Across the globe many of the West’s hopes for a better world lie in smouldering heaps. The optimism that we felt when freedom swept across eastern Europe is now a distant memory.
We heaved a sigh of relief when the American-Soviet nuclear weapons standoff, based on mutually assured destruction, was dismantled. Now North Korea, which may not be susceptible to any conventional theory of deterrence, has the bomb. Iran’s revolutionary Shi’ite government plans to have one too.
America’s role since the Soviet collapse as the world’s single superpower has brought it unforeseen difficulties. Its supremacy has bred resentment and defiance among both its enemies and friends.
We should certainly not be nostalgic for the bygone era of the two superpowers. The alleged stability of that age was dearly bought. Around the world many proxy wars were bloodily fought between communism and capitalism, and numerous vile regimes were propped up by the global rivals. In 1962, during the Cuba missile crisis, we were brought to the edge of global nuclear war, a position that is inconceivable today.
But since the end of the cold war Washington has not matched its monopoly of power with either humility or wisdom. Its foreign policy failures have been humbling. Intending to show that it could project power anywhere in the world, it has instead demonstrated the severe limitations of its military and diplomatic reach.
Even if Saddam Hussein is hanged, dictators around the world have no reason to tremble before the United States. Its authority has crumbled. It is left simply blathering at events in Iran, and has no answer to North Korea’s provocations. America once unleashed a bombardment on Iraq so ferocious that it was labelled “shock and awe”. But nobody is in awe of the United States today.
In truth, it has been difficult for the US to strike the right balance. It has oscillated between being too passive and too aggressive and both extremes have had dire consequences.
When it expelled Saddam from Kuwait in 1991 it left him in power in Baghdad. That signalled that dictators could thumb their noses at the world yet survive. But after that first Gulf war the Americans left a garrison in Saudi Arabia, which Osama Bin Laden used as his main pretext to attack the United States.
First President Clinton’s failure to react effectively against Al-Qaeda’s outrages throughout the 1990s seemed to invite the terrorists to escalate their campaign. The pendulum swung right back after 9/11. Alas, President Bush’s invasion of Iraq in 2003 hugely inflamed the Muslim world’s sense of grievance.
Throughout the Middle East strength is respected and weakness despised. But America’s intrusion on Muslim soil redoubles the strength of its enemy, and the US has shown that all its impressive weaponry cannot defeat fanatical insurgents.
Last week comments by General Sir Richard Dannatt, Britain’s chief of the general staff, that “we should aim for a lower ambition” in Iraq marked the end of any pretence that the allied invasion could be converted into, or presented as, a success. John Warner, the veteran Republican and chairman of the Senate’s armed services committee, also returned recently from Iraq with a similarly gloomy assessment, and urged that “bold decisions” might be needed, presumably meaning decisions to pull out.
The trouble with that viewpoint is that if we abandon Iraq we will supply to Al-Qaeda a tremendous propaganda boost and cede it a vast lawless territory from which terrorists can launch attacks just as they did from Afghanistan before September 11, 2001.
Also, Afghanistan is as big a problem as Iraq, although for different reasons. We have had our successes there. We have denied Al-Qaeda access to the capital Kabul and disrupted many of its operations. But the British Army, while displaying extraordinary courage and skill, is hanging on in Helmand province by its fingernails. It is starved of resources by the British government and denied reinforcements by our Nato allies.
The North Atlantic alliance, which for decades intimidated the Soviet Union, has fallen apart as a result of Iraq. Anti-Americanism in France and pacifism in Germany have rendered the alliance almost useless. Nato’s secretary-general has resorted to appealing through the media to those governments that make little contribution to fighting Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.
Presumably there is no honest disagreement within the alliance about the importance of that war. Following the 2001 attacks on New York and Washington the alliance pledged to depose the Taliban and deny Al-Qaeda the use of Afghan bases. Nothing that has happened since affects the validity of that strategic imperative. But France and Germany have allowed their discontent over Iraq to affect their policy in Afghanistan.
Six decades after the defeat of the Nazis, Germany still uses its fear of militarism as a reason to play only a token role in the alliance. Its attitude is no longer acceptable. It is absurd that Europe cannot call on the resources of its richest and most populous country to bolster its defence.
The failure of some allies to fight in Afghanistan sends the clearest signal to Al-Qaeda that the West is too decadent to defend itself. The terrorists may draw comfort too from Dannatt’s view that Iraq could in time break the British Army. The fanatic’s crucial advantage in any terrorist struggle is that governments and peoples — especially in democracies — often lack the willpower to resist over a prolonged period.
However, before gloom overwhelms us, we should remember Al-Qaeda’s failures. Its primary targets, chronologically at least, are Muslim states with governments friendly to America. In the five years since September 11 terrorists have not dislodged the regimes in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Morocco or any Gulf state. The only Muslim country to have imploded is Iraq and that was accomplished by the allies.
Nor has Al-Qaeda succeeded in mounting a second attack on the United States. Dhiren Barot’s admission in court that he planned to unleash a dirty bomb in Britain underlines how great a threat we face, but it also demonstrates that our security services have had some spectacular successes against the plotters.
Maybe there is a link between America’s perceived impotence in the Middle East and North Korea’s decision to test its bomb now. But in reality North Korea has always armed itself heavily and was therefore not in awe of America even when its power seemed supreme.
The cold war is over but the doctrine of nuclear deterrence has now to be resurrected. The United States will surely make clear publicly or privately that any state using a nuclear weapon will face nuclear retaliation. Perhaps Kim Jong-il is too mad to be deterred but we should not assume it. Last week Bush took the deterrence doctrine an important stage further when he remarked that “the transfer of nuclear weapons or material by North Korea to states or non-state entities would be considered a grave threat to the United States”.
The 21st century has brought us many disappointments. We have had to lower our ambition. Democracy is not going to flower throughout the Muslim world and nuclear weapons will continue to proliferate. We face serious terrorist threats and a limited risk of nuclear attack.
However, we have lived with such dangers before. I suppose we can again.
Michael Portillo