In most countries, a 72-year-old retired general who once led a severe military dictatorship that imprisoned its opponents without trial, publicly executed convicts by firing squad, arrested journalists who criticized it, ran an Orwellian intelligence apparatus that bugged the phones of government ministers — a man whose overthrow three decades ago was welcomed with relief by his countrymen, and who lost three consecutive presidential elections in 12 years — would be considered unelectable.
Not in Nigeria.
Last time Muhammadu Buhari came to power, on Dec. 31, 1983, he seized it. The coup came at a time when Nigeria’s economy was reeling from plunging world oil prices, corruption scandals and security challenges. This newspaper described him then as a “tough, self-assured and somewhat austere” man determined to fight corruption. Last week, he returned to power after winning a closely fought presidential election.
As a military ruler, Mr. Buhari’s uncompromising temperament invited opposition. He quickly dissipated the tremendous good will that greeted his entrance into government by simultaneously picking fights with, rather than bargaining with, powerful opponents and the media, and trying to impose military discipline on those he governed.
How then has Mr. Buhari managed to rehabilitate himself and return to power, and what can we expect from Buhari 2.0? Some believe that Nigerians are the most forgiving people in the world toward their leaders because the bar for conduct of public officials has been set so low. However, there are more elaborate reasons for Mr. Buhari’s rehabilitation.
More than 70 percent of Nigeria’s population is under 30 years old and thus too young to remember his time as a military leader. It is no coincidence that support for Mr. Buhari is most zealous among young people.
There is also a sense of unfinished business. Mr. Buhari’s supporters think his tenure as a military leader was a missed opportunity and that the country may have been spared many years of corruption had his ruthless anticorruption campaign not been prematurely ended.
A university professor who worked for the Buhari government in the 1980s once told me that Nigeria “would have been a different country today” had Mr. Buhari’s military regime been allowed to govern for five years rather than the 20 months he ruled before he was overthrown in a palace coup. Many Nigerians who cheered his downfall back then now read lurid exposés of government corruption and recall that era with nostalgia.
Mr. Buhari can be a severe man. His resolve, puritanical streak and iron will are renowned. On the campaign trail he remained true to his image, talked tough and vowed to hit the Islamic insurgents of Boko Haram with a military sledgehammer.
Nigerian soldiers I’ve interviewed believe that Mr. Buhari will fight it out with insurgents in a battlefield slugfest. However, those who expect him to be the same blood-and-thunder general he was 30 years ago are in for a surprise.
After winning the election, Mr. Buhari has toned down his rhetoric, warning that there are no quick fixes to the Boko Haram crisis and declaring that Nigerians “shouldn’t expect miracles to happen” after he comes to power.
Although he will use military force against Boko Haram, he will eventually realize that there is no military solution to the insurgency and that its deep socioeconomic causes must be addressed. Younger technocrats in Mr. Buhari’s All Progressives Congress party are likely to influence the president to take a more pragmatic approach that does not rely on military force alone.
Boko Haram will find Mr. Buhari a far more formidable opponent than the outgoing president, Goodluck Jonathan — not so much because of Mr. Buhari’s military background, but rather because of his personal and political links to northeastern Nigeria, where the Boko Haram insurgency rages.
During the mid-1970s, Mr. Buhari was the governor of Borno State — the northeastern state hit hardest by Boko Haram attacks. He later fought there as a military officer, and his grandfather came from the same Kanuri ethnic group to which most Boko Haram members belong. He will bring a great deal of local knowledge and a personal stake in the conflict that Mr. Jonathan did not have.
Mr. Buhari has identified three fundamental problems to tackle: insecurity, corruption and the economy. These are the same issues he faced when he was Nigeria’s military ruler. The question is what he will do this time to address them differently.
In order to succeed, he must learn from what happened to him in 1985. Back then, his military colleagues were horrified to learn that they were not immune to his anticorruption investigations and were spooked when the National Security Organization wiretapped their phones, looking for evidence of financial impropriety. His alarmed colleagues organized an internal military coup and overthrew him in August 1985.
Can a man renowned for being uncompromising and rigid resolve issues that require tactical adroitness and pragmatic flexibility?
There are signs that he has learned to work with opponents. His party is a coalition of former government ministers, multiple opposition parties and even his former political rivals. Although Nigerians expect another war on corruption from Mr. Buhari, a big test will be whether he will have the courage to once again rock the boat by investigating powerful members of his own government who have been tainted by corruption allegations.
If he launches an all-out anticorruption drive with no sacred cows, his popularity with the electorate will soar, but he will also step on toes powerful enough to trip him up and topple him from power. If he decides to be selective and navigate his war on corruption around powerful vested interests, he may avoid a power struggle, but will erode his credibility with the public.
Nigerians should hope he is a changed man, one who will find a way to tackle the country’s intense corruption and security challenges without amplifying the insurgency or triggering a political crisis and power struggle.
Nigeria today needs a reconstructive surgeon, not a bulldozer.
Max Siollun is a Nigerian historian and the author of Oil, Politics and Violence: Nigeria’s Military Coup Culture (1966-1976) and Soldiers of Fortune: A History of Nigeria (1983-1993).