Aung San Suu Kyi sat in the living room of the home where she lived under house arrest for so many years and talked about the future. She is now a free citizen, meeting with high-level foreign delegations; she’s a political star in her country and possibly a future president. In an interview with Washington Post senior associate editor Lally Weymouth on Wednesday — the same day Suu Kyi registered as a candidate for Burma’s parliamentary elections — she talked about her country’s president, U.S. economic sanctions and her political plans. Excerpts:

In the United States, people are asking if President Thein Sein’s reform process is real. Do you think the reforms are real? And how did your meeting with the president go?

My meeting with the president went well, and I believe he sincerely wants reform. But he is not the only one in government. Our present constitution gives the military far too much power. Although the president is the head of state, he is not necessarily the highest power in the land. The commander in chief can take over all powers of government at any time he feels it to be necessary. That must be very difficult if you are in the position in which our president is. I don’t know how much support he has within the army. He himself is an army man, so I assume there must be considerable support for him in military circles. But that is just an assumption.

I think the president is genuine about reform. I think there are those who support him in the government. Whether all people support him, I can’t answer.

Do you worry that there could be a reversal of this reform process?

I don’t worry overmuch, but I am aware that there is a possibility of reversal. I think we have to work very hard to diminish this possibility. I do appreciate what the United States is doing to encourage this process. I think we here inside Burma have to do the major part of the work.

Should the United States lift sanctions and engage?

Engage and lift sanctions when they think the time is right. The U.S. has laid out very clearly what the conditions are for the removal of sanctions. If this government wants sanctions to be removed, they will have to try and meet those conditions.

One condition was the prisoner releases, and the president did release quite a few recently.

Yes, but not all of them yet. All the major political prisoners have been released.

Do you feel you could you play a role in bringing about peace and reconciliation between the ethnic groups and the government?

I could play a role only if both sides are willing to have me play a role. I can’t just go in because one side has asked me to take part. The ethnics have indicated they want me to be part of it.

I asked the president if he would consider giving you a cabinet post. He said it was up to parliament.

Quite right. Even if we win all the seats we are contesting, that will be only 48 out of 600 seats. The reason we want to get into parliament is not because we expect to do all our work in parliament. We want to extend our activities into the parliament.

Going back to the U.S. demands — what other conditions must be met?

There should be an end to all hostilities in the ethnic areas. There has been a cease-fire with the KNU [Karen National Union] but not yet with the KIA [Kachin Independence Army]. That is a big problem for the country.

Senior U.S. officials look to you for guidance in regard to lifting the sanctions.

What they have in me is someone to give an honest assessment of the situation. The situation in the Kachin [state] is a major problem. If we are to have a genuinely peaceful nation, we will have to resolve these problems politically, not militarily.

The government reportedly has been brutal in the ethnic areas.

Yes, there have been human rights violations, and that’s why it’s necessary to allow third-party access to those areas to find out what’s really happening.

Sen. Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) has said that Burma is developing a nuclear weapon with the help of North Korea.

I don’t know that they are developing a nuclear weapon. They certainly have reestablished diplomatic relations with North Korea. That cannot be denied.

Is it true they picked Naypyidaw as the new capital because of an astrologer?

I understand that the previous government was guided by astrologers.

Do you think Thein Sein is sort of a Gorbachev?

No, because Gorbachev came into power gradually through the ranks, and he had his grip on power quite firmly before he started going towards reform. Thein Sein is in a rather different situation. I think very few people expected him to become head of state. He was not the highest-ranking member in the military government under Gen. [Than] Shwe.

You referred to the fact that the army could overthrow this president. What is his relationship with the army?

He is respected in the army, that we know. He is one of the few members of the previous regime who is considered by all to be clean. Not only he, but his family as well, and that is unusual.

This is the house you lived in when you were under house arrest. How many years did that go on?

All together, 15 years.

How did you keep going?

I had enough to do to keep this house from toppling down. I could listen to the radio, and I had access to books from time to time. Not all the time.

Your family was in England?

Yes, in some ways that was good because I didn’t have to worry about them. At least I knew that they were safe. The first six years I was kept totally alone. The last six years I had two people staying in the house. The first six years really trained me very well.

Do you want to be president one day?

I don’t want to be president, but I want to be free to decide whether or not I want to be president of this country.

If you win a majority of the parliamentary seats in 2015, as you did in 1990, do you think they would let you assume power?

What we want is to make sure that by 2015, this should not be a question at all. By 2015, we should be certain that whichever party wins the majority in parliament should decide how the government is going to be organized. We have said quite clearly that one of the aims of the NLD [National League for Democracy] is the necessary amendments to the constitution.

We have reregistered our party. I went to register myself as a candidate this morning. We have started campaigning around the country. People have been very enthusiastic. It is very encouraging — all these years, and they are still standing solidly behind us.

What about a free press?

There is no real freedom of the press yet. When I was released last year, I think we didn’t have half the number of journalists and publications that we have now. Within the last year, the number of publications have proliferated.

But they have to submit their stories to a censor.

Yes. The censorship laws have been relaxed considerably. When I was released, I couldn’t publish anything under my name.

Do you have ideas as to how to improve the living standards of the people of this country?

We need to empower the people. One way to empower them is to make them stronger economically. That’s where we would like our friends to help: foreign aid in the right way; development aid that is not frittered away to those who are administering the funds.

Do you favor privatizing the economy?

Yes, but we need sound laws with regard to the economy. We need sound banking and sound investment laws. Only a small minority of our people have anything to do with banks.

What is your view of the Arab Spring? Do you think the government in Naypyidaw was influenced by it?

The situation in the Middle East is considerably different. I was heartened that people everywhere want certain basic freedoms, even if they live in a totally different cultural environment.

I understand that when you met with President Thein Sein last summer, he had your father’s picture prominently displayed.

When the military regime first took over, my father’s face was on the currency. It was gradually removed and replaced by the symbol of the USDP [Union Solidarity and Development Party]. All the photos of my father were taken down from schools and government offices. You were not allowed to put photos of my father in journals or magazines. The meeting without the picture would have meant less.

Were you surprised when you walked in?

I was, yes. I had not expected it. My father’s picture was in the center.

Did you and the president decide you could work together?

I felt I could work with him, and I hope he felt he could work with me.

Did Secretary Hillary Rodham Clinton invite you to Washington when she was here in December?

Yes, I would love to go to Washington as soon as possible. Has it changed much in the last 40 years?

Recently you have had many foreign visitors. Hasn’t your life changed drastically in the past year?

It doesn’t seem all that different, except much busier. I don’t have enough time to read.

Do you know how to use a computer?

I do. I learned to work on a computer years before I was placed under house arrest. Fortunately I had two laptops when I was under house arrest — one an Apple and one a different operating system. I was very proud of that because I know how to use both systems. I had no contact with the outside world. But I learned how to use different programs — I would make little invitation cards for myself just for fun. Just to learn how to use it.

What do you worry about the most?

I worry that even those who want to reform are not quite sure how to go about it. There is so much to be done — this is why I am keen on an assessment by the World Bank as a first step towards finding out what we need to do.

Some say the regime undertook the recent reforms because they believe that China is gaining too much influence here and they want the United States and the international community as a counterbalance. What is your view?

It’s not necessarily connected with our relations with China. A lot of officers in the Burmese army have always wanted to have good relations with the U.S. Previously we have had good relations with the U.S., and some of the generals were trained in the U.S. The minister of labor had a stint at Fort Benning.

I heard he is the president’s liaison to you. Is that so?

That is right. He has been the liaison between me and the government for several years — since 2007. A few times a year, we had a meeting at a government guest house.

What did you think of him?

He is intelligent, which is a plus. He has goodwill. He wants the right kind of changes. Before 2004, they had a designated liaison officer. But he was removed. My first liaison officer was a major, and he rose through the ranks. At the end he was a brigadier. I knew some of the army quite well. I was the responsibility of the military intelligence.

You have some familiarity with army thinking?

Of course. And you must not forget that I come from an army family.

Right now, you hope for what?

I hope to win all the seats in the elections, which are very few. They aren’t giving it to us. They [the ruling USDP party] are going to contest this election themselves.

Did President Obama ask your opinion about sending Clinton to Burma?

He asked if I thought it was a good idea, and I said yes.

And you got along?

Yes, she is very nice and very intelligent. I like intelligent people.

Since Thein Sein took office as Burma’s president nine months ago, the country’s famous opposition leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, has been freed from house arrest, political prisoners have been released and the United States has normalized bilateral relations with Burma, also known as Myanmar. This week, Sein granted The Post’s Lally Weymouth his first interview with a foreign journalist. Excerpts:

President Sein: I would like to welcome you to our capital and I know The Washington Post is a renowned newspaper in America. This is the first time to meet with the foreign media. This is our foreign minister, our minister of information and our minister of labor.

Q: The West has been watching the changes you have brought about in your country — the freeing of political prisoners, enabling Aung San Suu Kyi’s party to run in the upcoming April election and the cease-fires you’ve declared with some of the ethnic groups. You have made extraordinary changes in a short time. What motivated you to want to change your country and to start this reform process?

A: With regard to the reform process we are undertaking in our country, there is a lot of encouragement from our people. The reform measures are being undertaken based on the wishes of the people [who want] to see our country have peace and stability as well as economic development. To have internal peace and stability and economic development, it is important to have good relations with the political parties that we have in our country. That is why we have had engagement with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. In my meeting with Daw Aung Sang Suu Kyi, we were able to reach an understanding between the two of us.

People would like to see peace and stability and that is why we have had engagement with the ethnic armed groups. That’s why our reform process is based on the wishes and the will of the people.

The people could not had this reform process without your leading it. You decided to release the political prisoners, you met Aung San Suu Kyi. . . . What is next? Will you continue with this pace of reforms?

With regards to our future perspectives, we’d like to see transparency. I hope that we can and will be able to maintain friendly relations with countries of the world.

Can you share with us what is next in the reform process? What your vision is?

I believe that you need to know our aims, and they are to have peace and stability and economic development in our country. For the future, we need to continue to take necessary actions to achieve these goals.

You have normalized relations with the U.S., you have released political prisoners and achieved cease-fires with some of the ethnic groups. Do you have a definite next step?

The parliament also made amendments to the election commission law so that Aung San Suu Kyi can contest the upcoming by election [April 1]. Now, The National League for Democracy — her party, the NLD — has registered as a political party, and Aung San Suu Kyi will be contesting the upcoming by-election. If the people vote for her, she will be elected and become a member of parliament. I am sure that the parliament will warmly welcome her. This is our plan.

Another thing I would like to shed some light on is the ethnic armed groups we have in our country. First of all, we need to build confidence between the two sides. We have reached agreements on certain things. This requires the two sides to sign an agreement and return to the legal fold without carrying arms.

You made a cease-fire with the Karen group.

There are a total of 11 armed groups in our country. We have engagement with all the armed groups. We also have agreements with some of the ethnic armed groups. But this is not over yet. We are continuing negotiations.

What did you mean when you said they should return to the legal fold? Is that after reaching an agreement with the government?

This is based on the agreement between the two sides. Soon we will try to achieve an eternal peace in the country. However, this will require time.

If she does well in the upcoming election, would you think of giving Aung San Suu Kyi a cabinet post?

It depends on the elections and if she was voted for by the people or not. Once she has been elected, she will become a member of parliament. All of the cabinet ministers that we have now are appointed based on the agreement given by the parliament.

Would you like to see her become a cabinet minister?

If one has been appointed or agreed on by the parliament, we will have to accept that she becomes a cabinet member.

What is your vision for U.S.-Myanmar relations in the future? What are your hopes for that relationship and how would you like to see it evolve?

With regard to U.S.-Myanmar relations, I would like to make three points. First, we already have engagement with the United States. Secretary of State [Hillary] Clinton visited our country and just today we were visited by Senator Mitch McConnell. The second point is that we are not represented by [diplomats at the] ambassadorial level. We hope the representation can be upgraded. The third point I would like to make is that the U.S. and the E.U. have had economic sanctions on our country. It has been [for] nearly 20 years now. I would like to see them ease . . . and eventually get rid of the sanctions. . . .

Secretary Clinton announced last week that relations would be normalized and that the U.S. and Myanmar will exchange ambassadors.

Yes, I have heard that news also. Until today it has not been announced that there has been an appointment of an ambassador.

There are three requirements that Western countries would like to see us do. First is the release of political prisoners. Second is to hold the [parliamentary] election. Thirdly, to have Aung San Suu Kyi and others participate in our political process. I believe we have accomplished these steps already. What is needed from the Western countries is for them to do their part. In taking actions with regard to the three points I have mentioned, we have done it not because others were putting pressures on our country. We did it because we felt it was necessary to do for our country.

It was not [Your reforms were not motivated by] because of the pressure from the sanctions? Didn’t sanctions work?

Sanctions were aimed at harming our government but, actually, they harmed the interest of our people. Nor did they affect the previous government, which actually laid down the procedures so they could hand over a democratic system for our country.

You are speaking about the seven-step program outlined in 2004?

The previous government laid down the seven-step program so they could implement a democratic system in our country. They have taken the necessary measures step by step.

They laid out the program so they could implement democracy?

Yes, it’s true.

People are wondering, why are you reforming now. Your answer is that this was planned a long time ago and it has been moving along in stages?

When a system needs to be changed, it cannot be done overnight. Some countries that have tried to change overnight have deteriorated. That is why we laid down the seven-step road map and have taken step-by-step measures. You can see we are a democratically elected government.

But 25 percent of the government is reserved for the military, and most of the members of the government, including yourself, are former members of the military. Democracy to us means a civilian government that has power over the military.

The military is no longer involved in the executive body. Even if you look at our parliament, one-fourth is reserved for the military. We cannot leave the military behind because we require the military’s participation in our country’s development.

The U.S. perspective would be that you have to have a strong military but the civilians have to have the power. Our president is more powerful than our chief of staff of the armed forces. That to us is democracy. So how far can you take this reform process?

I hope that you can study our constitution. [Under it] the president has to appoint the commander in chief of the armed forces in our country, too.

The U.S. is also concerned about your relationship with North Korea. Senator [Richard] Lugar recently stated that your country might be developing a nuclear program with the help of the DPRK. Could you comment on this? Are you willing to sever military ties with North Korea?

We have diplomatic relations with the DPRK [but] we don’t have any relations with regard to a nuclear program or military cooperation. These are only allegations. In the international arena, our country is one that stands for the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. We have always abided by the resolutions of the United Nations and these are only allegations. We don’t have any nuclear or weapons cooperation with the DPRK. The DPRK is not in a situation to provide assistance to our country, and we don’t have the financial means to implement a nuclear program.

Are you willing to let IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] inspectors into your country?

We are in the process of signing the additional protocol of the IAEA. This requires a study, which has to be submitted to our parliament for approval.

Is there anything you would like to say to American readers?

My message is that we are on the right track to democracy. Because we are on the right track, we can only move forward, and we don’t have any intention to draw back. Our government is only about nine months old.In terms of democratic experiences and practices, we still have very little experience and practice. I don’t think that we can compare with the United States — a country that has been practicing democracy for over 100 years. For democracy to thrive in our country there are two main requirements. First is to have domestic peace and stability. Second is that we need economic development and we are taking necessary measures for our economy to develop so our people will have a better livelihood. . . . About 3 million of our people are working in other countries. We have about a 26 percent poverty rate. That is because for over 20 years sanctions were placed on our country. Sanctions hurt the interest of our people. For that reason, there were no job opportunities in our country. If you would like to see democracy thrive in our country, you should take the necessary actions to encourage this by easing the sanctions that were placed on our country.

If you want to build up your economy and develop it, would you be willing to privatize some industries and let foreign investors come in?

We welcome foreign investors and we have made necessary amendments to our law as it relates to foreign investment. But foreign investors will only come once sanctions have been eased up on our country.

But investors will ask for rule of law and for courts.

I don’t think there are any difficulties for foreigners to make investments in our country. The only difficulty they [would have] is sanctions.

Are you willing to allow a free media in this country, to abolish the 1962 media law, allow daily papers to be published and also allow for private ownership of the media?

With regards to freedom of the media, you can see that it is not like it was before. We have a daily journal published in our country and [the media] can express freely in the paper. However, we still require democratic practices. The media needs to take responsibility and proper actions. Media freedom will be based on the accountability they have.

En mai dernier, nous avions publié avec l’équipe d’Info Birmanie un livre destiné à faire mieux connaître la pensée et l’action d’Aung San Suu Kyi, figure de référence du mouvement démocratique birman et lauréate du prix Nobel de la paix. La “Dame de Rangoun”, évoquant ses objectifs, disait ne pas viser seulement un changement de gouvernement mais aussi “un changement dans la société birmane, une évolution des concepts politiques, des idées politiques [car] je crains qu’il fasse désormais partie de [notre]culture politique de penser qu’un changement significatif ne peut advenir que dans la violence”. Son approche non-violente a parfois été confondue avec de la passivité. La possibilité qu’elle atteigne ses objectifs n’a pourtant jamais semblé si proche.

Les évolutions à l’oeuvre en Birmanie ont été largement commentées : reprise du dialogue avec la “Dame”, suspension d’un projet de barrage controversé, adoption de lois autorisant les syndicats, le droit de grève ou les manifestations, mise en place d’une commission nationale des droits de l’homme, relâchement de la censure. Certes, l’amnistie attendue d’un grand nombre de prisonniers politiques s’est soldée le 12 octobre dernier par un constat décevant : si quelques activistes de premier plan ont retrouvé la liberté, la plupart demeurent encore derrière les barreaux.

Pour Aung San Suu Kyi, qui réclame leur libération, la volonté de réforme du régime semble cependant réelle. Mais la dirigeante de la Ligue Nationale pour la Démocratie (LND) demeure prudente : elle rappelle que nous n’en sommes encore qu’ “au début du début” des changements espérés. Elle estime en outre qu’il faut demeurer attentif à la possibilité d’une réaction violente des éléments conservateurs du régime : “pour l’instant, je ne pense pas que le danger soit grand. Mais bien évidemment, les choses peuvent évoluer très vite en politique.” Assiste-t-on en Birmanie à une transition qui s’opèrerait “par le haut” et à laquelle la mobilisation continue des forces démocratiques serait étrangère? Rien n’est moins sûr. En décidant de fonctionner comme un parti autorisé, la LND a mis un régime soucieux d’améliorer son image au pied du mur : la réprimer ou priver de nouveau sa dirigeante de liberté anéantirait les efforts déployés par la dictature pour convaincre qu’une démocratisation du régime est à l’oeuvre depuis les élections contestables de novembre 2010. La légalisation de la LND, annoncée le 13 décembre par les médias officiels birmans, est à l’évidence un effet de sa persévérance. Aung San Suu Kyi et son parti envisagent désormais de se présenter aux élections législatives partielles à venir. La “Dame” sait que rentrer dans le jeu politique “normal” la rendra plus vulnérable : “Certaines personnes s’inquiètent du fait que participer pourrait faire du tort à ma dignité. Franchement, si vous faites de la politique, vous ne mettez pas en cause votre dignité”. L’un de ses objectifs est d’entrer au Parlement pour pouvoir y discuter la peu démocratique constitution de 2008, qui assure à l’armée un contrôle certain de la chose politique. Un sujet sensible.

Elle sait aussi qu’il ne saurait y avoir de stabilité en Birmanie si les revendications des minorités nationales (qui souhaitent un Etat fédéral et démocratique) ne sont pas entendues. Elle regrette que les partis ethniques soient toujours exclus du dialogue. Certes, la signature d’un accord de cessez-le-feu avec l’Armée de l’Etat Shan Sud et l’ordre donné par le président Thein Sein de ne plus combattre l’Armée de l’indépendance kachin sont choses encourageantes. Mais une paix durable ne pourra être obtenue que si les différentes parties conviennent d’un accord politique de fond. Les minorités l’attendent d’ailleurs sur ce sujet, un responsable karen confiant qu’“en ce moment, Suu Kyi discute avec le gouvernement tandis que les civils kachin fuient [toujours] les soldats birmans et se cachent dans les camps de réfugiés. C’est pourquoi ceux-ci pensent qu’elle ne les soutient pas.”

Aung San Suu Kyi sait que le temps de la politique est un temps long. Sa patience ne doit pas être confondue avec une forme de négligence ou d’indifférence envers des réalités humaines qu’elle sait dramatiques. Loin de regretter d’avoir perdu la figure morale au profit de la femme politique, ses soutiens internationaux devront admettre qu’il ne lui sera pas toujours possible de faire avancer des dossiers pourtant urgents aussi rapidement ou aussi complètement qu’il le faudrait. Il leur faut pourtant continuer de soutenir la “Dame” : pour que les évolutions en cours en Birmanie aillent le plus loin possible, il importe que le monde extérieur lui apporte son plein soutien.

US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s recent visit to Myanmar (Burma), noted largely for a memorable photo opportunity with a wan but smiling Aung San Suu Kyi, signaled a significant change in the geopolitics surrounding a land that has faced decades of isolation, sanctions, and widespread condemnation for its human-rights violations.

Twenty-one years ago, after Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) swept a general election, the results were annulled, the party’s leaders and workers were incarcerated or exiled, and two decades of ruthless – and remarkably opaque – military rule followed. This year has witnessed political opening, the release of several prominent political prisoners, and evidence of self-assertion by the nominally civilian government (headed by a former general, Thien Sein). Suu Kyi’s announcement of her intention to contest a by-election to the new parliament offers a glimmer of hope that democrats could use the fledgling political process to create something resembling genuine representative government.

Burma’s military rulers are cynically hoping to use Suu Kyi’s participation in the parliamentary process to bolster the illusion of freedom while continuing to exercise real control. But such exercises in “managed democratization” – in places as different as Iran, Indonesia, and the Soviet Union – have often surprised their would-be manipulators. It is clearly in the interests of both India and the United States to seize this opportunity. While China has always been much more comfortable dealing with a military regime, India’s embrace of the junta has been more reluctant, based on reasons of geography rather than shared ideals.

When the generals in Rangoon (Yangon) suppressed a popular uprising in 1988, overturned the NLD’s overwhelming electoral victory, shot students, and arrested the new democratically elected leaders, India’s government initially reacted as most Indians would have wanted. For many years, India was unambiguously on the side of democracy, freedom, and human rights in Burma – not only rhetorically, like the regime’s Western critics, but also in more tangible ways. It offered asylum to fleeing students, allowed them to operate their resistance movement within India (with some financial help), and supported a pro-democratic newspaper and a radio station.

Then reality intruded. India’s strategic rivals, China and Pakistan, began to cultivate the Burmese generals. Major economic and geopolitical concessions were offered to both suitors. The Chinese even began developing a port on the Burmese coast, far closer to Calcutta than to Canton. And the junta’s generals began providing safe havens and arms to a motley assortment of anti-India rebels that would wreak havoc in the country’s Northeastern states and retreat to sanctuaries in newly renamed Myanmar.

Four of India’s politically sensitive Northeastern states have international borders with Myanmar. But the key development was the discovery of large natural-gas deposits in Burma, which would not be available to an India deemed hostile to the regime. India realized that its rivals were gaining ground in its backyard, while it was losing out on new economic opportunities. The price of pursuing a moral foreign policy became too high.

So India turned 180 degrees. The increasingly forlorn resistance operations based on Indian territory were shut down. And India sweetened the generals’ tea by providing both military assistance and intelligence support in their never-ending battles against their own rebels. India had gone from standing up for democracy to aiding and enabling the military regime. As I wrote at the time, “India’s policy may be governed by the head rather than the heart, but in the process we are losing a little bit of our soul.”

Yet, paradoxically, Myanmar’s gradual opening following the 2011 elections and the installation of Thien Sein as president may offer India some measure of vindication. As the new regime released political prisoners, permitted freedom of movement to the detained Suu Kyi, and even questioned the environmental and economic impact of a big Chinese dam project in the country’s north, Western critics began to acknowledge that genuine change might be on the way. Countries like India that had maintained links with the junta and gently prized open its clenched fist may well have achieved more than those whose threats, bluster, and sanctions had merely hardened the general’s stance.

In canceling a $3.6 billion Myitsone hydro-electric project (90% of whose electricity would have been exported to China), the Burmese government surprised most observers, even though Chinese analysts were quick to express understanding of the government’s desire not to be seen as wholly subservient to a much more powerful neighbor. But the signal is clear: Myanmar is not a Chinese vassal state, and is willing to diversify its foreign relations.

It is in Burma’s interests to have more than one suitor wooing it; offsetting one neighbor against another is a time-honored diplomatic practice. Though China’s engagement dwarfs India’s, Myanmar-India bilateral trade reached almost $1.1 billion in 2010-2011, and India is now Myanmar’s fourth-largest trading partner, after Thailand, Singapore, and China, accounting for 70% of the country’s agricultural exports.

Economics can always open political doors. “That Myanmar could defy the Chinese,” wrote Indian scholar Sreeram Chaulia, “is being seen as a sign that political space exists for the US to work as a facilitator of the democratization process in Myanmar.” Clinton’s visit brought confirmation that India has been playing a quiet but effective role in promoting greater engagement with the Burmese.

India cannot and should not seek to outdo China in appeasing the military junta. Its natural instincts lie with the Burmese democrats, Suu Kyi, and the former students for whom it has, over the years, shown its support. With the US signaling its willingness to take Thein Sein’s political openness at face value, the stage is set for the region’s democracies, especially India, to open Burma’s windows to the world. China will be watching closely.

Why does change seem so desirable and so exhilarating in our times? Barack Obama’s presidential campaign was fueled by the promise of change. In Burma today there is continuous debate on whether the new government means real change or whether it is no more than the old army dictatorship in new civilian garb. Almost every day I am asked if I believe that measures taken by the new administration should be seen as mere window dressing or as signs of genuine change in the right direction. After 23 years under authoritarian rule, impatience to see and to experience change is understandable. It has been sharpened by events in other parts of the world during 2011.

The political upheavals of the Arab Spring have been of such proportions that fundamental and irreversible changes are expected throughout the Mideast and Arab Africa in 2012, with possible copycat effects elsewhere. Whether such expectations will be fulfilled will depend on many factors, not least the degree of commitment by those who wish to create a brave new future. I’m thinking of commitment here as passion, in the social theorist Max Weber’s sense of passionate dedication to a cause.

Were the peoples of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya led to topple seemingly indestructible regimes by such passion, or were they merely moved by what Weber denigrated as “sterile excitement?” It would surely be sophistry to label as sterile an outcry that led to such convulsive results. It might be argued, though, that the emotion fueling the Arab Spring was the kind that burns itself out speedily, after setting off the first sparks of defiance.

If the original impulse needed some help to turn those first sparks into a full-scale conflagration, another more effective catalyst must have been at work. Could that have been power? People power, or IT power or the power of global democratic solidarity or, simply, in the end, military power, either the use of it or the decision to refrain from using it?

Power is by nature latent until a force sets it in motion. What starts up the engines of power, whether they be tanks and fighter jets and nuclear weapons or diverse individuals linked by a shared cause and modern technology? The means to unleash power that could change frontiers or crush men and their aspirations can become active only when an initial force sweeps away irresolution and inhibitions. The power of defiance, too, needs that first impulse to encourage passive individuals to put aside the inaction fostered by decades of fear or by natural human caution.

So then, is it “passion vs. power?” Does it have to be versus? Are passion and power natural opposites, or mutually exclusive in promoting political change, either of the ordinary variety brought about through constitutional processes in established democracies, or of the revolutionary brand that reshapes the destinies of peoples and nations?

There is also the kind of change that defeats easy categorization. The U.S. presidential election of 2008 was certainly not ordinary, but whether the election of Barack Obama should be regarded as a seismic event in the history of the United States or just a political landmark is a matter of opinion. There can, however, be no controversy about the outcome of the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa; it changed the political landscape of the nation, and it changed perceptions with regard to race and color the world over.

What prevented the now toppled regimes of Tunisia and Egypt from using all their administrative and military might? What convinced the despots of Libya and Syria to make war on their own people? And what made the anti-government forces of Libya and Syria persist even after it was clear the fight would be prolonged and brutal?

Is there not, behind the iron mask of autocracy, the flesh and blood of human will, just as there is a steely, collective will behind a motley, unarmed crowd determined to exercise its right to cry out its woes and perhaps even to take up arms to assert that right? And is not will — which is, after all, deliberate, controlled purpose — closely joined to passion? It may be joined either as an intense, transitory emotion, which may well be no more than “sterile excitement,” or as a long-term, firmly rooted dedication to principles or a cause — something as broad as freedom or as limited as self-preservation.

