It has been said that there are no atheists in a foxhole. Here, after my show trial and four and a half months in a cell, I have discovered that there are no atheists in prison, either.

When, despite unbearable pain, you are interrogated – including in your cell – for dozens of hours without a break, and an authoritarian regime’s entire system of coercion, including its media, is trying to discredit and destroy you once and for all, prayer becomes the only intimate, trusting, and reassuring conversation that one can have. God, one realizes, is one’s only friend and only available family, because – deprived even of access to a trusted priest – there is no one else in whom to confide one’s worries and hopes.

In this season of love and family, the loneliness of a prison cell is almost unbearable. The gray, dead silence of night (guards peer in voyeuristically through a slot in the door), the sudden, disembodied shrieks of prisoners, shrieks of distress and rage, the distant rattles and clangs of prison bolts: all make sleep impossible, or so restless as to be a torment.

But what is strange is that your senses are not dulled by this dead and dreadful world. On the contrary, they are ignited by it: your mind is set free from mundane concerns to ponder the inestimable and your place within it – a freedom of spirit that is a truly unexpected gift this Christmas season. In the cell’s darkness, I gather strength and hope from the fact that God somehow seems so near to me here. For where else would Christ be but with those who suffer and are persecuted?

Indeed, I have recently been reading Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s sublime and challenging Letters from Prison, in which he yearns for a Christ capable of offering mercy to a world, our world, then in the process of being martyred for a single man. Written in a cramped, dank, and putrid cell, where hope was meant to die before the body, Bonhoeffer crafted a book rich in faith, openness, possibility, and, yes, hope – even in humanity’s darkest hour.

One particular passage resonates with me as I contemplate Ukraine’s plight. As he awaited his approaching execution by the Nazis, Bonhoeffer wrote that, in prison, “the godlessness of the world is not…concealed but, rather, revealed, and is thus exposed to an unexpected light.”

So I take some comfort this Christmas in knowing that the godlessness, inhumanity, and criminality of the regime that is now ruling in Kyiv is, at long last, being exposed to the world in a clear light. Its democratic posturing has been unmasked as cynical political theater, its claim to desire a European future for Ukraine’s people revealed to be a lie, and the rapaciousness of its kleptocrats has been laid bare. The regime’s contempt for the constitution and the rule of law is now undeniable, and that clarity is empowering.

More importantly, the suffering of Ukraine’s people has also become more widely known, and we are no longer so alone in our plight. Alleviating it has been embraced as a just cause across Europe and around the world. The everyday oppression, stifled media, and shakedowns and extortion of businesses for bribes all point to a mafia state on Europe’s border. Now our European friends can no longer deny the smug vileness of the regime with which they are forced to deal. And I am thankful this Christmas for being able to believe that democratic Europe will not tolerate this state of affairs. Ukrainians will be strong knowing that they are not alone in their fight.

I do not pretend to be an expert on religious faith and spiritual values. I am only a believer who cannot accept that our existence is the result of some freak cosmic accident. We are, I believe, part of a mysterious yet integral act, whose source, direction, and purpose, though difficult to grasp at times, does have meaning and purpose – even when one is confined behind prison bars.

It is only faith in the idea that our lives matter, and that our decisions must be judged by their moral content, that we in Ukraine, and elsewhere, will be able to find our way out of the misery, unhappiness, and despair that has consumed us over the last two years. It is within our power to recover or reinvigorate our freedoms and our societies, not by individual efforts, but by joining forces with likeminded people all over the world. I know that we will manage this.

This Christmas, I ask my family and friends everywhere not to worry about me. As Anna Akhmatova, the great poetic chronicler of Stalin’s terror, said, “I am alive in this grave.” Indeed, I am more alive, I know, than the men who have imprisoned me here.

Christmas is meant to mark the possibility of a new beginning for all men and women.

As Bonhoeffer affirmed with his last words: “This is for me…the beginning of life.”

Hace siete años la Revolución Naranja de Ucrania alimentó la esperanza de que el país estuviera avanzando hacia una verdadera democracia. Desde entonces, las libertades democráticas se han restringido, la ex primer ministro y líder de la revolución, Yulia Tymoshenko, ha sido encarcelada y el régimen del presidente, Viktor Yanukovych, se ha aislado de la escena internacional. Ucrania se está deshaciendo.

Actualmente, un pequeño grupo de oligarcas que rodean a Yanukovich han secuestrado el poder. Manipulan las elecciones, controlan los medios de comunicación, y están configurando las instituciones del país de modo que sirvan a sus propios intereses empresariales. La condena de Occidente no ha tenido impacto. Mientras dominen las industrias y recursos naturales del país, seguirán  teniendo el poder –enfoque que perfeccionó el ex primer ministro italiano, Silvio Berlusconi, la figura que toman como ejemplo.

Independientemente de la opinión que se tenga sobre Tymoshenko, su encarcelamiento no se debe a ninguno de los delitos manifiestos que cometió mientras estuvo en el poder. Está en prisión porque ya no tiene ese poder. Esto sienta un precedente peligroso porque crea un incentivo poderoso –el ganador se lleva todo, el perdedor va a la cárcel- para cometer actos despiadados.

Es difícil predecir el curso que seguirán los acontecimientos del caso Tymoshenko – Yanukovych cederá a la presión de la Unión Europea y los Estados Unidos para liberarla, o, las fuerzas que la quieren excluir para siempre de la política. Hasta hace poco, los dirigentes ucranianos usaban medios más eficientes que la prisión para tratar a los opositores incómodos. Por ejemplo, en 2000, el periodista Georgiy Gongadze, fue secuestrado y decapitado después de haber publicado en línea informes sobre la corrupción en los altos niveles del gobierno. Durante la investigación correspondiente, el ex ministro del Interior, Yuriy Kravchenko, murió de dos disparos en la cabeza horas antes de atestiguar.

Tal vez la propia Tymoshenko no entendió cuán bruscamente su país se había desviado de las normas democráticas cuando se burló de Yanukovych y sus opositores durante su juicio. En efecto, su primer breve encarcelamiento en 2001, le dio capital político y la llevó a las primeras filas de la oposición democrática.

Tal vez el mismo Yanukovych no previó las consecuencias del arresto, juicio y encarcelamiento de Tymoshenko. Algunos teóricos de la conspiración ucranianos –los cuales abundan- sostienen que a Yanukovich se le tendió una trampa mediante información errónea, hábilmente preparada, que le facilitaron los funcionarios de su entorno.

Si el encarcelamiento de Tymoshenko hace que la Unión Europea se niegue a firmar un acuerdo de asociación con Ucrania en la próxima cumbre que dichas partes celebrarán en Kiev el 19 de diciembre, los perjuicios para el país serán enormes y duraderos. Sin embargo, cada mes que Tymoshenko pasa en la cárcel –hasta ahora más de tres- su condición de mártir aumenta, lo que hace más difícil para Yanukovych ponerla en libertad. Yanukovych se ha vuelto un rehén de sus propias acciones –y por ende no ha hecho nada para salir de esta situación.

El entonces presidente de Rusia, Vladimir Putin, se metió también en un embrollo similar en 2003 debido al arresto del oligarca petrolero Mikhail Khodorkovsky. En aquel entonces, Khodorkovsky era el hombre más rico de Rusia y un crítico abierto del gobierno de ese país, por lo que su detención desencadenó una lluvia de protestas internacionales. Al igual que Yanukovych, Putin siente la presión de Occidente para liberar a su oponente, pero el riesgo político es demasiado grande.

Los objetivos de Yanukovych no son claros. No responde a la presión europea, a pesar de que Ucrania ganaría influencia política si tuviera una relación más estrecha con la UE. Tal vez, simplemente a Yanukovych le desagrade la UE porque ésta celebró su derrota en la Revolución Naranja, y por las pifias vergonzosas en las que incurre siempre que está de visita en algún país de la UE.

O tal vez aprendió del presidente bielorruso, Alexander Lukashenko, que la UE tiene poca influencia sobre la política interna de los países extracomunitarios. A la primera señal positiva de Belarús, la UE olvida y perdona. De hecho, incluso sin una señal positiva de Ucrania, el Parlamento Europeo ha recomendado el comienzo de las negociaciones para un acuerdo de asociación.

En general, la política exterior de Yanukovych parece reactiva. Por ejemplo, en 2010, cedió a la presión de Putin para extender hasta 2042 el arrendamiento ruso de instalaciones navales en Crimea, mientras que Tymoshenko y otros señalaban la inconstitucionalidad del tratado.

Yanukovych también socavó la fortaleza geopolítica de Ucrania frente a Rusia al rechazar la invitación de la OTAN a unirse en 2010. Aunque el Kremlin no vea con mucho agrado el acuerdo de asociación previsto entre la UE y Ucrania, no tiene razones para inquietarse mientras Yanukovych continúe siendo un presidente débil en un país dividido.

Así pues, Ucrania se está convirtiendo en una mezcla peligrosa de autoritarismo y capitalismo corrupto. En Belarús el empobrecido Lukashenko recurre cada vez más a la fuerza bruta para mantener el poder –reprime manifestaciones pacíficas, encarcela a los opositores políticos y aterroriza a los intelectuales. Comparado con él, Berlusconi es un ejemplo de buen gobierno. No obstante, como bien saben Yanukovych y sus partidarios, Berlusconi ha dimitido, pero Lukashenko no.

Dec. 1 marked the 20th anniversary of Ukraine’s independence referendum. More than 90 percent of Ukraine’s population voted that day in 1991 to affirm the parliament’s independence declaration, thus cementing the dissolution of the Soviet state and the rise of a free and independent Ukraine. With the Soviet hold lifted, Ukraine was viewed by many as a state with great economic potential and one with potentially great social and political vibrancy.

Ukraine, however, has fallen short. A common view now is that it is a stalled state, unable to move forward on major economic reform and with a fraying democratic fabric. In truth, Ukraine is not the failure many portray it to be, nor is its success as easy or guaranteed as early observers believed.

The record, as with any process of nation-building, is mixed. Overall, Ukraine’s successes outweigh its shortcomings. Ukraine’s existence as a state is a success in itself given the fact that many observers believed that Ukraine would not be able to survive the pangs of independence and the pressures of Russian nationalists, particularly regarding Crimea and the Black Sea fleet. Both issues, heavily identified with Russia’s history, appear to have faded into the background now. Ukraine’s historical geographic split between competing empires over the centuries, the large Russian minority and a large Catholic minority in a predominantly Orthodox society were also seen as possible fault lines. Ukraine has established its presence as a state, deftly dealing with the religious, ethnic and geographic fissures that could have split the society apart. Ukraine’s ability to deal with these issues serves as an example in a region that has experienced a variety of conflicts. Indeed, Ukraine has set a course as a stable regional actor and over time, can help strengthen regional cooperation.

Ukraine has also had a series of national and local elections that have led to peaceful transfers of power. Ukraine has elected four presidents. While many of these elections have been marred by irregularities – and outright fraud in the case of the 2004 presidential election that led to a new election and the election of President Viktor Yushchenko – a process has been established for the peaceful transfer of power. The 2004 peaceful democratic revolution, known as the Orange Revolution for the color of the banners of the democratic forces that brought Mr. Yushchenko to power, initiated wide, popular participation in the political process and gave hope to the populace that the future belongs in their hands. Many of the economic and political hopes of that revolution fell short, but it did establish a benchmark for popular expectations.

Equally important, unlike many of her neighboring states, Ukraine has established a host of political parties, all of which serve as a foundation for the continued development of a civic and participatory society. Ukraine also possesses numerous natural resources, a strong industrial base and a highly educated population that augur well for future economic development. A free-market economy is taking root, although the environment for business transactions is far from ideal due to a lack of certain standards, such as a viable judicial system and legal transparency.

On the international level, Ukraine has been able to maintain a stable relationship with Russia, even while jousting with Moscow over gas supplies and prices, and at the same time has extended its role in the larger international community. Ukraine has participated in a variety of international peacekeeping missions and is a member of NATO’s Partnership for Peace program. It has also become a member of the World Trade Organization and is increasing its efforts for greater integration into Europe. Ukraine also gave up its large nuclear arsenal, underscoring its own commitment to peaceful state relations and, through this step, serves as an example to other states.

That Ukraine faces numerous challenges is undeniable. The backsliding in democratic rights, the persistent corruption, and the inertia on further economic reform under the current government of President Viktor Yanukovych all pose formidable hurdles. On this 20th anniversary, however, the people of Ukraine have much to be proud of when they take their short history into perspective. They have maintained their independence and state and have established democratic principles that can serve as the foundation for overcoming the challenges they face. It is important that the government of Mr. Yanukovych take steps to nurture this democratic spirit and, thus, move Ukraine forward and not take measures that impinge on democratic processes and are reminiscent of the stagnant past.

The Chernobyl disaster of 1986 brought great joy to my family.

The Soviet Union relocated hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians from the contaminated area to new houses in other parts of the countryside. Ukrainians are shrewd. Many families that had lost one home tricked the government into giving them two houses as compensation, and then sold them off at ridiculously low prices. And so that was how my wife and I came into possession of an excellent second home in the country with a garden and a plot to plant vegetables in, and a separate brick shed that was later converted into a real Finnish-style sauna — for only $6,000.

We have lived part time in that village ever since, through the Soviet Union’s fall and Ukraine’s (I am tempted to say “great”) Orange Revolution. We lived there through Yulia Tymoshenko’s defeat of Viktor Yanukovich and ascent to prime minister, and through Viktor Yanukovich’s subsequent defeat of Yulia Tymoshenko and ascent to president. Last month, his judges sentenced her to seven years in prison for abusing power (or disrespecting him).

But in the meantime, many more mundane things have happened in our village. The first person to make our acquaintance there was the village policeman. Once he invited me to a pub that was owned by an acquaintance of his in a neighboring village. We drove there in my car. “Don’t worry, you can drink as much beer as you want! With me in your car nobody will stop us!” he told me.

I understood it would have been simply impolite not to drink in his company, so we had a good binge. The bearded owner came to our table several times and told us about his business plans. At the end of the evening, I noticed that the policeman was not about to pay for the beer we had drunk. I tried to pay, but he said to me, politely yet firmly: “Don’t do that! It’s all right, I have invited you!”

That came to mind a couple of years later, when another village friend told me about his attempt to start selling ice cream. “The business wouldn’t be too bad, were it not for our policemen who always came and took ice cream without paying.”

My village has taught me a lot, so I am glad whenever I can be of some use to it. American readers may not be aware of the special status enjoyed by writers in the former Soviet Union. The Ukrainian provinces still believe in the powers of the renowned men of letters.

Thus, the village’s school principal once asked me to appeal to the head of the regional state administration for two or three new teaching positions, so that the school could go up to the American equivalent of senior year instead of stopping at sophomore year. I think this was around 2002, during a very conservative period. At the time, President Leonid Kuchma was being accused of ordering the assassination of a journalist named Georgy Gongadze. Many unpleasant things were happening; obviously, there was not the slightest bit of freedom, be it of speech or of the press. Nonetheless, I did go to the state administrator. He listened and agreed. Everything happened very quickly. The school got its teachers and they treated me to a dinner with vodka. My prestige in the village soared and everybody was pleased, the school kids most of all.

However, after the Orange Revolution, which began in 2004, that state administrator was replaced by a younger “orange” man. Then the villagers came to me with another request. The new administrator had been bribed into selling off the villagers’ communal land, without consulting the village council. I wrote an article for the local newspaper and posted the information on the Internet. Soon after, he was caught red-handed while receiving a bribe and arrested. At first I felt a certain pride and confidence in my powers. Somewhat later it became clear that the administrator had been caught only because he had taken money from several different people, and none of them had ever come into possession of the land.

Years have gone by and the land has not been returned to the village; no one knows who owns it now. However, it must be said that it has not been dug up or carried away. It is still there, spread around the village, covered with woods and wheat fields.

During the presidential elections last year, I was fond of saying that choosing between Ms. Tymoshenko and Mr. Yanukovich was like choosing between a car with no brakes and the brakes with no car. Ukrainians are conservative folk; they did not opt for the car with no brakes. Ms. Tymoshenko has since been thrown in prison, for one reason: if she was not in prison, she would win the next parliamentary elections, and after that the presidential elections as well, and then she could turn around and arrest the politicians who arrested her.

As for our prisons, they are not made of rubber, and their capacity to accommodate additional inmates is not endless. As a man who served as a guard at the Odessa prison way back in Soviet times, I can personally attest to that.

But I am in no position to predict the future. All I know is that the Ukrainians will continue amazing the world by the very fact of their existence, by their flexibility, shrewdness and their ability to adapt to any circumstance. Given the current situation, I find the latter quality encouraging, because as soon as real democracy comes to Ukraine, Ukrainians will quickly grow accustomed to it, life will become civilized, and Ukrainians will turn into law-abiding citizens. Obviously, that is not something that comes naturally to them, but should life require respect for law, they will do it, even if that should run counter to their interests. The authorities must simply create the appropriate conditions.

One thing is certain: in Ukraine, we live surrounded by so many charismatic and anti-charismatic political figures, only the laziest writer could fail to crank out at least one novel per year.

In the Russian language, Ukraine has two meanings: one, the country of 43 million people that lies on the north coast of the Black Sea, and two, “on the border” or “borderland.” For most of the past 20 years, Kiev’s foreign policy aimed, and largely managed, to fix on Europe’s geopolitical map the first meaning rather than the second. Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich is now undoing that.

Ukraine became independent in 1991. In 1994, as Washington contemplated the enlargement of NATO, Boris Tarasyuk, Ukraine’s deputy foreign minister, met Strobe Talbott, the U.S. deputy secretary of state. Tarasyuk noted that NATO’s enlargement to include states such as Poland and Hungary would prompt a negative reaction from Moscow — and also raise a dilemma for Kiev: how could Ukraine avoid becoming a gray zone of insecurity, or a borderland, between an enlarged NATO and Russia?

Talbott agreed that the Ukrainians deserved a good answer to the question, and finding one became a priority task for the Clinton administration’s Europe policymakers. Washington moved to expand its bilateral relationship with Ukraine, establishing in 1996 a strategic partnership and a bilateral commission chaired by Vice President Al Gore and President Leonid Kuchma of Ukraine. One year later, NATO and Ukraine agreed to a distinctive partnership and set up the NATO-Ukraine Council to promote stronger links between Kiev and the alliance.

The goal was straightforward: to deepen ties between the West and Ukraine and thereby reassure Kiev that it would not find itself an isolated borderland as the enlargement of NATO and the European Union transformed Europe’s geopolitical landscape. In 2002, Kiev adopted the goal of joining NATO. While Ukraine’s relations with the European Union developed more slowly, they also acquired greater breadth and depth.

Following the 2004 Orange Revolution, Viktor Yushchenko made joining the Euro-Atlantic community his primary foreign policy objective and sought a membership action plan with NATO. He was considerably ahead of the Ukrainian public on the question of NATO membership, though Ukrainians strongly supported closer E.U. links. More critically, Yushchenko failed to address his country’s key domestic problems. A disillusioned Ukrainian electorate turned to Yanukovich in 2010.

On assuming office, Yanukovich stated that his first foreign policy priority would be to repair a badly frayed relationship with Moscow. He also made clear that Ukraine would balance its relationships with Russia and the West. He stressed the importance of deepening Ukraine’s integration with the European Union, most immediately through the negotiation of an association agreement and comprehensive free trade arrangement.

He regularly brushed aside Moscow’s entreaties to join a customs union with Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus. While some in the West regretted that Kiev no longer sought to join NATO, a closer Ukraine-E.U. relationship seemed a good answer to the question that Tarasyuk posed in 1994 about keeping Ukraine from becoming a borderland.

This is now in danger. The democratic backsliding that has occurred under Yanukovich, recently epitomized by the trial of opposition leader Yulia Tymoshenko, threatens Ukraine’s links with the West.

E.U. officials have canceled one planned Yanukovich visit to Brussels. While negotiation of the association and free trade agreements may continue, their completion is in jeopardy. Parliamentarians from E.U. states say the agreements have zero chance of ratification as long as Tymoshenko remains in prison. As the European Union grapples with the euro-zone crisis, Yanukovich’s democratic backslide offers those Europeans who always were skeptical about E.U. engagement with Kiev a handy excuse to oppose it. In parallel, Ukraine’s relations with individual Western countries seem headed for a freeze, as Yanukovich is increasingly viewed as another Aleksandr Lukashenko — the Belarus strongman — rather than an aspiring E.U. leader.

Yanukovich seems to recognize the risks of isolation, especially for his dealings with the Kremlin. Ukrainians voice frustration that although Kiev in 2010 acted to address major Russian concerns, Moscow has done little on issues of importance to Ukraine. The Russian government, for example, continues to pursue a natural gas pipeline under the Black Sea that would take gas that now travels through Ukraine. The deterioration of Ukraine’s relations with the West will likely embolden Moscow to press Kiev harder.

Thus, on its current course, Yanukovich’s domestic repression will leave Ukraine precisely where it did not want to be: in a gray zone between Europe and Russia. Yanukovich may not intend this, but that does not matter. He is making Ukraine into the borderland it had long sought to avoid.

Esta semana, en una exhibición de firmeza muy de agradecer, los líderes de la Unión Europea revocaron la invitación al presidente ucranio Víktor Yanukóvich, que debía asistir a varias reuniones importantes en Bruselas el jueves. De no haberlo hecho, habrían dado una imagen patética e insuficiente después de la condena escandalosa y casi digna de Putin de la rival política de Yanukóvich, Yulia Timoshenko, a siete años de cárcel, una multa de 190 millones de dólares y tres años de prohibición de ocupar ningún cargo oficial cuando salga de prisión.

La revocación de la invitación (en lenguaje diplomático, el “aplazamiento”) planteó la interesante cuestión de saber qué iba a hacer Yanukóvich entonces. Cuando le preguntaron por el viaje previsto hace unos días, al parecer contestó: “El jueves iré de todas formas en esa dirección… No voy a ponerme a suplicar a nadie. Si hace falta, iré más lejos”. ¿Más lejos? Ese comentario tan délfico se refería seguramente a su viaje previsto a Cuba y Brasil. ¿Pero es posible que también, en su mapa mental, se refiriera a Moscú? La UE no debe consentir que la intenten chantajear con la amenaza implícita que a Kiev le gusta tanto utilizar: “Si no nos aceptáis tal como somos, nos iremos con Rusia”. Es más, aunque los métodos de justicia como instrumento al servicio de la política son como los suyos, Vladímir Putin está también muy descontento con la condena de Timoshenko. El cargo del que se le acusa es un contrato de gas corrupto con Rusia. (¿Un contrato de gas corrupto? ¿Con Rusia? Quién lo iba a pensar).

El país más preocupado de todos por estos acontecimientos es el vecino occidental de Ucrania, Polonia, que ha sido su amigo y defensor más constante dentro de la UE. Como expresión simbólica de esa amistad, Polonia y Ucrania acogerán de forma conjunta el campeonato europeo de fútbol de 2012. Varsovia ha aprovechado su primer turno en la presidencia rotatoria de la UE para pedir que, en medio de las tormentas de la eurozona y las emociones de la primavera árabe, no se olvide del todo a los vecinos del Este con sus dificultades.

En parte a través de Varsovia, Yanukóvich había estado mandando a los dirigentes europeos mensajes privados sobre concesiones que estaba dispuesto a hacer en el caso de Timoshenko, en clara contradicción con las hipócritas protestas sobre la independencia de los tribunales ucranios. El propio partido del presidente ha propuesto que el Parlamento revoque o enmiende la ley sobre delitos económicos por la que se condenó a Timoshenko. Es decir, es evidente que la condena ha sido una falta política que convierte el famoso cabezazo de Zinedine Zidane en el Mundial de 2006 en la cúspide del juego olímpico.

El contraste entre las trayectorias de estos dos países vecinos es imposible de ignorar. Mientras Ucrania presenciaba su esperpéntico juicio, Polonia celebraba unas reelecciones parlamentarias más normales y tranquilas (incluso aburridas) que muchos países de Europa occidental. Como resultado, ha vuelto al poder un partido perfectamente sensato -aunque con un miedo crónico a las reformas- de centro-derecha, la Plataforma Cívica, en coalición con un partido de pequeños agricultores a cuyo líder es difícil verlo sin su iPad. La economía del país creció el 3,8% el año pasado. Hasta ahora, su Gobierno ha asumido los modestos deberes de la presidencia de turno de la UE con aplomo.

Hoy día, volar a Varsovia es como volar a Madrid o Roma, salvo que hay menos probabilidades de encontrarse con airados manifestantes anticapitalistas y nerviosos policías antidisturbios. Al país le queda aún mucho de su viejo estilo político paranoico, representado en los últimos tiempos, sobre todo, por la absurda insinuación del líder de la oposición nacionalista conservadora, Jaroslaw Kaczynski, de que a Angela Merkel le había ayudado a llegar a canciller un pasado en la Stasi. Sigue teniendo más pobreza de la normal, sobre todo en el este y el sureste, donde más apoyos tiene Kaczynski. Pero el rumbo emprendido está muy claro. Desde todos los puntos de vista razonables, la historia de Polonia desde su revolución de terciopelo en 1989 es un gran triunfo.

Comparémoslo con Ucrania desde su revolución naranja en 2004. Yo, que fui testigo de primera mano de aquel momento tan prometedor, esperaba que Ucrania se pusiera a la altura de los tiempos con su transición democrática, igual que lo había hecho en cuestión de revoluciones de terciopelo. También lo esperaban muchos polacos, para no hablar de los propios ucranios. Aquellas esperanzas -las nuestras y, mucho más importante, las suyas- se han visto frustradas. Muchos ucranios han mejorado sus vidas individuales. En muchos aspectos, son más libres. Pero el sistema político y económico sigue enfangado en la corrupción, el matonismo y la ineficacia.

En el Índice de percepciones de la corrupción 2010 que elabora Transparency International, Ucrania ocupa el puesto 134, al lado de Zimbabue. (Polonia está en el 41, muy por delante de Italia y Grecia). Y les recordaré que el presidente que acaba de tratar de eliminar a una rival política encerrándola en la cárcel es el mismo hombre cuyo intento de robar las elecciones presidenciales de 2004 desencadenó la revolución naranja. (El chiste que corría entonces era que quería seguir un tercer periodo en el poder; los dos primeros periodos eran los que pasó en la cárcel por sendos delitos en su juventud). Pero lo que ocurre es que los vencedores de aquella revolución, incluida Timoshenko, fueron grandes decepciones en el Gobierno, y tampoco son ningunos angelitos.

¿Por qué estas horribles diferencias entre dos países en los que grandes regiones pertenecieron a los mismos imperios (la Comunidad polaco-lituana de los primeros tiempos de la Edad Moderna y el Imperio ruso anterior a 1914) y Estados (la Polonia de entreguerras) durante largos periodos de la historia? Algunos señalan las diferentes circunstancias exteriores: el hecho de que la UE tiene mucho menos tirón y Rusia mucho más, sobre todo en el este de Ucrania, que habla ruso. Otros destacan la economía, como si fuera posible separarla de la política y las leyes. Otros sugieren profundos factores culturales. Son seguidores del difunto Samuel Huntington que opinan que el legado cultural ortodoxo y oriental de Ucrania condena al país, por alguna razón, al fracaso democrático, mientras que Polonia está predestinada al éxito democrático por su herencia católica y occidental.

Cada una de estas teorías tiene una pizca de verdad. La UE ha sido tibia en su relación con Ucrania, y no pocos Estados de Europa occidental que son miembros de la UE se alegran, en privado, de ver que Ucrania se descalifica por sí sola. El vibrante sector privado de Polonia, ayudado por millones de polacos que han trabajado y estudiado en Occidente, ha contribuido enormemente a la transición del país. Es extraordinario ver cómo reaparecen las fronteras de viejos imperios en los mapas electorales de las democracias poscomunistas, incluido el más reciente en Polonia. Ahora bien, ni la geografía ni la economía hacen que el destino sea inevitable.

Como observó el político y pensador estadounidense Daniel Patrick Moynihan: “La verdad conservadora fundamental es que lo que determina el éxito de una sociedad es la cultura, y no la política. La verdad progresista fundamental es que la política puede cambiar una cultura y salvarla de sí misma”. La buena política, las buenas Constituciones y los buenos tribunales pueden, con tiempo y suerte, cambiar el curso de los ríos. Las sociedades degradadas, borrachas y corruptas -como podía parecer Polonia a cualquier visitante hace 40 años- pueden volverse modernas, abiertas y democráticas. Y la apuesta progresista es que las sociedades ortodoxas, islámicas y asiáticas pueden transformarse también.

Esta no es solo una reflexión para el observador filosófico; es una lección política para la UE. En la Europa poscomunista, es preciso variar el aforismo de Bill Clinton. Es la política, estúpido. La política y el imperio de la ley. El caso Timoshenko importa porque, en él, coinciden la política y la ley precisamente como no deben coincidir. Por eso la UE no debe ablandarse en este caso, como suele hacer. Y, si el presidente Yanukóvich quiere irse más lejos -hasta Kamchatka, por ejemplo-, que tenga buen viaje.

Un proceso con fines propagandísticos que avergüenza a Europa acaba de tener lugar en Kiev. El presidente democráticamente elegido, Víktor Yanukóvich, ha permitido que la ex primera ministra Yulia Timoshenko fuera a juicio por decisiones tomadas durante su ejercicio del cargo. El pasado martes, Timoshenko fue sentenciada a siete años de cárcel tras protagonizar uno de los abusos más absurdos del sistema judicial en un país que dice ser una democracia y que está llamando a las puertas de Europa.

Todos los políticos recién llegados al poder culpan a sus predecesores de todos los males.

En Reino Unido, David Cameron culpa a Gordon Brown por todas las leyes y decisiones que tomó y por todos los problemas que el país sufre ahora. En Rusia, Vladímir Putin todavía acusa a Gorbachov y a Yeltsin por las dificultades actuales de ese país. En Estados Unidos la política está totalmente polarizada. Leer los comentarios de los centroizquierdistas sobre George W. Bush o de los republicanos sobre Obama es exponerse a imágenes de líderes políticos corrompidos y de Gobiernos malignos y casi criminales.

Por esta razón, las políticas democráticas son una válvula de seguridad. Permiten que el odio y la antipatía sean desviados a las urnas electorales.

¿No le gusta Yulia Timoshenko y piensa que fue un desastre para Ucrania, que malvendió el gas ucranio a Rusia? No hay ningún problema. Vote por Yanukóvich. Eso es exactamente lo que han hecho los ucranios tirando a Timoshenko a la basura de la historia.

Pero ahora Víktor Yanukóvich ha logrado lo que parecía imposible. Ha convertido a una de las políticas más controvertidas y polémicas en una nueva Juana de Arco europea, llevándola a un juicio que el mundo ve como un acto de venganza de los nuevos líderes ucranios.

La relación entre dinero y política, entre oligarcas y líderes políticos, no es nueva en Ucrania. Todos los oligarcas ucranios son dueños de cadenas de televisión. Incluso Valery Khoroshkovsky, líder del SBU, el servicio de seguridad estatal, es dueño de las emisoras de televisión Inter.

