

“Take It Outside!”: National Identity Contestation in the Foreign Policy Arena

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Abstract

Are foreign policy initiatives best conceived as outcomes of domestic identity politics or as contributing factors to them? Why do elites choose to politicize national identity debates at the foreign policy level, and with what consequences? Despite numerous studies by comparativist and IR scholars on identity politics and foreign policy, the relative disconnect between the two literatures creates a gap in understanding the relationship between them. In teasing out this complex link, this article conceptualizes foreign policy as an alternative arena in which supporters of particular proposals for national identity compete in a struggle for hegemony. Highlighting various strategies of contestation aimed at achieving hegemony of one’s own proposal, this article argues that political elites choose to take this identity contestation “outside” when identity gambits at the domestic level are blocked. The article draws its analysis from an in-depth study of Turkey, a case offering a promising empirical window onto these dynamics because of its recent and dramatic shifts in the dynamics of its public identity debates and its multiple international roles such as NATO ally, EU-candidate country, and regional power-broker. The recent upsurge of Ottoman- and Islam-based public discourse at both the elite and society levels, for example, evidences a politics of identity that is fundamentally at odds with Turkey’s previously dominant, Western-oriented understanding of Turkishness. This rapid increase in public support of what I term an Ottoman Islamist proposal takes place, however, during the rule of a party that pursued EU membership as a primary foreign policy objective. While this disconnect seems to suggest discarding arguments linking identity and foreign policy, this article demonstrates, counterintuitively, that the rise of Ottoman Islamism was made possible through Turkey’s EU-oriented policy. Examining evidence collected from archives, interviews, surveys, news and entertainment media, and ethnographic observation, I employ intertextual analysis to identify three main identity proposals held within contemporary Turkish society, parsing out the domestic and foreign policy interests generated by each. Utilizing a cohesive framework to specify points of incommensurability among proposals, I demonstrate how the ruling AKP strategically utilized the foreign policy goal of EU accession to reduce the threat of domestic challengers supporting competing identity proposals. By taking its fight outside, the AKP was then able to consolidate support for Ottoman Islamism at home while opening space for deeper engagement to the south and east abroad. The framework developed here fills a gap in existing scholarship by closing the identity-foreign policy circle, analytically linking the means by which national identity debates spill over into foreign policy with the means by which foreign policy serves as a strategy for advancing a particular group’s position in these debates.

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Introduction

Turkey's foreign policy orientation recently swung enthusiastically toward the EU and then sharply away, in the direction of former Ottoman territories and other Muslim countries. The latter shift also coincides with an upsurge of Ottoman- and Islam-based public discourse at both elite and society levels within Turkey. Pointing to the Islamist roots of the ruling Justice and Development Party – (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* – AKP), various identity-based arguments such as “Islamic ties” and “neo-Ottomanism” cite cultural factors driving Turkey's apparent reorientation.¹ Turkey's previous cooperation with Iran in attempting to broker a nuclear deal and its prolonged support of Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad and Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi during the Arab revolutions, for example, are often assumed to be manifestations of Turkey's increasingly Islamic political identity.² While intuitively intriguing, however, many of these arguments are less academically rigorous than rhetorical. More importantly, static conceptions of identity such as those underlying Islam-based arguments don't explain the initially pro-European swing followed by deeper engagement with Muslim countries all under the same AKP, nor can monolithic definitions of Islamic identity account for the seemingly increasing sectarian politics between Turkey's Sunni-led government and Alawite rule in Syria (or Iran's Shi'i regime).³

As an empirical question, if identity – in whatever form – does play a role in shaping Turkey's foreign policy, how, specifically, does it do so? Further, how does it change? The

¹ See “Sultan Erdogan: Turkey's Rebranding into the New, Old Ottoman Empire,” *The Atlantic*, 5 April 2013: <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/04/sultan-erdogan-turkeys-rebranding-into-the-new-old-ottoman-empire/274724>; “Davutoğlu Invokes Ottomanism As New Mideast Order,” *Al-Monitor*, 10 March 2013: <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/03/turkey-davutologu-ottoman-new-order-mideast.html>; “Erdogan and the Decline of the Turks,” *The Wall Street Journal*, 2 June 2010: <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704875604575281392195250402.html>.

² A quote exemplifying the Libya case: “[T]he government, influenced by Islamist sympathies, fell out of pace with NATO while resisting military action against Libya.” See: *France24 International News*, 24 March 2011: <http://www.france24.com/en/20110324-turkey-allows-nato-command-libya-military-operations-vote>.

³ The recent rise of sectarian-based arguments, fueled by tensions with Syria and Iran, as well as animosity between Erdoğan and Shi'i Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, highlight the need to reject both static and monolithic Islamic ties explanations. See “Turkey's Sectarian Foreign Policy May Backfire,” *Al-Monitor*, 3 August 2012: <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/tr/politics/2012/08/turkey-wallowing-in-sectarian-an.html#>.

Ottoman and Islamist identities claimed to be reorienting Turkey's policies are fundamentally at odds, for example, with the state's previously dominant, "Kemalist" understanding of Turkishness.⁴ The now-frequent references to Turkey's glorious Ottoman past and conservative values of Islam as the basis of societal interaction are antithetical to the Kemalist concept of the "model citizen:" Western, modern, and secular.⁵ What accounts for this rapid shift in the contours of Turkey's identity debates? From a disciplinary perspective, how can examination of the Turkish case under the AKP reveal dynamics of utility to broader studies of these dynamics?

Indeed, despite numerous studies by comparativist and international relations scholars on identity politics and foreign policy, a relative disconnect between the two literatures leaves important questions about the relationship between the two subjects of inquiry underexplored. In exploring the empirical puzzles noted above, therefore, this article engages both literatures to tease out the complex link between the rapid shifts at the international and domestic levels in the Turkish case, developing a comprehensive theoretical framework for better understanding the relationship between national identity contestation and foreign policy. The framework's use of contestation among groups supporting different understandings of national identity provides a mechanism accounting for change in the dynamics of identity debates within states – i.e., the distribution of support for particular identity proposals – as well as providing insight into the conditions under which this contestation spills over to shape relations among states. While identity clashes may eventually become ossified to the point where identity differences both within and among states seem natural, even endemic, relatively rapid shifts observed in the dynamics of these debates indicate that the distribution of identities across a population is not static. As case in point, Turkey's society has recently become highly polarized between

⁴ Ömer Taşpınar notes a difference between the two in a briefing, but does not account for the change: Taşpınar 2008.

⁵ See Ciddi 2009, 13-30.

individuals identifying with – in very general terms – liberal/secular and conservative/pious lifestyles,⁶ and a glance at foreign policy shifts over the last ten years reveals a struggle to discern where Turkey “fits” in terms of its geo-cultural landscape. In brief, it is a fundamental error to assume that such divisions are the result of natural cultural “fault lines” doomed forever to produce instability and destruction among bounded “civilizations.”⁷

Accordingly, this article’s focus on dynamic processes of contestation elucidates the various rhetorical and institutional tools used by elites in attempts to achieve “identity hegemony” for their own understanding of national identity and to delegitimize alternative understandings. The theory of identity hegemony presented in this article employs a cohesive framework to parse out the content of various “proposals” to allow for clear comparison of points of intense contestation – or incommensurability – among groups.⁸ When elites find their identity gambits are blocked at these points of incommensurability within the arena of domestic politics, they shift their contestation of identity to the foreign policy arena, taking the fight outside.

In exploring this phenomenon, the article conceptualizes foreign policy as a locus of identity contestation in which these struggles take place. I demonstrate that the practice of foreign policy provides an arena – a familiar term in IR literature, but one that I select deliberately to convey its battle-ground connotation – in which elites contest against their domestic rivals as much as their international counterparts. While much work has been done

⁶ The constructed (and arbitrary) nature of how this divide is often portrayed is highlighted well in Kandiyoti 2012.

⁷ Such Huntingtonian thinking reduces societal collectivities to exogenously determined units as though they were tectonic plates, thus lacking agency within or variation across them, while also assuming that relations between these units are inherently conflictual. Huntington’s subsequent conclusion that states (Turkey, Ukraine, Mexico) whose borders encompass more than one civilization are “torn countries” is empirically incorrect and normatively irresponsible. See Huntington 1996, pp. 139-154.

⁸ Abdelal 2001.

examining institutions such as education systems,⁹ the military,¹⁰ and even museums¹¹ as sites for defining and spreading a particular understanding of national identity throughout a population in place of other potential competing narratives, this article explores foreign policy as a counterintuitive site for the contestation of domestic identity debates. Particularly, this conceptualization challenges traditional IR understandings that assume states' interests as fixed and foreign policy to be the realm of an experienced and institutionalized bureaucracy that maintains a long-term view of the security of the state,¹² rather than an issue area that is subject to the vagaries of politics¹³ – much less the politics of identity.

The analysis of domestic identity debates and foreign policy presented here derives from an in-depth case study of Turkey, a state whose national identity has long been a hotly contested topic,¹⁴ as much by citizens of Turkey themselves as by the scholars who study them. While Turkey – a NATO ally, EU-candidate country, and regional power-broker in the Middle East, the Balkans, and the Caucasus – therefore offers an excellent empirical window onto these dynamics, some version of these dynamics pervades the foreign policy of all states. Further, of the various points of contention at stake in Turkey's national identity debates, only a few – such as the Kurdish issue – involve (relatively) ascriptive, or fixed, components such as ethnicity. Insights derived by examining Turkey can therefore be applied to the analysis of identity debates in cases both with and without ascriptive components. Finally, as highlighted above, Turkey has

⁹ See Kaplan 2006.

¹⁰ See Krebs 2006.

¹¹ See Anderson 2006, 167-191.

¹² For a clever critique on the dangers of this view, see Drezner 2014.

