By Derek Mitchell, a Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and co-author of China: The Balance Sheet: What the World Needs to Know Now about the Emerging Superpower (PublicAffairs Books) (THE WASHINGTON POST, 18/04/06):
This Thursday, Hu Jintao will be in Washington for his first visit since becoming China's paramount leader in 2002-3. While summit meetings used to be occasions of great importance and attention, in the aftermath of the Cold War, and particularly September 11, such great power get-togethers have receded as emblems of international peace. Nonetheless, the upcoming U.S.-China summit comes as the United States is once again awakening to a challenge from the east, after years of ignoring China's dramatic rise in economic, political, military, and even cultural power.
It did not start out this way, of course. The Bush Administration came into office talking about China as a "strategic competitor," and early indications suggested that China was to be the main focus of President Bush's security-oriented foreign policy team. The EP-3 spy plane incident in April 2001 served as a wake-up call to some about the dangers of casual antagonism toward Beijing, while others, particularly in the Pentagon, were reaffirmed in the belief that China was no friend but was likely to challenge the United States in the near term and become the U.S.'s foremost competitor over the longer term.
September 11 bumped China off the front-burner . Faced with a clear and present danger, the Bush Administration's 2002 National Security Strategy listed China among the major powers to be included in a proposed condominium with which the United States would work to combat the new terrorist threat. Almost overnight, China went from being part of the problem to being part of the solution for the United States. Secretary of State Colin Powell began to speak of the relationship as being in the best shape in over a generation or more. Wags commented that the Bush Administration came into office criticizing its predecessor for talking about "working toward a constructive strategic partnership" with China only to take power and fulfill that vision.
Over the last year, however, this calm, if not euphoria, in U.S.-China relations has steadily been upset by the concerns over China's take over of U.S. interests. In East Asia, China began to promote multilateral vehicles for dialogue and action that excluded the United States. Its military modernization accelerated, tipping the military balance in the region, and particularly across the Taiwan Strait.
In 2005, China opened up a $200 billion trade surplus with the United States, raising concerns over China's currency controls. China's requirements for natural resources to fuel its growth have risen dramatically, with China becoming the world's second largest oil consumer (after the United States) and the world's leading importer of iron ore, aluminum, and paper. In the process, China has increased its diplomatic engagement around the globe to secure these resources, often leading to relationships with pariah nations -- such as Burma, Sudan, Zimbabwe, and Angola -- that welcome an alternative source of unconditional support as they resist outside pressures to conform to international norms of human rights, environmental protection, etc. Such concerns have led Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick to urge China to become a "responsible stakeholder" in the international system.
It is China's growing domestic challenges rather than any international or domestic successes that keep Beijing's leaders up at night, however. Increased civil unrest, corruption, disparities of wealth, environmental degradation, and health challenges such as HIV/AIDS and avian flu, threaten to overwhelm the leadership during a period of economic, social, and political transition. By reducing China's political and cultural space in recent years, Hu has demonstrated either his essential conservative nature or his government's deep insecurity during this transitional period.
Hu's desire for the upcoming summit to be a formal "state visit" reflects the traditional Chinese attention to symbolism and face even at the expense of substance. Because his predecessors received such treatment, Hu needs to receive the same protocol as a sign of respect and almost as a rite of passage. The United States, and particularly the Bush Administration, has less patience for mere protocol without substance -- which bodes ill for the upcoming talks. Members of the Bush Administration have expressed great frustration with the lack of progress on the full range of issues of deep concern to the United States, including currency reform, intellectual property rights, assistance in addressing Iran's and North Korea's nuclear programs, human rights, religious freedom, etc. So far, China seems content that a buying spree at Boeing and elsewhere might be enough to allay concerns. That would be a miscalculation.
In fact, both the Bush Administration and Congress are betraying increasing impatience with China. The question is what can be done about it. Given growing bilateral economic ties, the United States is becoming increasingly reliant on China's economic health for its own economic security. The Bush Administration hardly needs another source of international tension, particularly considering how much Beijing's help will be required for progress on Iran, North Korea, and other matters. Nonetheless, Congress as always is the wild card in the deck, and domestic political pressures could lead to legislation that would serve neither U.S. nor Chinese interests.
The American people are awakening to the challenge of China with more questions than answers about the implications on their interests. China indeed presents a unique challenge that will not conform easily to Cold War notions of ideological conflict or global competition. A strong and prosperous China could add a major new market and strategic asset to global growth, development, scientific discovery, and strategic stability. Nonetheless, the uncertainty of China's future is an inescapable component of the U.S.-China relationship, since no one -- not even the Chinese -- can predict for certain the trajectory of China over time. Even a summit with no particular substantive result will be important for the longer-term objective of promoting communication at all levels, public and private. This will be a critical aspect for managing what will be the world's most important -- and complex -- bilateral relationship in the 21st century.