As a member of a movement that has been engaged in a long struggle to effect change through nonviolent means, I have learned to value above all other attributes in colleagues and supporters disinterested, active commitment. Such commitment is seldom given to pyrotechnic display, but it is always there, and it provides constant assurance that the essential flame that keeps our cause vibrant will not die out. It is passion, not of the sterile breed, but passion that moves hearts and minds and makes history. It is passion that translates into power. When such passion is brought to bear on public issues, it is a potent instrument for political and social change.

In Burma, again and again, the most active members of our party and other forces committed to the struggle have been placed under detention, their voices silenced, their faces almost forgotten by the public. Again and again they have emerged, arousing the world to their cries. In 2002, after I was released from my second term of house arrest, I toured the country, and the commitment of our supporters translated into large, enthusiastic rallies that made the authorities feel the power of our passion. Quite recently, concern over the fate of our Irrawaddy River united peoples from all walks of life. Our passionate appeal for a reappraisal of the dam project was so powerful that the president announced the suspension of the project for the duration of his term.

Can the process be reversed, can power become passion? Power that effects political change cannot be defined as an isolated, unique brand different from all other powers. Party power, money power, media power, pressure group power and many other powers strongly influence political evolution and revolution. Power as the authority of the ruler(s) backed by the machinery of state might, however, be considered a contrast to passion. The distinction between despotic power and democratically invested power is relevant here.

When do those in authority wish to work for political change? The impulse of those who hold the powers of state is generally toward conservation, not transformation. Only when problems arise, and not always then, do rulers begin to consider the need for change. Intelligent rulers are quick to grasp when change becomes unavoidable. But realizing the need for change is not the same as having the means to make it possible.

In pluralistic societies, government alone cannot bring about change. Many other players are involved. The bipartisan negotiations to push through the U.S. debt deal that did not seem to please anybody demonstrated that the president of the United States does not have sufficient means to effect the change that not only he but many of his countrymen consider necessary.

If presidential power can be considered an impetus toward change, it is one that is easily dissipated by other powers. Commitment, perseverance, persuasion, the ability to win hearts and minds can be counterweights to these opposing powers. Passion can fill in the gaps when power alone is not enough.

It is easier for an authoritarian government untroubled by counteracting powers or passions to act in accordance with its own will. A ruthless despot allowed to proceed unchecked can change not just the political scene but the very psyche of a nation. For a time. Under Stalin’s brutal absolutism, terror seeped into the very bones of citizens and made them unrecognizable to themselves. For a time. Then the despot died, and the country woke from its nightmare. People began to ask what had happened and why. Did power alone transform a whole society? What enabled Stalin to exercise power with such single-minded brutality?

Whether Stalin was fired by dedication to a cause or whether personal ambition motivated him, it could be said the element that initially fueled his ruthless machine was passion, albeit of the worst kind. As his iron rule continued, an all-consuming preoccupation with the preservation of his inviolability, obsession rather than passion, moved him to commit some of the greatest political crimes in history.

Stalin was not alone in establishing his reign of terror. Vast numbers collaborated, and some of those who did so consciously and willingly were fired by passion: as commitment to the political and social changes they believed Stalin would achieve for their country or as dedication to the man himself. Power can generate passion; and power needs passion as its agent.

In all its might, power is less self-sufficient than passion; passion generates its own power. Passion is in itself a kind of power that is by its very nature a kinetic force.

Power, on the other hand, tends naturally toward entrenchment. When power moves in the direction of political change, it usually does so because external forces — from popular uprisings to poll predictions — have become irresistible.

Passion is more effective than power as an impetus for political change. Meaningful political change, however, needs to be sustainable. For that, passion and power must work together as mutually supportive partners.

We all wish for change, but there is no guarantee that change will take place or that it will live up to expectations. There is always an element of risk when we step out into the unknown. The greatest challenge for Burma and the countries of the Arab Spring, as well as all peoples who hope to enjoy the flowers and fruits of their endeavors in 2012, will be to bring wisdom to bear on passion and power, to create a blend of the two that is both effective and wholesome.

La histórica visita a Birmania de Hillary Clinton supone el primer contacto al más alto nivel entre la Casa Blanca y el Gobierno del país asiático. La secretaria de Estado de EEUU llegó el miércoles y ayer mostró su apoyo al proceso de cambio emprendido por la Junta Militar birmana, lo que gran parte de la prensa ha interpretado como el principio del fin de una de las dictaduras más arraigadas de Asia. Pero este artículo tiene una visión mucho más pesimista.

Antigua colonia del Imperio británico, el país consiguió su independencia en 1948. El primer líder de la Birmania libre fue U Aung San, padre de Aung San Suu Kyi, ahora líder del movimiento prodemócrata y la principal razón por la que Hillary Clinton está haciendo una visita. U Aung San fue asesinado en los albores de la independencia y el país degeneró en una guerra civil. Siendo yo un niño en aquellos días, recuerdo las alarmas nocturnas en Rangún, y cómo nos tendíamos en el suelo para evitar el peligro de las balas. El nuevo ministro de Finanzas, que vivía enfrente de nosotros, fue asesinado. Desintegrado el Gobierno, las guerrillas armadas tomaron el campo, los intereses comerciales huyeron del país, y la economía se deterioró. Birmania había ido en busca de la libertad, y solo había logrado la ruina y el caos.

El nuevo dirigente del país, U Nu, era un político demócrata que consiguió ganar las elecciones y aportar algo de orden en los asuntos públicos. Pero los problemas fueron creciendo. A primera hora de la mañana del 2 de marzo de 1962, tanques y unidades armadas leales al ejército entraron en la capital Rangún, arrestaron a U Nu y todas las otras figuras políticas de mayor rango, e instalaron la dictadura militar. Aung San Suu Kyi se fue al extranjero a estudiar. Se graduó en India y después completó sus estudios en Oxford. Regresó a Birmania, donde participó en movimientos por la democracia política. En las elecciones de 1990 dirigió un partido que arrasó en las urnas, con más del 80% del voto popular. Los generales suprimieron los resultados y arrestaron a Aung San. Pero desde su casa-prisión logró componer discursos, artículos y libros, se ganó la admiración de todo el mundo civilizado, y fue galardonada con numerosas distinciones internacionales, incluido el Premio Nobel.

El año pasado, los generales decidieron celebrar elecciones, pero el partido de Aung San se negó a participar. Este año, sin embargo, ha acordado tomar parte en cualquier elección futura. Es el pequeño rayo de esperanza que ha alentado a los Estados Unidos a enviar a Hillary Clinton. ¿Pero hay realmente alguna esperanza? Enfrentémonos a los hechos, porque es seguro que cualquier elección futura será un fraude a menos que cambien las condiciones. En virtud de la Constitución aprobada en 2010, la Junta Militar se disolvió y entregó el poder a un parlamento. Pero los militares se reservaron el derecho a nombrar al 25% de todos los diputados en las cámaras del Parlamento. En total, la junta ha nombrado 110 oficiales militares para la nueva Cámara Baja y 56 para la Cámara Alta. El restante 75% de los escaños en el Parlamento fue al partido de Solidaridad y Desarrollo, que cuenta con apoyo militar. Aquellos que han vivido bajo una dictadura, como los españoles, reconocerán que las elecciones nunca son libres, a menos que las condiciones sean realmente democráticas. Por el momento, hay pocas posibilidades de que esto ocurra en Birmania.

Además, el tema de las elecciones es sólo uno de los problemas. El país ha estado en guerra continua durante más de 70 años, debido a la cuestión de las nacionalidades. Es una de las razones principales que los generales esgrimen para tener el control continuo del poder. Los grupos étnicos que constituyen la Unión de Birmania se hallan en un perpetuo estado de insurgencia. El país se compone no sólo de birmanos (en Birmania central) sino también de vastas zonas que son el hogar de los karen, kachin, shan y otras minorías, que tienen la ventaja de ocupar casi toda la frontera exterior del país, hecho que facilita la importación de armamento y la exportación de productos como el opio (Birmania es probablemente el mayor productor mundial de esta droga). Durante las décadas de conflicto, cientos de personas fueron arrestadas y, por supuesto, asesinadas. Se estima que todavía hay 2.000 presos políticos encarcelados, entre ellos monjes, estudiantes, periodistas, abogados, diputados y más de 300 miembros del partido de la oposición de Aung San Suu Kyi, la Liga Nacional para la Democracia. Uno tendría que ser muy optimista para creer que cualquier cambio es posible en un país con esta herencia política.

Y luego, por supuesto, está la cuestión de la economía. Mis recuerdos de Birmania datan de los últimos años del Imperio británico. Mi padre solía llevarme a los campos petrolíferos donde trabajaba y mostrarme cómo funcionaban los grandes pozos de petróleo. Las riquezas de la tierra todavía están allí. En 2008, el sector del petróleo y gas representaron más de 3.000 millones de dólares en inversión extranjera directa. Pero el ingreso de ello ha sido malversado por la dictadura militar y no se ha gastado ni un céntimo en mejorar la situación de las personas. No hay un sistema judicial adecuado. No hay ningún sistema bancario adecuado, no hay hipotecas en Birmania, y los bancos tienen prohibido conceder préstamos por periodos de más de un año. La corrupción es desenfrenada. El Estado utiliza mano de obra forzada para construir edificios militares y empresas comerciales. Se estima que el 90% de la población vive en o por debajo del nivel de pobreza, y Birmania tiene el PIB más bajo de todo el sudeste asiático. El ejército controla todos los principales sectores de la economía tales como minería, petróleo, transporte, manufactura, prendas de vestir y electricidad. Según un informe publicado por Reporteros sin Fronteras, Birmania es uno de los cinco peores países del mundo en cuanto a la libertad de prensa, ocupa el lugar 174 de un total de 178 países clasificados.

¡Y es este país pobre el que acaba de crear una nueva capital en medio de la nada! Con la excusa de que Rangún estaba abarrotada, los generales decidieron construir una ciudad completamente nueva y le dieron el nombre de Naypyidaw, que significa la casa de reyes. Fue excavada en la selva y construida partiendo de cero a 320 kilómetros al norte de Rangún. El 6 de noviembre de 2005, a las 6:37 de la mañana, hora auspiciosa astrológicamente, el Gobierno trasladó apresuradamente todos sus departamentos a la nueva capital. Hay campos de golf, dos nuevas salas de cine y una réplica a escala real, completada en 2009, de la famosa pagoda de Shwedagon de Rangún. También hay una colección de hoteles al estilo de Las Vegas en el principal bulevar de la ciudad. Casi todos ellos están prácticamente vacíos, aunque es la única ciudad en Birmania donde la electricidad está disponible las 24 horas del día.

Después de este sombrío panorama, hay buenas razones para estar agradecido a los Estados Unidos por su interés en el futuro de Birmania, uno de los países donde la política estadounidense en favor de la democracia ha sido más consistente. Funcionarios del Departamento de Estado han viajado con regularidad allí en los últimos meses. El Gobierno de Washington exige libertad incondicional para Aung San y para todos los presos políticos; poner fin a los conflictos con los grupos étnicos minoritarios; acabar con las violaciones de los derechos humanos; y acuerdo entre todos los grupos en una transición a la democracia. El problema es que después de 70 años de violencia, una solución parece todavía muy lejana.

Resulta obvio que la democracia por sí misma no es una solución automática y Aung San Suu Kyi no es la única clave. Vale la pena recordar que una situación parecida se produjo en Pakistán hace muy poco tiempo. Se disolvió la dictadura militar, se convocaron elecciones libres, se liberó a los prisioneros, y se permitió a Benazir Bhutto volver del exilio. Las consecuencias todavía están presentes: Pakistán es probablemente hoy la nación más peligrosa e inestable del mundo. Afortunadamente, Birmania es ante todo un país budista, no islámico, y Al Qaeda no tiene la posibilidad de una base allí.

A pesar de todo, los generales birmanos deben ser conscientes de los recientes cambios alarmantes en el mundo árabe y sin duda una revuelta popular es un motivo de grave preocupación para ellos. Los amantes de la libertad y los exiliados birmanos en todo el mundo sólo pueden desearle lo mejor a Hillary Clinton.

Historic transformations often happen when least expected. Mikhail Gorbachev’s liberalizing policies of glasnost and perestroikain the Soviet Union emerged at one of the Cold War’s darkest hours, with US President Ronald Reagan pushing for strategic missile defense and the two sides fighting proxy wars in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Deng Xiaoping’s economic opening followed China’s bloody – and failed – invasion of Vietnam in 1978. And South Africa’s last apartheid leader, F. W. de Klerk, was initially perceived as just another apologist for the system – hardly the man to free Nelson Mandela and oversee the end of white minority rule.

Now the world is suddenly asking whether Burma (Myanmar), after six decades of military dictatorship, has embarked on a genuine political transition that could end the country’s pariah status. Is Burma, like South Africa under de Klerk, truly poised to emerge from a half-century of self-imposed isolation? And can Aung San Suu Kyi, the heroic opposition leader, and Thein Sein, Burma’s new president, engineer a political transition as skillfully and peacefully as Mandela and de Klerk did for South Africa in the early 1990’s?

Despite her two decades of house arrest and isolation, Suu Kyi possesses two of the gifts that enabled Mandela to carry out his great task: a reassuring serenity and an utter lack of vindictiveness. As Burma’s authorities test reform, these gifts, together with her negotiating skills and, most of all, her vast moral authority, will be tested as never before.

Moreover, unlike Mandela during his 27-year imprisonment, Suu Kyi has had her hopes raised – and dashed – before. In the mid-1990’s, and again in 2002-2003, reconciliation between Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) and the military junta seemed to be in the offing. On both occasions, however, the regime’s hardliners gained the upper hand, crushing prospects for reform.

Yet Suu Kyi, and much of the Burmese opposition, is beginning to admit that today’s political liberalization might be the real thing. Because Burma’s generals say almost nothing in public, it is difficult to fathom why they allowed elections that elevated Thein Sein to power, or to explain their willingness to embrace dialogue with the long-suppressed opposition.

Recent events suggest one possible explanation: Burma’s rulers have grown wary of China’s almost smothering embrace – a result of the country’s international isolation. Indeed, public protests against China’s commercial exploitation of Burma’s natural resources became so widespread that the government called a halt to construction by Chinese investors on the huge and environmentally damaging Myitsone Dam on the Irrawaddy River.

Thein Sein’s decision to halt the project is clearly an important policy shift. It is also a signal to the outside world that Burma’s new government may be much more willing than any of its predecessors to heed both public pressure and international opinion, both of which vehemently opposed the dam’s construction.

Almost simultaneously, Thein Sein offered even stronger signals that his was a very different Burmese administration: he freed political prisoners and invited Suu Kyi for direct talks with him. Indeed, Suu Kyi now enjoys far greater freedom of movement than she has at any time since she received the Nobel Peace Prize 20 years ago, and the NLD recently announced that it will field candidates in the forthcoming by-elections to the country’s newly established parliament. If Suu Kyi is permitted to campaign free of restraint, for both her own seat and to boost the electoral chances of her NLD colleagues, it will be clear that Thein Sein and his government are truly determined to bring their country in from the cold.

For both Suu Kyi and Thein Sein, every step from now on will be delicate, to be calibrated with the same care and deliberation that Mandela and de Klerk used in bridging their differences and leading their country out of isolation. But the international community, too, must act with great care.

While Thein Sein would undoubtedly wish to see the myriad economic and political sanctions imposed on Burma quickly lifted, it is too soon for a general easing of such measures. But the outside world should demonstrate that every clear move toward greater political openness will merit more international political and economic engagement.

The Japan Investment Bank’s decision to invest in port development in Burma – essential if the economy, too, is to be opened – is one positive sign that the world will keep pace with Thein Sein step for step. And US President Barack Obama’s decision to send Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to Burma to meet Thein Sein is another clear sign that the world is ready to end the country’s isolation.

Closer to home, ASEAN’s recent decision to give Burma a chance to chair the organization in 2014 underscores its neighbors’ desire for the country’s full participation in Asia’s growing prosperity.

No one should rush to judgment yet, but Thein Sein’s decisions, at least so far, are beginning to resemble those of South Africa’s de Klerk when he initiated his country’s reform process. Fortunately, Burma already has in Aung San Suu Kyi its very own Nelson Mandela.

When President Obama sees his counterparts among the Association of Southeast Asian Nations this week in Bali, he is expected to advance a number of major initiatives. Washington has made clear the Asia-Pacific region’s importance to the 21st century and its dedication to an enduring U.S. presence there.

For its part, Myanmar has weathered numerous revolutions without regime change, including the “first wave,” after the fall of the Berlin Wall; the Saffron revolution in 2007; and multi-party elections in November 2010. The political situation in Myanmar cannot be compared with the uprisings in the Middle East because Myanmar itself overcame uprisings like those changing the Arab world.

Myanmar’s path is intricately tied to the needs of our country. Washington and the West need to understand that our president is a strong political reformer and that our proposal for Myanmar to assume the chairmanship of ASEAN in 2014 would accelerate the process. This is my president’s political road map for the international community. The United States must recognize that Myanmar’s politics will transform in steps. Every change must be based on reality, stability and systematic process. Myanmar must focus on overhauling the old system while building the society the international community has long hoped for. This is the political drama in Southeast Asia.

President Thein Sein is the hope of our entire nation, including ethnic minorities, people in the grass roots and the middle class. Aung San Suu Kyi said in an interview with local journalists that she believes President Thein Sein “is very genuine in his desire for the process of democratization.” But he needs strong support from the international community to usher in a new era. Washington and others must change their dual-track policy toward Myanmar if they want it to become a democratic country as measured by their values and norms.

In the short term, Myanmar needs aid and trade, direct foreign investment and business opportunities. Financial sanctions must be lifted and upgrades made to public education and the health-care sector. Efforts must be made to develop the overall economy. If Myanmar does not overcome these battles, it cannot evolve in ways that would be a win for our people and the outside world.

What the West must realize is that in today’s geopolitical situation, particularly given the rise of China, it needs Myanmar. Washington and others must help facilitate Myanmar’s connection to the outside world at this critical juncture. My president’s cancellation of the Beijing-backed Myitsone Dam signaled to the world what he stands for. If the United States neglects this opportunity, Washington will part ways with the new order in the Indochina region.

When President Thein Sein came to power in March, he declared an unprecedented reform agenda, including clean government, good governance, poverty reduction, national reconciliation, development and industrialization. His commitment to drive the reform process has impressed people in and outside our country. When Sen. John McCain visited Myanmar in June,our government made it clear that it intends to walk away from its pursuit of nuclear power, even though Myanmar has many research and development needs to which nuclear technology could be applied. The new government decided after the incident at Japan’s Fukushima site this spring not to pursue the nuclear path.

President Thein Sein has made extraordinary progress over the past eight months. Facing many challenges, he is trying to implement democratic processes. The U.S. government must understand his political situation — for every one step forward, there is a more difficult step back. The West should encourage him, not simply apply pressure without any give in its own positions. Don’t push him into a corner.

Many observers believe Myanmar is approaching a new beginning. People are starting to feel they can express openly what they want, that they can ask questions of the government and make demands on lawmakers. These are tangible results of the 2010 elections.

U.S. attempts to further isolate Myanmar at this juncture would be a disaster. As this country opens its doors to the outside world, Washington must cross the threshold. Obama and Congress must strongly support President Thein Sein and democratization in Myanmar. The White House must officially build the diplomatic bridge to our country at the Bali summit by supporting Myanmar’s bid to assume the ASEAN chair in 2014. A message from Obama that this move would assist the advancement of peace, stability and development in Myanmar would reinforce hopes across our country.

Some have expressed doubts about Myanmar’s state capacity, the population’s confidence in the leadership and the political implications of Myanmar holding the chairmanship. Would this be a step toward international sanctions being lifted?

First, taking on this role would give Myanmar the status with which the nation should be viewed on the international stage. The key point is pride for Myanmar’s people, not for the president and his administration.

Second, Myanmar has been closed to the outside world for decades. Many in the region and elsewhere pressure Myanmar or treat it with doubts and questions. Our country was historically a regional powerhouse and should regain its rightful position.

Political development in Myanmar is home-grown. Our country has taken steps other nations in the region have not yet accomplished. We implemented a new constitution late last year and its effects are taking hold.

China ascended to the world stage with the Beijing Olympics. The ASEAN chair is Myanmar’s opportunity to step forward. This issue must be raised, and not postponed, at this week’s summit.

President Thein Sein looks forward to trying to lead ASEAN much as he has guided Myanmar — maintaining his commitment to improve political, social and economic development, without outside pressure or influence. This country has shown it can stand on its own. It is time the international community and the people of Myanmar turned to a new chapter.

Myanmar, sandwiched between China and India, is at its most important political watershed since the establishment of army rule in 1962. Over the next few weeks, the Obama administration can make a big difference in determining whether historic reforms under way there will lead to Asia’s newest democratic transition. President Obama should publicly support the changes taking place, and back up those words with actions to end the country’s isolation, before hard-liners who oppose reform are able to push back.

Six months ago it was difficult to be optimistic. Elections had been held but they had been widely condemned as being far from free and fair. And although Myanmar’s aging autocrat, Gen. Than Shwe, retired, the constitutional leadership that replaced his junta included many of the same former generals. Few expected more than minor reforms.

But U Thein Sein, the new president and himself a former general, surprised everyone. In his inaugural address to Parliament, he spoke forcefully of combating poverty, fighting corruption, ending the country’s multiple armed conflicts, and working for political reconciliation. By June, state pensions for nearly a million people, most of them very poor, were increased by as much as a thousandfold, taxes were reduced, and trade cartels were dismantled. The government redrafted banking and foreign investment rules and began revising its foreign exchange rate policy — all of this in consultation with businessmen and academics. That alone was a huge step, because army rulers had long shunned any civilian advice.

Then, on July 19, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the opposition leader who was released from house arrest last November, was invited to the annual Martyrs’ Day ceremony. The holiday memorializes the 1947 assassination of her father, who is considered the architect of the country’s independence. Thousands of her supporters were permitted to hold their first lawful march in years and several independent newspapers came to life. Mrs. Aung San Suu Kyi’s name, which couldn’t be mentioned in print a year ago, began to appear regularly on the front pages.

By August, Parliament began debating sensitive issues, like the release of political prisoners, and passed laws legalizing microfinance for the rural poor and allowing independent trade unions. All Internet restrictions were soon lifted. On Aug. 18, at a meeting with dozens of independent civic groups, the president called for peace talks with the country’s ethnic-based rebels and invited exiles to return. The next day, he met for over two hours alone with Mrs. Aung San Suu Kyi.

I saw her soon afterward for the first time in over 20 years. She told me that she believed the president was genuine in wanting change and that she hoped we were at the beginning of a new era in Myanmar’s politics.

This past week, we’ve seen previously unimaginable developments. On Friday, following increasing popular agitation, the president halted work on a $3.6 billion hydroelectric dam being built by China on the Irrawaddy River to send power to Chinese provinces next door. This was a victory for Myanmar’s nascent environmental movement and the area’s minority Kachin people. That the president would stop a Chinese-backed project of this magnitude was the clearest sign yet that the country was at a turning point. And many in Myanmar now hope that the government will soon release most or all political prisoners.

But monumental challenges remain — for example, even though the government agreed recently to a cease-fire with the country’s largest ethnic-based militia, deadly clashes continue with smaller militias fighting on behalf of minorities in the mountains to the north and east. It is hard to imagine a successful democratic transition while these longstanding and often brutal little wars continue.

Reformist voices are not the only ones in the new system, and a hard-line pushback is far from inconceivable. So the Obama administration needs to do three things, and do them quickly.

First is to unambiguously voice its support for the reforms under way, while at the same time being patient and refraining from demanding too much too fast. The alternative to what is happening is not a perfect revolution; the alternative is going back to square one.

Second, the administration needs to ensure that the reform efforts receive the technical advice and knowledge they desperately require. After decades of isolation, Myanmar suffers from a dearth of skilled people in every field, from banking to environmental regulation to public health. So the United States should lift all restrictions that limit the United Nations and international financial institutions like the World Bank from offering Myanmar their technical expertise. This is not about giving money, but providing the knowledge needed to conceive and carry out reforms in the best possible way.

Third is to move toward ending trade embargoes against Myanmar. As the country opens up, it should neither become dependent on outside aid, nor become an even more corrupt crony-controlled oligarchy. Responsible trade and investment can play key roles in creating jobs, helping to build a new middle class and hastening democratic change.

What we’re seeing today is Myanmar’s best chance in half a century for a better future. America needs to help end Myanmar’s isolation, urgently.

Every spring, Forbes publishes its ranking of the richest men and women on the planet. One person you won’t see on the list is Burmese business tycoon Tay Za. The charismatic Tay Za is chief executive of the Htoo Group of Companies, a business empire founded during Burma’s era of democratic rule that spans logging, gems and jade, palm oil, construction, hotels and tourism, mobile-phone services, an airline and more. At 46, he is widely believed to be Burma’s first billionaire.

Tay Za is a high-profile figure in Asia, with business ties in Singapore, Thailand and elsewhere – even more so since the United States and EU levied sanctions against him for his relationship with Burma’s ruling generals. Yet he remains largely unknown in the West, and has received remarkably little press attention.

I have visited and written about Burma many times over the past 15 years. During my last trip in January, I had the opportunity to meet Tay Za in his palatial home in Rangoon. Tay Za has shied away from the spotlight and seldom agrees to be interviewed. Yet, as Burma, an emerging economic corridor between India and China, becomes more important on the world stage, its leading entrepreneur is speaking out. Maybe it’s time for America to take notice.

Tay Za is eager for more engagement with the West, and welcomes the scrutiny that comes with it. That’s good, because this enigmatic tycoon is certainly no stranger to controversy. His critics claim he has derived most of his wealth by colluding with a regime notorious for human rights abuses. He is reportedly close to junta strongman Senior Gen. Than Shwe. The United States accuses Tay Za of arms dealing for the government; he now controls all of Burma’s business links with Russia. Tay Za and his family are barred from entering the United States, EU, Canada, Australia and Switzerland.

But Tay Za contends that “investigations, which I would welcome, will prove that I am not a crony and a bagman for the generals.” While admitting that he is on “friendly terms” with the military regime, he insists he makes “no contribution to the generals other than officially paying taxes levied on my various businesses,” pointing out, “it has always been the case worldwide that regardless of government system, businesspersons and the incumbent state leaders have to cooperate for the benefit of the country.”

Not surprisingly, Tay Za is strongly opposed to Western sanctions, noting that while the United States and EU have punished local Burmese business leaders, they have taken “no action … against Chevron and Total, the two prominent Western energy companies that are making billions of dollars annually from their natural gas project in [Burma].”

Moreover, he argues, sanctions hurt Burma’s most vulnerable, not its most powerful, deepening the hardship in a country where one in three citizens lives below the poverty line. He says the sanctions “have virtually no effect on the rich” – and he is in a position to know.

Tay Za maintains that “no two nations can flourish through isolation.” Lately, it appears several Western governments may be coming around to his way of thinking. Earlier this spring, the European Union signaled a more flexible approach to Burma when it relaxed some sanctions against members of the government. The Obama administration recently appointed Asia expert Derek Mitchell the first U.S. special representative and policy coordinator for Burma.

If the United States seeks to reevaluate and fine-tune its foreign policy toward Burma, figures like Tay Za – who operate at the nexus of politics and economic markets – should be at the top of our list of people to know and not to shun. For decades, Americans have viewed the country through the prism of opposition leader and human rights activist Aung San Suu Kyi, who was recently released from years of house arrest after the country’s November elections. The resulting black-and-white perspective obscures a more textured and complicated story.

In addition, U.S. authorities should reconsider the policy of punishing dependent children of persons designated for financial sanctions. Whatever relationships Burma’s business leaders may have with the military regime, sanctioning their dependent children simply isolates the next generation from the West and pushes Burma ever closer to China by default.

In any case, Tay Za says, the Htoo Group will “continue with our business activities, regardless of the government system, be it military or otherwise.”

When asked about his goals for the future, he answers like a Burmese Bill Gates: “I hope to become a philanthropist after qualifying for a billionaire.”