¹³ Discussed in more detail below, rationalist approaches (neo-realism, neo-liberalism, strategic choice theory) explicitly exclude domestic factors. Liberalist approaches and schools of IPE acknowledge that domestic institutions and actors' interests shape states' options at the international level, but their focus on material factors occludes the often powerfully constraining effect of identity on what domestic actors are willing to accept as reforms in pursuit of a foreign policy goal. See Moravcsik 1992).

¹⁴ Among the many arguments put forward, some of the most frequently cited are Mardin 1989; Heper, Öncü, and Kramer (eds.) 1993; Çağaptay 2006; and White 2013. Comparative studies engaging questions of Turkey's identity include Zarakol 2011 and Aktürk 2012.

undergone a dramatic and rapid shift in terms of understandings of national identity prevalent in the public sphere, provoking questions of how such an identity transformation became possible.

In structuring my argument, the following section briefly examines the literature on identity in foreign policy in order to lay the foundations for the third section's presentation of a theory of identity hegemony and cohesive framework for parsing out the content of various identity proposals. The fourth section details the methodology used to collect and interpret texts from which elements of identity content were extracted. The fifth section outlines three proposals for national identity present in contemporary Turkish society, while the sixth section analyzes the struggle for hegemony of what I term the AKP's Ottoman Islamist identity proposal, demonstrating how this proposal's ascendance relative to other proposals was made possible through strategic contestation of alternative identities in the foreign policy arena. The article concludes with a brief analysis of both domestic and international challenges to the AKP's "take it outside" strategy, as well as suggestions for extending the theory of identity hegemony it develops to a wider scope of cases.

Identity and foreign policy

While the "constructivist turn" in IR scholarship¹⁵ sought to unpack the concept of identity, attempts to problematize this previously bracketed concept have been, in brief, problematic. The use of identity as a variable in IR is fraught with analytical obstacles, normative objections, and – in the words of scholars attempting to address such challenges – "definitional anarchy."¹⁶ The challenge to formulate, much less agree on, a workable definition for such a nebulous concept proved so formidable that some have called for abandoning the

¹⁵ Checkel 1998. For arguments that this "turn" is in fact a "return" to the study of culture and identity in IR, see Kratochwil and Lapid (eds.) 1996.

¹⁶ Abdelal, Herrera, Johnston, and McDermott 2009, 18. (Henceforth Abdelal et al.)

terminology of identity altogether.¹⁷ Others argued that existing identity-based explanations reify precisely that which scholars attempting to offer such explanations argue is intersubjective.¹⁸ Objections may also arise in critique of the generalization and determinism of arguments explaining behavior in terms of identity.¹⁹

Even if all these obstacles to the study of identity can be overcome, one also must question whether identity is actually doing any constitutive or causal work in the cases we seek to understand. As Henry Hale's discussion of "ethnicity-as-epiphenomenal theories" explains,²⁰ epiphenomenal arguments pointing to causal mechanisms ranging from elite manipulation²¹ to political action coordination²² assert that identities such as ethnicity and other commonly shared understandings of group membership have no intrinsic value, but rather serve as tools in the pursuit of (largely) material interests such as power, resources, and security. All of these arguments could ostensibly apply to Turkey, as a state that has at different times contested Shi'i-majority Iran and Eastern Orthodox-majority Russia for dominance in the region, made pan-Turkic overtures to the newly independent Central Asian republics in hope of obtaining further pipeline access, and lobbied to secure its place in the trans-Atlantic security community through NATO membership. Indeed, these whiplash-inducing switches between (Sunni) Muslim, pan-Turkic, and Western identity appeals seem to lend credence to arguments that states can select from a "menu of choices" for national identity,²³ or perhaps a state-based version of the "identity

¹⁷ Brubaker and Cooper 2000.

¹⁸ See Zehfuss 2001.

¹⁹ Huntington 1996 is perhaps the most common target of such objections.

²⁰ Hale 2008, 25-30.

²¹ Examples of this approach include Mueller 2000, Snyder 2000, and Brass 1997.

²² David Laitin's work extensively employs an extraordinarily "thin" version of identity, conceptually speaking, as purely a coordination mechanism. See Laitin 1998 and Laitin 2007. See also: Hardin 1995.

²³ Shibley Telhami and Michael Barnett outline this concept as a common theme engaged in their edited volume. Telhami and Barnett (eds.) 2002, 13-16.

repertoire” that Daniel Posner outlines, which provides an “inventory of ethnic group memberships that individuals possess.”²⁴

As an analytical heuristic, Posner’s conceptually spare treatment of identity is tidy,²⁵ but such rationalist approaches omit elements essential for understanding behavior such as the ontological and emotional importance of identities and the actor-specific interests they generate. Constructivist arguments, in brief, account for factors that fundamentally shape ideas about what is possible, desirable, and necessary, prescribing and proscribing behaviors based on understandings of identities and interests that purely rationalist arguments do not problematize. That a gun in the hand of a friend differs from a gun in the hand of an enemy is commonsensical. The explanation for this lies not in distributions of material capabilities, but in the intersubjective understandings that give meaning to relationships between actors.²⁶ Those rationalist arguments explicitly incorporating information variables and signaling mechanisms offer much more nuanced explanations of interactions in international politics than previous neo-realist and neo-liberalist theories,²⁷ but cannot account for the constitutive and constraining effects of identities in the international system.

Several recent constructivist works address the challenges enumerated above while directly engaging the role of identity in foreign policy.²⁸ This article builds from this foundational scholarship, developing a well-grounded study newly examining the foreign policy

²⁴ Posner 2005, 17.

²⁵ Posner admits that he “strip[s] identity of its affect,” thus leaving out any emotional or ontological commitments an individual may have with a particular identity and leaving him or her free essentially to pick up – or, crucially, discard – identities based on what a certain situation demands. *Ibid.*, 12

²⁶ Alexander Wendt’s example of this is the difference to the United States in the meaning of British versus Soviet nuclear capabilities. Wendt 1994, 389.

²⁷ While defensive realists such as Stephen Walt suggest that threat perceptions of a potential adversary may be shaped by factors such as historical aggression – clearly an informational element – Charles Glaser explicitly posits information about potential adversaries’ motives as a variable influencing the severity of the security dilemma and therefore the relative prospects for cooperation and conflict among states. See Walt 1990 and Glaser 2010.

²⁸ See, *inter alia*, Campbell 1992, Finnemore 1996, Barnett 1998, Lynch 1999, Hopf 2002. Bozdağlıoğlu 2004 applies constructivism in accounting for Turkey’s historically Western-oriented foreign policy. This article presents a more comprehensive constructivist theory accounting for changes in orientation.

arena as a locus of national identity contestation. In doing so, I develop a theory that identifies the underlying sources of what may otherwise appear to be inchoate sets of pick-a-mix foreign policy strategies. This theory moves beyond prominent approaches noted above that assume elites pick foreign policy strategies either constrained or facilitated by an identity “menu of choices.”²⁹ I not only demonstrate how menus become constituted in the first place, but identify the specific mechanisms of contestation at the domestic and international levels by which the contours of such menus can change. Finally, I provide systematic analysis of the actual “stuff” of identities by breaking down this concept into content elements. Engaging a replicable framework to be extended to other studies, I flesh out here the identity content specific to current understandings of Turkishness to account for the dynamics of the AKP’s decision to take their contestation of domestic identity debates outside.

Theory of identity hegemony

With the goal of providing a more comprehensive analysis of the relationship between domestic identity politics and foreign policy, this article conceptualizes foreign policy as a locus of identity debates, defined as ongoing processes of contestation among groups holding differing understandings of what constitutes the appropriate national identity for their state. This approach offers a broader lens for the analysis of the relationship between national identity debates and foreign policy than those viewing the latter solely as an outcome of struggles between competing identity groups or as the source of those struggles.³⁰ Academic work examining these issues generally employs what IR scholars have termed either “second image” or “second image

²⁹ Telhami and Barnett 2002.

³⁰ Both the comprehensive approach presented here and the particular ontological significance of identity in these debates, elaborated on below, differentiates this analysis from studies of competing foreign policy schools of thought. See, for example, Tsyganov 1997.

reversed” approaches.³¹ The argument advanced here not only synthesizes these two approaches – examining the reasons why national identity contestation takes place in the foreign policy arena, and, in turn, how foreign policy practices shape the contours of identity debates back home – but develops a theory of identity hegemony that accounts for otherwise inexplicable shifts at both levels of analysis.

Rather than a theory of domestic politics explaining struggles over resources or other forms of material power, identity hegemony theory analyzes struggles to define the appropriate identity for a particular social group. These struggles carries immense ontological significance, as groups compete against each other to delineate, among other standards, the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion, desired goals of the group, friends and enemies – essentially who “we” are and how we should behave. Drawing on insights from social psychology regarding the ontological function of social identities, identity hegemony theory assumes that supporters of a particular identity proposal – defined for this article’s purposes as an understanding of the appropriate content of a national identity for citizens of a state – seek to increase support for their proposal by spreading its acceptance to more individuals. Social identity, defined by Henri Tajfel as “that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership in a social group... together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership,”³² provides individuals with a mechanism for generating self-esteem by fulfilling a need not only for distinctiveness but for positive distinctiveness. These ontological needs for group membership and positive distinctiveness serve as the “motivational underpinnings” of social identities.³³ Individuals seek to fulfil these needs through intergroup evaluation of and competition among – treated here as processes of contestation – various social

³¹ Gourevitch 1978.

³² Tajfel 1981, 255.

³³ Huddy 2004, 956.

identities. National identity proposals, as social identities especially “thick”³⁴ with historical and political meaning, particularly function to provide legitimacy and esteem to Ingroup members (supporters of the same proposal), and thus are expected to be highly contested among supporters of different proposals.

The theory also assumes that Ingroup members share a desire to realize in practice the goals envisioned by their identity. In constructivist IR terms, this is equivalent to an actor attaining the interests generated by his identity.³⁵ The theory posits that individuals believe the more widely supported their identity proposal is, the more likely they will be able to access the requisite institutions to facilitate achieving the goals their identity prescribes. Individuals – and particularly elites, who may be better equipped with financial tools and skill sets – thus strive for hegemony of their proposals in order to satisfy personal needs and realize group interests.

While acknowledging that hegemony is a loaded term, I select it to connote the power wielded and legitimacy enjoyed by an identity proposal that has achieved hegemony. A hegemonic proposal is an understanding of a national identity that is widespread, in terms of distribution across a population, to the point of being “relatively stable and unquestioned.”³⁶ Supporters of a hegemonic proposal therefore wield the capacity to dictate political and societal rules within the state as well as the behavior of the state – from the lifestyles of its citizens to foreign policy preferences – in line with ideas about appropriate behavior stemming from its identity.³⁷ This formulation of identity-power relations shares some assumptions with Antonio Gramsci’s theory of cultural hegemony, in that identity hegemony also involves support among Ingroup members for an overarching social structure of norms and rules that shape everyday life.

³⁴ Geertz 1973.

³⁵ In Alexander Wendt’s succinct terms, “identities are the basis of interests.” See Wendt 1992, 398.

³⁶ Cox 1993, 42.

³⁷ This political and societal institutionalization in line with an identity proposal’s prescriptions for appropriate behavior – i.e., how one with a certain identity should act – is in line with Robert Cox’s discussion of a hegemonic actor’s “mission.” Cox 1986, 219.

However, it departs significantly from Gramsci's assumption that hegemony comes about by a passive revolution.³⁸ In contrast, the theory assumes that the struggle to achieve hegemony is often met with active and sustained resistance to an identity proposal ascending by acquiring widespread support, and that acquiescence – required to constitute a hegemonic structure of relations among actors³⁹ – is nearly impossible to attain due to the ontological importance of identities to individuals, noted above. Hegemony is thus a goal for which supporters of competing identity proposals strive, but may rarely achieve. Strategies used by an identity proposal's supporters in pursuit of this goal take various forms, including inundation of popular media with images depicting an identity proposal in a positive light, persuasion campaigns to reinforce loyalty of existing supporters as well as gain new supporters, enforced nationalizing practices aimed at assimilation,⁴⁰ defamation/delegitimization campaigns of those in the "Outgroup," and institutional reform that seeks to alter the distribution of competing identity proposals by advancing one's own.

By conceptualizing foreign policy as a locus of national identity contestation, the theory identifies an additional, and counterintuitive, site in which supporters of identity proposals attempt to advance these proposals toward hegemony other than within the domestic sphere. In contrast to rationalist IR theories' views of foreign policy as a tool of institutionalized bureaucracies serving the (fixed) interests of a (black-boxed and unitary) state,⁴¹ identity hegemony theory's challenge to these assumptions reveals the mechanism by which national identity debates spill over into foreign policy. Specifically, given the ontological importance of

³⁸ Gramsci 1971. For a study applying passive revolution to explain Islamic de-radicalization, see Tuğal 2009. Lustick also engages Gramsci in his study of ideological hegemony, but does not engage the daily public contestation between competing ideologies or the obstacles that lead elites to choose one arena over the other as analyzed here. See Lustick 2002.

³⁹ Cox, "Social Forces, States, and World Orders," 219.

⁴⁰ See Brubaker 1996.

⁴¹ For an excellent summary, see Glaser 2010, particularly 148-66.

identity and thus the potential gains to be had by increasing one's own proposal's share in the distribution of identities across a population, the theory assumes when supporters of identity proposals find their struggle to achieve hegemony obstructed at the domestic level that they take their contestation battle to the foreign policy arena.

Further, foreign policy is treated here not solely as the realm of governmental elites, but as a site in which identity proposals whose supporters are not in power may attempt to spread awareness of the legitimacy of their understanding of national identity when their contestation attempts are similarly – and more frequently, given their relative disadvantage vis-à-vis institutional access – blocked at home. Diaspora communities may be frequent targets of such appeals, and may serve as financial support for contestation back home.⁴² International institutions, non-governmental organizations, and foreign governments may also serve as more efficient fora in which to raise international awareness.⁴³ Supporters of an identity proposal may also use the foreign policy arena to contest for hegemony if doing so at home risks posing an organizational (or even existential) threat to the Ingroup. Political or religious groups that have been forced to disband, for example, but whose members have reconstituted a moderated version of the group may be more likely to advance their identity proposal in the foreign policy arena due to past experiences and fear of future repression.

With the mechanism of contestation used to advance the spread of identity proposals across a population outlined, the last part of this section presents a framework for analyzing the identity content specific to each proposal. Identity content represents the “stuff” of identity – i.e., the elements supporters of an identity proposal share that form an Ingroup among them and differentiate them from other Outgroups. This shared content – such as beliefs about membership

⁴² See Han 2013.

⁴³ The foreign policy appeals of Turkey's Kurdish population are good example of contestation. See Balçı 2013.

in and desired goals of the Ingroup, as well as how the Ingroup should relate to others – is difficult to determine empirically and even more difficult to capture analytically.

Identity hegemony theory therefore utilizes a framework that breaks down identity content into four components,⁴⁴ thus making the nebulous concept of identity easier to grasp. Firstly, constitutive norms provide guidelines for membership within and appropriate behavior for the Ingroup, defining who “we” are and how we should behave. Secondly, the social purpose component defines group interests – i.e., the goals that the Ingroup believes it should achieve. The third component of relational meanings defines the Ingroup’s relation to various Outgroups; some of these relations may be friendly while others may be hostile, fearful, etc. Finally, the cognitive worldview component provides an overarching sense of the group’s role in the world.

Importantly, this framework does not posit that any of these elements are fixed; rather, through processes of contestation both within an Ingroup and among an Ingroup and its various Outgroups, these components can change. This framework therefore facilitates the analysis of such topics as a change in the norms of behavior for a specific identity proposal over time (e.g. what it means to be Western or liberal), changes in how an Ingroup views its relations with a particular Outgroup (e.g. a shift from viewing “Europe” as an enemy to viewing it as a partner), and changes in relative distribution of proposals across a population (e.g. a shift from a high amount of support for “Western” proposal to high support for an “Eastern” proposal).

This framework also facilitates identifying clear points of incommensurability among proposals, specifying components that constitute fundamental points of disagreement among supporters of different proposals that appear to be irresolvable (e.g. is Europe our friend or enemy, are we pacific or bellicose?) Some components of identity content may be shared across proposals (two proposals with a common cognitive worldview of global human rights norm

⁴⁴ Abdelal et al. 2009, 17-32.

entrepreneur) and others may differ but not *necessarily* conflict (e.g. Proposal A's constitutive norm of religious freedom and Proposal B's constitutive norm of piety), allowing for collaboration, or at least peaceful coexistence, among groups. Proposals with components that are incommensurable (e.g. social purposes of spreading capitalism vs. spreading communism), however, pose ontological threats to supporters' sense of who they are as individuals and as a group, leading supporters to use all available strategies of contestation to prevent such proposals from becoming more widespread and, when possible, increase the spread of their own proposal. Identifying incommensurable components among proposals thus provides insight into conditions under which supporters of a proposal may find their pursuit of hegemony blocked in the domestic arena, and therefore choose to pursue their identity contestation through foreign policy.

In sum, the framework developed here specifies content components of identity proposals, highlights points of incommensurability among proposals, and identifies a mechanism of contestation that allows for both the content and distribution of identity proposals to change. As such, the framework provides a basis for replicability and cross-case comparison of identity proposals in future scholarship.

Methodology

Vital to constructing and applying a theory of identity hegemony is being able to identify and distinguish among competing identity proposals. In basic terms, how do we know an identity proposal when we see it? Using an explicit framework of identity content enables a delineation of the particular components that make up each identity proposal – i.e., specifying the “stuff” that members of certain Ingroup share with each other about who they are and how they behave. This step allows for the analytical assembly of the bits of identity stuff into coherent and cohesive concepts once located, but the task of determining how to collect and interpret these

bits remains. Searching for evidence of certain identities could easily prejudice the findings in numerous ways, such as by creating pre-determined notions of what particular statements or actions mean that lead to misinterpretations, or by creating blinders that inhibit the capture of identities present in society but not familiar to the researcher.

Rather than engage, therefore, in basic ascriptive classification, I employ an intertextual analysis approach that seeks to extract existing proposals for national identity content from discourse. This approach deliberately avoids application of identities specified *a priori* by initiating investigation agnostic about the understandings of identity content expected to be found. Intertextual analysis involves inductively recovering existing but potentially obscured identities from oral and written texts,⁴⁵ organically constructing collective identities that cohere around shared understandings. The sources used to extract various identity proposals in this study include texts found in print and online news media, social media sharing sites, and minutes from parliamentary debates and party group-meetings. In line with Ted Hopf's assumption that novels depict background daily practices and everyday dimensions of interpersonal relations in which "incidental asides to identity" are likely to be found,⁴⁶ or in whose plots overt discussion of identity may play out,⁴⁷ I also drew on texts of best-selling novels.

Working under the assumption that all forms of popular fiction constitute a particularly important source of identity and its discursive practices, I expand the breadth and variety of texts analyzed in Hopf's approach to analyze the content of television series and films.⁴⁸ Samples

⁴⁵ See Hopf 2002, 24.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 35.

⁴⁷ Ömer Zülfü Livaneli's widely popular works, for example, regularly insert questions of identity into conversations among characters seemingly juxtaposed precisely to facilitate such discussion. See *Mutluluk (Happiness)* and *Serenad (Serenade)*.

⁴⁸ Including television series and films serves to extract texts from media consumed by a much broader swath of the population than just novel-readers. This approach builds on work demonstrating how broad social issues such as modernity and nationalism are engaged via popular culture media. See, for example, Armbrust (ed.) 2000 and Abu-Lughod 2005.

chosen a) had high ratings/box-office sales and b) were cited frequently in an initial survey of university students,⁴⁹ who might be more likely to access such media through YouTube or other online sources. I further broaden the collection of texts through semi-structured interviews, extended written questionnaires, and ethnographic observation.⁵⁰

From this cumulative body of material, the identity content framework outlined above provides a guide for making analytical sense of the discursive practices extracted from these texts, creating composite understandings of identity that cohere around shared constitutive norms, relational meanings, social purposes, and cognitive world views. This framework thus functions here in reverse of the order that was originally intended – i.e., to parse out the content among competing identity proposals that have already been determined. In contrast, these four content elements serve as a useful framework on which to drape the discursive practices observed to discern whether they do in fact flesh out into coherent identity proposals as expected. Bearing in mind the complexity of identity in practice, this extraction of identity proposals does not claim to be able to capture perfectly neat boxes into which all content elements discretely and uniformly fall, even in the necessarily finite number of texts analyzed here. There is, for example, some overlap among elements of the three identity proposals that emerged from this process. The relational meaning of belonging within the Western world and the social purpose of modernization, for example, may be shared among texts that differ greatly in constitutive norms of human rights and various freedoms of expression.⁵¹

⁴⁹ The survey asked its 175 participants to list the television, novel, and film characters they believed represented the ideal example of who a Turkish citizen should be, and well as which characters they thought represented the worst possible example, and why.

⁵⁰ Nearly all interviews were conducted in Turkish; all translations are the author's. The ethnographic observation conducted resembles research methods used by Lisa Wedeen and Jenny White to discern the underlying meanings structuring daily forms of individual practice and social interaction. See Wedeen 1999 and White 2002.

⁵¹ These differences eventually produced two separate identity proposals, discussed later as Western Liberalism and Republican Nationalism.

Despite such factors, general patterns of correspondence among content elements clearly emerged – e.g., texts containing both the constitutive norms of piety and belief in an overtly strong ruler also tended to exhibit the social purpose of increasing space for Islam in the public sphere, the relational meaning of brotherhood and solidarity with other Muslim countries, and the cognitive worldview of Turkey as a revered cultural and military power in line with its imperial legacy. Further, after these patterns of identity content began to coalesce around four general sets of elements that can be considered as coherent identity proposals – in that each contains clear norms of membership and appropriate behavior, desired goals for the group, beliefs about relations with others, and overall views of the group’s place in the world – examinations of new texts conducted while aiming to adhere to the principle of ontological openness produced similar alignments of identity content.

In brief, this process of identity extraction using texts collected agnostically from multiple sources generated three main composite proposals for the content of national identity in Turkey. Western Liberalism, Republican Nationalism, and Ottoman Islamism are named for their overall identity orientation, and collectively capture the most widespread proposals for national identity within Turkey’s society today.⁵² The following section outlines the content of each of these identity proposals, facilitating analysis of attempts to achieve hegemony for Ottoman Islamism via contestation of national identity in the foreign policy arena.

National identity content in Turkey: Three proposals

Western Liberalism

⁵² Pan-Turkism emerged as a fourth identity proposal during my fieldwork. Due both to the much lower levels of support for Pan-Turkism when compared to the other three identities outlined here, as well as the relatively insignificant role it plays during the events covered in this article’s scope, I do not include it here. For an in-depth discussion, see This Author, 2014.

Western Liberalism is the least exclusive of Turkey's national identity proposals and the newest to emerge. The constitutive norms of membership, for example, are quite broad and have no ethnic, religious, or even linguistic criteria.⁵³ Citizens of Turkey who define themselves as modern, supportive of individual rights and freedoms, and embodying Western values fall into this Ingroup.⁵⁴ This Western orientation is often articulated as fervently European: one Turkish MP even stated that her "*kible* is the European Union."⁵⁵ As the *kible* is the arrow that orients Muslims toward Mecca, in explaining that the EU is her point of reference the MP demonstrates the fundamental importance of international orientation and foreign policy in her identity. In terms of membership, for reasons that will become clearer in the discussion of the treatment of Alevi by supporters of the Ottoman Islamist proposal, many individuals such as Laz, Kurds, and non-Muslims such as Jewish and Christian fall into the Western Liberal proposal partly because of what they are not – i.e., ethnically Turkish or Muslim. The norm of upholding individual and group rights and liberties is constitutive of Western Liberalism, and many interviewees of these groups defined themselves using the discourse of this identity proposal.⁵⁶

The protection of these rights and liberties, including minority rights along with individual liberties, constitutes Western Liberalism's social purpose. There is a strong focus on the importance of women's equality and the advancement of rights of the LGBT community, as

⁵³ One survey respondent whose responses formed a composite Western Liberal identity eschewed these notions, stating that the most important elements of being Turkish are "being true, enlightened, and having a vision." Survey respondent from Ankara (name withheld). Another Western Liberal respondent explicitly stated that, to avoid any possible exclusion based on ethnic lines, she tries to say "people in Turkey" rather than "Turks." Survey respondent Özden from Mersin.

⁵⁴ The use of liberalism here should not be conflated with recent usage of "liberals" to describe members of the "*Yetmez Ama Evet*" ("It's Not Enough, But Yes") movement, who supported the AKP's initial promises to expand rights and liberties, but later criticized the regime's increasing authoritarianism.

⁵⁵ Author interview with CHP Deputy Chairman and MP Şafak Pavey, Ankara, June 2013. It is important to note that party affiliation does not correspond directly to the identity proposals I have specified. Pavey, for example, is a staunch Western Liberal, but is a leading member of Atatürk's CHP. As this is common throughout Turkey, analysis of party membership or preference would be unhelpful and, indeed, counterproductive to a study of identity contestation.

⁵⁶ One Laz academic stated that he was "insulted" by the word "Turk," and refused to be defined as such by the government. Author interview with Yüksel Taşkın, Istanbul, August 2013.

these communities are suffering particular hardship in Turkey. At a recent seminar in Istanbul, MP Aylin Nazlıaka expressed the grievances of her female constituents by stating: “they tell me: ‘I want to work, but my family doesn’t let me,’ because parents say they are less valuable as a marriage candidate.”⁵⁷ Women’s labor force participation the lowest in European countries by far – the EU’s aim for its 2020 strategy is 75% while Turkey’s is 35%⁵⁸ – and gender equality and violence against women still remain in need of major reform.⁵⁹

Improving opportunities for and treatment of Turkey’s LGBT community is an even tougher social purpose to achieve. Most texts collected containing elements of Western Liberalism indicated a desire for, but lack of, optimism about change. Two supporters of this identity proposal, however, expressed great hope at the newly created space for LGBTs during the 2013 Gezi Park protests. They stated the communal and supportive atmosphere among those demonstrating against the government provided a newly safe space within the public sphere for people to whom “solidarity means a lot.”⁶⁰

The relational meaning component, as indicated by the discussion above, consists of either geographical and cultural inclusion in, or at least close relations with, the West and/or Europe. This component supports continued engagement with Western institutions such as NATO and the EU, even if EU membership is never full realized.⁶¹ A cognitive worldview separate from Turkey’s place in Western civilization and modernity seems to be unclear at

⁵⁷ Minutes of “Women and LGBT Rights in Turkey – Progressing or Regressing?” 6 November 2013.

⁵⁷ “European Parliament Resolution of 22 May 2012 on a 2020 Perspective for Women in Turkey - par.36,” European Parliament, April 2013: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEX>.

⁵⁸ “European Parliament Resolution of 22 May 2012 on a 2020 Perspective for Women in Turkey - par.36,” European Parliament, April 2013: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEX>.

⁵⁹ Gülay Barbarosoğlu, 31st Conference of International University Women, Boğaziçi University, 16 August 2013.

⁶⁰ Interview with lawyer and activist (name withheld), Istanbul, August 2013.

⁶¹ This commitment to sustaining and further develop active ties with the EU is present in texts collected from TÜSİAD (Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association), but does not seem as clear of a priority for its conservative counter-part MÜSİAD (Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen). Author interview with TÜSİAD foreign trade official (name withheld), Istanbul, August 2013.

present. Previous roles may have included Turkey's role as a buffer-zone or defender of the West against a Soviet or communist incursion, or more recently against radical Islam. Currently, the only clear point is that Turkey should constitute a full and legitimate member of the Western liberal order.

Republican Nationalism

Republican Nationalism is also a relatively new proposal, but is rooted in Turkey's first (and arguably only) hegemonic identity: Kemalism. Members who support the identity proposal outlined below are often still referred to as "Kemalists," but are referred to here as Republican Nationalists for two reasons. Firstly, "Kemalist" has become a moniker used pejoratively to denote individuals who are dogmatic in their beliefs and fawning in their admiration for the Republic's founder and first president Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Secondly, several of the components of identity content shared by the original Kemalists have transformed over the years, such that it is justifiable to create a new proposal for identity content. Republican Nationalism is used to describe those who, broadly, are highly patriotic and still concerned about protecting Turkey's borders and values, but are relatively more flexible and open to discussion as to how to go about ensuring that protection.

