

**In 1991, Belgium's then-Foreign Minister, Mark Eyskens, said that 'Europe is an economic giant, a political dwarf, and a military worm.' Is this statement still valid in 2014?**

*If we succeed, [...], Europe's role in the world [...] will be respected and listened to, not only as the economic it already is, but as a political power which will talk on equal terms to the greatest powers on our planet. (Giscard d'Estaing, 2002)*

## **Introduction**

After EU's failure to properly respond to the Gulf Crisis, Belgium's then-Foreign Affairs Minister, Mark Eyskens, harshly criticized the EU's incapability of going beyond a trade area calling it an economic giant, a political dwarf and a military worm. However, as this essay will argue, since the statement was made in 1991, the EU has gradually developed its economic, political and military capabilities. The European Union has greatly increased its 'actorness' capability especially in the latter 2 areas, partially using its economic giant status. The paper will be divided into three sections each looking at the inter-connected dimensions of the EU, drawing on main and sub-strands of realism, liberalism and constructivism in analysing the EU's role in international relations. As this paper is not concerned with what the EU is but rather its role and scope in the international arena, realism, liberalism and constructivism will be used complementarily to conduct the analysis, which will not go thoroughly into theoretical debates. Instead, a large body of empirical evidence will be drawn while main theoretical approaches will be used to reinforce presented arguments.

## **EU and theoretical approaches**

While definitions of the European Union can vary depending on the angle and perspective it is approached from, no single theory can fully account or explain for the complexity of the European Union. Former Commission President, Jacques Delors, suggested that the EU represented an UPO, and unidentified political object<sup>1</sup>, while Michael Burgess that while it works in practice it does not in theory.<sup>2</sup> Federal, con-federal, quasi-federal, multi-level governance amongst other have attempted to explain what type of actor the European Union is while realist, liberalist, constructivist etc. have looked at its role and impact in the international arena. Nevertheless, instead of offering a clear picture of the EU, the debates have instead led to further debate. As a result, such approaches should not be used exclusively but rather complementary in understanding the role of the European Union. Therefore, in this analysis, the EU will be analysed as both an actor and a collection of states working along same principles in an attempt to assess its status economically, politically and militarily. While classic realists such as Mearsheimer<sup>3</sup> would only see the EU as a counter-balance to the US and focus on its lack of deploying coercive force as an actor, inter-governmentalists would only see cooperation possible when member states' foreign interests converge. As Moravcsik argues, key decisions will always be taken by the states as foreign security and defence policy cannot be coordinated let alone integrated.<sup>4</sup> Neoliberalism, on the other hand, emphasizing the role trade and economics in deploying soft power and promoting interdependence focuses specifically on EU's civilian role.<sup>5</sup> Complementarily, constructivism has brought ideas of normative power and on many occasions has argued along similar lines with liberalism.<sup>6</sup> As specified above, this paper is not concerned with refuting or choosing the best theoretical approach but rather, by borrowing from each theory and drawing on a large body of empirical evidence, EU's scope as an economic, political and military power will be analysed.

## **The Economic Giant**

The EU remains the world's biggest trading power as well as its wealthiest marketplace. It accounts for 28% of the world's GDP, more than the U.S and for bigger shares of trade in merchandise (17% of merchandise shares) and commercial services (25%) than either the US or

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<sup>1</sup> Delors, J. (1985) 'Speech by Jacques Delors', retrieved from [http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2001/10/19/423d6913-b4e2-4395-9157-fe70b3ca8521/publishable\\_en.pdf](http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2001/10/19/423d6913-b4e2-4395-9157-fe70b3ca8521/publishable_en.pdf)

<sup>2</sup> As quoted in McCormick, J. (2014) *Understanding the European Union: a concise introduction*, London: Macmillan p.22-23

<sup>3</sup> Mearsheimer, J. (2001) *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, New York: Norton p.392

<sup>4</sup> Moravcsik, A. (1998) *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press p.27

<sup>5</sup> Keohane, R.O. and J, S. Nye, Jr. (1977) *Power and Interdependence*, New York: Addison-Wesley Longman p.15