I now know what it feels like for dissidents in Burma, when the authorities knock on the door late at night. In my case, I was treated civilly, but I know that if I had been Burmese it would have been far, far worse.

I had been in Burma a week, and had visited the country several times before. Having written a biography of the dictator, Than Shwe, accusing him of crimes against humanity, I was surprised to have made it back into the country, and was not surprised when the authorities caught me.

It happened at 11 p.m. on my last night in Rangoon. I had gone to the hotel bar to listen to some jazz before bed. I had been there barely five minutes when I was informed that the authorities wished to speak to me.

Six plainclothes military intelligence agents were standing outside my room.

I invited them in. I had already decided that I would answer their questions honestly, but not volunteer extra information. I would be cooperative, but not too cooperative. My top priority was to protect other people.

“Mr. Rogers, we have instructions from Naypyidaw to deport you tomorrow morning,” came the dreaded words. I had always known this was a strong possibility, but the words still make my heart sink.

I asked the reason. They told me they did not know, and were just following instructions. But during the course of the interrogation, one of them flicked through a file and I saw it contained a photocopy of the front cover of my book.

They checked my camera, and were frustrated that it only contained pictures of tourist sites. I had been scrupulously careful. They asked to copy my photos, and I asked why. “We have to show our superiors something,” one of them said.

At midnight they concluded the process, and told me to be ready at 7 a.m. They left, but five minutes later one man returned.

“I left my notebook,” he said. After searching for a while he found it in my suitcase. He must have put it in accidentally while putting my belongings back. It’s a pity he remembered — it could have been very interesting.

The following morning I was escorted to the airport by two men. They were polite. I asked again why I was being deported.

“We’ll tell you at the airport.”

At the airport I was met by a large group of officers. They photographed every step I made.

Two men sat down with me by the gate. “Mr. Rogers, after we left your hotel last night I was informed about the reason for your deportation,” one of them said. (Liar, I thought — I saw your file last night.) “I can now inform you. We know you have written several books about Myanmar, including “Than Shwe: Unmasking Burma’s Tyrant.” (At least he got the title right.) “These books, and your many articles, are misinformation about our country.”

I was determined not to go silently. I wanted them to know what I thought — but I also didn’t want to blame them personally. They were just doing their job — it was the system that was wrong.

“Is it a crime to write a book?” I asked. That flustered him. “In November, Myanmar held elections,” I continued. “So I thought Myanmar was becoming a democracy. In a democracy, it is very normal to write books freely, and very common to write books about leaders. Some books are positive, others are critical. But the fact that you are deporting me for writing a book suggests that Myanmar is not a democracy. So, can you tell me, is Myanmar becoming a democracy or not?”

He hesitated. “Myanmar will be a democracy one day, but slowly, slowly. We are in transition period.”

“I thought Myanmar was changing. But deporting a foreigner for writing a book suggests no change. So is that correct — no change?”

He nodded enthusiastically. “Yes, yes, no change, no change.”

If there is no change, surely talk of lifting sanctions is ill-judged? Now is not the time to lift sanctions, not before there is meaningful change. Rather, it’s time for the world to get tougher, to target pressure more carefully, to provide aid for the people and to investigate Than Shwe’s crimes against humanity through a United Nations inquiry.

I asked if the man deports many foreigners. He smiled. “Yes, many.” I asked if he thought my deportation was fair. He said he had not read my book, so he could not comment. “Do you have a copy of your book with you?” he asked “I would be interested to read it.”

I laughed, and said I did not, but I offered to send it to him. He did not provide his address.

I asked him if he enjoyed working for a government that treats its people so badly, and if he knew that ethnic nationalities in Burma were particularly suffering under this regime. No response.

I asked what he thought about the events in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya. “I don’t like this kind of change,” he said. “I think it was created by Al Qaeda. Do you think so?”

No, I said, the movements in these countries were led by ordinary people who hate dictatorship.

“But democracy gives Al Qaeda opportunities,” he said.

I disagreed. “Democratic, open societies are a better way to challenge extremism and terrorism than dictatorship,” I said.

Then they told me I could board the plane. I reminded them that they had my passport, and they were confused over what to do. I said: “No passport, I stay in Myanmar, O.K.?” and we all laughed.

They shook my hand and said goodbye. “Thank you for treating me well,” I said. “I know that your government does not treat your own people well at all, but I am grateful that at least you treated me well.”

The Burmese pro-democracy leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi recently urged Western nations to maintain economic sanctions against Myanmar, where the world’s longest-running military dictatorship is tightening its repressive ways: Over 2,000 prisoners of conscience languish behind bars in squalid conditions, while arbitrary arrests and detentions, extrajudicial killings, torture and other abuses continue to be widespread and systematic, particularly in ethnic areas.

Nevertheless, Mrs. Aung San Suu Kyi’s message is not without controversy. It comes just weeks before the European Union will revisit its hotly debated sanctions policy, and a few disquieted Western policymakers, corporate executives and think tanks are advocating for economic engagement with the reclusive generals and their cronies. Sanctions policy is not only antiquated, ineffective, and hurtful to the Burmese people, they argue, it also gives the upper hand to China, which is sending companies to Burma with abandon, especially for big-ticket energy projects tapping natural gas reserves.

Beijing has at least 16 oil and gas companies invested in 21 onshore and offshore projects in Burma, far more than any other country. Until now, there’s been very little information available about these projects, the largest of which are dual gas and oil pipelines under construction from western Burma to the Chinese border, led by the state-controlled China National Petroleum Corporation and Korea’s Daewoo International.

Passing rugged mountains, dense jungles, arid plains, important rivers and a number of contested territories and population densities in Burma, the 500-mile-long pipelines will enable Beijing to bypass the vulnerable Strait of Malacca and supply gas and oil directly to landlocked Yunnan Province.

Leaked documents and clandestine interviews with affected populations along the project route in Burma confirm that the Burmese military is responsible for guarding the pipelines and related infrastructure, and for committing serious human rights violations in connection to the projects.

The most common violation so far is land confiscation and forced or coerced evictions. Families have been stripped of their means of subsistence — their land — with little or no compensation, making them instantly more vulnerable to the trappings of poverty and abuse in the militarized state.

“I don’t have enough rice for my family,” said one farmer who lost the land his family cultivated for generations. “I worry for my family.”

Violent abuses are also happening. “They blindfolded me and put me in a car,” an Arakanese man reported, referring to Burma’s Military Intelligence, “I’m not sure where they drove.” This man was tortured brutally for four days in a windowless room before standing trial on trumped-up charges with no defense lawyer.

Not that legal representation would have mattered. In proceedings that he says lasted five minutes, a Burmese judge sentenced him to six months in the notorious Insein Prison, where he survived appalling conditions before going into hiding. His crime: leading two community-level training sessions to raise awareness about the pipelines.

Unsurprisingly, in a multitude of interviews, not one villager expressed support for the pipelines.

Perhaps of greatest concern for Burma’s development is that the projects will generate billions of dollars annually through gas sales, taxes, fees, royalties and production bonuses. If the past is any judge, those revenues will accrue to the military rulers and serve to widen the gap between the haves and the have-nots. Burma already ranks as the world’s second most corrupt country, beating only Somalia, according to Transparency International, which publishes a widely cited corruption perception index.

Barring targeted action from the international community, revenues from these pipelines will likely remain outside the national budget and tucked away in offshore bank accounts held in trust for the military rulers and their closed network of political and economic elite. Despite billions of dollars in export gas sales already coming in, new schools and hospitals are few and far between in resource-rich Burma, but luxury homes and expensive cars for the ruling elite and their families abound.

As sanctions policies are revisited, Western oil and mining companies shouldn’t assume they have the answers for Burma’s development or that they can do better than China. No matter how well intentioned a company may be, no matter how responsible, constructing new energy projects in Burma’s contested ethnic territories with the backing of the Burmese Army is bound to be violent, and enormous revenue flows into military coffers will do more to perpetuate authoritarianism than to promote positive change, regardless of where those revenues come from.

Barring meaningful political changes, new energy projects in today’s Burma are simply not good business — for China, the West, or the people of Burma, regardless of any sanctions policy.

En demandant le 28 février 2011 le maintien des sanctions économiques à l’égard du régime birman, Aung San Suu Kyi et sa Ligue nationale pour la démocratie (LND) auront clarifié leur position sur un sujet toujours au centre de nombreuses polémiques. Certains observateurs, prêtant à la figure de référence du mouvement démocratique birman leurs propres vues, avaient pourtant affirmé que cette dernière avait “changé d’avis” sur les sanctions.

A la source de cette erreur, une lecture hâtive de la lettre qu’Aung San Suu Kyi adressait à l’homme fort de la dictature birmane, Than Shwe, le 29 septembre 2009. Elle s’y disait prête à rencontrer le dirigeant de la junte afin de travailler avec lui à la levée des sanctions. Cette offre était assortie de conditions, visant à l’évidence à pousser le régime militaire à la table des négociations. Ainsi Aung San Suu Kyi précisait-elle qu’“afin de travailler efficacement à la levée des sanctions”, il fallait d’abord étudier les éventuels dommages causés par celles-ci et les motivations des gouvernements à l’origine de ces dernières. Quelques précisions auxquelles nombre d’observateurs ne souhaitèrent pas porter attention.

Pour Aung San Suu Kyi et son parti, il ne saurait pourtant être question de lever les sanctions sans qu’un progrès significatif ait été accompli par le régime birman sur le plan politique. Une question légitime est cependant posée : les sanctions pénalisent-elles la population ? Une évaluation a récemment été conduite par la LND et s’appuie notamment sur une étude du Fonds monétaire international. Se basant sur les conclusions de cette dernière, Aung San Suu Kyi déclarait que “la grande majorité des Birmans, qui travaille dans l’agriculture, n’est affectée en rien”. La mauvaise situation du pays s’expliquerait davantage par l’inaptitude de la junte en matière économique ainsi que par le “capitalisme de connivence” qui sévit en Birmanie.

Cette affirmation qu’Aung San Suu Kyi aurait évolué sur la question des sanctions n’était basée ni sur une lecture correcte de ses propos ni sur une étude de l’impact des sanctions sur la population civile. Pourquoi cette contre-vérité s’est-elle affirmé avec une telle force ?

Difficile d’abord de ne pas observer la façon dont l’opportunisme commercial revêt les atours du pragmatisme politique. Frustrés de voir des marchés leur échapper, des investisseurs occidentaux insistent sur le fait qu’exposer le régime birman aux standards éthiques de l’occident ne pourrait que favoriser l’évolution sociale et politique du pays. Les paysans birmans réduits au travail forcé au bénéfice de Total apprécieront. De même, on peut s’inquiéter des activités d’Alcatel-Lucent qui, par l’intermédiaire de l’une de ses filiales, aurait permis à la junte birmane de centraliser les moyens de communication électroniques du pays et partant de les surveiller voire de les censurer.

Outre ceux qui souhaitent l’ouverture des marchés birmans, certains observateurs défendent également l’idée que les sanctions seraient contre-productives. Non soutenues par les puissances asiatiques, ces dernières seraient incapables de faire peser sur la dictature une pression à même d’entraîner sa chute. Elles auraient en revanche pour conséquence de braquer le régime. La solution serait alors inverse : en finir avec toute pression sur la junte afin de ne pas compromettre les timides avancées en cours.

Beaucoup sont convaincus que les élections du 7 novembre 2010, farce démocratique s’il en est, constituent cependant un progrès. Une évolution de la structure du pouvoir est certes bien à l’œuvre en Birmanie. Cependant, cette évolution n’a pas pour but d’augurer une évolution démocratique mais de le faire croire. Faut-il penser que la mise en place – plutôt que l’élection – d’un nouveau parlement constitue une promesse d’ouverture dès lors que celui-ci est soumis au contrôle total d’un conseil militaire ? Aucun progrès tangible vers la démocratisation du pays n’étant encore survenu, Aung San Suu Kyi et la LND ont estimé que les conditions n’étaient pas réunies pour une levée des sanctions.

L’heure n’est pas venue de relâcher la pression sur le régime birman. En avril prochain, lors du renouvellement de la position commune européenne sur la Birmanie, la France devra appuyer le maintien et l’amélioration de la politique de sanctions économiques ciblées visant la dictature birmane. Elle doit aussi user de toutes ses ressources diplomatiques afin qu’émerge un consensus international sur la mise en place d’une commission d’enquête sur les crimes de guerre et crimes contre l’humanité commis en Birmanie.

No existe nada comparable a estar allí. A falta de eso, lo mejor es un enlace de vídeo. De pronto, aquí tenemos a Aung San Suu Kyi, en una pantalla delante de nosotros, en directo desde el 54 de University Avenue en Rangún. Está sentada con la espalda muy tiesa, tranquila, elegante con su blusa blanca, y vagamente divertida, tras más de siete años de aislamiento, por las nuevas y poco familiares tecnologías de la comunicación a larga distancia. “Estoy muy contenta de poder comunicarme con ustedes”, dice, “es un gran progreso para mí”, y el enlace de vídeo se cae.

Poco después vuelve a entrar en contacto con el auditorio de la London School of Economics, lleno de estudiantes y especialistas, mediante una terrible conexión de teléfono. A ratos no puede descifrar lo que le preguntamos y a ratos nosotros no podemos descifrar lo que responde ella, con su voz distorsionada que nos atruena desde un altavoz. Después de que un alumno intente hacerle varias veces una pregunta ligeramente complicada, Suu Kyi dice: “Dígame una palabra clave”. “¡Compañías multinacionales!”, gritamos. “¡Inversiones en Birmania!”. Se ríe, nos reímos, por el tono casi cómico de estas conversaciones a larga distancia. “Tenemos años de práctica de hablar sin obtener respuesta”, dice en un momento dado, pensando que se ha cortado la conexión. Práctica de hablar con los generales que están llevando su país a la ruina, claro.

No creo que ninguno de esos estudiantes olviden jamás el día que pudieron hacerle una pregunta directamente a Aung San Suu Kyi. A pesar de las dificultades técnicas, su personalidad y su mensaje traspasan las barreras. El mensaje es decidido, pero también conciliador. Subraya en varias ocasiones que confía en trabajar con las autoridades militares, no en contra de ellas. Por lo que podemos descifrar de su respuesta, parece acoger con precaución la idea de una comisión internacional que investigue la situación de Birmania, y hace hincapié en que no debe considerarse en absoluto “un proceso a los generales”.

Tras siete años y medio de arresto domiciliario, en los que obtenía noticias de su propio país solo a base de escuchar constantemente programas de radio internacionales, es evidente que Aung San Suu Kyi quiere darse un tiempo para aclararse las ideas. ¿Podrá revivir su debilitada Liga Nacional para la Democracia? ¿Podrá reagrupar a los que se apartaron o formaron un nuevo partido con la esperanza (vana) de obtener un número significativo de escaños en las últimas elecciones? ¿Qué pasa con los monjes budistas que transmitieron tanta energía y disciplina al movimiento pacífico de protesta en 2007? Y otra cosa importante: ¿podrá establecer vínculos con los representantes de las minorías étnicas que constituyen aproximadamente un tercio de la población del país? Es lo que hizo su padre, Aung San, en 1947, en la conferencia de Panglong que ayudó a preparar el terreno para la independencia de Birmania. Hoy, ella dice que confía en que haya “un segundo Panglong”.

Al pedirle que diga cuáles son sus fuentes de inspiración, responde: “En primer lugar, mis padres”. Luego menciona al arzobispo Desmond Tutu. Después, cuando la conversación vuelve sobre la idea de una comisión de la verdad y la reconciliación, como la que presidió Tutu en Sudáfrica, explica que las cosas son más complicadas en Birmania. “Ojalá fuéramos todos negros”, piensa a veces, porque entonces los birmanos y las minorías étnicas reconocerían que forman, todos ellos, una mayoría oprimida. Como indica el especialista en Birmania Maung Zarni, en la versión birmana del apartheid, los militares hacen el papel de los blancos.

Es una conversación estimulante, que supera todos los obstáculos. Todo me empuja de forma instintiva a enmarcarla en un relato de liberación, gradual, a menudo frustrada, pero al final triunfante. “Porque la batalla de la libertad, una vez comenzada… aunque a menudo frustrada, siempre se gana”: estas grandes palabras del poeta inglés del siglo XIX Byron aparecieron clavadas en una cruz de madera ante los astilleros Lenin de Gdansk, durante el nacimiento del movimiento polaco Solidaridad hace 30 años. Hoy, la batalla de la libertad se libra y se frustra con las armas de Internet, el satélite y el teléfono móvil. Algunos las llaman “tecnologías de la liberación”.

Desmond Tutu ha hecho una reflexión optimista sobre la “maravillosa” conversación telefónica que tuvo él mismo con Suu Kyi (“parecía constantemente a punto de estallar en carcajadas”) a principios de este mes: “Cuando pienso en la situación que había en Sudáfrica, recuerdo muchos momentos en los que parecía que nunca íbamos a ver la libertad en nuestro país, cuando nuestros opresores parecían invencibles. Pero, como digo siempre, este es un universo moral y la injusticia y la opresión acaban derrotados al final”.

Sin embargo, un análisis frío muestra una combinación de fuerzas menos favorable en torno a Birmania que en Sudáfrica, o en Polonia, o en Filipinas, o en Chile, o en todos los otros casos en los que la libertad ha resultado triunfadora en los últimos 30 años. No solo por la debilidad y las divisiones del movimiento de oposición, después de decenios de opresión brutal y la estrategia del régimen de “divide y vencerás”. Eso puede cambiar, con tiempo, una dura labor sobre el terreno y unos líderes inspirados.

Es, sobre todo, un problema del contexto exterior. Algunos lectores recordarán que hace un mes me preguntaba en esta columna si la mayor democracia del mundo, India, podría ser más fiel a sus valores en relación con su pequeño y vapuleado vecino oriental. El presidente Barack Obama, nada menos, planteó una pregunta similar durante su visita oficial a dicho país. Me da la impresión de que, hasta el momento, la respuesta ha sido un rotundo silencio. India no está preparada para discutir la cuestión con las otras grandes democracias mundiales, ni mucho menos para cambiar su forma de actuar. Mientras los vecinos asiáticos de Birmania, incluidas Tailandia y, por supuesto, China, sigan comportándose de esta forma, poniendo sus intereses comerciales y estratégicos por encima de las vidas de los sufridos habitantes del país -y por delante de lo que les interesa a largo plazo, que es tener un vecino próspero y estable-, los generales estarán encantados.

Birmania no es el único caso en el que el entorno exterior es desfavorable. Este es el mundo posoccidental. Si las cosas siguen así, Internet, los satélites y los móviles nos permitirán asomarnos a la jaula, pero no abrir la puerta. Podremos ver con más claridad a los amigos de la libertad asediados, pero no podremos ayudarles mejor. Cuando el ganador del Premio Nobel de la Paz de este año, Liu Xiaobo, salga libre, quizá tengamos la oportunidad de hablar también con él por un enlace de vídeo, aunque, por ahora, está bloqueado incluso el teléfono de su mujer. Podemos observar al multimillonario ruso Mijaíl Jodorkovski, injustamente encarcelado, tras las rejas, pero él sigue encerrado.

Tenemos ante nosotros una versión política del dramático espectáculo de los mineros chilenos. Los vimos gracias a una cámara de vídeo cuando todavía estaban atrapados bajo tierra, pero si sus propios esfuerzos y la perforación de la roca no hubieran dado fruto, ese vídeo solo habría servido para verlos morir.

Esta no es una opinión dictada por la desesperación, sino por el realismo. En Birmania, como en todas partes, las tecnologías de la comunicación, por sí solas, no ponen a nadie en libertad. A las personas las liberan otras personas.

The recent release of Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest, after deeply flawed elections that allowed the military in Myanmar, also known as Burma, to tighten its half-century-long grip on the country, raises numerous political questions: What comes next for her? Will the ruling junta engage her newly reconstituted National Democracy Party? Will other political prisoners be freed?

While political headlines are filled with uncertainty, recent business headlines are not. It was reported last month that Chinese companies had invested $10 billion in Myanmar’s economy from January through May. A Thai-Italian partnership signed a $10 billion contract Nov. 2 to build a massive industrial zone on Myanmar’s coast – a project that Myanmar’s dictator, Senior Gen. Than Shwe, reportedly views as “an experiment in opening the largely state-controlled economy.” More than 30 companies, from Russian to Indian to French, are engaged in oil and gas exploration across Myanmar.

Yet while American companies’ interest in doing business in Myanmar has increased, Reuters reported last month, Western sanctions continue to prevent American participation.

Washington’s claim on the moral high ground is admirable, if one sets aside the fact that the only people who continue to suffer from Western sanctions are the 50 million people of Myanmar. After nearly two decades of U.S.-led sanctions that have sought to isolate Myanmar’s military rulers, it is increasingly clear that the only nation really isolated in Southeast Asia today is . . . America.

By refusing to engage Myanmar because of its repressive practices, Washington has forced that country’s leaders – who have no idea how to construct a modern economy – to emulate the nearest successful model: China. Than Shwe recently said as much, proclaiming his desire to “emulate China’s remarkable . . . transformation into one of the most successful capitalist stories ever.”

A longtime American observer of Myanmar who was recently in Southeast Asia told me: “A senior official from one country said, ‘Our people won’t even buy your jeans anymore, such is the grass-roots backlash. By abandoning the people of Myanmar to China, you Americans have squandered moral stature as the world’s savior.’ ”

But that perception could still be changed, he added. “The real issue in Myanmar lies in the business sector. This is where Yankee ingenuity can lead by example.”

With the election over, America should do four things:

First, recognize that further sanctions mean surrendering Myanmar to China. There is a good reason sanctions haven’t worked: Too many others don’t recognize them. The dissident news agency Mizzima reported in July that from 1988 to early 2009, Myanmar attracted foreign investment worth $15 billion. In 2011-12, according to the Irrawaddy news agency, the junta expects foreign investment to top $16 billion.

For China, which recently approved $90 billion in soft import-export loans for the junta, Myanmar represents a wealth of natural resources as well as direct access to the Indian Ocean – which is why Beijing is building oil and gas pipelines from Kunming, in southwest China, to the port of Kyaukpyu in Myanmar. By 2012, they will carry 85 percent of China’s imported energy.

If the U.S. response to last month’s elections is, as rumored, a ban on U.S. dollar transactions with Myanmar, “China would have a blank slate in Myanmar for years to come,” says the longtime observer.

Second, focus on capacity building. Myanmar’s economy was neglected for decades. Efforts have been made recently to build up foreign reserves, improve dialogue with international financial institutions and issue bonds to finance the nation’s 2009-10 budget deficit (a departure from its practice of printing money).

Washington should work with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to build capacity in Myanmar – starting with governance training for newly elected leaders and the revival of the financial sector. ASEAN has incentive to participate: Myanmar, a member, remains the biggest hurdle to a U.S.-ASEAN free-trade agreement and to ASEAN’s goal of regional economic integration by 2015.

Third, rebuild the agricultural sector. Seventy percent of Myanmar’s people live in rural areas, and agriculture accounts for 40 to 50 percent of gross domestic product. Before World War II, Myanmar was the world’s biggest exporter of rice. Misguided government policy has squandered that legacy. America should work with the U.N. Development Program and ASEAN to help build a bank-based rural credit system to bring Myanmar’s rice economy into the 21st century.

Fourth, link the West’s economic sanctions to Myanmar’s economic policies. Currently, Western sanctions will be lifted only if political benchmarks are met. Those carrots have proved ineffective. They might be productive, however, if linked to economic concerns such as respect for private property, the lifting of arbitrary restrictions on private business and the creation of a working credit system. Economic benchmarks led to political change in Korea, Indonesia and Singapore. For Western companies eager to enter new markets, it could be a huge opportunity.

A century ago, Myanmar’s economy was the region’s crown jewel. Korea and even China considered it a role model. The recent election was deeply flawed, but it provided hope for a new beginning. It’s time to end the U.S. isolation in Southeast Asia and engage Myanmar.

Si queremos ayudar a Aung San Suu Kyi y contribuir a la causa de la libertad en Myanmar, debemos confiar en que India redescubra su mejor faceta. La democracia más poblada del planeta necesita revisar con urgencia su relación con una de las peores tiranías del mundo, agazapada como un sapo en el umbral de su propia puerta. Si no lo hace, parece muy poco probable que las fuerzas de oposición birmanas, débiles y divididas, y las potencias occidentales sean capaces de crear los apoyos suficientes para impulsar la revolución no violenta y negociada de la que ha vuelto a hablar la heroína liberada. Mientras los generales birmanos puedan contar con la realpolitik estratégica y comercial de China y las evasivas de Tailandia y otros países de Asociación de Naciones del Sureste Asiático, (ASEAN) por intereses comerciales y energéticos, la única potencia exterior que podrá alterar el equilibrio de fuerzas dentro y alrededor de Myanmar será India.

Quizá me equivoque. Ojalá me equivoque. Pero un análisis en frío indica que la responsabilidad última de Myanmar corresponde a Nueva Delhi. Es evidente que está fuera de lugar -e incluso puede ser contraproducente- cualquier lección torpe por parte de las antiguas potencias coloniales y EE UU. No se trata de que India se adapte de pronto a la estrategia política de Occidente. Al contrario, en Occidente deberíamos acudir al gigante democrático regional para que nos diga cuál es la mejor forma de fomentar el cambio en la miserable dictadura vecina. Así se debería trabajar en un mundo cada vez más posoccidental. ¿Y quién mejor para indicar el camino de apoyo a uno de los movimientos de liberación más espectacularmente no violentos de nuestra era que el país de Gandhi y Nehru? Por suerte, existen ya varias voces indias importantes que hacen las preguntas necesarias sobre la estrategia política de su Gobierno, con más autoridad que cualquier comentarista occidental. En un reciente artículo, Shashi Tharoor, ex ministro de Estado de Asuntos Exteriores de India y ex vicesecretario general de la ONU, recordaba la trayectoria recorrida por su país, desde un idealismo tal vez excesivo hasta un supuesto realismo sin principios. Nehru era amigo del padre de Suu Kyi, el general Aung San, líder de la lucha birmana por la independencia. La propia Suu Kyi vivió y estudió en Nueva Delhi, y en su libro Freedom from Fear se incluye un largo ensayo que compara la vida intelectual en India y Birmania durante el periodo colonial. A finales de los años ochenta y principios de los noventa, India ofreció un generoso apoyo a su Liga Nacional para la Democracia.

Pero entonces los rivales regionales de India, China y Pakistán, empezaron a querer congraciarse con el régimen birmano parabeneficiarse de sus enormes reservas de gas, petróleo y otras riquezas naturales. Y cuando el presidente paquistaní Pervez Musharraf fue a Myanmar, el ministro indio de Exteriores se apresuró a seguir sus pasos. “India dio un giro de 180 grados”, escribe Tharoor. Colocó sus intereses económicos y geoestratégicos por delante de sus simpatías y sus valores. Especialmente escandalosa fue la reacción india -o, mejor dicho, la falta de reacción- ante las protestas absolutamente gandhianas que encabezaron los monjes budistas en Myanmar en 2007. El ministro indio del Petróleo visitó el país para firmar contratos sobre crudo y gas con el régimen en el momento más caliente. Cuando el régimen llevó a cabo su brutal represión de la llamada (demasiado pronto) revolución azafrán, el Gobierno indio se limitó a hacer unas declaraciones patéticas en las que expresaba su confianza en que “todas las partes resolvieran sus problemas de forma pacífica”.

Aún más elocuentes son las críticas que hace el gran economista del desarrollo y pensador político Amartya Sen. En un artículo escrito antes de que Suu Kyi saliera en libertad, Sen recuerda su infancia, que pasó en Mandalay, Birmania (donde su padre era profesor visitante), y exclama: “Tengo que decir que, como leal ciudadano indio, me parte el alma ver al primer ministro de mi democrático país -uno de los dirigentes políticos más humanos y compasivos del mundo- dedicado a dar la bienvenida a los carniceros de Myanmar”. El problema nace, sugiere, “de un cambio en el clima político de India que ha hecho que se defiendan con gran fidelidad los intereses nacionales -o unos supuestos intereses nacionales- concebidos con estrechez de miras y que la tendencia de India a dar lecciones de moral política al mundo se considere un triste recuerdo de la ingenuidad de Nehru”.

