Truckling to the Taliban

Listen, for far in the distance one can hear the sound of a great tin cup rattling. The president of Pakistan tells the newest president on the block (via the Washington Post) that his country could be "the most critical external problem" facing the US. And he wants "aggressive, innovative action" against the forces of darkness. But for Pakistan to defeat the extremists, it must be stable - and economically viable. So give us the money, and necessary military hardware, too. Then together we can try to do something about Afghanistan and our collapsing region - your slightly desperate friend, Asif Ali Zardari.

Well, that's the story of the last 30 years - perhaps even the basic story of Pakistan's short existence. Hang tight with whoever happens to be in the White House and hope that he delivers enough goods to keep us afloat. But now, perhaps, there's a new answer building. Ask not what the US treasury can do for you - ask, rather, what you can do for America. And, first, ask Pakistan's million-plus military. (Immediately deployable men, 650,000; plus 350,000 paramilitary, and reservists and reserve reservists, making 1.4 million in a crisis - the seventh biggest national defence total in the world.)

Turn those big figures inside out. Short of resources to fight the Taliban inside Pakistan as Nato's secretary general rattles his own tin cup? Anxious, if you're Obama, to wind down Iraqi deployments so you can bring critical mass to bear from Kabul to Helmand to the long, infinitely porous border with Pakistan? Then look at the troops already there or thereabouts on the ground.

Factor in some of Zardari's millions. "Unlike in the 1980s, we are surrogates for no one," he writes. "We need no lectures on our commitment. This is our war. It is our children and wives who are dying."

Very well. Then follow the logic and match his pretty desperate assertion against 60 years of war and constant tension. Pakistan's army is the largest, most omnipresent political player in the country. Four of its leaders have doubled as military dictators - rivalling mere elected politicians in time served at the top. The army, in that sense, is effectively a political party itself, seizing power when the quasi-democrats fail and relinquishing it when their popularity begins to run dry. And, within that neat game of pass the power parcel, there are well-oiled wheels within wheels. Retired top brass don't go home to the Punjab and sit on their porches: they run corporations, found factories, open carpet emporiums and travel agencies. In sum, they accumulate nice little earners, wrapped safe by the nest-feathering activities of previous army generations. Putting on the braid is one of the best insurance policies in the world.

And who - as America pours in more billions of dollars - is the main enemy here? Not those involved in "our war, where women and children are dying". No, as always, the alleged enemy is India, with Kashmir as casus belli. Military intelligence specialises in shadowy manoeuvres involving Kabul (where Indian influence is a supposed threat). Army deployment concentrates along the border with India, supposedly ready for any attack.

But it's irrelevant now. Nuclear weapons on both sides has made it irrelevant. And see how the puppet masters pull the strings. An attack in Mumbai leaves carnage in its wake. India prepares to react. Islamabad orders its Afghan frontier forces to head east to another frontier fast. Implied message: you can have one proper line of defence, but not two. There's an obvious answer to that.

Pakistan's president is right. "This is our war" being waged now and increasingly lost - not just on the Afghan border, but right through the North-West Frontier, where extremists can shut the Khyber Pass for days. So why shouldn't Obama make a totally fresh offer? Withdraw from the borders with India. We Americans will give all the guarantees necessary, plus some international troops on the ground to make that stick. And this, Mr Zardari, means you can flood the other border with your own surge. Instead of abandoning the Swat Valley and shrugging, you can take it back. Instead of truckling to the Taliban, you can do your own dirty work properly - and show, once and for all, whose side you're on.

What's the use of a 1.4 million military if it can't or won't fight the war it has on its hands? What's the use of feeding a beast with no will to win? Maybe Helmand and the rest need more troops as those who are there go on dying - but, over that lethal, open border, there's a mighty army busy doing not very much. Time for it to get on - or time for us to get out, and take our billions with us.

Peter Preston