The killing of Hamas chief Yahya Sinwar in Gaza at the hands of the Israeli military, on October 16, 2024, ended a critical aim for the Jewish state. Sinwar, who took over the reins of Hamas only some months ago after the assassination of then chief Ismail Haniyeh in Iran, in July 2024, was known to be a main architect of the October 7, 2023 terror attacks.
As Israel’s core kinetic aims come to fruition, with the elimination of a plethora of leaders from Hamas and Hezbollah, the question of ‘what next?’ remains palpable. Civilian casualties in both Gaza, and now Lebanon, have mounted, and political space in both regions that are under siege continue to persist without a blueprint for any off-ramps. The United States, paralysed with its own domestic electoral requirements, has been unable to turn the keys towards a ceasefire. Others have increasingly looked towards alternatives, including India and China.
Countries and their moves
The proverbial Global South, so to speak, has arguably shown a fragmented approach to the crisis. South Africa, led by its own experiences of the apartheid era, took Israel to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in December 2023, looking for the ICJ to issue a warrant against Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. While Israel has lost a lot of goodwill in these countries, the two biggest powers within this construct, China and India, have taken divergent positions which are anchored more around their individual national interest rather than trying to build a consensus within newer multilateral formats such as BRICS. This is despite calls for ceasefire and diplomacy-led resolution promoted by both these states.
This divergence between the two Asian powers, representing over a third of the global population, ultimately decides the rudders of what the ‘Global South’ is, despite the non-monolith nature of this construct. Both India and China have clear diplomatic and political markers on the Palestine issue. Beijing has put its eggs in the Arab basket, in tune with its own postures of supporting causes such as that of Palestinian sovereignty from a de-colonisation lens. It was only in July 2024 that 14 Palestinian factions, including Hamas, travelled to China for a conference aimed at “ending divisions and strengthening Palestinian unity”.
China’s view and the Indian line
China, since October last year, has not condemned Hamas by name for planning and executing the attack against Israel. This, in part, was to keep its own mediation window open, something it had mobilised previously between Iran and Saudi Arabia, which had created a lot of fanfare for China’s increasing clout in the international order. Those calculations were made redundant with the assassinations of Ismail Haniyeh and now Sinwar as follow-up conversations on said ‘unity’ remain far and few. To back the now hyphenated Arab-Iranian position, China undermined its relations with Israel, calculating that Israeli proximity to the U.S. is endearing and its capacities are better utilised elsewhere.
But China still sees newer forums, such as BRICS, to incubate the narrative of the Global South in its own favour. This was reflected in the recent expansion of the group which India was not particularly keen on but had to go along with. Interest to join BRICS has grown since, with even Palestine looking to apply as Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas attended this year’s BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia.
The Indian position, on the other hand, has been consistent and balanced regarding its national interest and international obligations. Many analysts believe Indian approach to the conflict has been skewed towards Israel, giving tacit yet critical support, and this is not an entirely incorrect view of things. In contrast to China’s approach, New Delhi also sees this from the view of countering terrorism. To put this in perspective, beyond their different domestic and regional realities, both states suffer from the designs of cross-border terrorism. To colour this argument further, the fact that Israel was forced to release Sinwar from prison in 2011 in exchange for a captured Israeli soldier is a parallel experience to India being forced to release Jaish-e-Muhammad’s Masood Azhar during the hijacking of IC814 in 1999. India continues to push a return of countering terrorism as a core multilateral deliverable as the U.S.-pushed ‘war on terror’ draws down. Parallelly, India continues to support a two-state solution and recognised the Palestinian state in 1988. Both these policies running concurrently do create polarised impressions. However, both do co-exist as realities and do not undermine one from the other.
A perspective
Ultimately, the war in Gaza has shown that while the idea of America’s ‘Pax Americana’ design is diminishing, and finding fewer takers within the U.S. itself, alternatives remain distant realities. The India-China contestation by itself undermines any real unity within the Global South, while other disparities, such as democracies versus non-democracies, present more crevasses to navigate. True mediation relies on political and military power to mobilise and exploit leverages, and no power in the Global South, individually or collectively, has the correct tools in place to project such influence in West Asia today. Whatever little such projection is witnessed, is more about individual interests, rather than any collective aim to design, promote, and, most importantly, guarantee peace.
Kabir Taneja is Deputy Director and Fellow, Strategic Studies Programme, Observer Research Foundation