Only three weeks remain until a U.S. presidential election that may be of huge significance for trans-Atlantic cooperation on peace and security.
The U.S. election pits sitting Vice President Kamala Harris, a Democrat, against former President Donald Trump, the Republican candidate. From the European perspective, Harris represents continuity – the heir to an Atlanticist foreign policy that she has helped President Joe Biden forge and carry out. Although she would invariably make adjustments, it is unlikely that her winning in November would bring fundamental change to trans-Atlantic cooperation. A Trump win, on the other hand, could cause shocks. Transactional in his foreign policy outlook, Trump has long argued that the NATO alliance is a bad deal for the United States, and many of his advisers urge the U.S. to redirect its resources to competing with China. While full withdrawal from NATO is unlikely, a Trump administration could trim U.S. commitments to Europe’s defence, while boosting the morale of far-right European politicians working against a stronger, more integrated Europe.
For many European leaders, it is jarring to think about the erosion of a partnership on which the EU relies to manage the crises that plague its neighbourhood. In all the biggest conflicts in and around Europe, the U.S. is playing a central role. It is a critical supplier of military aid to Ukraine as Kyiv fights to fend off Russian aggression. It has taken the lead in attempting to end the Gaza war and contain spillover elsewhere in the Middle East. Washington has also been out front seeking a settlement to the civil war in Sudan.
But as the following review of the conflict landscape makes clear, none of these efforts has been fully successful, and some have struggled mightily. This mixed record holds a lesson. Regardless of who wins in November, the U.S. will continue to face political and resource constraints that inhibit its effectiveness as a global peacemaker. As I noted in previewing our January 2024 Watch List, the EU and member states have to be clear-eyed about these limitations and their implications for European interests – even as they consider how they can use their own leverage and capacity to help compensate.
A High-Stakes Election for NATO and Ukraine
From the EU’s perspective, the most consequential differences between the two U.S. presidential candidates relate to U.S. support for the NATO alliance and for Ukraine. Trump expresses frustration with the alliance and the EU, suggesting that if European partners do not start spending more, he might “encourage” Russia to attack them. Such talk does not mean that Trump will fully withdraw the U.S. from NATO – an unlikely move given the instability that it could create. But big changes could be in store, as many of his top advisers argue for cutting back U.S. commitments to Europe so as to put more resources toward competing with China. Some potential Trump advisers suggest that the U.S. commitment might be limited to nuclear deterrence, and that Europe’s conventional defence might be left to European states. What precisely that would look like, and how it might affect Europe’s capacity to deter future Russian aggression, are questions that can only worry European capitals.
As for Ukraine’s defence, which is the EU’s immediate peace and security priority, Trump and his running mate JD Vance have said they oppose open-ended support for Kyiv and would press Europe to foot more of the bill. Trump has also claimedthat he could resolve the war in 24 hours. Here he seems to be suggesting he might attempt to strike a deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin (for whom he has repeatedly expressed admiration) over the head of Ukraine’s leadership, threatening to withdraw assistance if Kyiv does not agree. While virtually any settlement to end the war is likely to leave Moscow at least temporarily in control of some of the territory it currently occupies, the worry in Kyiv and EU circles is that a deal negotiated by Trump and Putin might give the latter favourable terms – for example on where the line of separation is drawn, what constraints Ukraine would have to accept on its military capability and what security guarantees Western states would offer Ukraine to deter future Russian attack. Ukrainians and many other Europeans could be left having to fear renewed Russian aggression.
Given the extent to which a Trump presidency could unsettle the status quo, many EU member state leaders would almost certainly prefer to see Harris elected, even if they need to be politic about making that clear. Harris, if elected, will surely seek to maintain support for Ukraine, though the U.S. Congress will constrain what is possible going forward. She will likely be looking for ways to end the war that as much as possible protect Ukraine’s and Europe’s security. That said, regardless of what happens in Ukraine, like previous U.S. presidents, Harris would almost certainly push for greater burden sharing with allies to free up U.S. resources for other priorities, including strategic competition with China.
