

# Antisemitism in contemporary Great Britain

A study of attitudes towards Jews and Israel

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The **Institute for Jewish Policy Research (JPR)** is a London-based independent research organisation, consultancy and think-tank. It aims to advance the prospects of Jewish communities in the United Kingdom and across Europe by conducting research and informing policy development in dialogue with those best placed to positively influence Jewish life

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## Executive Summary

### The dataset and underlying rationale for this study

This report is based on the largest and most detailed survey of attitudes towards Jews and Israel ever conducted in Great Britain. It harnesses a dataset containing **5,466 observations** to produce insights of direct relevance for Jewish communal discourse and national political debates on antisemitism. The analysis that underpins it is unprecedented in its depth and the amount of detail it provides about the multiple ways in which uneasiness, negativity and hatred towards Jews express themselves.

The strength of analysis offered in this report owes a great deal to the size of the dataset and the detail that it provides, as well as to our determination to let real and very specific concerns and questions about antisemitism inform the line of inquiry. **How much antisemitism *really* exists? Are antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes related, as some think, or are they completely independent of each other, as others maintain? In what parts of society is antisemitism located and how do political and religious groups differ in that respect?**

### The ‘elastic view’

This report introduces a new way to think about the level of antisemitism in a society: **the elastic view**. Antisemitism is an attitude, and like all attitudes, it exists in society at different levels of intensity, and with different shades to it. The elastic view explicitly takes this into account: some people may be strongly antisemitic, others less so; and while still others may not fit into either of these categories, they may still hold certain attitudes – even if these are small in number and weak in intensity – that have the potential to make Jews feel offended or uncomfortable. Thus, no single figure can capture the level of antisemitism in a given society.

Determining what is, and what is not an antisemitic attitude is not always clear. **In keeping with the elastic view**, we draw a critical distinction between **counting antisemites** – i.e. people who are clearly antisemitic – and **measuring antisemitism** – i.e. ideas that are commonly perceived by Jews to be antisemitic. The prevalence of the former is marginal in Great Britain; the prevalence of the latter is rather more common.

### Counting antisemites versus measuring antisemitism

**The existence of strong, sophisticated, perhaps internally coherent and at times even ‘learned’ antisemitism, where open dislike of Jews is combined with developed negative ideas about Jews, does not exceed 2.4% of British adults**, irrespective of the method of measurement used in this analysis. These are people who express multiple antisemitic attitudes **readily and confidently**. An additional 3% of the population of Great Britain can be termed ‘softer’ antisemites, expressing fewer, but nonetheless multiple antisemitic attitudes, often couched in less certain terms. This relatively small group of about 5% of the general population can justifiably be described as antisemites: people who hold a wide range of negative attitudes towards Jews. However, because **antisemitic ideas** circulate in society well beyond this group, there is a much larger number of people who believe a small number of negative ideas about Jews, but who may not be consciously hostile or prejudiced towards them. In total, about 15% of British adults hold two or more of the antisemitic attitudes tested here to some degree at least, and a further 15% of British adults either strongly agree with, or tend to agree with just one antisemitic

attitude. Adding these figures together brings the total prevalence of antisemitic attitudes, at different intensities, to 30% of the adult British population.

**While 30% of British society hold at least one antisemitic attitude, to varying degrees, this emphatically does not mean that 30% of the population of Great Britain is antisemitic.** A majority of people who agreed with just one negative statement about Jews in this survey also agreed with one or more positive statements about Jews, suggesting that the existence of one antisemitic or stereotypical belief in a person's thinking need not indicate a broader, deeper prejudice towards Jews. Rather, the 30% figure captures the current level of the **diffusion of antisemitic ideas** in British society, and offers an indication of the likelihood of British Jews encountering such ideas. Whilst most people included in this 30% are in no way committed political antisemites, they still have an important bearing on how Jews perceive antisemitism, albeit in a very specific way. Most Jews do not come into regular contact with strongly antisemitic individuals. Such people are few in number to start with – the small scope of strong antisemitism in itself limits how frequently these views are encountered. However, what Jews are exposed to far more frequently are people who are not strongly antisemitic, yet who hold, and from time to time may vocalise, views that may make them feel uncomfortable or offended.

The shift in focus from 'counting antisemites' (as implied by identifying the 2%-5% share of 'hard-core' or 'softer' antisemitic people, and labelling them as such) to 'quantifying antisemitism' (as implied by the emphasis on the diffusion of views and ideas) may appear to be subtle, but it is extremely important. Antisemitic ideas are not as marginal in Great Britain as some measures of antisemitism suggest, and they can be held with and without open dislike of Jews. The motivations of those expressing such views may well be benign, and in many instances, they may not even realise that a particular comment or remark might be experienced by Jews as offensive, upsetting or simply uncomfortable, but they can impact significantly on the perceptions, sense of comfort and safety, and, ultimately, the quality of life for Jews in Great Britain. **The probability of encountering such a potentially offensive or, at the very least, uncomfortable view for a British Jewish person, is not one in twenty (as it is when only strongly antisemitic individuals are accounted for) but rather, about one in three.** Thus, the implementation of the elastic view makes anxieties among Jews about widespread antisemitism instantly more understandable.

### **The probability of violence**

**1% of British society believes that violence in defence of their religious or political beliefs and values is "often" justified against Jews,** and a further 3% believe that it is "sometimes" justified. Almost identical results are reported for any justification of violence against Zionists and Israelis. Levels of justification for violence on similar grounds against Muslims are higher (7.5% 'often' and 'sometimes' combined). Against Islamist extremists the equivalent figure is 27%. Against immigrants in general it is 7%, the same level as against banks or big business. **Thus, the position of Jews based on this measure is the least threatened among all of the groups investigated.**

### **The comparatively low levels of antisemitism in Great Britain**

Antisemitism remains high on the agenda of Jewish communal organisations. It is a serious issue from the point of view of the British state and civil society, not

uniquely so, but as part of a broader agenda of trying to maintain harmonious relations in a diverse and diversifying society. With this in mind, it is worth stressing a fact that runs the risk of being understated in a problem-centred report: **levels of antisemitism in Great Britain are among the lowest in the world.** British Jews constitute a religious and ethnic group that is seen overwhelmingly positively by an absolute majority of the British population: **about 70% of the population of Great Britain have a favourable opinion of Jews and do not entertain any antisemitic ideas or views at all.** In this respect, Jews are in a similar position to some other religious minorities, most notably Hindus.

### **Measures of anti-Israel individuals and ‘anti-Israelism’**

The prevalence of **anti-Israel attitudes** was assessed in the survey by an entire battery of questions focusing exclusively on what respondents feel and think about Israel, **independently from what they feel and think about Jews.** Whilst, empirically, all of the anti-Israel statements we tested are considered to be at least ‘probably antisemitic’ by a majority of UK Jews, we did not relate, **in the first instance**, to the question of whether or not they are antisemitic from the perspective of those holding such views. **We found that 12% of the population of Great Britain have ‘hard-core’ negativity towards Israel.** These are people who express multiple anti-Israel attitudes readily and confidently. A further 21% of the population of Great Britain have ‘softer’ negativity towards Israel. They endorse fewer, but nonetheless multiple, anti-Israel attitudes, often couched in less certain terms. Finally, 56% of the general population hold at least one anti-Israel attitude. As with the equivalent measure of antisemitic attitudes, **this does not mean that 56% of the population of Great Britain is anti-Israel;** it rather captures the diffusion of anti-Israel ideas in British society.

Invoking **the elastic view** again infuses these figures with real social meaning. Whilst strong anti-Israel attitudes are held by a distinct minority (about one in ten), the diffusion of anti-Israel attitudes is considerable: over half of British adults holds at least one of the attitudes tested. Given this, any feeling among Jews – many of whom hold Israel dear as part of their Jewish identity – that they are exposed to anti-Israel positions ‘all the time’ becomes immediately comprehensible.

### **The relationship between antisemitism and anti-Israelism**

Traditional antisemitism and anti-Israelism may or may not be related. We approached this question empirically and **correlated the two types of attitudes.** We discovered that **anti-Israel attitudes are not, as a general rule, antisemitic; but the stronger a person’s anti-Israel views, the more likely they are to hold antisemitic attitudes.** A majority of those who hold anti-Israel attitudes do not espouse any antisemitic attitudes, but a *significant minority* of those who hold anti-Israel attitudes hold them alongside antisemitic attitudes. Therefore, **antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes exist both separately and together.**

In numerical terms: **86% of those who do not hold any anti-Israel attitudes do not hold any antisemitic attitudes either; whereas, among those holding a large number of anti-Israel attitudes, only 26% do not hold any antisemitic attitudes.** In sum, among those who are completely free of anti-Israel attitudes, a minority holds antisemitic attitudes, while among those with strong anti-Israel attitudes a majority holds at least one antisemitic attitude. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first robust empirical documentation of the association between these two types of attitudes in the history of this subject that is specific to Great Britain. So, asserting that antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes are unrelated (effectively, that people endorsing harsh critiques of Israel have absolutely nothing against Jews)

would be a misdiagnosis of the situation; equally, maintaining that they are always related (that people endorsing harsh critiques of Israel are necessarily antisemitic) is also wrong.

### **Antisemitism and anti-Israelism among key religious and political sub-groups**

**Levels of antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes among Christians, of whatever denomination and at whatever level of religiosity or practice, are largely in line with levels found in the population of Great Britain in general – neither higher nor lower.** The Christian theological idea that Jews are cursed in some way because they do not believe in Christ is still in circulation among a small minority of Christians, but its current role in feeding antisemitic feelings and thoughts is unclear and probably minimal.

Levels of both antisemitism and anti-Israelism are consistently higher among the Muslim population of Great Britain than among the population in general. **The presence of antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes is 2 to 4 times higher among Muslims compared to the general population.** Non-religious Muslims are the least likely group among all Muslims to hold antisemitic or anti-Israel attitudes, and come closest to the levels found in the general population, although they still remain above average. **Yet most Muslims (60%) – religious or not – agree with the statement ‘A British Jew is just as British as any other person,’ and most either disagree with, or are neutral on, every one of the antisemitic statements presented to them.**

**Levels of antisemitism among those on the left-wing of the political spectrum, including the far-left, are indistinguishable from those found in the general population.** Yet, all parts of those on the left of the political spectrum – including the ‘slightly left-of-centre,’ the ‘fairly left-wing’ and the ‘very left-wing’ – exhibit higher levels of anti-Israelism than average. **The most antisemitic group on the political spectrum consists of those who identify as very right-wing:** the presence of antisemitic attitudes in this group is 2 to 4 times higher compared to the general population. **Although the prevalence of antisemitism on the far-right is considerably higher than on the left and in the political centre, the far-right remains marginal in British politics in general, as well as on the broader political right.**

Political debates both within and beyond the Jewish community often focus on groups perceived as especially antisemitic, but the role of various groups in relation to any phenomenon is not only a matter of the concentration of this phenomenon within these groups, but is also related to the **actual size of the groups within the population** as a whole. Whilst levels of antisemitism in 2017 are significantly lower among the far-left than the far-right, the larger share of the far-left in the population of Great Britain means that the actual numbers of far-left and far-right antisemites are rather similar. However, in general, the relative sizes of the far-right, the far-left and Muslims in British society are quite small. Taking into account both the strength of antisemitism in each group and the sizes of these groups, leads to the conclusion that **the overall ‘responsibility’ of these groups for the total level of the diffusion of antisemitism in Great Britain is, in fact, rather low.** If these groups exhibited the average level of antisemitism found in the population as a whole, rather than the raised levels found in this study, then the proportion of those who hold at least one antisemitic attitude in society as a whole would fall from 30% to 28%, a very insignificant reduction. Similarly, the proportion of those holding multiple and intense antisemitic attitudes would only fall from 3.6% to 3.0%.



## Foreword

JPR has long been engaged in the study of antisemitism, publishing the now discontinued *Antisemitism World Report* for many years, as well as the academic journal *Patterns of Prejudice*. In recent years, we have primarily focused our attention on the study of Jewish people's perceptions and experiences of antisemitism in the wider context of surveying Jewish attitudes, behaviours and beliefs more generally, most notably working with Ipsos MORI to conduct the 2012 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights survey. Yet, as antisemitism has become a growing concern within Jewish circles both in the United Kingdom and abroad, we have felt increasingly compelled to examine it in more detail. We were particularly prompted to do so in the aftermath of the murder of four French Jews at a kosher supermarket in Paris in January 2015, and we published our analysis of existing data on antisemitism at the time in our May 2015 report, *Could it happen here?*

That study found a rather incoherent empirical picture. We found data showing that levels of antisemitism were growing over time, declining over time, and were stable. We found considerable dissonance between anxiety levels among Jews and levels of antisemitic sentiment among non-Jews. We found evidence of antisemitic sentiment declining significantly in France, at precisely the same time as some of the worst attacks on French Jews were carried out since the Second World War. In short, we found a lot of data that were difficult to interpret in any meaningful sense, or that could be easily applied to inform useful policy interventions in this area. Perhaps most critically, we found ourselves in a position where it was difficult to make any definitive empirical statements about antisemitism in the United Kingdom that might have some useful application in any decisions British Jews choose to make about their lives and their futures.

This study is an initial attempt to address these issues. At this stage, it simply offers a detailed snapshot in time. Yet it seeks to be the first in a series of repeat studies that will allow us to accurately determine how antisemitism is evolving in Great Britain over time, and the significance and meaning of any changes observed. It draws heavily on existing approaches to measuring

antisemitism, and in many respects, we stand on the shoulders of researchers from the Pew Research Centre, the Anti-Defamation League and the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights in particular, whose work over many years has had a considerable bearing on this project. At the same time, we have sought to take their work to another level, utilising it to go further and deeper than ever before, in an attempt to develop a far more detailed and nuanced understanding of antisemitism than has ever previously existed.

In developing our plans, we quickly realised that it would be extremely expensive to run the survey we required. Building a study that took into consideration the sensitivity of the topic, the complexities of sampling, and the desire to investigate small groups within the population meant that we would have to identify and secure both the moral and financial support of a considerable number of organisations and individuals in order to achieve our goals. We were extremely fortunate to enlist the support of the Community Security Trust (CST), and particularly of its Chairman, Gerald Ronson CBE, who not only contributed their own funds, but also helped us to approach other donors willing to support our efforts. The CST has also been eager to undertake this type of work and found a willing partner in JPR. Our own Chairman, Stephen Moss CBE, was also centrally involved in helping to fundraise for this work, and contributed personally to the project. In addition, our specific thanks go to the Department for Communities and Local Government, the Kantor Charitable Trust, the Rothschild Foundation Hanadiv Europe, the R and S Cohen Foundation, the Rubin Foundation, the Haskel Family Charities, Sir Mick and Lady Barbara Davis and several other trusts, foundations and individuals who helped to make this project a reality and wish to remain anonymous. We also acknowledge Pears Foundation with gratitude, as ever, for its ongoing financial support, which significantly helps to enhance the scope of all of our work.

During the project development phase, we were also aided by several individuals who brought their expert knowledge and understanding of antisemitism to bear. In particular, Dr Dave Rich and Mark Gardner at the CST helped us to

construct the survey questionnaire, along with Danny Stone MBE and Amy Wagner from the Antisemitism Policy Trust (APT). We drew on the expertise of both organisations because of their longstanding work in this area, and their common desire to understand antisemitism with greater empirical sophistication in the cause of shaping meaningful policy. The team at Ipsos MORI – specifically, Kully Kaur-Ballagan, Hannah Shrimpton and Thomas Weekes – was also extremely helpful in assisting us with shaping and constructing the questionnaire, not to mention running the fieldwork and delivering to us a clean and complete dataset.

However, responsibility for the analysis of that dataset, and the way in which it has been written up, resides solely with JPR and, in particular, our Senior Research Fellow, Dr Daniel Staetsky, who has spent the best part of nine months working on it. This work has been done entirely independently of any views or agendas held by any of the donors or supporters of this project. We have sought to be as objective and empirical as possible, constantly testing our ideas among ourselves, consulting with professional colleagues at the CST, the APT and key experts and advisors on the JPR Board where appropriate, including our main research advisor, Professor Stephen Miller OBE, but ultimately, determining ourselves the content of this report on the basis of our best read of the data. That content was also heavily informed by our ongoing monitoring of the discourse around antisemitism itself, both within the British Jewish community and beyond, and by a strong desire on our part to

bring greater empiricism to the discussion around some of the central questions being debated today.

In producing this report, thanks are due to the wider team at JPR – notably, Richard Goldstein who helped to manage various aspects of the project, and Judith Russell, who edited the manuscript with her usual attention to detail. Catriona Sinclair deserves particular thanks for typesetting this report, and designing the exhibits in ways that will hopefully help to maximise the chances that the ideas contained here are fully understood.

We hope that this study will establish some accurate benchmarks against which to measure antisemitism in Great Britain, in all its various forms and levels of intensity, going forward. Given the extensive lengths we have gone to quantify the phenomenon and test our numbers, we are confident of its empirical accuracy. Whilst this is by no means the final word in the analysis of antisemitic attitudes, we believe it takes a quantum leap forward in research in this area, and sets a new gold standard for its professionalisation in the future. Perhaps most importantly, it demands that such data are analysed soberly and responsibly going forward, with meticulousness, exactitude and circumspection, and in ways that bring meaning to any figures. Such demands should be self-evident in a context of both the widespread concern about antisemitism that exists among Jews, and the continuing need to address it coherently, with accuracy, sensitivity and thoughtfulness.

Dr Jonathan Boyd  
*Executive Director*

## Introduction

This report presents an overview of the scale and nature of antisemitism among the general population of Great Britain. It is based on the largest and most detailed survey of attitudes towards Jews and Israel ever conducted in this country. The analysis that underpins it is equally unprecedented in its depth and the amount of detail it provides about the multiple ways in which uneasiness, negativity and hatred towards Jews express themselves, not only among the general population, but also among key sub-populations who have been found in previous research to harbour particularly hostile views towards Jews.

Research begins where there is insufficient information, or where the quest for information has not produced sufficient results. It seeks to remedy this situation. This study grew out of a sense of dissatisfaction with the current state of scholarship and public debate on the topic of contemporary antisemitism, both in Great Britain and beyond. At first glance, antisemitism is anything but an under-researched subject. The last decade alone has seen several important studies of the topic. Work by academics such as Robert Wistrich, David Nirenberg and Daniel Goldhagen has charted the millennia-long history of antisemitism, seeking to describe, explain and link together its various forms, with a focus on both the fundamental continuity of antisemitism as a type of prejudice, and the transformation of its content over time, in line with changes in cultural and political conditions. In a similar vein, intellectuals and researchers such as Anthony Julius and Dave Rich have documented some of the historical and contemporary aspects of antisemitism in the United Kingdom. Finally, other scholars, for example Clemens Heni, have produced critiques of the contemporary scholarship of antisemitism, exploring its embeddedness in ideological and political agendas. What unites all of these studies is their reliance on historical methods and/or literary criticism. Some also include a significant political and polemical element, which is by no means unusual in this field of knowledge.<sup>1</sup>

1 Goldhagen, D. J. (2013). *The devil that never dies: the rise and threat of global antisemitism*. New York, Boston, London: Little, Brown and Company. Heni, C. 2013. *Antisemitism: a specific phenomenon*. Berlin: Edition Critic. Julius, A. (2010). *Trials of the Diaspora:*

However, none of these was a statistical study. That is to say, none of them relied on an analysis of a large quantity of numerical data, and none produced solid statistical assessments of the phenomenon of antisemitism. Yet it would be imprecise to call the body of scholarship reviewed above non-empirical. To the extent that the materials underlying these studies constitute factual information collected by means of observation, these studies are all empirical in essence. However, the absence of a statistical method within this type of work leaves the reader with a degree of uncertainty about the extent to which the observed phenomena permeate society. This weakness lies precisely where a statistical analysis claims its strength. As the eminent British statistician, A.L. Bowley has noted: “[a scholar] is limited in what he can see, a very small part of one division of the social organism... his knowledge is extended in various ways, but it is in the highest degree improbable that he will not have been biased by the peculiarities of his position, and that he will place his different items of information in the right perspective... In almost all cases, [a statistical estimate] is likely to be more accurate than a casual observer’s impression, and, in the nature of things, can only be disproved by statistical methods.”<sup>2</sup> In short: objectivity, ‘big picture’ and replicability are the advantages of a statistical investigation.

In fairness, it should be said that the study of antisemitism has not altogether escaped statistical analysis. In fact, the opposite is true. As public debate has intensified in the West about multiculturalism, immigration and the place of ethnic and religious minorities in Europe, the prevalence of negativity towards all minorities, including Jews, has become a topic of great interest for politicians, journalists, scholars and society at large. That factor, combined with the significant

*a history of anti-Semitism in England*. New York: Oxford University Press. Nirenberg, D. (2013). *Anti-Judaism: the Western tradition*. New York: W.W. Norton and Company. Rich, D. (2015). *The Left’s Jewish problem: Jeremy Corbyn, Israel and anti-Semitism*. London: Biteback Publishing. Wistrich, R.S. 2010. *A lethal obsession: anti-Semitism from antiquity to the global jihad*. New York: Random House.

2 Bowley, Arthur Lyon. (1901). *Elements of statistics*. London: P.S. King & Son, pp. 8-9.

development of the polling industry thanks to the revolution in computing and communications, has helped to generate a substantial body of knowledge about attitudes towards Jews among the public. Most notably, attitudes towards Jews have been regularly surveyed on a global scale by the Pew Research Center (Pew) as part of its Global Attitudes Project, and by the Anti-Defamation League (ADL). Pew data allow attitudes to Jews to be traced over time, not just in the UK, but in the United States and in selected European countries going back to the early 1990s. Indeed, since 2004, British attitudes to Jews have been surveyed at least eleven times by Pew alone, and the ADL surveyed the prevalence of specific antisemitic ideas and canards in the UK and globally no less than eight times between 2002 and 2015. Furthermore, in 2015 and 2016 alone, at least six surveys of attitudes towards Jews were carried out by polling firms in the UK (including YouGov, Populus, and ICM Unlimited) working on behalf of different academic and advocacy organisations and news outlets. Thus, the polling of antisemitic attitudes is a burgeoning enterprise. The accumulation of quantitative data on this scale could be a very promising development in the study of antisemitism if it was being leveraged to better understand social realities. However, in reality, it is precisely in this respect where survey results are under-used.

A typical commentary on the results of such a survey highlights its main findings, expresses a degree of dismay over the lingering character of antisemitism in society, and emphasises the continuing need to combat it. Rarely does such commentary reach into historical, sociological or political scientific research to enhance its interpretations or to test claims arising from such research. By way of example: two studies – the study of the link between antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes by Kaplan and Small (2006) and the study of the discrepancy between antisemitic acts and attitudes in France by Jikeli (2017), are exceptions to this picture. Both are statistical studies incorporating historical, sociological and policy perspectives.<sup>3</sup> However, in essence,

3 Kaplan, E. and Small, C. (2006). 'Anti-Israel sentiment predicts anti-Semitism in Europe', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50 (4): 548-561. Jikeli, G. (2017). 'Explaining the discrepancy of antisemitic acts and attitudes in 21st century France', *Contemporary Jewry* 32: 257-273., DOI: DOI 10.1007/s12397-017-9221-x.

whilst the numerical realities of antisemitism are reasonably well understood, their social and practical significance is not. For example, English-speaking countries, including the UK, as well as Scandinavian countries, have been shown to have relatively low levels of antisemitism in these types of studies: no more than one in ten individuals in these countries is commonly found to be antisemitic. That finding is often intuitively read as an indication that antisemitism is 'low' in these countries. However, empirically, this view is unmerited. True, *in comparison* to other countries around the world, levels of antisemitism in these places are, indeed, low. Yet international comparisons do not allow us to determine what 'low' and 'high' levels of antisemitism *mean* in an absolute and policy relevant sense – for example, at what levels they may be considered safe, manageable or dangerous for any given population.

