
Israel’s assault on Gaza, launched in response to Hamas’s Oct. 7, 2023, attack, has laid waste to the strip. The campaign, according to local authorities, has killed upwards of 45,000 Palestinians. Most were civilians—at least a third of them children. Thousands more bodies are missing, presumably under the rubble. Two thirds of buildings and infrastructure are damaged or in ruins, with entire neighbourhoods levelled.
While many Hamas leaders have been killed and the group’s military assets decimated, Western officials and even some Israelis quietly acknowledge that no authority can govern Gaza or carry out civil functions without Hamas’s acquiescence.
Israel’s operations are reshaping Gaza’s geography. It has dug into the Philadelphi Corridor, a narrow buffer zone along the Gaza-Egypt border. It has split Gaza through the Netzarim Corridor, in which a large military base now sits, and reportedly plans to bisect the strip’s south, too. It has besieged and all but emptied the area north of Gaza City, ostensibly to better combat or force out Hamas fighters, but in effect expelling hundreds of thousands of starving civilians. It has also expanded a pre-existing buffer zone along the strip’s perimeter with Israel.
What change incoming U.S. President Donald Trump will bring is unclear. He has reportedly told Netanyahu that he wants the Gaza war to end before he assumes office but without hinting at his terms. Overall, his cabinet picks mostly seem inclined to give Netanyahu an even freer hand.
Talks mediated by Egypt, Qatar, and the United States have yet to yield a ceasefire. Diplomats still suggest that Hamas, in exchange for a pause, might release some hostages (roughly 100 captives, seized on 7 October, remain in Gaza, at least a third of whom are presumed dead). Such an agreement might, in principle, envisage further phases, with Israeli troop withdrawals, reconstruction, or some form of local rule.
But given the mood in Israel, it is hard to imagine subsequent phases happening, even if there is a deal. More likely is that the army stays in Gaza, keeping most Palestinians cornered in the south, surviving on humanitarian aid. Israeli sources suggest that vetted Palestinians might eventually move to “humanitarian bubbles”, with policing and aid delivery falling to foreign contractors or locals with ties to Israel, though it is hard to see that working. Either way, society in Gaza cannot recover any time soon.
Another battle lies in the West Bank, which Israel appears poised to annex. Under ultranationalist Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, Israel is transferring the territory’s management from military to civilian control, extending sovereignty, ordering more Palestinian homes demolished, and legalising settler outposts. Even without formal annexation, Israel could further accelerate tactics it has used for years: moving more settlers in and squeezing Palestinians into tinier pockets by force.
Israel has weathered international opprobrium during previous Gaza wars, only for it to subside as the occupied territories returned to a grim routine. This time, though, the war’s aftermath is less clear because Israel has discarded even the pretence of political accommodation in favour of unapologetic repression. By trying to crush not only Hamas but Palestinian hopes of self-determination, Netanyahu and Israel’s political leaders appear to have made a series of bets: that security can be maintained through force without credible Palestinian partners; that international institutions and justice remain largely toothless; that Israel’s supporters will hold onto power in the United States and other Western capitals, despite mounting horror at what its army has done to Gaza; and that, in the end, Arab leaders will respect Israel’s might, notwithstanding its treatment of the Palestinians.
Perhaps the best, albeit slim, hope lies in the Gulf. Trump still wants Saudi Arabia to normalise diplomatic ties with Israel as part of the Abraham Accords, the centrepiece of his first-term Middle East policy. Perhaps Riyadh, which rules out normalisation without a path to Palestinian statehood, can persuade him to lean on Israel to keep that option viable.
In Gaza, the U.S. failure to stop Israel’s campaign, despite supplying the bulk of the military aid it has relied on, and extract from Netanyahu a day-after plan has left the Israeli far right and military logic to define the strip’s future. It is all too plausible that the same happens for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict writ large.