The latest talks between Iran and six other countries to discuss Iran's nuclear programme, held in Kazakhstan over the last two days, broke up again without a settlement. But there were positive noises from the Iranians, and the negotiators agreed on further talks at technical level in March and in full session again in Almaty in earlyApril.
As the successive rounds of talks have come and gone (in Istanbul, Baghdad and Moscow in 2012, let alone earlier) it It has become clearer that more effort, more political will, is needed at the highest level of the two countries that count most: the US and Iran, if this problem is to be resolved. The nuclear question is not just, not even primarily a technical matter; it involves wider security questions in the Middle East and, crucially, the longstanding underlying hostility between Iran and the United States. Political commitment and focus is needed to drive away ambiguities and establish the beginnings of new trust.
One of the major difficulties of the talks has been that of ambiguity about intentions. On the Iranian side, many believe that the furore in the west over Iran's nuclear programme is merely a screen to justify sanctions against Iran, whose true aim is to destabilise the Islamic republic and produce regime change. And let's face it, many in the US and in Europe would be quite happy to see that happen.
. On the western side, few take seriously repeated Iranian protestations that they have no ambitions towards a nuclear weapon, that such weapons are unacceptable under Islam, and that Iran's nuclear programme aims only at the generation of electricity. But notwithstanding the evidence of Iranian work toward a nuclear weapon, we should take such statements into account.
The point is that Iran's true objective is probably not a weapon "in hand", but a potential, threshold or latent weapon: in other words, the technical capability, should Iran be attacked, to produce a nuclear weapon at short notice. Such a capability would serve as a deterrent in itself – and as is well known, the only real utility of nuclear weapons is deterrence.
This leads to another ambiguity – about who really is demanding what of whom in the immediate, present circumstances, and from whom movement is necessary, if there is to be a deal. Is it true, as we are told from all sides, that the Iranians are only negotiating seriously now because of the sanctions (most observers accept that Iran has shown more seriousness in the talks since the beginning of 2012), and that settlement will only be possible if they make new concessions?
Perhaps not. Much of what is said in public is an imperfect reflection of the true positions taken by the parties in the actual discussions – this is almost always so in international diplomacy, but even more in this case. There is good reason to believe that the Iranians have signalled a preparedness to accept the main demands of the US and the other five, namely a cap on uranium enrichment at 5%, and increased IAEA supervision of Iran's existing stockpile of uranium enriched to the 20% level. If this is so, the effect of sanctions on Iranian thinking may have been exaggerated. The Iranians may be prepared to reach a settlement now because they have, in effect, secured the advances in technical capability that they wanted. So why has there not been a deal already?
Beyond the fog of accusations, the fact is that the US and other western countries are not yet willing to take yes for an answer, to come off their own previous position of opposition in principle to any Iranian enrichment – still the firm position of the Israelis — and agree to Iranian enrichment up to the 5% level. (Iran is fully entitled to enrich uranium for civil purposes under the terms of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.)
Behind this is the real problem – quite simply, to do a deal with someone, anyone, or a country, you have to trust them when they say they will keep to their side of the bargain. Thirty-four years after the traumatic events of the embassy hostage crisis, relived so vividly in the recent film Argo, is a US president prepared to go to the American people and say to them that he believes the Iranians will keep to a deal? And signal it by the relaxation of sanctions that the Iranians expect as a quid pro quo?
Some have suggested that impending presidential elections in Iran make it too delicate and too difficult for the Iranian leadership to take the reciprocal step. My view is that the nuclear question is about the central, deep interests of the Islamic republic; the team around Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran's supreme leader, that decides such questions is long-standing and largely unaffected by the coming elections. If Khamenei and his team decide the time is right, they could do it.
But there is a feeling that something more is necessary. A deal between Iran and the US over the nuclear question would be a historic event. The talks in Kazakhstan and elsewhere so far do not seem to have had the magic of history about them. It needs more involvement by the key politicians, and, perhaps, more involvement of the many wider security questions (Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria) that both sides are preoccupied with.
To avoid the danger of miscalculation and war, and to end the slow disintegration of the Iranian economy under the pressure of sanctions that is causing real misery to ordinary Iranians(and could cause worse), leaders in Iran and the US must take a deep breath. They must come off their positions of entrenched hostility, on which it is politically easy to camp – and take the risks involved in making the deal. When the ambiguities and complexities are stripped away, that deal is now there for them if they have the political courage for it.
Michael Axworthy is the author of Revolutionary Iran: A History of the Islamic Republic.