The norm of membership for Republican Nationalism is broad overall, but contains the caveat that its members must consider themselves to be Turkish, they must honor Atatürk⁶² and the Turkish flag, and they must speak Turkish. Atatürk's phrase "*Ne Mutlu Türk'üm Diyene*" (How Happy Is He/She That Says 'I Am a Turk') fills social media feeds around holidays associated with the Republic. A declaration of the vital importance of saving the Turkish

⁶² "Being Atatürk's children" was one survey respondent's first answer to "What are the three most important elements of Turkish national identity?" Survey respondent İpek from Istanbul. Another response, stating that "the most important, of course, is loving Atatürk," explicitly emphasized this hierarchy of identity elements. Survey respondent Kortay from Izmir.

language from the yoke of foreign languages in protecting the country's independence is engraved in Atatürk's handwriting on the side of the Turkish Language Institute (*Türk Dil Kurumu*).⁶³ As an acquirable component that can thus be taught, language was viewed as a better criterion for identity membership than ethnic descent or even religion⁶⁴ during Kemalism's nationalization campaign, an identity hegemony strategy noted in the theory section.

The constitutive norms of appropriate behavior for Republican Nationalism are derived from Atatürk's guiding principles. While some of these concepts, such as populism and statism, have become relaxed in the transformation from Kemalism to Republican Nationalism, others such as nationalism and particularly secularism have remained firmly in place. Indeed, the social purpose of this identity proposal essentially consists of the protection of these principles. Similar to the Turkish Language Institute, other protective institutions such as the military, the Constitutional Court, and Atatürk's Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* – CHP) were put in place but, as is described below, the strength of many of these institutions has been eroded due to the identity hegemony practices of the AKP.

What *can* still be considered as a fundamental social purpose of all supporters of a Republican Nationalist proposal is the absolute maintenance of Turkey's borders. As both a domestic politics and a foreign policy issue, border maintenance is deeply ingrained in Republican Nationalists' identities. In its earlier Kemalist, hegemonic iteration, this identity proposal undertook nationalizing projects that sought to erase ethnic divides and other potential avenues of mobilization along identity lines believed to be lethal to the Turkish Republic. This causal belief between competing identity proposals and dissolution of territory – pervasive in many Turks' descriptions of the Balkan Wars and other conflicts that led to a massive territorial

⁶³ Atatürk's penning of the phrase decorates the institute's homepage. See <http://www.tdk.gov.tr/>.

⁶⁴ The "Speak Turkish!" campaign of the 1930s, for example, was used to assimilate Turkey's Jewish population. See Çağaptay 2006, 57-62.

“dismember[ment]” in the Ottoman Empire’s final years⁶⁵ – manifests itself in a desire among Republican Nationalists for a complete lack of dependence on external powers, including the US and the EU.⁶⁶

Moving to relational meaning, Republican Nationalists adhere to Atatürk’s vision for the Republic in viewing Turkey as oriented firmly toward the West and away from its Ottoman legacies.⁶⁷ While struggling to remain neutral during World War II, Turkey later demonstrated its Western commitment by sending troops to the Korean War in the hopes of being admitted to NATO. Republican Nationalists today remain supportive of Turkey’s general Western orientation but are hesitant over Turkish EU membership, for fear of dependence as discussed above. The most common overarching theme is the imperative not to shift Turkey’s focus southeastward, or “backward,” to the lands of the Ottoman Empire.⁶⁸

Finally, the cognitive worldview component is tricky, given the traditional, primarily inward focus of Republican Nationalism’s roots in Kemalism. Turkey as an independent non-aggressor would have been a fair characterization of the Kemalists’ view. Today’s Republican Nationalists are wary of being entangled with or “operated by” foreign powers,⁶⁹ and thus strongly believe in the need to remain an example of independence. They have also been uniformly opposed to the AKP’s increasingly engaged and, to many, arrogantly aggressive

⁶⁵ Survey respondent Cuneyt from Istanbul. This narrative of dismemberment emerged many times in interviews and surveys from those I categorized as Republican Nationalist.

⁶⁶ This desire for lack of dependence takes different forms; in its most extreme nationalist form, alliances with both the US and the EU are seen as dangerous. A frequent chant at rallies organized by the Atatürkist Thought Association (*Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği*) and the Association for Support of a Modern Lifestyle (*Çağdaş Yaşamı Destekleme Derneği*) is: “*Ne ABD ne AB, tam bağımsız Türkiye!*” (“Neither the US nor the EU, a completely independent Turkey!”) Author interview with retired admiral and frequent speaker on Atatürkist thought Türker Ertürk, Istanbul, August 2013.

⁶⁷ Robins 1996.

⁶⁸ Author’s interview with two retired civil servants (names withheld), Ankara, August 2013.

⁶⁹ Survey respondent Ahmet from Istanbul.

foreign policy initiatives.⁷⁰ With few clear statements regarding Turkey's role in the world by individuals sharing other content elements, it seems that Republican Nationalism's cognitive worldview has not yet cohered.

Ottoman Islamism

Finally, Ottoman Islamism contains clearly understood but not clearly expressed constitutive norms of membership. These norms, as in the Republican Nationalist identity proposal, are intertwined with behavior. Here, however, the membership criteria for identity are being a pious Muslim and revering the glory of the Ottoman Empire. The primacy of this identity component is laden throughout Erdoğan's speeches, many of which reference his desire to raise a pious generation. While this understandably constitutes a point of incommensurability among Republican Nationalists and Western Liberals alike given the discussion of their respective identity contents above,⁷¹ supporters of Ottoman Islamism as promulgated by the AKP recognize that someone is finally speaking to "us."⁷²

As the discourse used by Erdoğan frequently employs "Us" and "Them" categories, it is important to examine not only who is a member of the Ingroup according the norms of membership, but also who does not belong. An implicit but evident constitutive norm of the Ottoman-Islamist proposal is its Sunni component of membership. That is, individuals supporting this identity understand Turkishness to include being a Sunni Muslim and thus, believe non-Sunni Muslims, such as Alevis, are part of "Them" (or at the very least misguided, heretical parts of "Us" in need of persuasion).

⁷⁰ Author's interview with foreign policy official (name and position withheld), Ankara, July 2013; interview with CHP MP Kazım Kurt, Eskişehir, August 2013; interview with self-proclaimed Atatürkist organization National Center (*Milli Merkez* (National Center) board member Ümit Ülgen, Istanbul, August 2013; interview with CHP local MP Hakan Türker, Giresun, March 2104.

⁷¹ See also: Not the State's Job to Raise People According to Religion. *Today's Zaman*, 12 February 2012.

⁷² Interview with AKP supporter and organizer Zeynep, Trabzon, March 2014.

While even among Alevis themselves there are disputes as to whether Alevism is a syncretic and Shi'a-based form of Islam, a religion outside of Islam, or not a religion at all but a lifestyle, Alevis are often proudly Turkish and thus frustrated with the AKP government's non-recognition of them in their own state. One prominent activist noted that, in the AKP's view, "Turks are Muslims. There are no Alevis."⁷³ Another Alevi activist argued that this non-recognition is a "habit of the state," and that the AKP's project of "Sunni-fication" is akin to the "Turk-ification" practiced in the Republic's founding years.⁷⁴

Feelings of exclusion from the ruling government's identity proposal stem not just from historical experience but also from their recent treatment under the AKP government. Erdoğan made disparaging innuendoes toward CHP leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu's Alevism at multiple campaign events during the last general election in 2011,⁷⁵ an example of the delegitimization campaign strategy of contestation noted above. Alevis are also institutionally discriminated against, as their places of congress and worship (*cemevleri*) do not receive funding through the Directorate of Religious Affairs (*Diyanet*) as mosques do. Although the AKP has pledged to recognize *cemevleri*, when a long-awaited democratization package did not contain this recognition, the Alevi community interpreted this as further evidence of their exclusion within the AKP's vision for Turkey. The deputy chairman of one of Turkey's largest Alevi associations

⁷³ Author interview with Pir Sultan Abdal Cultural Association General Secretary Hasan Cem Yılmaz, Ankara, July 2013.

⁷⁴ Author interview with Pir Sultan Abdal Cultural Association Board Member Hüseyin Aydoğdu, Ankara, July 2013.

⁷⁵ A standard tactic was to announce "you know Mr. Kılıçdaroğlu is an Alevi..." (*Biliyorsunuz Kemal Bey bir Alevidir...*) and then wait for the crowd's jeering response. See "Sizin inancınızı binlerce aynı anda hiç yuhaladı mi?" ("Have thousands ever jeered at your faith at the same time?") *T24.com*, 18 June 2012: <http://t24.com.tr/haber/sizin-inancinizi-binlerce-kisi-ayni-anda-hic-yuhaladi-mi/206585>.

stated “we couldn’t see anything in that package for Alevis... It’s as though (the AKP) didn’t take the tiniest step.”⁷⁶

The Alevi case represents one of many narratives that not located within the government’s definition of who demonstrates behavior as an appropriate citizen of Turkey. Other behaviors found to be inappropriate and thus punishable according to the Ottoman Islamist identity proposal include showing too much cleavage,⁷⁷ wearing red lipstick,⁷⁸ and insulting Islam on television.⁷⁹ To demonstrate the norms of behavior that should be followed, such as piety, charity, reverence for a strong leader, and a family-centered focus,⁸⁰ state-run television shows filled with Islamic-themed programming ranging from cooking shows to soap operas⁸¹ to *iftar* programs repeatedly reinforcing these standards of appropriateness.⁸²

The social purpose of the Ottoman Islamist identity involves increasing the space allowed for Islam in the domestic public sphere, and acting in solidarity with Turkey’s Muslim brothers internationally. In the run-up to the release of the new democratization package mentioned above – in which the ban on headscarves in parliament and other public buildings would be lifted, thus testing Turkey’s tolerance for what is still perceived by some still Kemalist-leaning Republican

⁷⁶ Pir Sultan Abdal Cultural Association Deputy Chairman quoted in “*Demokratlesme Paketine ilk Tepki!*,” in *Milliyet Gazetesi*, 30 September 2013: <http://gundem.milliyet.com.tr/-demokratiklesme-paketi-ne-ilk/gundem/detay/1770585/default.htm>. Scholars of the Alevi experience assert that the “Alevi stigma is quite powerful in Turkey,” leading many to migrate to Europe rather face exclusion in their home country. Interview with sociologist and Alevi expert Besim Zirh, Ankara, August 2013.