<sup>6</sup> McCormick, op.cit p.216

China.<sup>7</sup> With a population over 500 million, the EU has 61% more consumers than the US while the personal wealth of Europeans, combined with the largely open internal market that now exists in the world makes the EU the wealthiest market in the world.<sup>8</sup> Its huge market has led to the creation of European multinationals with a global presence only comparable to their US counterparts. The EU is now the source of two thirds of all investment coming from OECD member states and more than three times as much as the US.<sup>9</sup> The EU27 trade deficit for goods and services in 2011 was equivalent to -0.2% of GDP in 2011, a smaller deficit than the US (-3.7%) or Japan (-0.7%).<sup>10</sup> While the Eurozone crisis has posed a challenge for policies on currency, the EU's giant status in the economic field remains indisputable. In the Eurozone, the 17 member states act and work collectively and the Euro is the only substantial competitor with the US dollar in terms of credibility and influence. Had it not been for the problems that commenced in 2010, it has been suggested by Chinn and Frankel that it might have eventually become the primary international reserve currency due to the US increase of national debt that questioned its economic leadership.<sup>11</sup> (see appendix 1)

The EU has developed an extensive network of both bilateral and multilateral trading networks and treaties based on proximity (Eastern Europe, The Mediterranean), colonial ties (parts of Africa and Asia especially) and of expediency (the US and Japan). As it is a giant trading bloc with an unparalleled power of influence on procedures in international commerce it has the ability to shape and reshape both the flow and the composition of international trade, most evident in the influence it has on the World Trade Organizations.<sup>12</sup> During WTO negotiations, EU negotiates as an actor and is represented by the European commissioner for trade.<sup>13</sup> While the European Union's political and military capacities have been bitterly and easily criticized along the years, its economic weight has been hardly disputed. Such weight comes from its internal and external capacity, as it works as both an actor in itself but also as a congregation of states.

First of all the EU has the necessary resources to respond to internal crises. It has in place financial capacity to help member states 'bounce back' during the long aftermath of large-scale disasters. The EU solidarity fund can be mobilized up to a maximum amount of one billion Euro and it can be used for restoration of critical infrastructures such as water, energy, telecommunications, transport, health and education but also for rescue services, preventive infrastructure and immediate protection of cultural heritage and cleaning up of the stricken areas.<sup>14</sup>

Secondly, the EU has displayed its economic power in terms of foreign assistance. It has been the most important source of aid to the south by having institutionalized relations with 90 of the world's poorest countries. According to the OECD website, it is the largest source of official development assistance in the world, jointly accounting for 56% the total of 120 billion dollars given in 2009 by the 24 members of the development assistance committee of the OECD compared to the 22 % from the US and 8% from Japan.<sup>15</sup> It is also the largest second provider of food aid after the US supplying food worth 500 million euro per year.<sup>16</sup> (Appendix 1) In 2011, the EU signed a 5 million Euro contract with IMF to enhance their cooperation in capacity building under the Managing Natural Resources Wealth Tropical Fund Trust, to which, the EU, with a total contribution of 49 million dollars becomes the largest donor amongst Australia, Netherlands, Switzerland, Kuwait and Oman on the Steering Committee of the Trust.<sup>17</sup> In addition, it has committed 20 million dollars to support IMF's Africa Regional Technical Assistance Centre for Eastern and Southern African and the Indian Ocean region. (AFRITAC EAST, AFRITAC SOUTH).<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> OECD (2014) 'OECD Factbook 2013', retrieved from [http://stats.oecd.org/BrandedView.aspx?oeed\\_by\\_id=factbook-data-en&doi=data-00647-en#](http://stats.oecd.org/BrandedView.aspx?oeed_by_id=factbook-data-en&doi=data-00647-en#), date accessed: 10/05/14

<sup>8</sup> Ibid

<sup>9</sup> Ibid

<sup>10</sup> Eurostat (2013) 'Key figures on Europe', retrieved from [http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY\\_OFFPUB/KS-EI-13-001/EN/KS-EI-13-001-EN.PDF](http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-EI-13-001/EN/KS-EI-13-001-EN.PDF)

<sup>11</sup> Chinn, M., & Frankel, J. (2008) 'Why the Euro Will Rival the Dollar', *International Finance*, 11/1, p.51

<sup>12</sup> The Handbook of European Politics, Smith, p. 530

<sup>13</sup> McCormick, op.cit. p. 207

<sup>14</sup> McCormick, op.cit., p. 27

<sup>15</sup> As quoted in McCormick, op.cit. p.217

<sup>16</sup> Ibid, p.217

<sup>17</sup> IMF (2011) 'Press Release No. 11/452', retrieved from <http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2011/pr11452.htm> date accessed 10/05/14

