By Paddy Ashdown, high representative for Bosnia-Herzegovina from 2002 until last January (THE GUARDIAN, 05/06/06):
Iraq is at a tipping point. We are not yet definitely losing the battle. But we are definitely not winning it either. For someone who argued that it was right to use force against Saddam Hussein, that is an uncomfortable thing to have to say. The election, at last, of Iraq's new government - partly secular, partly religious - offers us the last workable chance to turn things around. But one of my worries is that London and Washington are now so politically locked into withdrawal that they may be preparing to pull out too early.
That would mean certain failure in Iraq. It would mean abandoning the country to become a lawless space used as both haven and facilitator for global terrorism, spreading instability to the fragile oil-rich states of the region. It would mean further disruption of an already fragile world oil market. It would mean, almost certainly, a breakaway state for Kurds in the north, which Turkey could not ignore. It would mean a vacuum of power in the heart of the Middle East, into which Iran and Syria must be drawn.
It would mean a US bruised and damaged, which would be in danger of turning in on itself, recriminating with its friends and retreating from its willingness to intervene to resolve instability. It would mean floods of refugees heading for Europe and rising threats from instability in the Maghreb and to the east. Indeed, Europe probably has more to fear than anywhere else in the west from a failure in Iraq. So failure - cut and run - is not an option. But neither is going on as we have done, for that is to risk failure by another route.
This is a political problem and it can only be solved with a political solution, not by force of arms. But it cannot be won with the current coalition. There was a day when that was possible, but no longer. The job of the coalition troops, in growing partnership with the Iraqi army, is to hold the ring while the politicians find the solution. The bottom line is that the Iraq problem cannot any longer be solved within Iraq alone, and it cannot any longer be solved by the coalition alone.
There are some rough rules about stabilisation and nation-building after war. One is that these operations have a much greater chance of success if the neighbouring countries participate constructively in the process. We began to succeed in Bosnia only after Croatia and later Serbia shifted from wreckers to helpers in the process.
The British government began to create opportunities for peace in Northern Ireland only when it recognised that Dublin had a legitimate role in the process. This was a lesson - among many others - that was completely ignored in Iraq. We tried in vain to seal off Iraq from its neighbours and from the contagions of instability in other parts of the region. We have paid the price.
To be fair, I think that London has understood this for some time now. But however hard it has tried to internationalise the conflict, the British government has been unable to persuade international institutions, any of Iraq's neighbours or European countries to get more involved. One reason is that, while London may will the ends, Washington still seems reluctant to will the means.
It is a pity, indeed, that Tony Blair was unable to convince George Bush that a just settlement in Palestine and a successful outcome in Iraq were intimately connected. Powerful voices in Washington are now remaking that case. I hope they are listened to. Leaving Iraq with dignity may depend on it.
And now we have Iran to add to the mix. While it is right to put pressure on Tehran, we have a little longer than some suggest - maybe two or three years. We must not get ourselves locked in as we have in Iraq. We need to avoid alienating alternative secular voices in the country, and to ensure that other nations are on board. The US offer of talks is to be welcomed, and it is encouraging to see the US secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice, working to win the support of China and Russia. But we need to remember that diplomacy works best - and with countries like Iran and people like Slobodan Milosevic perhaps works only - when a credible sanction awaits if it fails.
I do not believe any of Iraq's neighbours, Iran included, want to have a black hole on their doorsteps. All of them have an interest in preserving a unitary Iraq. That is our most important asset. We are going to have to start doing deals with some people we find distasteful - but no more distasteful than Milosevic and Franjo Tudjman in the Balkans.
We are going to have to make some unpleasant compromises, too. The US very publicly went into Iraq to bring democracy to the region. The western world may support that. But none of Iraq's neighbours do. We may have to subordinate the rhetoric of democracy for the Middle East to the need to find a regional solution for Iraq.
The wider the international coalition, the greater the chance of success; the narrower, the smaller. This was another rule of successful peacekeeping that we forgot when we launched the attack on Iraq. If Washington is to get out of this with dignity and honour, it has to ask others to play a role in crafting the wider regional solution, which now provides the best - perhaps the only - context for the restoration of peace and stability.
There is a role for Europe as honest broker here, if only the European Union can snap out of its current mood of sulky weltschmerz. After all, in the west, it is Europe that would suffer most from an Iraqi collapse. Paris and Berlin dissociated themselves from the war. Now is the time for them to play that asset and work with Washington and the UN on this regional agenda. The EU's expertise in election oversight, institution building, strengthening the rule of law and the creation of regional security architectures can help in practical ways, too. As can, once again, the UN.
Some development institutions, notably the UN's agencies and the World Bank, are still slowly expanding their operations in Iraq. This is a trend that should be strongly encouraged. We need to start with facing up to the uncomfortable truths of our present situation in Iraq and some of the uncomfortable compromises that will have to be made if we are to turn proximate failure into a chance of delivering success.