The turbulent prospect of direct US intervention against al-Qaida and Taliban jihadi bases in Pakistani territory adjoining Afghanistan appears to have moved closer following last week's visit to Washington by Pakistan's new prime minister, Yousef Raza Gilani.
Far from reassuring his hosts that Islamabad is on top of the situation in the so-called tribal areas, Gilani's uncertain performance seems to have convinced US officials of the need to move quickly. A sub-text to this dangerously fast-moving drama is George Bush's desire to catch or kill his 9/11 nemesis, Osama bin Laden, before he leaves office in January.
Bin Laden and senior al-Qaida leaders are believed to be in the lawless, former princely state of Swat, in North-West Frontier province, or in areas such as Waziristan in Pakistan's federally administered tribal areas. Their support for Taliban efforts to drive Nato forces out of Afghanistan has brought escalating military and civilian casualties – and pressure from US commanders to strike back across the border.
Afghanistan is now more dangerous for US and British troops than Iraq. And US officials in Baghdad say leaders of al-Qaida in Mesopotamia recently left for Afghanistan, taking new recruits and foreign fighters with them.
Primary US concern, plainly expressed to Gilani at the White House, focuses on the pressing need to stop the aiding and abetting of the Afghan Taliban by Pakistani counterparts and itinerant jihadis. But nagging fears also persist of a major terrorist outrage aimed directly at the US, mounted from the Hindu Kush and coinciding with the presidential election's climax.
"The worst thing that could happen to the US-Pakistani relationship would be another large al-Qaida strike against the US staged from the tribal areas – a possibility that is frighteningly real," the Washington Post said on Saturday. Recognising the situation's political complexity, the paper called for a careful, flexible US response. But it also suggested unilateral US military action, such as last week's CIA Predator drone missile strike on a presumed al-Qaida target deep inside Pakistan, may be necessary and justified.
Pakistani officials complain that Predator attacks – there have been several over the past year – invariably kill civilians and alienate the local population. "The new government [elected earlier this year] has been holding talks with the Islamists. But whenever we seem to be making progress, one of the US drones seems to lose its way. It's perpetually happening," a senior Pakistani official said. "We're saying to the US, now we're a civilian government, please give us time to get results. Drones and gunships will not resolve the issue."
Such arguments are undermined by heavy fighting in the past week in Swat, where a May ceasefire with the Taliban has collapsed, and by US intelligence findings that members of Pakistan's military-run Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate are collaborating with the jihadis and assisted last month's bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul.
This latter claim was initially flatly denied. Later, Pakistan information minister Sherry Rehman admitted: "There are probably still individuals within the ISI who are ideologically sympathetic to the Taliban and act on their own."
Apparently responding to US worries about rogue operations, Gilani's government announced, as he was flying to Washington, that the ISI would be placed under the control of the civilian-led interior ministry. A day later, after the security services reportedly refused point-blank to agree to the change, the government embarrassingly backed down.
These events have underscored US suspicions that Gilani does not control the military and intelligence apparatus put in place by his political enemy and former army chief, Pervez Musharraf, who still holds the presidency. They have also strengthened the hand of those in Washington who, egged on by an increasingly alarmed Indian government and by the beleaguered Karzai, feel the US must take charge.
Unless the political situation turns around dramatically, the extension of the Afghan war into western Pakistani territory now looks highly probable. And while there will be continuing limits on US involvement, those restrictions may become increasingly elastic.
Under discussion now, according to US and Pakistani officials, are plans for the insertion of US-trained Pakistani special forces into the border badlands, backed by US advisers and US air power; the deployment of more sophisticated US-supplied technology and communications equipment; increased intelligence sharing; and greater use, in theoretical consultation with Islamabad, of Predator missile strikes.
The plans are still under discussion. But Congressional threats to withhold military and other funding if Pakistan demurs, and offers of big economic assistance packages if it plays ball, suggest the Americans will get their way.
They should be careful what they wish for. By any measure, this is a fraught undertaking. And given the brutal history of an ungoverned region the British signally failed to tame, the Americans may come to rue the day they crossed the Durand Line.
Simon Tisdall