High stakes in Islamabad and Washington

George Bush and Pakistan's president, Asif Ali Zardari, have more in common than one might think. As younger men, both had reputations as playboy hell-raisers. As the current, more sober leaders of their respective countries, both are deeply unpopular with large numbers of fellow citizens. For his part, Bush is on his way out. And if the Islamists who bombed the Islamabad Marriott at the weekend have their way, Zardari, husband of the murdered Benazir Bhutto, will surely follow him – one way or another.

The stakes for this odd couple are high. Zardari is engaged in an increasingly fraught political and military campaign not only to retain power but, more importantly, hold the country together in the teeth of an existential threat to democratic, secular governance. The war in Afghanistan has taken deep root inside Pakistan and is now spreading beyond the tribal areas and North-West Frontier Province. Afghan Taliban and foreign jihadis from Kunan, in eastern Afghanistan and beyond, temporarily abandoning the fight with Nato, are now reportedly flocking to Bajaur, Kohat and Swat to join battle with the Pakistani army.

Pakistani military analysts and commentators warn that the challenge to the country's integrity, though seemingly familiar, is growing more formidable with each passing week. Suicide bombings, almost unknown five years ago, have claimed over 300 lives this year. Recent days have seen heavy fighting, with the army claiming to have killed 60 insurgents. The economy is in deep, destabilising trouble. The UN meanwhile launched an emergency appeal today for $17m to assist more than a quarter of a million internally displaced people in the western border areas.

The Bush administration's analysis, offered after the Marriott bombing, was no less dramatic:

Their (the insurgents') goal is to create mayhem and weaken the institutions of government so that they may operate unfettered while spreading their intolerance. The US will continue to stand with the Pakistani people and their democratically elected government as it confronts this scourge.

Since Zardari gave his army chief, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, a green light in July to conduct unrestricted operations against the Islamists, the conviction has grown among Pakistani officials that only outright victory will now suffice. But they have another motive. July was also the month when Bush secretly authorised US special forces' operations inside Pakistan. Decisively beating back the militants is thus seen as perhaps the only way of curbing direct US military interference, so thoroughly offensive to most Pakistanis. This consideration forms the uncomfortable context for a recently floated plan for joint Pakistani-Afghan border patrols.

Islamabad has not wholly recovered from its outrage over the September 3 raid into Pakistan by US forces that killed several civilians, and over two alleged subsequent US helicopter gunship incursions that were supposedly repulsed by ground fire from tribesmen or Pakistani troops or both. The argument now is that Pakistan must take "ownership" of a war that to some degree has been foisted upon its territory. The stark danger is that in doing so, Zardari and Kayani, goaded by Washington, will provoke a nation-shattering civil war.

Increasing the military pressure on Pakistan to act firmly against the "terrorist nests" and safe havens, thereby helping protect coalition forces in Afghanistan, is part of Bush's own endgame, which he was expected to pursue during a scheduled meeting with Zardari today at the UN general assembly in New York. Speaking ahead of the talks, Stephen Hadley, the US national security adviser, bypassed several opportunities to reassure Pakistan that the September 3 affront would not be repeated.

"I think the [Pakistan] government is increasingly recognising ... that dealing with the terrorist threat is not a favour they're doing to Afghanistan or a favour they're doing to us - it is something that is essential to their survival," Hadley said. "We are working closely with them to try and navigate what is a very difficult situation. And that's really all I can say." Hadley's hesitancy left the distinct impression that, whatever Pakistan does in the future, more raids would be mounted if US forces so decided.

Robert Gates, US defence secretary, was blunter in prepared testimony to Congress yesterday. "Until the insurgency is deprived of safe-havens, insecurity and violence will persist." Islamabad and Kabul should cooperate more closely, he said. "The war on terror started in this region. It must end there."

Yet Bush is also looking longer term, apparently determined in the self-justificatory, squalid final months of a dying presidency to set Afghanistan and Pakistan on the "right track". According to reports in Washington yesterday, this effort includes a "comprehensive strategic military review", now under way. One proposal is to increase US combat troop levels in Afghanistan by an additional 15,000 soldiers, over and above the 8,000 reinforcements already announced, as part of a campaign, involving enhanced troop contributions from Nato countries such as Britain, of up to 10 years in duration.

If this sounds like a risky, Iraq surge-style escalation, that's not surprising. If agreed, it would be. As in other policy areas, Bush's quest for a lasting legacy leaves others, such as the hapless Zardari, to pick up the tab.

Simon Tisdall