Three U.S. service members were killed near the Syrian border in northeastern Jordan by a drone from an Iranian-aligned militia over the weekend. U.S. troops are in the area to support the ongoing campaign against the Islamic State while also monitoring Iranian activity along the land corridor between Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. As tensions escalate in the Middle East, the frequency of attacks on U.S. troops in the region by Iran-aligned militias places American soldiers at greater risk than they have faced in years. With over 100 attacks reported since the onset of the Gaza conflict, it is time to ask whether the risks of maintaining these outposts outweigh their remaining benefits.
After the recent tragedy, there have been new demands to confront Iran, aiming to restore deterrence and show strength. Washington may find itself drawn into an avoidable conflict against an opportunistic adversary whose violent tactics are all too easily applied when U.S. troops are deployed next door to Iran amid a welter of pro-Iranian militias largely unconstrained by Baghdad. Keeping troops deployed does not advance U.S. security—it puts it at greater risk.
In Washington, there has been a readiness to downplay the risks to U.S. soldiers in Iraq and Syria. This weekend’s attack on a base in Jordan used to support operations in Syria should be a wake-up call. True, most assaults are meant to stir the pot rather than kill Americans. But given the nature of the weapons, from mortars to drones of varying complexity, launched at U.S. forces and the uneven competence of those who fire them, these militias cannot be certain that their attacks will not inflict casualties that cross the threshold of escalation. These attacks have already left numerous American service members with traumatic brain injuries, claimed the life of a U.S. contractor, and left six other U.S. personnel deployed to Syria wounded in March of last year.
This fragile situation illustrates the broader problem of forward-deployed forces. The farther forward they are and the closer to an adversary’s territory they are based, the more exposed they are to attack. In some instances, of course, troops are deliberately exposed in this way and in relatively small numbers as tripwires. In Iraq, this is emphatically not their purpose; but our forward-deployed forces might nonetheless function as though they were a tripwire. This is a serious problem whether militia attacks against U.S. forces are directed by Tehran or not. If they are masterminded by Iran, there is the danger of miscalculation. And if they are not, then these militias are like tails wagging the dog, acting independently of Iran for their own local interests, while placing Tehran at the risk of escalation it does not seek.
The purpose of tripwires in strategic thought is a deterrent one: a signal to an adversary that if it invades, it is sure to kill Americans and therefore face a nearly certain—and possibly devastating—response. But U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria aren’t intended to serve that purpose.
So why are they there? They remain a crucial enabler of Iraq’s security forces, and around 2,500 U.S. troops are deployed in Iraq. In 2022, U.S. Central Command, working closely with local forces, conducted 313 operations against the Islamic State, resulting in the elimination of 466 fighters in Syria and at least 220 in Iraq. The degradation of the Islamic State continued in 2023 with assistance from U.S. advisors. Policymakers in the White House and Pentagon consider the U.S. presence in Iraq and Syria essential for suppressing the Islamic State. Thus military forces serve a purpose in the country, and any decision to withdraw needs to be a careful one.
The U.S. military is in Iraq as invited guests of the government in Baghdad and operates under the 2008 U.S.-Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement. This agreement was reaffirmed during the Strategic Dialogue initiated by the Trump administration and concluded by the Biden administration in July 2021. Despite viral public statements from Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani suggesting a reassessment of U.S. troop presence and nonbinding eviction resolutions from the Iraqi parliament, the formal request for the continued presence of U.S. troops in an advisory role, without specifying a timetable, persists behind closed doors.
And yet even before the recent attack in Jordan, an escalation cycle had already begun. A U.S. airstrike in early January in Baghdad killed Mushtaq Jawad Kazim al-Jawari, also known as Abu Taqwa, a commander of Harakat al-Nujaba, along with an unranked individual. The targeted killing happened amid strained relations between Washington and Baghdad. Seen as an initial warning to Iraq, U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin directly addressed attacks by Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat al-Nujaba on U.S. forces in a conversation with Sudani in December 2023.
This warning went unheeded, highlighting Sudani’s limited control over militias, even if those militias direct armed brigades that formally report to him. The United States has even less influence on the ground. The U.S. displayed restraint for three months as attacks increased, and targeting militia leaders launching rockets at U.S. troops has a certain logic. Now the Biden administration is likely to respond with forceful strikes in Iraq and Syria. It will worsen already-strained relations between Washington and Baghdad, putting Sudani in a difficult position. He is unable to rein in the Iran-aligned Iraqi militias targeting U.S. troops. However, engaging in a tit-for-tat cycle to restore deterrence is ultimately ineffective. While it might prompt a short-term reassessment by the militias, new attacks are likely to occur as time passes or tensions in the Middle East escalate further.
There’s no feasible way for 2,500 U.S. troops to both assist Iraq against the Islamic State and contain Iran-aligned militias without the explicit approval and cooperation of the government in Baghdad. Ditto for the approximately 900 U.S. troops in Syria which rely on support from the U.S. military presence in Iraq and neighboring countries. The era of troop surges and active U.S. combat is over. With the global Islamic State threat decreasing significantly, attacks are down by over half compared to 2022. The operational benefit U.S. troops provide to Iraqi partners simply isn’t worth the risk of escalation if U.S. troops are killed. Some may argue that withdrawing from Iraq militarily would benefit Iran and its proxies, and they would be right. But by providing them with troops to target, the U.S. inadvertently validates their raison d’être, while perpetuating the risk of an undesirable war with Iran.
The United States should begin preparations to withdraw the majority of its troops from Iraq in order to deprive the militias of targets and reduce the risk of the militias sparking a larger war with the U.S. by successfully targeting U.S. soldiers. This is a process that will take time but delaying it will only compound the risks of staying. Operation Inherent Resolve ought to be replaced in the near future by a significantly reduced group of advisors and special operators centered on the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq in Baghdad. A limited Title 10 mission under U.S. Central Command can assist with training and intelligence sharing with Iraq’s most elite units. But the process of a drawdown must begin and should lead to a normalized U.S. diplomatic mission in the country.
If U.S. troops in Iraq and Syria, along with those supporting them, become little more than a permanent lightning rod for violence, no one wins except the militias.
Adam Weinstein is deputy director of the Middle East Program at the Quincy Institute. Steven Simon is the professor of practice in Middle Eastern studies at the Jackson School of International Relations, University of Washington. He is the author of Grand Delusion: The Rise and Fall of American Ambition in the Middle East.