Around the world, good governance is now in short supply. Democrats and Republicans on the so-called deficit reduction supercommittee in Washington failed to agree even on what they disagree about. There is no consensus among the leaders of euro zone countries on the cause of Europe’s debt crisis, much less on what to do about it.
Nor are major emerging markets blazing a trail toward better governance. China’s leaders accept that the country’s economic growth is “unstable, unbalanced, uncoordinated, and unsustainable,” in the words of Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, but early evidence suggests they haven’t done much to change it. Vladimir Putin, Russia’s once and future president, is not the man to reform Russia. Even Brazil, a notable developing world success story, faces a wave of high-level political scandals and resignations.
So where are we to find decent governance in today’s crisis-prone world?
It’s hard to look to Washington. For all the worries over squabbling U.S. lawmakers and the histrionics of Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street activists, to find the real problem in American politics we must follow the money.
Interest groups of every stripe have the cash and the access to co-opt broad segments of both parties. This allows them to block efforts at reform that might erode their wealth and influence. Not even a financial meltdown of historic proportions could generate enough public demand to loosen the lobbyists’ grip.
Across the Atlantic, the problem within the euro zone is the structure of the euro zone itself. These 17 countries share a common currency, yet they have distinctly different political systems, electoral calendars and approaches to taxes and state spending. The debt crisis has now empowered both bureaucrats in Brussels and governments led by unelected technocrats in Athens and Rome. That may help avert near-term disaster, but it won’t produce a credible long-term solution.
Are authoritarian states better equipped than democracies to govern effectively in times of crisis?
On the one hand, it’s considered a strength of democracies that the independence of their institutions — courts, media, political parties, banks — bolster public confidence in government, no matter who is in charge. On the other, as checks and balances limit the power of individual elected officials, they make it more difficult to get things done when change is needed most.
Autocracies have weaknesses of their own. Beijing can move hundreds of billions of dollars into infrastructure projects on a scale and with a speed impossible in America. The Saudis can order construction from scratch of new cities in the sand. Yet leaders of these countries face checks and balances too.
The nine members of China’s Politburo Standing Committee contend with competing pressures from all sorts of entrenched interests — from industry groups to the military to the largest state-owned companies. The Saudi monarch and his inner circle cope with demands from clerical leaders and competing branches within the royal family.
Structural change comes slowly in both countries, not simply because their leaders are risk-averse, but because so many demands must be satisfied. A Chinese state-owned company with deep political connections or a Saudi prince with control of a key ministry can paralyze a reform plan.
The Russian model of autocracy has built-in problems of its own. Here, authority is vested in an individual leader, and though groups compete for access, assets and influence, spoils can be awarded only by the emperor or trusted members of his entourage. Oligarchs come and go. A state-supported industry or military faction can fall from favor. Power is concentrated at the tip of the pyramid. With this model, the challenge isn’t in coming up with new policies, it’s in implementing them. Consolidation of control requires that economic and security bureaucracies are prevented from becoming competing centers of power, rendering them less effective at getting things done at the local level.
In addition, this system works only as long as the public accepts the legitimacy of the man at the top. Egypt without Hosni Mubarak will take time to regain its footing, and Venezuela’s near-term stability continues to depend on the health of Hugo Chávez.
After touring the world, you end up where we started ... The country most likely to produce good governance over the next several years is, believe it or not, still the United States. In fact, the first three years of the Obama administration has seen passage of more legislation than at any time since the mid-1960s.
That’s in part because a sense of economic crisis forced early cooperation. It’s also because the two parties aren’t really that far apart on foreign policy, national security and trade issues. There is less contention here than on domestic priorities, but these issues are no less important.
Though hotly contested U.S. elections will bring Washington to a near standstill in 2012, the prospects for 2013 are more promising. Republicans will likely strengthen their leverage within both houses of Congress. If a Republican wins the White House, the party will face enormous pressure to keep its campaign promises on reform of government spending. If Obama wins, a legacy-minded president will have ample incentive to strike an historic bargain on long-term debt reduction for which both parties can claim credit.
Take pride, Americans. You have the worst system of governance on Earth — except for all the others.
Ian Bremmer, president of Eurasia Group and author of The End of the Free Market: Who Wins the War Between States and Corporation?