A largely unknown reformist lawmaker from Tabriz, cardiac surgeon Masoud Pezeshkian, defied the odds in a snap election to beat five conservative contenders and become Iran’s ninth president. He succeeds Ebrahim Raisi, the hardliner president who died in a helicopter crash on 19 May.
Pezeshkian’s victory and the dynamic of the electoral race provide important insights into Iran’s political landscape and the country’s likely trajectory.
What the election reveals about Iran
First, the disconnect between the state and Iranian society has never been higher. In the first round, only 39 per cent of those eligible cast their vote, a historic low for the Islamic Republic’s presidential elections and following the low turnout in parliamentary elections in March.
In the second round, when only Pezeshkian and hardliner Saeed Jalili were left in the race, about 49.8 per cent participated, still one of the lowest turnouts in Iran’s presidential elections. Pezeshkian’s campaign in the runoff sought to convince young and disappointed people who boycotted the first round, but the results showcase the extent of apathy and discontent among the population.
Second, the usual divide between reformist and conservatives no longer seems to apply. The electoral campaign was characterized by a bitter rivalry within the conservative camp between hardliner Jalili and traditional conservative and parliamentary speaker Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf.
Despite pressure from the leadership for the camp to unite under a single candidate to avoid split votes, neither agreed. After failing to make it into the second round, Qalibaf supported Jalili, but not all his backers followed suit. The results indicate that at least some of Qalibaf’s votes shifted toward Pezeshkian, contributing to his victory.
Third, those in favour of some change managed to prevail over those endorsing the status quo. This was despite widespread apathy among the population, attempts by the security forces to violently crush discontent and the progressive marginalization by the establishment of key reformist and moderate figures. Demand for reform, even marginal, from within Iran is thus still a reality that needs to be reckoned with.
Change but not too much
Pezeshkian’s background and statements during the electoral campaign suggest that, while he will aim for some change, he will not try to rock the boat. During the debates, he often pledged loyalty to the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and never called into question the continuity of Iran’s political system.
He is not seen as a threat by the establishment. This is likely the reason why he was approved by the Guardian Council (the body in charge of vetoing candidates) in the first place, becoming the only reformist candidate allowed to run in the race and the first reformist president since Mohammad Khatami left office in 2005.
Through his slogan, ‘For Iran’, Pezeshkian promised to be a voice of the voiceless, speaking against the repression of protesters and supporting women’s freedom of choice on wearing the hijab.
During his mandate, he will likely try to win over a largely disenchanted population that has seen reformists and moderates govern before, without much tangible change on their daily lives. Such steps would likely include pushing for the end of internet restrictions and promoting some social freedoms, including on women or minorities rights.
On foreign policy, Pezeshkian’s campaign focused on the need to engage with the West, including on the nuclear issue, to get sanctions relief and improve the economic conditions of the country, as well as to move away from the brink of regional war.
He also praised Raisi’s rapprochement with Arab countries, signalling that, in issues other than ties with the West, he is likely broadly to continue the policy of the previous administration.
His first challenges
His immediate challenge will be to pick cabinet members who can ensure the implementation of his political agenda, which will need approval by a conservative-dominated parliament – a balancing act that will require some time. Signals indicate the reformist camp did not have such a list ready, as the results of the elections were unexpected and expectations, before Raisi’s accident, were for conservative forces to be in power for at least five more years.
Some names are already being floated. These include the potential appointment of Abbas Araghchi as foreign minister.
In contrast to former foreign minister Javad Zarif, who acted as Pezeshkian’s foreign policy adviser during the electoral campaign, Araghchi is largely viewed positively within the conservative camp and has played a key role in the negotiations over the nuclear deal.
Once his cabinet is appointed, Pezeshkian’s main challenge will be posed by conservative forces. While currently divided, they are likely to unite in the coming months faced with the common threat posed by reformists in power. They will probably use all unelected and elected institutions under their control to undermine Pezeshkian’s actions, especially when they are perceived as threatening conservatives’ power or interests.
In this context, improving ties with the West will be a tall order, as most conservative figures see a deal or even talks with the US as potentially threatening.
And this is without even considering the challenges posed in the region by heightened tensions with Israel, or more globally by the uncertainty over the next US president and the overall Western posture towards Iran in light of recent elections across Europe.
Pezeshkian’s task is thus huge. But, by not wanting to rock the boat, being loyal to the system and coming into power at a time in which the Islamic Republic needs to regain its lost legitimacy, he might be well placed to provide some necessary, albeit limited change.
Dr Aniseh Bassiri Tabrizi, Associate Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme.