A Euro-army is fantasy land. We need our American ally

Like pensions and insurance, defence is one of those subjects to which too many people only pay attention when things go wrong. You might think, in the light of the past decade, that this would have changed. But you would be sadly mistaken.

Even today, even after Iraq, few mainstream MPs without an immediate personal or constituency interest in the subject turn up in the Commons for defence debates. Many politicians who are thoughtful about a range of domestic issues still pass by on the other side when the conversation gravitates to the military. In this they reflect the British public's preference for a quiet life. But it means that debates on defence remain monopolised by the committed - those who have always championed the armed services uncritically on the one hand, and those who have always viewed them with reflexive distaste on the other. As a result, such debates rarely give any sort of sensible lead - and we are stuck with the worst-of-both-worlds policy that has been on display in Basra this week.

Nato, which has been at the heart of British defence policy for 59 years, is about to hold an extraordinarily difficult summit in Bucharest. Predictably, this fact has gone largely unnoticed except within these mutually dependent charmed circles. Nevertheless next week's meeting presents a succession of formidably divisive and important issues for the 26 Nato member states to grapple with. Thoughtful public opinion ought to grapple with them more seriously, too. Perhaps we would not have got to this difficult place if there had been more such grappling in the past - as well as better political leadership.

Afghanistan, where the Nato mission is sliding towards failure in a welter of disputes about unequal burden sharing as the spring fighting season approaches, stands at the top of the agenda. But the Balkans, freshly disturbed by Kosovo's divisive declaration of independence, run a close second. The relationship with Russia - which is making a guest appearance at the summit - threatens headaches, too: partly because of the US missile defence project's deployment in central Europe, but also because of the wish of Georgia and Ukraine, backed by the US, to be put on track towards Nato membership. Inevitably, there is also a parochial dispute involving Greece, this time its quarrel with Macedonia.

Underlying these arguments, though, is a potent issue to which far too few politicians pay enough attention. It can be starkly expressed in three questions. Are we content to rely indefinitely on the US to set the security agenda and carry the burden for Europe within Nato? If not, what is the alternative? And if we are serious about any such alternative, how do we propose to put it into practice in the foreseeable future?

This collective failure can be highlighted in another way. It would concentrate all their minds if every MP was to set out in a few sentences what they think this country's defence and security strategy over the next 20 years ought to be. I doubt that many of them would come up with the existing Nato and European Union defence structure as their answer. In the absence of such engagement, however, that is the place into which we have drifted.

It is easy to mock both Nato's and the EU's defence records. Both are in different ways cold war structures that have struggled to adjust to post-cold war realities. They duplicate and they overlap, providing lots of jobs for people who lead comfortable lives attending endless planning sessions at considerable cost but to quite modest effect. But it doesn't follow that the answer is to scrap either Nato or the EU defence effort. And it certainly doesn't follow that the only role for our armed forces is to withdraw from the world and stand guard on the beaches.

Although the defects and failures of the current strategy are obvious, the only serious alternative to the unilateral bring-the-troops-home mentality is to try to get the existing strategy to evolve into something more credible, shared and effective. The next US president will certainly press that case. Nicolas Sarkozy certainly had a stirring answer to it when he told the assembled houses of parliament this week that the return of the Taliban and al-Qaida to Kabul was unacceptable and that France was therefore, albeit belatedly, committing a thousand troops to Kandahar. But how many European nations are prepared to follow suit?

For years now, Nato nations have been committed to reach a minimum defence spending target of 2% of GDP. Yet 20 of them, including Canada, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain, have fallen far short. Among the six that have reached the target, the shares of four (including Britain and France) are in decline. Inevitably, that means the US carries ever more of the load and becomes ever more sceptical about taking Europe seriously.

For years also, European nations have talked about the importance of avoiding duplication in equipment and weapons. But the talk has largely remained just that. It is barmy that Europeans have four different models of tank, compared with America's one; 16 different types of armoured vehicles as against America's three; or 11 types of frigate to America's one. Once again, Europe's failure highlights the US predominance.

The experience of Iraq, coupled with Europe's increased role in the Balkans, has tempted some Eurocentrics to say that Nato is outmoded and that an enhanced military role for the EU should replace it. This is fantasy land. If there is one thing that would be even worse for Europe than fighting a war with the Americans as allies, it is fighting a war without them. While it is true that Europe spends too little on defence because it knows it can rely on the Americans, it does not follow that European nations would be keen to spend more if Nato broke down.

Nato - as Talleyrand said of Russia - is always too strong and too weak at the same time. Right now, it is also a solution in search of a problem. The immediate priority in Bucharest has to be to turn things round in Afghanistan. The alternative, as Sarkozy said, is not acceptable. But the long-term need is for Europe to take greater responsibility for our own security needs within Nato. That won't be done overnight. But nor will it be done unless we address it much more openly and honestly than we have in the past.

Martin Kettle