Como las demás democracias, India tiene que mantener un equilibrio entre defender sus intereses y defender sus valores; o, para ser más precisos, entre sus valores y sus intereses a largo plazo, por un lado (porque a India le interesa que exista un Myanmar próspero y abierto) y sus intereses inmediatos y estrechos, por otro. Por supuesto, India no es la primera democracia de la historia que se ha equivocado al respecto (no hay más que acordarse de EE UU, en Latinoamérica, por ejemplo, para no hablar de Reino Unido en India). Pero se ha equivocado. Tengo entendido que, en una reunión con diplomáticos celebrada en la capital birmana el domingo pasado, Suu Kyi manifestó al embajador indio, en tono suave pero firme, su esperanza de que los intereses comerciales no distorsionaran la amistad histórica entre los dos países.

Esto no quiere decir que India deba unirse de pronto a la política de sanciones selectivas adoptada hace tiempo por Occidente, ni tampoco pretendo recetar ninguna respuesta política concreta. Los amigos de la libertad en Myanmar, tanto próximos como lejanos, necesitan tomarse unas semanas, como la propia Suu Kyi, para averiguar qué está ocurriendo verdaderamente allí. Una vez pasado el entusiasmo inicial por su liberación -que, para mí, supera sin ninguna duda al que me provoca un compromiso en la familia real-, se ve con claridad que el contexto político en el que sale a la calle está a años luz, no solo del de Nelson Mandela en Sudáfrica y el de Václav Havel en Checoslovaquia, sino incluso del de Andréi Sájarov en la Unión Soviética.

Esta liberación no prepara el terreno para unas elecciones democratizadoras, ni mucho menos, sino que sigue a unas elecciones que el régimen militar robó y manipuló con torpeza, con lo cual desbarató los planes de los opositores de la “tercera fuerza” que habían abandonado la Liga Nacional para la Democracia con el fin de intentar cambiar el sistema desde dentro. El centro reformista, pragmático y francamente chaquetero, tan esencial para llevar a cabo una transición negociada, ha quedado aplastado precisamente cuando más necesario era. Además, aunque se ha puesto en libertad a una presa política de fama internacional, quedan aún en la cárcel más de otros 2.000. Suu Kyi es la primera en insistir en que no será posible ningún proceso serio de negociación y reconciliación mientras sigan encerrados.

Y aunque salgan a la calle, el proceso no habrá hecho más que empezar. El dominio militar de todas las áreas de la vida nacional, la interpenetración de los intereses militares y empresariales, la flagrante miseria de la población, el mosaico de minorías étnicas, señores de la droga, corrupción… Myanmar es un reto que haría palidecer a un mesías.

Por consiguiente, necesitamos esperar y ver qué pasa; y necesitamos un diálogo, no solo entre las fuerzas democráticas dentro de Myanmar, sino entre ellas y sus vecinos democráticos, sobre todo India.

Que India sea capaz de elaborar una nueva política en relación con Myanmar, que esté a la altura de sus valores y tradiciones y al mismo tiempo de sus intereses legítimos, es fundamental para el futuro del hermoso y martirizado país de Suu Kyi. Y es también muy importante para saber cómo va a ser el mundo posoccidental. Hablamos sin parar de China, pero la estrategia que ejerza India respecto a su desgraciado vecino nos permitirá atisbar el auténtico rostro de la otra gran potencia emergente de Asia.

(Versión en español)

With the release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi from prolonged house detention, it is time for the United States and its European partners to moderate their sanctions policy against Myanmar (Burma) so as to create incentives for greater political openness and to insulate its citizens from the rigors of the punitive actions.

There is no reason why a weak, impoverished Myanmar should continue to be held to a higher human-rights standard than an increasingly assertive China. Why deny Myanmar the international-trade opportunities that have allowed the world’s biggest executioner, China, to prosper?

The defining events that led to the crushing of pro-democracy forces in Myanmar and China actually occurred around the same time more than two decades ago, yet the West responded to the developments in the two countries in very different ways.

China’s spectacular economic rise owes a lot to the Western decision not to sustain trade sanctions after the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre of pro-democracy protestors. The Cold War’s end facilitated Washington’s pragmatic approach to shun trade sanctions and help integrate China with global institutions through the liberalizing influence of foreign investment and trade.

That the choice made was wise can be seen from the baneful impact of the opposite decision in favor of sustained sanctions against Myanmar, which brutally suppressed pro-democracy demonstrators 10 months before Tiananmen Square and subsequently refused to honor the outcome of a national election in 1990. Had the Myanmar-type approach of escalating sanctions been applied against China internationally, the result would have been a less prosperous and a potentially destabilizing China today.

By contrast, the continuation of sanctions and their subsequent expansion against Myanmar snuffed out any prospect of that country emulating China’s example of blending economic openness with political authoritarianism. Indeed, the military’s attempts to open up the Myanmar economy in the early 1990s fizzled out quickly in the face of Western penal actions.

Today, the release of Aung San Suu Kyi offers the U.S. and Europe an opportunity to recalibrate the sanctions policy by drawing on the lessons of the past two decades.

The first lesson is that the economic sanctions, even if justified, have produced the wrong political results. Years of sanctions have left Myanmar without an entrepreneurial class or civil society and saddled with an all-powerful military as the sole functioning institution.

A second lesson is that the expansion of sanctions has not only further isolated Myanmar, but also made that country overly dependent on China, to the concern of the nationalistic Myanmar military. At a time when the United States is courting Communist-ruled Vietnam as part of its “hedge” strategy against a resurgent China, it makes little sense to continue with an approach that is pushing a strategically located Myanmar into China’s strategic lap.

Yet another lesson is that the sanctions have hurt not their intended target — the military — but ordinary citizens. By cutting off investment and squeezing vital sectors of the Myanmar economy, from tourism to textiles, the sanctions have lowered the living conditions of the Burmese and shut out liberalizing influences.

The blunt fact is that after being in power for nearly half a century, the military has become too fat to return to the barracks. In fact, it won’t fit in the barracks.

With no hope of a “color revolution” in Myanmar, demilitarization of the polity can at best be a step-by-step process. In that context, the recent elections, although far from being free or fair, have helped revive a long-dormant political process, given birth to new political players and institutions (including a bicameral national Parliament, 14 regional parliaments and the impending appointment of a president and civilian federal government), and implicitly created a feeling of empowerment among the people.

With the military now in the throes of a generational change, the revived political process has created new space for the democracy movement, as symbolized by Aung San Suu Kyi’s release. But with the opposition badly splintered and the military’s grip on power firm as ever, Aung San Suu Kyi cannot bring about tangible democratic reforms without building bridges with the armed forces.

Now is the time, with Myanmar in transition, for the United States and its allies to get out of a self-perpetuating cycle of sanctions and help carve out greater international space in that nation. Each step toward greater political openness in Myanmar ought to be suitably rewarded.

More broadly, democracy promotion should not become a geopolitical tool wielded only against the weak and the marginalized.

Going after the small kids on the global block but courting the most-powerful autocrats is hardly the way to build international norms or ensure positive results.

An uncompromisingly penal approach against Myanmar has had the perverse effect of weakening America’s hand while strengthening China’s. This was best illustrated during the Bush administration, which, after slapping the harshest sanctions on Myanmar, turned to Beijing as a channel of communication with the Burmese junta.

President Barack Obama began on the right note by exploring the prospect of a gradual reengagement with Myanmar. Yet on his recent visit to India, Obama attacked Myanmar three times, reflecting his frustration with the painfully slow movement to create a democratic opening in that nation.

Despite Aung San Suu Kyi’s release, the seeds of democracy will not take root in a stunted economy. External penal actions without constructive engagement and civil-society development in a critically weak country defeat their very purpose.

(Versión en inglés)

Aung San Suu Kyi es la activista más famosa del mundo en defensa de la democracia y ahora, gracias a usted querido lector, está en libertad. Su prolongado arresto domiciliario ha llegado a su fin debido a la incansable presión ejercida de un extremo al otro del planeta por millones de personas que creen que ninguna injusticia dura para siempre. Sin embargo, el levantamiento de su arresto domiciliario, bajo el que ha pasado 15 de los últimos 21 años, representa tan solo una victoria parcial porque su liberación y la del pueblo birmano no serán completas mientras Suu Kyi no recupere su condición de legítima dirigente de su país.

Las recientes elecciones birmanas constituyeron un ejercicio de relaciones públicas, no de participación pública. La Constitución traída por los generales consagra el principio de que el presidente, que no es responsable ante el Parlamento, debe ser un militar, ya sea retirado o en servicio activo, y encabezar un Gobierno que no es necesario que incluya a un solo miembro electo del Parlamento. La decisión de poner en libertad a Suu Kyi demuestra que la Junta es consciente de que tener una única referencia simbólica de la resistencia le resulta contraproducente, pero no nos consta ninguna prueba de que tengan la más mínima intención de ceder un ápice y permitir una genuina reforma democrática.

A lo largo de dos décadas he ofrecido a Suu Kyi y a su familia todo el apoyo que he podido prestarles y le he escrito en numerosas ocasiones para decirle que hasta en el último rincón de Gran Bretaña hay personas que la tienen en su pensamiento y en sus oraciones. Mantuve una reunión con su marido, Michael Aris, que posteriormente murió de cáncer sin que le permitieran volverla a ver, y le prometí que haría todo lo que estuviera en mi mano.

Durante más de 20 años, la familia de Suu Kyi ha soportado el dolor de la separación y su fuerza nos ha servido de inspiración a todos. Su sostén ha sido no sólo la valentía de los monjes y de otros contestatarios birmanos que han desafiado la represión para proclamar públicamente su lealtad a la causa democrática sino también la solidaridad mundial promovida por organizaciones como Birmania Campaign UK, avaaz.org y otras.

El pasado fin de semana, cuando a invitación de mi mujer hice de editor de sus mensajes de Twitter para promover que se conociera más la grave situación de Suu Kyi, me sentí abrumado por cómo muchísimas personas de todos los rincones del mundo consideran ésta una de las causas definitorias de nuestra época. Por supuesto, hay injusticias graves en otros lugares, como la continua pérdida silenciosa de vidas que la pobreza extrema causa a diario a miles y miles de personas. Sin embargo, eso no debería servir jamás de excusa para que volvamos la espalda a infracciones tan grotescas de los derechos humanos como las que se han infligido a la dirigente democrática de Birmania. Un tweet enviado desde Amnesty fue especialmente aleccionador: «Nadie por debajo de 38 años (la mitad de la población de Birmania) ha votado hasta ahora». Que una población en su conjunto pueda llegar a la edad adulta sin haber ejercido jamás el voto y que luego se le ofrezca exclusivamente una sola papeleta en la que no aparece el principal partido de oposición del país representa todo un testimonio del enquistamiento de la Junta en el poder y de su brutalidad.

La democratización de Birmania no va a ser nada fácil, pero no es imposible. La Red es nuestra arma. A través de ella, las personas de buena voluntad pueden organizarse y aplicar esa forma de presión que dio lugar a la liberación del sábado. Sin embargo, y exactamente igual de importante, gracias a las nuevas tecnologías los activistas de Birmania pueden contar al mundo lo que está ocurriendo. En ningún otro medio queda este hecho más patente que en la película Birmania VJ, realizada por periodistas que han conseguido sacar de contrabando todas las imágenes fuera del país. En el avance de la película, hay una secuencia escalofriante en la que alguien que se encuentra al teléfono está contemplando desde una ventana la agresión a unos manifestantes y explicándosela a un amigo.

«¿A quién han disparado?», pregunta el amigo. La respuesta es la siguiente: «A un chico con una cámara».

Los generales tienen miedo de que se les observe, miedo de las pruebas, miedo de la solidaridad. En pocas palabras, tienen miedo de usted. La liberación de Suu Kyi es una de las grandes victorias del poder de la gente en nuestra época. Ojalá consigamos que la siguiente liberación sea la de su país.

(Versión en inglés)

La liberación de Suu Kyi brinda una oportunidad para reevaluar una política de sanciones contraproducente en el caso de Birmania. Con ocasión de la liberación de la líder en favor de la democracia tras un prolongado arresto domiciliario, es hora de que Estados Unidos y sus socios europeos suavicen su política de sanciones contra Birmania (Myanmar, en denominación de la junta) a fin de aportar estímulos orientados a suscitar una mayor apertura política. No tiene sentido que a una débil y empobrecida Birmania se le deba seguir exigiendo un nivel más alto de respeto a los derechos humanos que en el caso de la firme y autoritaria China. ¿Por qué negar a Birmania las oportunidades de comercio exterior que han permitido prosperar al mayor protagonista del mundo en este terreno?

Los acontecimientos clave que condujeron al aplastamiento de las fuerzas favorables a la democracia en Birmania y en China tuvieron lugar aproximadamente al mismo tiempo, alrededor de hace veinte años, a lo que Occidente respondió sin embargo en lo concerniente a estos dos países de muy diferente manera.

El espectacular auge económico chino debe mucho a la decisión occidental de no mantener las sanciones comerciales tras la matanza de la plaza de Tiananmen en 1989 ejercida contra manifestantes que se pronunciaban en favor de la democracia.

El final de la guerra fría favoreció el enfoque pragmático de Washington de rehuir la aplicación de sanciones comerciales y ayudar a China con el concurso de las instituciones y organismos internacionales y mediante el instrumento que representa el influjo liberalizador de la inversión y el comercio exterior.

Cabe afirmar que se trató de un acierto tras constatar el nocivo efecto de la decisión contraria, favorable a seguir manteniendo sanciones contra Birmania, cuyas autoridades reprimieron brutalmente a los manifestantes en favor de la democracia diez meses antes de los hechos de la plaza de Tiananmen y, posteriormente, dieron luz verde a la celebración de elecciones generales pero no reconocieron sus resultados en 1990. De haberse aplicado el enfoque del tipo Birmania de sanciones crecientes contra China, tal opción habría resultado en una China menos próspera y, posiblemente, factor de desestabilización en la actualidad.

La prosecución de sanciones y su subsiguiente ampliación contra Birmania extinguió cualquier perspectiva en el sentido de que este país emulara el ejemplo de China, consistente básicamente en combinar la apertura económica con el autoritarismo político.

De hecho, los intentos de la junta militar de abrir de par en par la economía birmana a principios de los años noventa se desinflaron rápidamente ante las sanciones occidentales.

En este momento, la liberación de Suu Kyi ofrece una oportunidad para reevaluar la política de sanciones extrayendo las correspondientes lecciones de hace dos décadas. La primera lección es que las sanciones económicas, aunque estén justificadas, han acarreado efectos políticos negativos.

Años de sanciones han privado a Birmania de una clase empresarial o de una sociedad civil; por el contrario, le han impuesto la losa de una todopoderosa junta militar en términos de única institución en el poder.

Una segunda lección consiste en que la ampliación de las sanciones no sólo ha aislado en mayor medida a Birmania, sino que también ha motivado que el país dependa excesivamente de China, para desazón de de la junta militar nacionalista que manda en Birmania.

En un momento en que Estados Unidos está cortejando a un Vietnam bajo régimen comunista en el marco de su estrategia de cobertura frente a una China en renovado auge, la verdad es que no tiene mucho sentido persistir en un enfoque que representa arrojar a una Birmania estratégicamente situada al área de influencia estratégica china.

Y otra lección enseña que las sanciones no han perjudicado al objetivo previsto – la junta militar-,sino a la gente de a pie.

La realidad pura y dura es que, tras hallarse en el poder durante casi medio siglo, los militares no están dispuestos a volver a los cuarteles. En realidad, no resulta plausible que se amolden a ellos. Sin esperanza visible de una revolución de los colores en Birmania, la desmilitarización de la política birmana podrá ser, en el mejor de los casos, un proceso gradual.

En este contexto, las últimas elecciones, aunque lejos de haber sido libres y justas, han contribuido ciertamente a reactivar un proceso político aletargado e, implícitamente, han estimulado un sentimiento de afirmación en la ciudadanía. El proceso, a su vez, ha creado un nuevo espacio para el movimiento democrático simbolizado en la liberación de Suu Kyi.

Es momento propicio para que Estados Unidos y sus aliados abandonen un ciclo de sanciones que se autoperpetúa y ayuden a forjar un mayor espacio internacional para Birmania. Debería alabarse todo paso o iniciativa tendentes a conseguir una mayor apertura política en Birmania.

Desde una perspectiva más amplia, el fomento de la democracia no debería convertirse en una herramienta geopolítica empuñada únicamente contra los débiles y excluidos. ¿Cabe concebir la aplicación de un principio a la mayor autocracia del mundo – el de que el compromiso y la participación es la forma de posibilitar un cambio político-mientras el principio opuesto – insistir en las sanciones-siga en vigor contra Birmania? Perseguir a los chavales que juegan en el patio de manzana en tanto se corteja a los autócratas más poderosos no parece la vía adecuada para promover normas de conducta internacional u obtener resultados positivos. Como señaló claramente el Comité del Premio Nobel de la Paz al distinguir con el galardón al disidente chino encarcelado Liu Xiaobo, “China infringe diversos acuerdos internacionales de los que es país firmante, aparte de sus propias disposiciones relativas a los derechos políticos”.

Un enfoque sancionador de cariz inflexible contra Birmania ha reportado el efecto perverso de debilitar la influencia estadounidense al tiempo que reforzaba la de China. Resulta ilustrativo al respecto el periodo de la administración Bush, que, tras descargar las más duras sanciones contra Birmania, volvió sus ojos a Pekín en calidad de canal de comunicación con la junta birmana.

El presidente Barack Obama comenzó positivamente explorando la perspectiva de una gradual actitud de renovado compromiso con Birmania. Sin embargo, durante su reciente viaje a India, Obama atacó a Birmania en tres ocasiones en las que se reflejó su sentimiento de frustración por el dolorosamente lento proceso de apertura de este país. No obstante, en este momento, con la liberación de Suu Kyi, debe admitir que las semillas de la democracia no arraigarán en una economía atrofiada. Una presión exterior falta de participación y progreso de la sociedad civil en un país extremadamente débil es contraproducente.

(Versión en español)

Aung San Suu Kyi is the most famous democracy campaigner in the world and today – thanks to you – she is free. Her prolonged period of house arrest has come to an end because of the unremitting pressure applied by millions of people around the world who believe that no injustice can last forever. But her release from house arrest – where she has spent 15 of the last 21 years – is only a partial victory, because her liberation and that of the Burmese people will not be complete until she is able to take up her position as the rightful leader of her country.

Last Sunday’s Burmese elections were an exercise in public relations, not an exercise in public participation. The constitution, brought in by the generals, enshrines the idea that the president, who is not accountable to parliament, must be either a former or serving soldier, and head a government which need not include a single elected MP. The decision to free Aung San Suu Kyi shows the junta realise that having a single iconic focus for resistance is counterproductive, but we have no evidence that they have any intention of weakening their own position or allowing genuine democratic reform.

During two decades I have offered Aung San Suu Kyi and her family all the support I could give and have written to her many times to say that all over Britain there are people who hold her in their thoughts and prayers. I met with her husband Michael Aris – who later died from cancer without ever being allowed to see her again – and I promised him that I would do whatever I could to be of help.

For more than 20 years Aung San Suu Kyi’s family have endured the pain of separation, and their strength is an inspiration to us all. They have been sustained not only by the bravery of monks and other Burmese protestors who have defied the repression to swear public allegiance to the democratic cause, but also by the global solidarity which has been marshalled by the Burma Campaign UK, Avaaz.org and others.

Last weekend, when I guest-edited my wife Sarah’s Twitter stream to raise awareness of Aung San Suu Kyi’s plight, I was overwhelmed by how many people from all over Britain and the world see this as one of the defining causes of our time. There are of course grave injustices elsewhere, and we must never forget the agonies in Darfur, the brutality in Zimbabwe, and the steady silent loss of life that extreme poverty inflicts on thousands of people every day. But that there are many draws on our compassion should never excuse turning our back on such a grotesque abuse of human rights as that inflicted on Burma’s democracy leader. One tweet from Amnesty was particularly sobering: “No one under 38 – half of Burma’s population – has voted before.” That an entire population could reach middle age without ever casting a ballot – and then be offered only a voting paper without the country’s main opposition party – is a testament to the staying power and brutality of the junta.

The democratisation of Burma will be hard, but it is not impossible. The web is our weapon. Through it people of good conscience can organise and apply precisely the sort of pressure which brought about today’s release. But just as importantly, through it and other forms of new technology activists in Burma can tell the world about what is happening. That is nowhere more apparent than in the brilliant film Burma VJ, made by video journalists who smuggled footage out of the country. In the trailer there is a chilling sequence where somebody on the phone is watching an attack on protesters out of a window and explaining it to his friend: “Who did they shoot?”

“A guy with a camera.”

The generals fear scrutiny, evidence, solidarity. In short, they fear you.

The liberation of Aung San Suu Kyi is one of the great victories of people power in our time – let us together ensure that the liberation of her country is the next.

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has been called Asia’s Nelson Mandela and, like him, is widely respected as a symbol of hope and change. Now many foreign observers are wondering whether her release will bring Myanmar’s “Mandela moment” — the beginning of the end of repression and the first, tangible step toward national reconciliation. But this is a skewed analogy. There are fundamental differences between the transition to majority rule in South Africa and Myanmar’s struggle for democracy.

Mr. Mandela’s release in February 1990 came as part of a political reform process that began when he first met representatives of the apartheid regime in 1985, thus paving the way for a dialogue that eventually led to a general election in April 1994. The African National Congress won that election and, in May of that year, Mr. Mandela became South Africa’s first majority-supported president.

In Myanmar there is no such reform process, and no willingness by those in power to engage in any real dialogue with the opposition. Over the years, a few highly publicized meetings — often involving foreign visitors — have taken place between Mrs. Aung San Suu Kyi and some of the country’s ruling generals. But those have been for P.R. purposes only — and so was her release from house arrest on Saturday.

The Burmese military is notorious for its own interpretations of the law — the generals could have held her in detention as long as they wanted. But they chose to schedule her release a week after the country had held a highly controversial election. They probably had anticipated what the international reaction to that vote would be: condemnation and lack of recognition.

Only China and Myanmar’s partners in Asean, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, have hailed the election as a significant, positive step forward.

Not surprisingly, however, several opposition parties and organizations representing the country’s many ethnic minorities are now calling for meetings with Mrs. Aung San Suu Kyi to map out a common strategy for Myanmar’s future. Political parties in several ethnic minority areas were not allowed to contest the Nov. 7 election, and the parties that did are complaining about fraud and vote-rigging. But even if the opposition manages to establish a united front of sorts, it would have to confront a military with its own, uncompromising agenda.

For the regime to make any significant concessions to the democratic and ethnic opposition, it would have to change fundamental principles in the country’s Constitution, which was “approved” by a Stalinesque 92 percent of the electorate. Article 121 in effect bars Mrs. Aung San Suu Kyi from holding any political office because of her marriage to a foreigner, the fact that her two sons are “citizens of a foreign country” — and because she has, as the clause says, “been convicted … for having committed an offence.”

Apart from giving a quarter of all seats in the bicameral legislature to the military, Article 396 of the new Constitution ensures that M.P.s-elect can be dismissed for “misbehavior” by the Union Election Commission, which will remain indirectly controlled by the military. And, if the “democratic” situation gets really out of hand, Article 413 gives the president the right to hand over executive powers to the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

Weeks before the election, observers were reporting that the military wanted to make the election credible by producing official results that showed 70 percent voter turnout with 80-percent support for its own party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party. That was exactly the announced outcome. Why then would the military, or the new “civilian” government that is expected to be formed shortly, be willing to call a new, free and fair election that would satisfy domestic and international opinion?

It should also be remembered that this is not the first time Mrs. Aung San Suu Kyi has been released from house arrest amid high expectations for change and democratic progress. She was first placed under house arrest in July 1989 and released six years later, in July 1995. After an initial period of relative freedom, she was prevented by the military from traveling around the country, and, in September 2000, was back under house arrest. She was released again in May 2002, and, in May 2003, placed under house arrest for “her own protection” after her entourage was attacked by a government-sponsored mob in Depayin in northern Burma and scores of her supporters were killed.

Meanwhile, one U.N. emissary after another has visited Myanmar to encourage a “dialogue” that has never materialized and never will. Mrs. Aung San Suu Kyi made her first appeal for a dialogue in August 1988, but there is nothing to indicate that the military has ever contemplated serious discussions.

So why would anything be different this time? Has the international community learned nothing from recent Burmese history? The Nov. 7 election was designed to institutionalize the present order. The release of Mrs. Aung San Suu Kyi has diverted all attention from that fraudulent election. Change will come only when someone within the ruling elite turns against the top leadership — as happened in the Philippines in 1986, when Ferdinand Marcos lost the support of his military, or in Indonesia in 1998, when General Wiranto refused to storm the parliamentary buildings in Jakarta that had been occupied by pro-democracy activists, or in South Korea in 1979, when the democratic transition was set in motion by the assassination of President Park Chung-hee.

It remains to be seen what Mrs. Aung San Suu Kyi is going to do — and how the authorities are going to react to, for instance, her pledge to investigate election fraud. But she will not be able to push a pro-democracy agenda without the support of at least some elements within the armed forces. This is the bitter reality that will have to be faced once the euphoria over her release has settled.

I remember that day. It was 27 May 1990. I was too young to vote, but I spent all day in front of a primary school turned polling station just a few doors down the street. In the afternoon, my father took us to the headquarters of National League for Democracy (NLD). I made sure I wore the NLD uniform, orange pinni jacket my grandmother sewed for me. I remember the euphoria and excitement on the streets. Turnout was high, at 73%. People were jubilant with the prospect of finally seeing a new dawn for democracy. But they were betrayed.

Fast-forward 20 years. Burma held its second election on Sunday. Scenes at Rangoon answered the question of whether or not Burma is a step closer towards democracy this time. Only police and security trucks occupied the streets. A clear sign of who is likely to dominate the political landscape.

To get a sense of voters turn-out, I conducted a mini poll. Out of 57 people I contacted, only 14 voted, ie 24.56%. This would not reflect the reality but could be close given the reports that many stayed at home. Why would voters stay at home at this rare chance to express their voices and opinions?

One explanation seems to be that without NLD, people had little faith in this election. That highlights the belief any democratic process must involve Aung San Suu Kyi and her party. With constitutional clauses clearly stating that the president may confer the executive and judicial powers to the commander-in-chief of the armed forces and, if required, may also suspend or restrict one or more fundamental rights of citizens in a state of emergency, voters clearly knew what this election had in store for them.

Non-voters sent a clear signal to the government that further unlawful actions against their fellow citizens and, more importantly, ethnic minorities living in the border areas, could not be committed in their names. The new government will not be their elected government and the likely wars against the then ceased-fired opposition groups could not be in the guise of protecting the union and protecting them.

But could the election not create political space? While some might argue oppositions can expand their space in the parliament, however limited initially, this imagined space is merely a window-dressing exercise of the regime. Approval is needed from the 75% of the members of the parliament for any change or amendment to be made in the constitution. But with directly appointed military personnel occupying a quarter of the seats and the rest likely to be won by the government proxy parties (the election results are yet to be announced, but an over 90% win is probable), the chances for change are slim.

So is there any hope for Burma? The role of Aung San Suu Kyi is still relevant in Burma politics, as she can not only rekindle the political movement but is also one of the few people who can unite the nation. With the longest civil war in the world, reconciliation is the sure way to save lives and the government and international community must recognise the role she and ethnic minority leaders could play in bringing peace and democracy to the country.

For Burma, democracy remains elusive and fear is suffocating. Its people still need the support from the international community, including the UK government. Aid should not be withdrawn or reduced. And more educational opportunities should be created for the young people of Burma in order to keep the spirit of democracy alive.

Next Sunday, 7 November, had the potential to be a truly great day. The first Burmese elections since 1990 should have seen grassroots and civilian candidates compete in free elections, as 60 million citizens finally threw off a brutal military dictatorship in front of international observers and the global media.

Instead next weekend’s poll will be a masquerade. Aung San Suu Kyi – the one person who in half a century has been democratically elected in Burma – has been prevented from standing for re-election on the specious grounds that her late husband was not Burmese, and her party, the National League for Democracy, has been forcibly dissolved.

It is a “democratic election” where a third of the seats have been reserved for the military. In addition, 40 “civilian candidates” of the Union Solidarity and Development party – the junta’s party – are senior military officers who resigned from the army a few weeks ago in order to stand. No foreign observers are allowed, foreign reporting is banned and there is no opposition party on the ballot paper because what is left of the NLD has chosen to boycott a rigged contest.

Twenty years ago, when Suu Kyi won a landslide majority of 392 out of 492 seats, the same military junta that governs today refused to accept the result and imprisoned the victors. The National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma, Burma’s democratic government in exile, works to remind the world of the MPs elected in 1990 who are now dead, in prison or in exile.

But Suu Kyi has not only been barred from taking office and from the contest to reaffirm her status as the choice of the Burmese people, she has been in prison or under house arrest for 14 of the past 20 years. Some of those were spent in solitary confinement, denied the chance to receive visits from her sons and her beloved husband Michael Aris, even when he was dying of cancer. She is not alone in suffering. Win Tin, a senior NLD politician, spent 19 years in prison; Min Ko Naing, chair of the All Burma Federation of Student Unions, 15 years; party chairman Tin Oo has just been released after seven years.

It is impossible not to weep over the fate of Burma. It is a country that, in the latter days of the second world war, resisted the Japanese. Yet its first democratically elected leader, Aung San Suu Kyi’s father, who negotiated Burma’s independence from Britain in 1947, was assassinated at the age of only 32 as the army took power in a bloody coup. It is the country that brutally repressed Buddhist monks when they spoke out. It is also the country where more than 130,000 people were allowed to die two years ago when the regime initially shunned external aid after severe flooding. Even as the election campaign takes place, people are suffering from flooding as not enough help is getting through.

While the election will not be fair, it should alert the world to Burma’s plight. I first became involved in the campaign for Suu Kyi’s release in the 1990s after arranging to meet her husband, then a professor at Oxford, and offering to do what I could to help. In my book of essays, Courage, I singled her out as the world’s bravest prisoner of conscience after Nelson Mandela. I was pleased that we screened the film Burma VJ in Downing Street to highlight the risks dissenters face.

But the time has come for us all to do more. We must ensure there is no reduction in sanctions against the regime and think how we can each contribute to raising the profile of this gravest of injustices. Aung San Suu Kyi should be released immediately but while she is denied a voice, we must each give ours.

In May I finally experienced a free and fair election. Unfortunately, I was thousands of miles from my homeland – Burma. I witnessed the UK’s May elections as a refugee in the country.

Next month, there will be elections in Burma and the eyes of the world will briefly turn upon the country. But these elections will be neither free nor fair. The polls are a masquerade designed solely to appease global opinion. The only winners will be the corrupt and brutal elite who rule the country. Dictatorship will continue.

Yet, the mere fact that elections are taking place offers a glimmer of hope. Although, on the surface, the picture suggests that the generals are beyond fear, and entirely confident that they will continue to get away with their blatant disregard for the rights of the population, I believe there are signs that they are scared.

Burma is a country where freedom of association, assembly and expression are severely limited, and torture, child labour and illegal detentions are commonplace. Sadly, they are all human rights violations I have witnessed firsthand.

My father is one of the famed Generation 88 leaders. On 8 August 1988, he and his fellow activists led thousands of students on to the streets of Rangoon as part of a wave of a million people who gathered to peacefully protest against the ruling military junta. The protests were put down by the most brutal means, and organisers such as my father were beaten, tortured and jailed.

He was released in 1996; I was eight years old. I was so happy to see him as a free man, and although I was still shy around him because of his absence throughout my younger years, I was glad to be able to hug him and talk to him whenever I wished to.

Even though he was home with us, I worried about him constantly. He continued his political activities – of course that is something I now admire profoundly, but at the time I lived in constant fear that the military intelligence would storm into our home in the middle of the night and take him away.

Sometime after my father was released, I came to the UK to study. While here, I watched international coverage unfold of the 2007 “Saffron revolution”, where people took to the streets of Rangoon once more, with renewed optimism, and persistent courage, that this time democracy would be achieved. It was not, and the junta violently suppressed the protests once more. My father was sentenced to 65 years this time, a death sentence for him.

Over the last months, I have attended the party conferences of the three largest UK political parties with Amnesty International, and spoken about Burma and the obligations of the international community toward the people of that country, who are being kept hostage in their own land.

Like my father before me, I consider it my duty to let the world know what is going on. While he instigated pressure within the country, I hope to amplify the pressure on the regime from outside – and the two forces combined may help make inroads into the seeming confidence they portray.

Some argue that the generals are immune to international pressure, ignoring calls for free and fair elections and banning the National League for Democracy, and continuing to detain Aung San Suu Kyi and the more than 2,100 other political prisoners. But I see November’s elections as a sign of how scared the generals are of strong international pressure.

The world has forgotten that these elections were announced back in 2003 as part of a so-called seven-stage road map to democracy. They were announced then because the world was outraged after the regime-sponsored attempt to assassinate Suu Kyi. At last it seemed like the international community would introduce tough, targeted sanctions.

Burma’s generals hoped the promise of elections would avoid strong pressure. It worked. For seven years the international community has told us to wait and see what happens. Our suffering has continued.

Once these elections are over there must be no more excuses, no more calls for us to “wait and see”. We cannot allow these elections to masquerade as part of a progress towards democracy that legitimises the junta’s ongoing persecution of the people. The idea that we might, scares me.

We are now a month away from the first elections in Burma in 23 years. That should give us cause to celebrate. Sadly, that is wishful thinking. Burma’s 55 million people continue to suffer brutal oppression. Abject, needless poverty is, for most, a daily reality. These elections will be little more than a sham to perpetuate military rule.

So when Asian and European leaders meet on Monday in Brussels, the U.K. will be calling for us to speak with one voice against the gross mistreatment of the Burmese people.

That means being unequivocal: These elections will be neither free nor fair. Opponents of the ruling party lack resources and are systematically targeted by the current regime. Thousands of political prisoners remain incarcerated. Various ethnic parties have been refused the right to participate. Last month the military dissolved the National League for Democracy — its biggest perceived threat.

The situation is little better for those parties which are being allowed to participate. The regime they oppose has passed deeply unfair election laws and runs the election commission. In Burma all media is heavily censored by the state.

So the election result is a foregone conclusion. Under the constitution a quarter of seats are already reserved for the military. In half of the remaining seats parties loyal to the regime will run uncontested, their opponents unable to field a candidate. The regime is therefore guaranteed a substantial majority — before a single vote is even cast.

The consequence for Burma is the return to power of a ruling elite that has presided over widespread human rights abuses, including arbitrary detentions, enforced disappearances, rape and torture. That same regime has been guilty of profound economic mismanagement and corruption. While they routinely blame sanctions for weak development, the truth is that they have squandered Burma’s natural resources and export opportunities. The country’s infant mortality rate is now amongst the highest in Asia.

These failings are undeniable. Yet some are tempted to overlook the deep flaws in the approaching election. Clearly, it would be more convenient for the international community to quietly agree that any election is better than no election. Burma would recede in the mind, allowing us to “move on.” That is attractive for nations that insist we should not interfere in one anothers’ affairs. And the West could not be accused, as it sometimes is, of attempting to recreate the world in its own image.

These are not reasons to ignore the truth. The European Union has already made it clear that sanctions — targeted at the regime and its sources of revenue — will not be lifted until genuine progress is made on the ground. We must now work with our Asian partners, using our collective clout, to push for that progress. Members of the Asia-Europe Meeting group, or ASEM, account for nearly 60 percent of the global population — and the same proportion of global trade. Burma’s military regime should know that, until it satisfies international demands, it will meet the same disapproval whether it looks East or West.

Not only is that our shared moral duty, but it is in our strategic self-interest too. Without a process of national reconciliation in Burma, the risk of instability is real. Ethnic cease-fires look increasingly fragile. A return to conflict would have devastating humanitarian consequences, undermining regional security and leading to further refugee flows into neighboring countries and beyond.

So we must continue to exert pressure on the regime to engage all opposition and ethnic groups in a meaningful dialogue. The objective must be a fair settlement that gives ethnic groups a political voice and protects their minority rights. All prisoners of conscience — including the opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi — must be released without delay. Reconciliation must be geared toward the social and economic development that has long evaded the Burmese state.

This week is an opportunity for Asian and European nations to reaffirm that message. Military men must know that swapping their uniforms for suits will not change the demands of the international community. We will not be pacified by a democratic facade. Our expectations will not drop.

Navi Pillay, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, recently said the world must exercise “utmost vigilance” to ensure the approaching elections in Myanmar (Burma) are free and fair.

We are disappointed in such comments, which focus on the election as something important for our country, as something worth waiting and watching for, although this election is not the solution for Burma.

The elections, scheduled for Nov. 7, are designed to legalize military rule in Burma under the 2008 constitution, which was written to create a permanent military dictatorship in our country.

After the election, the constitution will come into effect, a so-called civilian government will be formed by acting and retired generals who all are under the military commander-in-chief, and the people of Burma will legally become the subjects of the military.

Our party, the National League for Democracy, and our ethnic allies have refused to accept the regime’s constitution and have decided to boycott the elections. The military regime’s constitution and severely restricting election laws demonstrated to all of us the true intention the regime has for this election — the legalization and legitimization of military rule in our country.

We refuse to abandon our aspirations for democracy in Burma and give the regime the legitimacy it wants for its elections. With millions of people of Burma supporting our position, we hoped the international community would understand the regime’s intentions as clearly as we do and pressure the regime to stop its unilateral and undemocratic process.

Until recently, the United Nations demanded the regime commit itself to an all-parties inclusive, participatory, free and fair process through political dialogue with democratic opposition and representatives of ethnic minorities. But now an important phrase — “all-parties inclusive” — is surprisingly excluded from their statements and speeches.

Although Ms. Pillay urged the world to exercise “utmost vigilance,” there is no need to wait until the Election Day to make a judgment. The election commission was appointed by the regime and filled with loyalists who unilaterally decided that many candidates are ineligible to run. The electoral laws and by-laws impose severe restrictions on political parties. Thousands of political prisoners — including our leader, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi — are not allowed to participate in the election or be members of the parties.

The regime’s prime minister and cabinet ministers have switched to civilian dress, transformed their mass organization into their political party, and are campaigning with the use of state properties, resources, funds and threats. The election commission is shamelessly violating its own rules in favor of the prime minister’s party and other proxy parties of the regime.

Is it really necessary for the international community to wait until election day to see whether the elections are free and fair?

Unfortunately, some European countries are not only watching the regime’s elections, but also supporting them. They discussed with us their belief that the election is the only game in town, and suggested that we, the National League for Democracy, should participate.

When we explained our rationale for not legitimizing military rule, they turned to others and now help them to make their way in the regime’s election game. They have gone so far as to help pro-regime academics and opportunists travel to Europe to promote the regime’s election and gather support for their favorite parties.

Even though some democratic parties have European support, their chances of winning seats in the election are very slim, as more restrictions on their campaign activities are revealed each day. The regime is determined to capture almost all of the contested seats in the national and state parliaments by use of fraud and threats.

With 25 percent of the seats in Parliament reserved for the military, it is more and more clear that almost all the seats will be controlled by the military and its cronies. Even if some lucky candidates get elected, they will have no authority to promote change. The Parliament has no power to form the government, no authority to legislate military affairs, and no right to reject the president’s appointees and budget.

One might ask what is the solution, if it is not the election. It is dialogue, which we have been calling for for many years. Meaningful political dialogue between the military, the National League for Democracy led by Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi, and ethnic representatives is the only way to solve problems in Burma peacefully.

The military has no desire to talk. But if the international community seriously exercises strong and effective pressure on the regime, the combination of pressure from outside and peaceful resistance inside the country will force the regime to come to the dialogue table.

I wish that our friends in Europe would abandon their dream of expecting something impossible from the election, and start taking serious action against the regime with the aim of starting a dialogue. They should begin by creating a U.N. commission of inquiry to investigate human rights violations in Burma.

The United States decided this week to support the creation of a United Nations commission of inquiry into the Burmese military regime’s crimes against humanity and war crimes. That human rights violations have occurred is clear, and many have noted that the Burmese junta’s restrictions on its upcoming elections make it all but certain the generals will retain power. The real dilemma is whether it is better to express moral outrage at these offenses or to hold off, presuming the possibility of eventual change under a new government.

The options for nation states to express moral outrage are well established: sanctions, war crimes trials, embargoes. These are also tactics designed to achieve certain ends: liberalization, increased human rights, regime change or other indicators of progress. The key question for U.S. officials ahead of Burma’s Nov. 7 elections is: Will actions such as imposing new sanctions or endorsing a commission of inquiry improve the lot of the Burmese? Will they help further U.S. strategic and humanitarian objectives in that society and region under a revised government?

The Burmese constitution all but guarantees that its military will remain in command after the elections; by law, 25 percent of seats are reserved for the military. The voting for national and local legislatures will occur before opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi is to be released from house arrest, and many in her now-defunct National League for Democracy have pledged not to campaign in the biased elections. Further, the generals have legal immunity from in-country prosecution for all acts committed in official capacities.

Despite all this, it is likely that some members of the opposition — in modest numbers — will be among those seated in the central and local legislatures next year — marking the first time opposition voices would be legal in Burma since 1962.

It seems likely that political prisoners will be freed around the time of the elections so that they cannot “interfere” with that controlled process. There have also been indications that badly needed economic reforms could be instituted by the next Burmese administration and that civilians could play significant roles in the government. Essentially, it is possible that in Burma in the near future, we may see the transformation of a “soft authoritarian” state into one that is more pluralistic, including with some legal opposition legislators. In Burmese military lingo, it may be a “discipline-flourishing democracy” — but not a democracy unencumbered by deleterious adjectival modifications.

The plight of the Burmese people has long distressed many. But imposing additional sanctions on Burma’s regime or forming still more commissions will only salve our consciences. Neither will help the Burmese people, persuade the government to loosen its grip on the population, or even assist the United States in meeting its strategic or humanitarian objectives. In fact, such moves would hinder negotiations and relations with a new government that, even if far from a model for governance, would probably give the Burmese more political voice and freedom than they have had in half a century. If our concerns are for the well-being of the people and U.S. national interests in the region, then we might well wait for the elections and whatever government comes into power. Then will be the time to judge whether there has been a step forward and how to achieve our goals.

By the end of this year, Burma will be holding its first election in two decades. This southeast Asian nation has been in the grip of the military government since 1962.

The military government has yet to announce the exact date, while there are rumours that the election could be held on 10 October, in conformity with the Burmese generals’ superstitious beliefs about numbers, that if it is held on 10/10/10 it could bring them victory.

In the last election witnessed by the country in May 1990, the now-dissolved National League for Democracy (NLD) – a party led by the Nobel peace prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi – won a landslide majority of 392 seats out of 492 seats. After the election, the military government refused to accept the result. Suu Kyi, the NLD’s MPs and its members were imprisoned. The National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma, Burma’s government in exile, has documented the names of MPs that have died in prison or fled the country in exile. Many MPs have only been recently released.

For this upcoming election, the military government is getting smarter. It drafted a constitution, which took 10 years to write and is riddled with undemocratic elements such as barring candidates who are married to non-Burmese people from participating in the election. Thus, Suu Kyi is barred from participating. Furthermore, a third of the 664 parliamentary seats will be strictly reserved for the military. Based upon these irregularities, the NLD announced its refusal to join the election, making this an excuse for the military government to dissolve the party.

We can therefore be sure that this election will be neither free nor fair unless there are big changes based on the pressures from the international communities, especially from the association of southeast Asian nations (Asean), the regional grouping of 10 southeast Asian states, which Burma is a member.

The 43rd meeting of Asean foreign ministers, held last month in Hanoi, came up with a 15-page joint communiqué with only a single paragraph discussing the development in Burma. The paragraph states the “importance of national reconciliation in [Burma] and the holding of general election in a free, fair, and inclusive manner”. It does not, however, mention what Asean’s response would be if the election turned out to be a complete farce. Ban Ki-moon, the UN secretary-general and key stakeholder in Burma’s nation building, has already expressed his frustration at the “lack of co-operation at this critical moment”.

The statement from the meeting, however, is nothing new. Asean has been heavily criticised for not doing enough for Burma. After the violent crackdown on the streets of Rangoon in 2007, all it could offer to the Burmese people was a statement raising its concern.

During an interview with the BBC, Surin Pitsuwan, the secretary-general for Asean, saw the election as a step forward despite heavily criticisms from the NLD and the UN: “No election is going to be perfect. It is a positive step, better than not having election at all. It is a step forward”. At an international level, Asean member states are still silent with regards to the call by Tomás Ojea Quintana, the UN special rapporteur on Burma, to set up a commission of inquiry regarding the alleged war crimes the government has committed against its citizens.

In November 2007, Asean adopted its charter, which has an explicit aim to “strengthen democracy, enhance good governance and the rule of law, and to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms”. The upcoming election will test whether the regional body can actually deliver what it promises to the people of Burma. As the date comes near, Asean must realise that Burma’s election could become an embarrassment to the regional grouping. The clock is ticking.

“Don’t worry, don’t worry daughter, everything will be fine, change is coming soon.”

Tomorrow is an important day. William Hague, the UK’s foreign secretary, may not be aware of the date’s significance, but August 8 should be etched into his memory, as it is mine.

Tomorrow is my father’s day. When I was very young, I was taught that my daddy was a man in a photograph, and later I was shown he was the man in the prison, where we visited him and where I touched his fingers through iron bars and pretended that the armed guards surrounded him to protect him. Now I know him to be a hero of Burma, and my greatest inspiration.

Tomorrow marks the anniversary of the start of a peaceful protest movement in Burma, protests that would end in ongoing tragedy, bloodshed and decades of global inaction. On 8 August 1988, my father, Ko Mya Aye, led thousands of students on to the streets of Rangoon as part of a wave of a million people, who gathered to peacefully protest against the ruling military junta. The protests were put down by the most brutal means, and organisers such as my father were beaten, tortured and jailed.

These protests were repeated in 2007 by defiant individuals who desired democracy so fiercely that they were prepared to risk their liberty and lives a second time. Individuals such as my father who, as part of the iconic Generation 88 students group he co-founded, again helped orchestrate mass protests on the very same streets of Rangoon, this time as part of the so-called “saffron revolution“.

Both times the events offered hope to the long-suffering people of my homeland. Both would end with the Burmese authorities ruthlessly quashing dissent. By the end of the summer of 1988, more than 3,000 peaceful protestors had been killed.

In 1988, my father was arrested and given an eight-year jail sentence. In 2007, his sentence was 65 years. Without a regime change, I will never see him again.

Sadly, the human rights situation in Burma remains as grim now as it has ever been. It is illegal for more than five people to gather together to talk about politics, the internet and the media are severely restricted, torture is routine and there are currently 2,200 political prisoners.

Yet countries such as India and China continue to cosy up to the Burmese authorities in an attempt to tap into Burma’s natural resources. British politicians have been at the vanguard of calling for change, but they need to go the extra mile. William Hague needs to build a global consensus that exposes Burma’s human rights violations – especially now, with elections planned for the end of the year. And that means working hard to persuade the likes of India and China to change their tune. After all, they ultimately risk shooting themselves in the foot: Burma’s military junta cannot go on for ever, and any new government is unlikely to forget who helped prop the junta up. My father will not, and nor will I.

I left Burma in 2006 to study at university. From the moment I arrived in the UK, I talked to various media outlets about my father and his activities. It did not go unnoticed back home. The Burmese authorities went to my parent’s home and questioned my father about me, and it was then that my father told me it was not safe to come back. He said he did not want to lose his daughter.

I applied for asylum in the UK in April 2007. Just a few months later, the saffron protests started.

I remember speaking to my father over the phone on August 21. I told him how proud of him I was to see such big demonstrations and the international attention they were receiving, and I begged him to be careful. He said, “Don’t worry, don’t worry daughter, everything will be fine, change is coming soon.” He was full of hope.

He was arrested later that night. Despite our concerns for his safety, we expected him to get sentenced to 20 years at the most. Sixty-five years is a death sentence.

I am 21 now and my father remains my biggest inspiration. As long as I am in the UK, I can be his words. I just want to make sure the politicians are listening.

With Secretary of State Hillary Clinton attending the ASEAN Regional Forum this week, it is an opportune moment to examine U.S. efforts to engage with Burma (also known as Myanmar). When President Obama was inaugurated, many in the international community were particularly enthusiastic about a return to U.S. multilateralism to address global problems. Nowhere was this more necessary than in the case of Burma, where a brutal military dictatorship has for decades both oppressed its people and failed to yield power, despite losing democratic elections in a landslide in 1990.

Many observers of the nascent administration, myself included, applauded Clinton’s announcement in early 2009 of a full review of U.S. policy toward Burma. I understood that some creative thinking would be valuable, having spent eight years as the U.N. special rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar, trying to address the problems created by the junta. Yet since those early days, the Obama administration has made a series of inexplicable missteps.

First, the administration took some eight months to develop its new policy. As the junta increased its repression in the run-up to elections it scheduled for this year, the United States was absent in the global debate on how to respond. Not only did Washington fail to communicate its intentions, but this silence left many diplomats confused. This disengagement resulted in reduced pressure on the Burmese junta as other countries awaited the results of the U.S. review. When a new policy was finally announced last fall, it was remarkably uninspiring and uninspired: keep sanctions and increase engagement. Why it took eight months to develop such an obvious result is unclear.

Second, the administration has left unfilled the congressionally mandated position of special coordinator on Burma policy. While Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell has all the qualities necessary to lead the State Department’s engagement with the junta, he is also responsible for all U.S. policy relating to Asia, so he has limited time to focus on Burma, and the lack of sustained focus has been lamentable.

Finally, when the United States got around to engaging directly with the junta, it took a surprisingly unilateral approach. I do not understand why the administration would think it would have any leverage with this regime without bringing partners to the dialogue. The Burmese junta knows it has support from China and Russia in the U.N. Security Council. It is making billions of dollars annually from its natural resources. And the United States will get no leverage from existing sanctions against Burma until it exercises its leadership to bring into the process others whose views do matter to the regime.

If the United States wants to influence the junta, it must immediately change its entire approach. Beyond appointing an envoy, it must make Burma policy a high-level priority. The junta has the upper hand. Without the kind of pressure the United States can bring to bear multilaterally, the junta will have no incentive to come to the table, let alone change its behavior.

Specifically, the United States should reach out to its allies, beginning at the ASEAN Regional Forum, to ensure that most nations will reject the results from Burma’s upcoming “elections,” which by every indication will be neither free nor fair. It should publicly embrace the call of my successor, Tomás Ojea Quintana, to create a commission of inquiry through the United Nations to investigate crimes against humanity and war crimes committed by the junta, and then work multilaterally to make this inquiry happen. It should fully enforce existing U.S. sanctions and target Singaporean and Dubai banks that do business with the regime. It should work to impose a global arms embargo on Burma. And it should take full advantage of being one of three countries to lead the cross-examination of Burma’s human rights record in the Universal Periodic Review process taking place in the U.N. Human Rights Council early next year.

Some will say it is unrealistic to expect the United States to put in this kind of concerted diplomatic effort, particularly given its other foreign policy priorities. I have dealt with the Burmese junta and understand better than most how hard it is to influence the generals. I am certain that if the United States actually wants to affect this regime, its efforts must be strategic, focused and unrelenting.

Given the forthcoming “elections” in Burma, President Obama and Secretary Clinton have limited time to turn around their policy. As a start, they need to take Burma and this situation seriously. Then they need to show the world that the United States means what it says.

This is a sensitive moment in relations between the United States and the world’s most corrupt regime: the military junta that has plundered Burma for decades as if it were a private fiefdom.

The Obama administration has attempted to apply a strategy dubbed “pragmatic engagement.” As it works to rethink its position amid the present cacophony of foreign and domestic crises, there is a danger that Washington might give Burma short shrift and unwittingly soften its stance toward the country’s military leaders. It should be careful not do so. And it should take the junta’s nuclear-weapons ambitions seriously.

The regime in Burma has a history of deceiving American officials. I know; before defecting to the United States in 2005, I was a senior intelligence officer for the war office in Burma. I was also the deputy chief of mission at Burma’s embassy in Washington.

In the autumn of 2003, a senior staff member for a U.S. senator came twice to our embassy in Washington to call on Ambassador U Lin Myaing and me. At about the same time, officials from the U.S. State Department and the National Security Council also met in New York with U Tin Win, from the office of Burma’s prime minister, and Colonel Hla Min, the government’s spokesman.

The American officials were checking reports that Burma had secretly renewed ties with North Korea — one of the three pillars of George W. Bush’s “axis of evil.”

Burma had severed ties with North Korea in 1983, after North Korean operatives attempted to assassinate South Korea’s president, Chun Doo Hwan, during a state visit to Rangoon. Chun was unhurt, but 17 senior South Korean officials — including the deputy prime minister and the foreign and commerce ministers — were killed.

The head of Burma’s junta, Senior General Than Shwe, instructed us to lie to the Americans. We did. We blamed Burma’s political opposition for the “rumors” that Rangoon had renewed ties with Pyongyang. The Americans wanted proof. Than Shwe then ordered Foreign Minister U Win Aung to send a letter denying the reports to Secretary of State Colin Powell. The British government knew the truth. London’s ambassador to Rangoon rightfully called U Win Aung a liar.

Why did Burma renew ties with North Korea? Regime preservation.

In the aftermath of the 1988 nationwide uprising in Burma, many foreign joint ventures for the production of conventional weapons were cancelled. Than Shwe began the secret re-engagement with North Korea in 1992, soon after he took control of Burma’s ruling clique.

He argued that Burma faced potential attack from the United States and India, which at the time was a champion of Burma’s democracy movement. He wanted a bigger army. He wanted more modern weapons. He even wanted nuclear arms. He cared not at all for the poverty of Burma’s people.

Than Shwe secretly made contact with Pyongyang. Posing as South Korean businessmen, North Korean weapons experts began arriving in Burma. I remember these visitors. They were given special treatment at the Rangoon airport. With a huge revenue bonanza from sales of natural gas to Thailand, Burma was soon able to pay the North Koreans cash for missile technology.

The generals thought that they could also obtain nuclear warheads and that, once these warheads were mounted on the missiles, the United States and other powerful countries would not dare to attack Burma and have much less leverage on the junta.

Than Shwe hid these links with North Korea as long as he could from Japan and South Korea, because he was working to lure Japanese and South Korean companies to invest more in efforts to plunder Burma’s natural resources. By 2006, the junta’s generals felt either desperate or confident enough to publicly resume diplomatic relations with North Korea.

Burma has worked for almost a decade to expand its production of missiles and chemical warheads. General Tin Aye — chairman of the Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings, the military’s business arm — is the top manager of ordinance production and main liaison with North Korea.

According to a secret report leaked last year, the regime’s No. 3 man, General Shwe Mann, also made a secret visit to Pyongyang in November 2008. He signed an agreement for military cooperation that would bring help from North Korea for constructing tunnels and caves for hiding missiles, aircraft, even ships.

That this information was leaked by Burmese military officials working on such sensitive activities shows both the degree of Than Shwe’s military megalomania and the existence of opposition within the regime itself.

The words “pragmatic engagement” should not become synonymous with any weakening of Washington’s firm opposition to Burma’s rulers.

The United States and other nations must continue to question the legitimacy of Than Shwe and the regime. They should not believe his promises to hold free and fair elections this year.

Only coordinated pressure from around the globe will be effective in dealing with this master of deceit.

Burma’s military regime has forced our party, the National League for Democracy, to make a tough decision on whether we will continue to operate legally.

The ruling generals, known as the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), issued a set of unjust electoral laws this month that threatened to abolish our party if we did not re-register at the election commission within 60 days.

We know the cruel nature of the regime. We did not expect the electoral laws it established would offer a semblance of fairness. But we also did not expect that the regime would use its laws to remove our leader, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and all political prisoners from the political process. Once again the regime has defied the will of the people of Burma and the international community by disregarding their call for transparent, free and fair elections that include all parties.

The Political Party Registration Law bans all political prisoners from participating in elections by voting and contesting, forming a political party, or joining a party. Parties must make sure that political prisoners are not included in their membership and must pledge in writing that they will obey and protect the country’s constitution and abide by its election laws. They are also required to participate in the election. Failure to comply with these restrictions will lead to abolishment of the party.