Como el general De Gaulle en la Francia de los años sesenta, quien sea presidente de Ucrania debe asegurarse de tener a las televisiones de su lado. Los oligarcas se adaptaron a Víktor Yushenko y ahora se están asegurando de facilitar el camino a Yanukóvich.

Aun así, Ucrania es el único país europeo en el que una primera ministra ha sido llevada a juicio por actos cometidos durante el tiempo que estuvo en el cargo.

El año que viene, Ucrania y Polonia serán los anfitriones de la Eurocopa 2012, el campeonato de fútbol que produce tantas noticias como las olimpiadas de Londres. Pero es difícil imaginar que la Eurocopa 2012 transcurra sin problemas políticos o diplomáticos si Yulia Timoshenko es encarcelada. Se debería hacer todo lo contrario: permitir que continúe con su vida política y que sea juzgada en el tribunal de la opinión pública, en lucha abierta con los actuales gobernantes.

Todo esto es vergonzoso para el compañero de Ucrania en la Eurocopa 2012, Polonia, que ha tenido que mandar a su presidente, Bronislaw Komorowski, a ver a su homólogo en Kiev para rogarle que ponga fin a este juicio propagandístico.

Es difícil imaginar cómo un acuerdo con la Unión Europea puede ser firmado sin dificultades mientras Kiev niega uno de los valores fundamentales de la democracia europea, la idea de que es en las urnas, y no en los juzgados, donde los políticos resuelven sus diferencias.

Ucrania se plantea modificar su Código Penal eliminando los artículos utilizados para procesar a Yulia Timoshenko. Esta reforma tendría que ser inmediata, a la par que Timoshenko debería ser liberada para que así Ucrania pudiera ser considerado como un país europeo en el que la cultura de la democracia arraiga de forma permanente.

La Unión Europea celebró recientemente su conferencia sobre la Asociación Oriental en Varsovia. Los resultados fueron insustanciales dado que la UE ha perdido el deseo y la voluntad de asumir riesgos, permitiendo a países tales como Ucrania y Georgia comenzar el camino -tan largo como sea- de acceso a la Unión Europea.

La ampliación de la UE ha perdido ímpetu. Mientras la crisis económica azota Europa, tanto la eurozona como países fuera del euro, es difícil ver algo que aliente a los modernizadores ucranios y a los demócratas de estilo europeo a demostrar energía y compromiso.

Pero Ucrania no debería hacerse daño a sí misma con la culminación de este juicio kafkiano. Es en las urnas donde la venganza contra los políticos debe tener lugar, no en los tribunales.

A Ukrainian court’s conviction of Yulia Tymoshenko on charges of abusing her powers when she signed natural-gas contracts with Russia in 2009, when she was the prime minister, is not necessarily proof that she actually committed a crime.

Nobody, except perhaps President Viktor Yanukovich and his inner circle, really believes in the independence of the Ukrainian judiciary. In fact, this case can be viewed as a new chapter in Ukrainian politics — criminal prosecution for political motives.

Yanukovich had two such motives. First was to get rid of an opposition leader whose presence in the political arena has been a source of acute discomfort for him since the days of the Orange Revolution. Tymoshenko played a leading role in that popular uprising, which blocked Yanukovich’s first attempt in 2004 to secure the presidency. In his second bid in 2010, he narrowly defeated Tymoshenko.

The second motive was to use the Tymoshenko case as leverage against Russia to lower the price of gas sold to Ukraine. In the trial, Russia figured as an accomplice in an illegal transaction, and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and President Dmitri Medvedev as allies of Tymoshenko — an ironic reversal of Yanukovich’s reputation in the West as the Kremlin’s ally.

The Ukrainian government regards the current price of Russian gas as unfair, especially after Yanukovich, in a bid to lower it, extended the lease on Russian naval bases in the Crimea for 25 years, to 2042, and rejected NATO membership for Ukraine.

Yanukovich clearly did not expect that immediately after he satisfied those two Russian demands, Moscow would add two more: Ukrainian accession to a customs union with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, and the merger of the Ukrainian gas company Naftogaz with Russia’s Gazprom — a union that would give the Kremlin control over Ukraine’s gas transport network.

Yet the prosecution of Tymoshenko could end up as a political sentence for Yanukovich. For one thing, Tymoshenko would probably be the most convenient sparring partner if he runs for re-election in 2015. Public distrust of Tymoshenko is higher than of most other Ukrainian politicians, so she would be less dangerous as an active opponent than as a political martyr.

Ukrainians are so fed up with the old politicians that virtually any new face could pose a more serious challenge to Yanukovich than Tymoshenko. A recent poll, for example, showed that the 37-year-old leader of the “Front for Change,” the former Foreign Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk, would be a greater threat to Yanukovich than Tymoshenko.

The Tymoshenko case also stands to seriously harm Ukraine’s relations with the European Union — relations which are essential to Ukraine’s future. This month Ukraine is supposed to be dotting the final “i” in its negotiations over an Association Agreement with the European Union, which includes an agreement on a free trade zone. Paradoxical as it may sound, the “pro-Russian” Yanukovich now has a better chance to bring Ukraine closer to the E.U. than his “pro-European” predecessor, Viktor Yushchenko, ever had.

An Association Agreement with the E.U. would preclude Ukraine’s participation in a customs union with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, and make Ukraine’s European path irreversible. But over the past month Yanukovich has received clear signals from Europe that sending Tymoshenko to prison will create problems for the Kiev-Brussels dialogue and for the subsequent ratification of any agreements by European parliaments.

The problem is that some advisers to Yanukovich believe that European negotiators are using Tymoshenko as a pretext for slowing down Ukraine’s integration in the E.U., and that if there were no Tymoshenko case, they’d find another pretext. They also believe that the E.U. will sign an Association Agreement no matter how the Tymoshenko case is resolved.

Finally, a guilty verdict against Tymoshenko clearly will not improve relations with Russia. The issue is not Tymoshenko herself — though many in Kiev and Moscow believe that Putin now prefers her to Yanukovich as a partner. The fact is that her case involves natural-gas agreements with Russia; a guilty verdict is more likely to worsen Yanukovich’s relations with Putin than to make Russia more compliant on gas prices. That is not what Yanukovich needs in advance of parliamentary elections scheduled for next year.

The Tymoshenko case is not a battle of good and evil, of a “democratic and pro-European” Tymoshenko against an “autocratic and pro-Russian” Yanukovich, as some in the West seem to think. Yulia Tymoshenko is not a symbol of Ukrainian democracy, nor of Ukraine’s European choice. But this court ruling against her could have serious negative consequences both for Ukraine’s democracy and its European hopes.

Do Ukrainian leaders understand that? If yes, they should do everything possible to alter Ukraine’s Soviet-era laws, and to set Tymoshenko free.

From Western capitals it’s far too easy to see the prosecution of the Ukrainian opposition leader Yulia Tymoshenko as another example of post-Soviet repression. In reality, there are some serious questions surrounding her behavior in office over and above the usual corrupt practices of the region. Rather than directly challenging the prosecution, Washington and Brussels should insist on a greater commitment to rule-of-law standards in Kiev. Given that the European Union is in the process of negotiating a major trade deal with Ukraine, Brussels should be leveraging the Tymoshenko case to reinforce the rule of law there.

While questionable political and commercial practices are major problems across Ukrainian politics, the 2009 gas deal between Tymoshenko and Vladimir Putin was exceptional for the damage it did to Ukrainian interests. This was a deal that even Tymoshenko’s own cabinet refused to ratify along with the then head of the state energy company Naftogaz. It was only finally settled on her own authority.

The deal imposed a very high base price for gas of $450 per thousand cubic meters; a strict payment regime, which following any default could force Ukraine to pay for gas in advance; very high take-or-pay clauses that forced Ukraine to pay for gas it could not possibly use; and no ship-or-pay obligations on Gazprom (hence Gazprom, without penalty, could reduce shipments to Ukraine).

The deal’s impact on Ukraine’s economy and consumers was extremely negative. Ukrainian gas prices have remained substantially above those of most Western European countries. Ukrainian industries such as steel and chemicals have been hit hard by higher gas prices and greater competition from Russian rivals benefiting from much lower domestic gas prices. The deal’s high take-or-pay volumes made the situation worse for Ukrainian consumers and industry, as Ukraine was forced to pay for gas it did not need. This problem has been compounded by the economic crisis. As demand collapsed the take-or-pay clauses became more onerous.

It is unclear why Tymoshenko agreed to this very one-sided deal. Various reasons are given by opponents and supporters. One government version is that she signed the deal in order to settle a Russian case against her involving her old firm United Energy Systems of Ukraine and the Russian defense ministry. Another view is that Tymoshenko agreed to the deal to ensure Russian support during the Ukrainian presidential elections. Her supporters assert that she acted to ensure continued gas flow through the winter. However, many independent observers question why she did not call on Washington and Brussels to help pressure Moscow for a better deal?

Brussels and Kiev are in the final stages of completing the so-called Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement. There are calls in a number of E.U. capitals and Washington for Brussels to suspend the trade pact in order to force Kiev to end the prosecution of Tymoshenko.

While the West is right to be concerned by the prosecution of any political leader in the former Soviet sphere, its focus should be much more targeted on improving the rule of law in Ukraine. Rather than Brussels threatening to suspend negotiations on the trade agreement, Brussels and Washington should use the Tymoshenko case to promote the rule of law in Ukraine. Brussels, supported by Washington, should be looking for a side agreement on the rule of law as it negotiates the trade accord.

Brussels should recognize that adherence to the rule of law by Ukraine is a vital E.U. interest. One of the major concerns over the trade agreement is that the European Union will provide greater market access for Ukraine but that Ukraine will not reciprocate. Ukraine’s high levels of corruption and noncompliance with the rule of law will make it very difficult for Kiev to provide Western businesses with real market access according to modern trading standards.

A side agreement to the trade accord should include the creation of an independent international judicial commission to reinforce judicial independence. It should also include requirements to establish independent and properly funded agencies to underpin competition, promote trading standards and battle corruption.

Such a side agreement would boost the chances of successful implementation of the trade accord for all parties to the deal. It would also make the trade agreement much more economically effective in Ukraine, boosting competition, reducing corruption and opening up economic opportunity for both ordinary Ukrainians and foreign businesses.

The comprehensive free trade agreement should not be jeopardized by the Tymoshenko case. A great deal of effort has been deployed by both the European Union and the Ukrainian government to deliver a final agreement. Kiev has stood up to immense pressure from Moscow, which is very hostile to the trade accord and wants Kiev to join its own customs union. Rather than withdrawing from the trade accord and leaving Kiev with little option but to head in Moscow’s direction, the West should be seeking to bring more European standards to Ukraine.

It seems parts of Europe are less tolerant now than they were in the 16th century. Last week I watched as bulldozers began to demolish the adjacent remnants of what was once one of Europe’s most beautiful synagogue complexes, the 16th-century Golden Rose in Lviv. Most of the rest of the synagogue was burned down, with Jews inside, by the Nazis in 1941.

During the war, 42 other synagogues were destroyed in Lviv, which from the middle ages to the 20th century was known by its Austrian (and Yiddish) name, Lemberg, and then called Lvov after the Soviets annexed it in 1945. The remnants of the Golden Rose are one of the few remaining vestiges of Jewish existence in Lviv, the majority of whose residents, in 1940, were Jewish.

It is not only morally wrong for bulldozers to drill through the last traces of this vibrant past without first giving the handful of remaining Jews here a chance to restore this site, or turn it into a place of memorial. It is legally wrong, too. Ukraine’s own laws are designed to preserve such historic sites.

The Ukrainian authorities are not the only ones at fault. Where is the UN cultural organisation, Unesco? The synagogue ruins were designated part of a Unesco world heritage site in 1998.

And where is the European football body, Uefa? The Ukrainians are planning to build a hotel on the site to host next year’s European football championships, the world’s third most-watched sporting event, which they are co-hosting with Poland. So much for Uefa’s much-hyped campaign to “kick racism out of football”. (In addition to there being residual antisemitism in Ukraine, the authorities seem to be motivated by cultural and historical crassness and illiteracy and denial of the past, as well as real-estate greed.)

During the Holocaust, 420,000 Jews, including more than 100,000 children, were murdered in Lviv and its environs, more than in almost any other city in Europe. The killing was so efficient that the Nazis organised transports of Romanian and Hungarian Jews to be brought here to be killed once they were done killing the Polish and Ukrainian Jews. There were almost no survivors.

Yet you will hardly find any reference to this in the official guide books or in the museums of Lviv. There is no monument to the murdered Jews in Lviv’s old town.

A few elderly people still remember. One woman who approached me last week as I stood at what used to be the ghetto entrance told me she remembered as a child seeing Jews whipped as they were forced to walk on their knees back and forth for hours until they collapsed and were then shot while Nazis laughed.

Few tourists make their way here these days but many readers may recognise the city since it is where Steven Spielberg chose to film parts of Schindler’s List. This formerly Austrian and Polish town still resembles parts of prewar Krakow, where much of the film was set.

Others may have read Robert Marshall’s harrowing “In the sewers of Lvov” – an account of the only group of Jews to stay alive for any length of time in the sewers of Nazi-occupied Europe.

Ten Jews, including two children and a pregnant woman, managed to survive for 14 months among the feces, rats and darkness despite the Nazi use of dogs and grenades to flush out the other estimated 500 Jews who tried to hide there. (The woman’s baby, who was born in the sewer, died.)

This group of 10 survived with help from Leopold Socha, an illiterate Polish former criminal who, on release from prison, became a sewer worker and made it what he called his “life’s atonement” to save a few Jews by risking his life to bring them food as often as he could. (There is now a plaque to Socha at Jerusalem’s Yad Vashem.)

The Lviv authorities know it is an outrage to destroy the remains of the Golden Rose, which is why last week they placed a tall fence around the planned hotel site and closed off most of the street so hide it from view. One of Lviv’s last Jews, Meylakh Sheykhet, and I had to mount a long ladder to peek over a wall and watch the drills at work.

For more than 20 years, Sheykhet has almost singlehandedly been waging a campaign to stop the authorities destroying any more historic Jewish sites in this region and to encourage them to mark the sites of more than 1000 mass graves with memorial plaques.

“It is hard to imagine these sites being treated less respectfully,” Sheykhet observed. “The Holocaust has not stopped here, the destruction goes on. Over the tombstones of some of history’s greatest rabbis there are now movie theatres, discos and car parks. At the very least the authorities could put up some marker on these sites.”

Two years ago, another site of mass murder in Lviv, the Citadel – where tens of thousands of Jews and others were tortured to death – was converted into a five-star hotel. Amazingly, the hotel is owned by Volodymyr Gubitsky, the deputy regional governor responsible for the preservation of culture and heritage.

Sheykhet failed to block the Citadel project. But he is campaigning to stop the destruction of the remains of the Golden Rose (as well as prevent the last preserved part of the Citadel being turned into a casino in preparation for Euro 2012).

In the 16th century, when the Golden Rose was built, Lemberg was a tolerant city where many ethnic groups lived side by side. Is the world today really so intolerant that it can’t countenance conserving the last remains of this once flourishing Jewish community, and leave the murdered to rest in peace?

There is little doubt that the embarrassing spectacle of the trial of former Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko – and her recent arrest on contempt charges during the proceedings – is causing great damage to her country. And there is little doubt that how Ukraine develops will be of great importance for Europe’s future.

Ukraine’s Orange Revolution in 2004 ignited the hope of a new wave of democratic reforms in the countries to the east of the European Union – a period of so-called “color” revolutions. Soon, however, those forces that feared losing power in this vast and important region began a determined counter-offensive.

Nonetheless, Ukraine continued to stumble in a European direction, preserving important parts of the gains made in 2004. The 2010 comeback of President Viktor Yanukovich was essentially the result of a free and fair election.

It took some time, but Yanukovich’s determination to press on with the European integration efforts begun by his predecessor, Viktor Yushchenko, has become increasingly clear – in the face of repeated calls (and sometimes thinly veiled threats) by Russia to join its customs union with Belarus and Kazakhstan. Indeed, tension with Russia could well escalate towards the end of the year, because Ukraine’s foreign-policy orientation is of clear consequence to the Kremlin. A democratic Ukraine with an open economy and close ties with the European Union could not fail to influence Russia’s future path as well.

Negotiations for an association agreement between Ukraine and the EU, which includes far-reaching provisions for trade and regulatory integration, are well advanced, and could even be concluded this year. The agreement could become a model for similar agreements with other countries belonging to the EU’s Eastern Partnership. Georgia and Moldova are lined up to start similar negotiations.

Ukraine, reasonably enough, wants this agreement to be accompanied by an acknowledgment of its European destiny, and by clear steps towards reciprocal visa-free travel. Such an acknowledgement could be seen as formal recognition of the fact that membership of the EU remains a long-term option for Ukraine.

All of that has been put in profound jeopardy by Tymoshenko’s trial. Of course, few saints grace Ukrainian politics. Indeed, large-scale corruption has become entrenched in the country’s political system, with various oligarchic groups often battling each other. The corruption networks surrounding the old Soviet pipeline system carrying gas from Siberia to Western Europe have obviously impeded Ukraine’s political development. But, whether saint or sinner, everyone deserves a fair hearing, not a show trial.

The rule of law must apply to all, and very few believe that any of the charges against Tymoshenko would stand the slightest chance of being upheld in a Western court. It all smacks of a politically directed attempt by Yanukovich and his supporters to rid themselves of a powerful opponent before the next election.

Together with other similar cases, these trials raise serious questions about Ukraine’s judicial system and law enforcement agencies. They provide the clearest indication yet that Ukraine, despite assurances by Yanukovich’s government, is developing in the wrong direction.

Negotiations on the EU association agreement should proceed – this is an issue of strategic importance to Europe – but subsequent steps will inevitably depend on Ukraine’s commitment to the values and principles underpinning European integration. If the bizarre scenes now being witnessed in Kyiv continue, even Ukraine’s closest friends in Europe will find it very difficult to make the case for a deepening of relations. Tymoshenko’s trial, and how she is treated by the Ukrainian authorities, must not only be fair, but also must be seen to be fair.

Ukraine’s moves in the direction of the EU reflect its efforts to modernize and reform its economy. Indeed, the country could develop into a mini-China, placing massive manufacturing capacity immediately adjacent to the global economy’s largest integrated market. And Ukraine’s potential as an agricultural producer is equally impressive.

Yet Ukraine currently is struggling to meet the conditions of its IMF assistance program. Parliament watered down a proposal for far-reaching pension reform to the point that it borders on useless, and repeated promises to stop subsidizing wasteful energy consumption through low gas prices have not been honored.

Determined reform policies could overcome these obstacles; but, if Ukraine wants to proceed on the EU path, it must understand that the rule of law is a precondition for substantial integration. Yanukovich’s government must take stock of its behavior.

Freedom House concluded earlier this year that, since Yanukovich came to power in 2010, Ukraine “has become less democratic and, if current trends are left unchecked, may head down a path toward autocracy and kleptocracy.” But its assessment also noted that “political and cultural diversity is a bulwark against any one force dominating political space throughout the country.”

So Ukraine’s future remains open. It is a great country that deserves a secure and prosperous future as a member of Europe’s family. The show-trial of Yulia Tymoshenko, unfortunately, risks turning it into an estranged cousin.

The recent start of the trial in Kyiv of former Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, one of the leaders of Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, on charges of abuse of power raises grave concerns about President Viktor Yankovych’s commitment to democracy and the rule of law. In reality, it is his regime, not Tymoshenko, that is on trial, along with the European Union’s willingness to stand up for democracy in a large and important neighbor.

As the EU and Ukraine launch another round of negotiations for a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA), the EU should not repeat its mistakes in accession negotiations with Bulgaria and Romania, which most EU members believe were admitted prematurely, or with Belarus, where it failed to define impermissible behavior in 2008-2010. Instead, the EU should conclude the DCFTA and Association agreement with Ukraine only if the Yanukovych administration demonstrates clear commitment to European values.

Anchoring Ukraine inside a DCFTA and political association agreement would undoubtedly bring significant benefits to the country and strengthen its European ties. But these benefits should not come at the expense of turning a blind eye to the democratic norms that the EU claims to espouse.

During the 18 months since Yanukovych’s election as president, the United States, the EU, the International Monetary Fund, the OECD, and other international organizations have published detailed reports about Ukraine’s lack of progress in implementing economic and political reforms and reducing corruption. The IMF suspended its July 2010 standby program after Ukraine failed to implement a second round of reforms. Leading non-governmental organizations such as Freedom House and Reporters Without Borders have documented the country’s steep slide away from democracy.

Last month, the EU unveiled a new and ambitious European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), which stated: “A functioning democracy, respect for human rights, and the rule of law” are fundamental pillars of the EU partnership with its neighbors. To continue negotiations with Ukraine at a time of slowing economic reform and growing official contempt for democratic norms would undermine the EU’s claim to be forging a model for the ENP by upholding “European values” and standards in negotiations for a DCFTA and Association agreement.

The clearest example of the Yanukovich government’s undemocratic methods is its repression of its opponents, which the European Parliament sharply criticized in a resolution issued on June 9. During the 18 months of negotiations, the Ukrainian authorities have added new criminal charges to existing ones against Tymoshenko and 12 members of her 2007-2010 government.

Many of the charges border on the absurd, while others are attempts to criminalize political decisions. For example, former Interior Minister Yuriy Lutsenko has been charged with having used government funds to pay for a Police Day holiday. Anti-tax protesters are accused of having damaged tiles on Kiev’s Independence Square.

To maintain the credibility of its ENP policy, the EU should take three important steps. First, it should draw clear red lines regarding what constitutes impermissible behavior for the Yanukovych administration. The EU should make clear that Ukraine needs to demonstrate a tangible commitment to “European values” and standards.

Second, the EU should insist that Ukraine continue to abide by the conditions stipulated in its IMF program. This is important because Ukraine has only partly fulfilled IMF agreements that it signed in 1994, 2008, and 2010.

Finally, the EU should insist that Ukrainian authorities halt all politically motivated criminal cases and release those who are incarcerated for political crimes. Selective use of justice has badly damaged the Yanukovych administration’s reputation. Steps in this direction would greatly improve the Ukrainian government’s relations with the EU and the US.

These three steps would not resolve all of the difficulties in Ukraine’s relations with the EU. But they would lay down important guidelines and help to insure inclusiveness and transparency in Ukraine’s reforms process. They would also enhance the credibility of the EU’s commitment to promoting democratic reform as a core element of the ENP, and provide a clear roadmap of the steps Ukraine must take before a DCFTA can be concluded.

It is not too late to bring Ukraine back to a democratic course. Most Ukrainians yearn for a European future and would turn against any government that precluded such a course. Yanukovich knows this. Does the EU?

In February 2010, Viktor Yanukovych was freely and fairly elected president of Ukraine. It was not too surprising: The Ukrainian economy had contracted by 15 percent in 2009, and near political stalemate reigned in this fragile democracy. One year later, Yanukovych appears to be following the prescription of his political model, Russia’s Vladimir Putin, by swiftly concentrating power in his own hands and wealth among a small circle of associates.

In October, the Constitutional Court suspended the Ukrainian Constitution of 2004, returning to the 1996 constitution, which granted greater presidential powers. The country is no longer regarded as a democracy; Freedom House downgraded Ukraine to being only partially free, and Reporters Without Borders ranks Ukraine 131st out of 178 countries in press freedom. And local elections last October ended Ukraine’s string of free and fair elections.

The authorities defend their roughness as necessary to achieve reforms. Last summer, these statements had some credibility. In June, Yanukovych presented an ambitious economic reform program. In July, he reached agreement on a stabilization program with the International Monetary Fund, backed by $15 billion of credits. Impressively, Ukraine swiftly carried out the required early actions, such as tightening the state budget and raising gas prices for consumers.

The ensuing “reforms,” however, did not boost Ukraine’s competitiveness or market freedom but instead benefited a few businessmen close to the president. Yanukovych favors privatization, but the deals are neither transparent nor competitive. The national telecommunications company, Ukrtelecom, was sold to a single permitted buyer — an Austrian private-equity firm named EPIC — at the minimum price. More such deals are in the works. Last summer, Ukraine enacted a new law on government procurement, but major infrastructure projects connected with the Euro 2012 soccer championship were excluded from competition and appear reserved for a couple of the president’s closest associates.

Ukraine’s grain exports boomed in recent years, with domestic and international entrepreneurs stepping in. But last summer, Yanukovych ordered an embargo on exports, with quotas granted only to his associates. Food processing is declining as a result.

The key reform law was the tax code adopted last fall, but it cut taxes on big corporations while increasing the burden on small entrepreneurs, arousing protests all over Ukraine. In an apparent charade, Yanukovych vetoed the tax code, eliminating its worst aspects, but even so, big international auditing firms say the tax system has deteriorated, and many small businesses have closed.

In a brief annual address to parliament on April 7, Yanukovych appeared to have given up his reform pretenses, presenting platitudes, apart from insisting on privatization. Major pension and gas market reforms agreed to with the IMF have been postponed, while the grain export quotas have been maintained and tax reimbursements have stalled. As a result the IMF reforms have fallen apart.

The most sinister aspect of Yanukovych’s rule is the use of the judicial system to repress opponents and the media. In its recent human rights report, the State Department noted that prosecutors had brought charges against former prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko and other former high-level members of the government, and that the way the case was handled suggested it was politically motivated.

In March, prosecutors surprisingly charged former president Leonid Kuchma, a staunch Yanukovych supporter, with involvement in the murder of journalist Georgy Gongadze in 2000. Given Yanukovych’s attitude toward opposition media and his previous lack of interest in the case, the sudden concern does not seem plausible.

Yanukovych’s role in instigating the case has aroused online speculation in Ukraine about his motives. The media report that other Kuchma-era politicians are being investigated, notably the parliamentary speaker Volodymyr Lytvyn. Another hypothesis is that oligarchs allied with Yanukovych want to seize television stations or steelworks from Kuchma’s wealthy son-in-law, following the script of Russia’s prosecution of Mikhail Khodorkovsky. A third theory is that Yanukovych is taking revenge on Kuchma for not having ordered his security forces to shoot on the peaceful Orange Revolution protesters in 2004.

Meanwhile, economic growth was mediocre at 4 percent last year, and the same is expected this year. Transparency International reports rising corruption.

Can such misrule endure in today’s Europe? The spirit of the Orange Revolution lives on in multiple public protests against everything from unpaid wages to repression. In a year, the popularity of Yanukovych’s party has fallen by two-thirds, to 14 percent, and his approval rating has fallen to 17 percent. A large majority of Ukrainians, including in the Russian-dominated east, believe their country is going in the wrong direction.

Yanukovych does not seem to recognize what his Russian example does: To survive politically, even under light authoritarianism, requires remaining overwhelmingly popular.

Twenty-five years ago, the explosion at Chernobyl cast a radioactive cloud over Europe and a shadow around the world. Today, the tragedy at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant continues to unfold, raising popular fears and difficult questions.

Visiting Chernobyl a few days ago, I saw the reactor, still deadly but encased in concrete. The adjoining town of Pripyat was dead and silent — houses empty and falling into ruin, mute evidence of lives left behind, an entire world abandoned and lost to those who loved it.

More than 300,000 people were displaced in the Chernobyl disaster; roughly six million were affected. A swathe of geography half the size of Italy or my own country, the Republic of Korea, was contaminated.

It is one thing to read about Chernobyl from afar. It is another to see for it. For me, the experience was profoundly moving, and the images will stay with me for many years. I was reminded of a Ukrainian proverb: “There is no such thing as someone else’s sorrow.” The same is true of nuclear disasters. There is no such thing as some other country’s catastrophe.

As we are painfully learning once again, nuclear accidents respect no borders. They pose a direct threat to human health and the environment. They cause economic disruptions affecting everything from agricultural production to trade and global services.

This is a moment for deep reflection, a time for a real global debate. To many, nuclear energy looks to be a clean and logical choice in an era of increasing resource scarcity. Yet the record requires us to ask: have we correctly calculated its risks and costs? Are we doing all we can to keep the world’s people safe?

Because the consequences are catastrophic, safety must be paramount. Because the impact is transnational, these issues must be debated globally.

That is why, visiting Ukraine for the 25th anniversary of the disaster, I put forward a five-point strategy to improve nuclear safety for our future:

•First, it is time for a top to bottom review of current safety standards, both at the national and international levels.

•Second, we need to strengthen the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency on nuclear safety.

•Third, we must put a sharper focus on the new nexus between natural disasters and nuclear safety. Climate change means more incidents of freak and increasingly severe weather. With the number of nuclear facilities set to increase substantially over the coming decades, our vulnerability will grow.

•Fourth, we must undertake a new cost-benefit analysis of nuclear energy, factoring in the costs of disaster preparedness and prevention as well as cleanup when things go wrong.

•Fifth and finally, we need to build a stronger connection between nuclear safety and nuclear security. At a time when terrorists seek nuclear materials, we can say with confidence that a nuclear plant that is safer for its community is also more secure for the world.

My visit to Chernobyl was not the first time I have traveled to a nuclear site. A year ago, I went to Semipalatinsk in Kazakhstan, ground zero for nuclear testing in the former Soviet Union. Last summer in Japan, I met with the Hibakusha, survivors of the atomic blasts at Nagasaki and Hiroshima.

I went to these places to highlight the importance of disarmament. For decades, negotiators have sought agreement on limiting (and perhaps ultimately eliminating) nuclear weapons. And this past year, we have seen very encouraging progress.

With the memory of Chernobyl and, now, the disaster in Fukushima, we must widen our lens. Henceforth, we must treat the issue of nuclear safety as seriously as we do nuclear weapons.

The world has witnessed an unnerving history of near-accidents. It is time to face facts squarely. We owe it to our citizens to practice the highest standards of emergency preparedness and response, from the design of new facilities through construction and operation to their eventual decommissioning.

Issues of nuclear power and safety are no longer purely matters of national policy, alone. They are a matter of global public interest. We need international standards for construction, agreed guarantees of public safety, full transparency and information-sharing among nations.

Let us make that the enduring legacy of Chernobyl. Amid the silence there, I saw signs of life returning. A new protective shield is being erected over the damaged reactor. People are beginning to return. Let us resolve to dispel the last cloud of Chernobyl and offer a better future for people who have lived for too long under its shadow.

Comenzó como un día gris y lluvioso de primavera, como tantos otros en mi tierra, y acabó con pavor y luto.

Naturalmente, ninguno de nosotros supo el preciso momento en el que la catástrofe azotó en Chernóbil hace 25 años. Entonces vivíamos en un sistema que denegaba a las personas corrientes derecho alguno a conocer ni siquiera hechos y acontecimientos esenciales, por lo que se nos mantuvo en la ignorancia sobre la radiación que se filtraba desde el reactor destrozado en Chernóbil y volaba arrastrada por los vientos en el norte de Europa.

Pero lo más extraño del desastre de Chernóbil fue –como ahora sabemos– que también se mantuvo en la ignorancia sobre la magnitud del desastre a Mijail Gorbachev, Secretario General del Partido Comunista de la Unión Soviética. De hecho puede que fuera eso precisamente lo que acabara condenando el viejo sistema al basurero de la Historia tan sólo cinco años después. Ningún régimen basado en un autoengaño ilimitado puede conservar ni una pizca de legitimidad, una vez que se revela la magnitud de su autoengaño.

