Estado laico y fortalecerá el control del Gobierno sobre el poder judicial.

La revolución islámica de Erdogan también se ha extendido al sistema educativo mediante la introducción de un plan de estudios notablemente religioso. Para apoyar el desplazamiento estratégico de Turquía, una nueva ley ha hecho obligatoria la enseñanza del árabe en las escuelas. Es difícil imaginar un golpe más simbólico a la visión de Ataturk.

Erdogan cree que al ejercer la capacidad de mediación de Turquía recuperará el papel de sus antepasados otomanos como garantes de la paz y la seguridad en el Mashrek. Los esfuerzos de Turquía para actuar como negociador de la paz entre Israel y sus enemigos árabes, la estridente defensa de la causa palestina de Erdogan y su pretensión de ser el mediador en la disputa nuclear entre Irán y Occidente reflejan las percepciones cambiantes de Turquía sobre sí misma como líder regional.

Tanto para Israel como para Occidente, el contexto regional del ascenso de Turquía es particularmente preocupante. El neootomanismo de Erdogan no es un regreso a una idílica mancomunidad otomana. Es más bien un choque entre un eje radical en ascenso encabezado por dos potencias no árabes (Turquía e Irán) y los regímenes árabes conservadores en decadencia.

Turquía puso a Israel en el banquillo de la opinión pública mundial por el asunto de la flotilla de la paz de tal forma que todavía podría obligar al Gobierno de Benjamin Netanyahu a tomar la vía de las negociaciones de paz creíbles, dar un impulso a Hamás y lograr el inminente fin al bloqueo israelí de Gaza. Ese éxito sorprendente pone de relieve la impotencia de los aliados árabes de Occidente. En efecto, la relevancia regional creciente de Turquía refleja el fracaso de los árabes. No pudieron hacer que avanzara su iniciativa de paz con Israel, y son cómplices del bloqueo en Gaza con la esperanza de que Hamás se derrumbe, humillando así a sus propias oposiciones islámicas.

Como democracias islámicas cuyos Gobiernos surgen de elecciones populares, Irán y Turquía -y sus aliados Hamás y Hezbolá- pueden reivindicar una ventaja sobre los regímenes árabes, los cuales sufren de un déficit creciente de legitimidad. Todos son autocracias seculares que se mantienen en el poder gracias a sus servicios de inteligencia todopoderosos e intrusivos.

La estrategia de Erdogan lo hace cómplice de la agenda de los enemigos más feroces de Occidente. Incluso coqueteó con el perverso régimen islamista del presidente sudanés Omar al Bashir al darle la bienvenida a Turquía después de haber sido acusado por el Tribunal Penal Internacional por las masacres de Darfur sobre la base de que “los musulmanes no cometen genocidio”.

Irán y Turquía están destinados a reafirmar sus credenciales islámicas cada vez más a medida que se acercan a las masas árabes. Que el discurso panislámico haya sustituido ahora la causa del panarabismo es un retroceso importante para los regímenes árabes moderados.

Con todo, a pesar de la revolución islámica progresiva de Erdogan, Turquía no es un segundo Irán. El AKP sigue siendo un partido progresista, heterogéneo, que no ve contradicción entre el islam y la democracia. Tampoco se ha dado del todo por vencido respecto al sueño europeo de Turquía.

Además, una oposición secular cada vez más fuerte, el Partido Popular Republicano (CHP) bajo el liderazgo vigoroso de Kemal Kilicdaroglu, ayudará a detener la ola islamista. Con el regreso de Israel a una estrategia de paz sobria y con un diálogo franco entre Turquía y sus aliados de la OTAN, aún puede rescatarse el puente turco entre Oriente y Occidente.

En un reciente artículo de opinión publicado en estas páginas (El fracaso de Europa, del 28 de mayo de 2010), el sociólogo francés Alain Touraine, tras denunciar la miopía y pusilanimidad de la Unión Europea -léase Francia y Alemania- respecto al ingreso sin cesar demorado de Turquía en su seno, señalaba con razón que, sintiéndose indeseable en lo que algunos comentaristas turcos llaman “club cristiano”, Ankara se esfuerza más bien en estrechar hoy sus vínculos con las sociedades islámicas de Oriente Próximo y Asia Central.

La lectura de su artículo, a mi regreso de una estancia de dos semanas en Estambul y Damasco, me impresionó por su justeza y visión de futuro. El espectáculo de la Unión Europea (lo de Unión empieza ya a parecer un chiste como lo es desde hace tiempo lo de la Unión Árabe), con su incapacidad de coordinar criterios y medidas de cara a la crisis que sacude sus cimientos, y ajena del todo a la emergencia de países que pronto la superarán en términos económicos y de liderazgo político, es, en efecto, desolador. El temor al ingreso de un país en plena expansión económica, como Turquía, no toma además en cuenta la terca realidad de los hechos: la existencia indispensable de un puente entre el Viejo Continente y el mundo musulmán.

