In ancient Greece, any and all warfare would pause ahead of the Olympic Games so that athletes and spectators could travel safely to the big event.That’s not too far from what’s happening on the Korean Peninsula. After a year of mounting tension, North and South Korea have stumbled into a period of self-imposed calm. It’s not just that in the lead-up to the Pyeongchang games, which start on February 9, the two neighbors have agreed to field a unified women’s hockey team and parade together at the opening ceremony under a single flag. It’s that they’ve quietly entered into a de facto Olympic truce. Until the games conclude, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un appears likely to refrain from nuclear and missile tests, while South Korean President Moon Jae-in and President Donald Trump have postponed joint military exercises. To plan the joint Olympics competition, Pyongyang even reconnected an interKorean military phone line that had been dead for almost two years. Is there reason for hope?Maybe so, but the Trump administration appears to be doing little to encourage it. In his State of the Union address, Trump spent more time on this crisis than on any other foreign issue, and laid down this gauntlet: Pyongyang will not be allowed to develop the capacity to reach the U.S. homeland with nuclear-tipped missiles. He warned that he would not tread the path of his predecessors, by which he meant mutual concessions. His senior officials raise the improbable prospect of a“bloody nose” attack—a targeted strike powerful enough to set Kim’s program back, yet somehow finely calibrated enough to avoid provoking his retaliation. And, while Vice President Mike Pence, who will be leading the U.S. delegation at the Pyeongchang games, left open the prospect of meeting North Korean officials, his lead-up was anything but conciliatory: Speaking in Tokyo, he dismissed Pyongyang’s Olympic goodwill gestures, described its regime as the “most tyrannical and oppressive … on the planet”, announced the imminent imposition of the “toughest and most aggressive round of economic sanctions on North Korea ever” and, for good measure, stated that “all options are on the table,” a broad hint at the possibility of preventive military action.
Still, in between his bellicose statements and tweets, Trump frequently says he wants a diplomatic solution. If he’s serious, the de facto Olympic truce offers him a way forward. It starts with a relatively small step: for Washington, Seoul and Pyongyang simply to stick to the current script for the duration of the Games.
The next step would be tougher. The United States would need to work with China and South Korea to develop an expanded version of the truce that could be formalized after the Games. Under this arrangement, Pyongyang would freeze all nuclear tests and tests of missiles that advance their intercontinental reach. In turn, the United States would redesign joint exercises that especially rankle the North, like those focusing on “decapitating” Kim or that occur at particularly provocative moments—around North Korean national days, for example. Then, with help from Beijing—the next-door giant deeply unnerved by the prospect of war—and in coordination with Seoul, Washington and Pyongyang could use the newfound breathing space to launch formal talks on a more permanent solution. Kim might find this appealing: in this 70th anniversary year of the foundation of the Koreas, the North feels the need to show its people progress.
There is much not to like in this proposal. Past interim deals have not held, and North Korea could resume its frozen programs at any time. Plus, as Washington sees it, the U.S. would be trading something it is entitled to do (military exercises) for something North Korea is barred by the U.N. Security Council from undertaking (missile and nuclear tests). Nor, under this scenario, is the ultimate U.S. objective—North Korea’s denuclearization—likely to be achieved, at least in the foreseeable future.
But as Americans spend the better part of February as guests of the South Korean people—the millions of souls behind the coldly actuarial language that Washington policymakers deploy to describe “risks” and “costs” of war—consider the alternative. The Trump administration says it will not tolerate North Korea acquiring the capacity to strike the U.S. continent. Sanctions and pressure so far have not succeeded in halting North Korea’s advance on military programs its regime considers vital to its survival, and there is zero evidence that they will. Moreover, April is a month when Pyongyang traditionally flexes its military muscles and could thus engage in another round of nuclear or ballistic missile testing. This, in turn, could prompt the U.S. to launch its “bloody nose” strike and wager that Kim would just stay put. Think about how illogical that would be: That’s tantamount to betting that we can reliably predict and deter the response of a leader with whom the U.S. is ready to risk war precisely because Washington considers him unpredictable and undeterrable. It’s wagering that a potential nuclear conflict is a fair price to pay to alleviate the anxiety of living with a nuclear-armed North Korea. It’s the equivalent of risking a nuclear war in order to avoid one.
Every one of these claims has been persuasively debunked but, as Iraq taught us, when war drums start beating along the Potomac, logic does not always carry the day. Sustained de-escalation should begin now, and the American people as well as their representatives ought to push Washington in that direction. The forthcoming Olympic Games give them a helpful, and needed, head start.
Robert Malley (@Rob_Malley) is president and CEO of the International Crisis Group. He was the White House coordinator for the Middle East, North Africa and Gulf Region under President Obama, and senior adviser to the president for the counter-ISIS campaign.
Stephen Pomper (@StephenPomper) is the U.S. program director at the International Crisis Group. He was the National Security Council’s senior director for Multilateral Affairs and Human Rights under President Obama.