The community of scholars of antisemitism, irrespective of their disciplinary background, simply does not have a scale for benchmarking antisemitic attitudes, or a method of determining the levels that represent notable risk or danger to the Jewish community. This situation stands in stark contrast to the measurement of physical phenomena, such as body temperature or blood pressure, where the cut-off points between normality and abnormality are well known and unambiguous. In short, while historical research on antisemitism creates rich worlds of meaning but does not capture these worlds in numerical terms, survey research is abundant in quantification but is too light on social meaning to be of much practical or policy value.

Thus, the challenge of contemporary research into antisemitism is to combine the strengths of both the historical and the statistical approaches to create research products that tell coherent and lucid stories in empirically supportable ways. Such new statistically-supported narratives should be of great value both analytically and in terms of informing policy. These narratives are needed if the social sciences in general, and the study of antisemitism in particular, are to move up a gear in their understanding of social realities and become more 'scientific' in a strict sense – i.e. based on the systematic gathering and analysis of data in a measurable, transparent and replicable manner. And, furthermore, they are needed if the study of antisemitism wishes to remain useful for its

consumers: Jewish and non-Jewish members of the public committed to the wellbeing of Jews, who look to the study of antisemitism to help them to make sense of contemporary political realities.

This disconnect between historical research, statistical approaches and policy uses in the study of antisemitism is not an accident. It is rooted in certain traditions of scholarship in general, where the intellectual endeavours of historians and statisticians rarely cross paths, and where a focus on public policy issues is rarely seen as an imperative in academia. Yet, the integration of these three components is critical in the study of antisemitism if we are to find genuine policy value in new research findings. While a single study cannot transform and re-define the scholarship of contemporary antisemitism, it can begin the much needed process of change. The envisaged outcome of such a long-term journey would be a new scholarship of contemporary antisemitism, where historical insights, statistical methods and policy needs are habitually and harmoniously brought together.

### Open questions explored in this report

Perhaps, most importantly, the statistical study of antisemitism ought to bring some resolution to some of the key areas of debate that have peppered scholarly and Jewish community discourse in recent years. Three such areas are of particular interest in this report:

1. Why the levels of anxiety found within the UK Jewish population about the scale of contemporary antisemitism appear to be so far out of sync with the low levels of antisemitic sentiment observed among the general UK population;
2. Whether anti-Israel/anti-Zionist attitudes are antisemitism in a different guise;
3. Whether antisemitism is more or less prevalent among particular political and religious subgroups commonly accused of heightened levels of it, notably the far-right, the far-left and the Muslim population.

#### 1. Jewish anxieties and the observed levels of antisemitism: at cross-purposes?

Surveys of attitudes towards Jews have repeatedly shown that antisemitism in the UK remains

relatively low when compared to other European countries. For example, in its global survey in 2014, the Anti-Defamation League found only two out of thirty-four European countries to have lower levels of antisemitism than the UK. These findings are corroborated by the 2012 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights survey of Jewish experiences and perceptions of antisemitism: contrasted with other European Jewish populations, UK Jews are the least worried about antisemitism in their country. Thus, in relative terms, Jewish and non-Jewish perspectives are well aligned. However, in absolute terms, within the British context, they are considerably less so. According to previous Pew surveys, about 7% to 8% of the general population of the UK hold unfavourable opinions about Jews, and the situation has remained at this level since the early 1990s. However, nearly 50% of UK Jews perceive antisemitism to be a problem in the UK, two-thirds believe it to be on the increase, and about 20% report being subjected to antisemitic harassment on an annual basis.<sup>4</sup> Further, the sheer scope of research into antisemitism over the past twenty years or so is indicative of the extent to which it is a matter of considerable communal concern. Marginal topics simply do not generate research activity on this scale. So how does one explain the dissonance between the apparently low levels of antisemitism and the apparently high levels of anxiety about it? Are Jews and non-Jews fundamentally at cross-purposes in relation to antisemitism? Is the Jewish view disproportionate in relation to the real extent of the problem of antisemitism? Could it be that it is coloured by past events, particularly memories of the Holocaust, or by current events, particularly terrorist attacks against Jewish targets in other parts of Europe? Alternatively, could it be that the Jewish perspective is affected by the development of modern communications, including social media, that tend to heighten knowledge and awareness of issues that would have been less noticeable in the past? Or is there something fundamentally flawed in these social scientific measurements of antisemitism that fails to adequately capture what is really going on?

4 Boyd, J. and Staetsky, L. Daniel. (2015). *Could it happen here? What existing data tell us about contemporary antisemitism in the UK*. London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research.

In seeking to address these questions, we undertook a detailed study of the spread and intensity of various antisemitic ideas and attitudes, and developed what we subsequently called an ‘*elastic view*’ of antisemitism – i.e. multiple ways of measuring the extent to which antisemitic attitudes permeate society. This ‘*elastic view*’ has arisen based on two critical insights. First, research questions on opinions about religious, ethnic and racial groups are *sensitive*. They are politically charged and may be considered offensive by some survey respondents, and thus they raise concerns about the honesty of people’s responses. They are also often based on an assumption that interviewees possess quite an advanced degree of knowledge and opinion on a given subject matter, whereas, in reality, they may know little, if anything, about it. There is a vast academic literature providing examples of the ways in which sensitivity and genuine lack of opinion interfere with proper measurement.

Second, at an individual level, antisemitism is an attitude. Attitudes are states of mind and emotions. By definition, they are rich and complex, so any measurement of attitudes ought to take into account their inherently multifaceted nature. Any attempt to measure antisemitic attitudes based on a single survey question – for example, a question measuring respondents’ degree of favourability or unfavourability towards Jews – is likely to be insufficient when it comes to capturing the complexity inherent within people’s perspectives and opinions. However, even when one introduces a greater degree of complexity into the measurements of an individual’s perspectives, there is also the important issue of how to utilise these to understand antisemitic attitudes at a *societal* level. Some people ‘somewhat agree’ with one single antisemitic idea, others feel more strongly about a few ideas, still others subscribe to a full and impassioned antisemitic worldview. Yet typically, quantitative accounts of antisemitism generate a single measurement, in the style of *x%* of the population is antisemitic; *y%* is not, based on some working definition of who is an antisemite. That working definition often treats some arbitrary attribute, e.g. a certain number of antisemitic statements endorsed by an individual, or the expression of unfavourable views about Jews, as the core feature in defining that individual as antisemitic. In this way, their findings amount to ‘counting antisemites,’ rather than quantifying

the prevalence of antisemitic attitudes in society. This practice of counting antisemites may be adequate for quantifying how many hard-core antisemites exist in a given society, but it falls short of being able to describe the *diffusion* of antisemitic ideas in society. From a Jewish perspective, however, measuring the extent of the diffusion of ideas that may be hurtful, offensive, or simply uncomfortable, is no less important than capturing the concentration, i.e. the proportion of indisputably antisemitic people. Indeed, the degree of diffusion may be quite critical for understanding the extent to which Jews are exposed to antisemitic messages in their daily life, which may well be what colours their impressions about the extent to which antisemitism is a problem.

In thinking about how to measure the prevalence of antisemitism in Great Britain, we have adopted a flexible view of this phenomenon, that allows for the varying intensity of attitudes and emotions, as well as the circumstances under which these were measured. By working in this way, we take an important step forward in understanding both the shades of antisemitic attitudes in the country, and why levels of anxiety among Jews appear to be so out of sync with levels of antisemitic sentiment in British society.

## **2. Antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes: two sides of the same coin?**

Does criticism of Israel – particularly in its most harsh manifestations – constitute a ‘new antisemitism’? Most British Jews reject the notion that simple criticism of Israel is antisemitic, but maintain that it becomes so when it manifests itself in particular ways. By and large, mainstream scholarship of contemporary antisemitism maintains that there is a connection, or continuity, between the two types of attitudes, but there are dissenting voices. Many commentators have highlighted the presence of old antisemitic ideas, imagery and styles in anti-Zionist and some anti-Israel texts and activities, and have argued that such similarities and parallels justify their characterisation as a ‘new antisemitism.’<sup>5</sup> Those

5 The idea of continuity is present in the works of such scholars as Anthony Julius, Daniel Goldhagen and Robert Wistrich, all referenced in full in footnote 1. Other examples include: Porat, D. (2005). ‘The “New Anti-Semitism” and the Middle East’, *Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics, Economics and Culture*, 12 (2&3)

who challenge this view commonly maintain that any characterisation of anti-Israel/anti-Zionist attitudes as antisemitic is simply a rhetorical device designed to justify Israeli government policy, deflect substantive political criticism and de-legitimise political opposition.<sup>6</sup>

Neither school of thought is devoid of logic or intellectual appeal. The proponents of the ‘new antisemitism’ thesis have a point, given that animosity towards Jews has been known to mutate and develop culturally acceptable forms in the past, well before the establishment of the State of Israel and without any connection to it. For instance, the Christian belief in supersessionism – the replacement of Jews by Christians, and of the Hebrew Bible (the Old Testament) by a new covenant (the New Testament) – became significantly less popular in parts of Europe as the power of religious belief decreased during the Enlightenment. Yet the advancement of secularisation did not end hostility towards Jews. Nationalism and science engendered new forms of enmity towards Jews, based on exclusive nationalistic ideological ideas and racial theory, employing the term ‘antisemitism’ for the first time. These forms, which were still relatively new in the 1930s and 1940s, underpinned the Holocaust. Thus, antisemitism is clearly capable of mutating, and it can be argued that it has mutated again more recently from racial antisemitism to a fierce form of anti-Israelism. Today, most British Jews consider Israel to be a central part of

their Jewish identity,<sup>7</sup> and thus many experience hostility towards Israel – particularly in its most virulent forms against the State itself as opposed to simple criticism of specific governmental policies<sup>8</sup> – as antisemitic. Many similarly maintain that a specific rejection of Zionism, independent of any broader rejection of self-determination in all forms, is discriminatory. As Natan Sharansky has argued in a famous essay outlining his ‘3D test’ of antisemitism: “When the Jewish state is being demonised; when Israel’s actions are blown out of all sensible proportion; when comparisons are made between Israelis and Nazis and between Palestinian refugee camps and Auschwitz – this is antisemitism, not legitimate criticism of Israel ... When criticism of Israel is applied selectively; when Israel is singled out by the United Nations for human rights abuses while the behaviour of known and major abusers, such as China, Iran, Cuba, and Syria, is ignored ... this is antisemitism... when Israel’s fundamental right to exist is denied – alone among all peoples in the world – this too is antisemitism.”<sup>9</sup>

Yet the arguments of those who question this thesis are not without merit either. They maintain that Zionism itself – which assumes that the Jews constitute a nation – and the establishment of a Jewish State in that nation’s ancestral homeland, are not uncontroversial ideas. Indeed, some Jews today, and rather more in nineteenth and early twentieth century Europe, disputed these ideas themselves. So the idea that hostility towards Israel and/or opposition to Zionism can be equated with antagonism towards Jews is certainly open to debate. Indeed, as Brian Klug has written, “To argue that hostility to Israel and hostility to Jews are one and the same thing is to conflate the Jewish State with the Jewish people. In fact, Israel is one thing, Jewry another. Accordingly, anti-Zionism is one thing, antisemitism another. They are separate. To say they are separate is not to say that they are never connected. But they are

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and Sharansky, N. (2004). ‘3D Test of Anti-Semitism: Demonization, Double Standards, Delegitimization’, *Jewish Political Studies Review* 16: 3-4.

- 6 Klug, B. (2004). ‘The Myth of the New Anti-Semitism’, *The Nation*, February 2 issue; Ali, T. ‘Notes on Anti-Semitism, Zionism and Palestine’, *Counterpunch*, March (2004). <http://www.counterpunch.org/2004/03/04/notes-on-anti-semitism-zionism-and-palestine/>; Finkelstein, N. (2005). *Beyond Chutzpah: On the Misuse of Antisemitism and the Abuse of History* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press); Lerman, A. The ‘New-Antisemitism’, Centre for Research on Migration, Refugees and Belonging Discussion Paper Series, September (2015). David Hirsh’s term describing the extremely negative reaction to equating anti-Zionism and antisemitism is the ‘Livingstone formulation’, see Hirsh, D. (2010). ‘Accusations of malicious intent in debates about the Palestine-Israel conflict and about antisemitism’, *Transversal*, 1/2010. University of Graz.

7 See: Graham, D. and Boyd, J. (2010). *Committed, concerned and conciliatory: The attitudes of Jews in Britain towards Israel. Initial findings from the 2010 Israel Survey*. London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research.

8 See: Staetsky, L. Daniel, and Boyd, J. (2014). *The Exceptional Case? Perceptions and experiences of antisemitism among Jews in the United Kingdom*. London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research.

9 See footnote 5 for reference.

independent variables that can be connected in different ways.”<sup>10</sup>

The debate between these two positions has gone on for many years, yet, to date, empirical research has been scant. In a paper published in 2006 in *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Kaplan and Small proved the existence of the association between anti-Israel and antisemitic attitudes in a large European sample resulting from the Anti-Defamation League survey of antisemitism.<sup>11</sup> In our study, we explore the connection between anti-Israel and antisemitic attitudes in detail and specifically in the British context. We do that by means of an overlap test, which involves simple cross-tabulations and tests of any association between antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes – in essence, an examination of whether those holding particular anti-Israel attitudes are more likely or not to simultaneously hold traditional antisemitic attitudes. In this way, this study provides an answer to the question of the connection between antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes both at a national level and among different subgroups.

### **3. The relative importance of antisemitism among key sub-groups: the far-right, the far-left, Christians and Muslims**

Are antisemitic ideas more prevalent than average among certain subgroups within British society? In historical scholarship on the subject, the most virulent forms of antisemitism have found a home among several key groups. In pre-modern Europe, it was often found within Christianity, shaped by the Christian ideas of supersessionism and the continuing charge of deicide against Jews of all successive generations that, over time, served to demonise both Jews and Judaism. The worst consequences of this have been well-documented in the historical literature: blood libels, forced conversions, expulsions, violence and murder. Today, antisemitism in these quarters is far less pronounced; indeed, significant attempts have been made by Christian leaders to rid its theology of any trace of antisemitism, including, most notably, *Nostra Aetate*, by Pope Paul VI in 1965. Historically, Jews fared somewhat better under Islamic rule, although they typically held a diminished place in Muslim society too. Yet,

as Pew Research Centre and ADL data show, antisemitic attitudes have become remarkably common within majority Muslim countries today,<sup>12</sup> and classic antisemitic tropes such as the existence of a global Jewish conspiracy or accusations of demonic behaviours by Jews based on medieval myths, are often peddled. Unbridled criticism of Israel and fierce rejection of Zionism are rife, so much so that once thriving Jewish communities in Muslim countries have now largely migrated, or fled, elsewhere.

On the political spectrum, antisemitism has typically taken root at the extremes – on the far-right and the far-left. On the far-right, it has been driven by nationalistic and xenophobic ideas, sometimes disguised under the cloak of scientific and other forms of academic evidence. Again, the results are well-known: discrimination, hate crime, violence, and, in its worse excesses, genocide. The far-right in the United Kingdom has been largely relegated to the fringes of society in recent decades, although concerns about it persist. Antisemitism on the far-left has often been informed by certain interpretations of universalistic, atheist and anti-capitalist ideals that leave little room for any forms of particularism and often end up stigmatising Jews – and, more commonly, Israel and Zionism – as corrupting, exploitative and colonialist forces. In its worst excesses, under communist regimes, Jews, like many others, were commonly denied the right to practise their religion and the right to emigrate, as well as accused of long-term conspiratorial plots to undermine the ruling elite, and were imprisoned and even sentenced to death for their supposed ‘crimes.’ In recent times, the relationship between much of the UK Jewish community and the Labour Party has deteriorated rather dramatically, as several party leaders, members and activists have made statements many Jews considered to be offensive, if not blatantly antisemitic. The result is that levels of Jewish support for the Labour Party fell to an estimated 15% in the May 2015 general election (compared to 64% for the Conservatives) and an estimated 7% a year later (compared to

12 Attitudes towards Jews in majority Muslim countries and among Muslims in the West have been extensively documented by Pew Research Center as part of its Global Attitudes Project (see, for example, <http://www.pewglobal.org/files/pdf/253topline.pdf>) and Anti-Defamation League Global 100 surveys (<http://global100.adl.org/#country/united-kingdom/2015>).

10 <https://www.thenation.com/article/myth-new-antisemitism/>

11 See footnote 3.



67% for the Conservatives),<sup>13</sup> whereas support for both parties had been found to be at similar levels to each other just five to ten years earlier.

Thus, if we are to develop a sophisticated understanding of contemporary antisemitism, there is a continuing need to investigate attitudes within each of these parts of contemporary society. Indeed, it was this historical context that informed how the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) examined who was perpetrating antisemitic hate crime, discrimination and harassment. Its 2012 study allowed victims and witnesses of antisemitic incidents to identify the perpetrator on the basis of several key identifiers, including these four: someone with a left-wing political view; someone with a right-wing political view; someone with a Muslim extremist view; and someone with a Christian extremist view.

The findings from that FRA survey demonstrated that Jews in Great Britain have experienced antisemitic harassment and violence from each of these four groups in recent years, albeit to rather different extents. These data indicate that the most concern exists about Muslims and the far-left; it is considerably less pronounced about Christians and the far-right. Yet, certainly, there is reason to justify the examination of each of these groups. Given recent concerns about antisemitism in the Labour Party, there is a strong case for looking closely at the far-left, and given several high-profile terrorist attacks on Jewish targets in France, Belgium and Denmark in recent years, there is clear reason for an examination of at least parts of the Muslim population. The case for the far-right is strong too, given its specific legacy of antisemitism. Among British Christians, the case is rather weaker. However, bearing in mind the historical place of Christian theology in the development of antisemitism, there is clear value in establishing some benchmarks against which to measure

antisemitism going forward. Critically, however, our efforts here seek not to stigmatise any of these groups – on the contrary, this study is designed to bring empiricism and nuance to the discourse about each of them, so that one can speak with greater clarity and precision about these parts of society, rather than make sweeping generalisations about them as a whole.

For all of these reasons, this report aims to document the scope of antisemitism in different corners of the British social and political map. Are common perceptions and characterisations among Jews well supported by empirical data? Which groups demonstrate heightened levels of antisemitism? Is the far-left today more antisemitic than the far-right or vice versa? And, importantly, whilst certain groups may be especially antisemitic, to what extent are they responsible for the total volume of antisemitism in society? This study is designed to explore these questions.

### Technical note

This report is based on the survey of attitudes towards Jews and Israel in Great Britain, which was carried out by JPR in 2016/17. This survey was conducted both online and face to face and two samples were combined into a single dataset at the stage of analysis. This design reflected the dedication of the analysts involved in its development to sound scientific methodology and, simultaneously, an aspiration to create a large sample for detailed analysis at an affordable cost. All substantive conclusions of this study hold good in the context of the face to face and the online samples. Further details can be found in the methodology section of this report.

Unless otherwise stated, analyses at the level of the general population presented in this report were carried out on the dataset of 4,005 observations, which combined the face to face and the online samples.

<sup>13</sup> *Survation/Jewish Chronicle* May 2016 survey of 1,008 British Jews.

## Jews in the eyes of the population of Great Britain

How common are negative thoughts and feelings about Jews in contemporary Britain? In this and the next section, we investigate the range and extent of antisemitic attitudes among the population of Great Britain. We do this not only by sharing the fundamental findings, but also by investigating how different ways of asking survey questions and different methods of analysis result in different answers to the question of the prevalence of antisemitism in British society. Through this process, our analysis moves from the standard existing approach of ‘counting antisemites’ towards a new approach of ‘quantifying antisemitism,’ thereby providing an ‘elastic’ view of it. This does greater justice to the subject and helps to explain why Jewish and non-Jewish perspectives on antisemitism appear to be so far out of sync in existing data, which was one of the fundamental questions underpinning this study.

### Unfavourable opinions of Jews: prevalence, context and ambiguities


The most straightforward approach to clarifying the extent of negativity towards Jews is by presenting people with a direct question about their opinion of Jews, and allowing them to express a ‘favourable’ or ‘unfavourable’ view, in line with an established tradition of measuring attitudes. A simple inquiry of this kind leads to the conclusion that unfavourable attitudes towards Jews are, distinctly, a minority view

(Figure 1). About 5% of the population of Great Britain declared that their opinion of Jews is either ‘somewhat unfavourable’ (3%) or ‘very unfavourable’ (about 2%). By contrast, a large minority of the British population has a favourable opinion of Jews (39%), although the majority, in fact, chooses to express neither a positive nor a negative opinion (47%), or does not know what their opinion is (9%).

Looking at attitudes to Jews in their broader context, rather than in isolation, provides an additional insight. Examined on their own, unfavourable attitudes to Jews are low in prevalence. However, this characterisation is largely intuitive, based on widely shared popular ideas of what constitutes ‘high’ or ‘low’ proportions in relation to political and social views. In essence, unfavourability at a level of 5% *feels* low. Thus, benchmarking this figure against other groups is an additional way to interpret the severity and social significance of unfavourability towards Jews.

Figure 1 shows that popular attitudes toward Jews are very similar to attitudes toward Hindus and are somewhat more favourable than attitudes towards Muslims. In total, about 40% have a favourable opinion of Jews and Hindus and 35% have a favourable opinion of Muslims; about 5% have an unfavourable opinion of Jews and Hindus and 14% have an unfavourable opinion of Muslims. Of all religious groups, Christians

Figure 1. Opinions held by the population of Great Britain about Jews and other religious groups



Notes: Face to face sample, N=900. Due to rounding, percentages may not always add up to 100%. Question: Please tell me if you have a very favourable, somewhat favourable, somewhat unfavourable or very unfavourable opinion of (Jews, Muslims, Christians, Hindus)

are seen unfavourably by the smallest proportion of people (3%). Thus, in this hierarchy of favourability, Christians come first as the most favourably viewed group in Great Britain, perhaps unsurprisingly given the Christian heritage of the country, but they are followed quite closely by Jews and Hindus, with little distinction between them. Muslims come last.

A typical commentary on survey results of this kind would probably reiterate that positivity and indifference are the two most dominant sentiments towards religious minorities and stop there. Such a commentary would not be without good cause: after all, positive and neutral attitudes are indeed numerically dominant. However, in this study, this type of conclusion constitutes our starting point. Instead of summing up on this rather upbeat note, we ask whether or not this conclusion has genuine merit.

