The Kremlin’s announcement in mid-February of a ‘partial withdrawal’ of several Russian military units from occupied Crimea and other places around Ukraine’s border must – unfortunately – be understood as smoke and mirrors to conceal Russia’s intentions.
Moscow is not de-escalating the current standoff – quite the contrary. Ukraine is already under siege and critical national infrastructure was hit by a record-sized denial of service cyberattack on 15 February.
The Kremlin seems willing to use force against Ukraine again, and the situation remains extremely tense on the ground. More Russian troops are reaching full combat readiness and positioned only a few hours away from the border as well as in Belarus – for the Allied Resolve drills – and on the Black Sea coast. Belarus also announced Russian troops would remain after the end of the military exercise.
More offensive military hardware has also been moved closer to the Ukrainian border. Meanwhile, other military units have been mobilized in the past few days closer to Ukraine, with tactical orders reportedly being given – this contests Russian claims of ‘withdrawal’ or willingness to de-escalate.
The latest deployments are especially worrying because there is now a short window for military operations, and they also show the General Staff has planned for specific battles and not just a generic war. From a purely logistical point of view, Russian troops in combat-ready positions cannot stay deployed on such a high level of combat readiness for long before they must move – either back to their base or against Ukraine.
The withdrawal announcement could be interpreted as the Kremlin seeking to take back control of the dynamic. Indeed, Moscow’s narrative that it would not invade has been contested by the US after it declassified critical pieces of intelligence to ‘name and shame’ Russian plans.
Fabricating excuses for renewed war
The organization of an extraordinary Security Council in Russia on 21 February was a pretext to beat the war drum and justify further military action against Ukraine. The situation has now entered a new, worrying phase where the Kremlin appears to be looking for a tactical opportunity – essentially a contrived pretext to start military operations.
The Russian State Duma recently voted in favour of asking Vladimir Putin to recognize the legal existence of the Donetsk and Luhansk ‘People’s Republics’. Recognition would represent a game-changer by giving Russia the option to ‘defend’ the separatist territories against a fabricated Ukrainian attack.
Creating excuses to ‘legitimize’ a military intervention is part of the Kremlin playbook. Many ‘false flag’ operations have occurred recently to deflect attention and conceal potential military action, such as the reported explosion of a gas pipeline in Luhansk, the use of a non-existent ‘threat’ that Ukraine might try to retake Donbas by force because of a reported ‘genocide’, or the general mobilization of separatist troops in occupied Donbas.
Such tactics have already been used in a similar way to justify Russia’s intervention in Chechnya in 1999 as well as against Georgia in 2008 among others, so Moscow would not hesitate to use these proven tactics again. And the organization of a nuclear-readiness check exercise acts as a deterrent against international decision-makers.
Slim chance of a diplomatic way out
There is now little hope Moscow is seeking to de-escalate, and recent international endeavours have so far been in vain with shuttle diplomacy fruitless at best and humiliating at worst. Multilateral efforts at shoring up Ukraine militarily or the threat of renewed international sanctions have not, it seems, deterred the Kremlin. A last-ditch diplomatic effort is now scheduled between Putin and Joe Biden.
De-escalation will only happen if, and when, the Kremlin believes it has reached an acceptable outcome, which means Moscow needs to credibly be able to declare a form of victory. The problem is no-one knows what endgame is acceptable to the Russian elite, what ‘success’ looks like for the Kremlin, and what Russia considers its desired end state with Ukraine and NATO.
If genuine de-escalation starts to happen, the Kremlin will likely save face by announcing that the deployments around Ukraine and in Belarus were only the largest tactical military exercise conducted by the armed forces in recent history. But further withdrawal would not exclude some Russian equipment from remaining near Ukraine to maintain tension.
Since the beginning of 2022, the standoff has been defined on Russia’s terms, and so will its end. Renewed war with Ukraine is a political decision Moscow may have already taken, with recent events representing the start of wider military operations. The issue is that international policymakers might not recognize in time that this crisis has already tipped over into war.
If war breaks out in Europe in the coming days, the only solace is that the current standoff has at least given renewed purpose and internal unity to the Atlantic alliance. But that is a small consolation when considering the devastation a new war in Ukraine will entail.
Mathieu Boulègue, Research Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme.