The South China Sea (SCS) is currently the focus of a dispute between the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei. The PRC has preemptively deployed military personnel and equipment to enforce their claims to a trumped-up, self-identified but unrecognized “nine-dash line,” an imagined boundary that is inconsistent with international law and commonly accepted international behavior.
The PRC has diverted significant dollar equivalents of capital from its faltering economy that would have been better invested in educating and providing health care to Chinese citizens, to build approximately 3,000 acres of military bases on a variety of dredged coral reefs hosting 9,800-foot-long runways, combat aircraft, surface-to-air missiles and other weaponry. The military facilities pose a threat to shipping and aircraft belonging to all nations passing through or over the South China Sea. Other nations should be concerned that these actions are operational preparation of the battle space. Why would the Chinese military conduct these preparations unless they were preparing for battle?
And why is the South China Sea critical to the world economy? Half of the world’s merchant shipping, one-third of its oil and two-thirds of the world’s natural gas pass through the waterway.
The Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague issued its ruling in the case on July 12, finding in favor of the Philippines’ challenge to the PRC’s imperialist claim of sovereignty to over 80 percent of the South China Sea. Prior to the ruling, People’s Liberation Army Navy Adm. Sun Jianguo, deputy chief of the Joint State Department of the Central Military Commission, stated China would “not recognize or honor” any decision issued by The Hague court. PRC President Xi Jinping stated that “while China will firmly safeguard its sovereignty, rights and interests, it is willing to peacefully solve the disputes through friendly consultation and dialogue with the countries directly involved,” a policy that appears to exclude the United States.
During the recent commencement at the U.S. Naval Academy, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter stated the United States is concerned about China’s actions in the disputed South China Sea, that the U.S. is committed to upholding the freedom of navigation and commerce, as well as the peaceful resolution of disputes. Mr. Carter added, “China’s actions [in the South China Sea] challenge fundamental principles, and we can’t look the other way.”
Marine Gen. Joseph Dunford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated in a recent speech: “In the South China Sea, Chinese activity is destabilizing and could pose a threat to commercial trade routes.” Adm. Harry B. Harris Jr., commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, noted: “When [the PRC] put their advanced missile systems on the Paracels, and when they build three 10,000-foot runways in the Spratlys on the bases that they’ve reclaimed — when they do all of that, they’re changing the operational landscape in the South China Sea.” Adm. Harris went even further, stating, “I’m of the opinion they’re militarizing the South China Sea”
With the PRC pledging to “firmly safeguard” its claimed sovereignty and the United States stating it would uphold freedom of navigation and “We can’t look the other way,” there seems to be a strategic impasse. Short of military confrontation, what actions might the U.S. consider as part of a peaceful resolution?
In the face of an imminent takeover of the South China Sea, I suggest two actions the U.S. Congress should immediately forward to President Obama. The first is for all U.S. visas for students from China to be revoked prior to the start of the 2016-17 academic year, and for the students to be returned at China’s expense. During the 2014-15 academic year an estimated 304,000 Chinese students enjoyed a taste of freedom at American colleges and universities. China would hopefully realize demilitarizing the South China Sea would further contribute to maintaining stability at home when compared with the alternative.
The strategic impact on Mr. Xi would be significant. He would take the blame for the return of 300,000-plus students, who have experienced academic and personal freedoms on leafy American campuses and face their anger over the Beijing regime’s imperialistic actions that resulted in the students losing access to first-rate American university educations. Instead, the students would be forced to attend flawed Chinese universities — diploma mills that guarantee bleak earnings, endless studies of Mao Zedong thought, and overseen by Communist Party commissars dictating core socialist values, and Marxist and military theories. This would end their privileged access to Facebook, Twitter, Snapchat and Google Scholar.
Should the PRC not demilitarize the South China Sea by Jan. 20, 2017, the second phase would be implemented. It would consist of the revocation of all Chinese EB-5 visas, tourist visas and the resultant Green Cards dating back to the law’s inception, and the forfeiture of all properties and businesses purchased. Unknown to most Americans, the EB-5 visa program along with the purchase of $500,000 worth of U.S. real estate, or the same level investment in an American business, enables PRC citizens and their family members to, in essence, buy coveted U.S. permanent resident status.
Why should the United States educate future generations of Chinese princelings from an outlaw regime as computer engineers, scientists, captains of industry and corporate raiders? Why should the United States allow members of the PRC elite, many of whom support and benefit from outlaw Chinese military and economic imperialism, to shelter wealth in American safe-haven real estate and commercial enterprises, drastically inflating the values of those assets, and making them unaffordable for middle-class Americans?
Certainly, this proposal will bring shrill cries of outrage from the academic and business communities. But those cries would certainly be less costly than going to war — or perhaps losing a war — against the People’s Republic.
Similar actions should also be considered by other nations having economic interests in the South China Sea.
Kevin Smith is a retired U.S. Air Force officer and civil servant. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not reflect those of the U.S. Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other U.S. government organization.