The reason for asking this question is as follows. Attitudes towards ethnic and religious groups are a sensitive topic in contemporary Britain and elsewhere in the West. As a general rule, negativity towards certain groups is not a sentiment that is easily admitted to and/or readily expressed. There is often a degree of apprehension about holding and vocalising indiscriminate negativity towards whole groups defined by religion, ethnicity or lifestyle. Within the context of this survey, that means that the respondents may have been somewhat cautious about revealing the true nature of their feelings toward certain groups, and may have given responses that were socially acceptable instead, i.e. responses that were unlikely to result in them being negatively judged. In survey science jargon the outcome of such under-reporting is called *social desirability bias*. The presence of such bias would mean that the survey might produce lower levels of unfavourability towards various religious and ethnic groups than the levels that exist in reality.<sup>14</sup> Additionally, people differ in their degree of involvement in political debates, and significant proportions may not have particularly well-formed opinions on certain political matters. Thus, their responses may reflect a genuine lack of knowledge or opinion. Equally, some individuals may hold rather weak opinions and preferences that are not invoked immediately

by a particular survey question. In short, both social desirability bias and a lack of ready opinion can create a large proportion of respondents whose attitudes are ‘neither favourable nor unfavourable’, as is clearly the case here.<sup>15</sup>


There is no definitive method of revealing the true scope of a group’s unfavourability in surveys of this kind, but some measures can be taken to remove part of the impact of social desirability and any lack of a ready opinion. The results reported above are based on an especially ‘generous’ question, which offered seven response options in total, including three ‘opt-out’ possibilities (‘neither favourable nor unfavourable’; ‘don’t know’; and ‘refused’). Respondents who genuinely were not sure about the true nature of their feelings, or were uncomfortable with expressing them, could have chosen any of these options, and indeed a very large proportion – almost 56% in relation to Jews – opted to do so. Thus, arguably, to investigate the scope of any latent negativity towards Jews and other religious groups, a different version of the question is required, with fewer opt-out possibilities. This technique was implemented experimentally in this survey: a subsample of survey respondents was offered a version of the question with fewer opt-out possibilities. This type of question is also known as a ‘forced response’ one. The respondents in the subsample could still refuse to answer the question or they could use the ‘don’t know’ option, but the neutral option (‘neither favourable nor unfavourable’) was not offered (see Figure 2).<sup>16</sup>

15 For the issues associated with uses and meaning of the mid-point (neutral) category in surveys of attitudes see Sturgis, P., Roberts, C., and Smith, P. (2014). Middle alternatives revisited: how the neither/nor response acts as a way of saying “I don’t know”, *Sociological Methods and Research*, 43 (1): 15-38, and references therein.

16 A point of clarification is in order here. This survey was conducted both online and face to face and two samples were combined into a single dataset at the stage of analysis. Although, theoretically, implementing a more restrictive, or forced, version of a question is conducive to a less inhibited responses, the second version of the ‘favourability’ question was addressed to the online panel. The subsample of respondents originating from the online panel is different from the subsample of respondents originating from the face to face sample in three ways: (1) the nature of the universe from which the sample is extracted; (2) the method of sampling; and (3) the mode

14 Tourangeau, R. and Yan, T. (2007). ‘Sensitive questions in surveys’, *Psychological Bulletin* 133 (5), pp. 859-883.

Figure 2. Opinions held by the population of Great Britain about Jews and other religious groups – an alternative view



Notes: Online sample, N=1,001. Due to rounding, percentages may not always add up to 100%.  
Question: see a note to the previous exhibit.


Changing the response options in this way did not affect the hierarchy of favourability of religious groups: Christians still featured as the most favourably viewed group, followed by Jews and Hindus (with no difference between the two) and then Muslims. However, the change did affect the *level* of favourability for each group. Those who would have been inclined to declare neutrality, had such an option existed, could not do so, so they effectively had to redistribute themselves between the non-neutral response

of interviewing. Online panels, as is known from existing research, are selective in relation to the general population; samples originating from online panels are not taken at random with known probabilities of inclusion, so they can be affected by certain selectivity present in panels. For example, online panels may contain a larger proportion of educated and politically aware people, in comparison to the general population of Great Britain. Further, in the online mode of interviewing, the questionnaire is completed without any interaction with an interviewer. The presence of an interviewer is a major factor suspected of contributing to social desirability bias in the context of face to face interviewing; thus revealing one's true feelings towards religious groups may be easier in online mode due to the absence of an interviewer. However, in this particular case, neither panel selectivity nor the difference in the mode of data collection is suspected of having significantly impacted on responses. Certain questions in the survey were asked in exactly the same manner in the face to face and online samples, and the answers provided by both samples were very close. So, while the impact of the online sample selectivity and mode of interviewing cannot be ruled out, they are very likely to be of minimal importance in the big picture of this study. For further details, please refer to the methodological appendix of this report.

categories or select the Don't know/refused option. Most of these people declared a positive opinion but a minority expressed a negative one. As a result, the proportion of those holding an unfavourable opinion of all religious groups was two to three times higher in the 'forced' version of the question than in the non-forced version: about 13% had an unfavourable opinion of Jews and Hindus, 10% had an unfavourable opinion of Christians and 34% had an unfavourable opinion of Muslims. Nevertheless, in relation to Jews, a very significant majority held a positive opinion (almost 70%) even under the conditions of 'forced response.' The same was true of Hindus. Muslims were the only group in relation to whom the prevalence of positivity (47%) did not reach a numerical majority.

Given these findings, at a societal level, the prevalence of unfavourability towards Jews could be usefully presented as a continuum, rather than as a dichotomy. Hard-core negativity towards Jews is rare: no more than 2.4% of the population of Great Britain today holds a strongly unfavourable opinion of Jews. A further 3% holds a somewhat unfavourable opinion of Jews that they are prepared to reveal even when 'opt-out' options are offered. Thus, their negativity is well defined. Together, these groups amount to 5.4%. Finally, for an additional 7.2%, negativity towards Jews is probably best understood as latent, revealed only when the respondents have relatively little choice. Together, all three groups, marked by varying intensities of anti-Jewish attitudes, amount to 12.6% of the population. We call this conceptualisation *an elastic view* of the prevalence

Figure 3. Unfavourable opinion of Jews: an elastic view



of antisemitism. Figure 3 presents an illustration of this elastic view, based on the considerations presented above. The largest circle represents the entire adult population of Great Britain (100%). All groups holding an unfavourable opinion of Jews are colour-coded: the hard-core group is shown in red, and the softer and latent types, as described above, are in lighter shades. Under this analysis, the dominant finding is that the majority of British adults (87.4%) holds a positive opinion of Jews or no view at all: almost 70% have a positive opinion and just under 20% have no view. These groups, in combination, are located in the area of the exhibit shaded in blue.


Should the 12.6% figure be the final and maximal estimate of the extent to which unfavourable attitudes towards Jews exist in Great Britain? The estimate is based on a question designed to minimise the presence of social desirability bias and uncertainty, yet even this question rendered a rather high proportion of people who refused to answer it or gave a 'Don't know' response (19.4%). Is it possible that some undeclared negativity towards Jews might be present in this group of people? Might some within this group choose not

to reveal some negativity by opting for the 'Don't know' option?

Such a suspicion is reasonable, but the impact of such behaviour on the estimate of the general scale of unfavourable attitudes to Jews is likely to be small, based on what is known about the possible magnitude of the impact of social desirability in different contexts. First, questions on group relations and attitudes are considerably less sensitive than, for example, questions on substance abuse or sexual behaviour, and in relation to the most sensitive questions on the latter, the average level of underreporting has been found to be around 30%.<sup>17</sup> Second, the findings of this survey align well with the findings obtained by other surveys, conducted by various methods, as is shown in Figure 4 where both estimates of unfavourability towards Jews obtained in this survey are set against the backdrop of several recent surveys conducted by other organisations

<sup>17</sup> Tourangeau, R. and Yan, T. (2007). 'Sensitive questions in surveys', *Psychological Bulletin* 133 (5), pp. 859-883. Krysan, M. (1998). 'Privacy and the expression of White Racial attitudes: a comparison across three contexts', *Public Opinion Quarterly* 62, pp. 506-544.

Figure 4. Negative/unfavourable opinions held by the population of Great Britain about Jews: cross-survey comparison



Notes: See notes to Figures 1 and 2 for explanations about the JPR antisemitism survey.

The comparator surveys are:

1. YouGov/*Sunday Times* survey, January 2016, N=1,647. Question: Generally speaking, would you say, you have a positive or a negative opinion of Jewish people in Britain today? (A very positive; a fairly positive; a fairly negative; a very negative; Don't know).
2. YouGov/Eurotrack survey, May 2015, N=1,667. Question: Do you have a positive or negative impression of the Jewish people? (Very positive; fairly positive; neither positive nor negative; fairly negative, very negative, Don't know).
3. Pew Center Global Attitudes Surveys, Spring 2016, N=1,460. Question: I'd like you to rate some different groups of people in the UK according to how you feel about them. Please tell me whether your opinion is very favourable, mostly favourable, mostly unfavourable or very unfavourable (Jews).

that asked similar questions. Some of the surveys were conducted by telephone on randomly drawn samples (Pew Global Attitudes survey), others on samples derived from online panels (YouGov surveys). The two estimates from the JPR survey set the boundaries of the lowest and the highest levels of the prevalence of unfavourable attitudes to Jews. It is clear, considering all available estimates, that the estimates of the prevalence of negativity towards Jews vary in rather narrow boundaries: the minimum recorded level is 5.4%, while the maximum level is 12.6%.

Thus, with different questions (with more or fewer 'opt-out' options), different samples (random and based on selective panels), and different survey modes (telephone, face to face and online), the estimated level of unfavourability towards Jews lies in the range of 5.4% to 12.6%. The fundamental conclusion presented earlier, that unfavourable attitudes towards Jews in the UK is a minority phenomenon, remains unchanged. Yet the real social meaning of this level – i.e. is it dangerous for the Jewish population of the country, or what level does it have to reach to become socially or politically problematic or dangerous – remains unclear. If research findings are to be of value in policy

terms, it is critical that they are infused with social significance.

### Specific ideas and images of Jews held by the population of Great Britain

What are the specific ideas about Jews that are held by the population of Great Britain? As previously stated, attitudes in general, and anti-Jewish attitudes in particular, are not limited to simple emotional characterisations, such as those captured by the favourable to unfavourable scale discussed previously. They are complex, and a more complete picture of antisemitism in Great Britain can only arise from a more detailed exploration of the broad field of emotions and ideas concerning Jews. People may have a favourable or unfavourable opinion of Jews, but they may also have absorbed some specific ideas about what Jews are or are not in terms of their patterns of behaviour, their loyalties, or their political tendencies. Accounting for all these ideas in the measurement of the prevalence of antisemitism is important not just for the sake of theoretical completeness and scientific rigour, but also for the quality of any insight into existing social reality. In social encounters, antisemitic attitudes may be expressed in different forms and

it is impossible to understand Jewish anxieties without understanding the multiplicity of antisemitic forms that exist and their prevalence in British society. The study of antisemitism and the policy uses of any research findings may be better served not by enumerating how many antisemites exist, but by quantifying the spread of antisemitic ideas and imagery, thereby treating society, rather than an individual, as a unit of analysis. In this section, the first steps are taken in this direction.

What constitutes an antisemitic idea? Some ideas are known to resonate with Jews as antisemitic, and this study adopts a Jewish perspective on what constitutes antisemitism as its starting point. This perspective arises from the recent survey of Jewish perceptions and experiences of antisemitism, sponsored by the European Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA 2012 survey). In this survey, a large sample of Jews in the UK was offered a selection of views that some non-Jews are known to hold about Jews (based on existing research), and asked whether they consider these views to be antisemitic. 80% of British Jews considered Holocaust denial and trivialisation to be definitely antisemitic. 65-75% of British Jews thought that non-Jews saying that Jews have ‘too much power’ in British politics, or the media or economy, or placing blame on Jews for the economic crisis at that time, were definitely antisemitic. Certain other ideas considered by a majority of Jews to be definitely antisemitic included thinking that Jews in Britain are not really British, or are not capable of integrating into British society. Yet some ideas were only regarded to be antisemitic by a minority of Jews: e.g. non-Jews always noting Jews among their acquaintances; non-Jews saying they would not marry a Jew; or non-Jews criticising Israel.<sup>18</sup>

On the basis of this understanding, respondents to this survey were invited to agree or disagree with nine specific statements about Jews, seven of

18 Staetsky, L.D. and Boyd, J. (2014). *The Exceptional Case? Perceptions and experiences of antisemitism among Jews in the United Kingdom*. London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research. It is important to note that most Jews did not find criticism of Israel *per se* to be antisemitic, but a majority did find certain manifestations of that criticism to be antisemitic, namely support for boycotts of Israeli goods/products and the claim that Israelis behave ‘like Nazis’ towards Palestinians.


which were defined by a majority of Jews in the FRA survey as prejudicial against Jews, and two of which were unambiguously positive about Jews (Figure 5).<sup>19</sup> One of these positive statements was “A British Jew is just as British as any other British person” and was endorsed by a clear majority (almost 80%). The other positive statement, “British Jews make a positive contribution to British society,” was endorsed by about 60%. The scope of disagreement was comparatively very low in relation to both statements: only 4-6% explicitly disagreed with them, although a further 15-35% neither agreed nor disagreed, or did not provide an answer. The extent of neutrality and/or inability to answer are significant in relation to these questions, but this does not undermine the overall impression of the rather common, albeit not universal, positive perception of Jews as a group that is part of Britain and that makes a positive contribution to it.

Ideas considered to be antisemitic by Jews are held by a minority of the British population. In particular, the most offensive and extreme forms of Holocaust denial are especially rare: about 2% maintain that the Holocaust is a myth, and 4% either strongly believe or tend to believe that the Holocaust has been exaggerated. The prevalence of such ideas is of a similar magnitude to the prevalence of hard-core negativity toward Jews, as indicated in the previous section. However, other ideas are not as marginal. About 10% to 13% of the population agree to some extent with the assertions that Jews think that they are better than other people, that the interests of Jews in Britain are different from the interests of the rest of the population, that Jews get rich at the expense of others and that Jews exploit Holocaust victimhood for their own purposes.

Thus, ideas around excessive and sinister ‘Jewish power’, ‘Jewish exclusivity’, ‘Jewish wealth’ and ‘Jewish exploitation’ (of others or of certain historical events) are the most common antisemitic ideas, but they are not widely prevalent among the population of Great Britain. Indeed, the prevalence

19 In line with the Jewish perspective, as revealed by the FRA 2012 survey, we consistently relate to the prejudicial comments against Jews as ‘antisemitic’ throughout the rest of this publication. One additional negative statement was also tested, but only among self-identifying Christians, the results of which are discussed later in this report.

Figure 5. Opinions held by the population of Great Britain on specific statements about Jews



Notes: N=3979 (respondents self-identified as Jews – 26 in total in the dataset – were not asked these questions in the survey). Positive statements are italicised. Due to rounding, percentages may not always add up to 100%.

Question: Below are a few statements that people have made about different ethnic or religious groups in the UK. Some people may agree with them, some may disagree and some may not have an opinion at all. Please tell me to what extent you would agree or disagree with someone who said the following statements.

of each of these ideas is approximately at the same level as the prevalence of the hard, soft and latent forms of negativity towards Jews combined, as specified in the previous section. Note further that the idea that Jews exploit the Holocaust for their own purposes is more commonly held than the hard forms of Holocaust denial.

Looking at the distribution of the volume of antisemitic ideas (Figure 6) reveals that 28% of the population endorsed at least one of the seven statements and 72% endorsed none. Of those who endorsed at least one statement, about half endorsed only one, and most of the rest endorsed two or three. Only about 2% of the public endorsed five to seven statements – again, approximately the same proportion as that identified with holding hard-core negativity towards Jews.

Importantly, a large majority of respondents who agreed with at least one antisemitic statement also endorsed one or both of the positive statements about Jews (79%). In this regard, they were quite


similar to respondents who did not endorse any antisemitic statements whatsoever: 84% of this group agreed with one or both of the positive statements (not shown graphically). This finding adds some ambiguity to the ‘status’ of those who endorse antisemitic statements. Their ways of thinking and feeling about Jews are complex, combining both positive and negative aspects. It is impossible to determine, using statistical analysis alone, just how both these aspects can be reconciled and which aspect has a dominant role.

On the other hand, there is a clear association between one’s opinion of Jews (favourable, unfavourable or neutral) and the volume of specific antisemitic ideas one endorses (Figure 7). Three-quarters of those who held a favourable opinion of Jews did not agree with any antisemitic statements, compared with just one-third of those who held an unfavourable view.

These findings are highly significant in that they provide an additional, and very novel, insight into the thorny question of the prevalence of



Figure 6. Volume of specific antisemitic statements held by the population of Great Britain



antisemitic ideas and emotions. The previous section highlighted the uncertainty regarding the status of those who declared that their opinion of Jews is neither favourable nor unfavourable, or who did not respond to this question. Sensitivity to the question itself could, in theory, lead people who had an unfavourable opinion of Jews to avoid answering it. However, Figure 7 makes it clear that such a suspicion would be unjustified. A sizeable majority of those who declared neutrality on the question or who did not answer it did not agree

with any antisemitic statements. Their profile was much closer to those with a favourable opinion of Jews than to those with an unfavourable opinion.

However, it is also clear from Figure 7 that there is scope for some revision of the figure for the prevalence of antisemitic attitudes. Endorsement of at least one antisemitic statement is quite common among those who hold an unfavourable opinion of Jews, but, critically, it is also present among some people with a favourable or a neutral

Figure 7. Association between opinion of Jews and the volume of specific antisemitic statements held by the population of Great Britain





Figure 8. Presence of unfavourable opinion of Jews and/or endorsement of antisemitic statements: the elastic view updated, %



opinion. If one is inclined to adopt a multifaceted view of the prevalence of antisemitism, then all people who *either* hold an unfavourable opinion of Jews *or* who endorse at least one antisemitic statement should be included in the calculations of prevalence. Taken *together*, the presence of unfavourable opinion of Jews and/or the endorsement of at least one specific antisemitic statements can be found among about 30% of the population. We relate to this figure *not* as the proportion of antisemites that exist within British society (such a claim simply does not stand up to any reasonable scrutiny), but rather as a boundary of the *diffusion* of antisemitic attitudes in society. The use of the new term, *diffusion*, is highly significant analytically. It signals a shift in emphasis – from counting antisemitic individuals to quantifying the spread of attitudes that Jews consider to be antisemitic, and that may represent a source of discomfort or offense to many Jews when exposed to them.

Figure 8 updates the elastic view of the prevalence of antisemitism, incorporating this new information and further developing the new approach. The maximal number of antisemitic attitudes that one can hold is eight, which would effectively mean that an individual holds both an unfavourable view of Jews and endorses all specific antisemitic statements (seven in number,

in this context). Holding 6-8 antisemitic attitudes is very low in prevalence, affecting about 2% of population. With reference to the previous version of the elastic view, note that this figure is similar to the levels of hard-core antisemitism (2.4%). Holding the maximal number of antisemitic attitudes (eight) is very rare, affecting just 0.1% of the adult British population. Thus, the existence of strong, sophisticated, perhaps internally coherent and at times even ‘learned’ antisemitism, where open dislike of Jews is combined with developed negative ideas about Jews, does not exceed 2.4% of British adults, irrespective of the method of measurement used in this analysis. However, in total, about 15% of British adults hold two or more antisemitic attitudes to some degree at least, although the more attitudes they agree with, the smaller the proportion they represent. Beyond this boundary are a further 15% of British adults who either strongly agree with, or tend to agree with just one antisemitic attitude. Accounting for this group brings the total prevalence of antisemitic attitudes, at different intensities, to 30%.

How is this 30% figure best understood? Typically, research bodies measuring antisemitism with the aid of surveys do not choose to focus on diffusion in their reporting; instead, they commonly determine the

proportion of antisemites in a given society by referencing the proportion who agreed with *a certain number* of the antisemitic statements offered. This is often rather arbitrary: why draw the cut-off point at that particular point, and what of those within that group who express favourable views towards Jews or who endorse positive attitudes towards them? However, this is only part of the criticism of this traditional approach to measuring and reporting. This approach may suit some policy uses but not all. For example, it may well inform policies designed to tackle hard-core antisemitism by offering a quantification of this phenomenon. However, it will fall short of explaining perceptions and anxieties among Jews, or the fundamental clash of perspectives where their anxieties appear high in the face of the rather low percentage of strongly antisemitic people. The alternative approach to measuring antisemitism that is advanced here focuses not on the proportion of antisemitic individuals that exist, but rather on *the diffusion of ideas – the extent to which these antisemitic ideas permeate society*. That is what the 30% figure captures – ideas that Jews commonly perceive to be antisemitic can be found, to varying degrees, within close to a third of British society. Critically, however, there are shades of intensity within this 30%, based on the proportions who agreed with different numbers of statements – the most intensive forms of antisemitism reach into about 2% of British society, but *some* antisemitic ideas affect 30% of it.

This analysis suggests that antisemitic ideas are not as marginal in Great Britain as some measures of antisemitism suggest, and that they can be held with and without open dislike of Jews. This finding goes a considerable way towards explaining contemporary Jewish concerns about antisemitism. In day-to-day life, the frequency of Jewish people's encounters with antisemitism is determined not necessarily by the small minority of hard-core antisemites, but rather by much more widely diffused elements of attitudes that Jews commonly consider to be antisemitic. These elements are present to some extent in about one third of British society and, at that frequency, can be expected to be perceptible to Jews and, consequently, to impact on their lives. Individuals holding just one attitude considered to be antisemitic

by Jews (15% of the adult population of Great Britain) cannot be labelled as antisemites in any conventional political, or indeed moral, sense. They reject, after all, almost all antisemitic ideas presented to them, or, at the very least, remain neutral about them. It would be wrong, however, to ignore their existence in an investigation dedicated to the comprehensive mapping of the prevalence of antisemitic attitudes in society. A significant proportion of Jews perceive antisemitism to be a serious societal problem. The road to this perception passes through regular or just occasional encounters with attitudes which may or may not come from the small proportion of people who hold strong and multifaceted antisemitic views. Indeed, in many cases, given their rarity in the population, they will probably not come from this group. These individuals form a very small proportion of British society and the probability of Jews coming into direct contact with them is low as a result. Moreover, given their intense anti-Jewish orientation, these individuals are unlikely to spend much time associating with Jews. Thinly scattered antisemitic attitudes, however, are a different matter altogether. They are not restricted to the margins of society, and the probability of an encounter with these attitudes is higher for Jews. The motivations of those expressing such views may well be benign, and in many instances, they may not even realise that a particular comment or remark might be experienced by Jews as offensive, upsetting or simply uncomfortable, but they can impact significantly on the perceptions, sense of comfort and safety, and, ultimately, the quality of life for Jews in Great Britain.

A parallel can be drawn with attitudes towards women. For example, the 2005 World Values Survey found that between 3% and 4% of adults in the United Kingdom strongly agreed with the contentions that 'men make better political leaders' and 'men make better business executives than women.' About 16% agreed that 'when jobs are scarce men should have more right to a job than women.' Yet the proportion of people who agreed *to some extent* with at least one of the three statements was much higher, affecting as much as 31% of British society.<sup>20</sup> Thus, whilst levels of hard-core prejudice against women are low, the likelihood of women encountering

20 <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSONline.jsp>.

prejudicial ideas about them is much higher. So it is with Jews – hardcore prejudice is rare, but

encountering *some* degree of prejudice is much more common.

## Israel in the eyes of the population of Great Britain

Thus far, the favourability test and all of the statements presented to respondents related very specifically to Jews. At no point have Israel or Zionism entered into the discussion. Yet part of the purpose of this study was to investigate whether attitudes towards Israel correlate in any way with attitudes towards Jews, and in order to achieve that, it was necessary in the first instance to measure respondents' views and opinions about Israel.


Israel is held dear by most British Jews. 90% of the respondents to the FRA survey of perceptions and experiences of antisemitism among Jews in the UK indicated that they had spent some time in Israel, and 70% said that they had relatives there. Deep emotional and religious attachment to Israel is also evident from the responses of British Jews to the survey of British Jewish attitudes to Israel conducted by JPR in 2010: 90% see Israel as the Jewish ancestral homeland, almost 80% believe that they have a special responsibility to support Israel, and about 70% describe themselves as Zionists.<sup>21</sup> Given this reality, negativity towards Israel expressed by non-Jews is likely to be a cause

for significant concern or apprehension among many Jews.

In view of this and the lingering debates about the relationship (or the lack thereof) between antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes, this survey explored British people's attitudes to Israel along the same lines as their attitudes towards Jews: first, at the level of favourable or unfavourable opinion, and second, testing the prevalence of specific ideas about Israel. No connection between the two types of attitudes was assumed. On the contrary, the existence of the connection was treated as a research question in its own right.