For me, the decision was simple: No. We cannot expel Aung San Suu Kyi and others who are or have been imprisoned under this corrupt and unfair legal system. Without them, our party would be nothing. They are in prison because of their belief in democracy and the rule of law. Their immediate release and participation in Burma’s political process are necessary for a credible democratic process.

We do not accept the regime’s unilaterally drafted constitution, designed to legalize permanent military dictatorship. The referendum to ratify this constitution was conducted on the heels of Cyclone Nargis in 2008; it was “approved” by force and fraud. Our objective is to reject this sham constitution and create one that will guarantee democracy, human rights, justice, the rule of law and equality among all ethnic nationalities through an all-inclusive, genuine political dialogue. We cannot pledge to obey the sham constitution. True democracy will not come from this process.

It is not easy to make such a decision for an organization. Aung San Suu Kyi said she would “not even think” of registering her party for the polls. Yet as a leader who believes in democracy, she stressed that she would let the party decide for itself. On Monday, all of my colleagues agreed to confront these injustices together.

Some believe that the continued legal status of our party is more important. If our party is not legal, the thinking goes, how can we work for the people of Burma? The United Nations and some countries have asked the regime to change these unfair laws and to allow Aung San Suu Kyi and all political prisoners to participate in the election. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon held a meeting of his “Group of Friends on Myanmar” to discuss the situation in Burma. We have also heard that the U.S. government is “closely considering” the recent report and recommendations made by U.N. Special Rapporteur Tomás Ojea Quintana, including his suggestion that the United Nations establish a “commission of inquiry” to investigate war crimes and crimes against humanity in our country. This latent support from international voices may not be enough. My colleagues may have justifiable concerns that international voices and statements are not complemented by effective measures to change Burma’s political crisis.

Our party was born out of the 1988 popular democracy uprising with the noble intention to carry out the unfinished work of those who sacrificed their lives for freedom, justice and democracy.

We won a landslide victory in the 1990 election and have been the leader of Burma’s democracy movement for more than two decades. But because we refuse to bow to these unjust election “laws,” our party will be abolished by the regime soon. Still, the NLD will not disappear. We will be among the people, with the people. We will continue to fight for democracy, human rights and equality among all ethnic nationalities, by peaceful means.

I hope the international community will stand with us. The governments of the world should declare that they reject the regime’s election and prearranged outcome, and pressure the regime to make substantive and positive change for Burma, beginning with the immediate release of all political prisoners, including Aung San Suu Kyi, and the cessation of the regime’s military campaign against ethnic minorities. The regime should negotiate with Burma’s democracy forces, led by Aung San Suu Kyi, and ethnic representatives for a peaceful solution toward national reconciliation and true democracy.

News of Nelson Mandela’s release dominated the radio broadcasts by the BBC and Voice of America on Feb. 11, 1990. I felt I understood why he had resisted so long, because in Burma, as in South Africa at the time Mr. Mandela was in jail, the majority of people were struggling to make their voices heard. Within three months, the military junta would refuse to recognize the results of our national election — and I would be locked up in Rangoon’s Insein Prison for leading a demonstration.

Released in 1993, I was sent to prison again in 1994. It was during my second sentence that I managed to read a magazine article describing Mr. Mandela’s autobiography, “Long Walk to Freedom.” Single pages of this article were smuggled into the prison over a period of weeks, and I pieced them together from tightly folded scraps. But the story was worth the trouble: Mr. Mandela’s refusal to give up his principles, during more than 27 years in jail, was an inspiration to me and all the other political activists in Insein. “Nelson Mandela is the black power from South Africa, he can overcome 27 years of darkness,” went the refrain of a song that one of my fellow prisoners composed, a song we used to sing to keep up our spirits.

Mr. Mandela wrote that time drags in prison only if you are idle; if you organize, study and work, prison life can be very busy. But his situation seemed in some ways better than mine. He could study openly, whereas my friends and I could do so only clandestinely. We pleaded with the guards to allow it, but they told us we had to renounce political resistance first.

The Burmese authorities repeatedly pressured me to cooperate with them. But I held firm. In 1999, one year after my second prison term was finished, I escaped to Thailand — and right away got a copy of “Long Walk to Freedom.” “The challenge for every prisoner, particularly every political prisoner, is how to survive prison intact, how to emerge from prison undiminished, how to conserve and even replenish one’s beliefs,” Mr. Mandela wrote. “Prison is designed to break one’s spirit and destroy one’s resolve.”

For the Burmese people, the long walk toward a free society is not finished, but we are walking in the right direction, and we will arrive one day.

Il est des perceptions qui ont la vie dure. Comme celle que l’on a d’une Birmanie scindée en deux entités manichéennes, la junte militaire d’un côté, la leader de l’opposition démocratique et prix Nobel de la paix Aung San Suu Kyi de l’autre. L’une des erreurs de l’Occident est de penser son approche de la «question birmane» à travers ce prisme bipolaire et de concentrer ses efforts sur une transition démocratique censée à elle seule panser les plaies d’une société birmane meurtrie. Or, à trop vouloir d’abord porter le flambeau démocratique, nous avons ignoré les véritables fondements de l’instabilité de la Birmanie.

Outre l’absence de structures démocratiques, il est deux grands défis auxquels la Birmanie doit faire face depuis son indépendance. D’une part, la résolution d’une question ethnique qui a engendré six décennies de guerre civile, encore illustrée en août par l’écrasement de la milice des Kokangs par l’armée birmane. Et, d’autre part, l’essor socio-économique d’un peuple birman englué dans un sous-développement chronique, freiné tant par une junte isolationniste qu’une communauté internationale défaillante. Sans développement économique global, sans déploiement d’une société civile autonome à l’intérieur même du pays et sans paix sociale, la Birmanie ne pourra pas consolider son éventuelle transition démocratique. Or les mantras actuels demeurent prisonniers des déclarations passées d’Aung San Suu Kyi : d’abord la démocratie, ensuite le développement économique…

Le principal traumatisme de la Birmanie reste la guerre civile latente qui mine sa stabilité politique, hante les puissances voisines et plombe son économie depuis 1948. Sans résolution des conflits interethniques entre une majorité birmane (65 % de la population) qui a toujours dominé le paysage politique birman – tant militaire que démocratique – et de multiples minorités ethniques et religieuses elles-mêmes divisées (35 %), la Birmanie ne peut espérer connaître une transition pacifique. Pour calfeutrer ce divorce ethnique, la junte avait négocié à partir de 1989 des cessez-le-feu avec une quinzaine de groupes armés ethniques (Was, Kokangs, Kachins), tandis qu’elle continuait une lutte féroce contre une dizaine de rébellions historiques (Karens, Shans, Nagas).

Or la purge, en 2004, de l’architecte de ces cessez-le-feu, le général Khin Nyunt, puis l’adoption en 2008 d’une nouvelle Constitution aux accents jacobins – malgré une proposition de décentralisation effective – ont remis en cause cet équilibre. La récente déroute de la milice des Kokangs fut ainsi la démonstration des ambitions nouvelles d’un régime de Naypyidaw (du nom de la nouvelle capitale sortie de terre en 2005) outrageusement confiant : démobiliser les milices ethniques pourtant fortes de quelque 30 000 hommes, reprendre le contrôle de leur territoire afin d’y organiser les élections de 2010 et s’assurer une mainmise directe sur les flux commerciaux (et notamment gaziers) des zones frontalières auparavant contrôlées par ces milices.

Cette nouvelle approche de la junte, dont l’Occident n’a que peu mesuré l’importance géopolitique car obnubilé par le fantasque procès d’Aung San Suu Kyi, inquiète bien plus les voisins chinois, indien et thaïlandais de la Birmanie. La communauté internationale a pourtant ici un rôle crucial à jouer. Les Nations unies et l’Union européenne ont trop souvent abordé le problème birman sous l’angle exclusif de la transition démocratique, et non sous celui de mécanismes de résolution de conflits, de maintien de la paix, de démobilisation de milices armées ou encore de réconciliation nationale comme ce fut le cas – certes avec plus ou moins de succès – au Cambodge, au Liberia ou au Timor. Penser la Birmanie à travers le prisme de ses maux historiques et non à travers nos propres ambitions normatives et démocratiques est aujourd’hui capital. Les difficiles relations entre une opposition démocratique largement dominée par les Birmans (souvent d’anciens militaires) et de nombreux leaders ethniques karens, shans ou même rohingyas nous montrent en effet que la question ethnique demeurera source d’instabilité potentielle quel que soit le régime en place.

Le second grand défi de la Birmanie est d’ordre socio-économique. Etant donné l’assise politique de l’armée birmane et du régime qui l’incarne, sans base de développement, sans soutien à l’éducation, et surtout sans l’essor d’une société civile multidimensionnelle, la Birmanie ne sera pas à même dans les années à venir de soutenir – ni même d’initier – son propre processus transitionnel. Car la démocratie ne sera pas importée en Birmanie. La création d’alternatives institutionnelles et sociétales dans un pays qui ne connaît pas d’autre entité organisée et structurée que l’armée est indispensable. Pas de syndicats, pas de justice indépendante, aucun système bancaire fiable ni de socle administratif autonome, la Birmanie a besoin du monde extérieur afin d’établir progressivement ces bases prédémocratiques. Le Japon et l’Inde s’y essaient. Pourquoi pas l’Europe ? Aider les Birmans à préparer leur transition en leur donnant les moyens de développer eux-mêmes leur société civile naissante doit être la priorité de la communauté internationale. A elle – et surtout aux Occidentaux – de choisir entre la solution normative la plus confortable mais stérile car perpétuant l’impasse actuelle, et celle plus adaptée mais coûteuse politiquement, de préparer la Birmanie et son peuple à son futur, qui ne se borne pas à des élections contrôlées en 2010 mais à des années d’apprentissage sociodémocratique. Qu’on le veuille ou non, cela passe par une aide au développement accrue et repensée qui demandera un dialogue coopératif avec une armée birmane loin d’être monolithique mais qui dominera le paysage birman de la prochaine décennie.

Much attention has been focused on Sen. James Webb’s recent visit to my country and his meetings with Senior Gen. Than Shwe and incarcerated Nobel Peace Prize recipient Aung San Suu Kyi. I understand Webb’s desire to seek a meaningful dialogue with the Burmese ruling authorities. Unfortunately, his efforts have been damaging to our democracy movement and focus on the wrong issue — the potential for an “election” that Webb wants us to consider participating in next year as part of a long-term political strategy. But the showcase election planned by the military regime makes a mockery of the freedom sought by our people and would make military dictatorship permanent.

In our last free election, the Burmese people rejected military rule in a landslide, awarding our National League for Democracy party more than 80 percent of the seats in parliament. Yet the military has refused to allow the NLD to form a government. In the 19 years since that election, Burmese democracy activists have faced imprisonment, intimidation, torture and death as they have peacefully voiced demands for justice, individual and ethnic rights, and a democratic form of government that is representative of all Burma’s people.

While never ending our struggle for democracy, the NLD has continually sought to engage the regime and open a dialogue — based on peace and mutual respect — that could address Burma’s critical political as well as social problems. Make no mistake — these two issues are linked. Burma was once the rice bowl of Asia. Today, because of the regime’s destructive economic policies and its use of oppression to maintain military rule, Burma is a shattered, poverty-stricken country.

The regime is seeking to place a veneer of legitimacy on itself through showcase “elections” and claiming that “disciplined democracy” will be instituted next year. Yet in May 2008, just days after a massive cyclone devastated Burma and killed more than 100,000 people, the regime used a farcical process to claim that 93 percent of voters chose to adopt a constitution that permanently enshrines military rule and prevents those with undefined “foreign ties” from holding public office — catch-all provisions that would bar Suu Kyi and democracy activists from seeking office.

Some international observers view next year’s planned elections as an opportunity. But under the circumstances imposed by the military’s constitution, the election will be a sham. We will not sacrifice the democratic principles for which many millions of Burmese have marched, been arrested, been tortured and died to participate in a process that holds no hope whatsoever for bringing freedom to our country.

The demands of the NLD are reasonable. In April we issued another declaration to encourage engagement with the military that called for the release of all political prisoners, a full review of the constitution, reopening of all NLD offices and the right to freely organize. The regime’s answer is the continued jailing of Suu Kyi and 2,000 other activists, massive military offensives against ethnic groups and the enforcement of rules to gag democracy.

How can the international community play a meaningful role? First, officials such as Webb should stop fear-mongering about China. His language about containing China, and working with Burma’s regime to do so, is based on an outdated and unrealistic thesis. Suu Kyi rejected such notions by informing Webb that “we will not deal with anyone with fear and insecurity. We will deal with anyone, China, America, India, equally and friendly. As we can’t choose our neighbors, we understand that we need to have a good relationship with China.” Second, the NLD encourages other countries and international organizations to engage with Burma’s military leaders to persuade them to engage with us and Burma’s ethnic groups. The United States and many other nations have imposed sanctions on Burma. That is their decision and in keeping with their justified solidarity with the democratic values that we all hold so dear. If the regime genuinely engages with the NLD and ethnic representatives, releases political prisoners, ceases attacks against ethnic minorities and takes additional steps to build a true democratic state, these sanctions will be repealed at the right time.

In the meantime, let no one doubt our resolve. The NLD is a reflection of Burmese society. We will not be cowed or coerced into participating in a fatally flawed political process that robs the Burmese people of the freedom for which we struggle. We stand ready to engage, but we are more than willing to continue our struggle for the democratic values that so many have given their lives and their freedom to achieve.

It has been a good few weeks for Burma’s dictator, Senior Gen. Than Shwe, even though Sen. Jim Webb secured the release of an imprisoned American during his recent visit and even though the sentencing of Burma’s democracy leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, after this summer’s sham trial was roundly condemned. With all the media attention, Than Shwe got a dose of what he appears to crave most: international legitimacy. And he is assured that Suu Kyi, who won Burma’s last free elections in 1990, will remain under house arrest during the 2010 elections. Last month Burma’s state-run media even hailed the regime for its humanitarian nature and called for targeted economic sanctions to be lifted.

But is there, in fact, a more humanitarian regime in Burma?

Distinctly negative answers come from Ho Lom village in Burma’s Shan State, where junta soldiers burned 62 houses on July 29. Or from Tard Mawk, in the same district, where soldiers burned more than 100 homes. Or from the 38 other Shan villages from which villagers have been forcibly displaced in July and August, part of a systematic and brutal campaign documented by the Shan Human Rights Foundation and the Shan Women’s Action Network and reported by Human Rights Watch last month. Eric Schwartz, assistant secretary of the U.S. Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, noted on Aug. 19: “We’ve been deeply concerned by very recent reports of large-scale displacement, perhaps as many or more than 10,000 civilians . . . as a result of increased military activity in northeastern Burma.”

Schwartz said this even before the latest round of attacks — against the people of Kokang, an ethnic enclave of Chinese speakers in northeastern Shan State, close to the Chinese border. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees estimates that the fighting has driven 10,000 to 30,000 Kokang into China — prompting a rare rebuke from the People’s Republic, a longtime trade and investment partner of the junta.

Other ethnic groups, including the Karen in eastern Burma, have faced intensified fighting and egregious rights violations this summer. Some 5,000 Karen have fled into Thailand, according to Human Rights Watch. In Karen State, large numbers of land-mine injuries are being reported as untrained new conscripts, including children, are forced to fight their own people in some of the world’s most heavily mined jungles.

These systematic campaigns in Burma’s eastern ethnic regions have been marked by allegations of torture, extrajudicial executions and rapes of ethnic minority women and girls. Such mass atrocities are not new. Our collaborative team of medics conducted population-based health and human rights assessments in 2006-07 among more than 2,900 ethnic households in eastern Burma. We found that more than a quarter of all Shan families had been forcibly relocated in the previous year, that in 24 percent at least one family member had been taken by soldiers for forced labor and that in 9 percent of households at least one family member had been injured by a land mine — one of the highest rates ever documented.

The current assaults appear to be part of the junta’s strategy for the 2010 elections. The generals are attempting to force their ethnic opponents to become border patrol forces and to participate in their showcase elections. Most of the larger ethnic groups and political parties have rejected these offers, as did the leaders of Kokang. Most, along with Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy, have also rejected the junta’s constitution, which was drafted without their input and approved in the discredited referendum of May 2008.

Burma’s ethnic peoples know they are not living under a new, more humanitarian regime. Quite the opposite: The junta is creating humanitarian emergencies in its quest for control. Shan, Karen, Kokang and other civilians are losing their homes, livelihoods and lives. Their suffering is directly linked to the detention of Suu Kyi and to the crackdown against Burma’s democratic forces: student leaders, journalists, independent humanitarian relief workers and courageous clergy of all faiths. Indeed, essentially all the progressive forces opposing the generals are under attack.

Strikingly little international attention has been paid to this murderous turn of events. Yet these ethnic peoples must play a role if Burma is to have any sort of decent future. Suu Kyi knows this; in the only statement her people have had from her in years, given to U.N. Special Envoy Ibrahim Gambari in late 2007, she highlighted the need for ethnic participation for true national reconciliation. The Obama administration, which is reviewing its Burma policy, would do well to heed Suu Kyi’s advice: Don’t forget Burma’s ethnic groups. Whatever the administration does about sanctions, it must do much more to press the junta, Burma’s neighbors and the junta’s supporters to stop the campaign of bloodshed against Burma’s ethnic peoples. China has a special role to play, first in providing humanitarian relief to those seeking refuge across its borders and in pressuring the junta to end its brutal campaign. Ethnic warfare and its resultant instability are in no one’s interest, except perhaps Than Shwe’s. He must not be allowed to continue killing with impunity.

Eight years ago I visited Myanmar as a private citizen, traveling freely in the capital city of Yangon and around the countryside. This lush, breathtakingly beautiful nation was even then showing the strain of its severance from the outside world. I was a guest of an American businessman, and I understood the frustration and disappointment that he and others felt, knowing even then that tighter sanctions would soon drive them out of the country.

This month I became the first American political leader to visit Myanmar in 10 years, and the first-ever to meet with its reclusive leader, Senior Gen. Than Shwe, in the haunting, empty new capital of Naypyidaw. From there I flew to an even more patched-and-peeled Yangon, where I met with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the opposition leader and Nobel laureate who remains confined to her home. Among other requests, I asked Than Shwe to free her and allow her to participate in politics.

Leaving the country on a military plane with John Yettaw — an American who had been sentenced to seven years of hard labor for immigration offenses, and whose release I had also requested of Than Shwe — I was struck again by how badly the Burmese people need outside help. They are so hardened after decades of civil war and political stalemate that only an even-handed interlocutor can lift them out of the calcified intransigence that has damaged their lives and threatened the stability of Southeast Asia.

For more than 10 years, the United States and the European Union have employed a policy of ever-tightening economic sanctions against Myanmar, in part fueled by the military government’s failure to recognize the results of a 1990 election won by Aung San Suu Kyi’s party. While the political motivations behind this approach are laudable, the result has been overwhelmingly counterproductive. The ruling regime has become more entrenched and at the same time more isolated. The Burmese people have lost access to the outside world.

Sanctions by Western governments have not been matched by other countries, particularly Russia and China. Indeed, they have allowed China to dramatically increase its economic and political influence in Myanmar, furthering a dangerous strategic imbalance in the region.

According to the nonprofit group EarthRights International, at least 26 Chinese multinational corporations are now involved in more than 62 hydropower, oil, gas and mining projects in Myanmar. This is only the tip of the iceberg. In March, China and Myanmar signed a $2.9-billion agreement for the construction of fuel pipelines that will transport Middle Eastern and African crude oil from Myanmar to China. When completed, Chinese oil tankers will no longer be required to pass through the Straits of Malacca, a time-consuming, strategically vital route where 80 percent of China’s imported oil now passes.

If Chinese commercial influence in Myanmar continues to grow, a military presence could easily follow. Russia is assisting the Myanmar government on a nuclear research project. None of these projects have improved the daily life of the average citizen of Myanmar, who has almost no contact with the outside world and whose per capita income is among the lowest in Asia.

It would be wrong for the United States to lift sanctions on Myanmar purely on the basis of economic self-interest, or if such a decision were seen as a capitulation of our long-held position that Myanmar should abandon its repressive military system in favor of democratic rule. But it would be just as bad for us to fold our arms, turn our heads, and pretend that by failing to do anything about the situation in Myanmar we are somehow helping to solve it.

So what can and should be done?

First, we must focus on what is possible. The military government in Myanmar has committed itself to elections in 2010, as part of its announced “seven steps toward democracy.” Many point out that the Constitution approved last year in a plebiscite is flawed, since it would allow the military to largely continue its domination of the government, and that the approval process itself was questionable. The legislation to put the Constitution into force has yet to be drafted. The National League for Democracy, Aung San Suu Kyi’s political party, has not agreed to participate in next year’s elections.

But there is room for engagement. Many Asian countries — China among them — do not even allow opposition parties. The National League for Democracy might consider the advantages of participation as part of a longer-term political strategy. And the United States could invigorate the debate with an offer to help assist the electoral process. The Myanmar government’s answer to such an offer would be revealing.

Second, the United States needs to develop clearly articulated standards for its relations with the nondemocratic world. Our distinct policies toward different countries amount to a form of situational ethics that does not translate well into clear-headed diplomacy. We must talk to Myanmar’s leaders. This does not mean that we should abandon our aspirations for a free and open Burmese society, but that our goal will be achieved only through a different course of action.

The United States refused to talk to the Chinese until 1971, more than 20 years after the Communist takeover, and did not resume full diplomatic relations until 1979. And yet China, with whom we seem inextricably tied both as a business partner and a strategic competitor, has no democracy and has never held a national election.

The Hanoi government agreed to internationally supervised elections for Vietnam in 1973, as a result of the Paris peace talks; Washington did not raise this as a precondition to furthering relations. As someone who has worked hard to build a bridge between Hanoi and America’s strongly anticommunist Vietnamese community, I believe the greatest factor in creating a more open society inside Vietnam was the removal of America’s trade embargo in 1994.

Third, our government leaders should call on China to end its silence about the situation in Myanmar, and to act responsibly, in keeping with its role as an ascending world power. Americans should not hold their collective breaths that China will give up the huge strategic advantage it has gained as a result of our current policies. But such a gesture from our government would hold far more sway in world opinion than has the repeated but predictable condemnation of Myanmar’s military government.

Finally, with respect to reducing sanctions, we should proceed carefully but immediately. If there is reciprocation from the government of Myanmar in terms of removing the obstacles that now confront us, there would be several ways for our two governments to move forward. We could begin with humanitarian projects. We might also seek cooperation on our long-held desire to recover the remains of World War II airmen at crash sites in the country’s north.

Our ultimate goal, as it always has been, should be to encourage Myanmar to become a responsible member of the world community, and to end the isolation of its people so that they can live in economic prosperity, under an open political system.

Twenty years of sanctioning and lecturing Burma’s military regime have failed. The West needs to engage with Burma’s leaders, increase humanitarian aid and reopen commercial relations with the country. If it doesn’t, not only will positive change remain as elusive as ever, but the country will turn quickly and irreparably into an economic vassal of China.

In a sign of just how impervious the regime is to Western pressure, last week, opposition leader and Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi was sentenced to her fourth spell of house arrest. Two thousand political prisoners remain locked up. And a transition to democracy appears nowhere in sight.

I was born in the United States in 1966 to Burmese parents. My grandfather, U Thant, was then serving as the United Nations’ third secretary general. I witnessed repression in Burma firsthand when I was 8, during the violent unrest surrounding my grandfather’s funeral.

In 1989, just after college, I spent a year in Thailand and along the Thai-Burmese border, working with dissidents and trying help the first wave of Burmese refugees. Thousands had been killed during a failed anti-government uprising. Suu Kyi had just been placed under house arrest. And the ruling junta, after losing relatively free elections, was refusing to hand over power. Later in Washington I argued with members of Congress and others that maximum sanctions were the best way to topple the dictatorship. It was an easy argument to make.

By the early 1990s nearly all Western aid to Burma had been terminated, and development assistance through the United Nations, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund had been blocked. A decade later, embargos and boycotts had cut off nearly all economic ties with the United States and Europe. None of the senior Burmese government officials or their children (these are the only international sanctions targeting children) are allowed to travel to the West.

But as the regime not only survived but began to seek trade, investment and tourism, I started having doubts. My feeling was that the West should use the opening and find a back door to change while the front door remained firmly shut.

In 2006 I published a book, “The River of Lost Footsteps,” in which I argued for a shift in the West’s approach. Even when, in 2007, new protests were violently crushed, I still believed greater engagement was the right way. I felt that many policymakers and journalists were missing the bigger picture.

Few seemed aware, for example, that Burma was just emerging from decades of civil war. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the government and more than a dozen different ethnic insurgent armies hammered out cease-fires, a breakthrough that went virtually unnoticed in the West. (Today, though the cease-fires remain, there is no permanent peace.) And few seemed concerned by the country’s grinding poverty, the result of decades of economic bungling as well as embargos, boycotts and aid cutoffs.

In 1991, UNICEF’s country director warned of a humanitarian emergency among Burma’s children, arguing that more aid couldn’t wait for the right government. Eighteen years later, Burma still receives less than a tenth of the per-capita aid handed out to Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. Tens of thousands die needlessly from treatable diseases.

These challenges have been ignored in the hope that sanctions and tough talk would lead to political change. But that hasn’t happened.

Part of the reason is that the people who fashioned the sanctions didn’t consider how the rise of Asia’s giants — China and India — would transform Burma. As American businesses pulled out in the mid-1990s, Chinese and other Asian companies poured in. Hundreds of billions of dollars worth of natural gas have been discovered offshore, and massive hydroelectric and mining projects are being signed. Within two years a 1,000-mile oil and gas pipeline will stretch across Burma, connecting China’s inland provinces to the sea. The U.S. trade embargo led to the near-collapse of the garment industry in the late 1990s, throwing tens of thousands of people out of work, but for the regime this has meant little.

Burma today is in no danger of economic disintegration. Without Western engagement, however, Burma’s 55 million people risk becoming a virtual colony of their 1.3 billion Chinese neighbors to the east. There is no nefarious Chinese takeover scheme, but the vacuum created by Western policy is being filled.

The old Burmese generals will soon retire, and a new generation will rise to the top. Gen. Than Shwe, Burma’s powerful autocrat, is 77 and ailing. Any chance for change requires support from at least some military leaders. Yet we’ve done nothing to try to influence the worldview of Than Shwe’s possible successors. The upcoming generation of officers will be the first never to have visited Europe or America.

Last winter the Obama administration announced a review of Burma policy. I hope it will reconsider the United States’ long-standing reliance on sanctions. It’s not just that they don’t work, but that they’ve been hugely counterproductive, taking away the one big force — American soft power — that could have played a role in reshaping the landscape.

Asia has experienced many successful democratic transitions, and none came about because of the sanctions and lectures that Western powers and advocacy groups seem to think will work in Burma. Generals don’t negotiate away their power in the face of threats. You have to change the ground beneath them.

Engagement is not just about talking — it’s about dealing with the powers that be enough to get a foot in the door and create new facts on the ground, especially through economic contacts with the Burmese people. Nor is it based on the notion that economic development will automatically produce democracy, but that we must tackle simultaneously Burma’s political and economic ills.

Many in America and worldwide are again outraged by goings-on in Burma. But without new thinking, 20 more years will pass and the dream of a prosperous, democratic Burma will be more distant still.

El resultado atroz aunque inevitable de la parodia de juicio al que ha sido sometida Aung San Suu Kyi constituye la prueba definitiva de que el régimen militar de Birmania está dispuesto a seguir desafiando al mundo.

La desoladora noticia de que ha sido condenada a cumplir otro año y medio de arresto domiciliario no sólo es una tragedia para ella y su familia sino también para el pueblo birmano, que sufre diariamente a manos de los tiranos. Era el momento de que los generales atendieran el creciente clamor por un cambio y optaran por la vía de la reforma que exige la región y la comunidad internacional. Sin embargo, la han rechazado de plano. Los cargos carecían de fundamento y el veredicto ha sido escandaloso.

Por ende, la comunidad internacional debe responder a esta última injusticia dejando claro a la Junta que no va a tolerar más sus actos de tiranía. En respuesta al veredicto, la Unión Europea ha acordado otras sanciones dirigidas directamente a los intereses económicos del régimen. Estas medidas deben aplicarse a la mayor brevedad. A las sanciones deberán seguirles medidas concretas del Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU. Como mínimo, habría que empezar por la prohibición mundial de vender armas al régimen.