Atravesar Estambul desde el nuevo aeropuerto a Taksim Maydani muestra el prodigioso desarrollo urbanístico operado en la ciudad en poco más de un decenio. El partido de la Justicia y Desarrollo de Recep Tayyip Erdogan ha llevado a cabo con éxito desde su triunfo electoral en 2002 un programa de modernización y apertura democrática tanto en el campo político como en el económico y constitucional; ha puesto fin a la tutela del Ejército y enjuiciado al núcleo duro de jefes y oficiales kemalistas que fraguaban un golpe militar para derrocar su Gobierno; ha abierto el camino a una floreciente clase media que no soportaba ya la camisa de fuerza y los exorbitantes privilegios asociados a la cúpula del Partido Republicano del Pueblo (PRP) que, como el PRI mexicano, se aferraba al poder sin más fin que el de perpetuarse en él.

Todo ello con el apoyo mayoritario de un pueblo que, al menos en los grandes centros urbanos, se siente a la vez musulmán y europeo. Paradoja de las paradojas en este tiempo tan rico en ellas: ¡Estambul es este año la Capital Europea de la Cultura, mientras en Bruselas se suceden los obstáculos interpuestos para la admisión de la candidatura turca!

Veamos estos cambios. Los problemas acumulados en el patio interior tras la caída del Imperio Otomano tienden a resolverse. Con la pérdida de sus bases de retaguardia en Siria, la guerrilla kurda del PKK ha sufrido el golpe más duro desde el comienzo de su lucha armada. Frente a la intransigencia del Ejército y del PRP, Erdogan ha escogido el diálogo y la apertura a la diversidad cultural de su país: gracias a ella, existen escuelas y canales de televisión kurdos y la relación con los partidos políticos del área mayoritaria de esta etnia, aunque amenazada siempre por el anquilosado Tribunal Constitucional de Ankara, ha mejorado de forma sensible.

Igualmente alentadora es la decisión de dejar en manos de los historiadores el relato de las matanzas de armenios en 1915 durante la I Guerra Mundial. Por haber osado mencionar el tema, el premio Nobel Orhan Pamuk fue procesado por “insulto a la identidad turca”. Entre tanto, los libros de Taner Akçam en los que denuncia la responsabilidad del poder otomano en aquella limpieza étnica han abierto también una brecha en el campo del negacionismo. Hoy, las relaciones con Erivan, rotas a raíz de la guerra con Azerbayán y la ocupación armenia del Alto Kahrabaj, atraviesan una fase mucho menos tensa.

La complejidad de la vida política turca y sus contradicciones no pueden juzgarse sin tomar en consideración el peso de una serie de factores culturales, religiosos y geoestratégicos propios del Oriente Próximo. ¿Existe una agenda oculta del Gobierno de Erdogan para islamizar paulatinamente el país, como sugieren algunos intelectuales con quienes departí en Estambul? La respuesta es difícil y muchos kemalistas laicos y demócratas ven con esperanza la renovación del Partido Republicano del Pueblo tras el relevo de la desacreditada dirección del mismo en el reciente congreso celebrado en Ankara y su sustitución por el equipo de Kemal Kiliçdaroglu, un político muy valorado por su honestidad y al que algunos califican de Gandhi turco. Según ellos, el nuevo PRP mudado de la base a la cima, podría disputar la mayoría al partido de Erdogan en las próximas elecciones de 2011.

Paralelamente a la progresiva desmilitarización del régimen y de la sociedad turcos, Erdogan ha cambiado de un hábil golpe de timón la política exterior de su país. Sin renunciar a la entrada, por ahora imposible en la Unión Europea a causa de veto franco-alemán y del espinoso problema de Chipre, ha puesto patas arriba el cuadro político imperante en Oriente Próximo durante las últimas décadas. Consciente de que el tiempo juega a su favor y del creciente liderazgo económico de su país, ha convertido a éste en la potencia emergente de la región merced a sus nuevas relaciones con Siria, Irak y el siempre inquietante Irán de Ahmadineyad. La oferta, compartida con el presidente brasileño Lula, de procesar en Turquía el uranio enriquecido de Irán es un buen ejemplo de ello.

Tras el fracaso estrepitoso de George W. Bush -invasión de Irak, cuarentena de Siria, alianza incondicional con Israel-, no parece que los malabarismos de Barack Obama vayan a correr mejor suerte mientras no se establezca de una vez la existencia de un Estado palestino junto al judío en las fronteras anteriores a la Guerra de los Seis Días.

El abordaje en aguas internacionales de la flotilla de ayuda a Gaza confirma dicha aserción. No voy a juzgar aquí el asedio por tierra, mar y aire a una población de un millón y pico de habitantes y el asalto al Mavi Mármara y consiguiente asesinato de nueve activistas turcos: escritores de la talla de Amos Oz y David Grossman lo han hecho por mí en estas páginas. El inquietante autismo de Israel, rehén de su funesto papel de víctima, y su rechazo tenaz de las leyes que rigen la comunidad internacional están a la vista de todos.