Respondents to the current survey were presented with a list of countries, including Israel, and asked to give their opinion (favourable, unfavourable or neutral) of each of them. The results are rather unambiguous insofar as two groups of countries can be identified (Figure 9). The first group consists of the UK, USA and Germany. As one might expect, the population of Great Britain has an overwhelmingly favourable opinion of the UK (over 70%). The scope of favourability is

Figure 9. Opinions held by the population of Great Britain about Israel and other selected countries




Note: due to rounding, percentages may not always add up to 100%.  
 Question: I'd like you to consider how you feel about certain countries overall. Please tell me if you have a very favourable, somewhat favourable, somewhat unfavourable, or very unfavourable opinion of the following countries.

21 Staetsky, L.D. and Boyd, J. (2014). *The Exceptional Case? Perceptions and experiences of antisemitism among Jews in the United Kingdom*. London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research. Graham, D. and Boyd, J.

(2010). *Committed, concerned and conciliatory: the attitudes of Jews in Britain towards Israel*. London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research.

Figure 10. Sympathies declared by the population of Great Britain in relation to Israeli-Palestinian conflict



Question: Thinking of the continuing conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, do your own sympathies lie more with the Israelis or more with the Palestinians?

not as great in relation to the USA and Germany, yet these countries are still seen favourably by a significant proportion of the public (40-50%). Unfavourable opinions of the UK (about 6%), Germany (10%) and USA (23%) are clearly all minority positions. The second group, consisting of Iran, Syria and Russia, is seen unfavourably. Favourability towards these countries stands at about 10%, whereas unfavourability towards them exists at a level close to 50%.

Israel does not belong to either group. It appears in between them. Fewer than one in five people in Great Britain (17%) has a favourable opinion of Israel, whereas about one in three (33%) holds an unfavourable view – a rating better than that of Iran and worse than that of the USA.


Similarly, the British population appears to have limited sympathy for Israelis with regard to the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Figure 10). 6% sympathise with the Israelis, compared to 18% with the Palestinians. However, there is also a large degree of neutrality and uncertainty on the issue: close to half adopted these positions, and close to a third did not know where their sympathies lay or refused to answer. Thus, in general, the position of the British population

towards Israel can be characterised as one of uncertainty or indifference, but among those who hold a view, people with sympathies towards the Palestinians are numerically dominant.

Twelve specific statements about Israel were offered to survey respondents. Four statements were positive and eight statements were negative and captured well-known anti-Israeli sentiments circulating in British political discourse. Half of the negative statements were very similar to some of the negative statements about Jews. The resemblance was a deliberate strategy designed to test the extent to which some classic antisemitic themes and ideas are replicated in relation to Israel. The remainder are all known to be regarded by a majority of Jews in the UK as either 'probably' or 'definitely' antisemitic, based on the findings of the FRA 2012 survey. Statements tested in that survey that failed to meet the standards set by this test (including one that investigated simple criticism of Israel by non-Jews, which most Jews said was *not* antisemitic) were excluded.

Negativity towards Israel is significantly more common than negativity towards Jews (compare Figure 11 with Figure 5). The level of endorsement of antisemitic statements is in the range of 2-13%,

Figure 11. Opinions held by the population of Great Britain on specific statements about Israel



Notes: Positive statements are italicised. Due to rounding, percentages may not always add up to 100%. Question: I'd like to show you some statements that people have made about Israel. Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with each one.


whereas the level of endorsement of anti-Israeli statements is in the range of 9-24%. Here, as in the rest of the commentary on this exhibit, the response categories 'strongly agree' and 'tend to agree' are reported together, although they are broken down in detail in Figure 11. Only one positive statement about Israel is endorsed by a clear majority of the British population: 62% agree that Israel has every right to exist. A significant minority (43%) agrees that Israel is the historic homeland of the Jewish People. By contrast, in relation to both statements, the proportion who explicitly disagrees is rather small (6-13%) and the proportion of respondents who maintained neutrality or did not respond was high (33-46%). Lower levels of agreement were found with regard to the other positive statements: 25% agree that the State of Israel makes a positive contribution to global society (although 60% have no view or

don't know), and 15% agree that Israel is the only real democracy in the Middle East (again, about 60% do not express a view). However, only in the latter case, does the proportion disagreeing outweigh the proportion agreeing.<sup>22</sup>

Among the eight negative statements offered, those claiming Israel is committing mass murder in Palestine, is deliberately trying to wipe out the Palestinian population and is an apartheid state received the highest levels of agreement. All three views, considered by a majority of UK Jews in the FRA 2012 survey to be at least 'probably antisemitic,' were endorsed by 21-24% of the

22 In this instance, it is impossible to know exactly what aspect of the statement respondents are disagreeing with. Disagreement may indicate a criticism of Israel, but it may alternatively indicate a belief that other democracies exist elsewhere in the Middle East.

Figure 12. Volume of specific anti-Israel statements held by the population of Great Britain



respondents, with similar proportions disagreeing. Endorsement of a boycott of Israeli goods and products, also regarded as either ‘probably’ or ‘definitely’ an antisemitic position by a majority of Jews in the FRA 2012 survey, is at a lower level of 9%, with close to half of all respondents disagreeing, making it the least commonly held anti-Israeli statement. The statements specifically designed to resemble common antisemitic tropes (the interests of Israelis are at odds with the interests of the rest of the world; Israel has too much control over global affairs; Israel exploits Holocaust victimhood) stand between these poles in terms of endorsement levels: about 15-20% of respondents endorse them, and 25-40% disagree. The equivalent figures for the parallel statements about Jews have levels of endorsement of 8-12%, and levels of disagreement at 41-56%.

Almost half of the British population agrees to some extent with at least one of the eight anti-Israel statements offered. Of this group, just over half endorses 1-2 statements, and the remainder endorses 3-8 statements. About 7% endorses 6-8 statements (Figure 12).


Opinion of Israel (favourable, unfavourable or neutral) and the volume of specific anti-Israeli

ideas are associated with one another (Figure 13), just as opinion of Jews and specific antisemitic ideas are. Two-thirds of those who hold a favourable opinion of Israel do not agree with any of the anti-Israel statements. Among those who hold an unfavourable opinion of Israel, about 30% do not endorse any anti-Israeli statements, while the rest (about 70%) endorse at least one. Again, as was the case with attitudes towards Jews, the profile of those who claim neutrality in relation to Israel, or who did not respond to the question, is much closer to those with a favourable opinion of Israel than to those with an unfavourable opinion.

The ‘elastic view’ of anti-Israel attitudes is set out in Figure 14. In Panel A, a version of this view derived from the favourability question alone is presented: those holding ‘hard-core’ negativity towards Israel (i.e. the ‘very unfavourable’) constitute 12%, and those holding softer negativity (i.e. the ‘somewhat unfavourable’) constitute a further 21%. In Panel B on page 32, we combine the information from the favourability question with the information from the anti-Israel statements to show those who either expressed some degree of unfavourability towards Israel, and/or who endorsed at least one of the anti-Israel statements. These proportions are shown



Figure 13. Association between opinion of Israel and the volume of specific anti-Israel ideas held by the population of Great Britain




in degrees of intensity, with those endorsing fewer anti-Israel attitudes in paler shades, and those endorsing more anti-Israel attitudes in progressively darker shades. It is immediately clear that negativity towards Israel is significantly higher than negativity towards Jews. A very unfavourable opinion of Israel is held by about one in ten (12%) adults in Great Britain (2.4% in the case of Jews), and softer negativity (i.e. somewhat

unfavourable opinion) affects another 21% of British adults, bringing the total prevalence of unfavourable opinions to 33% (compared to 5.4% in the case of Jews).


The maximal number of anti-Israel attitudes that one can hold is nine, denoting an individual who holds an unfavourable view of Israel and, in addition, endorses all eight specific anti-Israel

Figure 14. Presence of unfavourable opinion of Israel and/or endorsement of anti-Israel statements: the elastic view

Panel A. Unfavourable opinion of Israel



Panel B. Unfavourable opinion of Israel and/or endorsement of anti-Israel statements



statements. Only 1% of the population of Great Britain holds anti-Israel attitudes at that level of intensity, although about 9% of the population hold 6-9 anti-Israel attitudes (Panel B). Yet, the *diffusion of anti-Israel attitudes* reaches a majority of British adults (56%): 36% hold two or more anti-Israel attitudes and the remaining 20% hold just one anti-Israel attitude. Comparing this figure (56%) to the maximal diffusion figure for attitudes to Jews (30%) provides yet another illustration of the point made earlier: anti-Israel attitudes are considerably more prevalent in British society than antisemitic attitudes. Again, it would be wholly erroneous to use either of these figures as indicators of the proportions of anti-Israel or antisemitic *individuals* that exist within Great Britain today – a considerable proportion of them, after all, reject most, if not all of the anti-Israel and antisemitic views presented to them, and may indeed have expressed a favourable view of Israel, Jews or both. Yet these figures do capture the extent to which anti-Israel and/or antisemitic sentiment permeates British society. At these levels,

the likelihood that a Jewish person will encounter such ideas, whether expressed with thoughtfulness, or malice, or mindlessness or ignorance, is arguably rather high.

Therefore, the idea of the diffusion of anti-Israel attitudes, in contrast to the quantification of the proportion of committed anti-Israel ideologists and activists, is as useful here as the idea of the diffusion of antisemitic attitudes. A relatively small proportion of British adults holds virulent anti-Israel views, but a much larger proportion endorses anti-Israel ideas or views to some extent, and at lesser degrees of intensity. The existence of widely spread low intensity views of this kind is important because these views may well play a role in shaping Jewish perceptions of the position of Israel in the minds of non-Jews. Note that the extent to which anti-Israel attitudes can be characterised as antisemitic is the topic of the next chapter. Thus far, these types of sentiments have been deliberately treated as separate from each other. The next chapter investigates whether or not they are linked.

## Antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes: are they linked?

Thus far, we have examined antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes independently of one another. However, a key objective of this study was to investigate the extent to which they correlate with one another, if indeed they do at all. In short, do the types of anti-Israel views and attitudes tested here constitute a ‘new antisemitism’? These questions are hotly debated in the UK and beyond. As we have seen, in the broad picture of attitudes held by British people towards Jews and Israel, anti-Israel attitudes have been found to be considerably more common than antisemitic attitudes. This point can be gleaned indirectly from the charts exhibited previously, but it merits a consolidation. As is shown in Figure 15 overleaf where Israel-related and Jewish-related attitudes are presented in different colours (blue and yellow, respectively), negativity towards Israel is more prevalent in the public mind than negativity towards Jews. Most anti-Israel attitudes are held, to some extent, by 13-24% of the public, whereas antisemitic attitudes reside in the range of 2-13%. However, these separate assessments of anti-Israel and antisemitic ideas do not provide a clue as to whether or not there is any connection between the two types of attitudes. The secondary status of antisemitic statements does not imply that these are unrelated to anti-Israel statements. To investigate this, a different approach is needed.

The connection between antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes has been a subject of numerous compositions by sociologists, historians and commentators in recent years. So far, no consensus has emerged. Most advocates of the position equating antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes do so based on the identified similarities of themes and styles between the two types of attitudes. Their methods mostly involve historical, sociological and literary analytical tools. By contrast, a strictly empirical social scientific approach to this question requires an ‘overlap test.’ After all, classic antisemitic ideas are well known. Anti-Israel views are also well documented. Are people with anti-Israel attitudes more likely to hold antisemitic attitudes than people who are not anti-Israel? Specifically, do people with strong anti-Israel attitudes also tend to hold strong antisemitic attitudes? A positive association between holding anti-Israel and antisemitic attitudes could support

the view that antisemitism is a driver of anti-Israel attitudes or vice versa.


To explore any link between antisemitic and anti-Israeli views two composite indices have been created and compared. The first is the ‘anti-Israel’ index (the AI index), calculated as a sum of negative opinions held about Israel and the presence of an unfavourable opinion of Israel. The range of the AI index scores is 0-9, with 0 describing an individual whose opinion of Israel was either favourable or neutral and who, in addition, did not endorse any of the anti-Israel statements. The highest value of the AI index is 9, describing an individual whose opinion of Israel was unfavourable and who endorsed all eight anti-Israel statements. The second is the index of antisemitism (the AS index, ranging from 0-8), derived by the same principle as the AI index, based on the number of endorsed antisemitic attitudes and the presence of an unfavourable opinion of Jews.<sup>23</sup> About 30% of the population hold at least one antisemitic attitude in the form of either unfavourable attitudes to Jews and/or endorsement of at least one antisemitic statement. About 56% of the public possess at least one anti-Israel attitude. The proportions of those scoring high on these indices (5-8 attitudes on the AS index, and 6-9 attitudes on the AI one) are 3.6% (AS) and 9% (AI).

In Table 1 the antisemitism and the anti-Israel indices are cross-tabulated and, in addition, the categories of the anti-Israel index are compared to each other in terms of the volume of antisemitic attitudes present in them.

Based on this approach, we find that the existence of an association between the antisemitic and the anti-Israel attitudes tested, is unambiguous

23 Cronbach’s alpha values for variables factored into the composite indices are: 0.785 for the AS index and 0.823 for the AI index. Thus, all questions that comprise the composite indices reliably measure the latent underlying concept. This is not the first time these indices are used in this report. In earlier chapters, they were used for an illustration of the ‘elastic view’ of antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes (for example in Figures 3, 8 and 14). In this chapter, they are given proper names for the first time.

Figure 15. Opinions held by the population of Great Britain on specific statements about Jews and Israel (strongly agree and tend to agree, %)



Notes: In relation to questions about Jews, N=3979. Respondents self-identified as Jews – 26 in total in the dataset – were not asked these questions in the survey. Positive statements are italicised.

(Table 1). Reading the table vertically, comparing the columns, one can see that the stronger the anti-Israel opinion, the higher the percentage of people with antisemitic attitudes. Respondents who are

completely free of any trace of anti-Israel opinion, scoring zero on the AI index, show very low levels of antisemitic opinion: 86% of respondents who score zero on the anti-Israel index also score

Table 1. The association between anti-Israel and antisemitic attitudes: % holding antisemitic attitudes of different intensities, by intensity of anti-Israel attitudes

		Anti-Israel (AI) Index										
		low					high					
		0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
Antisemitism (AS) Index	low	0	86	70	65	61	47	45	33	31	21	21
	1	11	18	19	19	22	19	17	21	16	2	
	2	2	6	7	9	10	12	23	10	6	10	
	3	1	4	4	6	7	13	9	8	10	12	
	4	1	2	2	3	8	6	9	9	12	10	
	5	0	1	1	2	3	4	7	11	14	12	
	6	0	1	1	0	3	2	1	4	10	17	
	7	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	6	9	14	
high	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	
	Sum, %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
	Sum, N	1744	791	410	312	210	167	139	112	78	42	

Note: See text for explanation of colour coding.

zero on the antisemitism index (top left quadrant shaded in deep blue). High levels of antisemitism (for example, scores of 5-8 on the antisemitism index) are practically non-existent in this group. In contrast, only about 20-30% of respondents exhibiting high levels of anti-Israel attitudes (those who score 6-9 on the AI index) score zero on antisemitic attitudes (top right-hand quadrants).<sup>24</sup>

The link between antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes is a much debated but, at the same time, empirically under-researched subject. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first robust empirical documentation of the association between the two types of attitudes in the history of this subject in the United Kingdom.<sup>25</sup> However, any prospective users of this information should bear in mind the meaning and the limitations of this insight. The association is documented at a *population* level, not at an *individual* one: i.e. at a population level, we find that antisemitic opinions *tend* to accompany anti-Israel opinions. However, this does not mean

that an individual holding even the highest volume of anti-Israel opinions is *necessarily* antisemitic; rather it indicates that the *probability* of such an individual being antisemitic is considerably higher than an individual who does not hold anti-Israel opinions.


Figure 16 overleaf helps to establish the correct interpretation and uses of this finding. It shows the percentage of people in the population who hold at least one antisemitic opinion as a whole, sub-divided by the intensity of their anti-Israel attitudes.

A clear majority of the British population is not antisemitic in any way. However, the greater the level of antipathy towards Israel, the more likely they are to register on the antisemitism index; indeed, of those scoring four or more on the anti-Israel index, it is more likely than not that they hold some antipathy towards Jews. In short, we find that, in the population as a whole, there is a three in ten chance that an individual selected at random would hold some level of antisemitic sentiment. Among those who hold no antipathy towards Israel, that would drop to just over one in ten. However, among those holding the strongest level of anti-Israel views (7 to 9 on the anti-Israel index), that possibility climbs to over seven in ten.

24 The association between the AI and AS indices is statistically significant. The Pearson correlation coefficient between the two indices is 0.484, and 23% of variation in the AI index is explained by variation in the AS index.

25 Kaplan and Small (2006) investigated this issue in an international context. See footnote 3.

Figure 16. The association between anti-Israel and antisemitic attitudes: an alternative cast



Note: scoring 0 on anti-Israel index N=1744, scoring 1-3 on anti-Israel index N=1513, scoring 4-6 on anti-Israel index N=516, scoring 7-9 on anti-Israel index N=232.


Having shown that the *volume* of antisemitic attitudes is greater among those who hold anti-Israel attitudes, we now move to the *nature* of their antisemitic sentiment. Is it also different from those without such attitudes, or from the general population? (Figure 17).

The most common antisemitic opinion in the general population is that Jews think that they are better than other people. Among those with anti-Israel attitudes this also scores highly, but the most common view is that Jews exploit Holocaust victimhood for their own purposes: about half of all respondents with strong anti-Israel attitudes hold this opinion, compared to just one in ten in the general population. This is a very significant

insight into the mindset of the segment of the population espousing strong anti-Israel attitudes, and it goes a long way towards explaining the degree of apprehension towards this segment felt in the Jewish community. Invoking the Holocaust as a political weapon is especially objectionable, in the eyes of many Jews.

The final point to address in relation to the connection between antisemitism and the anti-Israel attitudes tested here is the extent to which these types of attitudes exist without each other, in a pure form, in contemporary British society. In essence, is there antisemitism without these anti-Israel attitudes? And are there anti-Israel attitudes of this type which are untainted by antisemitism?


Figure 17. Endorsement of antisemitic opinions among those with strong anti-Israel attitudes and in the general population of Great Britain (strongly agree and tend to agree combined) %




Note: people with strong anti-Israel attitudes are those who score 7-9 on the AI index (N=232).

Figure 18. The diffusion and overlap of antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes: a summary

Panel A. Maximal diffusion of antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes: at least 1 attitude



Panel B. Strong antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes



Note: people with strong anti-Israel attitudes are those who score 6-9 on the AI index (N=371, or 9% of the total sample); people with strong antisemitic attitudes are those who score 5-8 on the AS index (N=147, or 3.6% of the total sample).

Figure 18 brings together all that is known about the spread of antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes and the overlap between them in a Venn diagram format. Two such diagrams are offered: one focusing on all those who score at least 1 on either the antisemitism index, or the anti-Israel index, or both (Panel A); and a second focusing on those who score highly on one, other, or both of the indices (Panel B). The specific figures in each case are less important than the overlap shown in both diagrams. In both cases, we find that the two circles do intersect but we also find that they do not overlap entirely. Indeed, in both diagrams we see that most of those holding the anti-Israel attitudes tested (whether measured at a level of one or more, or six or more) do *not* hold any antisemitic attitudes. In the former case, the proportion is 32/56 (about 57%), and in the latter 7/9 (about 78%). At the same time, we also find in both cases that most of those holding antisemitic attitudes also hold anti-Israel attitudes. Measured at the level of one antisemitic attitude or more, 80% (24/30) also hold at least one of the anti-Israel attitudes; measured at the higher degree of intensity of five or more antisemitic attitudes, we find that 56% (2/3.6) also hold six or more of the

anti-Israel attitudes. Fundamentally, we see that it is entirely possible to be anti-Israel without being antisemitic, and antisemitic without being anti-Israel, but we also see evidence of a clear overlap between them, demonstrating that for some, at least, these ideas coexist.

The attempt to comprehend the meaning of these figures from the point of view of a British Jewish individual, results in a significant breakthrough in understanding Jewish anxieties. Fierce antisemitism is undoubtedly a minority position in British society. However, Jews lead their lives without full knowledge or certainty about the scope or character of the thoughts and attitudes of others. Such is the nature of social interactions. What Jews come across in everyday social encounters at an individual level is expressions of *single attitudes*, often in a casual manner, rather than comprehensive profiles of all attitudes that other individuals may possess, and antisemitic attitudes, at some level, can be found among 30% of the British population in some shape or form. These attitudes do not need to be fierce and do not need to cluster within a particular individual in order to be noticed by Jews. Another third of

British society harbours some sort of anti-Israel attitude or attitudes, which are often treated as suspicious by many Jews, and not without reason, since, as we have seen, for significant proportions of people, anti-Israel attitudes are indeed mixed with antisemitic ones. Thus, 62% of British society endorse at least one antisemitic and/or one anti-Israel attitude, making the likelihood of Jews encountering such attitudes very high. In light of this recast, Jewish anxieties and fears instantly become more understandable.

Yet, at the same time, it is important to stress that intense antisemitic and/or anti-Israel sentiment

can only be found among about one in ten of the British population. The proportion scoring either 5-8 on the antisemitism index, or 6-9 on the anti-Israel index, or both, is 10.6%. Thus, whilst there is a high chance that British Jews will encounter an antisemitic or anti-Israel idea from someone around them that offends them or makes them feel uncomfortable, the likelihood that that idea is being expressed by someone who is intensely antisemitic and/or anti-Israel is much lower. This is very important for British Jews to understand when trying to make sense of the meaning of, and motivation behind, any such ideas they encounter.



## Violent orientations


Antisemitic attitudes can sometimes possess a violent dimension. Violent attitudes in general, clearly represent the greatest threat to social harmony. For Jews, violent antisemitism is a source of particular concern, as its presence and significance are re-evaluated in the historical shadow of the Holocaust. A study of attitudes cannot definitively assess the violent potential of those who hold antisemitic attitudes, as attitudes towards certain ethnic and religious groups and behaviour towards them are not synonymous. Actual behaviour depends on attitudes to some extent, but it also depends on psychological predispositions, cultural context and particular circumstances. Even extreme dislike of a given religious group may never be translated into violence. Thus, declarations about the readiness to use or excuse violence against any individual or group cannot be taken as an unambiguous measurement of the actual risk of violence. However, it takes us, metaphorically, ‘half-way’ between attitudes and behaviour, and somewhat closer to an empirical assessment of the potential for violence.

We investigated the extent to which British people feel that violence can be justified against various

groups, in defence of their political or religious beliefs and values. As Figure 19 shows, about 1% of the British population thinks that violence against Jews can ‘often’ be justified, and a further 3% think that it can ‘sometimes’ be justified. However, the vast majority (71%) believes that it can never be justified, and a further 10% maintain it can rarely be justified.


Looking at the justification for the use of violence against Jews in the broader context of the justification for violence against other groups (Figure 20), it is clear that any readiness to justify violence is a minority position in relation to all groups investigated. Justification for violence against Jews is lowest of all, followed very closely by justification of violence against Israelis and Zionists. By contrast, violence against Islamist extremists, a group that exists in active opposition to the Western way of life and is known for inflicting terror on innocent people, is justified often or sometimes by the largest proportion of the population (over a quarter). This is the only group that clearly stands out in the amount of animosity expressed towards it.