Following Washington’s Lead in the Middle East
The EU also has an abiding interest in how the next U.S. president will shape policy in the Middle East. Europe’s internal divisions have inhibited its ability to do much more than follow Washington’s lead on how to address the war in Gaza and other conflict spots in the region. This is so even though, due to geography, Middle East instability arguably creates greater costs for Europe than the U.S. When Houthi fighters in Yemen began attacking Red Sea shipping in support of their affiliated group, Hamas, in Gaza, it disrupted cargo traffic and drove up costs on the Europe-Asia route. Refugees fleeing conflicts are more likely to find their way to Europe. Yet, with limited exceptions, such as efforts to reach a settlement in Lebanon (where France has had a major role) or the EU’s deployment of a defensive naval mission in the Red Sea to accompany and protect cargo vessels, the U.S. has been driving policy, with the EU and member states in the back seat and not always in full agreement with the direction of travel.
It has not gone well. The Biden administration’s efforts to encourage a ceasefire in Gaza and stem escalation of the conflict between Israel and Hizbollah have flailed, at least in part because it has been reluctant to use the full weight of its influence over Israel by conditioning military assistance on a Gaza truce. Now Israel has raised the stakes in Lebanon, killing Hizbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah (and other commanders) and moving aheadwith a ground invasion in an attempt to deal the group a crushing blow. Iran, which backs Hizbollah and considers the group its most important regional ally, fired a ballistic missile barrage at Israel on 1 October; Israel is considering its next move. As the parties move up the escalation ladder, there is a growing risk that the conflict expands further and more deeply draws in Iran and the U.S. itself – a scenario Crisis Group warned of in the previous Watch List edition.
Neither Harris nor Trump has set out ideas for solutions that have eluded the present administration, and both would likely continue Washington’s near unconditional support for Israel, though they might differ in approach. Some of Harris’s remarkssuggest she might be firmer in pressing Israel on the need to reach a Gaza ceasefire and wider de-escalation. Her past statements on Iran suggest support for a return to the 2015 nuclear deal. But she has also said “all options are on the table” for stopping Tehran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, and she recently branded Iran the greatest U.S. adversary. As for Trump, he has intimated that Israel has let the Gaza war go on too long, but how that might translate into policy is unclear. As president, Trump was staunchly supportive of Israel – recognising Jerusalem as its capital, endorsing its Golan Heights annexation and brokering normalisation agreements with several Arab countries. He also withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal and heavily sanctioned Tehran. He may greenlight Israeli actions that the Biden administration discouraged, whether strikes on Iran or still harsher tactics in Gaza and Lebanon.
From Bad to Worse in Sudan
Sudan is another war in which Europe follows the U.S. lead, and another example of the ineffectiveness of U.S. peacemaking.
A confrontation between the country’s two most powerful armed actors, the Sudanese army, under General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, has killed tens of thousands, displaced nine million and threatens millions more with starvation (another development we warned about in the previous edition of our EU Watch List). Past U.S. administrations have dealt with Sudan crises with sustained senior-level attention, a signal that they were priorities, but the present administration has done nearly the opposite. It waited too long to appoint an envoy who could corral outside actors to work in concert to press the parties toward peace. Nor has it leaned as heavily as it might have on Gulf Arab security partners who have supported one or other of the belligerents. Part of the problem is political capital: as Washington pursues major-power competition and remains absorbed with conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, it is less likely to press its allies and partners for conflict resolution in Sudan.
Many experts see the Sudan crisis as partly a consequence of U.S. policy drift on the continent. The administration has taken some initiative in Africa: Biden has tried to diversify Washington’s partnerships in sub-Saharan Africa; Secretary of State Antony Blinken has attempted to nudge warring parties in the Great Lakes toward ceasefire agreements; and Harris visited several African countries in 2023 to bolster collaboration. But these efforts do not add up to a robust Africa policy. It is telling that Biden has not gone to Africa during his presidency thus far (a visit to Angola scheduled for October 2024 would have been his first, but the trip has been indefinitely postponed due to Hurricane Milton, which required his attention at home). The same can be said of the U.S. government’s $95 billion foreign aid package adopted in April, which allocates only a tiny portion to Africa, with the bulk going to Ukraine, the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific.
Neither candidate has done much to suggest that a new administration will reverse this trend or throw Washington’s weight behind bringing peace to Sudan. In truth, at least for now, neither the army nor the RSF seems inclined to give peace a chance, meaning that Sudan’s war could rage on in the months ahead.
Is Europe Ready?
With the EU so tethered to struggling U.S. policy, questions about the bloc’s readiness to chart its own course are omnipresent in Brussels. While there are differences between the two presidential candidates, it is increasingly clear that the EU has to take more responsibility for its own security and foreign policy, whoever is in the White House, both for the present and in preparation for a future in which U.S. leaders pursue policies that could leave Europe exposed.
Some of this work has begun. Indeed, the EU’s efforts to strengthen the European pillar of NATO, build a stronger European defence industrial base, develop a more robust foreign policy and deter and respond to economic coercion (through the 2023 establishment of an EU anti-coercion instrument) can be seen through this lens. For the first time, European NATO allies will collectively reach the target of spending 2 per cent of GDP on defence in 2024. More support is also on the way for Ukraine: European policymakers are hoping to set up a loan of up to €35 billion for Kyiv as part of the bloc’s share in a larger planned loan from the G7 before the November U.S. election, using windfall profits from Russian frozen central bank assets in Europe as collateral. Over the long run, this sum will hardly be enough to sustain Ukraine’s war effort, let alone shift the status quo in its favour or ensure long-term deterrence of Russia, especially with the future of U.S. support unpredictable. But Kyiv would at least get some additional financial security, regardless of who wins the U.S. vote.
In addition, European Commission President Ursula Von der Leyen has tasked the incoming EU high representative and the new European defence commissioner with drafting a white paper on the future of European defence. This paper, due shortly after the new U.S. president is inaugurated, could be a vehicle for making adjustments that respond to any dramatic new U.S. policy direction. But no immediate change Europe could make can replace the U.S. security partnership, which remains vital for Europe.
In the event of a Trump presidency, all this work will need to be turbo-charged. While the EU will need to grapple with constants in U.S. foreign policy, regardless of who is in the White House (such as the shift of resources from Europe to Asia, a push for European burden sharing or focus on competition with China), the way a Trump presidency would likely go about these policies would pose particular challenges. The unpredictable nature of Trump’s foreign policy, his transactional focus and his disregard for multilateralism would make it harder for a big bureaucracy with 27 EU member states to adjust. European policymakers worry that a second Trump presidency could put their unity to the test.
Some European policymakers are therefore trying to develop strategies to maintain a united front and keep national leaders from striking deals with Trump on their own terms. They hope to avoid any sense of complacency that the first Trump presidency has sufficiently prepared the EU for a potential second, anticipating that Trump 2.0 could be more directed, disciplined and therefore destabilising than he was the first time around. Close coordination – as well as quick, effective decision-making – will matter if the new U.S. administration pushes for transactional policies that would affect European economic and security interests, for example by trying to push through a Russia-Ukraine peace settlement without consulting Europe (to say nothing of Ukraine) or pressing Europe to increase tariffs on China in exchange for continued support for Kyiv. These scenarios are not certainties but are plausible enough to require serious forethought.
Some politicians in Europe, however, are likely to welcome Trump’s return. Hard-right parties have entered coalition governments in seven EU nations – Croatia, Czechia, Finland, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands and Slovakia. Many of their leaders, such as Viktor Orbán, Giorgia Meloni and Geert Wilders, openly embrace Trump. The far right has also gained ground in France and Germany, weakening governments (and their influence in the EU) that remain important to forging European consensus. A Trump win, former U.S. Ambassador to NATO Ivo Daalder writes, could “further galvanise hard-right parties in Europe and encourage their normalisation”.
It will not help that much of the European Commission leadership will itself be in transition. (Ursula Von der Leyen, who has been elected president for a second term, is an exception.) New commissioners and the new EU high representative will have their confirmation hearings in the European Parliament between 4 and 12 November, just as U.S. voters go to the polls. The new slate of leaders is expected to take office only on 1 December, shortly before the U.S. presidential inauguration in January. While, individually, they are already preparing for their posts and the challenges ahead, they will need to find their footing and figure out how to work together in their new roles in the first months. They could be left scrambling to respond to changes in U.S. policy.
On the EU Watch List
With Brussels immersed in the EU’s own transition and watching anxiously as the U.S. prepares to vote, conflicts and crises around the globe continue unabated. This Watch List update provides a non-exhaustive roster of some – beyond those discussed above – where the EU can play an important part. As always, it attempts to strike a balance between crises high on the EU’s radar and those easily forgotten. In this edition, we focus on Israeli settler violence in the occupied West Bank; Georgia’s democratic backsliding; conflicts in the Central African Republic and Myanmar; and the political crisis in Venezuela. Not all are top political priorities for the EU and member states, but in all their continued work remains critical. From humanitarian aid to long-term assistance, political pressure and continued engagement, Europe can contribute to peace and security in all these places, making a difference for vulnerable people on the ground.