⁷⁷ A TV presenter was fired after AKP Spokesman Hüseyin Çelik declared exposing décolleté was “unacceptable.” Bloomberg Cracks Down on Cleavage. *Bloomberg*, 9 October 2013.

⁷⁸ A ban was put in place on the state-run air carrier, Turkish Airlines. *THY’den Kırmızı Ruj Yasağı, Akşam*, 29 April 2013: <http://www.aksam.com.tr/yasam/thyden-kirmizi-ruj-yasagi/haber-200689>.

⁷⁹ ‘The Simpsons Slapped’ with Fine by Turkish TV Authority for Poking Fun at God. *Hurriyet Daily News*, 3 December 2012: <http://www.hurriyetaidailynews.com/turkish-tv-authority-fines-the-simpsons-for-poking-fun-at-god.aspx?pageID=238&nid=35981>.

⁸⁰ A cabinet member and founding AKP member stated that he and other AKP members grew up with such principles, and that it is only natural that this upbringing, coupled with religious education, would shape the way in which they governed. Author’s interview (name and position withheld), Ankara, August 2013.

⁸¹ In *Huzur Sokağı (Tranquility Street)*, for example, male protagonist Bilal is initially attracted to wealthy, mini-skirt-wearing Feyza, but eventually realizes his true love is modest, headscarf-wearing Şükran.

⁸² In the hour leading up to breaking the fast at the *iftar* meal during Ramadan, audience members can ask scholars questions about whether they have sinned and how to prevent their children from sinning. Observed July-August 2013 and July 2014.

Nationalists in the CHP (*ulusalcılar*) as an unacceptable incursion on the principle of secularism – state-run stations aired frequent showed discussions of the issue between covered and non-covered women, as well as between covered women and men. The discussions seemed to address potential problems that could arise and suggested solutions for solving these problems – by framing the debate as one of women’s equality rather than of religious expression, for example. Internationally, the social purpose extends the piety norm of charity to other Muslim countries in the form of humanitarian and development aid, primarily through the IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation (*İHH İnsani Yardım Vakfı*), but also through other channels.

The relational meaning of the Ottoman Islamist identity proposal orients Turkey away from close ties with Europe. Its supporters believe strongly in the need for Turkey to define itself and its relations independent of European standards of culture and civilization. Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu and his team at the International Strategic Research Organization build explicitly on the geo-historical and geo-cultural legacies Turkey inherited from the Ottoman Empire. Davutoğlu argued in the journals of MÜSİAD – the business group interest organization formed by pious members of the business community in opposition to TÜSİAD, the traditional institution of secularists – that “the Ottoman Empire constituted the political structure of the only civilization that succeeded in establishing its rule directly against Europe,”⁸³ and that Turkey’s flirtation with Europe and the West was an “aberration from a historically predetermined developmental trajectory.”⁸⁴ The roots of Turkey’s shift to reorient foreign policy toward its cultural and historical brothers lie mainly in these views.

The cognitive worldview of this proposal considers Turkey’s role as legitimate inheritor of Ottoman legacies and, in turn, the former home of the Caliphate; this positions Turkey as a

⁸³ Davutoğlu 2012, 13.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

regional power to be feared and admired.⁸⁵ These themes are rife throughout hundreds of novels and films with titles such as *1453 Fetih (Conquest)* that laud the heroic conquering of Constantinople by Fatih Sultan Mehmet and his immediate transformation of the great Hagia Sophia into a mosque. Television comedies such as *Harem* bring palace intrigues and military might to life through slapstick humor, while the immensely popular *Muhteşem Yüzyıl (The Magnificent Century)* is a dramatic series based on the life of Süleyman the Magnificent. Tellingly, while dealing with subject material in line with the ruling party's identity proposal, the series was criticized by Erdoğan for presenting an "inaccurate" depiction of history and loose moral behavior. The charges of insulting the sultan's legacy brought against the cast and crew of the series are powerful indication of the control the AKP wishes to retain over the content of the identity proposal it supports.⁸⁶

The government continued to stoke the public's fascination in Turkey's imperial history – an interest evident in the amount of references to Ottoman history in advertising from chewing gum to cell phone carriers to luxury housing, if advertising strategists are to be believed.⁸⁷ In the education realm, the number of Ottoman Turkish classes offered has multiplied in private institutions, and Ottoman Turkish courses are now taught in public as well as private high schools.⁸⁸ A large number of public buildings are now being remade in the Ottoman architectural style, as are the new mosques being constructed by the *Diyanet*.⁸⁹ In a highly controversial move, the AKP's decision to name the third bridge over the Bosphorus "*Yavuz Sultan Selim Köprüsü*"

⁸⁵ Interview with AKP member and local government official, Eskişehir, August 2013.

⁸⁶ See *Hurriyet Daily News*, 13 March 2013: <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/charges-against-muhtesem-yuzyil-actors-and-directors-dismissed.aspx?pageID=238&nID=42904&NewsCatID=381>.

⁸⁷ Perhaps indicative of an impending decline of support for Ottoman Islam (discussed below), the 2014 dearth of any media advertisements referencing Ottoman history is in striking contrast to the flood of such references in 2012-2013. Author's observation.

⁸⁸ Ongur, forthcoming.

⁸⁹ *AKP'nin Geneleği: Mevcut Yapılara Hasar Ver, Yerlerine Taklitlerini İnşa Et, HaberSol*, 3 August 2012: <http://haber.sol.org.tr/kultur-sanat/akpnin-gelenegi-mevcut-yapilara-hasar-ver-yerlerine-taklitlerini-insa-et-haberi-57908>.

provoked further outrage within the Alevi community. As Sultan Selim the Ferocious (*Yavuz*) got his name in part from the massive slaughter of Alevis during his Sunni-fication of the empire, many Alevis (and others) believe that the bridge's name was a symbolic gesture foreshadowing future attempts at Sunni-fication.⁹⁰

It appears, however, that the AKP may not be able to continue carrying out such nationalizing projects. While the following section analyzes the rise of Ottoman Islamist identity through contestation in the foreign policy arena, the conclusion highlights potential domestic and international challenges to its bid for hegemony.

Identity hegemony: Contesting Ottoman Islamism on the outside

The previous section's discussion of elements of the Ottoman Islamist proposal articulated clear interests in terms of foreign policy and domestic politics derived from its supporters' understanding of Turkishness. Why, then, did the AKP not immediately act to pursue these interests and reorient itself toward Turkey's former Ottoman neighborhood upon coming to power in 2002? Further, why did it not act quickly to expand the permissible space for Islam in the domestic public sphere once seemingly gaining the institutional power to do so?

From an identity hegemony perspective, the AKP could take neither of these steps as prescribed by Ottoman Islamism because it faced an organizational threat within the domestic arena upon coming to power in 2002. Examining the various proposals for identity content fleshed out above and identifying points of incommensurability helps understand what constituted this threat. Western Liberalists could be expected to object to the advancement of any identity proposal that contains membership norms based on religion and submission to an authoritarian leader, which are directly opposed to their own constitutive norms of diverse

⁹⁰ Turkey's Culture Wars: The Yavuz Sultan Selim Bridge, the Topçu Barracks, and the AKM. *Istanbul Gazete*, 3 June 2013: <http://istanbulgazette.com/turkeys-culture-wars-the-yavuz-sultan-selim-bridge-the-topcu-barracks-the-akm/2013/06/03/>.

inclusivity and protection of liberties. Similarly, the Republican Nationalist social purpose of protecting the founding principles of Atatürk – and particularly the principle of secularism – fundamentally conflicts with the Ottoman Islamist social purpose of increasing space for Islam in the public sphere. Identity proposals with content elements that are incommensurable with one another – e.g. their beliefs about appropriate behavior for group members (constitutive norms) or what the group’s goals (social purpose) should be appear irreconcilable – can be expected to have supporters that clash with each other as well. While both of these identity proposals contain points of incommensurability with Ottoman Islamism, Republican Nationalism posed a much more serious threat to any attempt by the AKP to pursue identity hegemony during its first term in power. Since the founding of the Turkish Republic, Republican Nationalism had been embodied in institutions such as the Constitutional Court (*Anayasa Mahkemesi*), the Turkish Armed Forces (*Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri* – TSK), and the CHP, all of which viewed themselves as institutionally tasked to uphold the Republic’s founding Atatürkist principles. Unlike relatively less widespread Western Liberalism, Republican Nationalism’s supporters therefore had institutional tools with which to combat and defeat attempts to advance the spread of Ottoman Islamism throughout the population and achieve the interests it prescribes.

As a result, even though the AKP received enough votes to form a single-party government – just months after being established – the party was far from free to realize the interests generated by its identity. As the successor to a string of parties that had all been shut down only to reopen under a new name, the AKP leadership acted pragmatically and cautiously, working under the knowledge that policies seen to threaten secularism domestically or alter Turkey’s historically Western foreign policy orientation could be seen as provocation by the military and thus cause for intervention. This cautiousness arguably stems from the constitutive

effect the period of the Welfare Party's (*Refah Partisi* – RP, one of the AKP's predecessors) closure had on former members – and Erdoğan in particular. The party was removed from power by the military in 1997, and closed by the Constitutional Court in 1998. In December 1997, as an RP member and mayor of Istanbul, Erdoğan was arrested for reciting a poem claimed to incite hatred.⁹¹ He spent four months in prison and was temporarily barred from politics, delaying his assumption of Turkey's premiership until 2003.