<sup>18</sup> IMF (2011) 'Press Release No. 11/365', retrieved from <http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2011/pr11365.htm> date accessed 10/05/14

The EU becomes engaged in many international trade disputes, well-armed with both traditional and modern trade weapons. , committed to defend multilateral systems.<sup>19</sup> The EU can be seen as a traditional actor from a realist perspective through the way it deploys its economic weight to demand concessions from those that wish to gain access to the market. On the other side, through neo-liberal lenses it is possible to analyse the EU trade policies as those of a trading state, aimed at using multilateral and civilian methods to create stability and good trading conditions. The third, constructivist view would be that the EU is a major contributor to global governance through its normative power.<sup>20</sup> The EU does not only assert its economic interests against other major players, such as the USA, but as Smith argues, it is also increasingly attempting 'to reshape international economic affairs according to its own standards.'<sup>21</sup> This can be seen in its foreign economic policies regarding issues such as genetically modified foods, privacy rights, competitiveness, or antitrust policy, intellectual property rights and others all which have caused transatlantic tensions. In these cases, the EU has been able to act as an economic power and force the USA and other actors to adjust their own policies.<sup>22</sup>

The economic spill over into the political field has firstly began indirectly, through the Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection department of the European Commission (ECHO), operating on a yearly budget of 700 million Euro, which has combined the EU's humanitarian assistance agenda with its overseas civilian protection management.<sup>23</sup> While ECHO does not directly implement aid programs, it projects influence through funding 'like-minded' partners such as NGOs, UN bodies or International Organizations such as the Red Cross.<sup>24</sup> Gradually, as it will be further shown, the EU, alongside indirect 'interventions' has also become engaged in direct initiatives.

### **Political dwarf**

The EU has, on many occasions been perceived as a weak political actor and with good reason. The incapability of its member states to agree on a common policy regarding the Gulf War gave it a weak aspect and rose questioned about it becoming more than an economic power. As Toje argues, the absence of President Obama at the annual US-EU summit meeting in 2010 sent the message that the EU was not a sufficiently important matter to justify the attention of the president.<sup>25</sup> Similarly, while giving a speech about the European Security Policy, Hillary Clinton mentioned Russia 29 times while failing to mention the CSDP once.<sup>26</sup> This section will argue that in spite of all the criticism, the EU's characterization as a 'political dwarf' is simply not valid anymore nowadays. While it may not be a political giant, it nevertheless shows both the inclination and the potential of becoming one due to its three developments: its increasing importance in the transatlantic security relation, humanitarian development and normative power and crisis management capabilities. This will be analysed primarily through liberal and constructivist lenses, through an increase partnership with the US on security issues and also through its economic leverage power, or the spill-over effect and its ability to shape events outside its borders through the projection of soft-power.

### Trans-Atlantic partnership

The events of 9/11 represented a catalyst in the EU's development as an actor and in the strengthening of the trans-Atlantic security partnership. While McCormick argues that the disagreement over the war on terror policies and of the Iraq invasion shook the Atlantic Alliance to its core, changing EU perceptions on US foreign and security policy leadership<sup>27</sup>, he seems to miss out on one important detail: the outcome was a strongest partnership between the two sides. Behind the public mud-trashing, there was more cooperation between both the US and European countries than it had ever previously been. At an intra-state level, a realist perspective is relevant in observing the triumph of high politics over the low ones. In France, while government officials harshly criticized US

<sup>19</sup> Smith, M., (2007) 'The EU and IPE' in Jørgensen, K. E., Pollack, M., & Rosamond, B., (Eds.), *The SAGE Handbook of European Union Politics*, London: Sage, p. 532

<sup>20</sup> Ibid, p. 534

<sup>21</sup> Smith, M. (2011) 'Implementation: Making the EUs international relations work', in Hill, C., & Smith, M. (Eds.), (2011) *International relations and the European Union*, Oxford: Oxford University Press. p.182

<sup>22</sup> Ibid, p.182

<sup>23</sup> Boin, A., Ekengren, M., & Rhinard, M. (2013), *The European Union as Crisis Manager: Patterns and Prospects*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., p. 72

<sup>24</sup> Ibid, p.73

<sup>25</sup> Toje, A. (2011), 'The European Union as a small power', *Journal of common market studies*, 49/1, p. 45

<sup>26</sup> Ibid, p.45

<sup>27</sup> McCormick, op.cit., p.200

policies publicly, the two governments quietly put in place Alliance Base, a CIA-FDGSE joint conducted facility which performed renditions throughout Europe, and the bilateral relationship was characterized by former CIA Director McLaughlin as 'the strongest intelligence partnership there was at the moment.'<sup>28</sup> The Alliance Base successfully completed at least 12 operations and also captured Ganczarsky, a key al-Qaeda leader in Europe.<sup>29</sup> At a supranational level, the US has pushed the EU into adopting a counter-terrorist strategy more compatible with theirs or at least complementary pushing for the EU to emerge as a strong actor against terrorism. From this perspective, during the war on terror the Atlantic alliance was not shaken to the core but rather consolidated to an unprecedented extent. The EU has been often criticized of bandwagoning and accepting pressure from the US on foreign policy issues, without much to say. As it was seen during the Container Security Initiative in 2002 and the Passenger Name Record negotiations in 2005, the US did not leave the EU too much freedom of choice and aggressively coerced the EU to conform to its demands.<sup>30</sup> Nevertheless, during the SWIFT negotiations that began in 2007, the EU reaffirmed its commitment to taking a strong position as an actor in the international field. The European Parliament rejected the terms US proposed and warned that it would stop data transfer had its values not been taken more seriously. The US had no choice but compromise and agreed to a set of EU requirements, which not only gave it an increased status but also decision power. As such, Europol was given authority to reject or approve any SWIFT data request from the US and also an EC official was appointed in Washington DC to supervise any U.S data request.<sup>31</sup>

In 2005, Salmon, amongst other academics, pointed out towards the division of Europe into the Atlantic (or Western) Europe and the rest, which had different and at times incompatible views on external policies.<sup>32</sup> Nevertheless, the 2007 Lisbon treaty and the creation of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), which ultimately rendered the Western European Union redundant and led to its dissolution stands proof of an emergent holistic, politically strong EU.

#### Exporting values through CSFP

For Smith, 'foreign policy is the 'capacity to make and implement policies abroad which promote the domestic values, interests and policies of the actor in question.' As the EU has developed a philosophy underpinned by liberal, capitalist and democratic principles and has attempted to shape both trade and judicial matters accordingly, it thus has a foreign policy that 'can be analysed in pretty much the same way as we can analyse that of any nation-state.'<sup>33</sup> The European Union describes itself as a firm supporter of international law, constantly pursuing the internationalization of concerning issues from terrorism, nuclear proliferation to human rights abuses and climate change. The EU has heavily drawn on its economic weight to emerge as a normative power, able to shift policies in developing countries and play a major role in global governance. It is no wonder then, that most developing countries prefer and adopt the European model as opposed to the American one.

In terms of human rights, the EU not only offers aid for human rights programs and diplomatic dialogues but also deploys conditionality policies. Whether positive or negative conditionality, the EU has imposed restrictions on countries disrespecting human rights and conditioned their accession to the EU market.<sup>34</sup> A prominent example of conditionality is the human rights clause. Between 1992 and 2014, over 60 agreements have been signed that contain the human rights clause out of which around 40 contain a suspension clause.<sup>35</sup> Diplomatic sanctions (suspending high-level contracts and withdrawing ambassadors) and arm embargoes have been imposed on developing countries who

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<sup>28</sup> Washington Post (2005), 'Help From France Key In Covert Operations', retrieved from <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/07/02/AR2005070201361.html>, date accessed: 10/05/14

<sup>29</sup> Ibid

<sup>30</sup> Argomaniz, J. (2009) "When the EU is the 'Norm-taker': The Passenger Name Records Agreement and the EU's Internalization of US Border Security Norms", *European Integration*, 31/1, p. 120

<sup>31</sup> MacKenzie, A. (2011) 'A US Driven Security Agenda? EU Actorness in Counter-terrorism Co-operation with the US' *EUSA Twelfth Biennial International Conference*, Boston: Massachusetts. P.5

<sup>32</sup> IOM Today(2005), 'Europe: Economic Giant, Political Dwarf, Military worm', retrieved from <http://www.iomtoday.co.im/news/business/europe-economic-giant-political-dwarf-military-worm-1-1738613>, date accessed: 10/05/14

<sup>33</sup> Smith, H. (2002) *European Union foreign policy: What it is and what it does*, London: Pluto Press, p.7-8

<sup>34</sup> Smith K.E.(2001) 'The EU, Human Rights and Relations with Third Countries: 'Foreign Policy' With an Ethical Dimension?' in K.E. Smith and M. Light (Eds.) *Ethics and Foreign Policy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp. 185-203.

