Anthony H. Cordesman

Nota: Este archivo abarca los artículos publicados por el autor desde el 1 de enero de 2009. Para fechas anteriores realice una búsqueda entrecomillando su nombre.

As it measures its response to the recent events on Egypt, the U.S. needs to be extremely careful about focusing on the definition of «coup» and the legitimacy — or non-legitimacy — of Mohamed Morsy’s election, the draft constitution, and the now-ousted Egyptian president’s efforts to give himself additional powers. It needs to be equally careful about focusing on the protests that helped drive him from power, and the legitimacy of political Islam.

If the U.S. focuses on whether or not a coup took place, it will be ignoring the fact that Egypt is a key center of the Middle East and that U.S.…  Seguir leyendo »

It may be fair to argue that the last thing the nation needs at the start of an election year is yet another budget crisis and another decade of war. Yet this is the path the United States appears to be taking in Afghanistan. U.S. officials are talking about removing all American troops from Afghanistan and about massive cuts in military spending as part of the “transition” to Afghan control of combat and civil governance operations in 2014. Given the lead times involved in funding and implementing such massive changes within two to three years, Washington really has only a few months in which to decide whether we will take on the burden of funding the Afghan government through 2014 and beyond, and whether we will provide most of the funds, advisers and partners that Afghan forces will need until 2020 and beyond.…  Seguir leyendo »

The U.S. focus on Afghanistan largely centers on withdrawing most forces by 2014 and reducing the cost of the war. These are important issues: By the end of fiscal year 2013, the United States will have spent $560 billion on the war, and current annual costs are more than $110 billion. It is, however, far easier to talk about troop levels and budget cuts than to plan and conduct a real-world transition to Afghan responsibility for security and funding of Afghan operations and to deal with the strategic realities involved. The United States needs to come to grips with a range of extremely difficult issues, none of which involves good options.…  Seguir leyendo »

1.- Reform or Go Home.
By David Kilcullen, a former adviser to Gen. David Petraeus and the author of The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One.

Counterinsurgency is only as good as the government it supports. NATO could do everything right — it isn’t — but will still fail unless Afghans trust their government. Without essential reform, merely making the government more efficient or extending its reach will just make things worse.

Only a legitimately elected Afghan president can enact reforms, so at the very least we need to see a genuine run-off election or an emergency national council, called a loya jirga, before winter.…  Seguir leyendo »

The United States cannot win the war in Afghanistan in the next three months — any form of even limited victory will take years of further effort. It can, however, easily lose the war. I did not see any simple paths to victory while serving on the assessment group that advised the new U.S. commander, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, on strategy, but I did see all too clearly why the war is being lost.

The most critical reason has been resources. Between 2002 and 2008 the United States never provided the forces, money or leadership necessary to win, effectively wasting more than half a decade.…  Seguir leyendo »

In Afghanistan Nato/ISAF faces challenges that go far beyond the normal limits of counter-insurgency and military strategy. It must carry out the equivalent of armed nation building, and simultaneously defeat the Taleban and al-Qaeda. It must change its strategy and tactics after years in which member countries, particularly the United States, failed to react to the seriousness of the emerging insurgency. The nations of the alliance lacked a unity of purpose, failed to provide enough troops and placed serious national caveats and limits on their use. They let the enemy take the initiative for more than half a decade.

The result is that the Taleban have been winning the war for control of Afghanistan’s territory and population while Nato/ISAF has focused on the tactical and combat aspects.…  Seguir leyendo »

Despite the violence of the past few weeks, it is Iraq that now risks becoming the «forgotten war.» Iraq has become both a perceived «victory» and a war that many Americans and members of Congress would like to forget. As a result, we may rush toward the «exit» without a strategy — and lose both the ongoing war and the peace that could follow.

It is all too easy to forget that we «won» in Vietnam. We left having defeated the Viet Cong, having forced North Vietnam to halt its offensives — and having gotten a Nobel Prize for the settlement.…  Seguir leyendo »