A mi juicio, también deberíamos identificar y dirigirnos a los jueces que actúan como cómplices en estos juicios de propaganda política, absurda parodia de la justicia.

Los generales no deben tener la más mínima duda sobre la firmeza de la solidaridad internacional con la causa de la libertad, la democracia y el desarrollo en Birmania.

La situación política y humanitaria en el país continúa deteriorándose. El año pasado, cuando el ciclón Nargis dejó tras de sí más de 140.000 muertos y millones de personas sin hogar, se rechazaron los esfuerzos internacionales de ayuda. Las protestas pacíficas de los monjes en 2007 fueron acalladas violentamente y las minorías étnicas son perseguidas y sufren ataques armados.

Los medios de comunicación están amordazados, no existe libertad de expresión ni de reunión y el número de prisioneros políticos, encarcelados únicamente por su firme compromiso con la paz y la conciliación nacional, se duplicó y ahora supera los 2.000 presos.

Aung San Suu Kyi es el ejemplo más destacado. Durante los largos 14 años que lleva como prisionera de conciencia ha sido todo un símbolo de esperanza y rebeldía. Es una mujer muy valiente. En esos largos años de aislamiento apenas ha podido ver a sus dos hijos, pero mantuvo firme su fe en la democracia y en el pueblo birmano. Su negativa a doblegarse ante los tiranos es una fuente de inspiración.

La farsa de su enjuiciamiento se ha vuelto más monstruosa porque el verdadero objetivo es cortar el lazo que le une al pueblo, para el que simboliza la esperanza y resistencia. El trato que ha recibido sólo puede interpretarse como la negativa de la Junta a avanzar hacia la libertad, la democracia y el Estado de derecho, con Aung San Suu Kyi como figura principal de una nueva Birmania.

Por tanto, salvo que el régimen la libere inmediatamente, a ella y a todos los prisioneros políticos, e inicie un diálogo genuino con la oposición y los grupos étnicos, las elecciones del año que viene no tendrán ninguna credibilidad.

En julio, en su visita a Rangún, el secretario general de la ONU, Ban Ki-moon, exigió la aplicación de estas medidas. Con este veredicto, los generales le han desairado públicamente.

Ahora llega la verdadera prueba para nosotros. Ante esta arrogancia, no podemos quedarnos de brazos cruzados y, de hecho, consentir las acciones abominables de una Junta violenta y represora. Debemos demostrarles que la comunidad internacional responderá de forma cohesiva y coordinada.

Hemos sido testigos de la consolidación en todo el mundo de un extraordinario consenso contra el régimen birmano, consenso que abarca a la ONU, la UE, la ASEAN y más de 45 jefes de Estado.

Todos debemos seguir ejerciendo presión para lograr un cambio y una reconciliación política genuinos, en especial aquellos países de la región con mayor capacidad de influencia.

Birmania es una nación rica en recursos naturales y humanos, situada en pleno corazón de un continente dinámico. La reforma democrática liberaría el tremendo potencial del país.

Asimismo, siempre he dejado claro que el Reino Unido respondería positivamente a cualquier señal de progreso. No obstante, en vista de este último veredicto las posturas deben endurecerse.Los generales están condenando al país y a sus habitantes al creciente agravamiento del aislamiento, la pobreza, el conflicto y la desesperación.

Algunos quizá se pregunten por qué Birmania merece tanta atención. Hay otros países donde los derechos humanos no se respetan o la gente vive en la pobreza. Sin embargo, el régimen birmano es prácticamente único en su grado de desgobierno y su total indiferencia ante el sufrimiento cotidiano de sus 50 millones de habitantes.

Una vez más nos solidarizamos con Aung San Suu Kyi, el rostro humano de la tragedia birmana, pero las palabras y las buenas intenciones ya no son suficientes.

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L’issue épouvantable mais inévitable du simulacre de procès d’Aung San Suu Kyi est l’ultime preuve que le régime militaire de Birmanie persiste à défier le reste du monde. L’annonce décourageante de sa condamnation à dix-huit mois de résidence surveillée est tragique, pour elle et sa famille, mais également pour le peuple birman, qui souffre au quotidien sous le joug de la tyrannie.

Les généraux auraient pu saisir cette chance de répondre aux revendications croissantes de changement, et choisir la voie de la réforme comme le demande la communauté internationale. Ils l’ont purement et simplement esquivée. Les chefs d’accusation sont sans fondement, le verdict scandaleux.

La communauté internationale doit réagir à cette nouvelle injustice en lançant un message clair à la junte : ses actes de tyrannie ne seront plus tolérés. De nouvelles sanctions visant directement les intérêts économiques du régime ont été décidées par l’Union européenne en réponse au verdict. Elles doivent être appliquées le plus rapidement possible.

Une action résolue du Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU doit suivre. Seul un embargo mondial sur la vente d’armes au régime saura constituer un premier pas. Je pense également que nous devrions identifier et cibler les juges complices de ces procès politiques factices.

Les généraux ne doivent avoir aucun doute sur la forte solidarité internationale en faveur de la liberté, de la démocratie et du développement en Birmanie. Les conditions politiques et humanitaires dans le pays continuent de se détériorer. Lorsque le cyclone Nargis tua 140 000 personnes et en dépouilla des millions en 2008, les efforts d’assistance du monde entier se heurtèrent à la résistance des autorités ; le soulèvement pacifique des moines de 2007 fut réprimé par la violence ; les minorités ethniques sont persécutées et subissent des attaques armées. Les médias sont muselés, les libertés d’expression et de rassemblement sont inexistantes, et le nombre de prisonniers politiques a doublé, dépassant aujourd’hui 2 000.

De ces prisonniers, Aung San Suu Kyi est la plus emblématique. Elle est devenue un symbole d’espoir et de défiance. Aung San Suu Kyi est une femme d’un très grand courage. Ayant à peine vu ses deux fils pendant ses longues années d’isolement, elle reste cependant déterminée dans sa foi en la démocratie et en le peuple birman. Son refus de plier sous le joug de la tyrannie est une source d’inspiration.

Le simulacre de procès dont elle vient de faire l’objet est d’autant plus monstrueux que l’objectif réel est de rompre les liens d’Aung San Suu Kyi avec le peuple, pour qui elle incarne l’espoir et la résistance. Le traitement qui lui a été réservé ne peut qu’illustrer la répugnance de la junte à évoluer vers la liberté, la démocratie et l’Etat de droit.

A moins qu’Aung San Suu Kyi soit libérée sans délai – avec tous les prisonniers politiques – et que s’ouvre un véritable dialogue avec l’opposition et les groupes ethniques, les élections de 2010 ne seront pas crédibles. Lors d’une visite à Rangoun, en juillet, le Secrétaire général de l’ONU avait déjà fait état de ces exigences. En rendant un tel verdict, la junte a publiquement fait fi de ses demandes.

Nous arrivons maintenant à un point critique. Devant une telle arrogance, ne rien faire reviendrait à conforter les ignominies d’une junte violente et répressive. Nous devons au contraire montrer que la communauté internationale est unie et coordonnée dans sa réponse.

Un consensus extraordinaire s’est cristallisé contre le régime birman à travers le monde : l’ONU, l’UE, l’Association des nations d’Asie du Sud-Est (Asean) et plus de 45 chefs d’Etat se sont prononcés. Nous devons tous poursuivre nos efforts pour une réconciliation et un changement politiques véritables, tout particulièrement les pays les plus influents de la région.

La Birmanie est riche en ressources naturelles et humaines, et se situe au coeur d’un continent dynamique. L’ouverture à la démocratie libérerait le formidable potentiel de ce pays. J’ai toujours dit que le Royaume-Uni répondrait positivement à tout signe de progrès, mais à la lumière d’un tel verdict, nous n’avons d’autre choix que d’adopter une ligne plus ferme. Les généraux condamnent le pays et son peuple à un isolement, une pauvreté, un désespoir et un conflit encore plus profonds.

D’aucuns se demanderont pourquoi la Birmanie suscite tant d’intérêt. Il est vrai qu’il y a d’autres pays où les droits de l’homme sont bafoués et où les gens vivent dans une très grande pauvreté. Mais le régime birman se distingue particulièrement par l’ampleur de sa mauvaise administration et de son indifférence aux souffrances quotidiennes de son peuple de 50 millions de personnes. Toutes mes pensées vont vers Aung San Suu Kyi, figure emblématique de la tragédie birmane. Mais les mots et les pensées ne suffisent plus.

La dictadura birmana ha asestado un nuevo golpe al indigente país sobre el que lleva gobernando durante casi 50 años. El pasado viernes confirmó el encarcelamiento de la líder del movimiento por la democracia en el país: Aung San Suu Kyi. La semana pasada se escucharon los alegatos finales en el nuevo juicio que se celebra contra la líder de la oposición y Premio Nobel de la Paz, que se enfrenta a otros cinco años de detención si es condenada por haber roto los términos de su arresto domiciliario. El fallo del tribunal -favorable a la Junta Militar- se ha pospuesto hasta mediados de agosto.

La historia de Aung San Suu Kyi es tan conocida que apenas necesita repetirse. Cuenta ahora con 64 años y es la hija de quien fuera el primer líder de Birmania independiente. Su padre fue asesinado en los albores de la independencia, y ella se trasladó al extranjero a estudiar. Se graduó en India y después completó sus estudios en Oxford. Regresó temporalmente a Birmania, donde participó en movimientos por la democracia política. En las elecciones de 1990 dirigió un partido que arrasó en las urnas, con más del 80% del voto popular. Los generales suprimieron los resultados y arrestaron a Aung San Suu Kyi. Desde entonces ha permanecido privada de libertad, de su familia, de sus amigos, de ayuda económica y de cualquier contacto con la prensa o el mundo exterior. Pero desde su casa-prisión ha logrado componer discursos, artículos y libros, se ha ganado la admiración de todo el mundo civilizado, y ha sido galardonada con numerosas distinciones internacionales, incluido el Premio Nobel.

Los nuevos cargos por los que se la juzga ahora obedecen a los acontecimientos de mayo, cuando un ciudadano de Missouri (EEUU) eludió la seguridad cruzando a nado un lago que conducía a su casa para poder verla. Los abogados de Aung San Suu Kyi han argüido que las fuerzas de seguridad que supuestamente habían de vigilar la casa deberían tomar la responsabilidad por haber permitido que el hombre pasara. Pero el Gobierno dictatorial aduce que ella quebrantó las condiciones de arresto domiciliario al recibirle. «Confiamos en que ganaremos el caso si las cosas van de acuerdo con la ley», comentaba un abogado de la defensa a los periodistas.

El hecho de su heroica resistencia ha dado lugar a una situación curiosa, en la que la gente de fuera de Birmania tiende a idealizar el país, imaginando lo que éste podría llegar a conseguir si ella fuera libre y la líder de un nuevo Gobierno democrático. Si, por alguna extraña lógica, los generales terminaran absolviendo a la acusada, le concedieran la libertad, disolvieran la dictadura y declararan elecciones democráticas, ¿pensarían los devotos de Aung San Suu Kyi que había llegado la solución? Merece la pena recordar que se produjo una situación parecida en Pakistán hace muy poco tiempo. Se disolvió la dictadura militar, se convocaron elecciones libres, se liberó a los prisioneros, y se permitió a Benazir Bhutto volver del exilio. Las consecuencias todavía están presentes: Pakistán es probablemente hoy la nación más peligrosa e inestable del mundo.

En otras palabras, y a pesar de nuestra inalterada admiración por la acusada, el verdadero problema es la historia de Birmania. En torno a 1880, el país, que estaba bajo dominio británico, se convirtió en una extensión del imperio británico en la India. Los ingleses lograron pacificar el país, pero el lazo con la India permitió que miles de indios emigraran hacia territorio birmano. De hecho, hacia 1930, más de dos tercios de los habitantes de la capital, Rangún, eran de etnia india. Se convirtieron en la elite profesional y en los más adinerados hombres de negocios del país. Esto ayudó a la economía, pero también fue un signo del desinterés británico hacia la población birmana.

Durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial, los japoneses ocuparon el país. Los resentidos líderes birmaneses empezaron a buscar en el exterior la inspiración para la lucha por la libertad. Un pequeño grupo de estudiantes birmanos, dirigidos por U Aung San (el padre de Suu Kyi) huyó del país, recibió entrenamiento militar de los nipones, y después se unió a los invasores bajo las siglas del Ejército Birmanés de Independencia (BIA). Más tarde cambiaron de aliados, y ayudaron a los británicos a echar a los japoneses en 1945. Por aquellas fechas, los británicos estaban preparando dar al país una medida de autogobierno. El grupo de Aung San, llamado entonces La Liga Popular Anti-Fascista por la Libertad (AFPFL), reclamó el reconocimiento inmediato como gobierno provisional. Después de una huelga nacional, los británicos aceptaron en 1947 entregar el poder a los de la AFPFL.

El acto central de la tragedia sucedió ese año. En julio, Aung San y su gabinete provisional, constituido por los principales grupos nacionales, se reunieron en una oficina en Rangún. Hombres armados en uniforme irrumpieron en el lugar y mataron a casi todos los asistentes, incluyendo a Aung San. Nadie ha descubierto aún quiénes fueron los responsables. La coalición nacionalista se desintegró, y se desencadenó una guerra civil.

Siendo yo un niño en aquellos días, recuerdo las alarmas nocturnas en Rangún, y cómo nos tendíamos en el suelo para evitar el peligro de las balas. El nuevo ministro de Finanzas, que vivía enfrente de nosotros, fue asesinado. Desintegrado el Gobierno, las guerrillas armadas tomaron el campo, los intereses comerciales huyeron del país, la economía se deterioró. Birmania había buscado la libertad, pero no había logrado nada más que ruina y caos. ¿Quién se encargaría del país?

El nuevo dirigente del país, U Nu, era un político demócrata que consiguió ganar las elecciones y traer algo de orden en los asuntos públicos. Pero el Gobierno controlaba muy poco del territorio. El orden lo mantenía el ejército, dirigido por el general Ne Win, un lugarteniente de Aung San y ahora comandante en jefe de las Fuerzas Armadas. A veces, el ejército tenía que encargarse de tareas administrativas, porque el Estado no podía funcionar debidamente. Los generales culpaban al Gobierno del caos y la enorme corrupción. A primera hora de la mañana del 2 de marzo de 1962, tanques y unidades armadas leales a Ne Win entraron en Rangún, rodearon el Palacio del Gobierno, arrestaron a U Nu y todas las otras figuras políticas de mayor rango, e instalaron la dictadura militar que sobrevive hasta este día.

Los nuevos gobernantes intentaron tomar medidas radicales que creían resolverían los problemas. Nacionalizaron todas las grandes industrias, incluyendo los bancos. Expulsaron a más de 400.000 personas de etnia india. Después, desmantelaron las principales instituciones civiles. Abolieron el Parlamento, los tribunales, la policía, las universidades y la burocracia. En resumen, buscaron una solución militar más que política.

Al hacer todo eso, consiguieron aislar Birmania del resto del mundo. Incluso cambiaron su nombre tradicional por el de Myanmar, que alguien desempolvó del pasado medieval. Se excluyó a los turistas. El país, privado del comercio exterior y ayuda, se deterioró. Finalmente, en 1988, un levantamiento masivo en Rangún asustó a los generales y les obligó a considerar la alternativa de una democracia.

Se permitió que Aung San Suu Kyi y otros políticos hicieran campaña, y se convocaron elecciones en 1990. Pero cuando la victoria se inclinó hacia la Liga Nacional por la Democracia (NLD) de Aung San Suu Kyi, y los líderes del partido empezaron a hablar de llevar a los generales a juicio, el ejército se echó para atrás. La suerte estaba de su parte esta vez. Durante los años 90, la feroz guerra civil en el país llegaba a su fin. El Gobierno llegó a acuerdos con las fuerzas rebeldes comunistas y con otros grupos. Los generales habían alcanzado el éxito. Poco a poco, se restauró el turismo. ¿Pero qué pasaba con los problemas básicos del país?

La versión de los hechos que más circula en Occidente en estos momentos ve a Aung San Suu Kyi como el símbolo de la democracia y de los derechos humanos contra un régimen brutal que permite muy poca libertad política. Pero esta versión es correcta sólo hasta cierto punto y la idealización de la dirigente opositora es, por supuesto, ingenua. Birmania ha estado en guerra, incluida la civil, durante 70 años; sus jóvenes han vivido en una sociedad de permanente violencia; todavía hay varias guerrillas armadas activas; y el uso de armas es universal. Además, los diversos grupos étnicos nunca han aprendido a vivir en un Estado unificado. Sumemos esta situación a los problemas económicos del país. Resulta obvio que la democracia por sí misma no es una solución automática.

Y Aung San Suu Kyi por ella misma es más un símbolo de esperanza que una esperanza tangible y real. Los políticos de Occidente deben pensar en Birmania partiendo del conocimiento de los hechos, y no del liberalismo fácil.

For two weeks, the world has been transfixed by images of Iranians taking to the streets to demand the most basic human freedoms and rights. Watching these courageous men and women, I am reminded of a similar scene nearly two years ago in Burma, when tens of thousands of Buddhist monks peacefully marched through their nation’s streets. They, too, sought to reclaim basic human dignity for all Burmese citizens, but they were beaten back by that nation’s harsh regime.

Since those brutal days in September 2007, Burma’s suffering has intensified. In the past 21 months, the number of political prisoners incarcerated by the junta has doubled. Within the past 10 days, two Burmese citizens were sentenced to 18 months in prison. Their offense: praying in a Buddhist pagoda for the release of the jailed opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi. That is only the tip of the regime’s brutality. Inside Burma, more than 3,000 villages have been “forcibly displaced” — a number exceeding the mass relocations in genocide-racked Darfur. The military junta has forced tens of thousands of child soldiers into its army and routinely uses civilians as mine-sweepers and slave laborers. It has closed churches and mosques; it has imprisoned comedians for joking about the government and bloggers for writing about it. Human trafficking, where women and children are snatched and sold, is pervasive. Summary executions pass for justice, while lawyers are arrested for the “crime” of defending the persecuted.

Rape is routinely used as a “weapon of war.” In 2006, I convened a roundtable at the United Nations to address the situation in Burma and listened as Burmese activist Hseng Noung described the rape victims she had aided. The youngest victim was 8; the oldest was 80. Her words silenced the room.

Yet time and again, the women of Burma, who are often the regime’s chief targets, have responded to this brutality with inspiring courage. I will never forget visiting the remote and crowded refugee camps on the mountainous border between Burma and Thailand. There, I watched the tireless efforts of Dr. Cynthia Maung to provide lifesaving medical aid for hundreds of Burmese in need, many of them ill or injured. I sat with victims of land mines who had lost legs or feet and were waiting quietly, often for hours, for basic care. Last fall, it was my great privilege to present a Vital Voices award to Charm Tong, who testified before U.N. officials at the age of 17 and eloquently described the systematic military campaign of rape and abuse that is being waged against women in Burma’s Shan state. She spoke unflinchingly even though her audience included representatives of the very regime she condemned.

More of us in America should make such courage our courage. At this moment, Aung San Suu Kyi, 64 and in fragile health, faces sentencing on trumped-up charges that could force her to endure five more years of brutal captivity. The junta leaders wish to undermine the Nobel Peace laureate’s influence ahead of next year’s elections. Leaders from around the world — including the United States — have called forcefully for the junta to release Aung San Suu Kyi and the 2,100 other political prisoners it is holding. Even Burma’s closest allies in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations have called for her to receive proper medical care and have warned that Burma’s “honor and credibility” are at stake. But the world must do more than express concern.

A new report from Harvard Law School asks the U.N. Security Council to establish a “commission of inquiry” into crimes against humanity and war crimes in Burma. Harvard’s panel of international law experts has carefully catalogued what it deems as the junta’s “widespread and systemic” human rights violations. The Security Council has already referred the crisis in Darfur to the International Criminal Court. It should do the same for Burma.

With U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon planning to visit Burma this summer, it is crucial that he press the regime to take immediate steps to end human rights abuses, particularly in ethnic minority areas. There have been 38 U.N. resolutions condemning these abuses, yet the horrors continue unabated. Under the junta’s brutal rule, too many lives have been wasted, lives whose talents could have helped all of Burma prosper.

But Aung San Suu Kyi’s continued example of civil courage — like those brave protesters in Iran — reminds all of us that no matter how callous the regime, it cannot lock up what she stands for: the fundamental desire of all people to live in freedom and with dignity. During the brief moments that foreign diplomats were allowed to observe her show trial, Aung San Suu Kyi calmly apologized for having to greet them in a prison, saying, “I hope to meet you in better times.” We should all share her hope — and add our voices to those who risk so much to protest tyranny and injustice in Burma and beyond.

The trial of the world’s only imprisoned Nobel Peace Prize recipient, Aung San Suu Kyi, has once again catapulted events in Burma onto the front pages of newspapers around the globe. The leader of Burma’s struggle for human rights and democracy has been charged with violating the terms of her house arrest after an American citizen swam across a lake and broke into her home last month. Heads of state from Asia and the West, celebrities, and U.N. leaders such as human rights chief Navi Pillay have responded strongly, demanding not only an end to the trial in Burma’s kangaroo courts but the immediate release of Aung San Suu Kyi, who has been under house arrest for 13 of the past 19 years.

With the verdict expected this week, many eyes remain glued to Burma. We hope this global attention will result in long-overdue action.

For while the imprisonment of Aung San Suu Kyi, without trial, has long been denounced, a less-publicized travesty has been underway in Burma for much of the past 15 years. Organizations such as Human Rights Watch, Human Rights First and Amnesty International have reported on the crimes against humanity and war crimes committed under the rule of Burma’s military regime, including the recruitment of tens of thousands of child soldiers and attacks on ethnic minority civilians. The former U.N. special rapporteur on human rights in Burma, Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, reported last year that he had received information indicating that the military regime had destroyed, forcibly displaced or forced the abandonment of more than 3,000 villages in eastern Burma, where ethnic minorities predominate. At least 1 million people fled their homes as a result of the attacks, he said, escaping as refugees and internally displaced persons. This is comparable to the number of villages that have been harmed in the Darfur region of Sudan.

Inexplicably, the U.N. Security Council has not systematically investigated these abuses, which probably rise to the level of crimes against humanity and war crimes. So a group of jurists from the United States, Europe, Asia, Latin America and Africa — of which we were part — commissioned a report by the International Human Rights Clinic at Harvard Law School to determine whether the United Nations is sufficiently aware of the seriousness of the charges and willing to pursue justice. The Harvard team — relying only on U.N. documents and not information from human rights groups — examined four international human rights violations documented by U.N. bodies over the past 15 years: sexual violence, forced displacement, torture and extrajudicial killings.

It found that, indeed, the United Nations is well aware that such abuses are taking place in Burma. Numerous U.N. special rapporteurs, the U.N. General Assembly, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights (now Human Rights Council), and the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women have repeatedly documented and cited human rights abuses that rise to the level of crimes, using language such as “widespread” and “systematic,” which are key elements to proving the existence of war crimes and crimes against humanity.

The Harvard report noted that the United Nations has acknowledged that rights abuses in Burma have taken place with impunity. Moreover, U.N. reports observe that most often the Burmese military commits these grave human rights abuses. Key U.N. experts have acknowledged that there is no independent judiciary in Burma, with Tomás Ojea Quintana, U.N. special rapporteur on human rights, stating as recently as November that “There is no independent and impartial judiciary system” in Burma.

Tragedies such as last year’s cyclone and this spring’s sham trial inevitably draw the world’s eyes to Burma. We should maintain our gaze. Given that the United Nations is aware of the scale and severity of rights abuses in Burma, it is incumbent on the Security Council to authorize a commission of inquiry into crimes against humanity and war crimes in Burma. In previous, similar cases — such as the situation in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Darfur — the council voted to create such a commission to investigate charges and recommend actions. So many U.N. bodies have documented severe human rights abuses that such a move on Burma is not only justified but long overdue.

In Burma, things just go from bad to worse. Last week, the country’s revered democracy leader and Nobel peace prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi was taken ill. Her doctor reported she was short of breath, had low blood pressure and was needing an IV drip. That was just before he was detained. Then there was news of an American who had swum to Suu Kyi’s house and stayed for two nights in her basement. Now Suu Kyi has been taken to the notorious Insein prison to be tried on trumped-up charges.

To anyone with even a passing notion of Burma’s Orwellian political context, this latest development is oddly predictable, even given the surreal circumstances. To reach an understanding of this awful turn of events, one has only to reach back a few months. In April, the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention found that Aung San Suu Kyi’s incarceration was not only in violation of international law, it is in contravention of Burmese law. Since then, it has been incumbent on the Burmese military regime to find a means to justify the country’s leading democracy figure’s continued imprisonment. This compulsion became particularly pressing as Suu Kyi’s current period of detention was scheduled to end on 27 May.

Desperately reaching for an excuse to bounce the country’s legitimate democratic leader into prison, the regime has cooked up a bizarre scheme to use the visit by John Yettaw and to then apply Article 22 of the State Protection Law, which prohibits any Burmese to accept a foreign visitor – even an uninvited one – for an overnight stay without state permission. No mention of the fact that it is the regime who should be on trial for failing to protect a prisoner under their watch. The trial looks set to drag on for days. It will take place behind closed doors, of course, and will likely be removed from any connection to basic legal due process.

Aung San Suu Kyi’s fate mirrors that of Burma’s many other political prisoners. There are now some 2,100 in Burmese prisons, and each and every one has landed there on the back of unfounded charges and hollow legal processes.

Suu Kyi’s widely reported health problems have clearly driven the regime to find ways to take her even further away from public scrutiny. This is a dangerous course, but it does at least suggest that the regime is increasingly reactionary and that international pressure to release Suu Kyi is gaining traction. While we all fear the health consequences should Aung San Suu Kyi be imprisoned, we can at least find some motivation in this fact.

This situation is as clear an indication there ever was, if one was needed, that the proposed 2010 national elections are an absolute sham. Finding scant reason to lock-up the country’s bona fide democracy leader is this regime’s obsession, not democracy. This election has zero credibility and zero democratic accountability.

As the regime has seen fit to look to imprison its greatest threat, we can all be emboldened by her spirit and by her fortitude. That she has remained in Burma to face such threats to her safety and well-being, despite being allowed to leave Burma at any time (as long as she does not return), she has chosen a harsh course. For her, it is the only course, for she must be where her people are.

Over the last few months, there has been debate over policy on Burma among the international community. The case of Aung San Suu Kyi underlines that any policy must have at its core a push for the release of all political ­prisoners, and should be driven by the need for a democratic transition to be initiated in Burma immediately.

Moreover, Suu Kyi’s arrest offers a firm basis for the continuation of targetted economic sanctions and on­going international pressure, as the regime obviously fears the opprobrium of ­global governments and institutions.

The solution to Burma has always been a combination of carrot and stick. What we learn from the case of Aung San Suu Kyi is that there is hope even in disaster, and that sacrifices can at last undermine the regime. Perhaps this appears paradoxical and counter­intuitive, but such is the shape of ­politics in today’s Burma.

The world must not let this moment pass without swift and sure action. It is time for the international community to end Burma’s descent into hell and to use Aung San Suu Kyi’s kangaroo court trial as a base upon which to build greater democracy in our country.

When President Obama was elected, I was filled with hope that America would regain the moral standing to aid those who are impoverished and oppressed around the world. I have since rejoiced to see him reversing the most obnoxious policies of the Bush administration — by ending torture, announcing the closure of the detention camp at Guantanamo Bay and engaging the world on climate change, to name just a few. But there is another issue on which America’s moral leadership is desperately needed, and here, it must be acknowledged, President Bush was on the side of the angels: the struggle for human rights and justice in Burma.

Last year, when a cyclone struck Burma, we watched in horror as the country’s military government refused offers of help to save thousands of people clinging to survival. Not everyone noticed what the government was focused on in those terrible days — a referendum to ratify a new constitution, designed to entrench its rule forever. As villagers in affected areas fought to stay alive and the rest of the country anguished over their fate, the government mobilized its forces not for rescue but to herd people to the polls. Of course, this was not a real referendum; it was illegal for any Burmese to urge a “no” vote, and the results were rigged in any case. But it was a real manifestation of the heartlessness of those who rule Burma.

Now the Obama administration is reviewing America’s policy toward Burma. A thoughtful review is needed; as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton recently said, neither economic pressure nor diplomacy has yet achieved the change we seek in Burma. It stands to reason that every aspect of U.S. engagement with this country needs to be made more effective, more targeted and more broadly supported by key countries around the world. But as we wait for the results of this thought process, as America’s allies wait, as the United Nations waits, as the Burmese people wait, we should remember that the Burmese government is not waiting. Each day, it moves a step closer to its goal of eliminating opposition and consolidating power, with another stage-managed “election” looming in 2010. The administration does not have the luxury of considering its options and then starting to lead; it must somehow think and lead at the same time, before it loses the initiative, and misimpressions about where it stands spread.

As the administration reviews its policy, I hope it will remember that the voices of those with the most at stake cannot easily be heard. My sister Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, the heroic and beloved leader of the Burmese democracy movement, remains under house arrest and cannot speak to the world. In recent months, hundreds of prominent activists, Buddhist monks and nuns, journalists, labor activists, and bloggers who want the world to maintain pressure on their government have been sentenced to years, even decades, in isolated jungle prisons, where not even their families can visit. Meanwhile, those who support or have resigned themselves to their government’s approach are free to speak out. This repression cannot be rewarded; the voices of those it has silenced must be heard as if the walls of their jails did not exist.

I hope that the Obama administration will energize global diplomacy on Burma. It should be willing to talk to Burma’s leaders, to work intensively with Burma’s neighbors and to make clear that there is a dignified way forward for all those in Burma who are willing to compromise. It should support carefully monitored humanitarian assistance directed to help Burma’s people, so aid reaches them and does not reinforce corruption or result in other unintended consequences.

So yes — America should engage Burma, but it should not engage in wishful thinking. Nothing in our experience suggests that offers of aid will cause Burma’s generals to change course; unlike some authoritarian regimes, this one seems to care not a bit for the economic well being of its country. It would probably interpret an easing of sanctions as an acknowledgment that it has won the struggle with its people and proved its right to rule. Indeed, all our experience suggests that diplomatic engagement is likely to succeed only when sanctions have truly hit their mark. In South Africa, it was only when sanctions became targeted and were implemented in a sophisticated way that a negotiated solution — one that seemed impossible for many long years — finally took shape.

Injustice and oppression will not have the last word in Burma (or Zimbabwe, or Sudan), any more than they did in South Africa, Poland, Chile or anywhere else the human spirit is alive. The brave Burmese people who have struggled for their freedom believe this is a moral universe, where right and wrong still matter. They need to know that the world’s most powerful democracy still believes it, too.

Naypyidaw, Burma — This is a city constructed out of fear. Naypyidaw reportedly was created by Burma’s brutal dictators on the advice of astrologers and built in part by forced labor. Worried they might be vulnerable to attack in Rangoon, a port city, they abruptly moved the government 250 miles to the north three years ago and modestly named the new capital “Abode of Kings.”

It is from here that the generals ordered that monks peacefully protesting gas prices in 2007 be beaten, shot and imprisoned, and here that they hunkered down in their mansions and thwarted international efforts to help after Cyclone Nargis devastated the Irrawaddy Delta last year and ravaged the lives of millions.

Few reach this remote city: Permission is required to come by plane, and a new superhighway was built primarily for government officials. Most travel the six-plus hours from Rangoon over a bumpy two-lane road shared by plodding ox carts and bicycle riders. Much of rural Burma still functions without electricity; families get by as they have for centuries, with hand pumps for water and cooking fires. Only the tea shops in villages have TVs, which run on generators. People watch soccer and maybe the news on al-Jazeera, then walk home in the dark.

Near Naypyidaw, however, the skies come ablaze. A huge new power station makes electricity available for the generals at all hours. The rutted road turns into an eight-lane highway lined by lights. Nearby, a reproduction of Burma’s most hallowed site, the Shwedagon Pagoda in Rangoon, is being constructed as the generals race to show their piety.

At first glance, the capital looks almost normal. There’s a new mall sporting cheap Chinese goods, a zoo where children can feed elephants, modern high-rise apartments, a luxury resort with a golf course. But there are also guards everywhere — in towers, on corners. And people along the side of the road seem to be watching everyone else — intensely.

In recent weeks, reports surfaced that the junta is building a series of tunnels under the capital. Rumors swirled: Are they part of a nuclear project? Escape routes? An underground gulag?

On one level there is a plastic veneer of modern life. Local TV channels show smiling young models singing about “Kiss Me” shampoo, and billboards advertise laptops. There’s even a Starbucks-style coffee house in Rangoon.

Yet on another level there is rampant poverty, disease and sex trafficking. People in famine-stricken areas pay a nickel for rats to eat. In the northern no-man’s land, miners are paid with opium and pass along HIV via group needles. In the largely Christian Karen villages that the junta is systematically destroying, the women are raped and children are forced into the military as human mine detectors.

In the Mandalay area farther north, the monasteries where the monks’ Saffron Revolution began in 2007 are still under heavy guard. The worship places are silent, abandoned. South in the delta area battered by Nargis, people struggle to get by — haunted, they say, by the ghostly cries of those who were swept away. Though the government has trumpeted its help, most of the assistance has come from nongovernmental organizations, churches and monasteries.

Here in Naypyidaw, ruling general Than Shwe recently claimed he was so busy accepting the credentials of some new ambassadors that he did not have time to meet with U.N. special envoy Ibrahim Gambari about democratic reforms. Gambari left after being rebuked by Prime Minister Gen. Thein Sein, who demanded the lifting of international economic sanctions on Burma and called them a “human rights violation.” U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon put a diplomatic spin on events, saying Gambari had “good discussions there even though one may not be totally satisfied.”

Gambari is supposed to brief the Security Council on Friday. Members should be told what the generals did as soon as he left: closed more churches in Rangoon, refused to let lawyers visit some of the country’s more than 2,100 political prisoners and extended the arrest of an 82-year-old opposition leader.

Naypyidaw symbolizes the stalemate over Burma: The generals in their labyrinth have created a surreal reality and defy world opinion. The international community lets them get away with it by failing to produce an effective, moral, organized response.

It is up to the Obama foreign policy team to put more backbone in the U.N. efforts. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s remarks yesterday about sanctions drew new attention to the issue. The Obama team has the chance to calibrate financial sanctions so they squeeze the generals and their money-laundering cronies. It can insist that verifiable benchmarks of real progress, such as the release of political prisoners, be met before development favors are done for the junta. And it can remind the world that the election scheduled for 2010 shouldn’t fool anyone. It is being engineered to ensure the generals’ hold on power, meaning business will continue as usual in Naypyidaw.

Almost a year ago, a Buddhist monk on the run from authorities published an op-ed in The Post advocating democracy for his Southeast Asian nation of Burma.

“It matters little if my life or the lives of colleagues should be sacrificed on this journey,” U Gambira wrote, describing the nonviolent campaign for freedom. “Others will fill our sandals, and more will join and follow.”

As he wrote, the regime already had arrested his father and brother, holding them as hostages to flush him out. It found and arrested him on the same day — Nov. 4 — that his article appeared.

Since then, U Gambira (a pseudonym; his real name is U Sandawbartha) has been forcibly deprived of his monastic robes and tortured in Burma’s notorious Insein Prison. A half-dozen other members of his family have been arrested or forced into internal exile. At age 29, he has been charged with “crimes” that could bring years in prison.

I thought of U Gambira’s case as I read a report published last week by the International Crisis Group that is part of a swelling campaign urging the United States and other nations to engage with Burma’s government, end many sanctions against the country and ratchet up humanitarian aid.

“Rather than shunning the authorities, the best way to help the people is to involve government officials at all levels and enlist their cooperation and support,” the report suggests.

ICG is a nonprofit “working to prevent conflict worldwide,” led by heavyweight former diplomats and government officials, and its latest report on Burma makes many good points. It argues that current policy has brought neither democracy nor prosperity to Burma’s 50 million people, and so it should be rethought. It praises the regime for allowing international aid to flow, admittedly after some delay, to victims of last spring’s Cyclone Nargis.

What’s curious, though, for a report advocating the supposedly pragmatic, realistic view, is how bloodless and detached from reality it is — as if Burma were just another ineptly governed Third World nation. “Government restrictions and intrusiveness” are a problem, it says, “as in many developing countries.”

You could read it, in other words, and not know that during this past year of supposed progress, the number of political prisoners has doubled, to more than 2,100 (including 21 in prison for attempting to help cyclone victims without government permission). Or that while permitting some aid to flow to the Irrawaddy Delta in one part of the country, the Burmese army has been waging a war in eastern Burma so directly targeted at civilians that in June Amnesty International accused it of crimes against humanity. Or that Reporters Without Borders, in its just-released index of media freedom, found Burma to be the world’s fourth-worst (better only than Turkmenistan, North Korea and Eritrea). The significance of that is not just the danger to Burmese journalists of honest reporting but the difficulty for the rest of us of knowing how bad conditions really are.

And you might not realize that organizations have curtailed aid in the past, not just because of politics in the West but because they couldn’t prevent the regime and its pervasive network of secret police and front organizations from stealing money or using aid to further its political goals.

There’s nothing new in the dispute between human rights and pro-democracy organizations, on the one hand, and aid-giving groups and foreign policy experts, on the other. When it comes to Burma, President Bush has identified with the democracy camp — the ICG report lambastes Laura Bush and others for “megaphone diplomacy” — and so has Sen. John McCain. Sen. Barack Obama‘s record is shorter, and the “realists” may think they have a chance with him.

But how realistic is that hope? Just last June, on the birthday of Burma’s confined democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi, Obama promised to honor her “the way she would want it done: by honoring the people of Burma, and keeping faith with them in their struggle for freedom, justice and democracy.”

The ICG report offers many recommendations to the United Nations, donors and the West. But it has only three for Burma, none of which — though the report acknowledges that “human rights abuses are a major contributor to poverty” — has anything to do with easing repression. Meanwhile, it calls on grass-roots groups in the West to “cease ongoing consumer boycotts.”

A policy rethink may be in order. But the idea that voters in Western democracies would support buckets of aid to a loathsome regime, delivered without political conditions and with a willing suspension of grass-roots pressure — how realistic is that? You might almost say it’s naive.

It is hard to imagine what life must be like for Aung San Suu Kyi, locked up inside her Rangoon home, separated from her children, denied visitors, her phone line cut, her mail intercepted. Burma’s opposition leader, whose 1990 election victory was annulled by the military, is now in her 13th year of detention. She has been held continually since 2003. In June she spent her 63rd birthday alone.

Unconfirmed reports suggest Suu Kyi, who has suffered health problems in the past, is unwell again. Her lawyer, Kyi Win, who was allowed to see her last month, quoted her as saying: “I am tired and I need some rest.” Following her refusal of a food delivery, there is also speculation the pro-democracy campaigner and Nobel peace prizewinner has begun a hunger strike. Her lawyer said her weight had fallen below the 7st she was known to weigh in 2003.

While uncertainty surrounds Suu Kyi’s plight, there is nothing at all ambiguous about Burma’s political, social and human rights situation one year after the junta brutally suppressed the Buddhist-monk-led “saffron revolution”. By almost any measure, it is distinctly worse. Last May’s Cyclone Nargis disaster played its part. But most of the deterioration is man-made.

Despite last autumn’s storm of international condemnation and impassioned calls for action, the junta continues to hold more than 2,000 political prisoners, including leaders of Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) such as U Win Tin, in jail since 1989. UN attempts to foster political reform have got nowhere. And trade sanctions imposed by the US and EU are being undermined by the generals’ energy deals with China, Thailand and India. Oil and gas sales topped $3.3bn (£1.85bn) last year.

According to Benjamin Zawacki of Amnesty International, half a million people are internally displaced. He said the army is continuing “systematic” rights violations against Karen and other ethnic minorities including “extrajudicial killings, torture, enforced disappearances, arbitrary arrests, forced labour, crop destruction [and] restrictions of movement”.

Amid some of the worst poverty, health problems and corruption in the world, many people now have only one wish: escape. Even long-suffering Zimbabweans have an option to flee to neighbouring countries. But the Burmese are locked in, held down by their rulers and not wanted in India, China or Thailand. With an estimated population of more than 50 million, Burma has become the world’s biggest prison camp.

“The UN mission has been a complete failure,” said Mark Farmaner, director of Burma Campaign UK. Since Ibrahim Gambari, a former Nigerian foreign minister, was appointed special envoy in May 2006, the number of political prisoners had doubled, ethnic cleansing in eastern Burma had intensified, and humanitarian aid for Cyclone Nargis victims was blocked, he said.

“There has been a massive deterioration in the human rights situation. But during Gambari’s last two visits no senior member of the regime bothered to see him,” Farmaner said. “He is seen as biased towards the regime and we think he should resign. He no longer has the respect or confidence of either side.”

Criticism of Gambari was also voiced by the NLD. It said his visits, the last of which ended on August 23, had produced “no positive developments”. The party said the UN envoy’s offer to help the junta organise elections in 2010 under a new constitution that the opposition rejects had undermined his independence. For her part, ill or not, Suu Kyi twice refused to meet Gambari, reportedly leaving him standing on her doorstep.

Farmaner said the time had come for Ban Ki-moon, the UN secretary-general, to take personal charge before the country exploded again. He is due to visit Burma in December following talks with Asian leaders. “There have been 37 UN visits in 20 years but things just get worse. Now they need to set timelines and benchmarks which the junta must meet. The first benchmark should be the release of all political prisoners,” he said. It was also essential the UN security council fully back the process, and be ready to pass a punitive resolution if the generals did not comply.

Farmaner praised Gordon Brown who he said was personally committed to ending the impasse and actively raised Burma at the UN and in other forums. But other western leaders, and countries with real leverage such as China, were less concerned now the media spotlight illuminated by last autumn’s revolt had shifted elsewhere.

“There is an increasing sense of desperation,” Farmaner said. “People were very depressed after the uprising, very frightened. But there was hope that Gambari would do something. Now that hope has gone and there is even more repression than before. At the moment, the fear is stronger than the anger. But that could change.”

Three months have passed since Cyclone Nargis and an accompanying tidal surge swept across Myanmar’s fertile Irrawaddy Delta region, claiming nearly 140,000 lives and devastating the livelihoods of many more people. All told, some 2.4 million people were seriously affected by Nargis, ranking it among the worst cyclones in Asia in the past 15 years and the worst in Myanmar’s history.

I recently completed my second trip to Myanmar, where I was again sobered by the immensity of the tragedy but was also cautiously hopeful about relief efforts. In May, government reluctance to allow international aid workers into the affected region sparked a storm of international criticism.

We have made a lot of progress since then. Touring the delta by helicopter, I could see that many houses had been repaired one way or another. There was agricultural activity in the fields and commercial activity on the waterways. Schools are in session, in tents if not permanent classrooms. And hundreds of international aid staffers are now working in the delta. The promises about access made to U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon when he saw Myanmar’s head of state, Senior Gen. Than Shwe, in late May have essentially been kept.

Without question, the international response has helped save lives and reduce suffering. While it is impossible to be sure all survivors have been reached, I am confident that the overwhelming majority have received help, even if many still need a good deal more.

Crucially, a much-feared second wave of deaths from starvation or disease has not happened — no small achievement, given that 75 percent of hospitals and clinics in the affected areas were destroyed. The people’s resilience has been remarkable, as was the degree of help and solidarity from individual citizens and organizations in Myanmar.

Challenges remain, of course, including over issues such as aid exchange rates, and it would be unwise to gloss over them. But the main priority now is to help remote communities further and to ensure that assistance is continued systematically until all concerned can feed themselves and rebuild their lives.

So, what can we learn from this crisis?

First, no nation, rich or poor, can go it alone when confronted by a natural disaster of the magnitude of a Cyclone Nargis. It would have been much better, not least for the survivors, if the government of Myanmar had recognized the value of an international presence from the start. I encourage Myanmar’s leaders to continue down the path of cooperation, including in response to other humanitarian challenges, based on the universal principle of the impartial provision of aid.

Second, we must stay focused on the goal: assisting people in crisis. From the first, the aid operation in Myanmar — as is true everywhere we work — had to be about helping vulnerable people in need, not about politics. In this post-Iraq age, I am concerned that humanitarians are often pressured to choose between the hammer of forced intervention and the anvil of perceived inaction. Was there a realistic alternative to the approach of persistent negotiation and dialogue that we pursued? I do not believe so. Nor have I met anyone engaged in the operations who believes that a different approach would have brought more aid to more people more quickly.

This is not to say that there can never be a role for humanitarian intervention, even in natural disasters. But it must be the last resort, when all else has been tried and the only alternative is death and suffering on a mass scale.

Third, Nargis showed us a new model of humanitarian partnership, adding the special position and capabilities of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to those of the United Nations in working effectively with the government. This may prove the most important — and, I hope, enduring — lesson of the cyclone response, with implications for how we respond, anywhere, in the future.

ASEAN’s leadership was vital in building trust with the government and saving lives. In recent years, ASEAN members have significantly stepped up participation in the humanitarian arena. Given that eight of the 10 worst natural disasters last year occurred in Asia, this represents a lifesaving investment, where the United Nations is helping to build local capacity.

Fourth, Nargis demonstrated once again the importance of disaster risk reduction and preparedness. Simple, low-cost measures — local evacuation plans, shelters, community early-warning systems — have saved tens of thousands of lives in neighboring Bangladesh when it has been faced with similarly devastating cyclones. We need to help the people of Myanmar strengthen their resilience and reduce their vulnerability. Building back better, to minimize future disaster risks, is a top priority.

In coming years we can expect to see more, and more intense, weather-related natural disasters as the effects of climate change become more pronounced. We must be better prepared and must cooperate as neighbors and an international community in meeting this challenge. The need for effective global humanitarian partnerships has never been more apparent — or more necessary.

We are but halfway through 2008 yet it has already born witness to a sizeable shift in global power. The default western mindset remains that the western writ rules. That is hardly surprising; it has been true for so long there has been little reason for anyone to question it, least of all the west. The assumption is that might and right are invariably on its side, that it always knows best and that if necessary it will enforce its political wisdom and moral rectitude on others. There is, however, a hitch: the authority of the self-appointed global sheriff is remorselessly eroding.

There have been two outstanding examples so far this year. The first was Burma (or Myanmar as it should be known). We can all agree that the regime is odious. The question facing the rest of the world in the aftermath of the cyclone, however, was how to assist the millions of victims of a humanitarian disaster. True to form, it was not long before the west, including our own foreign secretary, was talking up the idea of military intervention; warships were deployed off Burma’s coast, talk was rife of helicopter landings and amphibious craft making their way up the Irrawaddy delta.

The idea, of course, was patently absurd. Burma’s closest ally is China, with whom it shares a long border, while it is also a member of Asean (the Association of South East Asian Nations). China, India and Asean – who largely make up the region – were irrevocably opposed to the use of military force. Western leaders were living in a time warp: the kneejerk responses of old, freshened up by the short-lived era of liberal interventionism, have become a stock response. It was not long before the bellicose talk subsided and the west was obliged to channel its aid via Asean – which, from the outset, was the obvious and desirable course of action.

The fact that the west could not understand the geopolitical realities of east Asia – now the largest economic region in the world – and adapt its policies accordingly, revealed that old assumptions and attitudes run very deep indeed. Even when the very thought is ridiculous and utterly impractical, the call for military intervention, on the part of political leaders and media commentators alike, is seemingly the invariable reflex action. In fact, what Burma demonstrated were the limits of western power, the need for the west to understand those limits, and to respect and work with a region rather than seeking to intervene over its head like some kind of imperial overlord.The second example is Zimbabwe. This hurts the British psyche. Because we suffer from an acute case of colonial amnesia, we seem to think that we have some unalienable right to lecture Zimbabwe on its iniquities. Yet Britain’s culpability for the country’s plight – from tolerating Ian Smith’s declaration of independence to the disgraceful land deal that guaranteed the privileged position of white settlers – is second to none. Notwithstanding all of this, the British feel they enjoy incomparable moral virtue on Zimbabwe.

Yet this episode too has revealed British – and western – impotence in its starkest form. After much grandstanding at the G8 summit, the Anglo-American attempt to toughen up sanctions foundered in the UN security council, where it was vetoed by Russia and China and opposed by South Africa and two others. Meanwhile, President Thabo Mbeki, whose efforts to broker some kind of deal have been widely and patronisingly scorned, has scored a major diplomatic triumph. The Southern Africa Development Community’s appointed mediator for Zimbabwe, Mbeki managed to bring both Robert Mugabe’s Zanu-PF and Morgan Tsvangirai’s MDC to the negotiating table. All the western bluster and invective now look just that: the route to a possible solution has been the work of South Africa, the SADC and the African Union alone. This is yet a further illustration of a shift in global authority.

Western power can no longer deliver in the face of the growing power, competence and self-confidence of developing countries. Instead of universal western power, we are witnessing the rise of regionalisation and regional solutions. This reflects broader changes in the global economy. Economic power is fast ebbing away from the old G7 countries towards the so-called Bric economies (Brazil, Russia, India and China), or, rather more accurately, a growing number of developing economies. The G7 now account for less than half of global GDP and that share is steadily falling. Such economic shifts are the irresistible prelude to parallel changes in political power. The two examples discussed are classic instances of this process: Burma involved China and India, together with the Asean countries, while Zimbabwe featured South Africa, with Russia and especially China, emboldened in this instance to play a more assertive role on the global stage. They illustrate what might be described as the growing “Bricisation” of global politics.

They also underline the comprehensive failure of Anglo-American foreign policy. At the time of the invasion of Iraq, no thought was given to the idea that western economic power was on the wane; on the contrary, the likes of Bush and Blair seemed to believe that we were seeing the dawning of an era of new and overwhelming western power.

Never underestimate the ability of political leaders to misread history on a monumental scale. The invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan have both served to hasten western decline: they have both failed to achieve their objectives and in the process demonstrated an underlying western impotence. In contrast, those other “rogue” states, namely North Korea, Zimbabwe, and perhaps even Iran, show strong signs of responding in a positive manner to a very different kind of treatment. Liberal interventionism has failed. But as yet the west shows no sign of either understanding the new world or being able to live according to its terms.

It remains in denial, refusing to recognise the diminution in its own authority and, as a result, seemingly incapable of adapting to the new circumstances and coming up with an innovative response. This is certainly true of Britain. The foreign secretary only seems able to utter the platitudes and cliches of the discredited Blairite era: he has yet to come up with a single idea, suggestion or insight that indicates he understands the nature of this new world. British foreign policy is mired in its own past and in its relationship with the United States. In such circumstances we will find ourselves dragged kicking and screaming into the new era, constantly shunned and disappointed, a spectator rather than an architect, cast in the role of Mr Grumpy.

La respuesta criminalmente negligente del Gobierno de Birmania al ciclón del mes pasado y la reacción del mundo a esa respuesta ilustran tres desalentadoras realidades de nuestros días: los gobiernos totalitarios siguen ahí tan campantes, sus vecinos son reacios a presionarlos para que cambien y la noción de soberanía nacional como algo sagrado está ganando terreno, ayudada no en pequeña medida por los resultados desastrosos de la invasión de Irak por EEUU. De hecho, muchas de las intervenciones necesarias en la década anterior a esta invasión, en lugares como Haití y los Balcanes, parecerían imposibles en el ambiente hoy reinante.

La primera realidad, y la más obvia, es la supervivencia de gobiernos totalitarios en una era de comunicaciones globales y progreso democrático. La junta militar de Myanmar emplea el mismo repertorio de instrumentos utilizados por los epígonos de Stalin para aplastar a los disidentes y controlar las vidas de los ciudadanos. Las necesidades de las víctimas del ciclón Nargis no significan nada para un régimen centrado exclusivamente en mantener su propia autoridad.

La segunda es la nula disposición de los países vecinos de Myanmar a recurrir a su capacidad de influencia colectiva en favor del cambio. Hace una década, cuando a Myanmar se le permitió entrar a formar parte de la ASAO (Asociación de Naciones del Sudeste Asiático en sus siglas en inglés), dirigentes de la zona me aseguraron que presionarían a la junta para que procediera a abrir su economía y avanzara hacia la democracia. Con escasas y honorables excepciones, eso no ha ocurrido.

Una tercera realidad es que el concepto de soberanía nacional, en cuanto que principio inviolable y fundamental de la legislación internacional, está, una vez más, ganando terreno de nuevo. Muchos diplomáticos y expertos en política exterior tenían la esperanza de que la caída del Muro de Berlín llevaría a la creación de un sistema mundial integrado, libre de esferas de influencia, en el que cicatrizarían las heridas causadas por los imperios coloniales y los de la Guerra Fría.

En un mundo así, la comunidad internacional reconocería como propia una responsabilidad que pasaría por encima de la soberanía en situaciones excepcionales, como impedir las persecuciones raciales o los genocidios, detener a criminales de guerra, restaurar la democracia o proporcionar socorro en casos de desastre cuando los gobiernos nacionales no pudieran o no quisieran tomar las medidas correspondientes.

A lo largo de los años 90 se crearon algunos precedentes. El Gobierno de George Bush intervino para atajar el hambre en Somalia y para ayudar a los kurdos del norte de Irak, el Gobierno Clinton repuso en el poder en Haití a un dirigente elegido democráticamente, la OTAN puso fin a la guerra en Bosnia y cortó la campaña de terror de Slobodan Milosevic en Kosovo; los británicos pararon una guerra civil en Sierra Leona y las Naciones Unidas autorizaron misiones de socorro en Timor Oriental y en otros lugares del mundo.

Estas intervenciones no representaron ningún paso hacia un gobierno mundial. Reflejaban la postura de que el sistema internacional existe para que se impongan unos determinados valores esenciales, entre ellos, el desarrollo, la Justicia y los Derechos Humanos. Desde este punto de vista, la soberanía sigue teniendo una consideración fundamental, pero pueden plantearse casos en los que exista la responsabilidad de intervenir para salvar vidas, mediante sanciones o, en casos extremos, mediante el empleo de la fuerza.

La decisión del Gobierno Bush de presentar batalla en Afganistán a raíz del 11-S no restó fuerza, en modo alguno, a este planteamiento porque estuvo motivada claramente por la autodefensa. La invasión de Irak, con toda aquella palabrería grandilocuente sobre la prevención, era sin embargo, harina de otro costal. Desencadenó una reacción negativa que ha debilitado el apoyo a intervenciones transfronterizas en pos de objetivos encomiables. Los gobiernos, especialmente los del mundo en vías de desarrollo, están ahora decididos a mantener el principio de soberanía, aun cuando los costes humanos de esta actuación sean tan elevados.

Así es como los dirigentes de Myanmar se han librado de las repercusiones de sus atroces decisiones, Sudán ha tenido la posibilidad de dictar las condiciones de las operaciones multinacionales en Darfur y hasta es posible que el Gobierno de Zimbabue se salga con la suya de robar unas elecciones presidenciales.

Los dirigentes políticos de Pakistán han conminado al Gobierno Bush a echar marcha atrás a pesar del incremento de células de Al Qaeda y de los talibán en el indómito noroeste del país, los dirigentes africanos han dicho que no (lo que quizá sea comprensible) a la creación de un mando militar norteamericano para el continente y, a pesar de esfuerzos recientes por introducir dentro de la legislación internacional la doctrina de la «responsabilidad de protección», el concepto de la intervención humanitaria ha perdido predicamento.

La conciencia mundial no es que esté dormida pero, tras las turbulencias de los últimos años, se encuentra en un estado de profunda confusión. Algunos gobiernos estarán en contra de que se hagan excepciones al principio de soberanía porque temen las críticas a sus políticas respectivas. Otros defenderán el carácter sacrosanto de la soberanía hasta que recuperen la confianza en el criterio de los que proponen excepciones.

Lo que se ventila en el fondo de este debate es en qué consiste el sistema internacional. ¿No es nada más que una colección de recursos prácticos encajados por los gobiernos en un ordenamiento legal para protegerse a sí mismos? ¿Es un marco vivo de reglas dirigidas a hacer del mundo un lugar más humano? Sabemos cuál sería la respuesta del Gobierno de Myanmar a esta pregunta, pero lo que necesitamos oír es la voz (y el grito) del pueblo de Birmania.