Norway is facing a similar challenge to its long-term policy of remaining outside the EU as Finland and Sweden did with their stance on NATO membership three years ago.
Finland and Sweden’s foreign and security policies were for decades based on the idea that the Russian threat was manageable. But Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 posed a massive challenge to Finland and Sweden’s policy of remaining outside NATO.
From a Finnish and Swedish perspective, the fact that Ukraine was not a NATO member was an important factor. Helsinki especially saw clearly that any self-imposed restrictions for the sake of good relations with Russia would not be respected and thus not guarantee safety.
In the case of Norway, its foreign and security policy has since the end of the Second World War been based on the assumption that its relationship with the US and membership of NATO will guarantee its security. But the example of Norway’s neighbour Denmark – both a NATO and EU member – makes it clear that previously close relations with the US do not guarantee future US commitment to any European country’s security.
Denmark has been one of the most loyal European allies to the US, fighting alongside American forces in Iraq and Afghanistan and sustaining the highest killed in action ratio per capita. But that has not stopped President Trump from issuing repeated threats to annex Greenland from Denmark, by military means if necessary, or Vice President Vance from stating that Denmark ‘ has not been a good ally’.
Even the closest possible partner is still not a member
Much like Finland and Sweden’s NATO policy prior to accession, Norway has chosen the closest possible integration with the EU short of membership. As a result, Norway aligns most of its regulation, trade and foreign policy with the EU, joins EU sanctions, and as an EEA/EFTA member pays into the EU budget for the programmes and agencies it wants to participate in.
But so far Norway does not have a seat at the table where decisions affecting Norway are made – an arrangement which in January 2025 caused Norway’s government to collapse over the adoption of the EU’s energy rules. At the moment, Norway’s government is trying to prevent the country from getting caught in the crossfire of EU–US tariffs.
Just like Finland and Sweden with NATO, Norway is realizing that even the closest possible partnership with the EU is not the same as membership.
Accordingly, support for EU membership has risen considerably in Norway over the past months, reaching 41 per cent in a recent poll. In 2023, the ‘yes’ side still only accounted for 27 per cent. While the ‘no’ side still leads with 48 per cent, 63 per cent of respondents were positive towards a new referendum on EU membership – in contrast to the Norwegian political leadership that has ruled out a renewed EU debate. The new government in Iceland, the other non-EU Nordic country, has promised a referendum on EU membership no later than 2027 – a development that Norway is watching closely.
In Finland and Sweden, opinion polls showed that opposition to NATO membership was stable for decades until the full-scale invasion of Ukraine tipped the scales overnight. There too, politicians were behind the curve and had to catch up fast.
Economically, Norway has done well without EU membership, due to its abundant natural resources. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it has become Europe’s most important gas supplier and reaped massive windfall profits, bringing the Norwegian sovereign wealth fund to a record 20 trillion NOK in 2024 ($1.8 trillion).
But while the single market is the centrepiece of the EU, it is not the only rationale for joining the union. Norway’s neighbour Finland, for example, joined the EU mainly for security reasons to improve its relative position vis-à-vis Russia. Finland was also the only Nordic country to join the Eurozone, to have a seat at the table in a core area of European integration. Today, Ukraine’s integration into the EU has become a question of the highest geopolitical importance.
Less US means more EU
As the US considers scaling down its presence in Europe and with its commitment to NATO thrown into question, a new European security architecture is beginning to take shape. Inclusion and exclusion in this new security order, as well as possible grey zones, may no longer be delineated by NATO membership, but rather along the borders of the EU.
Not only China and Russia, but apparently now also the US, view the international order as more multipolar, where great power deals – and potential conflict – define the room for manoeuvre for smaller states. In such a system, EU membership will be crucial for any small European state, including Norway.
The EU’s rationale is to balance out natural differences in economic, military and population size. No other international organization aims to increase the relative power and safeguard the sovereignty of small states in the same institutionally anchored way as the EU does.
Smaller states also stand to benefit from shifting power dynamics in Europe, largely as a result of the war in Ukraine. The initial inability by France and Germany to offer credible and reliable leadership in the wake of the Russian invasion means the traditional Franco–German tandem is no longer sufficient for consensus-building within the EU. There has been a diffusion of power, with Poland and Italy inching closer to centre stage and the UK making a comeback as a key European power in any future security arrangements.
A strong Nordic–Baltic voice would benefit the EU
Smaller European states have had to step up to do their part to fill the leadership vacuum left by larger European countries. The Nordic–Baltic group (NB8) has emerged as a cohesive group and forms a new centre of gravity in Northern Europe. Taken together, the voice of these eight small countries carries both significance and credibility. Nordic–Baltic countries increasingly position themselves independently of Germany, which they in the past used to stand (and often hide) behind.
But only six of the eight members are also members of the EU. Adding Norway (and preferably Iceland too) to the group’s work within the EU would help boost regional cohesion.
As small states, the Nordic–Baltic countries struggle with bandwidth when it comes to the workload of EU regulation and policy formation processes, but the EU would profit from more policy initiatives by smaller states. The Nordic–Baltic group could cooperate on joint policy initiatives to keep the EU on the right track and use their voice to help streamline consensus-building within the union.
As a major energy supplier in Europe, Norway would carry a lot of weight within the EU and could influence decision-making in ways beneficial to Norwegian and wider regional interests. As Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støhre put it when visiting Brussels this week: ‘Norway needs Europe and Europe needs Norway’. Perhaps it is time to make it official.
Minna Ålander, Associate Fellow, Europe Programme.