Due to this organizational threat presented by institutions of Republican Nationalism, in its first years in power the AKP was unable to employ the domestic-level identity hegemony practices outlined above, including nationalizing projects (e.g. Kemalism's Turk-ification) and delegitimization campaigns against supporters of alternative proposals (e.g. a YouTube video campaign sponsored by major Republican Nationalist newspaper *Cumhuriyet Gazetesi* and titled "Are You Aware of the Danger?")⁹² An alternative tool to these practices is institutional change, a tool that is likely only available to Ingroups in power. The AKP embraced this tool with gusto but, given the domestic threats to the party's pursuit of Ottoman Islamist hegemony, took its efforts to enact institutional change to the foreign policy arena.

Through a main policy pillar of EU accession, the AKP worked to significantly reduce the role of the military in politics and its ability to intervene. Using the language of civil-military reform necessitated by the EU's Copenhagen Agreement, the AKP institutionalized civil authority over the military. The most effective step toward reducing threats from an autonomous, staunchly Republican Nationalist institution was taking control of the National Security Council,

⁹¹ The controversial line in the poem was: "Our minarets are our bayonets, Our domes are our helmets, Our mosques are our barracks." See Erdogan Goes to Prison. *Hurriyet Daily News*, 27 March 1999: www.hurriyetdailynews.com/erdogan-goes-to-prison.aspx?pageID=438&n=erdogan-goes-to-prison-1999-03-27.

⁹² One of the most ominous videos shows a woman with her hair uncovered in one frame and covered by a *niqab* in the next while a voice intones "Are You Aware of the Danger?" The title of the video (*Tehlikenin Farkında Mısınız?*) is also scrawled backward in a font resembling Arabic script and very difficult to decipher, evoking beliefs in the covert nature of the supposed Islamist threat. See: <http://alkislarlayasiorum.com/icerik/130020/cumhuriyet-gazetesi-tehlikenin-farkinda-misiniz>.

the body that forced the RP to step down in 1997.⁹³ The 2007 EU Progress Report – published at the beginning of the AKP’s second term in power – praised the NSC’s “new role,” the drastic reduction in the overall size of the NSC, and the halving of the number of military personnel on the committee.⁹⁴ Tellingly, those areas in which the report criticized lack of progress, including civilian control over the Gendarmerie and civilian oversight over defense expenditures, involved issues that did not constitute direct threats to AKP rule. The report also criticized the Turkish military’s statement against AKP Islamist presidential candidate Abdullah Gül in 2007,⁹⁵ a move that could have posed a threat to the AKP in the past when the military had stronger influence over politics. That nothing came of the famous “e-memorandum” and that soldiers stayed in their barracks testifies to the AKP’s success in reducing the role of a Republican Nationalist institution through foreign policy channels.

Also as part of its EU foreign policy, the AKP pushed through judicial reform that ended the jurisdiction of military courts over civilians, abolished the State Security Courts used to try crimes against the state, and placed the selection of new judges in courts as high as the Constitutional Court in the government’s hands. In particular, this change in the constitution of and future selections processes for the Constitutional Court – an institution previously known as a guardian of secularism that reflected a monolithic understanding of Turkish nationalism in its decisions⁹⁶ – represented a major step in reducing threats to the AKP’s advancement of its Ottoman Islamist identity proposal.⁹⁷ This institutional reform, ostensibly taken in pursuit of EU

⁹³ See Eldem 2013.

⁹⁴ Turkey 2007 Progress Report, Commission of the European Communities, 6 November 2007, 9: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2007/nov/turkey_progress_reports_en.pdf.

⁹⁵ The “e-memorandum” posted on the Turkish Armed Forces website on 27 April 2007 expressed its displeasure at the nomination of Gül and intimated that the military would intervene if Turkey’s secular system was threatened.

⁹⁶ See Yazıcı 2009, 166-209.

⁹⁷ The AKP’s 2008 survival of a closure case similar to those that closed its *Refah Partisi* and *Fazilet Partisi* predecessors also represents a reduction in the organizational threat that led it to take its national identity

membership, also greatly advanced the AKP's prospects for being able to contest national identity back home.

Emboldened by these institutional reforms in the arena of foreign policy that enabled the election of Gül, despite the open objection of the military, as well as the AKP's survival of a closure case in a less-threatening Constitutional Court in 2008, supporters of an Ottoman Islamist proposal began more openly to contest for identity hegemony in the domestic arena. The *Ergenekon* and *Balyoz* trials, for example, charged many opposition members with forming a terrorist organization and plotting a coup to overthrow the AKP. Initially heralded as a step forward in the democratization of civil-military relations by applying the rule of law even to former Chief of General Staff and President of Turkey Kenan Evren, the trials came to be seen as a way of removing the threat of potentially powerful individuals, as well as tarnishing the institutional credibility of the armed forces. The weakening influence of the military in Turkey was demonstrated by a general continuation of politics as usual following the resignation of the Chief of General Staff as well as the leaders of army, navy, and air force in protest of the trials in 2011. Erdoğan's immediate acceptance of the resignations and appointment of his own choice for Chief of General Staff further served to make the domestic arena a safer one for the contestation of national identity by the AKP in its second and third terms.

With these main threats to the AKP's advance of Ottoman Islamism reduced, the AKP was able to act on foreign policy goals that are incommensurable with the Republican Nationalist proposal for Turkish identity as outlined above. These goals involved increasing engagement with other Muslim states, such as Iran, and territories of the former Ottoman Empire, such as Syria and Iraq, with a view to "zero problems with neighbors" ("*komşularla sıfır sorun*").

contestation outside. See *AK Parti'yi Kapatma Kararı Askeri Darbeden Farksız Olur*, *Yeni Şafak*, 10 May 2008: <http://yenisafak.com.tr/yorum-haber/ak-partiyi-kapatma-karari-askeri-darbeden-farksiz-olur-10.05.2008-116288>.

Foreign Minister Davutoğlu claimed that the pursuit of strategic depth – i.e., taking advantage of the geo-cultural legacies a state has inherited – could only be undertaken once security threats in the region had been removed. Erdoğan’s speeches often specifically engage Turkey’s Ottoman legacies, reaching out to former imperial territories that he believes are “eagerly watching Turkey.”⁹⁸ In actual policy terms, acts such as lifting visa requirements for countries such as Syria, Iran, and Yemen; leadership of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation; and massive channeling of humanitarian aid to Muslim countries all constitute elements in line with the Ottoman Islamist social purpose of extending piety to fellow Muslim populations, its relational meaning of orientation toward former Ottoman territories, and its cognitive worldview of Turkey as the rightful leader of the Islamic world.

Perhaps the clearest foreign policy shift generated by pursuit of Ottoman Islamist interests by the newly emboldened AKP can be seen in the rapid deterioration of relations with Israel, Turkey’s former close ally. As Ottoman Islamism prescribes a view of Israelis as oppressors of fellow Muslim Palestinians, Israel became an explicit target of animosity during the AKP’s second and third terms, culminating in a severe downgrade of diplomatic relations. Erdoğan’s berating of Israeli President Shimon Peres for Israel’s killing of Palestinians before storming off the stage at the 2008 World Economic Forum was met with jubilation by supporters proclaiming him the “conqueror of Davos” for his willingness to stand up to Israel and his support for the Palestinian cause.⁹⁹ Erdoğan rhetorically wields his criticism of Israel on visits throughout the Muslim world – particularly following the 2010 raid of the Gaza-bound Turkish

⁹⁸ The quotes Ayşe Zarakol extracts from Erdoğan’s 2011 election victory speech are indicative of outreach to former Ottoman territories: “Sarajevo has won as much as Istanbul; Beirut as much as Izmir; West Bank and Gaza as much as Diyarbakır.” Zarakol 2012, 739.

⁹⁹ The word choice of “conqueror” (*fatih*), in its analogy with Fatih Sultan Mehmet as the conqueror of Istanbul, is telling. Erdal Şafak. *Davos Seçim Değil Tarih Malzemesi* (Davos Isn’t a Choice, It’s a Requisite of History). *Sabah*, 15 February 2009: http://www.sabah.com.tr/Yazarlar/safak/2009/02/15/Davos_secim_degil_tarih_malzemesi.

flotilla *Mavi Marmara* in which nine Turkish activists were killed – which in turn increases his legitimacy as defender of Turkey’s Muslim brothers back home.¹⁰⁰

In addition to pursuing foreign policy interests generated by its Ottoman Islamist understanding of identity, the AKP also was able to move forward on the social purpose of increasing space for Islam in public sphere domestically – another interest incommensurable with previously more widespread Republican Nationalism. The education system has been reconfigured to effectively increase the number of children attending clerical (*imam hatip*) schools;¹⁰¹ many new mosques are under construction; and bans on headscarves in universities, public administration buildings, and parliament have been removed. This extension of the spaces in which the Islamic headscarf could be worn was particularly celebrated by the AKP on 31 October 2013, when four headscarved AKP MPs entered Parliament. The relative lack of hostility with which their entrance was met contrasted sharply with Merve Kavakçı’s experience, a headscarved Virtue Party (*Fazilet Partisi*) MP who was booed so vociferously for being an “agent” of Islamism upon entering in May 1999 that she was unable to take her oath or return to Parliament.¹⁰² While the headscarved deputies took their oaths unobstructed in 2013, this act was perceived by some as a breach of secularism (Republican Nationalists) and by others as the increasing spread of subjugating forces disguised as women’s empowerment (Western Liberals).

CHP Deputy Chairman and human rights activist Şafak Pavey, for example, in addressing Parliament shortly after the headscarved deputies entered, noted critical areas in which women’s rights that intersect with Islam have not been advanced, such as some girls covering at the age of

¹⁰⁰ See: Erdogan Hailed as New Champion for Arabs Who Hope to Emulate the Turkish Model. *Al Arabiya*, 14 September 2011: <http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/09/14/166780.html>.

¹⁰¹ The new system ostensibly aims to provide early vocational training, but is claimed by its detractors to be a method of increasing the exposure of children to religious instruction at a younger age and thus increasing the number of those who will attend an *imam hatip* high school.

¹⁰² See Peres 2012.

five and marrying at 15. Immediately following her Western Liberal norms-laden speech,¹⁰³ Pavey – like Merve Kavakçı before her – was labeled an *agent provocateur* and subjected to character defamation by pro-government media sources.¹⁰⁴ This technique of delegitimization, one of several used in pursuit of an identity proposals hegemony as discussed above, is applied here to Pavey’s plea for universal rights and freedoms by Ottoman Islamists in the same manner used previously to delegitimize headscarves as a violation of secularism by Republican Nationalists.

Conclusion

This article’s analysis of identity hegemony as pursued by the AKP’s strategy of taking its fight “outside” highlights the role of foreign policy as an arena in which understandings of national identity can be contested. In doing so, the theory of identity hegemony developed here provides comprehensive understanding of what appears at first sight to be a series of rapid and even erratic shifts in Turkey’s foreign policy. The theory also accounts for the meteoric rise of an Ottoman Islamist identity proposal, whose content elements clash directly and are thus incommensurable with the previously widespread Republican Nationalist proposal’s strive for hegemony. Rather than relying on monolithic or deterministic identity explanations, the article’s break-down of identity content provides understanding of the goals (or interests) supporters of particular identity proposals wish to see realized, while its dynamic model of identity contestation illustrates how proposals for particular identities gain and lose support due to both domestic and international factors. The AKP’s swerve away from its initially eager pursuit of EU membership – once having fulfilled democratization criteria that served to removed

¹⁰³ Pavey’s speech highlighted the need to protect the rights, freedoms, and personal security of all individuals irrespective of identity or lifestyle – including gays, Christians, and miniskirt-wearers. Şafak Pavey, *Minutes of the Turkish Grand National Assembly*, 11th congress in the 4th year of the 24th term, 31 October 2013, p. 9.

¹⁰⁴ See, for example, Sevilay Yükselir. *Şafak Pavey ve Kirli Provokasyonu* (Şafak Pavey and Her Dirty Provocation). *Sabah Gazetesi*, 3 November 2013: <http://www.sabah.com.tr/Yazarlar/yukselir/2013/11/03/safak-pavey-ve-kirli-provokasyonu>.

organizational threats to the AKP¹⁰⁵ – becomes comprehensible when viewed through a lens of identity contestation. With threats from traditional bastions of Republican Nationalism thus neutralized through a foreign policy initiative, the AKP’s Ottoman Islamist understanding of national identity – and particularly its constitutive norms of piety and respect for a strong ruler, as well as Turkey’s legitimate role as leader in the Islamic world – could be spread throughout the domestic public sphere through contestation strategies including persuasion campaigns, delegitimization of the Other, and image representation in popular media.

Major challenges to this pursuit of hegemony in both domestic and foreign policy arenas,¹⁰⁶ however, indicate that although the AKP may have believed it was operating with the hegemony of its identity proposal, the social structures the party attempted to put in place were by no means met with acquiescence. In particular, a swell of opposition catalyzed and spread throughout the country in the wake of the 2013 Gezi Park protests has the potential to coalesce in political form.¹⁰⁷ Discourse used by protestors throughout the ongoing demonstrations carried numerous references to identity,¹⁰⁸ including rejection of the social purpose of spreading Islam in the public sphere. One of the most popular slogans of protest in Turkey was “*Türkiye laiktir laik kalacak!*” (“Turkey is secular and will remain secular!”).¹⁰⁹ In one of many creative uses of humor used to challenge hegemonic power, a protestor poked fun at Erdoğan’s call for women to have three or more children and his aspiration for a newly pious generation by spray-painting “Are

¹⁰⁵ This strategic use of the EU’s democratization criteria is hinted at in Erdoğan’s insinuation to King Abdullah of Jordan that democracy is a vehicle rather than a destination. See “Ürdün Kralı’nın Erdoğan’a İki Yüzlüğü,” *Haber7*, 19 March 2013: <http://www.haber7.com/dis-politika/haber/1003670-urdun-kralinin-erdogana-karsi-iki-yuzlulugu>.

¹⁰⁶ See Zarakol 2012.

¹⁰⁷ The protests, which began in May 2013 as a peaceful environmental demonstration and evolved into massive country-wide protests objecting to the increasingly authoritarian rule of the AKP, represent the first major, sustained contestation against Ottoman Islamism. Calls for those supporting the Gezi protests to form their own party are frequently voiced by disparate segments of Turkey’s population: Interview with a business owner (name withheld)r, Kaş, July 2013; interview with two retired civil servants (names withheld), Ankara, August 2013; interview with a lawyer and a civil activist (names withheld), Istanbul, August 2013.

¹⁰⁸ Turkish and Ottoman history expert Halil İnalcık even encapsulated the events as an “identity issue.” Author interview, Ankara, August 2013.

¹⁰⁹ Author’s observations of protests in Ankara, October, 2012 and in Ankara and Istanbul, June–August 2013.

you sure you want three kids like *us*?”¹¹⁰ This use of the word “us” underscores well the of Us v. Them discourse that constitutes the recently catalyzed contestation by those proposing Western Liberalism¹¹¹ and Republican Nationalism¹¹² as alternative understandings of national identity to that of Ottoman Islamism.

While these challenges to the pursuit of hegemony by Ottoman Islamism’s supporters underscore the domestic and international factors shaping the contours of national identity debates in Turkey, they serve as empirical indicators for scholars aiming to develop a broader understanding of the relationship between national identity contestation and foreign policy. Foreign policy may serve as an arena conducive to the advancement of an identity proposal when norms of interaction align – when the EU’s understanding of democratic civil military relations aligns with the AKP’s interest in civilian control of the military, for example – but may provide an environment hostile to the advancement of a proposal when understandings do not align – e.g. when Syria is suspicious of sectarian motives underlying Turkey’s overtures of Muslim solidarity.¹¹³ Analyzing foreign policy from this broader perspective facilitates not only a better understanding of the dynamics of national identity debates, but also provides insight into the dynamics of foreign policy itself. When viewing this realm – assumed by those who would black-box the state to be immune to the vagaries of domestic politics – as an arena in which

¹¹⁰ Photo of spray-painted graffiti used in *Direnince Çok Eğlenceli Oluyorsun Türkiye! Milliyet Gazetesi*, 9 June 2013. <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/direnince-cok-eglenceli-oluyorsun/pazar/haberdetay/09.06.2013/1720366/default.htm> Emphasis added.

¹¹¹ Liberal Democratic Party (*Liberal Demokrat Partisi*) Chairman Cem Tokar, for example, criticized Davutoğlu for “dreaming of the Ottoman Empire,” and pointed to “Western civilization” as a better model. Author interview, Istanbul, August 2013.

¹¹² A board member of the self-proclaimed Atatürkist organization National Center (*Milli Merkez*) stated that the Gezi Protests showed that the legacy of Atatürk was being “threatened” by the AKP, highlighting the ubiquitous display of Atatürk’s portrait during the protests. Author interview with Ümit Ülgen, Istanbul, August 2013.

¹¹³ Interview with two ministerial officials advising on foreign policy (offices and names withheld), Ankara, July 2013.

supporters battle to carve out hegemony for their own identity proposals, otherwise impenetrable patchworks of foreign policy initiatives become comprehensible.

Moving forward, the theoretical framework developed in this article can generate improved insight into the relationship between national identity contestation and foreign policy in cases such as Iran,¹¹⁴ Israel,¹¹⁵ Ukraine,¹¹⁶ and the United States.¹¹⁷ Further, the framework's specification of the unit of analysis as national identity proposals facilitates its extension to non-state cases, including secessionist movements. Utilizing the framework developed here could identify the conditions under which secessionist movements take their contestation "outside" to the foreign policy arena,¹¹⁸ as well as investigating related issues such as contestation within secessionist movements¹¹⁹ over competing proposals for identity content, and the international dynamics shaping the contours of this contestation.¹²⁰

¹¹⁴ Persuasive evidence for the existence of competing Iranian national identity narratives exists, suggesting this is a fruitful case for exploration in terms of foreign policy. See Holliday 2007.

¹¹⁵ See Shelef 2010. Applying this article's framework could extend Shelef's findings by examining potential links between his "evolving nationalism" and shifts in Israel's foreign policy orientation.

¹¹⁶ For example, the Ukrainian government's November 2013 refusal to sign an Association and Trade Agreement with the EU, and the so-called EuroMaidan protests this decision sparked, warrant examination through a contestation lens to determine how, if at all, identity considerations played a role.

¹¹⁷ Deborah Schildkraut's study, while focusing on a singular American identity rather than competing proposals, provides a useful starting point. See Schildkraut 2007.

¹¹⁸ In the case of Turkey, the Kurdish nationalist movement's strategy of soliciting EU support could provide particularly useful insights. See Balci 2013.

¹¹⁹ The contours of debates among groups such as Basques and Tamils over membership criteria, desired goals, and methods appropriate for achieving those goals are ripe for such analysis.

¹²⁰ Examining such dynamics could ascertain, for example, the extent to which international factors shaped the emergence of a Kosovar independence movement that repeatedly declared its Western orientation and commitment to multiculturalism (in lieu of other potential membership criteria such as ethnic Albanian or Muslim membership criteria).

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