Figure 19. Justification levels of the use of violence against Jews, in defence of one's political or religious beliefs and values



Question: Thinking about Britain today, to what extent do you feel that using violence against any of the following groups or institutions would be justified in order to defend your political or religious beliefs and values? (Jews)

Figure 20. Justification levels of the use of violence against Jews, in defence of one's political or religious beliefs and values, compared with other groups and institutions



Notes: \*Includes 'Prefer not to say'. The category 'Often justified' is under 2% of the total in most cases; consequently, the decision was made to combine the categories 'Often justified' and 'Sometimes justified' for the clarity of presentation. Due to rounding, percentages may not always add up to 100%.

The strongest conclusion in relation to all other groups would be that a certain amount of readiness to use or excuse violence exists among the British public, and groups and institutions featuring in major political controversies attract largely comparable degrees of animosity in that sense. The position of Jews is the least threatened among all of the groups investigated. So how serious or significant are the observed levels of justification in the use of violence towards Jews? Based on this analysis, they stand at a similar level of justification towards immigrants, banks, European Union institutions or British military personnel. This, in itself, should be helpful for policy orientation: if the threat of violence against these familiar and high profile targets is of concern and justifies some intervention, then Jews should attract a similar amount of concern and level of intervention.


The higher one scores on the antisemitism index, the more likely one is to justify violence against Jews and/or Israelis (Figure 21). One in five strongly antisemitic people believes that violence

against Jews can be justified often or sometimes, in contrast to 4% in the general population, and 3% of those who do not hold any antisemitic attitudes (Panel A). Those who score high on the anti-Israel index are also more inclined to believe that violence against Jews and/or Israelis can be justified often or sometimes (7-12%) compared to those who score zero (2%) (Panel B). Note, however, that justification of violence among the strongly anti-Israel types is on a much more modest scale than among the strongly antisemitic types.


Critically, however, strongly antisemitic people showing relatively high levels of justification for violence towards Jews also tend to show higher levels of justification for violence against other targets. They also think, for example, that violence is often or sometimes justified toward Muslims (26%), immigrants (24%), banks or big business (22%), and British military personnel (21%). Their other targets, self-evidently, do not seem to point towards a coherent ideological worldview. Thus, the non-exclusive tendency

Figure 21. Justification of the use of violence against Jews and Israel in defence of one’s political or religious beliefs and values (violence often or sometimes justified, %)

Panel A. By degree of antisemitism



Panel B. By degree of anti-Israelism



Note: (1) Strongly antisemitic: N=147; somewhat antisemitic: N=1099; not antisemitic N=2759. (2) Strongly anti-Israel: N=371; somewhat anti-Israel: N=1890; not anti-Israel: N=1744.

to justify violence suggests that this group is simply more likely to consider violence to be an acceptable method of protest *in general*. However, what exactly is at play is impossible to say by means of this research alone. Psychological research may be needed to provide a credible answer. From a Jewish communal point of view, however, it matters relatively little: any indication of a justification to commit violence against Jews is a concern. Monitoring

whether such levels are changing over time is part of the long-term aim of this research, in order to make accurate assessments of any threat levels against Jews and to determine the extent to which resources should be allocated. From the broader national perspective, however, this finding is of significance: strongly antisemitic people are not exclusively a ‘Jewish problem.’ They may pose a threat to Jews and to other groups alike.

## Religious and political groups and their attitudes to Jews and Israel

### Motivation and background

The role of different religious and political groups (e.g. Muslims, Christians, the political left and the political right) in shaping the landscape of contemporary antisemitism in the UK is a subject of particular interest to scholars of antisemitism, policy makers, law enforcement agencies and the Jewish community alike. From its establishment as the dominant religion in Europe, Christianity played a significant role in fuelling anti-Jewish imagery and ideas, particularly during the medieval era. The wide-scale reduction in the intensity of religious faith post-Enlightenment and the decline of the prominence of Christianity in public life, together with the internal transformation of Christianity, led to a reduction in its role in the shaping of antisemitic attitudes, especially in the late twentieth century. Furthermore, for most of the twentieth century, the far-right was perceived to be the major source of antisemitism, certainly in the eyes of most British Jews, and particularly given the destruction wrought by the Nazis and other fascist forces during the Second World War. The tables began to turn in the 1980s, when parts of the political left assumed strong pro-Palestinian and anti-Israel positions, and in recent years, faced accusations of antisemitism in the Labour Party. Historically, Jews tended to fare rather better under Muslim rule than under Christian rule, but particularly since the advent of political Zionism in the nineteenth century, strong anti-Israel sentiment has been commonplace in Muslim societies, and has sometimes spilled over into violence against both Israeli and Jewish targets. In the very recent past, terrorist attacks perpetrated by Islamist extremists against Jews in France, Belgium and Denmark have shaken those Jewish communities to the core, and prompted heightened levels of emigration among Jews from those countries.

However, fundamentally, the respective ‘contributions’ of the left, the right, Christians and Muslims to the total volume of contemporary British antisemitism remain unclear. They simply have not been studied in sufficient detail to date. British Jewish respondents to the FRA 2012

survey of Jewish perceptions and antisemitism who had been exposed to an antisemitic attack of some sort in the years prior to the survey pointed to the political left and Muslims as the two main sources of antisemitic violence and harassment. The political right came third.<sup>26</sup> A similar hierarchy came out of another recent survey of British Jews who indicated that Islamist extremists are their most feared group, followed by Neo-Nazis at a considerable distance.<sup>27</sup> Such is the Jewish perspective. How does it match up with the attitudes held by each of these groups?


Many surveys of attitudes towards ethnic and religious minorities have been carried out in the UK over the past decade. The most consistently found pattern across different surveys is heightened animosity towards Jews on the political right, typically captured by voting intention or actual voting for the UK Independence Party (UKIP). The political left, captured by voting intention or actual voting for Labour, appears in these surveys as a more Jewish-friendly, or neutral, segment of the population. Relatively high levels of negativity towards Jews have been documented among British Muslims, while among self-identified Christians, attitudes to Jews are not distinguishable from the attitudes of the general population.<sup>28</sup> Of all mentioned insights, the absence of clear signs of negativity towards Jews on the political left in these surveys appears

26 Staetsky, L. D. and Boyd, J. (2014.) *The Exceptional Case? Perceptions and experiences of antisemitism among Jews in the United Kingdom*. London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research.

27 *Survation/Jewish Chronicle* June 2016 survey of 1,023 British Jews.

28 This summary is based on the following surveys of British population: (1) YouGov/Tim Bale May 2016 survey of 1,694 British adults; (2) YouGov/Campaign Against Antisemitism survey December 2015/January 2016 survey of 3,411 British adults; (3) YouGov/*Sunday Times* January 2016 survey of 1,647 British adults; (4) Populus/BICOM January 2015 survey of 1,001 British adults; (5) ICM Unlimited/Channel 4 and Juniper April/May 2015 survey of 1,081 British Muslims; (6) Pew Research Centre April 2006 Global Attitudes survey (UK sample of 412 Muslims).

Figure 22. The left-right political spectrum in contemporary Great Britain



Question: Some people talk about 'left', 'right' and 'centre' to describe parties and politicians. With this in mind, where would you place yourself?

particularly curious in the current context. The relationship between the political left and many British Jews has been more fraught recently than ever before, informed by perceptions among some Jews of growing left-wing antisemitism.

Levels of antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes among Christians, Muslims, the right and the left, using data from the current survey, are documented in detail below. Christians and Muslims were identified in the survey through a question on religious affiliation. The political affiliation of respondents was captured using conventional questions on voting intentions, as well as a question requiring respondents to situate themselves somewhere on the left-to-right spectrum. Specifically, the survey respondents were asked to identify as very right-wing, fairly right-wing, slightly right-of centre, centre, slightly left-of centre, fairly left-wing or very left-wing.


### Antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes across the British political spectrum

The political landscape of Great Britain, as captured in our survey, is described in detail in

Figures 22 and 23. The left-right spectrum features regularly in political debates, and it proved to be well understood by the survey respondents. Only 15% did not identify themselves on the spectrum, and 42% within this group also did not know with which political party they most closely affiliated, suggesting that their response had more to do with a genuine lack of strong political orientation than with any unfamiliarity with the scale (Figure 22). Over a third of the adult population identifies as centrists in political terms. The political left is somewhat stronger than the political right: the very left-wing and fairly left-wing amount to about 16%, while the very right-wing and the fairly right-wing amount to just under 8%.

A strong majority of very left-wing respondents align themselves with the Labour Party (Figure 23). Fairly left-wing and slightly left-of-centre respondents similarly align strongly with Labour, but significant minorities also see themselves as Liberal Democrats, Greens, and Scottish or Welsh nationalists. Most respondents on the right, whether they are slightly right-of-centre, fairly right-wing or very right-wing, align themselves with the Conservatives, and 7-25% with UKIP.

Figure 23. The left-right political spectrum and party identification in Great Britain



Notes: Categories of very left-wing and very right-wing used for the calculation of percentages amount to 529 and 355 cases, respectively. These are group sizes after boosting. The remaining groups are: fairly left-wing (N=479), slightly left-of-centre (N=499), centre (N=1449), slightly right-of-centre (N=512), fairly right-wing (N=266). Due to rounding, percentages may not always add up to 100%.

Question: How would you vote if there were a General Election tomorrow? Would you vote...?, OR: If undecided or refused: Which party are you most inclined to support?

Figure 24 presents two measures of the prevalence of antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes across different political groups: (1) the measure of maximal diffusion, i.e. the proportion of people holding at least one antisemitic attitude or anti-Israel attitude (Panel A); and (2) the proportion of people holding strong attitudes, i.e. 5-8 antisemitic attitudes, 6-9 anti-Israel attitudes (Panel B). In the general population, the proportions of people holding at least one antisemitic or at least one anti-Israel attitude are 30% and 56% respectively; strong antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes are held by 3.6% and 9% respectively (shown on each figure by the dotted red line). Because the estimates for each group were carried out on the basis of comparatively small and varying numbers of cases, the proportions are reported here as ranges, rather than single figures. The ranges should be understood as an indication of where an accurate estimate for each group is likely to be situated.


When it comes to antisemitism, the very right-wing lead: 52% (46-58%) in this group hold at least one antisemitic attitude, in contrast to 30% in the general population; and 13% (10-17%) of the very right-wing hold 5-8 antisemitic attitudes, in contrast to 3.6% in the general population. Among those who identify as fairly right-wing or slightly right-of-centre, the maximal diffusion of antisemitic attitudes (the percentage of people with at least one attitude) is slightly elevated but not the

stronger forms of antisemitism. The very left-wing is indistinguishable from the general population and from the political centre in this regard. In general, it should be said that, with the exception of the very right-wing, there is little differentiation across the political spectrum in relation to the prevalence of antisemitic attitudes.


However, in relation to anti-Israel attitudes, the very left-wing lead: 78% (75-82%) in this group endorse at least one anti-Israel attitude, in contrast to 56% in the general population, and 23% (19-26%) hold 6-9 attitudes, in contrast to 9% in the general population. Elevated levels of anti-Israel attitudes are also observed in other groups on the political left: the fairly left-wing and those slightly left-of-centre. The lowest level of anti-Israel attitudes is observed in the political centre and among those who are slightly right-of-centre or fairly right-wing. The very right-wing segment of the population is peculiar: its level of anti-Israel attitudes does not appear to be elevated in a significant way when it is measured as a proportion holding at least one anti-Israel attitude, but when it is measured as a proportion holding strong anti-Israel attitudes, then the level of anti-Israel attitudes in this group is clearly heightened. In general, most of the political right is rather close to the general population, and only very slightly higher than the political centre.

Figure 24. Antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes across the left-right spectrum

Panel A. Maximal diffusion: percentage holding at least one antisemitic/anti-Israel attitude




Panel B. Percentage holding strong antisemitic/anti-Israel attitudes



Notes: (1) The boundaries of ranges are limits of the 95% confidence intervals, so the ranges should be understood as an indication of where an accurate estimate for each group is likely to be situated, with the higher figure (in blue) indicating the likely maximal level and the lower figure (in orange) indicating the likely minimal level. See Figure 23 for group sizes. (2) The dotted red line shows the level of diffusion of antisemitic attitudes (maximal diffusion of 30%, with 3.6% holding 5-8 attitudes) and anti-Israel attitudes (maximal diffusion of 56%, with 9% holding 6-9 anti-Israel attitudes), in the general population.

Figure 25. The religious landscape of contemporary Great Britain



Question: What is your religion, even if you aren't currently practising?

Thus, the very left-wing are, on the whole, no more antisemitic than the general population, but neither are they *less* antisemitic. In the context of the search for locations of heightened levels of antisemitism the latter point can easily be overlooked, but it is an important one. One might assume that those on the far left of the political spectrum would be more likely to hold anti-racist ideas than the population as a whole, but we do not find this to be the case with respect to antisemitism. At the same time, the very left-wing display the strongest anti-Israel attitudes. The very right-wing combine a relatively high level of antisemitic attitudes with a relatively high level of anti-Israel attitudes. In having this unusual combination of attitudes the far-right is truly unique on the British political map.

Two other points are worthy of note. First, no political group is free of the permeation of some antisemitic or anti-Israel attitudes, and in all groups anti-Israel attitudes are more pervasive than antisemitic ones. Second, moving from the political centre towards the right results in a fairly small increase in the diffusion of antisemitic attitudes until the very right margin of the political map is reached, whereas moving from the centre towards the left is accompanied by a steeper and quicker increase in the diffusion of anti-Israel attitudes. A decisive departure from the centre-ground in relation to antisemitic attitudes

is only observed on the far-right, but an equivalent departure from the centre-ground in relation to anti-Israel attitudes is observed everywhere across the left.

### Antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes among certain religious groups in Britain


The majority of the British population, about 90%, is either Christian (the largest religious group) or has no religion (second largest group). The remaining 10% is split between Muslims (about half of this group) and a handful of smaller religious groups, each below 1% of the whole (Figure 25).

A sizeable proportion (36%) of Christians identify with either the Church of England or the Church of Scotland, followed at a small distance by a large group of Christians who do not identify with any particular denomination. Roman Catholicism is the third largest Christian denomination (17%).

When it comes to the major branches of Islam, British Muslims appear to be more homogeneous than British Christians. Almost 80% of British Muslims belong to the Sunni branch, and a small minority (5%) belong to the Shia one. Most of the remainder self-identified in our survey as 'other,' or they refused to say/did not respond.




Figure 26. Christian denominations in Great Britain



Notes: N=2043. Due to rounding, percentages may not always add up to 100%.  
 Question: With which of the following Christian denominations do you most identify?

Figure 27. Branches of Islam in Great Britain




Notes: N=995. Due to rounding, percentages may not always add up to 100%.  
 Question: Which branch of Islam do you follow or most associate with?

The pattern of diffusion of antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes across religious groups is quite straightforward: people without religion


and of various Christian denominations are indistinguishable from each other in relation to both attitudes, and are very close to the levels

Figure 28. Antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes across the religious landscape of Great Britain

Panel A. Maximal diffusion: percentage holding at least one antisemitic/anti-Israel attitude



Panel B. Percentage holding strong antisemitic/anti-Israel attitudes



Notes: (1) the boundaries of ranges are limits of the 95% confidence intervals, so the ranges should be understood as an indication of where an accurate estimate for each group is likely to be situated, with the higher figure (in blue) indicating the likely maximal level and the lower figure (in orange) indicating the likely minimal level; (2) the dotted red line shows the level of diffusion of antisemitic attitudes (maximal diffusion of 30%, with 3.6% holding 5-8 attitudes) and anti-Israel attitudes (maximal diffusion of 56%, with 9% holding 6-9 anti-Israel attitudes), in the general population; (3) categories of religious groups used for calculation of percentages: no religion: N=1550; Christian non-denominational: N=670; Roman Catholic: N=342; Church of England: N=647; Methodist: N=87; Church of Scotland: N=97; Muslim (boosted category): N=995.

found in the population in general (Figure 28). To be precise, no Christian group, nor indeed the group with no religion, is completely exempt of antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes, but equally, there is not a single group among Christian denominations, nor among the group holding 'no religion,' that possesses elevated levels of antisemitic or anti-Israel attitudes. By contrast, Muslims stand out in relation to both types of attitudes: the diffusion of antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes is at a higher level compared to other groups defined by Christianity or no religion, and compared to the general population. At this stage, it is not possible to divide the Muslim sample into subgroups by branches of Islam, as the Sunni branch is so numerically dominant. However, alternative sub-divisions are offered later on in this study, in order to investigate where within the Muslim population any deviations from the general picture may exist. For the time being, looking across the Muslim sample as a whole, we can say that the presence of at least one antisemitic or anti-Israel attitude is 1.3 to 2 times higher among Muslims compared to the general population, and the presence of strong antisemitic or anti-Israel attitudes is 3 to 4 times higher.

### **Antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes: focus on the far-left, far-right and Muslims**

The association found between anti-Israel and antisemitic attitudes among the general population also exists in all political and religious subgroups. However, the political groups retained for detailed analysis here are just those who self-identified in the survey as 'very left-wing' and 'very right-wing' and omit those who self-identified as 'fairly' or 'slightly' left or right-wing, in order to obtain a distilled picture of differences. Given that the views of the Christian population largely align with those of the general population, the only religious group retained for analysis at this stage is the Muslim one.

In the general population, we found that only a small minority of people who do not hold any anti-Israel attitudes registers on the antisemitism index (14%). Among such Muslims and those on the far-left, the figures are very similar. Indeed, in their attitudes to Jews, Muslims who do not hold anti-Israel attitudes are no different


from others who do not hold such attitudes, and score rather better than their equivalent group among the far-right (Figure 29 overleaf). However, where each group's attitudes towards Israel become more negative, the proportion of people appearing on the antisemitism index increases dramatically. The incline is sharpest among Muslims and the far-right, and is most gradual on the far-left, suggesting some counterbalancing factors on the far-left which make it more resistant to antisemitism. However, these factors do not alter the fundamental finding that stronger anti-Israel attitudes are linked to stronger antisemitic attitudes. Among those with the strongest anti-Israel attitudes, two-thirds of those on the far-left and seven in eight of those on the far-right and among Muslims hold at least one antisemitic attitude.

These findings significantly enhance the previously obtained understanding of the association between antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes, both in this report and earlier by Kaplan and Small (2006).<sup>29</sup> In theory, this association did not have to hold in various subgroups in the population, especially given the widely varying values, political preferences and loyalties of these different groups. It is striking to see that a greater degree of antisemitism goes hand-in-hand with heightened anti-Israel attitudes both on the far-left and on the far-right. It stands to reason that the motivations for the development of anti-Israel feeling on the far-left could be rather different from the motivations on the far-right. On the left, for example, it may be driven by universalist, anti-tribalist political ideas, while on the right, nationalistic attitudes would likely prevail. Nevertheless, animosity to Jews will, in high probability, accompany anti-Israel attitudes, should they be present.

Thus, the association between antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes is well defined in all subgroups. This study was not designed to determine the causal mechanisms of this association: at this stage, it is possible that antisemitic ideas drive anti-Israel ones, that anti-Israel ideas drive antisemitic ones, or that both types of attitudes reinforce one another.

<sup>29</sup> See footnote 3.

Figure 29. The association between anti-Israel and antisemitic attitudes among Muslims, the far-left and the far-right: % holding at least one antisemitic attitude, by intensity of anti-Israel attitudes



Notes: Sizes of groups by categories of anti-Israel index are as follows. General population (N=4005): score 0 on anti-Israel index N=1744, score 1-3 on anti-Israel index N=1513, score 4-6 on anti-Israel index N=516, score 7-9 on anti-Israel index N=232. Very left-wing (N=529): score 0 on anti-Israel index N=116, score 1-3 N=196, score 4-6 N=138, score 7-9 N=79. Very right-wing (N=355): score 0 on anti-Israel index N=143, score 1-3 N=115, score 4-6 N=47, score 7-9 N=50. Muslims (N=995): score 0 on anti-Israel index N=250, score 1-3 on anti-Israel index N=225, score 4-6 on anti-Israel index N=264, score 7-9 on anti-Israel index N=256.

### The role of religiosity in shaping antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes


For most self-identifying Christians, Christianity appears to be a largely cultural or ceremonial matter, rather than a strictly religious one: 65% of Christians never or only rarely go to church, and only 15% attend church weekly or more often. About 50% of Christians identify as 'not so religious' or 'not at all religious.' We noted earlier the lack of heightened antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes among Christians in general relative to the general population, and the clear lack

of differentiation in that respect between various Christian denominations. Further to that, we also see that levels of religiosity among Christians, when measured by their self-described degree of religiosity, are also not associated with heightened antisemitism or anti-Israel attitudes (Figure 30).


The conclusion remains the same when Christian religiosity is measured in behavioural terms, i.e. as frequency of church attendance. Higher frequency of church attendance does not correlate in any way with heightened antisemitic or anti-Israel attitudes. (Figure 31).

Figure 30. Antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes among British Christians, by degree of self-described religiosity

Panel A. Maximal diffusion: percentage holding at least one antisemitic/anti-Israel attitude



Panel B. Percentage holding strong antisemitic/anti-Israel attitudes




Notes: (1) the boundaries of ranges are limits of the 95% confidence intervals, so the ranges should be understood as an indication of where an accurate estimate for each group is likely to be situated, with the higher figure (in blue) indicating the likely maximal level and the lower figure (in orange) indicating the likely minimal level; (2) the dotted red line shows the level of the diffusion of antisemitic attitudes (maximal diffusion of 30%, with 3.6% holding 5-8 attitudes) and anti-Israel attitudes (maximal diffusion of 56%, with 9% holding 6-9 anti-Israel attitudes), in the general population.


Question: the degree of religiosity was captured by the following question: 'Of the following statements, which do you consider yourself as being?', with response categories: religious (N=347); somewhat religious (N=646); not so religious (N=595); and not religious (N=440).

Figure 31. Antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes among British Christians, by frequency of church attendance

Panel A. Maximal diffusion: percentage holding at least one antisemitic/anti-Israel attitude




Panel B. Percentage holding strong antisemitic/anti-Israel attitudes



Notes: (1) the boundaries of ranges are limits of the 95% confidence intervals, so the ranges should be understood as an indication of where an accurate estimate for each group is likely to be situated, with the higher figure (in blue) indicating the likely maximal level and the lower figure (in orange) indicating the likely minimal level; (2) the dotted red line shows the level of the diffusion of antisemitic attitudes (maximal diffusion of 30%, with 3.6% holding 5-8 attitudes) and anti-Israel attitudes (maximal diffusion of 56%, with 9% holding 6-9 anti-Israel attitudes), in the general population.

Question: the frequency of church attendance was captured by the following question: 'How often do you go to your place of worship?', with response categories: every day or almost every day (N=37), about once a week (N=274), about once a month (N=140), just on religious holidays (N=261), rarely (N=907), never (N=424).

Figure 32. Opinions held by British Christians about Jews, compared to general population (strongly agree and tend to agree) %



Notes: General population, N=4005; Christians, N=2043. \*This question was only addressed to self-identified Christians. Positive statements are italicised.


Indeed, the Christian pattern of endorsing specific antisemitic ideas is very similar to the pattern exhibited by the general population (Figure 32). Religiously inspired opposition to Jews, as captured by the statement ‘Jews have been cursed or rejected because they do not believe in Christ’, is, however, present among some Christians, although it is at a similar level to other, non-religious, antisemitic ideas. The clear conclusion is that Christianity is not a significant driving factor of antisemitism in Great Britain today.

