Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is shocking because it is so unusual for one country to so brazenly attack another’s political independence and territorial sovereignty today. A norm against territorial conquest — especially, against the wholesale erasure of countries from the world map — has conditioned international relations since the end of World War II.
Russia’s behavior raises the question: Are we witnessing the demise of that norm?
Not necessarily — but maybe.
Countries used to conquer other countries frequently
Conquest of land, including of entire countries, used to be relatively common. As I show in my book, “State Death,” buffer countries — traditionally, countries that lie between two countries that are rivals — were especially vulnerable to conquest. Often, great powers on either side of buffer states did not trust each other not to take over the buffers between them.
Poland, carved up multiple times by more-powerful neighbors, provides a clear illustration of this dynamic. But buffer states around the globe — from Korea (in 1905) to Estonia (in 1940) — died by conquest. Ukraine lies in a similarly vulnerable position, sandwiched between NATO member countries and Russia.
Beginning in the early 20th century and, certainly, after World War II, however, a norm against such territorial conquest emerged. Promoted especially by the United States, but with support around the world, this principle is most clearly enshrined in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter: “All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State.”
After 1945, the violent death rate of states declined so dramatically that it virtually ceased. The norm against conquering another country is one of many factors, including the advent of nuclear weapons and increased global trade, that contributed to “the long peace” after World War II.
Countries turned to different ways to control other governments
One consequence of the emergence of the norm against conquest was a shift in the way countries exercised political control over other countries.
The norm did not magically reverse the incentives of countries that might have taken over buffer states in previous eras. But it did change how they tried to control buffer territory. Such countries sought to achieve the same political aims via different means. Thus, we saw a rise in foreign-imposed regime and leader changes of buffer countries after 1945, such as when the Soviet Union invaded Hungary in 1956.
What does this broader history tell us about Ukraine today? If Putin’s aim is limited to overthrowing and replacing Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky with a pro-Russian leader, the consequences for the survivability of the norm against conquest also would be limited. As scholars such as Kimberly Howe, Roxani Krystalli and co-authors have shown in the context of Syria, however, the consequences for Ukrainians would be severe. What is more, the costs to Russia are likely to be extremely high; invaders rarely accurately assess the costs of occupation.
A more serious challenge to the norm — and one that Russia has already mounted — would be to annex some of Ukraine’s territory. Russia’s 2014 invasion of Crimea was a first step in this regard. The more recent “recognition of the independent republics of Donetsk and Luhansk” is another.
Until now, Russia tried to appear to be playing by the rules
International relations scholars know more about the rise than the decline of norms. But chipping away at the norm by swallowing up pieces of Ukrainian territory one chunk at a time may prove an especially effective strategy to undermine the norm.
Even as the Kremlin flouts norms and breaks international law, until now even Russia seems to have acknowledged the need to at least look as if it respected international law. In 2014, Russia tried to obscure its role in the annexation of Crimea by using “little green men” rather than sending in clearly marked Russian troops, as it has done in 2022. Similarly, there was the pretext of the Crimean “declaration of independence” and subsequent deployment of a self-determination justification for Crimea’s becoming part of Russia. Likewise, by recognizing Donetsk and Luhansk, Russia is setting itself up to use a (sham) vote to justify irredentism — claiming these territories based on historical and ethnic ties.
In other words, Russia could have taken Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk without giving any justification. While the justifications are flimsy and unconvincing, there’s a reason Russia took pains to provide them, as Villanova political science professor Jennifer Dixon shows. Putin is trying to manipulate existing norms for his own ends. His search for a pretext for invasion in the last week — and the efforts of the United States, its allies and Ukraine itself to deny him one — only reinforce this point.
This time may be different
In the end, however, Putin launched the current war by rewriting history and accusing Ukraine of aggression it didn’t commit. As bombs fall on Ukrainian cities, is his end goal the Russian annexation of all of Ukraine? Putin’s Feb. 21 speech suggests regret and nostalgia for the territorial boundaries of the Soviet empire. The response to a Russian effort to change the map of Europe in this way leads to at least two possible outcomes for the norm against conquest.
A strong global response to such an annexation attempt would be a signal of the norm’s strength. The strength of norms that proscribe behavior is most visibly gauged when those norms come under a direct challenge. For example, when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 (using a similar justification to the one that Putin seems to be proposing), the large military coalition that responded reinforced the norm against conquest.
If, however, the world accepts a wholesale annexation of Ukraine, with little effective response — if Ukraine were to be erased from Europe’s map — the norm against conquest would be severely, perhaps even fatally, damaged.
Historically, most wars between countries have been fought over territory. The norm against territorial conquest was meant to decrease the incidence of this type of war. The risk of overturning the norm is a return to a world of conquest and violent state death.
Tanisha M. Fazal is a professor of political science at the University of Minnesota and a 2021 Andrew Carnegie Fellow. Find her on Twitter at @tanishafazal.