For over six decades, Israelis and Palestinians have been locked in cycles of violence punctuated by fruitless efforts to forge a peace settlement. Given this dismal track record, a breakthrough in the new negotiations now under way will require a bold move to prevent the talks from again ending in stalemate.
Since Israel holds virtually all the cards — the land, the tanks, the wealth, the water — the Palestinians should make that bold move by taking what they can get, not what they want.
The Palestinian Authority should make Israel an offer it can’t refuse by leapfrogging the logjam and declaring publicly that it is prepared to accept the outlines of the deal that successive Israeli governments have put on the table.
To the end of securing its main objective — statehood — the Palestinian Authority should acquiesce to major Jewish settlements in the West Bank in a swap for territory in Israel; it should give up the right of return for most Palestinian refugees and instead secure monetary compensation; it should accept effective demilitarization of a Palestinian state in order to meet Israel’s security needs; and the Palestinian Authority should aim to locate its capital in Arab East Jerusalem.
Although it may seem like an act of folly for the Palestinian Authority to accept Israel’s terms as its opening move, Palestinian leaders have little choice: They can opt for statehood on these terms — or no state at all.
Palestinians should stop denying themselves their only chance for statehood by clinging to demands that everyone knows full well they will never get.
To be sure, President Mahmoud Abbas and Prime Minister Salam Fayyad already lack strong popular support, and deep concessions to Israel would elicit a public backlash. But political weakness can be a strength; their legitimacy is a function of what they deliver, not who they are.
Economic growth of 7 percent last year, new shopping centers and movie theaters in Palestinian cities and security forces that are respected rather than feared give Abbas and Fayyad the credibility to make a deal — especially if statehood is the reward.
A bold offer would also smoke out the Israeli government, whose commitment to a settlement remains uncertain. Indeed, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s coalition government may well be too far to the right to approve any outcome that would entail an Israeli withdrawal from most of the West Bank.
But with roughly two-thirds of the Israeli electorate favoring a two-state solution, Netanyahu would face enormous popular pressure to act should the Palestinians put an attractive deal on the table. The likely result would be the collapse of Netanyahu’s current government, prompting him to forge a more moderate coalition — probably with the centrist Kadima Party — which would be much more receptive to a land-for-peace bargain.
By reinforcing moderates within Israel, the Palestinian Authority would likely improve the terms of a final settlement. With Netanyahu still talking about an undivided Jerusalem, a stronger Israeli center will be needed to ensure solid support for making East Jerusalem the capital of a Palestinian state. And although the large Jewish settlements near Jerusalem, such as Maale Adumim, are certain to remain part of Israel, more isolated settlements, such as Ariel, may well be in play.
Palestinian acceptance of Israel’s bottom line would also help secure another important piece of the puzzle: steady American pressure on Israel to make a deal.
The better able the Palestinian Authority is to demonstrate that it is a credible and willing negotiating partner, the easier it is for President Obama to rebut domestic critics of his readiness to lean on Netanyahu. And although Obama is not a popular figure in Israel, Israelis hang on Washington’s every move. They understand that their country is growing increasingly isolated, and that American support, morally and materially, is crucial.
Pressure from Washington is needed to deny Israel the complacency that currently accompanies its prosperity; it is too tempting for Israelis to push tough choices into the future. In addition, when Israeli leaders make those hard choices, they will find it advantageous to justify concessions as necessary to safeguard Israel’s vital alliance with the United States.
Uprooting tens of thousands of Jews from their homes in the West Bank will be painful and divisive. The imperative of avoiding a rift with the United States will offer Israeli leaders vital political cover.
Quick movement toward a final settlement between the Palestinian Authority and Israel of course leaves Hamas-controlled Gaza out of the picture. But on this front too, a bold stroke by the Palelstinian Authority has distinct advantages. The realistic prospect of peace and statehood for the West Bank might convince Hamas to seek the same for Gaza. If not, Gazans would likely jettison Hamas in favor of leadership ready to join the West Bank in a Palestinian state.
To avoid another round of piecemeal negotiations that go nowhere, the Palestinian Authority should quickly accept the bulk of Israel’s conditions for a settlement, and Israel should as quickly accept the offer. Tough times of implementation would lie ahead, but this go-for-broke strategy may well provide the best — perhaps the only — chance at lasting peace.
Charles A. Kupchan, professor of International affairs at Georgetown University and a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is the author of How Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace.