As the US presidential election result became clear, European leaders followed a similar formula when congratulating President-elect Trump. They offered their congratulations, mentioned previous good working relations with the US (special points for a nod to long-standing relations), and – most importantly – emphasized the need for this to continue for the benefit of the citizens of both their country and the US.
The formula was a telling sign of the political bartering most European heads of state expect with Trump back in the White House. The exception, of course, were Trump’s European allies who were simply ecstatic.
Transatlantic illiberalism
Trump’s growing number of European allies and the increase of illiberalism and populism is perhaps the most worrying development for Europe. In 2016, some of Trump’s counterparts in Europe were Angela Merkel in Germany, Emmanuel Macron in France, Mark Rutte in the Netherlands, and Giuseppe Conte in Italy. Regardless of their record, they were moderates.
The picture looks very different today. Anti-war extremist parties Alternative for Germany and the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance are on the rise in Germany. In France, pro-Russia Marine le Pen has been able to reduce support for Ukraine from €3 billion to €2 billion in the draft French budget. In the Netherlands, the far-right Freedom Party is the biggest coalition partner. In Italy, Prime Minister Georgia Meloni hails from a neo-fascist party. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s populist and illiberal playbook is being replicated across Europe.
Meanwhile in Poland, moderate prime minister, Donald Tusk, is experiencing the difficulties of reversing damage done by the previous populist government.
What European populist leaders have in common is a deep-seated scepticism of the EU and a desire to erode it from within. And many of these leaders also welcome the return of Trump.
It is no coincidence that Orbán scheduled the European Political Community Summit, hosted by Hungary, to take place just days after the US election. The Trump win was an added bonus. This meant European heads of state travelled to Budapest for the summit still reeling from – or rejoicing at – the election result.
Orbán would like to position himself as Trump’s man in Europe. He has spent the past four years building ties with the president-elect and the MAGA wing of the Republican party. Trump even namechecked Orbán – a Eurosceptic Putin-supporter – during the presidential debate.
Italy’s Meloni, meanwhile, has so far worked with EU institutions and NATO rather than against them: she has supported EU and NATO resolutions for Ukraine and demonstrated opposition to Russia. But this may have been a strategic calculation. She likely looked at her country’s balance sheet and realized she needed the European Commission’s COVID-19 recovery funds.
But with the fund coming to an end and given her history of Euroscepticism and pro-Russian views, the transatlantic illiberal ties mean she may now feel emboldened to revise her positions. She is already deploying the illiberal playbook domestically.
Policy implications for Europe of a second Trump term
Despite some ideological similarities, Trump’s policies will not be good for his European allies. He has threatened to impose 10 to 20 per cent tariffs on all EU imports. For Italy and the Netherlands, the second and fifth largest EU exporters to the US, this would have direct negative impacts on their economies.
Increased tariffs on Chinese goods – Trump has threatened up to 60 per cent – would also have an impact on Europe’s economies. Rerouting of Chinese goods could see China dump overproduction in Europe, one of the few remaining relatively open markets, and make European products compete with cheaper Chinese goods in Europe and on the global market.
Neither of these developments are positive for export-led European countries. In France, the EU’s fourth largest exporter to the US, Marine le Pen – previously a strong supporter of Trump – had a notably muted response to his victory due to concerns over a trade war.
Even European leaders who might have hoped for a different election outcome may seek to hedge their bets. There are two things that are clear about Trump: he is unpredictable and transactional.
It is quite possible that some European states, in particular frontline states with genuine fears over Russia’s imperialist ambitions, will seek to buy Trump’s support through bilateral arms deals – despite their distaste for Trump’s position vis-à-vis Russia. These countries already have some of the highest defence spending in NATO, with Poland, Estonia and Latvia leading the way, so this will not irk Trump – arms deals would simply be an additional insurance premium.
Countries rushing to make bilateral deals with the US risks a similar uncoordinated race for American arms deals as during Trump’s first term. This would in turn undermine much-needed European defence industrial cooperation efforts. As the need to reduce dependencies on third countries – even for defence equipment from historically close allies – has become increasingly clear, this would be a problematic development.
The silver lining may be that it could galvanize the UK and the EU just enough to take action on UK-EU security and defence cooperation, of which the defence industrial piece is the most essential.
Europe disunited
The transatlantic link between populist, illiberal leaders should be a concern. Trump is no longer isolated in Europe, he is rapidly accumulating allies among European heads of state. These leaders agree on the perceived existential threat posed by migration, the need for so-called ‘traditional family values’ and ‘anti-wokeism’. But beyond that, they share and want to advance an illiberal view of the world, with ramifications from security and global trade to human rights – and directly threatening the European project.
his development would be disruptive when times are easy but becomes a grave danger as Europe faces multidimensional challenges that require a strategic, coherent and unified response. The hope is Europeans will rally and close ranks. But achieving unity is difficult at the best of times and near impossible when populist leaders feel they are ‘winning’ and are emboldened by each other’s electoral successes.
Just as during Trump’s first term, Europeans will likely seek to simply muddle through best they can. But those European leaders who still believe in liberal open democracies must begin telling a much more compelling counternarrative – urgently.
There are no quick fixes. A start would be communicating the risks posed by Russia and other adversaries much more clearly.
Mainstream parties must also take the wind out of populist parties’ sails by recognizing the genuine concerns – inflamed by populist rhetoric and disinformation – people have about issues like migration and the green transition. And rather than move closer to the populists’ ever-more extremist policies to win votes, they should look to equitable and just policies as part of the solution.
This will not be easy by any means but the European project – which brought peace to Europe – is at stake.
Armida van Rij, Senior Research Fellow, Europe Programme.