The European Union renewed economic sanctions against Russia last week — and threatened further sanctions if Russia launched a military invasion into Ukraine. The E.U. and the United States initiated these sanctions in 2014, after Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Despite Russia’s outright violation of international law, many observers doubted that the E.U. would sanction Russia — or didn’t expect the sanctions to last for long.
Most European governments regard Moscow as important in both economic and geopolitical terms. So what keeps these sanctions in place, and what’s the longer-term outlook?
Seven years later, E.U. sanctions against Russia — targeting individuals and entities across four sectors of the Russian economy — remain in place, and prospects for dismantling the measures seem slim. With tensions running high at the Ukraine border and reports of a potential Russian military intervention — as well as an E.U. border refugee crisis orchestrated by Belarus and coordinated with Russian President Vladimir Putin — there is little appetite in Brussels and the European capitals for lifting sanctions.
Why the doubts that sanctions would persist?
Decision-making in E.U. foreign policy requires all member nations to agree. Decisions on economic sanctions are made at the European Council, a gathering of the E.U. heads of government, and the sanction regimes must be renewed every six months. This means renewing the sanctions requires a unanimous vote by all 27 current members — and the Russia sanctions are also tied to the Minsk agreements, a road map designed to restore the territorial integrity of Ukraine.
But many European countries have argued sanctions were unnecessary. In 2015, newly elected Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras called the sanctions “senseless” and threatened to undermine the sanction regime. In 2018, Italy’s interior minister, Matteo Salvini, announced that he would strive to lift the sanctions, claiming his government wasn’t afraid to veto them.
Poll data suggests that only 10 percent of respondents in Spain would like to see economic sanctions against Russia. And not all Europeans view Russia as a threat: Public opinion polls in Bulgaria show the United States as the biggest threat; while in Hungary and Greece only 14 and 39 percent of citizens, respectively, list Russia as their country’s biggest threat.
Not surprisingly, this lack of cohesion offers plenty of room for a “divide and conquer” approach — and Russia was quick to lobby European capitals with more favorable governments. In 2015, for example, Putin discussed assistance to Greece, which was on the brink of leaving the Eurozone. Troubled by Greece’s debt crisis and looking to boost trade, Tsipras criticized the E.U. sanctions on Russia in 2016.
Italian media reports, meanwhile, accused Italy’s far-right Lega Nord party of seeking financial support from Moscow in 2018. Salvini, the Lega leader, repeatedly threatened to veto the E.U. sanctions on Russia.
Why the E.U. Council continues to renew these sanctions
Why, given the lack of clear consensus on this issue, does the E.U. Council renew the sanctions against Russia? First, Germany and France — E.U. members whose support is critical for an E.U. sanction regime to form — have strongly endorsed economic coercion against Russia. However, while this endorsement is necessary, it’s not sufficient to maintain the sanctions regime.
Second, E.U. sanctions balanced the popular desire for tough action and the business elite’s demands for moderation. Public opinion in several countries pushed for tough sanctions. For example, 62 percent of Poles demanded a tightening of the sanction regime. Russia also tops the ranking as the biggest threat among hawkish E.U. members: 58 percent of Estonians and 69 percent of Poles mention Russia as the biggest threat to their country. These attitudes resonate in politics, with broad political consensus for sanctions among these E.U members.
Yet while popular support for sanctions is strong, the business elite of these same countries has remained lukewarm about economic sanctions. Russia is an important trade partner for Poland, with Polish exporters across many sectors sending their goods and services eastward. And despite the sanctions, Russia is still among the largest destination for Estonian exports — surpassing those to the United Kingdom or France.
The research suggests that E.U. leaders understood the importance of mitigating the economic costs of the sanctions regime. For example, when Russia imposed counter-sanctions in 2014, Poland’s economic minister had to find alternative markets for the exporters affected by the Kremlin’s measures — and organized a campaign to boost E.U. consumption of targeted Polish products.
In the same fashion, Germany attempted to support apple producers, who were among the hardest hit in the economic spat between the E.U. and Russia. The German minister of food and agriculture urged Germans to increase their domestic consumption, arguing in the summer of 2014 that “one apple a day, keeps Putin away.”
And several European countries that opposed sanctions ended up largely unaffected by the economic costs. Exports from Spain to Russia, for instance, are less than 1 percent of all Spanish exports. The lack of economic costs meant leaders in these countries could support E.U. sanctions, even in the absence of broad domestic support. They used this flexibility to pursue a more ambitious sanctions policy at the European level.
E.U. sanctions seem to be here to stay
The meeting of the European Council in late December again delivered consensus on a renewal of the measures. There’s little to suggest the E.U. will roll back these sanctions anytime soon — particularly with Russian troops mustering along the Ukraine border. In fact, the E.U. could apply further restrictions if Russia invades Ukraine. Further sanctions might even target the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, a nearly completed project linking Russia and Germany through the Baltic Sea.
More broadly, the E.U. appears to be stepping up its economic sanctions game with a proposed new tool to systematize how the bloc responds to economic pressure on its members — a legal framework for anti-coercion efforts. This policy proposal lays out how the E.U. will identify, respond and proceed when members face economic pressure to change its policies. The Anti-Coercion Instrument may soon turn out to be a big step in E.U. geopolitical resilience and ability to exercise power in international relations.
Dr. Dawid Walentek (@dawid_walentek) is a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Warsaw. His research concentrates on conflict and cooperation in international relations, with a focus on economic coercion. Dr. Clara Portela (@drclaraportela) is a professor at the University of Valencia and a former analyst at the E.U. Institute for Security Studies. Her research deals with international sanctions and European foreign policy. Dr. Paulina Pospieszna (@paulapospieszna) is an associate professor at the Adam Mickiewicz University of Poznan. Her research interests include democracy promotion, democratization, aid and sanctions as foreign policy tools. Dr. Joanna Skrzypczyńska is an assistant professor at the Adam Mickiewicz University of Poznan. Her research focuses on the European Union’s external relations, E.U. trade policy and protectionism.