Sin tener en cuenta el rápido deterioro de sus relaciones con el único aliado con el que contaba en la región -condena por Erdogan en Davos de la sangrienta Operación Plomo Fundido, exclusión de la aviación israelí de los habituales ejercicios militares en el espacio aéreo de Anatolia-, la acometida a la flotilla ha sido un disparate estratégico que ninguna cabeza pensante podía siquiera prever.

Enfrentándose a la opinión mundial, dicha operación insensata vulneraba no solo los principios de derecho internacional: cortaba también el ya frágil hilo de las relaciones de Tel Aviv con Ankara. Al denunciar el “terrorismo de Estado” israelí, Erdogan ha reafirmado su liderazgo en el mundo islámico que se extiende del Mediterráneo al Asia Central. En el Gobierno de Netanyahu nadie parece recordar, por el contrario, el salmo de David (XLI, 8): “El abismo llama al abismo”, esto es, un error acarrea otro. La prepotencia dictada por el miedo no es desde luego la mejor consejera en el campo político.

Since Israel’s deadly raid on the Turkish ship Mavi Marmara last month, it’s been assumed that Iran would be the major beneficiary of the wave of global anti-Israeli sentiment. But things seem to be playing out much differently: Iran paradoxically stands to lose much influence as Turkey assumes a surprising new role as the modern, democratic and internationally respected nation willing to take on Israel and oppose America.

While many Americans may feel betrayed by the behavior of their longtime allies in Ankara, Washington actually stands to gain indirectly if a newly muscular Turkey can adopt a leadership role in the Sunni Arab world, which has been eagerly looking for a better advocate of its causes than Shiite, authoritarian Iran or the inept and flaccid Arab regimes of the Persian Gulf.

Turkey’s Islamist government has distilled every last bit of political benefit from the flotilla crisis, domestically and internationally. And if the Gaza blockade is abandoned or loosened, it will be easily portrayed as a victory for Turkish engagement on behalf of the Palestinians. Thus the fiery rhetoric of Turkey’s prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, appeals not only to his domestic constituency, but also to the broader Islamic world. It is also an attempt to redress what many in the Arab and Muslim worlds see as a historic imbalance in Turkey’s foreign policy in favor of Israel. Without having to match his words with action, Mr. Erdogan has amassed credentials to be the leading supporter of the Palestinian cause.

While most in the West seem to have overlooked this dynamic, Tehran has not. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad used a regional summit meeting in Istanbul this month to deliver an inflammatory anti-Israel speech, yet it went virtually unnoticed among the chorus of international condemnations of Israel’s act. On June 12 Iran dispatched its own aid flotilla bound for Gaza, and offered to provide an escort by its Revolutionary Guards for other ships breaking the blockade.

Yet Hamas publicly rejected Iran’s escort proposal, and a new poll by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research found that 43 percent of Palestinians ranked Turkey as their No. 1 foreign supporter, as opposed to just 6 percent for Iran.

Turkey has a strong hand here. Many leading Arab intellectuals have fretted over being caught between Iran’s revolutionary Shiism and Saudi Arabia’s austere and politically ineffectual Wahhabism. They now hope that a more liberal and enlightened Turkish Sunni Islam — reminiscent of past Ottoman glory — can lead the Arab world out of its mire.

You can get a sense of just how attractive Turkey’s leadership is among the Arab masses by reading the flood of recent negative articles about Ankara in the government-owned newspapers of the Arab states. This coverage impugns Mr. Erdogan’s motives, claiming he is latching on to the Palestinian issue because he is weak domestically, and dismisses Turkey’s ability to bring leadership to this quintessential “Arab cause.” They reek of panic over a new rival.

Turkey also gained from its failed effort, alongside Brazil, to hammer out a new deal on Iran’s nuclear program. The Muslim world appreciated Turkey’s standing up to the United States, and in the end Iran ended up with nothing but more United Nations sanctions.

In taking hold of the Palestinian card, Prime Minister Erdogan has potentially positioned Turkey as the central interlocutor between the Islamic/Arab world and Israel and the West, and been rewarded with tumultuous demonstrations lauding him in Ankara and Istanbul. Meanwhile, the streets of Tehran have been notably silent, with Mr. Ahmadinejad’s regime worried about public unrest during the one-year anniversary of last summer’s fraudulent elections.

Prime Minister Erdogan has many qualities that will help him gain the confidence of the Arab masses. He is not only a devout Sunni, but also the democratically elected leader of a dynamic and modern Muslim country with membership in the G-20 and NATO. His nation is already a major tourist and investment destination for Arabs, and the Middle East has long been flooded with Turkish products, from agriculture to TV programming.

With Turkey capturing the hearts, minds and wallets of Arabs, Iran will increasingly find it harder to carry out its agenda of destabilizing the region and the globe. For Americans, it may be hard to see the blessings in a rift with a longtime ally. But even if Turkey’s interests no longer fully align with ours, there is much to be gained from a Westernized, prosperous and democratic nation becoming the standard-bearer of the Islamic world.