Como en aquel momento sólo llegaron hasta los ucranianos corrientes fragmentos de información fiable, mis recuerdos de Chernóbil son necesariamente imprecisos. Ahora sólo recuerdo los primeros susurros espantados sobre el desastre de un amigo de la familia. Recuerdo el miedo abyecto que sentí por mi hijita. Siguió en seguida un auténtico torrente de rumores casi histéricos e historias que iban llegando poco a poco sobre el desastre.

Naturalmente, todos aquellos recuerdos siguen indelebles, pero, incluso 25 años después, me resulta difícil relacionar lo que sé de verdad del desastre con el momento en que me enteré de él.

Hoy la fusión de Chernóbil recibe un juicio severo desde los puntos de vista moral y metafísico. Proyecta una obscura sombra sobre la humanidad, que no se había visto desde los bombardeos atómicos de Hiroshima y Nagasaki en 1945.

Pero, a diferencia de la crisis nuclear de Fukushima, en el Japón, la verdadera enseñanza que se desprende de lo sucedido en Chernóbil no se refiere a la seguridad de las centrales nucleares, sino a la arrogancia y la indiferencia oficiales ante el sufrimiento y un culto al secretismo que permite que sólo una pequeña minoría dominante y obsesionada con la estabilidad compartiera la información. Ahora mismo se recuerda a los ucranianos las consecuencias de esa mentalidad… y lo hace un gobierno que ha hecho recortes drásticos en las prestaciones de salud para los hombres que lucharon heroicamente a fin de contener el desastre de Chernóbil.

Entonces, ¿cuál fue la causa de la negligencia con la que se abordó la crisis de Chernóbil? ¿A qué se debió semejante despreocupación arrogante por la salud de quienes vivían cerca de la central, por aquellos hombres y mujeres heroicos que intentaron limitar el desastre (a los que los funcionarios siguen tratado como a títeres) y para los millones de personas que vivían bajo la nube radioactiva que se dispersaba?

La indiferencia gubernamental es un estado mental extraño y anormal, en el que se desdibujan las divisorias entre el crimen y el castigo, la crueldad y la compasión y el bien y el mal. Como me crié en la URSS, sé que los dirigentes soviéticos hicieron del desprecio del sufrimiento y de los pruritos morales prácticamente un fundamento de su concepción del gobierno. Los gobiernos que no rinden cuentas casi inevitablemente dejan de preocuparse por la suerte de sus ciudadanos.

¿Puede ser la indiferencia una virtud alguna vez? Naturalmente, en momentos de horror, como el Holacausto y el Holodomyr (“genocidio”) ucraniano, unas personas aisladas e impotentes pueden envolverse en la indiferencia simplemente para conservar una pizca de cordura, pero, aun en esos casos, no se puede justificarla totalmente y le sigue invariablemente la indecible y persistente culpa de la que Primo Levi escribió tan conmovedoramente.

Sin embargo, la que es en verdad imperdonable es la indiferencia oficial, tal vez porque los funcionarios indiferentes nunca sienten la culpa sobre la que escribió Levi. De hecho, para algunos dirigentes políticos, la indiferencia es seductora. Resulta mucho más fácil apartar la vista de los ciudadanos que afrontar su grave situación. Resulta mucho más fácil –y con frecuencia menos costoso– evitar las circunstancias trágicas de las personas que ajustar las políticas a sus necesidades.

Para el funcionario del Estado que da la espalda al sufrimiento, los ciudadanos de su país carecen de importancia. Sus vidas son insignificantes. Su angustia oculta o incluso visible carece de valor, es la desesperación de una cifra.

Semejante indiferencia es más peligrosa que la ira y el odio. La ira puede ser en realidad artística y políticamente creativa. Pushkin escribió algunos de sus mayores poemas imbuido de ira; Beethoven escribió sus grandes sinfonías presa de emociones intensísimas y Nelson Mandela, Václav Havel y Aung San Suu Kyi padecieron prisión porque se sintieron irritados ante la injusticia que presenciaron.

En cambio, la indiferencia nunca es creativa, porque significa que nunca habrá reacción ante la injusticia ni ayuda para los que sufren. Es el instrumento de los gobiernos que son, en realidad, enemigos de su pueblo, pues sólo beneficia al gobernante y nunca a la víctima, cuyo dolor intensifica la negligencia. No prestar atención a la difícil situación de los presos políticos, los niños hambrientos, los refugiados de Chernóbil sin hogar o los trabajadores irradiados y necesitados de ayuda médica durante toda su vida y negarse a ofrecerles una chispa de esperanza es exiliarlos a un infierno de desesperanza. Los funcionaos gubernamentales que deniegan la solidaridad humana de ese modo niegan su propia humanidad.

Desde su celda de la cárcel y en espera de su ejecución por la Gestapo de Hitler, Dietrich Bonhoeffer declaró que todos debemos “compartir el sufrimiento de Dios”. Para Bonhoeffer, la indiferencia no sólo es un pecado, sino también una forma de castigo. Tal vez sea ésa la enseñanza fundamental que se desprende de lo sucedido en Chernóbil: los gobiernos que sistemáticamente cierran los ojos ante la suerte de sus ciudadanos se condenan a sí mismos en última instancia.

In Wednesday’s IHT, two former American ambassadors to Kiev argued that Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich’s goal of integrating his country into the European Union was being undercut by his undemocratic actions. Alyona Getmanchuk, director of the Institute of World Policy in Kiev, joins the discussion.

After the first year of Viktor Yanukovich’s presidential term, it is possible to get the impression that Ukraine has been divided in two.

One Ukraine is the one presented by the president and his supporters. This Ukraine is politically stable, and economic reforms are at full speed ahead. The campaign against corruption is among the most effective in the world. Ukraine is as dedicated to democratic values as ever, and anyone who speaks of authoritarian tendencies is just trying to discredit Ukraine before the world. European integration is the priority of this Ukraine, but at the same time it has managed over the past year to restore damaged relations with Russia.

The other Ukraine is the one presented by the opposition and civil society. It is a state in which authoritarian tendencies are spreading at a furious rate and basic rights and liberties are rapidly deteriorating. In this Ukraine, it took Yanukovich only one year to seize all the levers of power — something Vladimir Putin required several years to achieve in Russia. The fight against corruption is but a cover for harassing political opponents. This Ukraine managed to repair relations with Russia only after several costly concessions.

The fact that each side presses its version of Ukraine has two advantages.

Firstly, the current Ukrainian authorities are highly conscious of their image in Washington and Brussels — they very much do not want Ukraine to be perceived as “Belarus-lite.” They do their best to assure Western leaders that Ukraine is still a democracy, except that under President Viktor Yushchenko democracy was synonymous with chaos, while now it means order.

It is also important for them that Ukraine not be perceived as a puppet of Russia. They talk a lot about European integration because the sooner they commit themselves to the European Union, the better they will be able to withstand the pressures from the Russians striking to push Ukraine into their economic integration projects.

The second advantage is that the authorities, much as they should like it, can not ignore the “other” Ukraine. Civil society in Ukraine is still much stronger and more active than those in other countries in the region.

The biggest challenge for Ukrainian civil society is not to become marginalized, as happened in Belarus. This is not easy, given that it has become clear in Yanukovich’s first year that the main driving force behind the power of the authorities is fear.

That was made clear by Prime Minister Mykola Azarov at a conference in Yalta last year when he said, “Fear is one of the main human instincts, and it has to be made to work.” Every action taken by the authorities — the arrests and interrogations of opposition leaders, the constant visits by the tax police to private firms — has one goal, to spread fear. And not only in the opposition, but in the ranks of the ruling party as well. It is no secret that senior officials in the party have differing views, but they keep them to themselves.

Which lesson should the West draw from the first year of Yanukovich’s presidency?

The West has no choice but to deal with the politicians in power today. And that does not mean dealing only with the presidential administration, but also with other government officials open to effective dialogue.

Everything should be done to make clear to antidemocratic ideologues that yes, Belarus-like sanctions can not be imposed now, but that can change.

While Ukraine still wants to be perceived as a democratic European state, and President Yanukovich does not want to be confused with the president of Belarus, officials in the West must do everything possible to send a clear personal message to the president: They too hope that he will not become the Ukrainian Lukashenko, and if he seriously heeds their concerns and takes certain concrete steps, he will not.

One of the proudest items on the wall of the U.S. ambassador’s office in Kiev from 2006-2009 was a world map showing the Freedom House ranking of free, not free and partly free countries around the world. Visitors could clearly see that Ukraine ranked as the only free country among the post-Soviet states.

Today, however, the Freedom House map shows Ukraine as only partly free. President Viktor Yanukovich, concluding his first year in office, should carefully consider what this means for his oft-expressed goal of integrating his country into Europe.

Ukraine has held a half dozen parliamentary, presidential and nationwide local elections since the Orange Revolution in late 2004. International observers judged all to be generally free and fair — that is, until the October 2010 election, the first conducted under the Yanukovich administration. President Yanukovich made some last-minute attempts to fix the election law, but the ballot fell short of the standard set by previous elections and was widely condemned as flawed.

Another troubling sign is the apparent effort by prosecutors to target officials from the previous government of former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko. Her minister of the interior, Yuri Lutsenko, sits in jail awaiting trial. Her minister of economy, Bohdan Danylyshyn, was granted political asylum by the Czech Republic — a friendly country that wants to see Ukraine succeed — on the assumption that he would be unfairly prosecuted by a corrupt, politically-driven judiciary in Ukraine. The former prime minister, still a formidable politician, is being questioned extensively by the prosecutor-general and banned from international travel.

At a Feb. 14 public talk in Washington, Foreign Minister Kostyantyn Gryshchenko offered an eloquent defense of Ukraine’s recent record on democratic practices. To his credit, he also engaged with Freedom House the next day on the question.

The truth likely lies somewhere between the picture drawn by Ukrainian diplomats and that drawn by President Yanukovich’s domestic critics. But the fact that the foreign minister felt he had to focus his comments on Ukraine’s domestic political scene is a reflection of the impression in Europe and the United States that Ukraine has turned away from European-style democracy.

This carries significant implications for Kiev’s foreign policy. Ukraine under its previous president, Viktor Yushchenko, and under President Yanukovich has sought to integrate fully into Europe, including someday joining the European Union. Ukraine certainly ought to have the chance. Reaching that goal, however, means reforming the economy, restructuring laws, and raising standards to meet E.U. requirements.

While all understood that the process was sure to be long, the effort was seen to be worthwhile and achievable, with time and determination. The U.S. government fully supported this effort. Developments in Ukraine, however, cause Europeans and others to question Ukraine’s commitment to broadly-accepted European norms of political behavior.

If President Yanukovich is committed to European integration and E.U. membership, his administration’s domestic actions make achieving that goal much tougher. The European Union has turned its focus to internal issues and shows little enthusiasm for integrating neighboring states. To the extent that Europeans see Kiev adopting a more autocratic model of government, it will be that much easier for them to ignore Ukraine’s desire to integrate.

So President Yanukovich faces a choice. He can continue, or allow the continuation of, current domestic policies and watch his chances of integrating Ukraine into Europe fade. Or he can strengthen democratic institutions — which, by the way, resulted in his own election last year — and restore positive momentum to the relationship between Ukraine and Europe.

For its part, the West can help crystallize this choice. European and American officials should make clear to the president — in plain terms, so that nuance is not misread — that the policies of his administration look like democratic backsliding. They should make equally clear that continuing this course will disappoint Ukraine’s well-wishers around the world and produce a growing divide between Ukraine and Europe.

Poor wheat harvests in Russia and Ukraine, along with devastating wildfires in Russia, have resurrected fears of a global food crisis. Some have blamed global warming for inducing a severe drought. But the real blame rests with poor agricultural performance over the long term in a region still hampered by communist experimentation. To react by banning exports, as Moscow has done and Kiev is considering, would be counterproductive. Combined with restrictions on the use of modern agricultural technologies imposed in the European Union and being proposed in the U.S., such bans really could lead to a global food crisis.

After the Russian revolution in 1917, the Bolsheviks socialized all agricultural markets. Although they directed their rhetoric against “middlemen,” their real aim was to squeeze farmers by paying them below-market prices and use the proceeds to finance state-owned industry. This “New Economic Policy” backfired spectacularly as farmers fed grains to livestock, or converted them into liquor and then sold both on the black market, thereby evading the Bolsheviks’ price controls.

Stalin dealt with such evasions first by denigrating independent farmers as greedy kulaks (the Russian word for fist) and then by starving them to death. As Soviet agriculture was collectivized and crops and livestock were confiscated, millions of peasants died. Russia and Ukraine have yet to recover fully from this assault on the countryside.

The contrast with China is stark. In the late 1970s, millions of peasants who had survived agricultural collectivization and Mao Zedong’s “Great Leap Forward” two decades earlier responded to his death by becoming entrepreneurs. In village after village, property was informally privatized. Output exploded, ensuring that attempts at sanctioning this illegal activity were carried out half-heartedly. Deng Xiaoping subsequently legitimized these bottom-up reforms in what became known as the “Household Responsibility System,” which provided a major catalyst for China’s modern economic take-off.

During the 1980s, Mikhail Gorbachev attempted similar reforms in Russia, but from the top down. These were not successful. After more than half a century during which entrepreneurship had been repressed, who would dare take the risks associated with farming and agricultural marketing?

In spite of the collapse of communism, it has been difficult to convert Stalin’s collectives into private farms. Although most of the farming industry is privately managed, rural property rights are poorly defined and access to commercial credit is limited. Also, bankruptcy law is ill-developed, which impedes the liquidation of inefficient operations and the transfer of real estate and other assets to efficient managers. All these factors undermine incentives to invest in productivity-enhancing technologies and good management. Former collectives are also subsidized, warping incentives further.

Fertilizer applications on Russian farms currently average 11 kilograms per hectare, which is below the amount needed to compensate for crops’ uptake of nutrients and is similar to levels in sub-Saharan Africa. As a result, soil fertility is declining with each passing year. Predictably, cereal yields in Russia (1,865 kilograms per hectare) are barely a quarter those of the United States (typically 7,000 kilograms per hectare or more), and similar to U.S. yields before the 1930s, when farmers began using hybrid seeds and synthetic fertilizer.

Russia and Ukraine have the potential to be far more productive, but to do so their governments must provide the right incentives to farmers to invest in land improvements and to use modern seed, fertilizer and pesticides. That means removing barriers to ownership and exchange. Banning exports has the opposite effect, curtailing farmers’ existing markets, then their incomes, then their incentives to invest, all of which would further reduce their low output.

World supplies of grains are also adversely affected by the EU’s restrictions on the use of biotechnology and pesticides. In addition to limiting production in the EU, these restrictions also spill over into exporting countries. Russian and Ukrainian producers, for instance, worry about falling foul of EU rules and so have additional reasons not to adopt beneficial yield-enhancing technologies.

To make matters worse, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency seems to be following the EU’s example and is seeking to restrict a number of widely used agricultural chemicals. One of these is atrazine, a weed-killer that has been applied for more than four decades with no observable ill effects, and which the EPA itself reapproved four years ago. Such restrictions would further undermine global crop output.

Americans are accustomed to availing themselves of plentiful food at affordable prices, which most take for granted. But there is no such thing as a free lunch in the food economy. Removing the inputs that make bountiful harvests possible will inevitably drive up prices and, as the experience of Russia and neighboring countries demonstrate, place the world at risk of shortages.

Ukraine is losing the right to call itself a democratic nation and is drawing into question any hope it has for EU membership any time soon. For even before campaigning starts ahead of local elections on 31 October there is speculation that the result is being manipulated. This is because a recent law prevents parties formed less than a year ago, and individuals standing independently, from participating.

On 27 July, President Viktor Yanukovych enacted a law that prohibits candidates from standing who are not from a party registered, even locally, at least one year before the election. There is little logic to the new law apart from that it shuts the door on any newly formed parties and bars those of successful politicians Sergei Tigipko and Arseniy Yatsenyuk, who came third and fourth respectively in the presidential election held last January.

The new law also stops political blocs – umbrella organisations of affiliated parties – from putting up candidates as in previous elections. Only individual parties may compete. This weakens the opposition, which hitherto has competed in blocs. But it has little effect on the president’s Party of Regions, which has a powerbase in the predominantly Russian-speaking east and south of the country.

The new law also prevents independent candidates from running. Mayoral candidates can only be nominated by the local organisations of political parties, therefore denying unaffiliated citizens the right to stand. The law appears designed to propagate the ruling elite, where those in power nominate the candidates rather than selection by the people.

All this does little to shore up Ukraine’s fledgling democracy. Since the fraudulent presidential election of 2004 and subsequent orange revolution, Ukraine’s political scene has been characterised by political infighting between president, government and parliament. In February this year, Yanukovych – the defeated candidate in the 2004 presidential election – made a spectacular comeback, narrowly beating then prime minister, Yulia Tymoshenko, for the presidency. Soon after, his forces ousted the Tymoshenko government and today enjoy a virtual monopoly on power, controlling parliament, the cabinet of ministers and the presidency.

The new electoral changes do little to build the credibility of his administration. Since coming to power, Yanukovych’s administration stands accused of some decidedly undemocratic actions. These include bending constitutional procedures in order to form a government, railroading the budget through parliament without proper due process and curbing fundamental rights, such as the right to assembly and media freedom.

Also of concern is an apparent disregard for Ukraine’s constitution. This was highlighted by the signing into law of a 25-year extension to the lease of the Russian Black Sea fleet’s naval base in Sevastopol in contravention of the constitution, which bans any foreign bases on Ukrainian territory.

To be fair, Yanukovich has managed to instil a degree of stability, agree a $15.5bn financial injection from the IMF and begun work on resolving the rights and status of some 300,000 dispossessed Crimean Tatars deported during the Soviet era, which is commendable.

But if Ukraine still harbours aspirations to join Europe’s top table, it must demonstrate that it is worthy. A potential springboard to EU membership will be the conclusion of an association agreement with the EU, which includes a free-trade agreement and the possibility of visa-free travel with the 27-member nation bloc. Yet the new election law can only be described as an affront to European norms of democracy and represents the sort of electoral meddling that is inconsistent with a country aspiring to EU membership.

The international community needs to find its voice. The west already has sufficient reason to care. Ukraine is a country of 46 million people; a nation that controls the flow of gas to millions of EU households. It remains one of the world’s largest exporters of grain – the leading barley exporter and sixth largest of wheat – at a time when the global market is in turmoil. A stable, democratic Ukraine is in everyone’s best interests.

Thousands of people will be in Vienna this week for the 18th International Aids Conference. The theme is human rights, and the focus will be on eastern Europe. That’s fitting, because poor health policies and on-going human rights abuses continue to fuel an HIV/Aids epidemic across thousands of miles, from Vladivostok to Lviv in Ukraine.

Every year for the last 20 years, HIV has claimed thousands of lives in countries of the former Soviet Union, largely transmitted by drug injection.

Most of these deaths could have been prevented: needle exchange and methadone programmes have dramatically reduced transmission elsewhere in the world. But in most countries in this region the overwhelming evidence that these approaches work has been largely ignored, with devastating consequences. The region now hosts the worst HIV epidemic outside sub-Saharan Africa and some of the fastest growing epidemics in the world.

The Russian government is at the root of the crisis. It rejects methadone treatment as “substituting one drug for another”. It has banned such treatment domestically, harassed advocates in Russia, and used its influence in the region to prevent neighbouring countries introducing methadone programmes. Under international pressure, some countries have small pilot projects – but most are totally inadequate.

Ukraine has been one of the few bright spots in this bleak picture. When the 2004 Orange revolution swept Viktor Yushchenko to power, Ukraine faced the worst HIV epidemic in Europe, with more than 1% of the population already infected, many new infections each year, and an ever-increasing number of Aids deaths. To his credit, Yushchenko recognised the urgency of the need for a decisive response, both with antiretroviral treatment for people living with HIV and with stronger prevention efforts.

Ukraine began using buprenorphine, similar to methadone, that year, and later added methadone itself. During the next five years, it set up the biggest and most rapidly growing substitution treatment programme of any country of the former Soviet Union (except the Baltic States, which had joined the European Union), putting more than 5,000 people on treatment. Expansion to 20,000 patients is planned by the end of 2013. While many more of Ukraine’s estimated 290,000 injection drug users remain without substitution treatment, Ukraine’s progress has been unparalleled in the region.

But its achievements are under threat. Coincidentally or not, the ascendance of a new, Russia-leaning Ukrainian president has corresponded with an increasing number of law enforcement attacks on substitution treatment programmes. Aids activists say police have raided drug treatment clinics, interrogated, fingerprinted and photographed patients, confiscated medical records and medications, and detained medical personnel in cities across the country in the last six months.

It’s hard to imagine: effective and life-saving medicine on the World Health Organisation’s essential medicines list is being treated as suspect and criminal. The raids have resulted in interruptions in treatment, and two doctors are facing drug trafficking charges. One of them is in pre-trial detention.

Police claim that these raids and arrests are part of legitimate efforts to enforce Ukraine’s drug regulations and prevent misuse of these medications. But many of the raids appear to have been conducted without probable cause and in violation of Ukraine’s rules for police operations.

The drug trafficking charges – punishable by up to 10 years in prison – against one of the doctors appear to be based on little more than clerical errors or omissions. Police claim that the doctor’s clinic failed to inform drug regulators of a change of address, making its licence invalid, and that the doctor neglected to follow some of Ukraine’s extremely onerous prescription requirements.

But police have provided no evidence of misuse of medications, and the people who “illegally” received the medications were all registered with the clinic. Most are still getting the medicine there.

Is this wave of harassment an effort by the new administration to discredit and then close drug substitution treatment programmes? Or are these just unrelated acts of harassment by overzealous law enforcement officials? Will Ukraine continue to be a leader in the battle against HIV, or will it follow Russia’s ill-guided lead, even if the cost is thousands of lives?

In fact, there is a broader question: will the president lead Ukraine toward the EU, as he has said is his intention, or is he turning eastward, as some of his first steps in office seem to suggest?

Viktor Yanukovych, Ukraine’s president, has remained silent on the topic of HIV prevention and treatment. But the nation can ill afford this silence. It still has Europe’s highest HIV rate, so slowing or closing down this treatment programme would have disastrous consequences. As Aids experts gather in Vienna this week, and the world’s attention turns to HIV epidemics in eastern Europe, it is time for Ukraine’s president to provide some answers.

While Europeans are talking about how Ukraine has been “swallowed” by Russia, Hillary Clinton is making her first visit to Kiev as secretary of state. Her European tour will also include visits to Poland, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Some European experts might view Clinton’s visit as one to victims of the Russian-American “reset” (Poland, Georgia) or the Armenian-Turkish “reset” (Azerbaijan).

But not everything is as it might have seemed even a half year ago. Ukraine is a different country than it was during Vice President Joe Biden’s visit last year, and even during President Viktor Yanukovich’s visit to Washington in early April.

First, the Ukraine of President Yanukovich does not feel offended by the United States. On the contrary, it is grateful: Ukrainian authorities can now use the U.S.-Russian “reset” as a carte blanche for moving themselves closer to Russia than they’ve been in 20 years.

The United States must understand that this Ukraine does not view itself as a victim of Russia’s “imperial ambitions” It is freely and willingly helping Russia appear as a new superpower.

For President Yanukovich, in contrast to the millions of Ukrainians who did not vote for him, the presence of the Russian Black Sea fleet in Sevastopol, or the law on Ukraine remaining outside any bloc (like NATO), is logical and natural.

The new government, in contrast to the opposition, does not see these agreements with Russia as a threat to Ukrainian sovereignty or territorial integrity.

Yanukovich offers Russia a very simple deal: Kiev will help Moscow gain the illusion that it is reviving its spheres of influence, and in exchange it will receive financial help (like the recent $4 billion loan from a Russian bank).

Yanukovich’s understanding of Ukraine’s national interests fundamentally differs from those of his opponents: He believes Ukraine cannot take a single Westward step further than Russia does. If integration with Europe means a visa-free regime with the European Union, then Russia must be no less interested in this than Ukraine.

The United States — and the West as a whole — should understand that Yanukovich does not perceive any concessions by Russia, even the most dubious, as “concessions.” His positions are often similar to those of Vladimir Putin and Dmitri Medvedev — even on some of the most divisive Ukrainian-Russian issues, such as whether Sevastopol is Ukrainian or a “city of Russian glory,” as the Russians maintain, or whether the famine of 1932-33 was a genocide against Ukraine organized by Stalin or a calamity that struck people across the U.S.S.R.

Perhaps the only potential for disputes between Ukraine and Russia today lies in conflicting business interests between the Russians and Yanukovich’s entourage. Not ideological or security issues.

This has been clear in the question of the South Stream gas transit line. The Ukrainian leadership does not conceal its negative view of this project in bilateral or international forums. Yet in his election campaign, Yanukovich suggested the participation of Ukrainian companies in the project.

It might well be that Yanukovich will turn out to be a greater pragmatist than Medvedev or Putin, for whom a reinstatement of a “zone of privileged interests” is still more important than business deals.

Second, the West should take into account that despite his relations with Moscow, Yanukovich does not want to be a second Lukashenko, a leader non grata in the West. Recognition by countries such as the United States or Germany, where he plans to make an official visit in coming months, is very important to him.

At the summit on nuclear security in Washington in April, Yanukovich agreed — to President Obama’s joy — to give up enriched uranium not because he believes in a world without nuclear weapons, but because a handshake from the American leader was for him something akin to international legitimization of his presidency.

Given the criticism inside Ukraine and some disappointment among Europeans over his first 100 days in office, Yanukovich needs such an American endorsement no less today. He needs not only American help in securing financing, but also the symbolic support of the Obama administration.

During Secretary Clinton’s visit, the United States should make clear that such support will not be possible if Ukraine continues to manifest tendencies incompatible with its declared desire for integration into Europe.

This includes pressures on the media — and especially the situation concerning Channel 5 and TVi, which were denied broadcasting frequencies at the demand of a media group controlled by the wife of the head of Ukrainian intelligence agency S.B.U., Valery Khoroshkovsky, who is also the biggest media owner in the country. The conflict of interest is obvious to everyone except the new president and his entourage.

Or there was the private talk the S.B.U. held with a university rector demanding that he ban students from participating in opposition rallies. Or, in the the most recent incident, there was the detention of the head of the Ukraine office of the Adenauer Foundation at the airport, prompting interventions from the German government and the president of the European Parliament, apparently because he had criticized the first 100 days of the new Ukrainian authorities.

Finally, Secretary Clinton should not forget that Ukraine has no less influence on Russia than Russia on Ukraine.

Do not believe those who claim that Ukraine lost its influence on Russia after the Orange Revolution. Ukraine was at least in part why the Russian president started to speak in full voice about “European integration,” while before he had spoken only of partnership or cooperation with the European Union.

Ukraine also played no small role in the failure of several Russian integrationist projects in the post-Soviet area — and those that were formed without Ukraine are marginal. It was after Ukraine refused to join a customs union with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan that the Kremlin became more active in trying to join the World Trade Organization.

There are other examples, too, and they all point to the fact that the influence of Ukraine on Russia is positive, and that it is more important than ever to preserve it. But that can be done only if there is a stop to the tendencies moving Ukraine toward politics à la Putin.

Doomsayers have been lamenting the West’s imminent “loss” of Ukraine for years, and the trend has only picked up since Viktor Yanukovich was elected president in February. In the recent signing of an agreement prolonging the lease of a Russian naval base in Crimea, they see proof of the new president’s desire to cement his country’s status as a Russian satellite.

They’re wrong. Sort of.

True, it’s a bad deal. In exchange for rebates on natural gas until 2019, President Yanukovich has allowed Moscow to station its Black Sea Fleet in the port of Sevastopol until 2042. In doing so, he has allowed Russia to maintain a foothold in a particularly unstable part of Ukraine — Crimea — and to continue to project its military power in the volatile Black Sea region — not a minor development, especially after Russia and neighbor Georgia came to blows in August 2008.

Just as worrying, the rebates will allow the president to postpone reform of Ukraine’s famously corrupt and inefficient energy sector. They are life support for a fossilized system that should long have gone the way of the dinosaurs.

Putting off reform is politically profitable for Mr. Yanukovich, who depends on the support of industrial and energy barons who made their fortunes thanks to corruption and artificially cheap gas. But it comes at a high political cost to Ukraine, which now essentially depends on Russian subsidies to pay for the energy it consumes.

In other words, the deal bolsters Russia’s influence in Ukraine and its claim to a sphere of influence in the region.

But those who see it as evidence of Mr. Yanukovich’s determination to steer his country back into Russia’s orbit are not looking at the right things.

The agreement is less evidence of Mr. Yanukovich’s geopolitical inclinations than proof of his country’s weakness. Ukraine’s economy shrank by one seventh in 2009, and with it the government’s ability to pay its energy bills.

Even Yulia Tymoshenko, a leader of the Orange Revolution who as recently as 2008 had called for Ukraine to join NATO, as prime minister found herself compelled in 2009 to make important concessions to Moscow — including a gas accord so one-sided it had to be revised only a few months after its signing.

Nor, for all its repercussions, does the deal spell the end of European integration in the broader sense. While NATO membership is clearly off the table in the short and probably medium terms, that was evident already before Mr. Yanukovich came to power.

The new president has resisted attempts by Moscow to get Ukraine to join a Russia-led customs union, preferring instead to continue negotiations on a deep and comprehensive free trade agreement with the European Union.

He has described European integration as his “key priority,” symbolically making his first visit as president to Brussels — much to Moscow’s ire. Mr. Yanukovich is less Western-oriented than his predecessor Viktor Yushchenko, but he is not a Kremlin stooge.

Despite his reputation for incompetence, Yanukovich can be a smooth operator. The gas agreement may undermine Ukraine’s position vis-à-vis Russia, but it is popular with industry and many households, whom it saves from higher gas bills (for this year at least).

It also paves the way for a national budget acceptable to the I.M.F., whose deficit-reduction demands have been a major stumbling block in negotiations on the release of further tranches of its emergency loan. Even U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has called it evidence of Ukraine’s new “balanced approach” to foreign policy.

More worrying than the agreement’s content is the deeply flawed way in which it was concluded — and what this says about Mr. Yanukovich’s attitude toward the rule of law in Ukraine.

The Constitution prohibits the basing of foreign military installations on Ukrainian territory, albeit in unclear terms. What’s more, the deal was never submitted to Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council, as it should have been, and the normal parliamentary ratification procedure was not respected. This, combined with the constitutionally dubious way in which Mr. Yanukovich recently pieced together his parliamentary majority, raises serious questions about his willingness to play by the rules.

It is too early to say that President Yanukovich is intentionally helping Russia “steal” Ukraine from the West. He is more positively inclined toward Moscow than his predecessor, but the truth is that he has been pushed into a corner by a combination of geopolitical ineptness, special interests and pre-existing problems.

The real question is whether he takes his obligations (constitutional and otherwise) seriously. If he doesn’t, both the West and Russia are in for unpleasant surprises.

Dmitri Medvedev managed to get half-way through his presidency without ever visiting Kiev. That was before Viktor Yanukovich replaced the Kremlin’s bête noire, Viktor Yushchenko, as Ukrainian president in February. Since then, high-level meetings have taken place almost weekly, culminating in Mr. Medvedev’s state visit to Kiev this week. Mr. Medvedev has even taken to advertising his part-Ukrainian grandmother from Belgorod.

Mr. Yanukovich has now signed a huge number of agreements with Russia, most notably the deal to swap an extra 25 years for the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Crimea for a 30 percent reduction in the price of gas. Ukraine has also agreed to big deals on cooperation in the nuclear industry and in aviation, a 10-year economic cooperation plan, and common positions on Transnistria and security in the Black Sea region that have disturbed neighbors like Moldova and Georgia. And Mr. Yanukovich has backed Mr. Medvedev’s pet European Security Initiative and its goal to “eliminate the dangerous dividing lines that have appeared in the European region over the past decade.”

A recently leaked strategy paper written by Russia’s foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, defines Russia’s overall aim as nothing less than “to actively draw Ukraine into an orbit of economic cooperation with Russia.”

This new Ukrainian foreign policy is something of a mystery. Even some old hands are wondering why Ukraine is huddling so close to Russia, and why it has conceded so much so quickly.

Four possible explanations suggest themselves.

One is that Ukraine is still in economic trouble and the rapprochement with Russia is all about cheap gas. The gas discount obviated the need for harsh spending cuts, and Kiev thinks a budget deficit under 6 percent of gross domestic product will bring the International Monetary Fund back to the table. Standard & Poor’s has upgraded Ukraine’s credit rating from B- to B.

In the short term, the gas deal is also the one thing that pleases both competing wings of Mr. Yanukovich’s Party of the Regions. The Dmitry Firtash group runs several chemical plants; Rinat Akhmetov’s main business is steel. Together, they consume almost half of all Ukraine’s gas imports.

However, the I.M.F. is well-aware that hard choices and fiscal retrenchment have been postponed, possibly only for a matter of months. Moreover, Ukraine is still paying $230 per 1,000 cubic meters for gas — the price may have fallen, but only to levels common elsewhere in Europe.

So if economic trouble is the explanation, Russia cannot bail out the whole economy. Ukraine will come back to the Western table soon enough. The European Union in particular should reiterate that the deal that Ukraine signed but never implemented in 2009, promising substantial Western investment if Ukraine reformed its gas sector, can still be revived.

The second possibility is that Mr. Yanukovich’s priority is to strengthen himself internally. Playing closer to Russia makes this easier, as Russia is not likely to object to recent moves to chip away at media freedom and pack the judiciary. But a stronger Yanukovich might be a more prickly partner in the long run — not just for the West but for Russia as well. If this is the case, the West should avoid giving the impression that it is so fed up with the years of chaotic “Orange” government that it will allow Mr. Yanukovich to undercut freedoms won by the Orange Revolution in 2004 in the name of restoring “stability.”

The third possible explanation is corruption. Local elites are quick learners. The main current scam involves Ukraine’s internal gas distributors buying cheaper “gas for households” and selling it to higher-paying industrial customers. The cut in the overall Russian gas supply price reduces the pressure from the European Union for market pricing across the board, which would close these gaps.

But the world is paying more attention since the gas crisis in January 2009. And some of Ukraine’s oligarchs may split from Mr. Yanukovich soon enough if the “gas lobby” gains too much power in the new government. The Ukrainian oligarchs are also interested in concessions from the Russian side, such as opening up access to Central Asian gas.

The fourth possibility is that Ukraine shares some of Russia’s analysis of rapidly changing world events. Mr. Yanukovich’s team may also think that the United States is preoccupied with other things, and that the E.U. is in long-term decline and is too busy with the euro crisis in the short-term to pay much attention to Eastern Europe. Ukraine might also believe that the global economic crisis will replace flat “globalization” with lumpy “regionalization,” and Ukraine should throw in its lot with Russia as it seeks to consolidate “its” region.

If that is the case, encouraging the Ukrainian pendulum to swing Westward again will be much harder this time.

Unanimement saluée pour ses progrès en matière de démocratisation (liberté d’expression, scrutins réguliers, émergence d’une société civile), l’Ukraine est en train de vivre, avec l’arrivée au pouvoir du nouvel élu, Viktor Ianoukovitch, l’évolution inverse. Le résultat de l’élection du 7 février dernier a été précipitamment salué par Bruxelles et Washington, et le nouveau chef d’Etat a reçu les félicitations du monde entier.

Très vite pourtant, ce dernier commet de nombreuses entorses constitutionnelles et devance les exigences du Kremlin qui surenchérit chaque jour. L’accord signé avec Moscou pour que les navires de la Flotte de la mer Noire puissent mouiller en port de Sébastopol jusqu’en 2042, et non quitter en 2017 comme le notifiait l’accord précédent, met à Kiev le feu aux poudres. La question de la Crimée n’est en effet que la partie émergée d’un plan de mise sous tutelle «étrangère».

Que s’est-il passé en moins de trois mois? Retour sur un calendrier très serré aux allures de coup d’Etat constitutionnel.

Etape No 1

Malgré son passé (criminalité, oligarchie), les premiers pas du nouveau pouvoir laissent augurer d’une volonté de stabiliser la situation intérieure et de maintenir un juste équilibre entre l’Est et l’Ouest. Habilement, le premier voyage du président est pour Bruxelles, qui l’accueille avec bienveillance. Mais première surprise: le gouvernement rapidement mis en place ne correspond guère à la politique de réforme et anti-corruption annoncée. Sa composition ressemble à s’y méprendre à celle qui marqua en 2004 la fin de la présidence Koutchma déclenchant la Révolution orange: de retour, les personnes ayant participé aux fraudes, les oligarques deviennent ministres, de hauts responsables recherchés par la justice et réfugiés en Russie rentrent au pays.

D’ailleurs, une des premières décisions du nouveau pouvoir est de repousser sine die les élections locales – qui devaient avoir lieu à la fin de mai – et de se livrer à une manipulation au sein du parlement lui permettant de constituer une majorité (alliance du Parti des régions, du Parti communiste et du bloc dirigé par le président du parlement).

Etape No 2

Tandis que le premier ministre Azarov fait la navette entre Kiev et Moscou, négociant, entre autres, un accord sur la baisse du prix du gaz dont les attendus sont de plus en plus lourds, les limogeages tombent: tous les gouverneurs, tous les responsables des principales institutions non affiliés au Parti des régions ou au Parti communiste sont écartés; on assiste à une purge gigantesque où le critère d’appartenance politique prévaut sur tous les autres. Comme le résume le vice-premier ministre Boris Kolesnikov, lié à la démarche séparatiste de l’est du pays en 2004: «Notre tradition politique est ainsi: nous changeons le pouvoir partout, indépendamment du professionnalisme de tel ou tel, qu’il s’agisse d’un bureaucrate déjà en place ou de son remplaçant.»

Etape No 3

Sur le plan culturel aussi les changements sont rapides, brusques: les représentants du pouvoir communiquent désormais le plus souvent en russe. Le ministre de l’Education, Dmitri Tabachnik, un des principaux défenseurs de la langue russe en Ukraine, fait immédiatement supprimer les examens obligatoires d’ukrainien qui ont lieu dans quelques semaines. Le réalignement historique sur la vision russe de la Seconde Guerre mondiale est imposé sous la forme d’une «leçon commune» qui devra avoir lieu le 9 mai, jour de la victoire à l’Est de l’Europe.

D’ailleurs des troupes russes défileront ce jour-là dans le centre de la capitale kiévienne, tandis que des troupes ukrainiennes feront de même sur la place Rouge à Moscou.

Les zèles se réveillent: la Maison de l’Ukraine, au centre de Kiev, propose ses locaux pour une exposition consacrée à Lénine pour le 140e anniversaire du chef de la Révolution.

Les archives du SBU, les Services de sécurité, qui faisaient l’objet d’un travail systématique durant les dernières années, sont fermées.

Les premières restrictions à la liberté d’expression commencent à se faire sentir: reprise en main de la télévision, pression sur les journalistes.

Etape No 4

Moscou accélère le pas en la personne du président Medvedev, qui avance son voyage pour se rendre à Kharkov le 21 avril où il signe des accords permettant de baisser le prix du gaz (230 au lieu de 330 dollars les 1000 m3) en échange de la prorogation du bail russe à Sébastopol jusqu’en 2042.

Un échange de bons procédés? Cette «ristourne» favorise les oligarchies de l’Est, dont les industries sont dévoreuses d’énergie. Qui plus est, Dmitri Medvedev précise que la réduction du prix du gaz est considérée comme une partie du loyer de la base militaire de Sébastopol. «En échange du Pacte de la Flotte, une occupation énergétique?» s’interroge l’hebdomadaire Zerkalo Nedeli, qui publie le fac-similé des documents préliminaires à l’accord.

La veille de la ratification du «contrat» par le parlement ukrainien, Vladimir Poutine débarque à Kiev à la nuit tombante et surenchérit: la baisse du prix du gaz sera également liée à la participation de la Russie dans l’industrie militaire, nucléaire et aéronautique.

L’accord est ratifié le lendemain par le parlement: le quota de députés présents dans l’assemblée ne le permettait pas, mais des fumigènes envahissent la salle, la plongeant dans une forme d’obscurité rendant impossible un décompte normal des voix. A l’extérieur, des milliers de personnes s’insurgent contre ce dépeçage de l’Etat. A l’intérieur, les députés se battent, physiquement. Reprenant le vocabulaire qui lui est cher, le premier ministre Poutine traite cette opposition de «hooligans».

Mais ce n’est qu’une mise en bouche: le nouveau ministre ukrainien des Affaires étrangères précise que le plus important sera signé avec le retour du président Medvedev à Kiev, le 17 mai prochain; «plus d’une dizaine d’accords» seront alors ratifiés.

Les suivantes?

On pourrait continuer à multiplier les faits qui ne laissent guère d’illusions sur les pas suivants. Pour expliquer ce qui est en train de se passer, les commentateurs invoquent la variante biélorusse qui permit à Alexandre Loukachenko de s’emparer «légalement» du pouvoir, voire l’ascension de Hitler dans les années 1930.

On peut noter aussi que ce scénario ressemble à s’y méprendre à celui de 2004, hautement défendu par le Kremlin, et qui fut stoppé par la Révolution orange.

Par ailleurs, la course en Ukraine entre le président russe Medvedev et son premier ministre Poutine semble confirmer une bataille pour le leadership en Russie dont le grand voisin ferait les frais. Au rayon des comparaisons, de nombreux analystes notent également que – toutes proportions militaires gardées – ce qui se passe en Ukraine en ce moment ressemble à ce qui se passa en Géorgie durant l’été 2008: une mise au pas et, en plus, avec consentement mutuel.

Es muy poco probable que el rumbo geopolítico de Víctor Yanukóvich como presidente de Ucrania dé un susto a Europa. Más bien todo lo contrario, ya que precisamente Yanukóvich puede ser el presidente que convierta en equilátero el triángulo Europa-Ucrania-Rusia, o dicho de otro modo, el que proponga a Europa y a Rusia reglas de juego correctas y, lo que es aún más importante, respetadas por Ucrania.

El primer argumento para confiar en una evolución positiva es psicológico. La primera ministra Yulia Timoshenko y Yanukóvich representan, a mi juicio, dos tipos psicológicos totalmente distintos.

Timoshenko pertenece a la categoría del “intermediario” clásico. Hizo carrera en el complicado negocio del gas como intermediaria entre suministradores y consumidores. Después, como primera ministra, intentó constantemente imponer su papel de intermediaria a Ucrania y a Europa en asuntos relacionados con el gas y en otros temas económicos y políticos.

Cualquier intermediario sabe que sus dividendos son máximos cuando las partes entre las que media tienen malas relaciones. Aparentemente, en función de esta lógica, la primera ministra hizo todo lo posible para empeorar las relaciones entre Rusia y Occidente. El papel desempeñado por Ucrania en el conflicto del gas entre Rusia y los países europeos en el año 2009 es una clásica ilustración del modelo de comportamiento de Yulia Timoshenko. A la misma serie pertenecen sus declaraciones en visitas internacionales, que en Rusia tenían carácter antioccidental y en Occidente, carácter antirruso.

Por eso, si Timoshenko hubiera sido elegida presidenta, el triángulo Bruselas-Kiev-Moscú habría tenido unos ángulos muy agudos tanto para Occidente como para Rusia. A Ucrania le habría correspondido el “ángulo obtuso”, lo que habría reducido al mínimo el margen de maniobra de los otros dos socios en juego.

Psicológicamente, Yanukóvich es más bien un rentista al que le gusta que los mecanismos por él creados funcionen de forma automática y le generen puntualmente dividendos y beneficios. Por consiguiente, tiene interés en motivar a Ucrania a mantener una buena relación con Rusia y Occidente a cambio de una copiosa renta.

En lenguaje geoeconómico eso quiere decir que Yanukóvich está sumamente interesado en grandes proyectos conjuntos con Europa y Rusia, siempre y cuando Ucrania se beneficie de ellos. Es posible que justamente esta característica psicológica le haya impulsado a declarar que intentará participar en la construcción del gasoducto del Norte, destinado a unir Rusia con Alemania por el fondo del mar Báltico. Timoshenko consideraba ese proyecto como sumamente hostil y, desde su lógica de “intermediaria”, tenía razón, porque ese gasoducto margina a Ucrania y reduce su potencial como país de tránsito. En cambio, para Yanukóvich, la participación de Ucrania en esta grandiosa construcción es positiva y ventajosa, si le da beneficios. En cuanto a la competencia para el tránsito del gas ruso por Ucrania, en los tres o cuatro años que durará la construcción del gasoducto del Norte, pueden pasar muchas cosas, entre ellas un aumento del consumo del gas en Europa. Así es la lógica del “rentista geopolítico”.

El segundo argumento es ideológico. Si caracterizamos la ideología de Timoshenko como “marxismo vulgar” o “socialismo vulgar”, la de Yanukóvich puede caracterizarse como “capitalismo vulgar”. La primera ministra trató de basar toda su geopolítica en el funcionariado. Su estrategia internacional se reducía a interminables viajes a diversos países de los funcionarios de su Gobierno, de su bloque parlamentario y de otras estructuras burocráticas. El resultado fueron acuerdos entre bastidores de funcionarios a distinto nivel.

Yanukóvich, por el contrario, considera los negocios como la principal fuerza creadora. Su doctrina en política exterior da preferencia a la formación de consorcios internacionales, grupos financieros e industriales y grandes proyectos tecnológicos. Por eso precisamente aboga por la constitución de un consorcio ucraniano-ruso-europeo para el transporte de gas. Por eso también, se refiere a la fundación de potentes estructuras internacionales para construir vías de tránsito, desarrollar la agricultura y crear la infraestructura bancaria entre otras cosas.

La fuerza de choque de la política exterior de Yanukóvich no será pues el funcionariado, sino el empresariado ucraniano con experiencia internacional y sus amplias relaciones de negocios tanto en Rusia como en Europa. Para Rusia y para Europa esta vía parece más segura y más sólida, ya que los funcionarios vienen y se van con sus acuerdos y los empresarios se quedan con su dinero.

Por último, pese a su atractivo externo y su retórica europea, Yulia Timoshenko tiene un defecto importante. Da su palabra con la misma facilidad con que la retira y casi nunca cumple sus promesas y compromisos. A Yanukóvich hay que sacarle las palabras “con pinzas”, pero, por lo general, cumple lo que dice.

Ucrania no está perdida todavía. No hay duda de que es un vuelco asombroso el hecho de que Víctor Yanukóvich, cuyo fraude en las elecciones presidenciales ucranianas de 2004 desató la revolución naranja, haya sido elegido ahora presidente; pero no es el triunfo de una contrarrevolución azul. En todo caso, confirma que Ucrania está convirtiéndose en una democracia seria, en vez de la democracia virtual de tipo ruso que era antes de la revolución naranja.

A diferencia de muchas supuestas elecciones en regímenes autoritarios, no hemos sido capaces de saber este resultado de antemano. Experimentados observadores internacionales han dicho que han sido unas elecciones libres y limpias. La princesa derrotada, Yulia Timo-shenko, no debe impugnar el resultado; lo que debe hacer es comenzar su campaña para ganar en 2015.

Yanukóvich buscará una relación más estrecha con Rusia, pero no existen indicios de que los oligarcas que le respaldan quieran que Ucrania deje de ser un país independiente. Les interesa jugar a dos bandas, con Rusia y con la Unión Europea. El propio Yanukóvich dice ahora que la integración en la UE es “nuestro objetivo estratégico”. A los amigos de la libertad en Ucrania les esperan cinco años difíciles. Siguen existiendo verdaderas amenazas contra la soberanía del país, entre ellas la utilización rusa del gas como arma y la posibilidad de un conflicto por la península de Crimea, en la que la mayoría de la población es rusa y la flota rusa del Mar Negro tiene el control de Sebastopol.

Ahora bien, si se capean estos posibles temporales y la elección presidencial de 2015 arrebata el poder a Yanukóvich, los futuros historiadores quizá juzguen la situación actual como un pequeño desvío en el camino hacia la consolidación de la Ucrania independiente. Pero para eso será necesario que haya valentía en Kiev, contención en Moscú y pensamiento estratégico en Bruselas; unas cualidades que faltan bastante hoy en las tres capitales.

Yo, que fui testigo de la revolución naranja en Kiev y le di una acogida entusiasta, debo reconocer que después me decepcionó. Víctor Yúshenko resultó ser un presidente bastante impotente, ya antes de tener las manos atadas en nudos de reparto de poder por el compromiso constitucional que puso fin a la revolución negociada.

Si leen el epílogo a la última edición de la excelente historia de los ucranianos escrita por Andrew Wilson, se encontrarán en un mundo más próximo a Los Soprano que a El Ala Oeste de la Casa Blanca. Los oligarcas se pelean entre bastidores de la política ucraniana como auténticos gánsteres; la corrupción esendémica; el país ha caído en el índice de libertad económica; la economía se contrajo más de un 14% el año pasado. Los ucranianos pueden hablar con libertad y escoger entre los diversos candidatos -la participación en los últimos comicios fue casi del 70%-, pero tienen buenos motivos para sentirse decepcionados por la falta de mejoras materiales, seguridad legal y justicia social.

También es cierto que, durante los últimos cinco años, Ucrania ha recibido menos apoyo del que debería de la UE. Los líderes europeos se han mostrado demasiado comedidos sobre la perspectiva de que Ucrania se incorpore a la Unión. Pero hasta los más firmes partidarios del país, como el ex presidente polaco Aleksander Kwasniewski, tienen que reconocer que los ucranianos han sido, muchas veces, sus peores enemigos. Europa no puede hacer por Ucrania lo que Ucrania no haga por sí misma.

En este sentido, y pese a todos sus defectos, la derrotada Timoshenko habría sido mejor opción. Incluso en comparación con el escaso nivel de la política postcomunista, Yanukóvich es un ejemplo de lumpen. Durante su candidatura a la presidencia en 2004 oí en Kiev este chiste: “¿Sabes que Yanukóvich quiere obtener un tercer periodo?”. Los dos primeros periodos fueron de cárcel, cuando era joven, por robo, lesiones corporales graves y agresión sexual. Pues bien, ahora ha obtenido ese tercer periodo. A pesar de todo lo que ha renovado su estilo el dinámico asesor político estadounidense Paul Manafort, sus discursos son infumables.

Me encanta la anécdota de que mencionó a la gran poeta rusa Anna Akhmatova llamándola Anna Akhmetova (el gran oligarca padrino de Yanukóvich se llama Rinat Akhmetov). Lo único bueno es que, como tantos otros dirigentes plúmbeos y poco elocuentes del mundo postcomunista, seguramente conseguirá que se movilicen los jóvenes ucranianos, llenos de vergüenza, repugnancia y sensación de ridículo.

Además, en cualquier caso, Yanukóvich es el presidente ucraniano que hay. Tenemos que trabajar con él. Lo importante ahora es qué puede hacer la Unión Europea para ayudar a Ucrania a encaminarse hacia un futuro más libre, próspero y europeo. Ésta es una pregunta dirigida en especial a una dirigente que casualmente ha sido elegida para el mismo periodo que Yanukóvich y cuyas declaraciones, hasta el momento, han sido de una sosería verdaderamente digna del presidente ucraniano. Me refiero, por supuesto, a la Alta Representante para la Política Exterior, Catherine Ashton.

La UE debería superar su lenguaje engañoso actual (“reconocemos las aspiraciones europeas de Ucrania y damos la bienvenida a su opción europea”) para decir que “queremos que sea miembro de la UE cuando satisfaga todos los requisitos para la integración. Eso beneficiará nuestros intereses y los suyos”. Será difícil que todos los líderes nacionales de la UE se adhieran a esa postura, pero Ashton tiene que empezar a intentarlo ya. En la política europea, cinco años son mucho tiempo.

Mientras tanto, hay cosas que ya puede empezar a hacer. A medida que construya el nuevo servicio exterior de la UE, debe decidir dónde concentrar los recursos diplomáticos y económicos. Los sitios en los que más impacto puede tener la UE son nuestros vecinos inmediatos, y hay pocos más importantes que Ucrania.

En la actualidad, la delegación de la UE en Kiev es un lugar siniestro, burocrático y de poca importancia, con la página web tal vez más aburrida del mundo. En menos de un año, Ashton debería convertirla en un sólido ejemplo de lo que puede ser una embajada de la UE, con un embajador de primera categoría, políticamente astuto, un equipo cuidadosamente escogido de lo mejor de Bruselas y de los servicios diplomáticos de los Estados miembros, gente que hable bien ucraniano para aparecer en los medios de comunicación de aquel país y una coordinación ejemplar con las embajadas bilaterales de los Estados miembros.

La Iniciativa Mixta de Cooperación creada recientemente por la UE en Crimea debe tener una presencia permanente y muy visible en la conflictiva península. Sus funcionarios deben ayudar a todos los grupos de población de la zona (rusos, ucranianos, tártaros de Crimea y otros) a conseguir mejorar en los aspectos más necesarios: mejores carreteras e infraestructuras, vínculos educativos y culturales. Y, por cierto, si está cociéndose algún problema serio allí, debemos poder enterarnos con mucha anticipación.

Aunque Yanukóvich seguramente tratará de conseguir un acuerdo especial sobre el gas con Moscú, Bruselas debe seguir dejando clara la necesidad de que el país cuente con unos precios más realistas para el gas, mayor eficiencia energética y redes de suministro más diversificadas e integradas. Es algo que interesa enormemente a Europa. Recordemos que, cuando Rusia cortó el suministro de gas a Ucrania en enero de 2009, la mitad oriental de la UE se resfrió. El próximo año, las presidencias de turno húngara y polaca apoyarán sin duda a Ashton y los comisarios en este intento.

En cuanto a los ucranianos corrientes, lo que más impacto tendría sería la relajación de las restricciones para el visado. Cualquiera que viese el efecto psicológico que tuvo el pasado mes de diciembre en Serbia el anuncio de la exención de visado para viajar a la UE sabe lo que quiero decir.

Es una tarea aburrida, lenta, nada espectacular, pero eso es lo que se le da bien a la UE. Una tortuga debe hacer lo que sabe. Según dicen, a veces incluso puede ganar a una liebre rusa.

If Viktor Yanukovich, the winner of the presidential race in Ukraine, acts quickly to address his country’s pressing problems, he could move it out of the doldrums and cure the “Ukraine fatigue” afflicting Washington and most European capitals.

As Viktor Yushchenko exits the presidency, Ukraine faces a host of problems. It suffered a crushing 14 percent fall in gross domestic product in 2009. Unwise pricing policies and widespread corruption have put the critical gas sector in virtual bankruptcy. The nasty in-fighting between Mr. Yushchenko and his prime minister, Yulia Tymoshenko, kept Kiev from implementing needed responses to these challenges.

As a result, Ukraine fatigue has again gripped the West. This malady first broke out in 1998 in the U.S. Congress. American legislators, weary of the slow pace of reform and mistreatment of U.S. investors, scaled back their generous assistance earmarks for Kiev. A subsequent outbreak was cured by the 2004 Orange Revolution, as Ukrainians inspired the West with a determined defense of their right to have their votes counted fairly.

Unfortunately, Mr. Yushchenko and Ms. Tymoshenko, close allies during the Orange Revolution, could not cooperate in power and failed to build on the revolution’s promise. Ukraine fatigue returned with a vengeance. The country has ceased to be a priority for the European Union and, given everything now on the Obama foreign policy plate, barely registers on Washington’s radar.

Mr. Yanukovich’s victory on Sunday rings with irony. After all, the Orange Revolution threw out his tainted election. But the Ukrainian electorate has given him a new chance. He now has an opportunity — and the responsibility — to show he can provide the decisive leadership his country needs.

Whatever the preferences might have been in the Washington and Europe, Ukrainians have made their choice. No compelling evidence of major voting irregularities has emerged, and international observers praised the election for meeting democratic standards, now the norm for Ukraine. The West should congratulate and engage Mr. Yanukovich, and urge him to get on with addressing Ukraine’s daunting problems.

A serious attack on corruption would create better conditions for both Ukrainian and foreign businesses. Reforming the gas sector would strengthen Ukraine’s energy security and benefit Europe: Gas spats between Kiev and Moscow have twice in the past four years halted gas flows to Europe. Coherent policymaking in Kiev would give Western capitals something with which to work.

Tackling this reform agenda will require tough decisions by Ukraine’s new leadership. The United States and European Union should jointly send a message to Kiev containing three key points:

First, the West welcomes Mr. Yanukovich as the democratically elected leader of Ukraine. However, a reversal of the democratic progress that Kiev has made in the past five years would have profoundly negative consequences for relations with the West.

Second, the West understands that Mr. Yanukovich’s foreign policy may differ from his predecessor’s. The doors to integration and cooperation with institutions such as the European Union and NATO nevertheless will remain open; Kiev should indicate how far and how fast it wishes to proceed.

Third, the West will assess his seriousness by the seriousness of his policies. The West cannot want Ukraine to succeed more than Ukrainians do. Should Mr. Yanukovich avoid crucial actions such as energy sector reform, that is his choice — even an understandable one given the tough politics that surround the issue. The West will still seek good relations. But Washington and Brussels should make clear that in such circumstances, Kiev should not expect the West to extend itself by intervening, for example, with the International Monetary Fund to cut Ukraine slack on meeting its loan obligations.

The goal should be to encourage Kiev to take steps that will make Ukraine more democratic, more stable and more capable of fending for itself. That will advance the country’s interests and make it a better partner for Europe. If Kiev proves unwilling to take such steps, the county will linger in the doldrums — and Ukraine fatigue in the West will grow.

La révolution, paraît-il, dévore presque toujours ses enfants. Cette citation est bien évidemment valable pour les «révolutions de couleur» – de Géorgie tout d’abord et d’Ukraine aujourd’hui – où le président sortant, Viktor Iouchtchenko, héros de la «révolution orange» en 2004, a été éliminé au premier tour de l’élection présidentielle il y a peu, avec moins de 6% des voix.

A ce stade, le printemps de liberté qui régnait sur l’Ukraine s’était déjà détérioré, son épanouissement atteignant le point mort, pour cause d’incompétence et de corruption mêlées, signes d’un fort désir de changement. Dans tous les cas, la Révolution orange ne sera plus.

Il convient donc de se pencher sur l’espérance mirifique qui régnait nuit et jour place de l’Indépendance dans le centre de Kiev il y a quelques années et sur l’espoir lié à la victoire électorale de Iouchtchenko. C’était la victoire de la démocratie et de l’indépendance sur la fraude électorale et le pouvoir nu.

Or, les événements de l’hiver 2004-2005 n’avaient pas seulement à voir avec le droit démocratique du peuple ukrainien à l’autodétermination et à l’indépendance nationale. Ils étaient aussi et surtout liés au futur ordre européen tel qu’il émergea à la fin de la Guerre froide. A l’époque, l’Europe comprit aussitôt l’ampleur du défi et réagit avec efficacité. Il fallait renouveler ces élections pour gagner cette démocratie.

Mais en fin de compte, tout cela était-il inutile? Pas du tout! En dépit des graves troubles économiques et sociaux qui accablent l’Ukraine, il ne faut pas oublier que le sort des «démocraties guidées» sur le moule russe lui a été épargné jusqu’à aujourd’hui.

En Ukraine, les médias indépendants et la liberté d’expression ne sont pas limités et depuis 2004 les élections ont été jugées libres et équitables, à la fois par des experts internationaux et les partis eux-mêmes. Or, ces éléments ne peuvent pas encore être considérés comme acquis en Europe orientale.

En outre, l’indépendance de l’Ukraine ne dépend pas du résultat de ces présidentielles et n’est plus une source d’inquiétude comme elle l’était en 2004-2005 – ce qui représente aussi un pas en avant non négligeable.

Pourtant, frustrée par son esprit de corruption et son immobilisme, l’Europe s’est détournée de l’Ukraine. Et cette position pourrait bien être une erreur stratégique de taille. L’Ukraine est l’une des pierres angulaires sur lesquelles l’ordre européen repose depuis la Guerre froide. C’est en Ukraine que l’Europe et la Russie se rencontrent. Ainsi donc, le sort de ce pays n’est pas seulement un facteur déterminant de la sécurité en Europe. Il tient aussi le rôle principal dans les futures relations entre l’Europe et la Russie.

Avec une Ukraine indépendante et démocratique, les relations russo-européennes prendront une tout autre tournure, bien plus positive que si le rôle de l’Ukraine devait venir à changer radicalement et l’histoire à s’inverser. L’avenir de ce grand pays étant d’une importance capitale pour l’Europe, il est donc dans le propre intérêt de l’Union de ne pas afficher ses émotions et sa frustration.

Il lui faut au contraire faire l’inverse: investir sans compter dans l’économie et miser sur la politique pour coopérer de manière plus étroite. Patience et persévérance sont les deux qualités requises pour traiter avec l’Ukraine, bien trop d’éléments étant en jeu pour se permettre d’emprunter une autre voie.

Par conséquent, lorsque l’Union européenne envisage une «nouvelle politique orientale», elle doit avant tout se concentrer sur l’Ukraine. Les membres de l’UE, notamment ceux d’Europe orientale, ne doivent pas se désintéresser de l’avenir de l’Ukraine, sinon l’ensemble de l’Union finira aussi par s’en désintéresser.

C’est là que l’Allemagne et la Pologne entrent en jeu. Ces deux pays comptent parmi les six plus grands de l’UE et savent bien combien l’Ukraine est d’une importance stratégique capitale pour l’Europe. En revanche – autre leçon apprise en 2004 – les intérêts de la France, du Royaume-Uni, de l’Italie et de l’Espagne n’abondent pas dans le même sens. Si, et seulement si, l’Allemagne et la Pologne, associées aux Etats membres plus petits d’Europe orientale, unissent leurs forces pour défendre une politique «orientale» et de bon voisinage envers l’Ukraine, alors la politique de l’ensemble de l’UE sera dotée de la persévérance et des compétences nécessaires.