The intensity of religious life is greater among Muslims than Christians: 40% of Muslims go to a mosque once a week or more often (in contrast to 15% of Christians going to church at least once a week). About 18% of Muslims identify as ‘not


so religious’ or ‘not at all religious’ (in contrast to 50% of Christians). Almost half of all Muslims pray five times a day. Whilst our findings are not conclusive in this regard, antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes among Muslims appear to have some association with intensity of religious belief and practice. This is shown in Figures 33, 34 and 35, where levels of religiosity are measured by self-description (Figure 33) and behaviourally, by frequency of mosque attendance (Figure 34) and the frequency of prayer (Figure 35). As a general rule, both antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes among Muslims are higher in prevalence than in the general population in all groups of Muslims exhibiting *some* degree of religiosity. However, this is not always the case in relation to non-religious (i.e. cultural or ‘heritage’) Muslims whose

Figure 33. Antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes among British Muslims, by degree of self-described religiosity

Panel A. Maximal diffusion: percentage holding at least one antisemitic/anti-Israel attitude



Panel B. Percentage holding strong antisemitic/anti-Israel attitudes




Notes: (1) the boundaries of ranges are limits of the 95% confidence intervals, so the ranges should be understood as an indication of where an accurate estimate for each group is likely to be situated, with the higher figure (in blue) indicating the likely maximal level and the lower figure (in orange) indicating the likely minimal level; (2) the dotted red line shows the level of diffusion of antisemitic attitudes (maximal diffusion of 30%, with 3.6% holding 5-8 attitudes) and anti-Israel attitudes (maximal diffusion of 56%, with 9% holding 6-9 anti-Israel attitudes), in the general population. Question: the degree of religiosity was captured by the following question: 'Of the following statements, which do you consider yourself as being,' with response categories: religious (N=394); somewhat religious (N=390); not so religious (N=140); and not religious (N=44).




Figure 34. Antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes among British Muslims, by frequency of mosque attendance

Panel A. Maximal diffusion: percentage holding at least one antisemitic/anti-Israel attitude




Panel B. Percentage holding strong antisemitic/anti-Israel attitudes




Notes: (1) the boundaries of ranges are limits of the 95% confidence intervals, so the ranges should be understood as an indication of where an accurate estimate for each group is likely to be situated, with the higher figure (in blue) indicating the likely maximal level and the lower figure (in orange) indicating the likely minimal level; (2) the dotted red line shows the level of diffusion of antisemitic attitudes (maximal diffusion of 30%, with 3.6% holding 5-8 attitudes) and anti-Israel attitudes (maximal diffusion of 56%, with 9% holding 6-9 anti-Israel attitudes), in the general population. Question: 'How often, if at all, do you visit a mosque?', with response categories: more than once a week (N=214); once a week (N=181); less than once a week but more than a few times a year (N=143); very occasionally (N=289); never (N=168).

Figure 35. Antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes among British Muslims, by frequency of prayer

Panel A. Maximal diffusion: percentage holding at least one antisemitic/anti-Israel attitude



Panel B. Percentage holding strong antisemitic/anti-Israel attitudes




Notes: (1) the boundaries of ranges are limits of the 95% confidence intervals, so the ranges should be understood as an indication of where an accurate estimate for each group is likely to be situated, with the higher figure (in blue) indicating the likely maximal level and the lower figure (in orange) indicating the likely minimal level; (2) the dotted red line shows the level of diffusion of antisemitic attitudes (maximal diffusion of 30%, with 3.6% holding 5-8 attitudes) and anti-Israel attitudes (maximal diffusion of 56%, with 9% holding 6-9 anti-Israel attitudes), in the general population. Question: 'How often, if at all, do you pray?', with response categories: five times a day (N=461); at least once a day (N=190); less than once a day (N=70); rarely (N=165); never (N=68).

levels of antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes come closest to the levels found in the general population. At the same time, note that *strong* antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes appear to be most clearly linked to greater Muslim religiosity (see Panel B in Figures 33-35), while weaker forms are not.

The association between religiosity among Muslims and antisemitic/anti-Israel attitudes is somewhat less pronounced when the former is measured by frequency of prayer (Figure 35). To be precise, here the association is observed in relation to strong anti-Israel attitudes (Muslims who never pray have the lowest prevalence of strong anti-Israel views), but not in relation to antisemitic attitudes.

The notion that Jews have been cursed or rejected in some way due to their lack of belief in Allah is present among Muslims to some extent (Figure 36), but it does not seem to be central to Muslims' image of Jews. Its prevalence is at a similar level to the equivalent idea held by Christians, and different forms of Holocaust denial or trivialisation, which are the least common antisemitic attitudes among Muslims. This is the case when looking at all Muslims collectively, and when focusing on Muslims who self-identify as religious (see Figure 36). This is also true of strongly antisemitic Muslims (i.e. those scoring 5-8 on the antisemitism index): the prevalence of the notion that Jews are cursed due to their lack of belief in Allah is somewhat higher in that group, but the idea is relatively low in the hierarchy

Figure 36. Opinions held by British Muslims about Jews, compared to the general population (strongly agree and tend to agree) %



Notes: All Muslims N=995. Religious Muslims (N=394) were identified through a question on their degree of religiosity (see note to Figure 33). Positive statements are italicised.

of antisemitic ideas (not shown graphically). These observations amount to a proposition that although levels of religiosity of Muslims, by self-description or behaviour, are linked to elevated levels of antisemitism, this specific theological idea is at most secondary in fuelling it. The antisemitic ideas that resonate most strongly among Muslims, both in general and among the most religious, are rather similar to those held by non-Muslims – i.e. those relating to superiority, wealth, power and the exploitation of victimhood.

This study is primarily concerned with understanding antisemitism in Great Britain, hence the intensive focus on those expressing antisemitic ideas. However, it would be remiss of us not to highlight the parts of the Muslim population that do not hold any antisemitic ideas, and who indeed, either reject them or are neutral about them. Most Muslims (61%) endorse the idea that a British Jew is just as British as any other person, and the equivalent figure among Muslims self-identifying as religious is more or less identical. Most Muslims, both in general and among the most religious, either reject, or are neutral about each of the individual antisemitic motifs presented to them – none of the ideas shown in Figure 36 scores higher than 28% agreement (for Muslims in general) and 34% for religious Muslims. Thus broad stigmatisation of all Muslims is neither accurate nor helpful – whilst we do find heightened levels of both antisemitic and anti-Israel ideas within the Muslim population, significant proportions of Muslims reject all such prejudice. In utilising these findings to seek to combat antisemitism in Great Britain, this fact must be clearly understood.

British Islam possesses a few conservative, or fundamentalist, religious orientations. The core characteristic of these orientations is the strict religious adherence of their followers and the perception of early Islam, its key figures and early Muslim society, as a pure form of Islam and the ideal social order to be reproduced in contemporary times. Three different questions in the survey allowed for the identification of these fundamentalist Islamic orientations. The first question, directed to Sunni Muslims only, asked them about the type of Sunni Islam that they espouse, with response options including some well-known fundamentalist orientations. The second question, directed to all Muslims, asked

whether or not they support a *sharia*-prescribed death penalty in various circumstances for leaving Islam. The third question, also directed to all Muslims, asked whether or not British Muslims should participate in the British democratic process in the form of voting in UK elections – a practice opposed in some circles of political Islam. Among British Sunni Muslims, about 5% identify as Salafi (one dominant form of such conservative orientations originating from the Middle East), and a further 10% identify as Deobandi or Barelvi (additional forms of religious conservatism with roots in South Asia). Thus, approximately 15% of Sunni Muslims and 11% of all Muslims in the UK could be identified with these conservative movements. Self-described Salafis, Barelvi and Deobandi Muslims are indeed more religious, compared to other Muslims; however, adherence to religious practice among this groups as a whole is in no way universal: 61% of this group pray five times a day (45% among the rest of Muslims) and a similar proportion attends mosque at least once a week (37% among the rest). 92% described themselves as either ‘religious’ or ‘somewhat religious’ (77% among the rest), with all differences being statistically significant.

For many adherents to these more conservative forms of Islam, the main meaning of their religious choice is simply religious devotion. Only some adherents espouse extremist, highly politicised and/or militant views of Islam, i.e. a desire to see an uncompromising application of Islamic religious law (*sharia*) or jihadi orientations. In response to the survey question on whether or not people who leave Islam should face the death penalty, 13% of British Muslims responded positively.<sup>30</sup> When cross-classified with conservative religious orientations, about 28% of Muslims who identified as Salafi, Deobandi and Barelvi answered positively, in contrast to 11% of all other Muslims (a statistically significant difference). So, the relationship between Islamic

30 The question read: ‘If someone is judged through the due process of shari’a, and it is established that they have left Islam, do you or do you not believe that they should face the death penalty?’. Responses: Please tick all that apply: 1. Yes, in all circumstances; 2. Yes, if they live in an Islamic State; 3. Yes, if they live in a Muslim country; 4. No, if they live in the UK; 5. No, regardless of where they live; 6. Not sure. The figure of 13% takes into account all respondents who chose response options 1-3.


religious conservatism and extremist orientations exists, though, self-evidently, only a minority of Muslims associated with the more conservative forms of the faith embrace extreme political forms of Islam. Only a very small handful of Muslims (1.3% of the total) said that they believe that Muslims definitely should not vote in UK elections, and a further 3.7% answered somewhat less categorically – i.e. that British Muslims probably should not vote.

Are Muslims who belong to these conservative forms more antisemitic than other Muslims? In order to test this hypothesis, Muslims self-identifying as Salafi, Deobandi or Barelvi (114 cases) and Muslims agreeing to some degree with the application of the death penalty for leaving Islam (131 cases) were separated from all other Muslims and various measures of antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes were computed for both groups. This analysis revealed that levels of antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes among people self-identifying as Salafi, Deobandi or Barelvi broadly resembled the levels documented among all other Muslims. To be precise, the level of antisemitism appeared slightly elevated among the conservatives, but the difference did not reach

statistical significance. However, among those who agreed at least to some extent with the idea of a sharia prescribed death penalty for leaving Islam, the levels of antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes were higher in statistically significant terms when compared to other Muslims. For example, 74% in this group hold at least one antisemitic attitude (in contrast to 54% among other Muslims), and 34% in this group hold 5-8 antisemitic attitudes (in contrast to 9% among other Muslims). In sum, political Islamism – rather than religious conservatism as such – comes with the highest levels of antisemitism inside the Muslim population.

It is important to stress, however, that, while *contributing* to the elevated levels of antisemitism among British Muslims, the presence of political Islamism does not explain the elevated levels of antisemitism, or indeed anti-Israel attitudes, among Muslims compared to the general population. When the most likely adherents of Islamic fundamentalism were experimentally removed from the calculations, Muslims still exhibited higher levels of antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes relative to the general population, as Figure 37 illustrates.

Figure 37. Strong antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes among British Muslims, with and without adherents to conservative forms of Islam and political Islam



Note: total number of Muslims: 995; Muslims without self-identified Salafi, Deobandi and Barelvi (N=881); Muslims without supporters of death penalty for leaving Islam (N=864).  
 Questions: (1) 'What type of Sunni are you?', with response categories: Salafi (N=38); Deobandi (N=31); Barelvi (N=45); just Sunni (N=508); all other (N=140). (2) 'If someone is judged through the due process of shari'a, and it is established that they have left Islam, do you or do you not believe that they should face the death penalty?', with responses: yes, in all circumstances (N=53); yes, if they live in an Islamic state (N=50); yes, if they live in a Muslim country (N=52); no, if they live in the UK (N=67); no, regardless of where they live (N=536); not sure (N=277).

The results regarding the association between religiosity among Muslims and attitudes to Jews (i.e. the least religious Muslims are also the least antisemitic) align with the findings of the major cross-European survey of religious attitudes towards Jews and other groups among Muslims of Turkish and Moroccan origin, conducted in 2008 (The Six Country Immigrant Integration Comparative Survey, or SCIICS).<sup>31</sup> SCIICS did not cover the UK; it focused on Muslims and Christians in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. This report adds significantly to the SCIICS findings in that it allows to consolidate the ‘religiosity-antisemitism’ link in relation to Muslims in Europe as a whole, by adding the previously unexplored case of British Muslims, most of whom are of South Asian origin. SCIICS also found especially high levels of antisemitic attitudes among Muslims espousing fundamentalist convictions, and it also revealed that relatively high levels of antisemitism persisted among religious Muslims without fundamentalist convictions. The SCIICS findings led to the conclusion that heightened religiosity among Muslims was linked to antisemitism even when uncomplicated by fundamentalism. However, SCIICS also found elevated antisemitic attitudes among religious Christians in those countries – something that this study did not find in the case of Great Britain. Thus, it is possible to conclude, with a degree of caution, that the pattern of attitudes to Jews among Muslims in Great Britain appears to be similar to other parts of Europe, whereas the Christian pattern is different.

### Apportioning ‘responsibility’

This chapter has focused its attention on various subgroups suspected of holding unusually high levels of antisemitic attitudes among the population of Great Britain. Yet to what extent are these groups responsible for the totality of antisemitism in the country? Political debates both within and beyond the Jewish community often focus on such groups, but the role of various

groups in relation to any phenomenon is not only a matter of the concentration of this phenomenon within these groups, but is also related to the actual size of the group within the population as a whole. The sizes of the far-right, the far-left and Muslims in British society are rather small. The far-right (very right-wing in this survey’s terminology) is the weakest in numerical terms. It constitutes less than 2% of the population of Great Britain and about 7% of those who identify as being right-of-centre politically. The far-left (very left-wing in this survey’s terminology) is somewhat larger: about 3.5% of the population and 13% of those who identify as being left of centre politically. Muslims constitute 4.5% of the UK population, both according to the 2011 Census and to the results of this survey. Thus together, all three groups form about 10% of the country’s population.<sup>32</sup>

Taking into account both the strength of antisemitism in each group and the sizes of these groups leads to the conclusion that the overall ‘responsibility’ of these groups for the total level of antisemitism in Great Britain is, in fact, rather small. 30% of the population hold at least one antisemitic attitude, for example, but only about four percentage points in this figure can be attributed to the far-right, the far-left and Muslims, in combination. 3.6% of the population hold 5-8 antisemitic attitudes, and one percentage point in this figure can be attributed to these groups. Expressed slightly differently, if these groups exhibited the average level of antisemitism found in the population as a whole, then the proportion of those who hold at least one antisemitic attitude in society as a whole would only fall to 28%, a very insignificant reduction. Similarly, the proportion of those who hold 5-8 antisemitic attitudes would only fall to 3%. In short, whilst these groups all have a tendency to exhibit unusually high levels of antisemitic and/or anti-Israel attitudes, a great deal of antisemitic sentiment, at various levels, lies elsewhere.

31 Koopmans, R. (2015.) ‘Religious fundamentalism and hostility against out-groups: a comparison of Muslims and Christians in Western Europe’, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 41 (1): 33-57.

32 10% is the upper limit to the combined size of these groups because this figure does not take into account some degree of overlap between the groups (e.g. some Muslims also form a part of the very left-wing group), but the calculations presented here ignore the existence of the overlap and treat the groups as mutually exclusive.

## Conclusion

The scientific study of antisemitism, in the UK and globally, is not a neglected field. Indeed, quite the opposite. It is a vibrant field exhibiting a diversity of schools of thought and an impressive quantity of research outputs. The last decade alone has seen at least eight serious compositions published on the subject<sup>33</sup> and at least fifteen surveys of the British population's attitudes to Jews conducted by different organisations, some global, others local. This reality raises the question: why this study? Indeed, what questions have escaped scholarly attention so far and how does this study address them? The truth of the matter is that, despite the proliferation of various research outputs, to date we have found it difficult to come up with a single example of a strictly empirical, quantitative scientific study of antisemitism in the United Kingdom. All published studies on this topic have relied on historical methods, participant observation or literary analysis, and, while the quality of their insights is undoubted, there is an obvious omission: a panoramic, empirical, numerical picture of the state of antisemitism. However, there has not been an absolute void in an empirical sense. The burgeoning polling industry has equipped us with a basic understanding of the scope of antisemitic attitudes in society. However, with the arrival of such raw data, analytical and policy questions regarding antisemitism have proliferated rather than diminished in scope. That, in itself, is not a problem: such is the fundamental nature of the scientific quest. With every question answered, the next question presents itself. However, there has been, in our assessment, some stagnation with formulating and sharpening that 'next question.' While the scope of antisemitism in the UK as a whole, and even in subgroups defined by age, sex and class, has become quite well understood, it has not been particularly clear what

33 Several major studies of antisemitism were referenced in footnote 1. Two additional studies should be added to the list, both focusing on antisemitism on the political left: Fine, R. and Spencer, P. (2017) *Antisemitism and the left: on the return of the Jewish question*. Manchester: Manchester University Press; Hirsh, D. (2018). *Contemporary Left antisemitism*. London and New York: Routledge. These have not yet been reviewed by this author as they were published in the course of the preparation of this report, yet it is important that they feature among the references of this report.

to do with these findings – either analytically, scientifically or in policy terms.

A research paper published by JPR in May 2015 (*Could it happen here?*) proposed a new agenda for the empirical study of antisemitism.<sup>34</sup> That paper, published in the aftermath of the murderous attacks on Jews in Paris and Copenhagen and the ensuing surge in journalistic commentary on the topic of antisemitism, consolidated the insights from various surveys of antisemitic attitudes and from other sources (e.g. administrative records of antisemitic events), and identified directions towards which the empirical study of antisemitism should be re-orientated. In particular, it maintained that far greater definitional clarity is needed regarding the nature of the problem under investigation. What is meant by 'definitional clarity' in this instance is not how, exactly, antisemitism is defined (enough is known on this topic to be able to capture antisemitic attitudes in quantitative form), but something more fundamental – namely, clarity about specific problems that require investigation, and a readiness to craft scientifically robust research designs which are strongly focused on these specific problems. More surveys and more data, it was maintained, will not result in a better understanding of antisemitism without such a commitment to investigating specific problems. Instead we maintained:

*"... we need to ascertain what it is that is of chief concern to British Jews; what it is that is causing the level of concern and fear that has been widely reported in the media. Much of the data ... demonstrates that, taken as a whole, the British population does not appear to be overwhelmingly antisemitic, certainly when contrasted with other European or Middle Eastern populations. In theory, at least, this should bring significant comfort to British Jews, and assuage many concerns. Yet, the discourse about Israel, particularly in summer 2014, the spike in antisemitic incidents that took place at that time, and an uncomfortable sense that an Islamist extremist attack on a Jewish site or sites in the UK*

34 Boyd, J. and Staetsky, L. Daniel. (2015). *Could it happen here? What existing data tell us about contemporary antisemitism in the UK*. London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research.

*is almost inevitable, are all generating widespread anxiety. In building a research agenda going forward, one needs to be absolutely clear about the specific problems that require investigation, and then focus energy clearly and robustly on those.*" (Boyd and Staetsky, 2015, p.27).

*Could it happen here?* made two additional points that are worth reiterating briefly. First, it stressed the need to benchmark antisemitic attitudes, i.e. to establish the dimensions of this phenomenon that can be considered 'standard' or 'normal,' not from a utopian perspective where such a benchmark would be zero, but rather from a more realistic perspective that takes into account the notion that the simple existence of any minorities in a society is likely to be accompanied by at least some degree of antipathy towards them. It maintained that benchmarking could be done by monitoring antisemitic attitudes, as well as other expressions of antisemitism, in a consistent fashion over an extended period of time. Registering the levels of antisemitic attitudes, and other expressions of antisemitism, both at times of political tranquillity and economic prosperity and at times of turbulence, will eventually clarify the levels that can be considered high and dangerous and the levels that can be considered low and standard. Further, it argued that benchmarking can only be carried out if the levels of antisemitism are measured consistently, using the same methods and tools over time. It is only in this way that changes in trends can be attributed to genuine changes in the prevalence of antisemitism, rather than to a change in the method of measurement.

Second, *Could it happen here?* pointed out the necessity of understanding the prevalence of antisemitism in subgroups rather than simply at the general population level, and the numerical importance of these subgroups as part of the general population. Changes in the prevalence of antisemitic attitudes in society can stem from a change in the intensity of antisemitism *inside* various groups within society, but can also occur from a change in the *size* of these groups. This understanding is practically absent from the empirical study of antisemitism today. To be precise, the most obvious candidate subgroups for an in-depth study of antisemitism have been readily identified by observers (e.g. the far-left, the far-right and Muslims). However, there is very little awareness of the fact that their impact

on the level and development of antisemitism in the general population is mediated not only by the level and development of antisemitism within these groups but also by their numerical weight. Commitment to benchmarking ought to take into account the need to monitor the size of certain population groups, not only how antisemitic these groups are.

The survey of antisemitic attitudes in Great Britain conducted by JPR in 2016/17 and the first report published on the back of this survey represent the continuation of JPR's engagement in the empirical study of antisemitism along the lines established in *Could it happen here?* This report attempted to implement the recommendations outlined in that study. The survey of antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes in the general population of Great Britain was carried out in late autumn 2016 and early winter 2017, partly in a traditional face to face mode and partly online, and it created a representative sample of 5,466 observations. Subgroups of special interest from the point of view of antisemitism research (the far-left, the far-right and Muslims) were oversampled (boosted) in the course of a second phase of the fieldwork to reach numerical sizes that would allow detailed intra-group analysis. A sample of this size and the application of boosting made it possible to describe the prevalence and intensity of antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes at very high resolution. We could investigate these attitudes not only at the level of broad religious and political subgroups, for example, but also *inside* these groups: by level and type of religiosity in relation to religious groups and by shade of political preference in relation to political groups. It will be vital to continue documenting the prevalence and intensity of antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes in a detailed fashion in the future, whilst simultaneously tracing the developments in the size of political and religious subgroups and any re-organisation of the British political and religious map. Whilst the prospects of the repetition of a survey on this scale are uncertain at the moment, the groundwork for high-resolution benchmarking has been laid by this survey and report.

The strength of analysis offered in this report owes a great deal to the size of the dataset and the detail that it provides, as well as to our determination to let realistic and very specific concerns and questions about antisemitism, held



by Jews and non-Jews, inform the line of inquiry. Such concerns and questions are completely external to the data and they remain at the heart of Jewish communal conversations and national political debates on antisemitism. The quality of these conversations and debates can and should be substantially enhanced if a dataset containing 5,466 cases can be harnessed to produce insights of direct relevance. How much antisemitism *really* exists? If antisemitism is indeed low in prevalence, as recent surveys seem to suggest, then what accounts for the significant anxiety among Jews about it? Where is antisemitism located exactly and how do political and religious groups differ in that respect? Are antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes related, as some think, or are they completely independent of each other, as others maintain?

#### **How much antisemitism really exists: the 'elastic view'**

We found that unambiguous, well-defined antisemitism is distinctly a minority position in Great Britain. Approximately 2-5% (when expressed as a range) or 3.6% (when expressed as an average) of the general population in Britain hold attitudes of a kind and intensity that would qualify as being called antisemitic. We explored how different ways of asking survey questions and different assumptions at the stage of analysis result in somewhat different answers to the question of the prevalence of antisemitism. While it is true that what one finds depends to some extent on the question one asks and how it is framed and worded, our overall characterisation of the scope of *serious* antisemitism in Great Britain did not change as a result of experimentation with different methods of asking. The numerical assessment of 2-5% is based on those respondents who openly admitted to having an unfavourable opinion of Jews and/or endorsed a significant number of views that most Jews regard as antisemitic. Incidentally, the proportion of people who think that politically or religiously motivated violence towards Jews is often justified in defence of their political or religious beliefs is even smaller, about 1%, with a further 3% thinking that it is sometimes justified.

In a typical commentary, a range of 2-5% will be characterised unquestionably as indicative of a 'low prevalence' of antisemitic attitudes. That, however, is an intuitive characterisation, which

is as arithmetically correct as it is analytically indefensible. There is no way of knowing what is high and what is low as long as the substantive question of what a dangerous level of the prevalence of negativity in social terms remains unanswered. What levels can be considered 'safe' or 'concerning'? At what level does it become 'dangerous'? This is not something that can be solved now, nor is it something that should rely solely on the precision of survey estimates, so we can only put it on the back burner for the time being and hope that the future development of social scientific methods will produce some much needed clarity.

