Today, Moldova’s first female president, Maia Sandu, marks her first 100 days in office. Sandu campaigned on a pro-European integration platform and has steered Moldova in that direction, ending the country’s pro-Russian orientation under her predecessor, Igor Dodon.
Sandu also promised to tackle high-level corruption, and the European Union promised to support her efforts. Despite this success, Sandu’s tenure remains constrained at home by a parliament that appears opposed to any anti-corruption reform attempts. In addition, Russia’s strong grip within the region is likely to challenge Moldova’s rapprochement with the West.
Russia continues to compete for influence
Research shows how the European Union and Russia shape political institutions in the post-Soviet countries. The E.U., for instance, uses promises of association and financial support to promote democratization. Russia’s influence, in contrast, tends to include support for autocratic institutions via political, economic and military assistance.
Shortly after her inauguration, Sandu embarked on a pro-E.U. diplomatic tour, visiting Brussels and Paris to meet with E.U. leaders and convey Moldova’s aspirations for European integration. Sandu has also prioritized relations with Moldova’s two closest neighbors, Romania and Ukraine.
Sandu’s foreign policy moves stand in contrast to Dodon, who prioritized relations with Russia and met with Russian President Vladimir Putin at least 14 times. Dodon never officially visited either Romania or Ukraine, nor did he host their leaders.
Why do post-Soviet countries shift allegiances so frequently? My research shows that a credible promise of E.U. membership is a powerful motivator. When E.U. membership is unavailable, post-Soviet leaders shift their foreign policy orientation strategically, switching between the E.U. and Russia depending on whether a specific alignment would enable them to acquire or retain power at home. Without a clear path to E.U. membership and with competing offers coming from Moscow, leaders in these countries were less willing to implement E.U. conditions for association, which typically involve democratic reforms and measures to counter corruption.
Moldova has tried to align with the E.U.
This strategic vacillation has defined Moldova’s foreign policy. In 2014, Moldova signed an E.U. association agreement, essentially agreeing to align its domestic institutions and policies to E.U. standards. In return for democratic reforms in Moldova, the E.U. pledged economic assistance and “improved access to the E.U. market”, but without a firm promise of E.U. membership.
During Dodon’s tenure, from 2016-2020, Moldova abandoned its 2014 reform commitments as domestic political developments directed the country toward a pro-Russian position. The European Parliament suspended macroeconomic assistance to Moldova, citing concerns that “the state was captured by oligarchic interests” and that the government was suppressing the judicial system. In Transparency International’s 2020 Corruption Perceptions Index, Moldova ranked as Europe’s third most corrupt country, trailing only Ukraine and Russia.
Sandu has made a clean shift toward Europe
In contrast, Sandu’s domestic commitments, especially her pledge to fight corruption and consolidate democracy at home, means Moldova will revert to a pro-E.U. foreign policy. The E.U. and United States are Moldova’s top financial supporters. The E.U. sustains its state budget and, together with the United States, invests in the country’s infrastructure, agriculture and energy sectors.
E.U. assistance is based on strict conditionality, however, and is linked to Moldova making satisfactory progress in implementing anti-corruption and rule of law reforms. Analysts see Sandu’s election as a sign that Moldovan voters favored the pro-Europe shift in priorities, and reforms to the judicial system.
But Sandu now faces a political crisis
While Sandu appears to have made significant diplomatic strides abroad, she now faces a political crisis at home. On March 25, Moldova’s parliament failed in its second attempt to elect a prime minister. Without a parliamentary government, Sandu won’t be able to move forward with democratic reforms.
Sandu is now asking the Constitutional Court to allow her to dissolve the parliament and organize snap elections. But the political wrangling brings Moldova’s E.U.-Russia divide to the forefront. In a challenge to Sandu, parliament nominated its own candidate for prime minister, Vladimir Golovatiuc, the current Moldovan ambassador to Moscow.
That’s not going down well with Moldova’s Western partners. In March, the E.U. ambassador to Moldova said that further financial assistance to the country depends on a “trustworthy” government, one that can function without interference from corruption and private interests. U.S. Ambassador Dereck J. Hogan conveyed a similar message, saying that “corrupt politicians and criminals can no longer dictate the course of the country’s future”.
Sandu faces pushback from Moscow
Along with challenges at home, Sandu also faces Russian opposition to her pro-E.U. stance. Research shows that Russia tends to punish post-Soviet countries that strive to integrate with the West. The Kremlin is skilled at exploiting internal weaknesses in these countries, to bolster Russia’s influence in the region.
Following the statements by the two ambassadors in March, Russia accused the West of interfering in Moldova’s internal political processes. In November, when a newly elected Sandu called for the withdrawal of Russian troops from Transnistria, a breakaway region backed by Moscow, the Kremlin warned that withdrawing the troops would lead to “serious destabilization” in the region.
And Russian interference is only likely to increase. My research demonstrates that when Russia’s relations with the E.U. and United States are most strained, post-Soviet nations’ relations with the West improved. Given the current tense relations between Russia, the United States and the E.U., the region will continue to face intensified pressure from Moscow, creating significant difficulties for leaders like Sandu and Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelensky to maintain their pro-Western agendas.
While the prospect of E.U. membership may be the most powerful incentive to maintain Moldova and Ukraine on a pro-Western foreign policy orientation, continued high-level corruption in both countries and the current geopolitical standoffs between Russia and the West means such promises are likely to be off the table.
For now, the E.U. and United States may focus on targeted political, technical and financial support for Moldova. It remains unclear whether this support will be enough to help Sandu democratize state institutions, reform Moldova’s justice system and cement the country’s pro-E.U. orientation.
Ecaterina Locoman (@E_Locoman) is a senior lecturer of international studies at the Lauder Institute, University of Pennsylvania. Her research focuses on comparative foreign policy analysis, the politics of alliance formation, mass media and public opinion, with a regional emphasis on Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.