Ainsi, la poursuite de ses propres intérêts en Europe orientale par l’Europe dépendra de la coordination entre les gouvernements de Berlin et de Varsovie, puis entre ces gouvernements et l’UE à Bruxelles et les autres Etats membres. L’Allemagne et la Pologne devraient aussi s’assurer, ensemble, que les intérêts de l’Europe pour une Ukraine indépendante et démocratique ne heurtent personne – non seulement à Kiev, mais aussi à Moscou.

Le nouveau ministre des Affaires étrangères allemand a parlé de faire renaître le vieux «triangle de Weimar» comprenant la France, l’Allemagne et la Pologne. Cette renaissance n’aura pas lieu, surtout du fait du manque d’intérêt français. Une coopération pour l’Ukraine pourrait néanmoins finir par déboucher sur la création d’un triangle Russie-Pologne-Allemagne bien plus significatif – qui pourrait d’ailleurs redonner de l’impulsion à la politique orientale de l’Europe.

L’Ukraine fait figure d’«homme malade de l’Europe». Au sens littéral, c’est le pays qui a été le plus touché par l’épidémie de grippe A, avec plus de 300 victimes. Economiquement, elle n’est pas en meilleure santé: c’est bien d’un effondrement qu’il faut parler puisque le PIB a chuté de 18%, du fait de la chute de l’activité industrielle et des exportations d’acier, ainsi que des vulnérabilités du secteur financier. C’est dans ce contexte peu réjouissant que l’Ukraine élit son président. Si le précédent scrutin en 2004 avait donné lieu à une forte mobilisation des Ukrainiens, connue sous le nom de «Révolution orange», l’humeur du moment est donc nettement plus morose. Le nouveau président aura pour mission de redresser l’économie et de chercher des fonds afin d’éviter que son pays ne s’enfonce davantage dans la crise.

Les grandes narrations géopolitiques pro-russes ou pro-européennes ou atlantiques, qui avaient fourni une grille de lecture des développements de l’Ukraine, semblent moins pertinentes aujourd’hui. En effet, les autorités russes prennent grand soin de préciser qu’elles travailleront avec la nouvelle administration ukrainienne, que la victoire revienne à Ioulia Timochenko ou Viktor Ianoukovitch, les deux grands favoris. Les relations économiques entre les deux États ont connu des transformations importantes depuis que l’Ukraine, qui a longtemps profité des subsides énergétiques russes, a été contrainte de passer à des relations de marché, plus prévisibles. De son côté, l’Union européenne est aujourd’hui plus présente que par le passé: la mise en place de la politique du «partenariat oriental» témoigne d’une préoccupation renouvelée pour les pays de la région. La perspective d’un accord de libre-échange approfondi et celle d’une plus grande facilité de circulation au sein de l’espace européen constituent les deux instruments de modernisation du pays, devant le tirer vers les standards européens. L’UE reste un objectif revendiqué au sein du spectre politique ukrainien, même si l’illusion d’une adhésion rapide s’est évanouie. Néanmoins, on voit mal les Etats européens distribuer une aide majeure à Kiev alors que l’aide a été minimale pour des Etats membres en grave récession comme la Lettonie ou la Lituanie. On le voit, alors que l’Ukraine est un pays soumis à une forte crise économique et sociale, ses partenaires traditionnels ne peuvent répondre aujourd’hui à ses besoins financiers. Dans un proche futur, la véritable nouveauté pourrait provenir d’une arrivée en force de la Chine dans le jeu local. La visite de l’un des vice-premiers ministres chinois à Kiev fin octobre 2009, Zhang Dejiang, afin de rencontrer Ioulia Timochenko, participe de ce mouvement, de même que l’aide rapidement proposée par la Chine pour lutter contre la grippe. L’influence chinoise a été grandissante en Afrique et en Amérique Latine au cours de la décennie écoulée, elle semble dorénavant également s’intéresser aux périphéries européennes, espace favorable pour une stratégie d’implantation.

Le cas de la Moldavie, pays encastré entre la Roumanie et l’Ukraine, en témoigne. Peu après les élections législatives tumultueuses d’avril 2009, Pékin a proposé aux autorités moldaves la signature d’un prêt de 1 milliard de dollars à un taux très avantageux de 3% sur 15 ans, dans le but de développer des projets d’investissement via l’entreprise Covec (société générale d’ingénierie outre-mer de Chine). Compte tenu de la taille réduite de l’économie moldave (environ 6 milliards de dollars en nominal pour 2008), et des contre-offres inférieures venant du FMI, des Etats-Unis, de Russie ou de l’UE, on comprend que l’entrée de la Chine dans ces conditions est un fait géo-économique majeur. Il ne s’agit pas d’exploiter des matières premières comme en Afrique ou en Amérique latine, mais plutôt d’exporter un savoir-faire en termes d’infrastructures vendues à moindres coûts. La Moldavie et la Serbie sont les deux Etats les plus avancés dans leurs relations avec la Chine, mais d’autres pays commencent à être intéressés.

Considérant les énormes besoins de financement de l’Ukraine auxquels ni l’UE, ni les Etats-Unis, ni la Russie ne peuvent faire face, on peut donc raisonnablement s’attendre à l’obtention d’un prêt chinois dans un avenir proche après les élections. Les deux pays ont déjà connu un essor de leurs relations commerciales depuis 2008, et cette tendance devrait s’affirmer. Depuis quelques années déjà, plusieurs milliers d’étudiants chinois sont présents sur le territoire ukrainien pour y enrichir leur cursus. De plus, si l’UE offre peu d’argent frais moyennant un certain nombre de conditions, la Chine offre davantage et ne demande que la non-reconnaissance de Taïwan; elle n’est regardante ni sur les droits de l’homme, ni sur les normes environnementales ou sociales, ni sur la «bonne gouvernance».

Dès lors, il convient de s’intéresser à la perspective d’une présence accrue de la Chine dans ce pays, qui ne sera pas sans effets économiques et politiques. Cela pourrait en effet aboutir à consolider un système dans lequel les groupes d’intérêts économiques, les «clans», jouent un rôle déterminant dans la vie politique du pays, en dépit du sentiment de lassitude des citoyens. L’arrivée de capitaux sans contreparties n’est pas neutre, puisqu’elle tend à déresponsabiliser les élites économiques, qui ont alors moins d’incitations à entreprendre des réformes entravant potentiellement leurs affaires. Dans le même temps, au vu de la faiblesse des infrastructures (transport, équipement, etc.) dans les pays du voisinage, le financement de projets concrets n’est en rien illégitime, et peut même s’avérer efficace. Le bilan chinois est en tout cas contrasté en Afrique: la diversification des partenaires et l’accès au financement sont contrebalancés par les risques écologiques et sociaux, ou encore les tensions nées de l’exportation de main-d’œuvre chinoise. Dans le cas ukrainien, l’UE ne peut être accusée de néocolonialisme, mais l’exportation de l’acquis communautaire pourrait se trouver contrariée par la politique chinoise.

Le retour aux sphères d’influence (russe, américaine ou européenne) semble une époque révolue, mais cela ne signifie pas la fin des politiques de puissance: cela montre simplement les transformations des règles du jeu du fait de la multiplication des acteurs concernés. Nous verrons donc à l’avenir si le «remède chinois», fait de prêts sans contreparties et de politique ambitieuse d’infrastructures, gagne du terrain dans le voisinage de l’UE, et avec quelles externalités

La nueva guerra del gas entre Ucrania y Rusia ha sido una versión corregida y ampliada de otras dos crisis similares, acaecidas en enero del 2006 y el 2008; y ello no ha sido por casualidad. El nuevo incidente ha tenido lugar precisamente pocos días antes de que el próximo presidente norteamericano, Barack Obama, jure el cargo: todo ello lo convierte en uno más de los conflictos sonda o recordatorio en este mismo periodo, tal como lo es la destrucción del gueto de Gaza. Se trata de aprovechar ese momento de claroscuro, los minutos de vacío de poder en Washington, para hostigar y lanzar un desafío que el nuevo inquilino de la Casa Blanca se verá obligado a atender en primera instancia, y al cual deberá dedicar todas sus energías justo en los momentos en los que estará más verde en el cargo. Esta situación tiene una faceta preocupante en lo que concierne a Europa, porque demuestra que una serie de países continúan depositando toda su esperanza en que el amigo americano les solucione la papeleta. Y algunos conflictos, pura y simplemente, fueron puestos en marcha durante la era de George W. Bush para erosionar la autoridad comunitaria europea.

RESULTA evidente que en la guerra del gas de enero del 2009, los protagonistas centrales han sido Ucrania y Rusia, por este orden. Los gobernantes del primer país, por su contribución, con alevosía, al desencadenamiento del conflicto por motivos políticos, buscando situarse, junto con Israel, en los primeros puestos de la agenda exterior del nuevo presidente norteamericano. A Moscú le ha venido de perlas el amago de represalia ucraniana, porque, en el caso concreto del gas, lo que buscan los rusos es marcar precios al alza en el mercado internacional del gas, en el cual ese país es la mayor potencia mundial. No es el caso del petró leo: no existe un mercado mundial del gas unificado, y tampoco un mecanismo que lo regule, por lo cual ahí Rusia tiene mucho que decir. Y ahora le conviene trabajar en esa dirección, dada la caída del precio del petróleo, que los grandes especuladores internacionales estuvieron hinchando entre la crisis de las subprime (agosto de 2007) y el crash del pasado septiembre. Este es el quid de la cuestión.

PARA LAUE es una situación delicada, y nada coyuntural; por eso son temerarias las llamadas al desplante o el desafío contra los rusos, como si estuviéramos en 1909. Las únicas armas que deben utilizarse, con la contundencia que sea, son las financieras y las económicas. En ese contexto, tratar el asunto como una continuación de la guerra de Georgia del pasado verano resulta muy perjudicial para los europeos. Pero más aún lo es jalear a esos países definidos por algunos como rogue eastates (granujas o gamberros del Este) en alusión a los rogue states, término acuñado durante la era de Ronald Reagan, traducible como estados granujas. Se denominaba así a todos aquellos países de régimen autoritario, con una desafiante actitud antinorteamericana y dispuestos a poses duras y/o melodramáticas en política internacional: armas nucleares, provocaciones, propaganda agresiva y manipulación de sus primos mayores o potencias favorables. Si cambiamos totalitarismo por populismo (lo que muchos norteamericanos aceptarían para la Venezuela chavista), se puede ver cómo en Europa oriental y el Cáucaso han proliferado una serie de países proclives a actuar forzando a su favor los equilibrios de poder internacionales.
Aunque se pueden señalar algunos países concretos que iniciaron esta tendencia, al comienzo de las guerras de secesión yugoslavas, los orígenes de la actual generación de países del Este partidarios de jugar al límite con el apoyo de países occidentales poderosos, se puede datar en 1996, cuando Georgia, Ucrania, Moldavia y Azerbaiyán pusieron los cimientos de lo que en el 2001 sería el el GUAM, Organización para la Democracia y el Desarrollo Económico. Posteriormente, Moldavia se daría de baja y Azerbaiyán no coincidiría con la política antirrusa de Georgia y Ucrania; lo cual, junto con el activo apoyo norteamericano, serían dos marcas de origen del GUAM.

SIN EMBARGO, con el tiempo, al no recibir el esperado e incondicional amparo europeo (dado que las cruzadas contra Rusia apoyadas desde Washington no tienden a beneficiar a Bruselas), estas actitudes han sido semillero de euroescepticismo, incluso en aquellos países que se han convertido en miembros de la Unión Europea. Es importante tenerlo en cuenta para valorar si nos interesa apoyar presiones contra Rusia que posiblemente terminarán en beneficio de los instaladores de centrales nucleares: algo en lo cual tienen especial interés algunos de los denostadores pertinaces de llegar a alguna forma de concordia estable y permanente con Moscú. En cuanto a las historias sobre mafias, son pintorescas: pero a la vista de fraudes como el de Bernard Madoff y de lo que ha destapado la actual crisis financiera norteamericana, lo de los malos del Este suena ya un poco a calderilla.

It is hard to decide which is more despicable, the virulent untruths issuing from the Kremlin or the readiness of gas-starved European politicians to gang up on Ukraine. Russia’s insistence that the gas is there, if Ukraine would only pump it through, is pure KGB-speak.

Tuesday’s ceremonial reopening of the taps that Gazprom should never have turned off was a propaganda stunt, no more. What went through was a trickle, halted after a few hours. Not only that, but Gazprom insisted that its “trial” shipment be moved along a pipeline that Ukraine needs for domestic use, to supply Odessa and other cities. To ship it through to Europe, Ukraine would have had to deny heating to its own citizens. Small wonder EU monitors met with Russian obstruction.

Gas flows to Europe will resume only when Vladimir Putin decides that Russia has successfully pinned the donkey’s tail on Ukraine. But an end to the immediate crisis will not alter the fact of Europe’s vulnerability to Russian caprice. The Russian Prime Minister has done what no Soviet leader did – made Russia’s key national asset an instrument of political blackmail. He has done it before, in 2006; he could do it again.

Forget about this being a “commercial dispute”, as the EU supinely affects to believe. Russia made no serious attempt to solve its pricing dispute with the ineffectual and divided Ukrainian Government. This is a Kremlin “cold war” against Ukraine’s dream of belonging to the West. When Mr Putin – not Gazprom’s management, note – ordered the gas to be cut off to Europe as well as Ukraine, the point he was making was political, and it was this: if shivering Europeans want secure supplies of Russian gas, they must either invest, with Gazprom, in new pipelines under the Baltic and Black seas that would bypass “unreliable” Ukraine, or trust Russia to secure Ukraine’s future “reliability”. If you want your gas, in other words, hands off Ukraine.

Mr Putin makes no bones about it. Russian oil and gas are his weapons of choice in a battle to reassert Russian dominance over its lost empire, to weaken European resistance to that grand design, and to reclaim respect and fear for Russia as a great power. His grand strategy is to make Gazprom, the queen of the global energy chessboard, a cartel with a reach that spans China, Africa and Latin America. Gazprom is, as Mr Putin says, already “a powerful lever of economic and political influence in the world”.

The EU responded to the first Russian cut-off in 2006 with an “energy security” plan: to diversify supplies, to build more gas storage and an EU-wide gas network, and to negotiate as one with Russia. A few more storage tanks got built, though not in Britain, which incredibly has only two weeks’ worth of storage compared with nuclear-rich France’s eighteen. But the EU soon returned to its obsession with carbon emissions. Individual countries, Germany foremost, rushed to do sweetheart deals with Gazprom.

After this latest alarm call, there must be no hitting the snooze button. Whatever EU emissions targets say about reliance on renewables, those targets rely heftily on gas, which provides a fifth of European electricity. A quarter of that gas comes from Russia, 80 per cent of it via Ukraine. With Russia busy bribing Azerbaijan to cold-shoulder Europe’s proposed Nabucco pipeline to transport its gas to Austria via Turkey, and Gazprom muscling in on a projected trans-Saharan gas pipeline from Nigeria to Europe via Algeria, Europe is stuck with high – and growing – dependence on gas that Gazprom, aka the Kremlin, controls.

This may seem a continental rather than a British emergency, but that is wishful thinking. Britain is already short of generating capacity and will lose a third of the existing 60-gigawatt supply by 2020, as old coal-fired and nuclear stations are decommissioned. Within six years – a blink of an eye in the generating industry – Britain’s energy gap will endanger the national economy.

A German consortium formed by E.On and RWE announced plans this week to build four new nuclear plants that could plug half of Britain’s energy gap, and EDF, which has just acquired British Energy, plans four more smaller ones. But because Britain wasted a precious decade pretending it didn’t need or want nuclear energy, they cannot be built in time to head of serious shortages. Offshore wind power cannot plug the gap. Ed Miliband’s green light for new coal-fired stations is a U-turn born of desperation. But gas will be a vital part of the solution, and Britain’s North Sea gas is rapidly running out.

So Britain, too, is doomed to turn to Gazprom, and has as much interest in countering Mr Putin’s blackmail as Bulgaria. It used to be thought that because Gazprom earns 60 per cent of its revenue from Europe, the contractual relationship was stable. Clearly, it is not.

Gazprom under Mr Putin is about control. Gazprom has been moving downstream in Europe, buying up hunks of gas infrastructure and developing joint ventures with European companies all the way “from the well to the end consumers”. It is moving in on Europe’s energy assets unobstructed despite the strict limits – and foul play – that dog foreign investors in Russian oil and gas fields, where Royal Dutch Shell and BP have got badly burnt. Europe’s supplies will be even more vulnerable once the eastbound trans-Siberian pipeline is built and China bids against it for Gazprom contracts.

But the Kremlin picked a bad time for this showdown. A year ago, Gazprom’s market capitalisation made it the world’s third-largest corporation, after ExxonMobil and General Electric. Dazzled by Gazprom’s “trillion-dollar business” prospectus, investors overlooked its splurging on acquisitions to the neglect of vital infrastructure. But the credit crunch and falling energy prices have temporarily spiked Gazprom’s guns. Its share price is down 76 per cent; its debts are $50 billion. Given its huge revenue flows, Gazprom is not broke. But it cannot keep gas flowing from its existing fields and also find £32 billion to finance two pipelines that would bypass Ukraine, the Nord stream under the Baltic and the South stream under the Black Sea.

These pipelines are key to Mr Putin’s divide-and-rule strategy. The Ukraine bust-up, he hopes, will frighten the Europeans into putting up the cash. Instead they should bin both projects. The EU should offer to arbitrate a fair and durable settlement with Kiev, adding that Ukraine has all the pipeline capacity, thank you, that Europe needs. The EU should insist further that Russia open its energy sectors to foreign investment, or face a block on Gazprom ventures in Europe.

Above all, reliance on Gazprom must be reduced. Britain should lead a crash programme of investment in liquefied natural gas technology, to ship gas from big producers such as Qatar. The fact must be faced: British and European energy security has got lost in the greenery. It should never have been neglected. After this spell in Putin’s freezer, cooler heads must now prevail.

Like every continent, Europe has its rituals. In the spring, the storks return to the Low Countries from their winter nests in Africa. In the autumn, the French return to Paris from their beaches in the south. And in the winter, the Russians threaten to cut off the natural gas supplies to Ukraine.

Okay, they don’t do it every winter. But they did it in the winter of 2005-06, they did it in 2006-07, and when they once again switched off the taps, on New Year’s Day, it was impossible not to feel a wearisome sense of deja vu. This year, as in previous years, the negotiations are almost too complicated to explain, involving not only Gazprom, the Russian gas behemoth, but also various shady intermediaries, dubious deals and differing price mechanisms. This year, as in previous years, the Russians are claiming that the conflict is purely commercial, not political; that Ukraine is stealing Europe’s gas; that Ukraine is not paying a fair price. But this year, unlike in some previous years, those claims are sounding exceptionally hollow.

For one thing, it was the Russian prime minister, Vladimir Putin, not the Gazprom CEO, who openly made the decision to switch off the gas. More important, the Ukrainians, who have engaged in plenty of pipeline hanky-panky in the past, have this time around readily agreed to let Europeans and Russians monitor their transit pipelines. They have also paid their (very large) Gazprom debt and have asked — at last — for a more transparent system of price-setting, one similar to those used in Western Europe (an algorithm that relates the price of gas to the price of oil). Over the weekend they even negotiated a deal with the Russians, belatedly brokered by European Union negotiators. The Russians then refused to sign it for two days before agreeing — at least in principle — to turn on the taps late last night (as of this writing, they aren’t on yet).

But why the delay? And why cut off the gas supply for so long in the first place? This being Putin’s Russia, theories abound. Perhaps the Russians thought the Ukrainians, in the throes of an economic and financial meltdown, weren’t going to be able to pay that very large Gazprom debt. Perhaps they hoped to discredit the Ukrainian leadership in the eyes of the European Union. Perhaps they wanted the lights to start going out in Bratislava or Brindisi, just to give everyone a scare. Or perhaps, as some believe, Putin was trying to distract Russians from their own pending economic and financial meltdown.

For once, it doesn’t really matter. In fact, the most important story is not about Russia and Ukraine but about Europe, and the European Union in particular. Europe, a Hungarian friend said to me last week, “occupies itself with unnecessary things and ignores everything that is important.” And there is something to this. There are E.U. sausage-making regulations, E.U. Intercultural Dialogues, even E.U. attempts to broker peace in Gaza. But while most of Europe — from Italy and France to Bulgaria and Slovakia — gets at least some of its gas from Russia, there still isn’t a true, unified E.U. energy policy, and there isn’t a true, unified E.U.-Russia policy, either.

Instead, Gazprom — no longer pretending to be anything but a tool of Russian foreign policy — still does deals with European gas concerns one country at a time, picking them off one by one. Putin still deploys “divide and rule” tactics to deal with Europe, making special arrangements for Italy, buying politicians in Germany and cutting off the gas to Ukraine. And the tactics work: In 2006, when Western Europeans suddenly felt the pressure drop in their pipelines, they protested, loudly. This year, as kindergartens in Bulgaria briefly went dark, no one in Brussels seemed especially bothered. Knowing that the Russians are unreliable, Russia’s European customers now build up their reserves, turn to other sources (the Norwegians have been pumping gas like mad) and keep their fingers crossed, hoping that the Russians and Ukrainians will come to their senses in time.

Instead of sending their best and brightest to create a genuinely secure system — through expanded use of liquid natural gas, more nuclear plants, clean coal — most European countries have settled for makeshift arrangements. Instead of using their collective bargaining power, they behave as though they are dependent on Gazprom, when the reverse is equally true: The Russians need the money they get from European sales, after all, almost as much as the Europeans need their gas. Instead of sending in crisis negotiators every Jan. 1, Europe’s leaders could focus on this problem and solve it. I would love to describe this past week’s events as a “wake-up call,” but there have been so many “wake-up calls” already. When will Europe heed them?

Tema: Los ministros de Asuntos Exteriores de la OTAN deben evaluar en su reunión de diciembre de 2008 si Georgia y Ucrania entran o no en el Plan de Acción para ser miembros de la OTAN.

Resumen: Los jefes de Estado y Gobierno de la OTAN, reunidos el pasado 3 de abril en Bucarest, encargaron a los ministros de Asuntos Exteriores que hiciesen una primera evaluación del progreso realizado por Georgia y Ucrania para unirse al Plan de Acción para el Ingreso (Membership Action Plan, MAP). La evaluación está siendo objeto de especial atención por los medios de comunicación a causa de la crisis en Georgia del pasado agosto y debido a las consecuencias que la decisión de los ministros pudiera tener en las relaciones OTAN-Rusia.

Si Rusia ya criticó entonces tanto la solicitud de ingreso de los candidatos como la admisión a trámite de la OTAN en Bucarest, tras el conflicto de Georgia ha reforzado su oposición al ingreso mientras que la Alianza Atlántica ha congelado prácticamente sus relaciones con Rusia y ha creado una Comisión OTAN-Georgia.[1] Los titulares de los periódicos recordaban los tiempos de la guerra fría y pese a la distensión registrada tras la retirada de tropas rusas de territorio georgiano, todavía no se puede predecir cuál será la decisión final que el Consejo Atlántico tome sobre el estatus futuro de las relaciones de la Alianza con Georgia y con Ucrania.

Análisis: El 7 de agosto de 2009, tropas georgianas atacaron Tskinvali, la capital de Osetia del Sur, iniciándose así una crisis cuyas consecuencias políticas son todavía difíciles de valorar pero cuyas consecuencias humanas comienzan a conocerse: unos 250 muertos, 1.500 heridos y 100.000 desplazados georgianos; 1.500 bajas entre las milicias surosetias y 20.000 refugiados en Rusia y Osetia del Norte; a los que hay que añadir unas decenas de soldados rusos muertos o heridos en los ataques georgianos sobre una base rusa y las fuerzas de pacificación allí estacionadas o en las posteriores operaciones.

Rusia solicitó una reunión del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas el día 8 de agosto pero, tras un acalorado intercambio de acusaciones entre Rusia y Georgia, no se llegó a ningún acuerdo. El Consejo de Seguridad se volvió a reunir a primeras horas del día 9 y otras dos veces el día 10 sin conseguir una declaración de alto el fuego. El día 10 de agosto, cuando las tropas rusas contaban ya con 10.000 efectivos en Osetia del Sur y avanzaban sobre territorio georgiano, los países europeos y EEUU condenaron con rotundidad la intervención rusa, pidieron la vuelta a la situación del día 6 de agosto y exigieron a Rusia que aceptase el alto el fuego propuesto por Bernard Kouchner, ministro de Asuntos Exteriores de Francia, que ejerce la Presidencia semestral de la UE. El alto el fuego contemplaba el cese inmediato de las hostilidades, la integridad territorial de Georgia y el retorno a la situación militar previa al ataque del día 7. Los rusos pusieron fin a las operaciones militares, salvo en defensa propia, el día 11 de agosto y el presidente francés, Nicolas Sarkozy, viajó a Moscú el día 12 con la propuesta europea de alto el fuego que ya habían aceptado los georgianos y consiguió que el presidente Medvédev lo aceptara, reservándose el derecho a responder a cualquier agresión. Los acontecimientos de agosto crearon un ambiente de confrontación verbal entre la OTAN y Rusia como no se había conocido en muchos años: mientras el presidente Medvédev decía el 19 de agosto que “no conseguirán empujarnos al aislamiento, al levantamiento de un nuevo Telón de Acero”, la secretaria de Estado de EEUU, Condoleezza Rice, recriminaba a Rusia un comportamiento “cada vez peor, cada vez más autoritario”.

A las declaraciones de condena de la invasión siguieron las condenas por el reconocimiento ruso de la independencia de Abjasia y Osetia del Sur el 26 de agosto y las acusaciones por la permanencia de fuerzas rusas en territorio georgiano incumpliendo el acuerdo suscrito con la UE. Las tropas rusas se retiraron de forma escalonada del territorio ocupado excepto unas zonas de seguridad guarnecidas por las “fuerzas de paz” rusas alrededor de los límites de Abjasia y Osetia del Sur. Pero cuando el presidente Medvédev anunció el día 10 de octubre que sus tropas se habían retirado de las zonas de seguridad antes de la fecha prevista, el Gobierno georgiano y el ministro francés Kouchner sólo confirmaron una retirada parcial. Posteriormente, fuentes rusas confirmaron que la localidad de Aljagori y las gargantas de Kodori no volverían a manos georgianas y anunciaron el envío de 7.000 efectivos adicionales, la mitad para desplegarse en Osetia del Sur y la otra mitad en Abjasia.

Frente a las quejas y recriminaciones occidentales, Rusia reiteró la lista de agravios que venía denunciando antes de la cumbre de Bucarest por la ampliación de la OTAN, el despliegue de misiles y radares estadounidenses en Polonia y la República Checa y la injerencia en su entorno inmediato del Cáucaso y añadió algunas amenazas adicionales sobre la posibilidad de desplegar misiles rusos en Kaliningrado o de retirarlos (opción cero) si se producía una moratoria en el despliegue del escudo antimisiles norteamericano. Por su parte, el Gobierno georgiano se aprovechó de la escalada verbal entre Rusia y los aliados para hacer olvidar su responsabilidad en el inicio del conflicto y ha llevado a cabo una campaña mediática y diplomática muy agresiva para conseguir que su derrota militar se convirtiera en una victoria diplomática sobre las tesis rusas.

La OTAN ante la crisis en Georgia

A diferencia de la UE, que reaccionó con gran rapidez ante la crisis, la OTAN reaccionó unos días más tarde apoyando al presidente Saakashvili. Tras la declaración inicial del secretario general de la OTAN pidiendo el cese inmediato de las hostilidades y reafirmando su apoyo a la integridad territorial de Georgia, se celebró una reunión OTAN-Georgia en Bruselas el día 12 de agosto en la que surgió la propuesta de crear una comisión bilateral permanente. En la reunión extraordinaria del Consejo Atlántico del 19 de agosto de 2008, los ministros de Asuntos Exteriores abordaron la situación en Georgia y sus implicaciones para la estabilidad y seguridad euro-atlánticas. Los reunidos fueron informados por el presidente en ejercicio de la OSCE, el finlandés Stubb, y por el de la UE, el francés Kouchner, de los esfuerzos realizados por ambas organizaciones. El Consejo del Atlántico Norte (CAN) se felicitó por el acuerdo de alto el fuego firmado por Rusia y Georgia pero resaltó la urgencia de una rápida y completa implementación del acuerdo. Los ministros reafirmaron su apoyo a la soberanía, independencia e integridad territorial de Georgia y acordaron una serie de ayudas para la población civil afectada por el conflicto. Los aliados decidieron apoyar el reestablecimiento del tráfico aéreo civil y acordaron otras medidas para ayudar al gobierno de Georgia.

Otra decisión muy importante del CAN fue la de aprobar la creación de una Comisión OTAN-Georgia para supervisar el estado de las relaciones bilaterales y la implementación de las decisiones tomadas en Bucarest sobre esas relaciones. El CAN requirió también a Rusia para que retirase a sus tropas inmediatamente del área y el secretario general, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, en rueda de prensa posterior al Consejo señaló que las reuniones del Consejo OTAN-Rusia serían pospuestas hasta que Rusia se adhiriese al alto el fuego porque las relaciones OTAN-Rusia no podían continuar como si no hubiese ocurrido nada y hasta que Rusia no se comprometiese a seguir los principios sobre los que se acordó esa relación. Tanto la declaración del secretario general del 19 de agosto como la respuesta del embajador adjunto de Rusia en la OTAN del 27 del mismo mes dejaron las relaciones bilaterales en estado de congelación.

El 26 de agosto, el secretario general rechazó en un comunicado la decisión rusa de reconocer la independencia de Osetia del Sur y Abjasia, considerándola una violación directa de diversas resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU. En el plano militar, la OTAN desplegó los buques de su Grupo Marítimo Permanente I de la OTAN (SNMG I) por el Mar Negro entre el 21 de agosto y el 10 de septiembre de 2008, de acuerdo con los planes previstos anteriormente al conflicto y que incluían la visita a puertos rumanos y búlgaros. Pese a ser una visita programada, Rusia acusó a la OTAN de acumular fuerzas navales en la parte occidental del mar Negro.

La visita del Consejo del Atlántico Norte a Georgia los días 15 y 16 de septiembre es una prueba de la atención que la OTAN ha prestado a la crisis. El secretario general y los representantes permanentes de los Estados miembros mantuvieron un intercambio de puntos de vista con el presidente Saakashvili sobre las reformas en marcha en el marco de la asociación del país con la OTAN y sobre la situación tras el conflicto de agosto. Los visitantes tuvieron la oportunidad de reunirse con miembros del parlamento y altos funcionarios de la administración georgiana así como con representantes de la sociedad civil. El secretario general mantuvo también una entrevista bilateral con el presidente Saakashvili esa misma tarde. Sin embargo, la primera reunión de la Comisión OTAN-Georgia fue el acto central del día. En esa ocasión y en el marco del Diálogo Intensificado del país caucásico con la OTAN, se produjo un animado intercambio de impresiones sobre las reformas en marcha y sobre las aspiraciones de Georgia de pasar a ser miembro de la Alianza. Los representantes aliados, por su parte, reiteraron su apoyo a la integridad territorial y a las aspiraciones euro-atlánticas de Georgia. El martes 16, los miembros del CAN visitaron la ciudad de Gori para obtener información de primera mano sobre el impacto del conflicto y los retos que tiene que afrontar Georgia para reconstruir algunas infraestructuras. Tras visitar las instalaciones de la 1ª Brigada de Infantería donde pudieron apreciar diversos daños, se trasladaron a un campo de la Alta Comisión de las Naciones Unidas para Refugiados (ACNUR) que acoge unos 2.000 desplazados por los combates.

Durante la posterior reunión informal de los ministros de Defensa aliados celebrada en Londres los días 18 y 19 de septiembre, se evacuaron consultas sobre los recientes acontecimientos en el área euro-atlántica que afectan intereses vitales de seguridad de los Estados miembros. Los días 9 y 10 de octubre los ministros de Defensa mantuvieron otro encuentro informal en Budapest en la que se reunió la Comisión OTAN-Georgia en la que se estudió la posible ayuda aliada a la recuperación de Georgia. Los ministros aliados discutieron también con su colega georgiano la coordinación de la cooperación en seguridad y defensa, en la reforma del sector de la seguridad y en la gestión del espacio aéreo. Los ministros de la Alianza reiteraron su apoyo a la integridad territorial de Georgia y su compromiso de seguir supervisando el proceso establecido en la Cumbre de Bucarest con vista a las aspiraciones euro-atlánticas de Georgia.

Ampliaciones con sentido

Las iniciativas de cooperación de la OTAN han sido uno de los mayores éxitos de la Alianza tras el fin de la Guerra Fría. La Asociación para la Paz (Partnership for Peace, APP) creada en la Cumbre de Bruselas en 1992 fue una mano tendida hacia los países que querían mantener una relación reglada con la Alianza Atlántica. Muchos de los socios pretendían convertirse en miembros y otros simplemente tener la oportunidad de participar en las actividades abiertas a ellos. La República Checa, Hungría y Polonia fueron los primeros socios de la Asociación que pasaron a ser miembros por decisión tomada en Madrid el año 1997. El año 2004, Bulgaria, Eslovaquia, Eslovenia, Estonia, Letonia, Lituania y Rumania se unieron a la OTAN. Por último, Albania y Croacia fueron invitadas en Bucarest a iniciar las conversaciones para unirse a la Alianza. Contando con estos dos países los miembros serán 28 y los socios 22 con la incorporación de Malta.

¿Cuántos candidatos más serán invitados a unirse a la OTAN en el futuro? El punto 18 de la Declaración de la Cumbre de Bucarest afirma que el proceso de ampliación en marcha ha sido un éxito histórico en el progreso de la estabilidad y la cooperación para aproximarnos al objetivo común de una Europa completa y libre, por lo que las puertas de la OTAN permanecerán abiertas a las democracias europeas dispuestas y capaces de asumir las responsabilidades y obligaciones inherentes a la pertenencia a la Organización, de acuerdo con el artículo 10 del Tratado de Washington. Por último se reitera en ese punto que las decisiones sobre la ampliación sólo pueden ser tomadas por la OTAN. Algunos analistas han considerado la ampliación como un proceso artificial que tiene como objetivo preservar la existencia de la Alianza. La mayoría de los países del centro y este de Europa tienen una percepción muy distinta. Para esos países, con un pasado de sangrientas guerras entre vecinos y muchos años de alejamiento político de Europa Occidental, convertirse en miembros de la OTAN ha sido un objetivo nacional logrado gracias a los diferentes planes y programas de la Asociación, especialmente el Plan de Acción para el Ingreso (Membership Action Plan, MAP).

Georgia se unió al Consejo de Cooperación del Atlántico Norte el año 1992 y el año 1994 a la APP. El año 2002 manifestó su aspiración de convertirse en miembro de la Alianza. Georgia fue el primer país en acordar un Plan Individual de Asociación con la Alianza en el año 2003. Al año siguiente, Georgia y la OTAN firmaron un acuerdo que permitía el tránsito de tropas y suministros de los aliados hacia Afganistán. La OTAN ofreció a Georgia en el año 2006 participar en un Diálogo Intensificado. En el año 2007 Georgia acogió el ejercicio aéreo OTAN/APP Cooperative Archer. Georgia ha usado ampliamente los instrumentos de planeamiento de la APP, ha participado en numerosos ejercicios y ha contribuido con tropas en las operaciones lideradas por la Alianza (850 efectivos en la operación Iraki Freedom y 150 en la operación Joint Enterprise durante 2007, un número muy elevado para unos 11.000 efectivos totales).

Una apuesta muy alta

La próxima reunión de diciembre de los ministros de Asuntos Exteriores aliados ha adquirido una relevancia muy especial. En efecto, los ministros tienen que dar cumplimiento al mandato recibido de los jefes de Estado y Gobierno reunidos en Bucarest el pasado mes de abril de hacer una primera evaluación de los esfuerzos realizados por Ucrania y Georgia y decidir sobre sus peticiones de unirse al MAP. Ser llamado a participar en el MAP no asegura el ingreso en la OTAN ni la fecha de ese ingreso, pero se considera una señal evidente de un acercamiento formal cuyo fin natural es ser miembro de la Alianza.

Mientras la OTAN insiste en que las decisiones sobre la ampliación sólo pueden ser tomadas libremente por sus miembros, existen circunstancias que condicionan esa decisión de diciembre. En primer lugar, las peculiaridades de la región en que se encuentra Georgia y que ya condicionaron la decisión de Bucarest. En segundo lugar, la decisión ha de tomarse a los pocos meses de un conflicto que no ha resuelto ningún problema y que ha abierto nuevas heridas con el reconocimiento por Rusia de la independencia de Osetia del Sur y Abjasia. El recuerdo de Kosovo es un tercer elemento de confusión. Aunque el caso de la provincia serbia y el de las repúblicas secesionistas de Georgia son distintos por muchas razones, en ambos casos se ha conculcado la legalidad internacional y algunos países, como Rusia, han empleado argumentos contradictorios para defender posturas fuera de esa legalidad. En cuarto lugar, cualquier decisión que se tome afectará a las relaciones OTAN-Rusia que han ido creciendo a lo largo de los años y han favorecido la estabilidad en Europa, por lo que su paralización afecta al progreso en esas relaciones aunque persistan los contactos informales a niveles subalternos y continúe la cooperación logística rusa con ISAF en Afganistán (tránsito por territorio ruso de cargas no militares de la Alianza y el uso de aviones de transporte estratégico Antonov An-124).

Los ministros aliados, autorizados en una medida poco habitual a decidir sobre las peticiones de acceso al MAP de Georgia y Ucrania, deberán hacerlo a principios de diciembre en una primera evaluación del progreso de ambos países. El abanico de posibles decisiones que los ministros podrían tomar es teóricamente muy amplio, pero algunas de esas opciones y de sus consecuencias serían:

• Evaluar positivamente el esfuerzo realizado por ambos países e invitar a Georgia y a Ucrania para iniciar el MAP. Dada la falta de un apoyo suficiente de la opinión pública al estrechamiento de las relaciones con la Alianza, sería necesaria una fuerte campaña de concienciación para superar las reticencias de la población ucraniana. Sin embargo, la casi seguridad de que no se celebraran elecciones anticipadas es un factor positivo.
• Evaluar positivamente el esfuerzo de ambos países pero invitar sólo a Georgia alegando cuestiones técnicas. En este caso otras naciones transcaucásicas reiterarían sus peticiones de participar inmediatamente en el MAP con el objetivo de convertirse en futuros miembros. El presidente ucraniano y los partidos que apoyan la integración en la OTAN quedarían políticamente desprestigiados y su posición política pro-occidental sería muy difícil.
• Evaluar positivamente el esfuerzo de ambos países pero invitar sólo a Georgia a iniciar el MAP con la condición de arreglar previamente con Rusia sus contenciosos bilaterales. Esta opción debería ir acompañada de un llamamiento solemne a Rusia para que reconsiderase su posición respecto a la independencia de Osetia del Sur y Abjasia y de una indicación a Georgia para que aceptase una autonomía muy amplia a esos territorios. La nueva situación debería ser garantizada por una fuerza de pacificación de la ONU, de la UE o mixta OTAN-Rusia. Para Ucrania la situación sería la misma que en el caso anterior.
• Evaluar positivamente el esfuerzo de ambos países e invitar a Georgia y a Ucrania a iniciar el MAP. Simultáneamente y tras una adecuada preparación diplomática ofrecer a Rusia una nueva fórmula de relación muy estrecha con la Alianza que podría dar lugar a su posible integración en la OTAN tras un período de transición de duración semejante al MAP de Ucrania y Georgia.
• Felicitar a Ucrania y a Georgia por los esfuerzos en la dirección correcta para ser invitados y exhortarles a seguir trabajando para que puedan ser llamados a iniciar el MAP en la próxima Cumbre del 60 aniversario el año próximo. Esta alternativa parece la preferida por algunos analistas pues, aunque defraudaría a Georgia y a Ucrania, daría unos meses para clarificar la situación en el Cáucaso y para que la nueva Administración norteamericana defina sus líneas de acción en política internacional. Por otra parte, en los meses que faltan hasta la Cumbre podrían despejarse las dudas existentes sobre unas posibles elecciones anticipadas en Ucrania y podría conocerse si la oposición política en Georgia consigue forzar al presidente Saakashvili a convocar elecciones anticipadas tras la desastrosa guerra de agosto con Rusia.

Conclusiones: A medida que el tiempo transcurre hacia el Consejo Atlántico de diciembre se van enfriando los sentimientos desatados por el conflicto y disminuyendo la agresividad de las declaraciones. La llegada de una Administración demócrata a la Casa Blanca y la atención dedicada a la crisis económica mundial parecen amortiguar los efectos de la decisión a tomar sobre la ampliación del MAP. No obstante, la apuesta es muy alta pues la decisión que se tome repercutirá en la estabilidad del Cáucaso, Oriente Próximo y Europa. Por un lado, la decisión pondrá a prueba el futuro de la relación OTAN-Rusia, una relación que se ha desarrollado con vigor durante los pasados 11 años y de la que se han beneficiado todas las partes. También pondrá a prueba la capacidad de la OTAN para proporcionar seguridad en una de las zonas más inestables del planeta si amplia su garantía de seguridad a Georgia como miembro de pleno derecho.

Del mismo modo, los aliados deben calcular el efecto de su decisión dentro de un contexto complejo con amenazas terroristas, con una crítica situación económica mundial unida a la escasez de energía y al deterioro del entorno natural donde cualquier fricción internacional puede poner en marcha un proceso incontrolado de interacciones.

[1] La presión rusa en aquel momento consiguió evitar la entrada en el MAP pero no consiguió que se rechazara la candidatura porque como recoge el punto 23 de la Declaración de Bucarest: “NATO welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO. We agree today that these countries will become members of NATO”. Para los antecedentes y consecuencias de la decisión de Bucarest, véase F. del Pozo, “El Conflicto de Georgia y la OTAN”, ARI nº 97/2008, Real Instituto Elcano).

Tema: El conflicto de Georgia ha vuelto a poner de actualidad los problemas entre Rusia y Ucrania a propósito del uso conjunto de la base y de Sevastopol.

Sumario: La nueva política exterior de Rusia en el Cáucaso dispone de varios instrumentos –económicos, diplomáticos y militares– para imponer su voluntad en una zona que le interesa tanto por razones geopolíticas como de consumo interno. Entre otros elementos de su poder militar en la zona, dispone de una fuerza naval y de una base en Sevastopol con limitaciones de uso. La fuerza naval se ve constreñida en su empleo por el Convenio de Montreux sobre los estrechos turcos y el uso de la base naval se ve limitado por el fin del acuerdo en 2017. Tras la demostración de poder rusa en Georgia, está por ver si Rusia querrá prescindir o no de una presencia naval en la zona que haga visible su influencia como hegemón regional. Este ARI revisa los antecedentes de la presencia naval rusa en Sevastopol, las controversias tras la independencia de Ucrania y los escenarios de solución o de conflicto posibles. Un análisis que cambia de interpretación con el giro intervencionista de la política exterior rusa en la zona.

Análisis: Sevastopol es una de las contadas bases navales de nombre legendario por su extraordinaria capacidad, lo protegido de su puerto y por los acontecimientos históricos que tuvieron lugar allí en la guerra de Crimea: la carga de la caballería ligera de Lord Cardigan en Balaklava por las torpezas de los Lords Raglan y Lucan, las enfermeras de Florence Nightingale, los primeros empleos en combate del fusil de ánima rayada, del telégrafo eléctrico y de la mina naval, todo tuvo lugar en el sitio de Sevastopol de aquella guerra, un sitio que tuvo una segunda edición por el Mariscal von Manstein en la II Guerra Mundial que añadió también su porción de leyenda. Junto con las otras bases principales rusas, en Kronstadt, Severomorsk y Vladivostok, Sevastopol comparte el sempiterno problema ruso del difícil acceso en todo tiempo a aguas libres, aspiración ésta que ha originado históricamente más de una aventura imperialista, aunque el caso de Sevastopol es el peor (si exceptuamos el obvio de la flotilla del Mar Caspio, basada en Astrakan) porque en vez de hielos invernales tiene el más formidable obstáculo del control turco de los estrechos del Bósforo y los Dardanelos, apoyado por las disposiciones legales del Convenio de Montreux, del que Rusia (?ay!) es parte firmante pero escasamente favorecida.

Desde 1992, Sevastopol ha pasado además a engrosar la lista de bases navales en territorio extranjero, algo relativamente usual durante los siglos XIX y XX por conveniencia colonial, pero que en nuestros días ha quedado prácticamente reducido a la media docena o algo más (según se ponga el umbral entre base naval importante y mera presencia) que posee EEUU, de las que Yokosuka en Japón es el ejemplo mayor y más notorio. Naturalmente, el origen legal de la situación extraterritorial de Sevastopol es completamente diferente, la partición de la antigua Unión Soviética, y aunque también sujeto a contrato, este caso fue forzado por las circunstancias y sujeto a disputas desde su firma en 1997 hasta hoy.

La distribución demográfica de una ciudad cuya función principal es servir a un arsenal es raramente reflejo del país o región que la rodea, y Sevastopol es prueba de ello, con un considerable exceso de rusos sobre el no pequeño porcentaje en el resto de la península (75% de rusos étnicos y 90% de rusófonos, frente al 55% y 70% estimados, respectivamente, para Crimea). Ello tiene consecuencias prácticas, así como en los sentimientos propietarios que Rusia todavía hoy mantiene respecto a esta ciudad y base, afecto que se añade al, seguramente más débil pero no desdeñable, que siente por toda la Crimea, tanto por razones demográficas como por los lazos emocionales que ha creado una ya larga presencia histórica. Porque el origen de los problemas de propiedad ruso–ucranianos está en el todavía relativamente reciente decreto del 19 de febrero de 1954 del Presidium del Soviet Supremo –aún no bajo la presidencia de Jruschov pero ya bajo su creciente influencia– que transfirió fríamente la administración de la península de la República Socialista Soviética de Rusia a Ucrania. Esta decisión –que por lo autocrática nada tuvo que envidiar a los ukases del zar– nada explicada por el Presidium (como toda explicación el decreto daba la increíble de que era un gesto de amistad para conmemorar el tercer centenario de la unión de Rusia y Ucrania)–, nada entendida en Occidente y poco localmente, era la segunda fase de una operación, de la que la primera fue la masiva deportación de los tártaros y otros grupos menores 10 años antes, diseñada para acabar con los sentimientos independentistas y pro–turcos de los habitantes de Crimea. Las técnicas de desplazamientos étnicos forzados y de redibujar las fronteras, en las que se alcanzó gran maestría durante la II Guerra Mundial, estaban aún en boga, y en todo caso quién iba a pensar entonces que los caminos de Ucrania y Rusia acabarían por divergir.

Los desencuentros sobre Sevastopol tras la independencia de Ucrania

Pero divergieron, y ello comenzó en 1992, cuando, poco después de que Ucrania declarara su independencia apoyada por una aplastante mayoría, que sorprendentemente incluía Crimea en el lado favorable, Rusia trató primero de sustraerla a la nueva nación, aduciendo lo artificioso de su integración en la República Socialista Soviética de Ucrania, argumento que como hemos visto no dejaba de tener cierta lógica. Cuando esta pretensión se mostró inviable por la numantina resistencia del Gobierno y sobre todo de la Rada (Parlamento) ucranianos, redujeron la reclamación a Sevastopol y su distrito circundante, apoyándola en su casi consustancialidad con la Flota del Mar Negro, que Rusia pretendía conservar como único heredero de la URSS y cabeza visible de la nueva CIS. Esto fue también disputado por Ucrania, que entre otros argumentos adujo que el 97% de los oficiales de la Flota había jurado fidelidad a Ucrania. Alguna razón no les debía de faltar, porque algunas dotaciones dieron también su opinión con el izado de la bandera ucraniana en el patrullero SKR–112 y su dramática huida a Odessa perseguido y abordado por unidades rusas, y pocos días después con la toma de posesión del nuevo buque de mando y control Slavutych. Las agrias discusiones duraron cinco años, incluyendo intervenciones diplomáticas pero un tanto parciales de EEUU, declaraciones unánimes de la Duma de irrenunciable soberanía sobre Sevastopol, un período de mando compartido, muchas declaraciones hostiles desde el campanario y varias ocasiones en que a punto estuvieron de llegar a las manos seriamente, sin contar el caso del SKR–112 y el llamado “incidente de Odessa” que implicaron un número limitado de fuerzas, y como telón de fondo de todo ello las propias tensiones étnicas de Crimea, ahora complicadas con el retorno masivo de los tártaros expulsados por Stalin en 1944.

Las discusiones llegaron formalmente a término con el Tratado de Paz y Amistad (sic) firmado en 1997. En él se atribuía a Rusia la mayor parte de la Flota del Mar Negro, junto con la propiedad del nombre. Ucrania conservaba una porción no desdeñable, pero cuantitativamente muy inferior: el Tratado especificaba que el 81,7% sería para Rusia, pero ese porcentaje –presumiblemente basado en el tonelaje– era operacionalmente ilógico porque no se puede distribuir porcentualmente un conjunto heterogéneo de portaaviones, cruceros, destructores, fragatas, submarinos o buques de asalto anfibio. Ucrania obtuvo dinero en efectivo (más bien condonación de deuda) por la diferencia entre esa porción y el 50%, así como por el armamento nuclear al que renunciaba (nunca lo reclamó, pero Rusia trató de usar su existencia y lo secreto de su composición en apoyo de sus tesis). También conservó la propiedad de Sevastopol, con la obligación de alquilarlo a Rusia por un período de 20 años prorrogable (lo que Ucrania ha declarado posteriormente que no tiene intención de hacer) a cambio de un alquiler de unos 100 millones de dólares anuales revisables, tal y como acaba Ucrania de anunciar que hará a partir del 1 de enero de 2009, lo que augura tensiones adicionales en años venideros. Como resultado, de la Flota rusa del Mar Negro atracan en Sevastopol un crucero de la clase Slava (en occidente sería clasificado como destructor), tres destructores (fragatas), dos fragatas, siete buques anfibios, dos submarinos y un número considerable de unidades menores, entre dragaminas, patrulleros y otros, hasta un total de aproximadamente 50.

Las fuerzas navales ucranianas son, evidentemente, de igual tecnología y similar vejez. La composición por tipo y clase de unidades es también parecida (a escala reducida) a la rusa en el Mar Negro, aunque con el extraño añadido de un buque de mando y control, el Slavutych antes mencionado, un tanto incongruente en una marina de sólo un crucero (destructor) clase Slava (en construcción), una fragata, seis corbetas (en realidad poco más que patrulleros), tres buques de asalto anfibio, un submarino y unidades menores hasta un total de 27 (Libro Blanco de la Defensa de Ucrania 2007). La cifra actual de buque rusos y ucranianos representa una considerable reducción sobre la existente a la firma del Tratado, habiendo dado de baja un gran número por obsolescencia, sin que haya habido en los últimos 10 años nuevas construcciones en cantidad o calidad significativa, ni desde luego más evolucionadas.

Pero si el reparto de los buques terminó con los problemas por ese lado, el de la base no ha hecho sino inaugurar otra serie de disputas. El arreglo es malo para Rusia, pero ésta no tiene prácticamente alternativa. Cualquier puerto en la costa rusa del Mar de Azov, como Taganrog, queda descartado, porque la división de aguas en el Kerch es tal que la entrada o salida del Mar de Azov debe hacerse por aguas ucranianas (aunque Rusia está alargando artificialmente la barra existente con objeto de forzar un nuevo trazado de la línea equidistante). Novorossisk, la opción menos mala, actualmente base de fuerzas sutiles, tiene mucha menos capacidad, y aunque aparentemente protegida en todos los cuadrantes menos el SE, es víctima del bora, un viento catabático que desciende de las montañas al norte a más de 100 nudos y que cuando se entabla produce verdaderas catástrofes. Sujumi, Batumi y Poti, muy inferiores, quedaron además fuera del alcance de Rusia, dentro de la nueva Georgia (pero el primero en Abjazia, cuya independencia de Georgia acaba de reconocer Rusia). Finalmente, no poco debió pesar en el ánimo de la marina rusa la consideración de que una base naval, por buenos que sean su bahía, muelles y arsenal, vale lo que vale su hinterland industrial, y la influencia en el tejido industrial de la zona de dos siglos de base naval no se sustituye fácilmente.

Escenarios posibles para la próxima década

En estas condiciones, las opciones para Rusia en 2017 son muy limitadas: (1) renunciar a una presencia naval importante en el Mar Negro, o lo que es lo mismo, a una presencia militar y política importante en la zona del Cáucaso; (2) persuadir a Ucrania de extender el contrato; o (3) construir una alternativa antes de esa fecha.

La opinión rusa respecto a la primera opción quedó ilustrada el 5 de agosto pasado, al inaugurar una nueva estrategia de imposición hegemónica en el Cáucaso. La fuerza naval es un factor indispensable para cualquier acción militar, especialmente teniendo en cuenta las dificultades que presenta la cadena montañosa (evitada en las acciones de agosto pasado por la toma preventiva del túnel Roki, algo con lo que no es razonable contar siempre) que hace preciso contar con la acción anfibia. No parece, pues, que Rusia esté dispuesta a renunciar al uso de la fuerza en apoyo de su política, al menos en el Cáucaso. En cuanto a la segunda opción, no es posible evitar la impresión de que la acción militar en Georgia, además de demostrar que Rusia considera el Cáucaso como zona de influencia exclusiva, fue también un mensaje nada sutil al otro país ribereño del Mar Negro ex–soviético, en otras palabras es la manera rusa de persuadir a Ucrania de que no se debe enfrentar con Rusia, su mejor amigo y peor enemigo. De hecho, parece que Ucrania ha tomado nota y aunque en un primer momento trató de ejercer sus derechos soberanos de limitar el uso de Sevastopol por la Flota rusa en apoyo de los ataque a Georgia, lo que hubiera sido consistente con los usos habituales respecto a bases militares extranjeras, al parecer los buques rusos han seguido utilizándola con normalidad sin que Ucrania haya tomado ninguna acción práctica. Pero ello y la protesta indignada por las pretensiones ucranianas, afirmando que para preparar la base alternativa hace falta más tiempo que el remanente hasta 2017, han sido prudentemente combinadas con un trabajo firme de preparación, que según algunos observadores permitirá trasladar la menguante Flota del Mar Negro a Novorossisk mucho antes del plazo fijado, combinando así la “persuasión” con las medidas prácticas. Mientras tanto, en espera de la gran decisión final sobre el uso de la base, hay continuas escaramuzas legales por la posesión de faros y otras señales marítimas en las inmediaciones de Sevastopol.

Las ambiciones rusas para la fuerza naval basada en Sevastopol nunca estuvieron limitadas a la dominación del Mar Negro. La salida libre al Mediterráneo fue siempre un objetivo, y lo sigue siendo, pero el Convenio de Montreux es al tiempo una grave dificultad y un factor crucial en el diseño y composición de la fuerza. La geografía hace a Turquía dueño indiscutible de la llave de la puerta, pues no es posible forzar uno de los dos estrechos sin que Turquía tenga tiempo de hacer el otro infranqueable y el Convenio así lo ratifica, haciendo a Turquía único intérprete de sus disposiciones, lo que lleva a cabo con considerable rigor hasta, incluso, el ocasional perjuicio de sus aliados de la OTAN.

El Convenio –en una necesaria simplificación de un texto largo, complejo y teñido de los conceptos navales vigentes en 1936– limita el tránsito de los estrechos de fuerzas navales de naciones no ribereñas a un máximo de 15.000 Tm acumuladas de una sola vez, y el total desplegado en el Mar Negro a un tiempo a 30.000 Tm, en todo caso sin superar los 21 días de estancia (sin contar las visitas a puertos turcos en los estrechos, como Estambul o ?annakkale). El tránsito debe comenzarse de día, y submarinos y portaaviones no están autorizados en absoluto.

Para los países ribereños, hoy Bulgaria, Georgia, Rumanía, Rusia y Ucrania, las disposiciones de tránsito están considerablemente aliviadas: el tonelaje agregado no está taxativamente limitado, y los submarinos pueden entrar, si fueron construidos fuera, o salir para reparaciones, lo que en la práctica los libera de trabas. Pero los portaaviones tienen la misma limitación que los de los no ribereños, y aquí está una de las principales piedras en el zapato ruso. Desde que empezaron a diseñar y construir genuinos portaaviones, clase Kiev en 1975, los denominaron “cruceros pesados con aviación embarcada” para circunvenir la letra del Convenio. A ello daba también cierta credibilidad el hecho, consistente con la doctrina naval soviética, de que las dos clases de portaaviones hasta ahora, Kiev y Almirante Kuznetsov, y contrariamente a la práctica occidental, llevan un armamento importante de diversas clases de misiles. De hecho, a pesar de las obligadas protestas de los EEUU, no tuvieron problema en salir del Mar Negro, habiendo sido ambas clases construidos en los astilleros de Nikolaiev, hoy Ucrania. Sí las tuvo el Varyag, segundo de la serie Kuznetsov, al que es preciso referirse a pesar de que no se completó su construcción por dos razones: porque fue la “pieza” (no unidad operativa) más importante que correspondió a Ucrania en el reparto de la Flota, y porque fue posteriormente vendido como casco inerte a la República Popular China que está actualmente completándolo para convertirlo en el primer portaaviones de su marina.<[1]

No hay hoy en día, por lo tanto, portaaviones de ninguna nación operando en el Mar Negro, aunque Rusia mantiene la posibilidad teórica de enviar de nuevo el Kuznetsov a su lugar de origen, lo que es tan improbable como que Turquía facilite el paso de de refuerzos rusos de otras flotas a la del Mar Negro. Ni los buques principales de combate que Rusia tiene, aunque aparentes, son de gran valor objetivo ni menos para el tipo de conflicto que amenaza en esa zona. Son todos de tecnología anticuada, incluido el ya mencionado e impresionante –de aspecto– Moskva de la clase Slava . Para ser precisos, la tecnología ya era anticuada cuando se entregaron, la mayor parte en la década de los 70, y adolecen de escaso nivel de integración de datos a nivel buque y nulo a nivel colectivo, con radares primitivos y no más misiles que los visibles en cubierta. Además, su diseño correspondía a un concepto soviético operativo de dominio negativo del mar, absolutamente irrelevante hoy, aunque el limitado teatro del Mar Negro no presentaba los problemas de aprovisionamiento en la mar que limitan la permanencia de sus buques en zona de operaciones.

Más coherente con las necesidades actuales es la flotilla de buques anfibios, y desde luego han sido puestos en buen uso en la campaña de Georgia de estos días pasados, con el Moskva y presumiblemente algún destructor o fragata dando protección, principalmente frente a fuerzas sutiles georgianas (aunque los detalles aún no han trascendido, parece que un patrullero clase La Combattante II, de nombre Dioskuria, fue averiado por barcos rusos, y posteriormente apresado y hundido de manera deliberada; el otro patrullero en lista, el Tbilisi, fue incendiado en puerto). Por otro lado, la capacidad de EEUU o la OTAN de proyectar poder en el Cáucaso es muy limitada, en tiempo y en magnitud. Sin portaaviones ni submarinos, teniendo que salir a los 21 días con Turquía vigilando cronómetro en mano, no es viable ejercer la presencia naval que sería necesaria para apoyar los deseos de Georgia y Ucrania de formar parte de la Europa occidental que admiran.

Conclusiones: La presión de Rusia sobre las naciones de su near abroad no ha hecho más que empezar, y los instrumentos que usa para ello son múltiples: manipulación de la opinión pública sobre todo de los residentes rusos y rusófonos, estimulando sentimientos independentistas donde conviene; medidas de presión económica como el embargo del vino y el agua mineral georgianas o el cierre del grifo del gas a Ucrania; medidas (escasamente) diplomáticas, como el reconocimiento explícito de la independencia de regiones separatistas, como Abjazia y Osetia del Sur (pero no de Chechenia o Ingushetia, ambas dentro de Rusia y con parecidos o superiores merecimientos); o directamente medidas militares, como el ataque a Georgia. Para estas últimas –y para proyectar poder en apoyo de las demás– la Flota del Mar Negro es una herramienta regional indispensable aunque la vetustez de sus unidades la hagan poco útil para fines más oceánicos. Esta herramienta necesita una base, y desafortunadamente para Rusia la continuidad de uso de la actual no está asegurada. Aunque al parecer están dando los pasos para sustituirla, el resultado nunca será tan satisfactorio como el servicio que presta Sevastopol y su hinterland industrial, por lo que cabe esperar en el próximo futuro presiones crecientes sobre Ucrania, que tomarán diversas formas, para forzar por lo menos una extensión de su alquiler y una contención en el precio. No hay duda de que la acción sobre Georgia ha sido, además de sus propios fines, un aviso a Ucrania en este sentido, que Ucrania ha acusado “replegando velas” y admitiendo el retorno de los buques rusos de Georgia.

Rusia no sólo ha recurrido a la proyección regional mediante su fuerza naval en el Mar Negro, sino que acaba de enviar una fuerza naval, presumiblemente procedente de Severomorsk y centrada en el crucero Pyotr Veliky, para realizar ejercicios en aguas venezolanas con unidades de esa marina, además del despliegue con permanencia no especificada de aviones de patrulla marítima, seguramente el Ilyushin 38 May. Desde el fin de la amistad cubana no se habían visto despliegues tan ambiciosos, probablemente en el límite de su capacidad operacional, pero capaces de enseñar la bandera rusa que ondea con crecientes ambiciones de proyectar su poder mediante su fuerza naval.

Hemos visto que a esta nueva Rusia segura de sí misma que está surgiendo al amparo de una economía boyante no le tiembla el pulso a la hora de utilizar el más radical de los instrumentos a su disposición. Parece que Putin (o Medvedev, que tanto monta, monta tanto) ha adoptado el lema oderint dum metuant ([no importa] que nos odien, con tal de que nos teman) diversamente atribuido a Tiberio y a Calígula, dos preclaros ejemplos de gobernantes sabios y preocupados por el bienestar de los ciudadanos.

Notas:

[1] La venta y transporte de Ucrania a China del Varyag fue una odisea que duró desde 1998 hasta 2002 y que parece un cúmulo de desastres y despropósitos. Fue vendido para ser convertido en hotel–casino flotante en Hong–Kong –algo difícil de creer– declaración de intención que no persuadió a Turquía, que tardó 16 meses en dar autorización para cruzar los estrechos aduciendo problemas de seguridad, y sólo lo hizo ante la promesa china de promover el turismo en Turquía. Egipto no permitió el cruce de Suez, por lo que tuvo que ser remolcado alrededor de África y a lo largo del Índico, sufriendo temporales y roturas de remolque. Finalmente, y no muy sorprendentemente, poco a poco la marina china lo ha ido rehabilitando y completando, y actualmente se espera que entre en servicio pronto con el nombre de Shi–Lang, significativamente el nombre de un almirante chino que conquistó Taiwán.

The conflict in Georgia revealed problems that extend well beyond our region. Recent events have made clear how perilous it is for the international community to ignore “frozen conflicts.” The issues of breakaway regions in newly independent states are complex; too often, they have been treated as bargaining chips in geopolitical games. But such “games” result in the loss of human lives, humanitarian disasters, economic ruin and the collapse of international security guarantees.

Ukraine has become a hostage in the war waged by Russia. This has prompted Ukrainian authorities and all of our country’s people, including those living in the Crimea, to ponder the dangers emanating from the fact that the Russian Black Sea fleet is based on our territory.

The tragic events in Georgia also exposed the lack of effective preventive mechanisms by the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and other international organizations.

We in Ukraine hope that the Russian Federation will heed the opinion of the global community so that the issues at hand can be settled through negotiations. We want an end to the looting and destruction of Georgian infrastructure. We must do everything possible to prevent provocations and avoid further massacres.

The ongoing conflict between Russia and Georgia affects my country’s interests. Military operations have taken place close to our borders, and the Russian Black Sea fleet was directly involved. The question of Ukraine’s national security was acutely raised. Given the activities of the Russian fleet, I had to issue a decree regulating its functioning on the territory of Ukraine.

Under these circumstances, Ukraine could not stay silent. We, along with other nations, engaged to seek resolution of the conflict. From the first day of hostilities, Ukraine called for an immediate cease-fire by all parties and dispatched humanitarian aid to victims regardless of their ethnicity.

Ukraine upheld its firm support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia.

On Aug. 12, I, together with my colleagues from the three Baltic states and Poland, visited Tbilisi. Our proposals seeking a solution to the conflict were in harmony with the European Union settlement plan. We highly praise the efforts of the United States and the E.U. presidency, led by the French, to achieve a cease-fire. Their actions proved efficient in putting a halt to war and bloodshed.

Ukraine favors a wider international representation in the peacekeeping force in the conflict area. A new multilateral format mandated by the United Nations or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe is the only way to guarantee security in the conflict zone.

I strongly hope that that plan will be strictly implemented by the conflicting parties. We are ready to join international efforts to provide relief and help victims resume their peaceful lives. Ukraine also stands ready to take part in the U.N. or OSCE missions by sending peacekeepers.

It is clear that in addition to the political dimensions of issues involving breakaway regions, we need to cope with the social and economic aspects of this phenomenon. Many of these provinces are beyond the control of the respective governments or the international community. In many cases, the absence of monitoring has turned these territories into havens for smuggling as well as illegal trafficking in arms, people and drugs. Corruption and human-rights abuses are rampant. These areas are marked by their lack of democratic electoral procedures and their unfree or biased media. The ethnic dimension of the problem is often exaggerated to help conceal the criminal practices.

Moreover, an area home to such activities poses a threat to the prosperity and development of adjacent nations. Official authorities are compelled to counter attacks from separatist paramilitaries. But they are not always successful. Before large-scale combat erupted in Georgia, Russian peacekeepers failed to prevent the shelling of Georgian territory by South Ossetian separatists. Indeed, that activity intensified in the days before the greater conflict.

This weekend Ukraine celebrated the anniversary of its independence. This conflict has proved once again that the best means of ensuring the national security of Ukraine and other countries is to participate in the collective security system of free democratic nations, exemplified today by NATO. In accordance with national legislation and its foreign policy priorities, Ukraine will continue following the path of Euro-Atlantic integration. This is the path of democracy, freedom and independence.

La historia contemporánea está llena de dictadores que con mayor o menor intensidad hicieron (o hacen) lo posible por negar toda virtualidad de libertad y democracia a sus ciudadanos. Si esto es algo generalizado en todas las latitudes del planeta, acaso los dos dictadores que con más crueldad actuaron a lo largo del siglo XX fueron dos europeos: un alemán nacido en Viena, Adolf Hitler, y un soviético proveniente de Georgia, Josef Stalin.
Ambos dirigieron su odio contra diversos colectivos por razones ideológicas, religiosas, culturales… o con cualquier excusa para desplegar, con el silencio de las sociedades que les amparaban, toda la brutalidad que llevaban dentro. Del primero, fue especialmente víctima el pueblo judío, que fue sometido a infames ignominias. Sería, sobre todo, el Estado de Israel, desde su posterior fundación, el que de modo muy comprometido ha querido mantener vivo el recuerdo de uno de los episodios más indignos de la historia de la humanidad.

SON NUMEROSOS los grupos sociales o nacionales víctimas de la maldad intrínseca de Stalin. Las matanzas y deportaciones, en unas condiciones que conducían a muertes seguras, fueron muy numerosas y prolongadas. Pero hay una que fue la principal y cuyo 75 aniversario se conmemora ahora: la hambruna creada en Ucrania, que provocó la muerte de entre 8 y 10 millones de personas (un 20% de la población de esta república soviética). Durante mucho tiempo cayó sobre este acontecimiento un manto ignominioso de silencio, que está empezando ahora a rasgarse.
Siempre el país ucraniano fue calificado de “granero” de Rusia o de Europa por ser, dada la fertilidad de sus tierras, uno de los mayores productores de trigo. Tras la fase previa de colectivización seguida de amplias deportaciones a Siberia, entre 1932 y 1933 se produjeron unas requisas e incautaciones masivas de toda la producción alimenticia, que condenaron a la muerte por hambre a millones de ucranianos. Mientras tanto, la Unión Soviética procedía a exportar a otros países lo incautado a los campesinos de una de sus repúblicas. Quienes querían huir de esa hambruna tan artificial como despiadada y desplazarse a zonas urbanas eran retenidos por los militares.
Ahora hace 75 años, en junio de 1933, se produjo el momento álgido de esa tremenda acción: cada día morían 25.000 ucranianos. Esa hambruna no tenía su origen en causas naturales sino en una premeditada actuación de los dirigentes soviéticos para provocar el aniquilamiento en masa de una población refractaria al sistema de colectivización.
Mientras Stalin contemplaba muy atento el aniquilamiento de los campesinos ucranianos que había promovido, seguía al detalle de la destrucción en 40 días del mayor templo religioso de Moscú, el Cristo Salvador, construido durante 50 años para conmemorar la victoria sobre Napoleón. En su lugar erigiría el Palacio de los Soviets.
Solo bastante recientemente se ha empezado a divulgar uno de las mayores actuaciones terroristas de Estado cual es la acontecida en Ucrania bajo la dictadura soviética. Hace cinco años, la Asamblea de la ONU aprobó una declaración de reconocimiento de esta gran tragedia. Más recientemente, tras el cambio originado con la revolución naranja, los nuevos dirigentes, alejados del comunismo, promovieron en su Parlamento una ley sobre la gran hambruna en la que se procede al reconocimiento de este genocidio.
Algunos países promovieron iniciativas en este sentido. El Congreso de los Diputados lo hizo (a instancia del diputado de CiU Xuclà) hace unos meses, consiguiendo el respaldo unánime de la Comisión de Asuntos Exteriores. Varias comunidades autónomas también lo han hecho, como Euskadi, Baleares o el Parlament de Catalunya.

COMO expresó Sören Kierkegar, “la historia se escribe hacia atrás pero se vive hacia delante”. Ahora, Ucrania recuerda aquellos hechos intentando recuperar su propia memoria histórica a la que todo pueblo tiene derecho cuando acontecimientos especiales justifican que se vuelvan los ojos atrás. Pero no para quedarse clavados en ese pasado sino para, con su voz alzada, reclamar y contribuir a que eso jamás pueda volver a suceder ni allí ni en cualquier otro lugar.
Hoy Ucrania sigue teniendo rémoras de aquel tiempo, como el gran peso de una oligarquía financiera y política corrupta, pero se han dado pasos hacia una clara libertad de prensa, pluralismo político (escaso en otros países ex soviéticos) y notable transparencia electoral. Es, ciertamente, un país con una doble alma, con una mitad que mira a Rusia y otra que lo hace a Europa. Si la inestabilidad no regresa, tiene un gran futuro.

NECESITAN antes recordar, reflexionar y lavar, tanto internamente como también hacia el exterior, aquellos hechos acontecidos hace 75 años. De ellos fueron responsables los dirigentes soviéticos del Kremlin de aquel momento, pero también el inmenso silencio, y a veces complicidad, con que gran parte de la sociedad ucraniana actuó no solo entonces sino también cuando el país asumió su independencia en 1991, al igual que el enorme silencio de todo el mundo hasta fechas recientes.

The deft way in which Vladimir Putin, the Russian president, is trying to ensure he remains in power even after he has left the presidency will ensure that Ukraine remains a recurring theme in US-Russian rivalry. Its role in this geopolitical contest lessens further still the likelihood that Sunday’s parliamentary elections will resolve the long-running power struggle between the president, Viktor Yushchenko, and the prime minister, Viktor Yanukovych.It is a tangled, tense struggle. Yushchenko swept to power when the orange revolution was triggered by the attempts of Yanukovych’s backers to rig the 2004 presidential election. But he was forced to nominate Yanukovych as prime minister following the latter’s success in last year’s parliamentary election.

Yanukovych’s Party of the Regions will remain the largest force, but if, as seems most likely, Yushchenko opts to enter into a coalition with Yuliya Tymoshenko, his partner during the orange revolution, they could form a government with a slim majority.

It’s no secret that Yanukovych regards this pre-term election as the fraudulent outcome of a crisis manufactured by Yushchenko and his western backers to shore up pro-western parties. Fearing that Yanukovych’s coalition government was about to increase its parliamentary majority to enable it to overrule the president and change the constitution, Yushchenko controversially dissolved parliament in April.

There have been suspicions that elements in the west, fearing that the Yanukovych government was endangering Ukraine’s drift to the west, helped to conjure up a context in which Yushchenko could dissolve parliament. During the crisis, the west’s promotion of democracy was certainly partisan and designed to promote its geopolitical interests against a resurgent Russia. Tymoshenko’s support for the transfer of powers from the president to the prime minister in January appears to have been the first act in an elaborate power play that was scripted in Washington, in which the two orange revolutionaries have, perhaps unwittingly, been caught.

Yushchenko shouldered the responsibility for the unpopular decision to dissolve parliament, while hinting at a possible post-election coalition with the Party of the Regions to stop it boycotting the poll. Tymoshenko distanced herself from the crisis, but once the election date was set she ran a populist campaign that portrayed her as a democrat and Yanukovych as little more than a post-Soviet mafia don. Tymoshenko and Yushchenko campaigned independently until late last week, when they announced they would seek to form a coalition government.

The election may be challenged in the courts, raising the spectre of a protracted legal morass. Even the rapid formation of a new coalition may not guarantee stable government. The Party of the Regions will feel aggrieved that its pragmatic decision to participate in what it regards as an illegal election has resulted in ejection from office. As the resignation of 150 members of parliament was used as the final legal justification for staging the early election, in the new parliament Yanukovych and Tymoshenko will have an effective veto over its operation and the formation of any new government. Also a cabinet without any representation from the industrial and financial heartland in the east of the country, where the Party of Regions is most popular, will find it difficult to implement economic reform.

What will now be a three-way power struggle erodes the electorate’s faith in their politicians and in their political parties, as a drop in turnout at the weekend showed. The political crisis, manufactured or otherwise, reinforces an east-west electoral divide that undermines the legitimacy of the state, prevents good governance and jeopardises economic development. Washington’s script may have unfolded largely as directed so far, but the denouement has yet to be drafted. Triggering an election that would inevitably be regarded as illegitimate by many was bound to plunge the country into yet another spell of political disorientation.

The intention is to postpone the final scene until the west can be certain of the happy ending it seeks. It is not too late, however, for the country’s politicians to ignore the self-interested overtures emanating from Russia and the west, and recognise their potential, and their responsibility, to become the authors of their own democratic future.

The Ukrainian parliament has wound up its life and set the stage for early parliamentary elections on Sept. 30, four years ahead of schedule. The elections could give Ukraine’s revolution — recently mired in crisis — new momentum and have an impact elsewhere in the post-Soviet space.

President Viktor Yushchenko and Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych agreed to hold early elections after a tense two month stand-off, caused by Prime Minister Yanukovych’s attempt to diminish the powers of the president and reverse many of Yushchenko’s pro-reform and pro-Western policies. Yanukovych and his allies removed checks and balances by seeking a constitutional majority that threatened to sideline the president and create a powerful prime minister.

Yushchenko’s decision to dissolve parliament and call for new elections demonstrated a resolve and decisiveness that had been often lacking in the past. Yushchenko had little choice. He had to reshuffle the deck or watch his authority — and Ukraine’s hopes for democratic reform and integration into Euro-Atlantic structures — become progressively emasculated and diminished by Yanukovych.

Four steps are crucial if the crisis is to contribute to democratic consolidation in Ukraine:

First, all sides need to adhere to the compromise agreements that have been reached. These compromises should ensure that the checks and balances of the reformed parliamentary constitution are not again threatened by the pro-government coalition attempting to forcefully usurp monopoly power by seeking to establish a constitutional majority. Ukraine cannot continue to have periodic breakdowns and crises every six months. The nation’s four crises since the Orange Revolution threaten to bring on Ukraine fatigue by Western governments giving up hope in Yushchenko’s ability to promote democratic change in Ukraine.

Second, if Ukraine’s 2007 elections are recognized as having been held in a “free and fair” manner by international organizations, as last year’s elections were, the outcome should be accepted by all sides. Early elections will permit a new parliament to begin office with a democratic mandate built on a consensus on domestic and foreign policy goals enshrined in law. Yushchenko needs to act decisively following the elections by ensuring a coalition and government is in place, thereby not repeating last year’s six-month post-election crisis.

Third, all sides in Ukraine need to adhere to the June 2005 recommendations of the Council of Europe’s legal advisory board, the Venice Commission, and to join the president’s constitutional commission. The Venice Commission recommended a range of improvements to the reforms in imperative mandates, inter-institutional relations, human rights and the constitutional court. These reforms, the Venice Commission said, would “improve the state of democracy and rule of law in their country.”

Fourth, active Western support will be important. The crisis in Ukraine provides an opportunity to consolidate the democratic gains of the Orange Revolution through building democracy at home and integrating Ukraine into the Euro-Atlantic community of democratic nations. If fair and free elections are carried out, the European Union should quickly move to negotiate a free trade agreement with Ukraine following its entry into the World Trade Organization. NATO should continue to hold out the offer of a membership action plan that Ukraine may find appealing.

The West has a strong political stake in Ukraine’s success. Ukraine’s evolution will have a significant impact on the Western regions of the post-Soviet space. If democracy can be consolidated in Ukraine, the pro-Western orientation of Georgia and Moldova will be strengthened, while Alyaksandr Lukashenko’s autocratic rule in Belarus will be weakened. But if Ukraine’s democratic reforms fail, the prospects for reform and closer ties to Euro-Atlantic structures in all three countries will be set back, perhaps irrevocably.

Russia’s political evolution could also be affected. If Ukraine’s Orange Revolution gains new momentum, it will be harder for Russian President Vladimir Putin’s successor to continue the progressive backsliding on democratic reform that has been a hallmark of Putin’s rule.

Amid the wreckage of the Bush administration it’s easily forgotten that the export of democracy to formerly unfree societies has not always been a failing policy. For a decade after the end of the Cold War, the United States and its European allies worked through NATO and the European Union to convert 10 post-Communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe. At the time it wasn’t clear that all or even any of them would embrace free elections and free markets. That they did was due in large part to the abundant tutelage, training, aid and tough love provided by the Western alliance.

Lots of people are pointing to Iraq as an example of what happens when attempts at nation-building go wrong. But what happens when it isn’t tried — when the West sees a country struggling to find a new political order after decades of repression and simply decides to back off? In effect, a test of that option is underway far from Iraq, in the biggest country between Western Europe and Russia — Ukraine.

Three years ago, when the Bush “freedom agenda” was still gaining momentum, Ukraine was a focal point. U.S. funds poured into nongovernmental organizations that were agitating for a free presidential election. When a Russian-sponsored candidate tried to steal the election through blatant fraud, the Bush administration strongly backed the popular protest movement, the Orange Revolution, that eventually forced a new vote. The pro-Western winner of that ballot, Viktor Yushchenko, was for a while a favorite in Washington; there was even a push to put Ukraine on a fast track for NATO membership.

The change from then to now is one measure of how far a demoralized administration has retreated from its ambitions, and from the world outside the Middle East. Last week Ukraine was again in political crisis; the protagonists once again were the pro-Western president, Yushchenko, and his pro-Russian rival, Viktor Yanukovych, who is now the prime minister. Once again crowds gathered in the center of Kiev. There were struggles for control over government buildings, and each side accused the other of plotting a coup. The country seemed to teeter between a compromise agreement on new parliamentary elections — which was announced yesterday — and an attempt by one side or both to seize power by force.

The Bush administration and its NATO allies, meanwhile, were nearly invisible. Contact between U.S. officials and the feuding Ukrainians was limited mostly to the U.S. ambassador in Kiev and European affairs officials at the State Department. A senior adviser to Yanukovych who came to Washington last week to lobby for more involvement, former foreign minister Konstantyn Gryshenko, found it hard to get a meeting at the National Security Council or the vice president’s office.

“What’s needed from the United States, and what has been lacking, is a strong message to all sides that it is in their interest to abide by democratic principles,” Gryshenko, a former ambassador to Washington, told me. “The message we’re getting is that the United States really doesn’t care.”

It’s not just the lack of phone calls or visits that conveys that disengagement. As the human rights group Freedom House points out in a new report, the administration’s foreign aid budget proposal for next year contains big cuts in democracy funding for Europe and Eurasia. In Ukraine, the administration would slash funding for civil society organizations — that is, the groups that led the democratic revolution of 2004 — to $6.4 million, reflecting a 40 percent reduction from last year. In Russia, where pro-democracy and human rights NGOs are under enormous pressure from an increasingly autocratic Vladimir Putin, a cut of more than 50 percent is planned.

The retreat is largely a function of the administration’s ever-deeper absorption in the Middle East — a lot of the democracy funding is being shifted there — and simple demoralization. There’s a reluctance to do anything that might help Russia’s perceived ally, Yanukovych, who believes he would win any free and fair election. It doesn’t help that European governments have lost their willingness to offer more memberships in Western clubs. Both NATO and the European Union have made it clear that Ukraine won’t be admitted anytime soon, regardless of how its politicians behave.

What will happen in the absence of Western influence? Maybe Ukraine will muddle through; most of its leaders seem more interested in the model of democratic Poland than of Putin’s Russia. Maybe Russia, which will never lose interest in its neighbor, will succeed in converting it into a political satellite, as it tried to do in 2004. Or maybe the chaos in Kiev will deepen, violence will erupt and the country will start to splinter, like Yugoslavia in the 1990s — or Iraq. If so, it won’t be because the United States tried to impose democracy; but it might be because it didn’t.

The decree issued by Ukraine’s president Viktor Yushchenko earlier this month to dissolve parliament and hold early elections is no less than an attempted coup d’etat, apparently aided and abetted by western powers.Last year’s elections brought Viktor Yanukovych – Yushchenko’s nemesis during the rigged presidential elections of 2004 which led to the country’s so-called Orange Revolution – to power as prime minister at the head of a coalition government. Yushchenko’s party, Our Ukraine, meanwhile straddled government and opposition, while his close collaborator during the Orange Revolution, Yuliya Tymoshenko, went into opposition and campaigned for new elections. The complex power-sharing arrangement that emerged resulted in a power struggle between government and president, which the government, backed by the parliament, had been winning.

but while Russia welcomed the Russophile government’s newly dominant position, elements in the west feared the strong parliament would undermine Yushchenko’s pro-western foreign policy. For Yushchenko, the attempted coup is a means to recover some lost power from parliament. For his western backers, it is a way of irreversibly locking Ukraine into western geopolitical and geo-economic structures.

The president has resorted to such a high stakes gamble because of his domestic political weakness. Even if the constitutional court rules in his favour, early parliamentary elections will almost certainly result in his party winning fewer seats than they did last year. Our Ukraine, with its neoliberal and pro-western outlook, came a poor third place, drawing support mainly in the west and centre of the country.

Should new elections take place, the largest party is likely once again to be Yanukovych’s Party of the Regions, a corporatist party which polled 32% last year, mainly in the Russian-speaking east and south of the country. Of the major parties only former prime minister Yuliya Tymoshenko’s parliamentary bloc, with its pragmatic populism and strong pro-western outlook, can expect an increased share of the vote.

Since the Yanukovych government was formed last summer, Ukraine has begun to be the author of its own democratic future. The power struggle has been a contest for the right to consolidate the state bureaucracy and the political system to enable strong and effective government. This has been accompanied by a booming economy and a pragmatic foreign policy that combines cooperation with Russia with closer integration with the EU – but not with the unpopular Nato.

Consolidation of the state and political system is a necessary prerequisite, not only for further political and economic reform but also for Ukraine to withstand geopolitical pressure and economic competition from east and west. Russia wants to establish a consortium with Ukraine to jointly own and manage the pipeline network that takes Russian gas to the EU, while Russian business has been seeking to acquire large Ukrainian businesses. For its part, the west would like Ukraine to adopt neoliberal economic reform, join Nato and deepen its relationship with the EU as a bulwark against a reinvigorated Russia.

Should large parts of the political and economic elite, and the country at large, regard early elections as illegitimate and boycott them, Yushchenko and his renewed ally Tymoshenko would be unable to negotiate any form of political compromise, weakening Ukraine’s ability to withstand external pressure. A combined political and legal solution preventing the need for early elections is more likely to emerge.

Yushchenko and Tymoshenko, who led the street protests during the Orange Revolution, have morphed into counter-revolutionaries, intent on crushing the parliament they ensured was elected in Ukraine’s freest and fairest elections since independence. Their western backers, with their own geopolitical agenda, hope neither will emerge as Ukraine’s equivalent of Boris Yeltsin and that the international community will not notice their improbable reincarnation.

Paradoxically Yushchenko has returned to the failed authoritarianism of the past, and jeopardised not only his but also his country’s democratic future. In so doing he has renounced his right as heir to the Orange Revolution and transformed Yanukovych into an unlikely defender of Ukrainian democracy.

And now, alert readers, it is time for a test: Here are two demonstrations, representing two political movements, that took place recently in two neighboring countries. For which country should fans of “democratization” cheer loudest?

Example No. 1: This demonstration took place in Moscow on Saturday. More precisely, it took place in Pushkin Square, legendary site of Soviet-era dissident protests. Some 2,000 to 3,000 people came to show their opposition to the Kremlin — and they were greeted by some 9,000 club-wielding riot police officers. About 200 people were arrested, including Garry Kasparov, the former world chess champion who was described in the Russian Web site Pravda.ru as “a political pawn who has sold his soul to the traitors who plot Russia’s demise.” Later, Kasparov was charged with “shouting anti-government slogans in the presence of a large group of people.”

Example No. 2: This demonstration began in Kiev some days ago and continues. More precisely, it is taking place in the Maidan, also called Independence Square, the legendary site of the Orange Revolution protests of 2004. The organizers are the anti-Orange, pro-Russian “Party of the Provinces.” Their goal is to prevent Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko from calling new elections. At their zenith last week, the protests attracted between 35,000 and 70,000 people, depending on whose estimate you prefer. They were not attacked by riot police. No one has been arrested.

Now, there are some inherent difficulties in judging the merits of these demonstrations, particularly if you are looking, as we Americans love to do, for good guys and bad guys. For it is true that the Russian demonstrators are, in their own words, fighting for freedom of speech, the press and association; that they oppose President Vladimir Putin’s increasing authoritarianism; and that they deplore his virtual elimination of political opposition. It is true that there are worldly, well-connected, well-known English-speakers in their ranks. It is also true that they enjoy very little popular support, in part because the Russian media portray them, as the newspaper Izvestia did, as a tiny group of malcontents, probably paid from abroad, who deliberately provoked a fight with the peaceful authorities.

The Kiev demonstrators, by contrast, oppose the Westernization of their country, dislike the idea of Ukraine growing closer to NATO and the European Union, and generally wish for a return to the days when their country was a client state of Russia. Most of their supporters are provincial, not so well connected and probably don’t speak English. There are no world chess champions among them. Nevertheless, they do enjoy an important measure of popular support: Although it does seem that their demonstration isn’t nearly as much fun as the Orange Revolution was — one observer described the demonstrators as “silent, poorly-dressed throngs of mostly younger men shuffling along Hrushevsky Street under blue flags” — their leader, Viktor Yanukovych, is in fact the elected prime minister of his country, and they did vote for him in democratic elections.

It’s a tough choice, I know: Intuitively, one wants to see brighter prospects for democracy in Russia. The Russian opposition is brave, its cause is admirable, and its members and methods are familiar. Unfortunately, the opposition’s protest is not evidence of democratization in Russia but rather of its absence. The truth is that the Russian authorities have, through censorship, intimidation and even murder, largely eliminated genuine political debate in their country. As the police reaction to Saturday’s demonstration in Moscow well illustrates, even the tiny number of people who want to maintain some kind of public presence outside the mainstream must now be prepared to encounter violence.

By contrast, Ukraine, though frequently condemned as a disorganized political basket case, does slowly seem to be transforming itself into a country where people can at least choose from two clear political options, after a more-or-less open debate. President Yushchenko’s decision to call for new elections is indeed controversial. However, it is being examined by the Ukrainian Constitutional Court, and all sides have agreed to abide by the court’s conclusions. Prime Minister Yanukovych’s call for demonstrations in Independence Square was a stunt. However, the stunt was legal, nonviolent and one that he has every right to try.

To put it crudely, overly simply and in language everyone can understand: Ukraine, for all of its multiple faults, is a free country in which anti-democratic forces can demonstrate. Russia remains an authoritarian country in which democratic forces are beaten up and arrested.

Myself, I wish the Russians luck — but at the moment, I’m cheering loudest for Ukraine.

The decree issued by Ukraine’s president Viktor Yushchenko earlier this month to dissolve parliament and hold early elections is no less than an attempted coup d’etat, apparently aided and abetted by western powers.Last year’s elections brought Viktor Yanukovych – Yushchenko’s nemesis during the rigged presidential elections of 2004 which led to the country’s so-called Orange Revolution – to power as prime minister at the head of a coalition government. Yushchenko’s party, Our Ukraine, meanwhile straddled government and opposition, while his close collaborator during the Orange Revolution, Yuliya Tymoshenko, went into opposition and campaigned for new elections. The complex power-sharing arrangement that emerged resulted in a power struggle between government and president, which the government, backed by the parliament, had been winning.

But while Russia welcomed the Russophile government’s newly dominant position, elements in the west feared the strong parliament would undermine Yushchenko’s pro-western foreign policy. For Yushchenko, the attempted coup is a means to recover some lost power from parliament. For his western backers, it is a way of irreversibly locking Ukraine into western geopolitical and geo-economic structures.

The president has resorted to such a high stakes gamble because of his domestic political weakness. Even if the constitutional court rules in his favour, early parliamentary elections will almost certainly result in his party winning fewer seats than they did last year. Our Ukraine, with its neoliberal and pro-western outlook, came a poor third place, drawing support mainly in the west and centre of the country.

Should new elections take place, the largest party is likely once again to be Yanukovych’s Party of the Regions, a corporatist party which polled 32% last year, mainly in the Russian-speaking east and south of the country. Of the major parties only former prime minister Yuliya Tymoshenko’s parliamentary bloc, with its pragmatic populism and strong pro-western outlook, can expect an increased share of the vote.

Since the Yanukovych government was formed last summer, Ukraine has begun to be the author of its own democratic future. The power struggle has been a contest for the right to consolidate the state bureaucracy and the political system to enable strong and effective government. This has been accompanied by a booming economy and a pragmatic foreign policy that combines cooperation with Russia with closer integration with the EU – but not with the unpopular Nato.

Consolidation of the state and political system is a necessary prerequisite, not only for further political and economic reform but also for Ukraine to withstand geopolitical pressure and economic competition from east and west. Russia wants to establish a consortium with Ukraine to jointly own and manage the pipeline network that takes Russian gas to the EU, while Russian business has been seeking to acquire large Ukrainian businesses. For its part, the west would like Ukraine to adopt neoliberal economic reform, join Nato and deepen its relationship with the EU as a bulwark against a reinvigorated Russia.

Should large parts of the political and economic elite, and the country at large, regard early elections as illegitimate and boycott them, Yushchenko and his renewed ally Tymoshenko would be unable to negotiate any form of political compromise, weakening Ukraine’s ability to withstand external pressure. A combined political and legal solution preventing the need for early elections is more likely to emerge.

Yushchenko and Tymoshenko, who led the street protests during the Orange Revolution, have morphed into counter-revolutionaries, intent on crushing the parliament they ensured was elected in Ukraine’s freest and fairest elections since independence. Their western backers, with their own geopolitical agenda, hope neither will emerge as Ukraine’s equivalent of Boris Yeltsin and that the international community will not notice their improbable reincarnation.

Paradoxically Yushchenko has returned to the failed authoritarianism of the past, and jeopardised not only his but also his country’s democratic future. In so doing he has renounced his right as heir to the Orange Revolution and transformed Yanukovych into an unlikely defender of Ukrainian democracy.

Two years ago an authoritarian regime’s attempt to hijack the presidential election in Ukraine failed. As official results were announced, disbelief provoked millions of citizens to pour into the streets in protest. They took a stand against those discredited officials who hid behind law enforcement bodies in an attempt to prolong their corrupt hold on power. Those days and weeks are known as Ukraine’s Orange Revolution.

In the time since, my main goal as president has been to institutionalize democracy and guarantee that it is irreversible. Many of the wrongs in my country have been corrected. We are maintaining our unwavering commitment to the principles of freedom. We agreed to shift constitutional powers from an authoritarian presidency to a coalition government formed by parliament to end the country’s political impasse. And we abolished state censorship of the media, while also forbidding interference in news reporting.

This year free and fair elections were held at national, regional and local levels. Overseeing the peaceful and democratic transition of power was my unique test, as it brought back to office my former political opponents.

But along with our national successes and economic achievements under two “orange” prime ministers, there have been disappointments and miscalculations. Infighting among my political allies has been the biggest disappointment. Some “orange” politicians have ignored their fundamental duty to deliver results for the public good. Instead, gaining political power and seeking the limelight have become their goal. As our country’s democracy continues to mature, I am convinced that a young cadre of leaders will rise through the ranks of Ukraine’s democratic parties to create a political renewal.

