One of the most common criticisms of the current “surge” in Iraq is that its proponents have not developed a Plan B in case it fails. The skeptics liken this lack of a backup strategy to the Bush administration’s failure to plan for various contingencies after the initial invasion in 2003; they see a continuity of errors between previous strategies in Iraq and the new one.
In fact, the debate shows only how little the critics of the war understand about military operations. As one of the initial proponents of the surge, I argue that there is no Plan B because there cannot be one. The idea that there can be a single alternative strategy, developed now, just at the beginning of the surge, is antithetical to the dynamic nature of war. At this early stage, there are only possible general responses to various contingencies, which will become more focused as operations move forward.
The strategy now under way in Iraq — we are providing an increased number of American forces, working closely with Iraqi troops, to establish and maintain security in Baghdad as a precondition for political, economic and social progress — will change the situation in Iraq significantly, whether or not it succeeds in its aims.
In fact, it has already done so, and for the better: the rebel Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr has apparently fled to Iran; American and Iraqi forces have killed or captured more than 700 key leaders and allies of his Mahdi Army, causing the movement to fragment; sectarian killings in Baghdad in April were about one-third of the level in December.
There have been gains outside the capital as well. Nearly all of the two dozen or so major tribal leaders in Anbar Province have joined the new Anbar Salvation Council, which is committed to fighting Al Qaeda and other foreign terrorists; Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, along with his defense and interior ministers and national security adviser, met with these sheiks and the provincial council in Anbar’s capital, Ramadi, in March to discuss reconstruction; reports in the American press suggest that even some Sunni Baathist insurgents formerly allied with Al Qaeda are now fighting the foreign terrorists in Anbar and elsewhere.
On the political front, the tenor of the Iraqi government’s pronouncements has changed. Prime Minister Maliki and the commander of the Iraqi forces in the surge, Lt. Gen. Aboud Qanbar, have repeatedly declared a new commitment to establish security in a nonsectarian manner; in a 180-degree turnaround, Mr. Maliki has now permitted repeated strikes against senior Shiite militia leaders and sweeps of Shiite neighborhoods; and the government has publicly vowed to expel Shiite squatters from the houses of displaced Sunnis.
At the regional level, discussions have begun between Iraq and its neighbors, including the international conference held in Baghdad in March and last week’s regional conference at Sharm-el-Sheik in Egypt. Saudi Arabia pledged last week to forgive 80 percent of its loans to Iraq.
Some of these promising developments may yield permanent gains; others may offer false hope. But the thing to keep in mind — and the thing those calling for a Plan B seem to forget — is that they will proceed in unpredictable ways.
In mid-2006, for instance, the Marine commanders in Anbar had nearly given up hope for restoring peace to the province. Now the Anbari sheiks are sending their sons to join the local police forces and take on Al Qaeda. In fact, so many young men have joined that the police forces in Ramadi and Fallujah are considered to be at “overstrength.” Many applicants in Anbar had to be turned away because they could not read or write, so the local government has set up literacy programs to prepare them to reapply.
This spring, 500 locally recruited policemen conducted a large-scale sweep through Ramadi, without direct American support. While a number of officers have been killed at their checkpoints by Al Qaeda’s suicide bombers, their efforts are having an effect: attacks in Ramadi are reported to have dropped to fewer than five a day on average, down from last year’s average of more than 20.
The point is that it is impossible to say with any confidence what Iraq will look like in the fall. Yes, many things might happen to derail the current plan. But each eventuality would require a different response.
Of late, the American military command in Iraq has been remarkably adaptive to the changing situation, responding to both good and bad events they occur. For example, the Qaeda forces driven from Anbar by the increasing animosity of the local leaders have sought new havens in places like Diyala Province. The two top American generals, David Petraeus and Ray Odierno, responded by quickly sending reinforcements to Diyala to prevent the terrorists from establishing new bases.
When Moktada al-Sadr called for fellow Shiites to demonstrate against the American surge last month, General Petraeus wrote an open letter to the Iraqi people pointing out that such demonstrations would not have been permitted under Saddam Hussein, and asking the demonstrators to avoid violence. In the end, the demonstrations were limited in scale and peaceful, and fears that Sunni terrorists would set off a wave of attacks on the protesters proved unfounded.
As we look ahead, two things are very clear. First, there can be no “do-over” — the various plans proposed in late 2006 as alternatives to the current strategy are extremely unlikely to be relevant in 2007. Any idea of reverting to the Iraq Study Group plan — which focused on pushing more Americans into training teams and pulling them out of the neighborhoods — will probably not make sense in August.
Second, it is very premature to evaluate the success or failure of the surge, since the third of five additional brigades has just begun operations and the other two will not be in place for weeks. The major clear-and-hold operations that are the centerpiece of the strategy have not yet begun in most parts of Baghdad. Military and political plans of this magnitude take months to work, and General Petraeus is right to say that we will not know if this one is working until the fall at the earliest. As the facts on the ground change, our military leaders and policy makers will consider new strategies to deal with them. This is the nature of war.
This is not the time to be rehashing strategies developed six months ago under very different conditions, or to be planning for the collapse of a strategy that has just begun. It is time, however, to consider the possibility that any Plan B in Iraq will focus on exploiting the success of the current surge rather than on mitigating a failure.
Frederick W. Kagan, a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and a former professor of military history at the United States Military Academy.