2024 started with a surprise speech by North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, in which he dropped North Korea’s decades-old policy of peaceful unification with South Korea and declared Seoul to be Pyongyang’s principal foe. The year ended with Kim ratifying a mutual defence pact with Moscow and deploying thousands of North Koreans to fight alongside Russia against Ukraine – as well as a botched self-coup attempt by South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol that ended with parliament voting for his impeachment.
With much in flux, the Korean Peninsula is set for an edgy 2025.
In his January speech, Kim aimed to further seal off North Korea, especially from South Korean cultural exports – K-Pop, in other words – while tightening his grip on the economy. But further cutting ties, including virtually all inter-Korean communication, leaves the countries with few options to manage incidents at a time of mounting friction.
Already, shortly after Yoon assumed power in 2022 and adopted a harder line toward Pyongyang, the two Koreas had abandoned an accord that disarmed border guards and set up no-fly zones as well as land and sea buffer areas.
Kim has also been flexing his military muscle. Since 2019, when the last round of nuclear diplomacy – championed during U.S. President-elect Donald Trump’s first term – fell apart, the North Korean leader has eschewed nuclear tests, likely in part because he saw warhead tests conducted two years earlier as having already established deterrence. Pyongyang has, however, built up and tested its arsenal of missiles. Kim is also threatening to redraw North Korea’s maritime borders with South Korea. Both sides have stepped up naval exercises. Seoul has reportedly flown drones over Pyongyang.
Kim’s pact with Moscow – and the subsequent deployment of an estimated 10,000 elite North Korean troops to Russia’s Kursk region – links the military balance on the Korean Peninsula to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war in Europe. Closer ties to the Kremlin reinforce Kim’s rule, and Russia is paying for the troops, who will presumably get valuable combat experience.
The question is what else Pyongyang gets in return. Russia probably will not send nuclear know-how, which would infuriate China. Despite Beijing’s ties to both Moscow and Pyongyang, Chinese leader Xi Jinping almost certainly dislikes the mutual defence pact, likely fearing that Russia’s sway over Kim could undercut his own. Fast advances in North Korea’s nuclear program or military provocations by Kim risk destabilising the peninsula or attracting more U.S. military assets to the region – the last thing that Xi wants.
But U.S. intelligence suggests that Putin has promised Kim fighter jets. He could help Pyongyang with ballistic technology, especially in placing multiple warheads – with the capacity to hit multiple targets – on a missile, thus making it easier to penetrate U.S. and Asian defences.
In Seoul, Yoon’s failed power grab likely heralds further upheaval. In early December, Yoon declared martial law, citing what he called the opposition’s obstructionism. Military officers refused to detain legislators, who quickly vetoed the emergency provisions and eventually impeached Yoon the second time that the assembly voted.
Trump’s return adds another layer of uncertainty. Despite his distaste for allies, he is unlikely to pull Washington out of its defence treaty with South Korea or withdraw U.S. forces. But he may demand that Seoul pay more for protection. That will boost calls, especially among ordinary South Koreans, for Seoul to acquire its own nuclear arsenal. Any ambiguity about Washington’s commitments to Seoul also risks emboldening Kim.
A return to nuclear diplomacy with Pyongyang, if Trump’s team has the bandwidth, would be difficult but worth a shot. During his first term, Trump was reported to be close to getting North Korea to close its Yongbyon plant – not its only nuclear facility, but the main one – in exchange for partial sanctions relief. This time around, negotiations would be tougher. North Korea’s program is more advanced, and Kim’s pact with Russia gives him less incentive to compromise.
Despite warnings from Korea watchers, Kim seems unlikely to launch a full-blown war, which would risk going nuclear, spell catastrophe for Asia and the world economy, and likely culminate in his own demise.
Rather, the main danger lies in miscalculation. Perhaps evidence surfaces of, say, Russian missile technology transfers. Or Kim, animated by his Russia ties, upheaval in Seoul and mixed signals from Trump, pushes the envelope with some form of provocation. In both cases, the United States and its allies would face pressure to respond.