In the meantime, we turn to a different group of people – most of whom cannot meaningfully be described as antisemitic, but who may express some degree of negativity towards Jews and/or endorse one or two attitudes that a majority of Jews are likely to *perceive or experience as antisemitic*. About 25% of the British population belong to this group, which, when added to the 5% who qualify as antisemitic, sums to about 30% of the population of Great Britain. This figure can be thought of as the level of *maximal diffusion of antisemitic attitudes* in Great Britain in 2017. The shift of focus from 'counting antisemites' (as implied by identifying the 2-5% share of the hard-core antisemitic people, and labelling them as such) to 'quantifying antisemitism' (as implied by the emphasis on the diffusion of views and ideas) may appear to be subtle, but it is extremely important. 'Antisemite' is an extremely negative political label, and it should only be applied with caution and common sense. Whilst it may be applicable to about 5% of the population, it cannot be used indiscriminately in relation to the remaining 25%. However, the real difficulty with the application of this label to the latter groups is not political, but analytical. Labelling them as such obscures their real role in the picture of antisemitism in Britain. Whilst they are in no way committed political antisemites, they still have an important bearing on how Jews perceive antisemitism, albeit in a very specific way. Most Jews do not come into regular contact with strongly antisemitic individuals. Such people are few in number to start with; the small scope of strong antisemitism in itself limits how frequently these views are encountered. However, what Jews are exposed to far more frequently are people who hold, and from time to time may express, views that make Jews feel uncomfortable

or offended. A person expressing such a view (e.g. ‘Jews think that they are better than other people’) may hold this view in isolation and may indeed hold a weak version of it, but when it is casually voiced in front of a Jewish individual, it can cause considerable upset and concern. Social encounters are not always conducive to an in-depth investigation of what stands behind a single expressed view (i.e. why is he/she saying this? Is there more to this than meets the eye? How serious is this view? etc). After such an encounter, a Jew may be left with a nagging doubt as to the meaning of what he or she just heard, with a sense of slight insult, uncertainty and anxiety. Thus, whilst 25% of the population may not be antisemitic in any reasonable sense of that term, some of their views could be identified by many Jews as such. With 30% of the population in total holding potentially uncomfortable or upsetting views from a Jewish perspective, anxieties among Jews about widespread antisemitism become instantly more understandable. The probability of encountering such a view is not one in twenty (as it is when only strongly antisemitic individuals are accounted for) but rather one in three.

### **How do political and religious groups differ in relation to antisemitism?**

Levels of antisemitism among people who self-identify as Christians are no different from those found in the general population. This is irrespective of the Christian denomination, or the level of Christian belief or practice investigated. Due to the size of the dataset we could quantify levels of antisemitism separately among Anglicans, Catholics, Methodists and non-denominational Christians, as well as by frequency of church attendance and self-description as religious or not. No Christian group, however defined, exhibited elevated levels of antisemitism. To be sure, the Christian theological idea that Jews are cursed in some way because they do not believe in Christ is still in circulation among a small minority of Christians, but its current role in feeding antisemitic feelings and thoughts is unclear and probably minimal.

However, the situation with Muslims stands in stark contrast to the situation with Christians. About 13% of Muslims hold hard-core antisemitic attitudes, compared to 3.6% in the general population (3.5 times higher). Further, 56% of Muslims hold at least one antisemitic attitude,

which is nearly twice as high as the equivalent measure of the maximal diffusion of antisemitic attitudes in the general population (30%). And among Muslims, the prevalence of antisemitism varies in some way with the degree of religiosity. The only group of Muslims whose level of antisemitic attitudes approaches the level of the general population is those who self-identify as non-religious and/or are non-practising.

Looking at the political spectrum of British society, the most antisemitic group consists of those who identify as very right-wing. In this group about 14% hold hard-core antisemitic attitudes and 52% hold at least one attitude, compared again to 3.6% and 30% in the general population. The very left-wing, and, in fact, all political groups located on the left, are no more antisemitic than the general population. This finding may come as a surprise to those who maintain that in today’s political reality, the left is the more serious, or at least, an equally serious source of antisemitism, than the right. Indeed, Jewish victims of antisemitic violence or harassment identify Muslims and the far-left as the chief perpetrators. This perception is not limited to victims of antisemitism. Three academic studies on the topic of left-wing antisemitism have been published over the past two years,<sup>35</sup> clearly indicating that the perception that the left has an issue with antisemitism is quite prevalent in the minds of Jews and scholars of political sociology and history. Is this view misguided or rooted in error? Not quite. It is simply insufficiently precise.

The left tends to see itself, and is commonly regarded, as an anti-racist and egalitarian political group, both in terms of its political goals and its *modus operandi*. This image tends to impact on people’s expectations of the left or, at the very least, draws attention to how well (or otherwise) it performs in relation to its own proclaimed values. We found that the left (including the far-left) is *no less* antisemitic than the general population. This is not a trivial finding, as it runs counter to the left’s self-proclaimed ethos. When the expectation is to find less antisemitism than elsewhere, the finding of ‘just the same’ level of antisemitism as elsewhere is likely to be noticed by politically attuned individuals. Simultaneously embarrassing the left and being used as a weapon by its critics,

35 See footnotes 1 and 33.

this dissonance becomes the centre of attention and gets accentuated.

That, however, is not the whole story. The prevalence of antisemitism on the far-right is considerably higher than on the far-left. However, in the context of realistic social encounters, it is not only the prevalence of antisemitism within the group that matters, but also the size of the group on the political map. While 14% of the far-right are strongly antisemitic, the far-right constitutes just 1.4% of all British adults. By comparison, while only 3-4% of the far-left are strongly antisemitic, the share of the far-left in the British adult population is higher (3.5%). The political centre is indistinguishable from the general population when it comes to strong antisemitism, but it is a heavyweight political group in the population: 30-40% of British adults self-define as belonging to the centre. Based on data from the European Social Survey, the British political map is somewhat fluid over time. However, even after accounting for this fluidity, the conclusion that the far-right remains marginal in British politics in general, as well as on the broader political right, holds good.<sup>36</sup> The probability of meeting someone who exhibits a combination of a given political preference and strong antisemitism is a joint function of the prevalence of strong antisemitism inside the political group and its relative share in the population. When both of these factors are taken into account, it appears that the probability of encountering a strongly antisemitic right-wing individual may not be very different from the probability of encountering a strongly antisemitic left-wing/politically centrist individual.<sup>37</sup> About

36 The European Social Survey can be accessed on <http://nesstar.ess.nsd.uib.no/webview/>. Among other things, the survey allows to track the development of British political affiliations, in terms of the left-right spectrum. Years 2002-2014 were characterised by some increase in the share of the far-left, but with a fundamental stability of the basic division into left, right and centre political blocks.

37 The probability is achieved by the multiplication of proportions of strongly antisemitic individuals inside each group by the population share of this group. For example: the very right-wing comprise 1.4% of the population, with 14% being strongly antisemitic. For the fairly right-wing, the corresponding proportions are 6.4% and 4.1%; for the very left-wing the proportions are 3.5% and 4.2%; and for the fairly left-wing they are 12% and 3.6%. Under this scenario, the probability of encountering a strongly antisemitic individual identifying as very or fairly left-wing is

four in every hundred British adults are strongly antisemitic, and, depending on the assumption made about their political composition, 1 to 2 individuals out of four will be right-wing, and 2 to 3 will be left-wing or centrist. Admittedly, emotional and political characterisations are not made on the basis of the exact calculation of probabilities of an encounter, but the point that, in the population, right-wing antisemitic individuals may be as common (or uncommon, depending on the perspective) as non-right-wing (i.e. left-wing and centrist) individuals goes some way towards explaining why left-wing antisemitism is perceived to be such a problem. However, in exploring these issues further, one also needs to take into account the issue of anti-Israel attitudes.

### ***Antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes: are they related?***

The prevalence of anti-Israel attitudes was assessed in the survey by an entire battery of questions focusing exclusively on what respondents feel and think about Israel, independently from what they feel and think about Jews. We did not relate, in the first instance, to the question of whether or not anti-Israel attitudes are antisemitic. It is a bitterly contested issue that we approached empirically and without prejudice. However, before reviewing the results of this part of our investigation, it is worth recalling the Jewish perspective on it. All of the selected antisemitic statements and all of the selected anti-Israel statements were chosen on the basis of empirical evidence showing that a majority of the UK Jewish population considered all of them to be 'probably antisemitic' at least (FRA 2012). Thus, irrespective of whether or not a member of the British public expressing any of these views considers them to be antisemitic, there is a high probability that a significant proportion of Jews will experience them as such, or, at the very least, as potentially uncomfortable, offensive or prejudicial to some degree.

Now to the numerical aspects. The prevalence of anti-Israel attitudes is considerably higher than the prevalence of antisemitic attitudes: 56% of the general population hold at least one anti-Israel attitude and about 9% hold strong anti-

$(0.035*0.042)+(0.12*0.036)=0.00578$ , or 0.578%. The probability of an encounter with a strongly antisemitic individual identifying as a very or fairly right-wing is  $(0.014*0.14)+(0.064*0.041)=0.00458$ , or 0.458%.

Israel attitudes (in fact, it is a range of 9-12%, but a single point is chosen for the convenience of exposition). Invoking the 'elastic view' infuses the figures above with real social meaning. Whilst strong anti-Israel attitudes are held by a distinct minority (about one in ten), the diffusion of anti-Israel attitudes is considerable: over half of British adults holds at least one of these attitudes, to some extent at least. Given this, any feeling among Jews that they are exposed to anti-Israel positions 'all the time' becomes immediately comprehensible.

Negativity towards Israel is also differentiated by political preference and religion. Anti-Israel positions are stronger than average on the left side of the political map, particularly on the far-left, but also among those who self-identify as 'fairly left-wing' or slightly left-of-centre. The maximal diffusion of anti-Israel attitudes on the left is in the range of 67-78% (compared to 56% in the general population), and strong anti-Israel attitudes are held by 14-23% of the left (compared to 9% in the general population). To be sure, heightened levels of anti-Israel attitudes exist on the far-right as well, with 19% there being strongly anti-Israel, but, as mentioned before, the size of that group in the population is very small. The anti-Israel attitudes of Christians are at the same levels as the general population, without any signs of differentiation by Christian group. The anti-Israel attitudes of Muslims are considerably higher: 75% of Muslims hold at least one anti-Israel attitude and 35% hold strong anti-Israel attitudes.

We have discovered that anti-Israel attitudes are not, *as a general rule*, antisemitic. This is to say that a significant proportion of those who hold anti-Israel attitudes, a majority in fact, do not espouse any antisemitic attitudes. Yet, we have also seen that a *significant minority* of those who hold the anti-Israel attitudes tested here hold them alongside antisemitic attitudes. Therefore, antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes exist both separately and together. In numerical terms: 32% of the British population hold at least one anti-Israel attitude and no antisemitic attitudes whatsoever; 6% hold at least one antisemitic attitude but no anti-Israel attitudes; and 24% hold both types of attitudes. Focusing on those with particularly strong views, 7% hold at least six anti-Israel attitudes, 1.6% at least five antisemitic attitudes, and 2% hold both of these. The proportion of people who are strongly antisemitic

and strongly anti-Israel at the same time is greater than one would expect if there was simply a chance relationship between the two attitudes. So, asserting that antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes are unrelated (effectively, that people critical of Israel have absolutely nothing against Jews) would be a misdiagnosis of the situation; equally, maintaining that they are always related (that people critical of Israel are necessarily antisemitic) is also wrong. Our findings and conclusions are well aligned with the findings of Kaplan and Small (2006).<sup>38</sup> Our analysis lacks the capacity to identify causality. What remains unclear is just how the connection between the two types of attitudes arises, when it does. Do people develop anti-Israel attitudes because they are antisemitic? Does adopting an anti-Israel position become just one more channel for expressing antisemitism? Or, alternatively, do people become antisemitic as a side-effect of their anti-Israel attitudes and activities? Future research will have to tackle the question of the chain and order of the acquisition of these two types of attitudes.

This report has been devoted to antisemitism, a lingering social and political problem in Western societies. Antisemitism remains high on the agenda of Jewish communal organisations. It is a serious issue from the point of view of the British state and civil society, not uniquely so, but as part of a broader agenda of trying to maintain harmonious relations in a diverse and diversifying society. With this in mind, it is worth stressing a fact that runs the risk of being understated in a problem-centered report: levels of antisemitism in Great Britain are among the lowest in the world. British Jews constitute a religious and ethnic group that is seen overwhelmingly positively by the absolute majority of the British population: about 70% of the British population have a favourable opinion of Jews and do not entertain any antisemitic ideas or views at all. In this respect, Jews are similar to some other religious minorities, most notably Hindus. As for the animosity towards Jews felt by a minority of British adults, we believe, having invested considerable effort into its detailed characterisation, that the ball now lies in the court of policy makers both within and beyond the Jewish community. This report is as much a scholarly study as it is an invitation for policy debate.

38 See footnote 3.

## Methodology

The 2016/17 survey of antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes is the largest ever population survey conducted on this topic in Great Britain. It was developed by JPR, with input from the Community Security Trust (CST), the Antisemitism Policy Trust and Ipsos MORI at the questionnaire development stage. The fieldwork was carried out face to face and online by Ipsos MORI, on behalf of JPR. Data analysis and report-writing were carried out exclusively by JPR.

### Questionnaire and sample design

The survey questionnaire was developed by considering the following sources: (1) historical research on antisemitism; (2) past surveys of antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes conducted by various research institutes and polling companies (such as the Pew Center Global Attitudes survey, the Anti-Defamation League Global 100 study etc.); and (3) the advice of practitioners developing policy responses to antisemitism (such as the CST).

The survey was carried out in two modes: face to face and online. The fieldwork was conducted between 28 October 2016 and 24 February 2017. The face to face mode relied on random sampling of the general population aged 16 and over in Great Britain. In order to do this, Office for National Statistics (ONS) Output Areas were grouped into sample units, each containing approximately 500 addresses. A total of 170-180 sample units were then randomly selected from stratified groupings with probability of selection proportionate to size. Target quotas for sex, age, working status and tenure were set for the interviewers. The application of quotas makes it difficult to calculate the exact response rate. It is estimated that 10-12 addresses needed to be accessed by the interviewer for one interview to take place. Given the existence of the quotas, this would mean a *minimal* response rate of 8-10%. The face to face mode generated a nationally representative sample of 2,003 observations (implying a 2% margin of error in application to the full sample).

The national online sample of 2,002 observations was created by inviting members of the voluntary commercial panel maintained by Ipsos MORI to participate in the survey. This panel is comprised

of approximately 220,000 members, all of whom have volunteered to take part in market research surveys. The panel includes various hard to reach groups on the internet (such as ethnic minority groups, young people, the elderly), who have been recruited via various 'wide net' methodologies (e.g. email campaigns, affiliate networks, text advertisements, search engines, specialised websites) and customised incentives and materials. In building the national online sample, target quotas were set for sex, age, working status and geographical region (but not for tenure). It is not possible to estimate the response rate for the national online sample.

In both face to face and online modes, the core part of the questionnaire relating to attitudes to Jews was offered to respondents for self-completion. While self-completion is the only logical possibility for the online mode, it was implemented in the face to face mode as well to minimise any effects of the interviewer's presence on respondents' answers, particularly to potentially sensitive questions. The average length of the interview on the attitudinal part of the questionnaire was 15.5 minutes.

Since the analytical focus of this project was to allow an in-depth investigation of antisemitism in subgroups of the British population, certain groups, suspected of harbouring especially hostile views towards Jews or Israel (i.e. Muslims, the far-left and the far-right) were boosted in the course of sampling. Boosting took place both in the face to face and the online modes. For Muslims, the total number of observations available for analysis was 995; for the far-left it was 529 observations; and for the far-right it was 355 observations. Table A1 shows the origin and the numbers in each subsample, in total and by subgroup of interest.

Most analyses at the level of the general population in this report were carried out on the dataset of 4,005 observations, which combined the face to face and the online samples (henceforth referred to as the combined national sample).

There has been considerable debate around the appropriateness of the use of online panels based on volunteers for estimating the prevalence of various attitudes in the general population. It is

Table A1. 2016/17 survey of antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes: samples

The national samples					
	Total	which includes:	Muslims	Far-left	Far-right
Nationally representative face to face sample	2003		145	72	24
National online sample	2002		35	69	33
Total	4005		180	141	57
Boosters					
	Total	which includes:	Muslims	Far-left	Far-right
Face to face	613		350	195	71
Online	848		465	193	227
Total	1461		815	388	298
Total in dataset					
	Total	which includes:	Muslims	Far-left	Far-right
Face to face	2616		495	267	95
Online	2850		500	262	260
Grand total, available for analysis	<b>5466</b>		<b>995</b>	<b>529</b>	<b>355</b>


important to emphasise that the classic texts in survey sampling do not address this issue in a systematic way simply due to its very novelty: the use of volunteer panels on a large scale, as a cost and effort-saving replacement for genuine random samples, is a relatively recent phenomenon in the polling industry. The beginnings of scholarly consideration of this development are documented in an edited volume on online panels published by Wiley in its series on survey methodology, and in a special issue of *Public Opinion Quarterly* in 2017.<sup>39</sup> The debate has not been limited to strictly professional statistical circles but has attracted the interest of the general public, particularly within the context of predicting national election outcomes. In view of these debates, it is important that full clarity exists regarding the characteristics of the face to face and online samples. The sections below provide this.

39 See: Callegaro, M., Baker, R., Bethlehem, J., Göritz, A. S., Krosnick, J. A. and Lavrakas, P. J. (eds.) (2014). *Online Panel Research: A Data Quality Perspective*, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, Chichester, UK. DOI: 10.1002/9781118763520.ch1. See also: *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 2017, volume 81, Special Issue.

### How representative is the combined national sample?

The face to face sample can be considered fully nationally representative due to the sampling method used. Whilst deviation from representativeness may still occur as a result of non-response, the significance of such deviation for the patterns of response related to antisemitism depends on the scope and nature of non-response. After comparing the composition of the face to face sample to the true population composition, as documented by official demographic and social statistics, we concluded that the sample provides a reliable picture of the fundamental socio-demographic features of the population of Great Britain. Such comparison was not possible in relation to attitudinal variables, but the existence of a good match in relation to socio-demographic characteristics suggests that the face to face sample is representative of the national picture of attitudes towards Jews and Israel. The online sample cannot be considered fully nationally representative, due to its reliance on a self-selecting panel with unknown probabilities of inclusion. However, its composition is close enough to the face to face sample, as shown below, to justify combining

Figure A1. Socio-demographic composition of the face to face and online samples, compared to recent population estimates and the 2011 Census for Great Britain, unweighted data



Note. Data for age and geographical distributions for the population of Great Britain are from 2015 mid-year population estimates produced by the Office for National Statistics; data on religion and education are from the standard Census tables DC5102EW, DC5102SC, DC2107EW and DC2107SC. All materials were sourced from Nomis, official labour market statistics website, <https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/> and Scotland Census, <http://www.scotlandscensus.gov.uk/>.

the two samples for analysis. Comparison of the attitudinal variables across the two samples lends further support to this strategy.

Looking at the demographic profile of the face to face sample in comparison to the demographic profile of the population of Great Britain, Figure A1 shows that the age structure and the geographical distribution of the face to face sample are very close to the distributions found in population estimates for Great Britain, produced by ONS. The same

applies to the sex composition (the sample contains 50% females), not shown graphically to save space. Finding a good match of age, sex and geography to population estimates is not surprising: target quotas (or proportionate sampling, in relation to geography) were applied precisely in relation to these variables, so these distributions were ‘made to match’ the population and not ‘allowed’ to arise naturally. Observing this good match between these variables and population characteristics confirms that the use of these quotas was successful.

On the other hand, the religious and educational compositions of the sample evolved naturally, and are the real test of how different types of samples perform in relation to representativeness. The face to face sample is reasonably well aligned with the British population in terms of religious composition. The proportion of people without religion is somewhat larger than expected, but the comparison here is with the 2011 Census data rather than more recent national estimates, and the proportion of people without religion could have increased since the last Census. The proportion of Muslims is close to the proportion of this group found in the Census. The proportion of people without educational qualifications is lower than expected in the face to face sample. However, here too the comparison is with the 2011 Census, and the proportion of people without such qualifications is expected to have declined since that time.

The online sample matches the face to face sample and the population estimates very well on age and geography. The online sample sex composition is identical to the face to face sample (not shown graphically). Again, these characteristics were generated through the application of quotas. The online sample appears to have a relatively large proportion of people without religion, a small proportion of Muslims, and, perhaps most importantly, a relatively very small proportion of people without educational qualifications and a high proportion of people with advanced educational qualifications. This is something that can be expected in view of what is known from previous research about the selective nature of online panels.<sup>40</sup> People who choose to take part in panels tend to be people with a special interest in current affairs and relatively high levels of Internet use and political involvement, so there is little surprise that, in socio-demographic terms, this is captured by elevated levels of education. Therefore, the combined national sample possesses a demographic and religious structure that is very close to the British population, but it is somewhat

more educated. Much of this educational factor originates from the online sample.

The results presented above relate to the unweighted samples. Weights were developed by Ipsos MORI to adjust the samples for possible deviations from the true population distributions. The combined weights incorporated corrections to age, sex, government office region and working status, with the latter designed to compensate for any under-representation of full-time workers. Effectively, the weights were created to produce corrections where target quotas were imperfectly met. Given how close the unweighted distributions of age, sex and geography are to the population characteristics, it is not surprising that the application of weights, in general, had minimal impact on all distributions and on the comparisons between the two samples. Nevertheless, all findings pertaining to the general population in the main body of this report are weighted.

The comparison of samples in this section aligns well with the emerging understanding from the literature on the difference between classic probability samples and non-probability samples, especially samples based on volunteer panels.<sup>41</sup> The nationally representative face to face sample in this survey represents the population better than the panel sample. The face to face sample bears some very slight signs of educational selectivity, but this observation may be due to the fact that the 2011 Census is somewhat outdated in relation to education. Educational composition changes rather fast, as people without qualifications constituted about 35% of the total adult population in Great Britain in 2001, compared to 23% in 2011, for example. Assuming the continuation of this trend post-2011, the face to face sample may, in fact, be well aligned with the educational composition of the current population. The online sample, based on a volunteer panel, is much more selective in educational terms. The significance of this feature, and of other features on which the online sample may be different from the face to face sample, should be studied in application to

40 See Callegaro, M. Villar, A., Yeager, D., and Krosnick, A. (2014). 'A critical review of studies investigating the quality of data obtained with online panels based on probability and nonprobability samples', in Callegaro, M., Baker, R., Bethlehem, J., Göritz, A. S., Krosnick, J. A. and Lavrakas, P. J. (eds.) (2014). *Online Panel Research: A Data Quality Perspective*, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, Chichester, UK. DOI: 10.1002/9781118763520.ch1.

41 See, for example, Dutwin, D. and Buskirk, T.D. (2017). 'Apples to oranges or gala versus golden delicious? Comparing data quality of nonprobability internet samples to low response rate probability samples', *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 81, Special Issue, pp. 213-249, and references therein. See also the source quoted in the previous footnote.



concrete analyses. We consider it inconsequential for the purpose of the analyses presented in this publication, but a different decision could be made in relation to other types of analysis.

### Antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes: comparison of face to face and online samples

In this section we present, in a series of tables, comparisons of responses in the face to face and online samples, in an attempt to establish the extent to which the two samples differ in respect

to attitudinal variables. The mean score of the general attitude towards Jews, measured on a continuous scale of 0-10 (the higher the score, the more favourable the view), is 7.2 in the face to face sample and 7.1 in the online sample (Table A2), with clearly overlapping confidence intervals. In relation to other religious groups, the differences between samples are somewhat larger, but the scale of differences is still rather small. The total proportions of persons holding negatives views of Jews in the face to face (6.7%) and the online samples (6.0%) are very close.<sup>42</sup>

Table A2. Responses to question ‘Please indicate your feelings towards people from the following groups’, with a scale of 0-10\*

Jews				Muslims			
	Face to face sample	Online sample	Ratio (FtF/ Online)		Face to face sample	Online sample	Ratio (FtF/ Online)
<b>Total negative</b>	6.7	6.0	1.1	<b>Total negative</b>	14.8	24.8	0.6
<b>Neutral</b>	52.9	52.5	1.0	<b>Neutral</b>	47.1	46.0	1.0
<b>Total positive</b>	36.3	39.6	0.9	<b>Total positive</b>	34.5	27.1	1.3
<b>Don't know</b>	4.1	2.0	2.0	<b>Don't know</b>	3.6	2.1	1.7
<b>Total</b>	100	100		<b>Total</b>	100	100	
<b>Mean</b>	7.2	7.1	1.0	<b>Mean</b>	6.8	6.1	1.1
<b>95% confidence intervals</b>	7.1; 7.3	6.9; 7.2		<b>95% confidence intervals</b>	6.7; 6.9	5.9; 6.2	
Hindus				Christians			
	Face to face sample	Online sample	Ratio (FtF/ Online)		Face to face sample	Online sample	Ratio (FtF/ Online)
<b>Total negative</b>	5.5	7.1	0.8	<b>Total negative</b>	3.5	6.2	0.6
<b>Neutral</b>	52.2	52.8	1.0	<b>Neutral</b>	44.0	44.4	1.0
<b>Total positive</b>	37.1	37.9	1.0	<b>Total positive</b>	49.8	47.5	1.0
<b>Don't know</b>	5.2	2.2	2.3	<b>Don't know</b>	2.7	1.9	1.4
<b>Total</b>	100.0	100.0	1.0	<b>Total</b>	100	100	
<b>Mean</b>	7.2	6.9	1.0	<b>Mean</b>	7.8	7.5	1.0
<b>95% confidence intervals</b>	7.1; 7.3	6.8; 7.1		<b>95% confidence intervals</b>	7.7; 8.0	7.4; 7.6	
<b>N</b>	1103	1001		<b>N</b>	1103	1001	

Note: \* with 0 denoting ‘very negative feelings’ and 10 ‘very positive feelings’, 5 ‘neutral feelings’. Weighted and unweighted results are identical.

42 These calculations are based on respondents choosing 0-5 on the favourability scale of 0-10. They are somewhat different from the proportions presented

in the main body of the report, with the latter being based on questions employing the Likert scale.

Table A3. Endorsement of selected statements about Jews

Jews exploit Holocaust victimhood for their own purposes			
	Face to face sample	Online sample	Ratio (FtF/Online)
Strongly agree + Tend to agree	9.7	10.9	0.9
Strongly disagree + Tend to disagree	53.0	58.8	0.9
Neither agree nor disagree	19.5	18.5	1.1
Don't know	17.8	11.7	1.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	
Jews think they are better than other people			
	Face to face sample	Online sample	Ratio (FtF/Online)
Strongly agree + Tend to agree	10.8	14.7	0.7
Strongly disagree + Tend to disagree	47.8	47.5	1.0
Neither agree nor disagree	24.3	24.3	1.0
Don't know	17.2	13.6	1.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	
The interests of Jews in Britain are very different from the interests of the rest			
	Face to face sample	Online sample	Ratio (FtF/Online)
Strongly agree + Tend to agree	11.5	12.8	0.9
Strongly disagree + Tend to disagree	39.0	41.9	0.9
Neither agree nor disagree	28.0	26.4	1.1
Don't know	21.6	18.9	1.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	
British Jews make a positive contribution to British society			
	Face to face sample	Online sample	Ratio (FtF/Online)
Strongly agree + Tend to agree	55.6	66.7	0.8
Strongly disagree + Tend to disagree	5.0	3.2	1.5
Neither agree nor disagree	22.7	19.4	1.2
Don't know	16.6	10.7	1.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	
<b>N</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2002</b>	

Note: weighted and unweighted results are identical.

The difference between the samples is largest in relation to Muslims: 14.8% of the face to face sample see Muslims negatively, compared to

24.8% of the online sample. The importance of the difference of ten percentage points depends on the application, and is important to bear in mind for

Table A4. Responses to question 'Please tell me if you have a very favourable, somewhat favourable, somewhat unfavourable, or very unfavourable opinion of the following countries.'

Israel			
	Face to face sample	Online sample	Ratio (FtF/Online)
Very favourable + Somewhat favourable	17.7	16.3	1.1
Very unfavourable+ Somewhat unfavourable	27.2	39.6	0.7
Neither favourable nor unfavourable	40.9	38.2	1.1
Don't know	14.3	5.9	2.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	
USA			
	Face to face sample	Online sample	Ratio (FtF/Online)
Very favourable + Somewhat favourable	42.4	44.7	0.9
Very unfavourable+ Somewhat unfavourable	19.3	24.8	0.8
Neither favourable nor unfavourable	29.2	27.4	1.1
Don't know	9.1	3.1	2.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	
Russia			
	Face to face sample	Online sample	Ratio (FtF/Online)
Very favourable + Somewhat favourable	12.8	7.5	1.7
Very unfavourable+ Somewhat unfavourable	40.8	63.1	0.6
Neither favourable nor unfavourable	34.2	24.8	1.4
Don't know	12.2	4.6	2.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	
Iran			
	Face to face sample	Online sample	Ratio (FtF/Online)
Very favourable + Somewhat favourable	10.4	5.0	2.1
Very unfavourable+ Somewhat unfavourable	35.8	60.4	0.6
Neither favourable nor unfavourable	39.3	28.7	1.4
Don't know	14.5	5.9	2.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	
<b>N</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2002</b>	

Note: weighted and unweighted results are identical.

anyone with an interest in social attitudes towards Muslims. However, in this particular application,

it is inconsequential. The two samples produce similar pictures of the extent of negativity towards

Table A5. Endorsement of selected statements about Israel

Israel exploits Holocaust victimhood for its own purposes			
	Face to face sample	Online sample	Ratio (FtF/Online)
Strongly agree + Tend to agree	11.4	14.9	0.8
Strongly disagree + Tend to disagree	38.1	39.5	1.0
Neither agree nor disagree	19.9	19.9	1.0
Don't know	30.5	25.7	1.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	
People should boycott Israeli goods and products			
	Face to face sample	Online sample	Ratio (FtF/Online)
Strongly agree + Tend to agree	8.9	10.6	0.8
Strongly disagree + Tend to disagree	48.3	44.4	1.1
Neither agree nor disagree	20.9	24.7	0.8
Don't know	22.0	20.3	1.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	
Israel is committing mass murder in Palestine			
	Face to face sample	Online sample	Ratio (FtF/Online)
Strongly agree + Tend to agree	21.9	25.3	0.9
Strongly disagree + Tend to disagree	21.7	21.8	1.0
Neither agree nor disagree	21.9	21.7	1.0
Don't know	34.5	31.2	1.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	
Israel is the only real democracy in the Middle East			
	Face to face sample	Online sample	Ratio (FtF/Online)
Strongly agree + Tend to agree	12.6	17.6	0.7
Strongly disagree + Tend to disagree	27.3	23.8	1.1
Neither agree nor disagree	22.1	24.6	0.9
Don't know	38.0	34.1	1.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	

Note: weighted and unweighted results are identical.

religious groups in British society, with Jews positioned similarly in relation to other groups. If there is anything that stands out in the expressed attitudes of either sample, it is a lesser tendency of the online sample to say 'Don't know.' Thus the online sample is more opinionated.

The differences between the two samples in relation to specific attitudes towards Jews are also minor (Table A3). Further, there is not an anti-Jewish, or indeed, a pro-Jewish flavour in either sample. In the online sample the proportion of respondents agreeing with various statements

about Jews is somewhat higher than in the face to face sample, but the same is true of the proportion of respondents who disagree with the statements, in three out of four cases presented in Table A3. Here too the online sample comes across as the more ‘opinionated’ one.

A broad resemblance between the two samples is also observed in relation to attitudes to Israel, and the more ‘opinionated’ nature of the online sample is visible here too (Tables A4 and A5). Note, however, that in relation to other countries, such as Iran and Russia, there are rather large differences in favourability (above twenty percentage points) between the two samples (Table 5). The positioning of Israel in the comparison remains the same irrespective of the sample, but if the research focus were to shift from Israel to these countries, the appropriateness of the use of either sample, or both, would need to be reconsidered.

Violence is seen as slightly more readily justifiable in the online sample, but the difference between the two samples is quite small (Table A6). In addition, the greater acceptance of violence does not translate into a coherent political position and seems to apply in relation to all groups: Jews and Muslims, Israelis and Islamist extremists, and other groups not presented here but exhibiting the same pattern (immigrants, British military personnel).

A further attempt was made to understand the reasons behind the observed differences between the face to face and online samples. Are these differences, however modest, related to the differences in education, with the online sample being the more educated one? Are there other differences between the samples that are also associated with antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes? To answer these questions, a regression model was built with belonging to the sample, online or face to face, as a binary dependent variable, and age, sex, religion, political affiliation, place of birth and place of residence as independent predictors. In line with previous observations (Figure A1), educational differences between the two samples persisted in the multivariate analysis, and their impact proved to be the most significant of all listed predictors. In addition, the online sample appeared to have a somewhat more right-wing orientation and a greater presence of the native (born in the UK)

population compared to the face to face sample. Experimentally, weights were developed to adjust the online sample to match the educational, political and place-of-birth profiles of the face to face sample. Selected indicators of antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes were then recalculated after application of weights, only to find out that the differences between the two samples remained practically unchanged.

In sum, the face to face and online samples present slight differences in attitudes towards Jews and Israel, but these differences could not be linked to other observable socio-demographic differences between the two samples. The modest scale of differences in attitudes makes it possible to combine the samples for analysis rather unproblematically.

### **How representative is the Muslim subsample?**


As Muslims constitute a demographic group of special interest in the report, this section considers in some detail the characteristics of the face to face and online samples for the Muslim subsample separately. No target quotas were applied to Muslims *specifically*, and all of their socio-demographic distributions allow the assessment of the performance of the two types of samples relative to the true population characteristics (Figure A2). Neither sample is unambiguously better when it comes to geography, age and sex. The face to face sample is well aligned with the population distribution in relation to the proportion of Muslims living in London, although other geographical regions are somewhat over- or under-represented. By contrast, the online sample underrepresents Muslim Londoners but aligns well with the population in relation to most other regions. The face to face sample underrepresents young Muslims, but the online sample underrepresents the elderly. Both the face to face and the online samples deviate from the true sex composition of the population, albeit in contrasting ways: the face to face sample is dominated by males, whereas the online sample is dominated by females. In relation to education, however, the face to face sample matches the population much better than the online sample, with the latter being significantly better educated than the Muslim population is found to be in the 2011 Census data.

Table A6. Responses to question 'Thinking about Britain today, to what extent do you feel that using violence against any of the following groups or institutions would be justified in order to defend your political or religious beliefs and values?'

Jews			
	Face to face sample	Online sample	Ratio (FtF/Online)
Often or sometimes justified	3.4	4.8	0.7
Rarely justified	7.5	12.1	0.6
Never justified	73.2	69.2	1.1
Don't know	11.9	11.2	1.1
Prefer not to say	4.0	2.7	1.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	
Israel			
	Face to face sample	Online sample	Ratio (FtF/Online)
Often or sometimes justified	3.8	5.8	0.7
Rarely justified	8.2	12.7	0.6
Never justified	71.0	66.3	1.1
Don't know	12.9	12.6	1.0
Prefer not to say	4.2	2.7	1.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	
Islamist extremists			
	Face to face sample	Online sample	Ratio (FtF/Online)
Often or sometimes justified	22.3	31.4	0.7
Rarely justified	9.9	12.0	0.8
Never justified	51.7	42.6	1.2
Don't know	12.1	10.9	1.1
Prefer not to say	4.0	3.1	1.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	
Muslims			
	Face to face sample	Online sample	Ratio (FtF/Online)
Often or sometimes justified	5.8	9.3	0.6
Rarely justified	8.9	12.7	0.7
Never justified	70.1	64.1	1.1
Don't know	11.2	11.2	1.0
Prefer not to say	4.0	2.8	1.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	
<b>N</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2002</b>	

Note: weighted and unweighted results are identical.

Figure A2. Socio-demographic composition of the face to face and online samples for Muslims, compared to 2011 Census for Great Britain, unweighted data



Note. Data for age, geographical distributions and education for the Muslim population of Great Britain are from the standard Census tables DC5204EW, DC2107EW and DC2107SC, Education for Muslims in England and Wales. All materials were sourced from Nomis, official labour market statistics website, <https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/> and Scotland Census, <http://www.scotlandscensus.gov.uk/>.

The differentiation between the face to face and online samples in relation to attitudes to Jews and Israel that was observed in the general population can also be seen among Muslims, and it is amplified among the latter compared to the general population (Tables A7 to A9). Neither sample appears to have an unambiguous political flavour: the online sample is as much ‘more antisemitic’ as it is ‘less antisemitic’ compared to the face to face sample. Both ‘unfavourable’ and ‘favourable’ categories in that sample are larger than in the face to face sample. Further, the online

sample is very significantly more opinionated, with a smaller proportion of people claiming to be neutral or not knowing what to respond on various issues. The neutral and the ‘Don’t know’ response options are the known ‘opt-out’ options for people without strong convictions, and it is reasonable to assume, on the basis of existing research, that some people choosing these options would redistribute themselves between the other response categories under a scheme of ‘forced’ response. In the meantime, it is clear that with the existing response scheme, levels of

Table A7. Endorsement of selected statements about Jews by Muslims

Jews exploit Holocaust victimhood for their own purposes			
	Face to face sample	Online sample	Ratio (FtF/Online)
Strongly agree + Tend to agree	19.0	31.0	0.6
Strongly disagree + Tend to disagree	18.8	27.2	0.7
Neither agree nor disagree	19.0	20.4	0.9
Don't know	43.2	21.4	2.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	
Jews think they are better than other people			
	Face to face sample	Online sample	Ratio (FtF/Online)
Strongly agree + Tend to agree	20.4	34.6	0.6
Strongly disagree + Tend to disagree	21.8	29.6	0.7
Neither agree nor disagree	19.6	21.6	0.9
Don't know	38.2	14.2	2.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	
The interests of Jews in Britain are very different from the interests of the rest			
	Face to face sample	Online sample	Ratio (FtF/Online)
Strongly agree + Tend to agree	18.5	25.2	0.7
Strongly disagree + Tend to disagree	18.8	26.0	0.7
Neither agree nor disagree	21.2	25.8	0.8
Don't know	41.5	23.0	1.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	
British Jews make a positive contribution to British society			
	Face to face sample	Online sample	Ratio (FtF/Online)
Strongly agree + Tend to agree	33.1	41.0	0.8
Strongly disagree + Tend to disagree	8.3	10.6	0.8
Neither agree nor disagree	20.6	28.4	0.7
Don't know	38.0	20.0	1.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	
<b>N</b>	<b>495</b>	<b>500</b>	

both negativity and positivity towards Jews are somewhat underestimated, especially in the face to face sample.

Are the differences between the two Muslim samples in attitudes towards Jews and Israel related to the differences in socio-demographic

compositions, i.e. the age, sex and education compositions of the samples? Are there other differences between the samples that are also associated with antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes? To answer these questions, experimental weights were developed to adjust the face to face and the online Muslim samples to obtain a full



Table A8. Endorsement of selected statements about Israel by Muslims

Israel exploits Holocaust victimhood for its own purposes			
	Face to face sample	Online sample	Ratio (FtF/Online)
Strongly agree + Tend to agree	24.3	42.2	0.6
Strongly disagree + Tend to disagree	9.7	15.2	0.6
Neither agree nor disagree	14.5	17.4	0.8
Don't know	51.5	25.2	2.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	
People should boycott Israeli goods and products			
	Face to face sample	Online sample	Ratio (FtF/Online)
Strongly agree + Tend to agree	28.5	46.8	0.6
Strongly disagree + Tend to disagree	15.6	17.0	0.9
Neither agree nor disagree	16.6	22.8	0.7
Don't know	39.3	13.4	2.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	
Israel is committing mass murder in Palestine			
	Face to face sample	Online sample	Ratio (FtF/Online)
Strongly agree + Tend to agree	47.9	68.6	0.7
Strongly disagree + Tend to disagree	3.4	6.4	0.5
Neither agree nor disagree	10.4	12.2	0.9
Don't know	38.3	12.8	3.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	
Israel is the only real democracy in the Middle East			
	Face to face sample	Online sample	Ratio (FtF/Online)
Strongly agree + Tend to agree	9.1	11.2	0.8
Strongly disagree + Tend to disagree	34.4	50.0	0.7
Neither agree nor disagree	11.5	17.0	0.7
Don't know	45.0	21.8	2.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	
<b>N</b>	<b>495</b>	<b>500</b>	

match in relation to age, sex and educational profiles. Further, a regression model was built with belonging to a sample, online or face to face, as a binary dependent variable, and age, sex, education, political affiliation, place of birth and place of residence as independent predictors. In a multivariate setting, in addition to having

a different profile in relation to age, sex and education, the face to face sample appeared to have a somewhat more politically-centrist orientation, whereas the online sample leaned more towards both the political left and the political right. Consequently, another set of weights was developed to adjust the online sample to match the

Table A9. Attitudes to Israel and justification of violence against Jews among Muslims

Attitude to Israel			
	Face to face sample	Online sample	Ratio (FtF/Online)
<b>Very favourable + Somewhat favourable</b>	13.8	13.6	1.0
<b>Very unfavourable+ Somewhat unfavourable</b>	31.3	57.0	0.5
<b>Neither favourable nor unfavourable</b>	28.6	21.6	1.3
<b>Don't know</b>	26.3	7.8	3.4
<b>Total</b>	100.0	100.0	
Justification of violence against Jews			
	Face to face sample	Online sample	Ratio (FtF/Online)
<b>Often or sometimes justified</b>	4.4	15.6	0.3
<b>Rarely justified</b>	5.5	10.4	0.5
<b>Never justified</b>	51.1	56.4	0.9
<b>Don't know</b>	23.4	14.4	1.6
<b>Prefer not to say</b>	15.6	3.2	4.9
<b>Total</b>	100.0	100.0	
Justification of violence against Israelis			
	Face to face sample	Online sample	Ratio (FtF/Online)
<b>Often or sometimes justified</b>	5.8	18.2	0.3
<b>Rarely justified</b>	7.5	11.0	0.7
<b>Never justified</b>	44.4	53.0	0.8
<b>Don't know</b>	26.5	14.0	1.9
<b>Prefer not to say</b>	15.8	3.8	4.2
<b>Total</b>	100.0	100.0	
<b>N</b>	495	500	

political profile of the face to face sample. Selected indicators of antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes were then recalculated after application of various weights. However, the differences between the two samples remained practically unchanged after weighting. In sum, the face to face and online samples of Muslims, just like the samples of the general population, present some differences in attitudes to Jews and Israel, but these could not be linked to the observable socio-demographic differences between the samples.

In view of these findings, combining the face to face and online samples represents a justifiable strategy in relation to Muslims as well. Further

observation in support of this strategy is found in the fact that elevated levels of antisemitism, broadly similar in scale, are found among Muslims in all comparisons with the general population: in the face to face samples alone, the online samples alone, and in the combined samples. Further, the elevated levels of antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes among Muslims persist both in the original data and after the removal of all cases with 'Don't know,' 'Neither/nor' and 'Prefer not to say' types of response (Table A10).

The prevalence of negativity towards Jews and Israel is, on average, twice as high among Muslims than the general population, irrespective of the

Table A10. Ratio of the percentage of Muslims responding in a particular way to the percentage of the total population of Great Britain responding in this way

Question	Response	Original data		With those who responded 'Don't Know/neither ... nor/ Prefer not to say' excluded	
		Face to face sample	Online sample	Face to face sample	Online sample
<b>Jews exploit Holocaust victimhood for their own purposes</b>	Strongly agree+ Tend to agree	2.0	2.8	3.2	3.4
<b>Jews think they are better than other people</b>	Strongly agree+ Tend to agree	1.9	2.4	2.6	2.3
<b>The interests of Jews in Britain are very different from the interests of the rest</b>	Strongly agree+ Tend to agree	1.6	2.0	2.2	2.1
<b>Israel exploits Holocaust victimhood for its own purposes</b>	Strongly agree+ Tend to agree	2.1	2.8	3.1	2.7
<b>People should boycott Israeli goods and products</b>	Strongly agree+ Tend to agree	3.2	4.4	4.2	3.8
<b>Israel is committing mass murder in Palestine</b>	Strongly agree+ Tend to agree	2.2	2.7	1.9	1.7
<b>Attitude to Israel</b>	Very unfavourable+ Somewhat unfavourable	1.2	1.4	1.1	1.1

comparison. Thus, the choice of the sample does not affect the fundamental conclusion regarding the relative prevalence of antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes among Muslims, but working with the combined sample brings the benefits of the larger number of observations available for analysis. We arrived at a similar conclusion as well in relation to other subgroups, i.e. the far-left and the far-right.

## Conclusion

The dataset underlying this analysis is a combined dataset consisting of two subsamples: a subsample achieved by probability sampling from the general population and interviewed face to face, and a non-probability subsample recruited from a volunteer panel and interviewed online. This design of the survey reflected the dedication of the analysts involved in its development to sound scientific methodology and, simultaneously, an aspiration to create a large sample for detailed analysis at an affordable cost. Non-probability samples originating in volunteer panels, which are widely used by the polling industry today, have attracted considerable scrutiny and criticism. We felt that by launching a detailed investigation of the differences and similarities between the two

subsamples, we could not only better assess the quality of existing work on antisemitism, but also contribute to the advancement of knowledge about the appropriateness of the use of volunteer panels.

We found some differences in the socio-demographic profiles of respondents in the face to face and the online samples. The most noteworthy difference is the educational profile, with the online sample being the more educated one of the two, a finding observed both in relation to the general population and to subgroups. We also found some differences between the samples in patterns of response to questions on attitudes towards Jews and Israel. In particular, the online sample appeared to be the more 'opinionated' of the two. However, adjusting the sample composition for differences in socio-demographic profiles with weights did not change the picture of the differences between the samples in relation to attitudes towards Jews and Israel.

The overarching conclusion that can be drawn from this research into sample composition is that the face to face subsample generated by random sampling and the online sample based on a volunteer panel are somewhat different. They

generate slightly different responses to questions on anti-Jewish and anti-Israel attitudes, but these differences are small enough to allow utilisation of the combined sample. All substantive conclusions of this study (regarding the scope of negativity towards Jews and Israel, the link between anti-Jewish and anti-Israel attitudes, and any differentiation in negativity across religious and political groups) hold good in the context of the face to face and the online samples.

This conclusion, however, is not universally applicable to all comparisons between the random samples and the samples generated by non-probability sampling from volunteer panels. Sampling methods may not matter in relation to

attitudes towards Jews but they may matter in other areas. We found significant differences in attitudes between the two types of samples in relation to certain countries, for example Iran and Russia. The extent to which these differences matter depends strictly on the projected uses of such comparisons. The methodological value of this report in relation to other topics is that, first, it shows that both the overly critical approach to non-probability samples based on volunteer panels and the uncritical reliance on samples obtained by random sampling are unmerited. Both can generate useful insights. In addition, it also proposes the way by which differences between samples can be investigated and their practical consequences assessed.

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