No Longer a Haven for International Terrorists

Members of the Afghan security forces hold men suspected of suicide bomb attacks, in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, in October. Credit Ghulamullah Habibi/European Pressphoto Agency
Members of the Afghan security forces hold men suspected of suicide bomb attacks, in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, in October. Credit Ghulamullah Habibi/European Pressphoto Agency

Conventional wisdom holds that withdrawing all or a significant number of American troops from Afghanistan would lead to a Taliban takeover and the creation of a new safe haven for militants bent on attacking the United States. This threat was cited by President Trump during a speech in August where, in laying out his strategy for the war, he asserted that “a hasty withdrawal would create a vacuum which terrorists, including ISIS and Al Qaeda, would fill, just as happened before Sept. 11.” It was also echoed in numerous National Security Council meetings I attended during the Obama administration.

But such dire consequences are far from certain. Here are five reasons I believe it’s time to re-evaluate our assumptions about Afghanistan’s potential as a terrorist safe haven. (These views do not reflect the position of the United States government.)

First, while the Taliban are resilient enemies who have battlefield momentum and effective control over much of the country, they are far from being able to conquer all of Afghanistan. Their forces remain overwhelmingly outnumbered by the Afghan security forces, and some Afghan units — notably the Special Forces — have demonstrated improved battlefield performance. In addition, the United States and the West would almost certainly continue to offer financial backing, intelligence support and military advice and equipment to the Afghan government even after a drawdown. Therefore, while the Taliban would certainly gain significant ground after an American withdrawal, an outright Taliban victory is far from likely.

In fact, the Taliban’s public statements this year have cited a Quranic justification for peace talks and have expressed a desire for reconstruction and development assistance, perhaps reflecting the organization’s recognition that seizing Kabul by force is unlikely and would, in any event, render effective governance virtually impossible. The group’s most important supporters, especially Pakistan, have also become more wary of what a truly empowered Taliban could mean for regional stability, and would probably prefer to follow a more cautious strategy with the group than backing an all-out Taliban offensive to take over the capital.

Second, even if the Taliban were to conquer Kabul, would they be willing to host an influx of international terrorists determined to strike the United States? The Taliban leader, Mawlawi Haibatullah Akhundzada, recently marked the Muslim religious holiday of Eid al-Adha by publicly declaring that any area under Taliban control would not be used for bringing harm to other nations.

Is that credible? Yes, because Taliban leaders are deeply aware that sheltering Al Qaeda before the Sept. 11 attacks resulted in an American-led invasion that forced them into political exile, killed thousands of their fighters and commanders and eroded their international legitimacy. Taliban leaders also recognize that even with a reduced footprint, the United States military would, if provoked, still be capable of inflicting grievous pain on the group, as evidenced by the missile strike in May 2016 in a remote area of Baluchistan, Pakistan, that killed their leader at the time, Mullah Akhtar Muhammad Mansour.

Third, the Taliban and Islamic State dislike each other intensely, so the notion of the Taliban welcoming an Islamic State base in Afghanistan seems implausible. Press accounts suggest that more Islamic State fighters have been killed by the Taliban than by Afghan security forces, and there have been violent clashes between the groups recently in Nangarhar Province that displaced hundreds of Afghan citizens.

At the heart of this enmity is the Taliban’s deep local roots and their focus on nationalist rather than international objectives. The Islamic State’s extreme interpretation — even by Taliban standards — of Sunni Islam and its close adherence to the Wahhabi-Salafist tradition also create tensions. Far from cooperating beyond isolated tactical agreements involving local commanders, the Taliban’s leadership appears much more interested in killing Islamic State loyalists than hosting them.

As for Al Qaeda, the core of the group that planned the Sept. 11 attacks and established itself in Pakistan after the American-led invasion has been devastated by American and allied counterterrorism operations. Today the group’s focus is on its affiliates, especially in Syria and Yemen, not South Asia. The remaining terrorists in Afghanistan, often described by the State Department as the reason Afghanistan is a hotbed of international terrorism, are a patchwork of groups focused primarily on local and regional grievances, with thus far no demonstrated ability or intent to operate internationally.

Fourth, in the wake of the Arab Spring and the profound instability that has gripped countries from Syria to Yemen, there are ample safe havens where international terrorists operate, devaluing Afghanistan’s utility to them. Why would large numbers of Arab terrorists want to travel to Afghanistan when they have bases nearby? Wouldn’t it be easier and more logical for Islamic State fighters from Iraq or Syria to flee to central and southern Libya, eastern Yemen or the Sinai Peninsula, than to Kandahar? The same logic applies to terrorists from Southeast Asia, the Sahel and parts of sub-Saharan Africa.

In fact, it’s clear that Islamic State is trying desperately to cling to a foothold in eastern Syria and along the Iraqi border in the face of tremendous United States military pressure. It is also telling its operatives to remain where they are and to launch attacks from there, especially in Europe. Afghanistan was an attractive terrorist base of operations before Sept. 11, but it simply does not have the same resonance or utility today.

Finally, American counterterrorism and homeland defense capacities have improved by an order of magnitude since Sept. 11. The old model of terrorists training unimpeded in Afghanistan and then traveling to the United States to conduct attacks is more difficult to envision. It’s easier to imagine a cell of jihadists with good computer skills plotting against the United States from an apartment in London, Paris or Brussels than from remote parts of Afghanistan.

So, what does this mean for American policy? In my view, the latest troop surge will help the Afghan government counter, but not defeat, the Taliban. The additional 4,000 troops — which would bring the United States total to over 12,000 — will also offer a critical morale boost to the government of the Afghan president, Ashraf Ghani. But it will do little to break the political stalemate among Afghan factions fighting over the distribution of power. In addition, the deployment of thousands of additional United States troops will most likely bolster the Afghan public’s confidence and potentially help stem the flow of refugees to Western Europe, while allowing the United States to keep a platform from which to conduct operations regionally.

These are all worthwhile objectives. But it’s far less certain that a larger United States military commitment in Afghanistan will have much impact on our fight against international terrorists. Given the cost — as much as $40 billion a year — and with the potential for more American casualties, we need to rigorously test our assumptions about the Taliban and the terrorist threat. It is time to clarify precisely what we hope to achieve in Afghanistan.

Michael P. Dempsey, a career intelligence officer, is the national intelligence fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, a government-sponsored position.

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