On my watch, the corruption that has historically emanated from the president’s office ceased. Thousands of election officials, tax collectors, foot patrols, road police and customs agents were brought to justice for petty corruption. Yet the biggest abusers of public office remain at large because of unreformed prosecutors and corruption in the courts. I have recently initiated a number of anti-corruption bills to reform the criminal justice system and the courts, and I will continue to press parliament for speedy action.

Because we were preoccupied with domestic political reforms this year, we failed to communicate effectively with our international partners. I want to explain where Ukraine stands and where we are heading. Democracy and stability — two interdependent principles — form the basis of my agenda. To this end, I will continue constitutional reforms that facilitate the effective work of government and prevent a return to authoritarianism or the usurpation of power.

Today there is a balance of political power between two directly elected democratic bodies: the president and parliament. The prime minister, although not directly elected, represents a majority of the parliamentarians. Bills specifying the role of the governing coalition and the opposition have yet to be passed. But let there be no mistake: Together we share responsibility for shaping, executing and controlling laws and state policies.

Second, constitutional reforms are incomplete, and as a result there is a political asymmetry. We will continue refining a reliable system of checks and balances between the presidency, parliament and coalition government to expedite policy decision making. To meet these objectives, I have commissioned a group of constitutional experts to recommend amendments to strengthen our nascent democratic institutions.

Third, our law on national security promotes participation and membership in pan-European and regional systems of collective security. Membership in the European Union and NATO, as well as good relations and strategic partnerships with Russia and other countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States, are not romantic ideas of the Orange Revolution — they are founded in Ukrainian law. The president, coalition government and parliament determine the speed with which these goals are reached.

Most important, the democratic debates in Kiev’s halls of power are now centered on ideas about competing economic theories, values and worldviews. Our current system of checks and balances requires policy coordination, party coexistence and political compromise for us to move forward. Not everyone likes the new rules of the game, and some are having trouble playing in this new reality — but Ukraine’s democracy is here to stay.

As president, my historic mission is to guarantee that Ukraine’s national goals are reached not through political dictates but through an institutionalized democratic process that brings together governing bodies and citizen groups. I am convinced an inclusive democracy is one of the most significant and lasting achievements of the Orange Revolution.

Throughout European history, my country, Ukraine, has been badly misunderstood in Western capitals. Until the middle of the past century, it was referred to as “the Okraina,” literally the borderlands between European civilization and a distant and unfathomable Russia. There are perhaps many in Europe who still see us that way, but in fact things have changed in Ukraine, to an extent that surprises even those of us who played a part in bringing about those changes.

On Aug. 2, Ukraine’s president, Viktor Yushchenko, and I, along with other political leaders, signed a statement of principles that we believe will serve as the foundation for modern Ukraine. This statement will provide a blueprint for the government and a guide to reforms to which we are committed. Among the key points:

· Economic reform. Our citizens have been left behind by the economic “shock therapy” and subsequent wave of prosperity that has swept over Eastern Europe since 1989. We have seen what lowering taxes, securing private prosperity and liberalizing trade have done for our neighbors in Europe. Our government is going to be pro-business and committed to building an economy that will be competitive in world markets. Our first step on this path will be passage of legislation required for entry into the World Trade Organization.

· Political pluralism. The powers of our government are divided fairly and are faithful to the results of our parliamentary elections in March. The party of Yushchenko — Our Ukraine — continues to hold the presidency and ministerial positions in foreign affairs, defense, interior and the National Security Council. My party, the Party of Regions, holds the prime ministerial post and the majority of ministerial posts overall (they are heavily focused on the economy). The leader of the Socialist Party, Oleksander Moroz, is speaker of the parliament and a member of the governing coalition. My political opponent Yulia Tymoshenko is head of the largest opposition bloc in parliament and is already a candidate in the 2009 presidential elections. Parliament may at times be more raucous than the U.S. Congress, but it is no less representative.

· Constructive relations with Russia and, where possible, a broadening of cooperation. We believe that the core principle of both liberal trade theory and diplomacy is a respect for the political character and sovereign independence of other states. We believe these principles will guide our relations with Russia on a range of bilateral issues, including our discussions of energy security and cross-border investment.

President Yushchenko and I also agree that Ukraine has made a choice for Europe and will pursue closer relations with all European and Euro-Atlantic institutions. With the European Union, we are working on an action plan of reforms under the auspices of the European Neighborhood Policy, which we hope will lead to the beginning of negotiations on an E.U.-Ukraine free-trade agreement. With the United States, we are developing an action plan of anti-corruption measures and judicial reform under a grant from the Millennium Challenge Corp. And we are committed to continuing active cooperation with NATO.

As our relations with NATO have been a source of some confusion, let me be clear. The president and I have secured legislation that allows Ukrainian troops to participate in NATO exercises, in Ukraine and elsewhere. We intend to pursue defense reforms. But when an invitation is extended, we will hold a referendum in which the Ukrainian people can make their choice. Whatever happens in this regard, however, there should be no doubting our nation’s European direction.

Finally, Ukraine is and will remain a country of great diversity. We have the largest Jewish population in Europe. I have many close friends of the Islamic faith, and we have countless Christian denominations, including at least three Orthodox ones.

Like Canada and Switzerland, we speak two languages, Ukrainian and Russian. I come from Eastern Ukraine, where the first language of the majority of people is Russian. This, too, has been a source of misunderstanding. Some have suggested that the cultural influence of Russia and the linguistic origins of people such as myself are proof that the Party of Regions is pro-Russian. It is not. The presence of Spanish-speaking Americans in the Republican and Democratic parties does not make those parties pro-Spain or “pro” any other country. By the same token, the American people should not think that my party, or for that matter any party in Ukrainian politics, is less than completely committed to the cultural unity and political independence of a sovereign Ukrainian nation.

Be assured, Europe and America need not look for Ukraine somewhere out on the borderlands anymore. After we have completed our reforms and built our economy, Ukraine will be found at the very center of the Euro-Atlantic world.

En relación con la publicación, el 20 de julio del 2006, del artículo del politólogo ruso Serguei Karaganov, “Geopolítica trastornada“, en el cual el autor, bastante tendenciosamente, expone la situación alrededor de la ampliación de la OTAN en general y la posible adhesión de Ucrania a la Alianza en particular, nos gustaría expresar algunas opiniones al respecto.

Karaganov intenta ser aforístico y chispeante en sus conclusiones, demostrando con su visión los verdaderos (y no irracionales y suicidas) intereses nacionales tanto de Ucrania como de la Unión Europea. Quizás, desde su punto de vista, dichos intereses pueden ser articulados más adecuadamente desde Moscú y no desde Kiev, Bruselas o Madrid.

No obstante, el autor demuestra una comprensión absolutamente errónea de la naturaleza del Estado ucraniano y su lugar en el mundo, así como la visión de los intereses nacionales de los países de la Unión Europea. La aparición de Ucrania en el mapa político hace quince años es un elemento natural de extensión de la zona euroatlántica de estabilidad y seguridad. El complicado camino de una Ucrania independiente confirma que, a pesar de las dificultades del periodo de transición, este país toma la trayectoria del desarrollo democrático, inmanente para la mayoría de los países europeos. Los sucesos de la revolución naranja del 2004 confirmaron esta tendencia y la llenaron de un sentido nuevo. Estas circunstancias provocan celos incontenidos de las fuerzas que siguen pensando en términos de guerra fría y esferas de influencia.

El primer error de Karaganov es un intento, típico de los realistas rusos, de polarizar las diferencias en el enfoque de EE. UU. y la UE en asuntos de seguridad para fomentar la desconfianza entre los países democráticos con el fin de construir sus propios juegos geopolíticos a partir de las diferencias existentes. Explotando cierta irritación de los europeos por la actitud de EE. UU., el autor inventa la tesis de que Ucrania pretende convertirse en el baluarte pronorteamericano en Europa del Este. Bastan sólo dos hechos para desmentir esta tesis: Ucrania, como España, retiró sus tropas de Iraq; Ucrania, como España, mantiene una posición consecuente respecto a la actual crisis de Oriente Medio y no apoya el uso desproporcionado de la fuerza por Israel.

Tras haber declarado sus intenciones de integración en la OTAN y la UE, Ucrania ha optado por el camino de las transformaciones sistemáticas de la sociedad y del Estado basándose en el modelo europeo, así como lo habían hecho anteriormente los países de Europa Central y Oriental. Sí, el camino de Ucrania parece ser más difícil y extendido en el tiempo, pues las deformaciones provocadas por el régimen comunista y la debilidad de las tradiciones democráticas han resultado más profundas.

Otro error del autor está en la demostración de su arcaica visión del problema de las fronteras. Según él, Ucrania, intentando convertirse en miembro de la OTAN, va a construir en la frontera con Rusia “un cerco de alambrada”. Fronteras de este tipo en Europa ya no las hay, y las necesidades (tanto políticas como tecnológicas) de construirlas ya no existen. No obstante los politólogos de la escuela soviética, como vemos, todavía sueñan con las imágenes de murallas, destruidas ya hace tiempo. La imagen de familias divididas, paro, compañías que cierran y el arco de inestabilidad al estilo de Yugoslavia demuestra el fervor enfermizo, típico más bien de la parte revanchista de los políticos rusos que de un politólogo profesional. Sin embargo, nosotros recordamos, que el mismo Karaganov hace casi un par de años predijo un conflicto armado en la frontera entre Ucrania y Rusia en caso de que las partes comenzasen su demarcación. Entonces los rusos estaban totalmente en contra de la sencilla demarcación de la frontera, al considerar que de esa manera se iba a reconocer la irreversibilidad de la independencia de Ucrania. Actualmente, la situación ha cambiado y las partes se están preparando para el proceso de demarcación. Y nada despierta ya ningún tipo de temor respecto a la desestabilización en la frontera.

La farsa analítica de Karaganov llega a la culminación en su absurda profecía de que la perspectiva del ingreso de Ucrania en la OTAN “beneficiaría a los terroristas y radicales, que aspiran a desestabilizar la situación y conseguir las armas nucleares”. Quisiéramos saber de qué manera la ampliación del espacio de democracia y estabilidad que es la OTAN puede tener consecuencias semejantes. Al contrario, la preparación para el ingreso en la Alianza Atlántica significa para Ucrania la realización de toda una serie de importantes reformas que sustancialmente mejorarán la capacidad del país para afrontar nuevas amenazas de su seguridad. Esas reformas están detalladamente reflejadas en los planes anuales Ucrania-OTAN. El cumplimiento de esos planes se encuentra entre las prioridades de la política del Gobierno ucraniano, independientemente de qué partidos forman hoy en día la coalición que integra el Ejecutivo.

Respecto a la percepción en Rusia de la intención de Ucrania de ingresar en la OTAN, es oportuno acordar la postura oficial del presidente de la Federación Rusa, Vladimir Putin, expresada en su entrevista para la cadena de televisión France 3 el 7 de mayo del 2005: “Quiero subrayar: nosotros acogeremos con respeto su decisión, porque determinar la política de defensa es su derecho soberano. Ello no va a perjudicar nuestras relaciones interestatales. Repito, nosotros mismos desarrollamos relaciones con la OTAN”.

El ingreso de Ucrania en la OTAN puede convertirse en un factor que ejerza una influencia positiva en los propios procesos de Rusia, donde las tendencias autoritarias están dominando. El éxito de las transformaciones en Ucrania y como resultado su posterior ingreso en la OTAN y la UE puede indicar a la elite rusa que el camino de aislamiento y contraposición en el mundo democrático no es la dirección óptima para el progreso de Rusia como potencia regional.

A year ago the jewels of President Bush’s democracy policy were the Cedar and Orange revolutions of Lebanon and Ukraine, which had ousted autocratic regimes backed by Russia and Syria and seemingly ushered in pro-Western democracies. Last week their unforeseen and unpleasant consequences presented Bush with a critical pair of choices. He could abandon his faith in a new democratic order — or double his bet on it.

The crisis that has the world’s attention is Lebanon; though most people don’t perceive it as a test of Bush’s democracy agenda, that is how the administration sees it. Oddly, Hezbollah’s astute leader, Hasan Nasrallah, also gets it: “The main obstacles in the path of the new Middle East are the resistance movements in Palestine and Lebanon, and, on the level of the regimes, mainly Syria and Iran,” he said in a television interview last week, accurately summarizing Bush’s view. “What is required, then, is to eliminate these obstacles and to remove them from the path of the historic American plan for this region.”

The parallel crisis in Ukraine — yes, there is one — is far from American television screens. The fight there is being waged in smoke-filled rooms, and is as obscure as Lebanon is dramatic. But the essential problem for Bush is similar: The new democratic system he so strongly supported has been skillfully exploited by the revolution’s erstwhile losers.

After months of Byzantine maneuvering, the thuggish politician Moscow tried to install as Ukraine’s president though electoral fraud in 2004, Viktor Yanukovich, is on the point of taking office this week as prime minister — with powers that equal or exceed those of President Viktor Yushchenko, the leader of the Orange Revolution.

From the viewpoint of traditional U.S. interests, Yanukovich is still a menace. He opposes Ukraine’s integration into NATO, a step the Bush administration has been pushing, and he may well be willing to sacrifice his country’s sovereignty to Vladimir Putin’s Kremlin. He favors the Russian language over Ukrainian. But, in contrast to 2004, Yanukovich won his votes fairly in March’s parliamentary elections, drawing on the disaffected Russian-speakers of eastern Ukraine. So far he’s done nothing to undermine the democratic system — in fact, he’s trying to persuade Yushchenko’s party to join his government.

For Bush, the question is: Should the United States accept a democratic Ukrainian government that turns its back on the West, or encourage its allies to twist the political system to prevent that outcome? Was the Orange Revolution about installing democracy or shifting Ukraine from Moscow’s orbit to that of Washington and Brussels? Yushchenko is being urged by some pro-Western politicians to dissolve the parliament, a technically legal but democratically questionable maneuver. By some scenarios, he would then postpone new elections — which Yanukovich would probably win — and rule the country on his own.

Last week the president demanded that Yanukovich accept a number of conditions, including continued steps toward integration with the West, in exchange for being designated as prime minister. That left open both the option of parliament’s dissolution, and that of a national unity government.

The Bush administration has been working for months to keep Yanukovich out of power. A few weeks ago it urged Yushchenko not to seal a pact he was about to make with his pro-Russian rival. But by the end of last week, officials were saying that Bush had decided to accept any democratic outcome in Ukraine — including a government that rejects the West — as long as that government preserves free elections and free markets.

If he takes office, there’s a risk that Yanukovich could once again try to turn Ukraine into an autocratic Russian satellite or that a country the size of France, with a population of nearly 50 million, will be stranded for years outside an integrating Europe. Ukraine, like Lebanon, could be lost. But then, this year’s reversals have already demonstrated that the color revolutions of 2004 and 2005 were the beginning, rather than the end, of the transformation Bush seeks.

Tell someone in the Ukrainian capital that you have an appointment with President Viktor Yushchenko, and you will quickly be showered with advice, suggestions and requests. “Please, tell him to ask the Americans to fund Radio Liberty,” one woman begged. Another gave me a book she had published, asking me to pass it on. A Ukrainian journalist said not to bother asking Yushchenko whether he had yet found out who had attempted to poison him with dioxin during the bitter 2004 presidential election campaign: Surely he knew the criminal’s identity perfectly well. Instead, he said, it would be more interesting to find out why, exactly, the president had withheld this important information from the public.

Particularly given the atmosphere of semi-hysteria that surrounds the president — the extra-high security, the canceled and rescheduled appointments, the multiple telephone calls from multiple aides — this sort of talk made me feel as if I were about to encounter a remote, all-powerful figure, the sort of politician who can make things happen with the snap of a finger. And at some level, this is indeed what Ukrainians expect their president to be: Consciously or otherwise, they assume that their democratically elected leader has the same omnipotence that their communist leaders once had, the same bureaucratic resources, even the same access to secret information. He can get the Americans to fund Radio Liberty, help a publishing house survive and manipulate information about infamous crimes, all at once.

But, of course, he does not have the same powers and resources, as Yushchenko himself makes clear. I met him in his office, a vast room whose pretentious, palatial design has been hidden beneath the president’s equally vast collection of Ukrainian folk art. One of the first things he told me was that the criminal investigation into his poisoning had stalled. When he first came to office, the Ukrainian chief prosecutor — still loyal to the previous, post-communist regime — had dawdled, prevaricated and let the top witness in the case depart for Russia. The president, whose face is still mottled by side effects of the poison, said that Ukrainian authorities had asked the Russians to hand the witness over for questioning.

And? He shrugged. “You see how it is,” he said.

In any country, poor relations with a larger neighbor could damage a president’s political career. But for Yushchenko they pose a particularly difficult problem. Far from omnipotent, he is surrounded by corrupt officials, many of whom are easily won over by a Kremlin awash in oil money, most of whom are still loyal to the previous, pro-Russian, post-communist regime. As president in a parliamentary system, his powers are limited in any case, but in Ukraine, where secret information his police officers intercept is more likely to be sent to Moscow than given to him, they are almost nonexistent.

This might be true even if the Russian government were deeply committed to keeping Yushchenko in power: But Russian authorities have never tried very hard to hide their disapproval of Yushchenko, who was declared winner of the election only after mass demonstrations — the Orange Revolution — of a kind the Russians themselves fear.

Yushchenko speaks carefully about this problem, calling the Russian decision to switch off Ukraine’s gas in January a “development that didn’t help our relations” and describing his personal relations with Russian President Vladimir Putin as “very good.” He also tried to be positive about Russia and Ukraine’s attempts to resolve their long-standing disputes: over borders, over Russian naval bases on Ukrainian territory, even over historical issues such as the Ukrainian famine of the 1930s, which Ukrainians remember as an attempted genocide and Russians don’t officially recognize at all. Commissions had been set up, Yushchenko said, and committees had been established. But not much, he conceded, has been resolved.

Some of this explains, at least in part, the poor performance of Yushchenko’s political party in Ukraine’s recent parliamentary elections (which, incidentally, he calls “the most successful in Ukrainian history,” because they were the first to be conducted without “allegations of tricks by the authorities”). True, many around Yushchenko agree that his party ran a strangely inept campaign. The breakup of the “Orange Coalition,” the group of politicians who put him in power in 2004, didn’t help either. Yushchenko himself told me that many Ukrainians saw the coalition as a “political ideal” and have been disillusioned by the economic and political disagreements that have haunted the diverse group since they united to bring him to power.

Nevertheless, the unusually large gap between his supporters’ extremely high expectations and his own extremely limited authority are an important source of the growing disappointment with his presidency, too. When I emerged from my interview with him, my acquaintances in Kiev again peppered me with questions. What had he said? Why hadn’t he convicted anyone of electoral fraud? Why were his reforms taking so long?

They suspected a conspiracy, assumed there must be a secret explanation for the slow pace of political and economic change. But the truth seems much more straightforward to me. There is Yushchenko, alone in his big office. There is Ukraine, a country of 50 million people. And in between the two are thousands of people — civil servants, politicians, journalists, business people — who have deep financial and personal interests in maintaining the corrupt status quo. For Ukraine, the Orange Revolution was the easy part, compared with what lies ahead.

Al final, todas las revoluciones pasan de la euforia a la desilusión. En una atmósfera revolucionaria de solidaridad y sacrificio personal, la gente tiende a pensar que cuando su victoria sea completa, el paraíso en la Tierra será inevitable. Por supuesto, el paraíso nunca llega y, naturalmente, luego viene la decepción. Ése parece ser el caso actualmente en Ucrania, ahora que sus ciudadanos se preparan para elegir un nuevo Parlamento, poco más de un año después de su exitosa revolución naranja. La desilusión posrevolucionaria, especialmente después de las revoluciones contra el comunismo -y, en el caso de Ucrania, la revolución contra el poscomunismo- tiene su origen en la psicología. La nueva situación impuso nuevos desafíos a la mayoría de la gente. Antes, el Estado lo decidía todo, y muchos, en especial las generaciones de edad mediana y avanzada, empezaron a percibir la libertad como una carga, ya que acarrea una toma de decisiones constante.

En ocasiones he comparado ese hastío psicológico con mi propia situación al salir de la cárcel: durante años, anhelé la libertad pero, cuando por fin fui liberado, tenía que tomar decisiones todo el tiempo. Al verte enfrentado de repente a muchas opciones todos los días, empieza a dolerte la cabeza y a veces deseas inconscientemente regresar a prisión. Esa depresión probablemente sea inevitable. Pero, a una escala social, se acaba superando a medida que maduran las nuevas generaciones. De hecho, 15 años después de la desintegración de la Unión Soviética, parece estar produciéndose una nueva catarsis, y la revolución naranja de Ucrania formó parte de ella. Como demuestra claramente Ucrania, el proceso de liberación del comunismo estuvo, por definición, asociado a una privatización gigantesca. Naturalmente, los miembros de la vieja clase dirigente, con sus conocimientos y contactos internos, se hicieron con buena parte de la propiedad privatizada.

Ese proceso inevitable envenenó la vida política y los medios de comunicación, lo cual dio pie a un estado de libertad limitada y a un entorno similar al de la mafia. Los matices diferían de un país a otro en el mundo poscomunista, pero las nuevas generaciones que surgieron en esas sociedades ahora parecen estar hartas de él. La revolución naranja ucraniana, al igual que la revolución rosa de Georgia, parecen confirmarlo. Mientras que las revoluciones de finales de la década de los ochenta y principios de los noventa se dirigían contra los regímenes comunistas totalitarios, hoy en día pretenden deshacerse de ese poscomunismo mafioso. Pero para que el cambio sea irreversible, es esencial un poder judicial verdaderamente independiente e incorruptible. Con demasiada frecuencia, en los casos relacionados con la política, las sospechas y acusaciones de delitos no se persiguen judicialmente hasta llegar a una conclusión inequívoca. Es comprensible: el sistema de justicia comunista era manipulado para servir al régimen, y no se puede sustituir a miles de jueces de la noche a la mañana.

Aunque está claro que no es posible un regreso a la antigua Unión Soviética, algunos culpan a la influencia rusa de la desilusión en Ucrania. Sí, existen algunos elementos alarmantes en la política rusa, sobre todo porque Rusia nunca ha sabido realmente dónde comienza y dónde acaba el país. O poseía o dominaba a muchas otras naciones, y ahora lidia con la pérdida de todas ellas, aunque a regañadientes. Algunas de las declaraciones del presidente ruso, Vladímir Putin, parecen recordar la era soviética con nostalgia. De hecho, no hace mucho describía la desintegración de la Unión Soviética como un trágico error. Pero la nostalgia soviética guarda mucha más relación con las tradicionales ambiciones rusas de ser una superpotencia que con el comunismo. Creo que Rusia debería decir con claridad -y la comunidad internacional decirle con claridad a Rusia- que tiene unas fronteras definidas que no serán cuestionadas, ya que las disputas fronterizas son el núcleo de la mayoría de los conflictos y guerras. Por otro lado, no quiero vilipendiar a Putin. Quizá rebaje los precios del petróleo para algún allegado, como el dictador de Bielorrusia, Alexandr Lukashenko, e insista en un precio de mercado para otros, pero eso es básicamente todo lo que puede hacer. No preveo ningún conflicto grave aparte de ése.

La promesa de la integración en Occidente es uno de los motivos por los que el conflicto parece imposible, ya que es tanto una cuestión de geografía como de valores y cultura comunes. Ucrania pertenece a una entidad política europea unida; los valores que apoya Ucrania y que están arraigados en su historia son europeos hasta la médula. La experiencia checa demuestra que el aplicar todas las normas de la UE para reunir los requisitos de ingreso lleva un tiempo. Pero, en principio, Ucrania también puede conseguirlo.

Ocurre más o menos lo mismo en el caso de Ucrania y la OTAN. Las asociaciones basadas en normas y valores compartidos son el latido de la seguridad moderna. Además, en cierto sentido, la OTAN define la esfera de una civilización, lo cual no significa, por supuesto, que la comunidad de la OTAN sea mejor que cualquier otra. Pero es una comunidad a la que es bueno pertenecer, siempre que la gente lo desee y tenga sentido histórico para ella. La pertenencia a la OTAN conlleva obligaciones, ya que pueden producirse situaciones -y ya las hemos vivido- en las que la OTAN siga un llamamiento de Naciones Unidas y lleve a cabo una intervención militar fuera de su zona de influencia, por ejemplo, porque se esté cometiendo un genocidio. En otras palabras, la pertenencia a la OTAN, como la pertenencia a la UE, tiene un precio. Sin embargo, creo que las ventajas superan con creces a cualquier posible inconveniente. Está en manos de los ucranianos el decidirlo por sí mismos y superar así la desilusión posrevolucionaria.

Supporters of the nuclear industry will be apoplectic about the report on the Chernobyl legacy by John Vidal (UN accused of ignoring 500,000 deaths, March 25). And even those of us who believe the effects of the nuclear disaster to be widespread, serious and long term, will be disappointed to read of what must surely be a gross over-estimate of the real casualty figures.It is notoriously difficult to gather real statistics – there has been little serious research, and many of those involved have an axe to grind.

The charity I represent has been working in Belarus for 11 years, delivering humanitarian aid, training orphanage staff and foster families, and bringing children to the UK for recuperative holidays.

Regular visitors to Belarus cannot fail to be aware of the many health problems which, even today, seem to be more acute in the contaminated parts of the country. Twenty years on, young parents are giving birth to babies with disabilities or genetic disorders, or who develop serious diseases in their early months. But as far as we know, no research is being conducted into these issues.

Haematologists speak of blood disorders in children which are normally only seen in the elderly; heart disease and respiratory problems in children are widespread; osteoporosis is seen in small children; in the orphanages there are many children who do not grow, still looking like toddlers into their teens; babies are born with missing or twisted limbs; and breast cancer among young women is a major problem.

Thyroid cancer is the only illness which is indisputably linked to Chernobyl. There was a great deal of early scepticism, especially from US scientists, but eventually it could not be denied that the exponential rise in this normally rare disease could have only one cause.

Last September a report by the International Atomic Energy Authority’s Chernobyl Forum claimed that, apart from thyroid cancer, there were very few serious health effects in Belarus and Ukraine. Most of the problems were caused by psychological distress or radiophobia, it said. As the IAEA’s primary role is the promotion of nuclear power, playing down the effects of the world’s worst nuclear disaster is part of its agenda.

On the other hand, if the figures reported by John Vidal were to be believed, 500,000 deaths in Ukraine would mean that at least as many would have died in Belarus, which received a greater proportion of the radiation, with perhaps a further 100,000 in Russia. This would amount to well over a million deaths in the immediate region, not to mention the fatalities across Europe in the path of the fallout. These figures seem almost as unlikely as the derisory “only 51 deaths so far” of the IAEA-led report.

Many charities in Britain have come together to form a coalition – Remember Chernobyl – which seeks to raise maximum awareness about the long-term effects of the fallout, and to appeal for unbiased, independently funded research. Twenty years on, it is time a determined effort was made to learn the truth about the real effects of the disaster.

Since 2003, democratic revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia have dealt strategic blows to the ambition of Russia’s leaders to reconstitute the former Soviet empire by retaining political and military suzerainty over their weaker neighbors. But Russia’s imperial pretensions along its periphery linger.

Calls from the elected presidents of Georgia and Ukraine for a united Europe stretching “from the Atlantic to the Caspian” should embolden Europe and the United States to help people aspiring to freedom in other post-Soviet states end Russia’s continuing dominion over them by rolling back the corrupting influence of Russian power in regions beyond its borders. This task is especially urgent in countries where Russian troops and political support sustain secessionist conflicts that threaten aspiring new democracies and the security of the West.

Since the Cold War ended, Russian leaders have built a shadow empire on the territories of Russia’s sovereign neighbors, extending Russian power where it is unwarranted and unwelcome by sponsoring “frozen conflicts” in southeastern Europe and the South Caucasus. This behavior, designed to maintain political and economic influence beyond Russia’s borders, impedes democratic development in states that aspire to join the West. It exports instability, criminality and insecurity into Europe. It threatens regional military conflict that could draw in the United States and other powers. It also bolsters anti-democratic forces within Russia who believe Russia’s traditional approach of subverting its neighbors’ independence is a surer path to security than the democratic peace enjoyed by the nations of Europe.

The frozen conflicts in the Georgian provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and in the Moldovan territory of Transdniestria, share many characteristics. Russian troops fought on the side of local armies when these regions broke away from their mother countries as the Cold War ended. Russian officers continue to help train and command the breakaway territories’ Russian-armed militias. The secessionist leaders are all Russian citizens, some sent directly from Moscow, who are maintained in power by the continuing presence of members of the Russian military and security services. Secessionist political leaders also enjoy the sponsorship of powerful criminal elites in Russia, which profit from the unregulated smuggling trade — in consumer goods, drugs, weapons and women — in the conflict zones.

Moscow has granted the people of South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transdniestria Russian citizenship, including Russian passports and the right to vote in Russian elections. This effective annexation of sovereign peoples is expressly designed to undermine the authority of pro-Western governments in Georgia and Moldova.

Russian political and military influence also looms in the shadows of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Opposing armies that fought a bloody war over the disputed enclave in the 1990s now shoot at each other from trenches across a “no-man’s land” more reminiscent of Flanders in 1916 than the European neighborhood in 2005. This barely frozen conflict threatens a hot war that would devastate the region.

It is also the place where a breakthrough is perhaps most likely. Western governments could support a settlement there in which Armenia returned to Azerbaijan the occupied provinces surrounding the disputed territory and allowed Azerbaijani refugees to resettle there. Nagorno-Karabakh could enjoy full autonomy until its ultimate status was decided by democratic referendum at some future date. In return for Azerbaijan’s cooperation in ending a conflict that threatens its growing prosperity, the West should welcome closer partnership with that country as it moves forward with reform, end residual sanctions against Azerbaijan dating from the 1991-94 war, require closure of the Russian bases on Armenian territory that threaten Azerbaijan, offer a mini-Marshall Plan for the entire South Caucasus and put these countries on a path to Europe.

In South Ossetia, Europe and the United States should support Georgian calls to internationalize the Russian-dominated “peacekeeping” force, which now functions chiefly to obstruct changes to the secessionist status quo. The United States and the European Union should join Georgia, Russia and South Ossetia in a new negotiating framework designed to achieve a lasting political settlement consistent with international law.

In Abkhazia, the Atlantic democracies should push to transform the U.N. observer mission into an armed peacekeeping force, hold Russia to its 1999 promise on troop withdrawal and pledge assistance to rehabilitate Abkhazia’s war-torn economy as part of a federation agreement with Georgia. With the West, Ukraine can help bring change to neighboring Transdniestria by continuing its recent crackdown on cross-border smuggling, reinforcing Moldovan demands for a Russian military withdrawal and supporting a political settlement upholding Moldova’s sovereignty and the democratic rights of all its people.

Russia holds the key to any resolution of the frozen conflicts, and the Western democracies are surely not powerless to foster a change of Russian behavior in Europe’s back yard. President Vladimir Putin must understand that his country cannot enjoy partnership with the West — including membership in the G-8 club of Western democracies and the chance to host their summits — as long as his policies in the European neighborhood, and at home, look less like those of a modern European statesman than of a czar.