<sup>35</sup> EEAS (2014), 'Ready Inventories', retrieved from <http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/viewCollection.do> date accessed 10/05/14

exhibited unsatisfactory human rights records.<sup>36</sup> The Human rights clause is a powerful, under-rated instrument considering the demand for developing countries to enter agreements with the EU. Human rights have become an important defining part of the EU's identity. For example in 2000 the EU postponed a meeting of foreign ministers for three years as it did not tolerate the participation of the Burmese junta.<sup>37</sup> Its insistence on the abolishment of the death penalty caused friction with China and the USA and also sponsored a resolution banning executions globally which was carried by the UN commission on Human Rights.<sup>38</sup>

### Crisis management

The European External Action Service, launched in 2010 is a combination of foreign ministry and diplomatic corps for the EU charged with working with the diplomatic services of the member states to manage EU foreign and security policies and support the work of the HR. It brings together external relations department of the Commission and the Council of ministers into an independent body with its own budget. It cannot make policy but acts on the decisions reached by the council and parliament made easier as the HR has seats both in the commission and the council.<sup>39</sup> This was a step to give the EU a clearer presence on the world stage. It is present in 138 countries and can build on these diplomatic networks to help prevent conflict and support the management of acute crises.<sup>40</sup> In CSDP matters, the most important body supporting the Council is the Political and Security Committee (PSC).<sup>41</sup> Although it remains intergovernmental, it has become truly institutionalized and it's supported by the EU military committee and by the Committee for Civil Crisis Management. The EUMC directs the military operations and provides the PSC with advice and recommendations on military issues and strategic military operations in a crisis situation, the operation concept and draft operation plan. The CIVCOM does the same for civilian crisis management and provides the PSC with information of available capacities.<sup>42</sup>

While 20 years ago the EU had no direct crisis management capacities, after the initiation of ESDP and CSFP, crisis management capacities have become rapidly institutionalized. The network of organizations has become denser and more complex. In addition the EU's emerging identity as a global crisis manager has been received well, which suggests a growing degree of legitimacy. Member states appear the support missions as they allow EU to participate in uncontroversial UN-like operations that do not intrude upon their sovereignty.<sup>43</sup> As the EU has forged relationships with other international actors, it has influenced their political behaviour as well. The CSDP has forged a close cooperation with the AU through a substantial number of missions on the continent. As a result, the AU adopted a 'Common African Defence and Security Policy' (CASDP) in 2004 largely modelled after the European one. AU has worked with the CSDP in Sudan (AMIS), Central African Republic (FOMUC) and COMOROS (AMISEC) and the EU funded many of these operations (except weapons and ammunition). CSDP offers training, technical assistance, funding of the AU personnel and military workshops.<sup>44</sup> In these respects the EU is seen in a brighter light than the US due to its promotion of regionalism. While the US made several mistakes, the EU is increasingly seen as the best alternative Africa is looking towards. Even in the case of UN regional organisations in Africa have started undertaking interventions without a Security Council Mandate and it was only later that the UN recognized the peace agreements reached through the interventions.<sup>45</sup>

In regards to its relation with the UN, the two can be said to be complementary in regards to their actions. As CSDP assists and works under the UN umbrella, it gives the EU its international actor character. At times it can actually go where the UN can't.<sup>46</sup> For example Russia couldn't veto a CSDP's intervention in Georgia. The EU controls a budget of 141 million Euros, almost 200 billion dollars, in comparison to the UN which only has 2 billion dollars a year plus 2.5 for peacekeeping. Beyond its own budgetary authority it can also draw on the experience and resources of its individual

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<sup>36</sup> Smith, K.E , op.cit., p.195

<sup>37</sup> Ibid, p.199

<sup>38</sup> Ibid, p.200

<sup>39</sup> McCormick, op.cit p.202

<sup>40</sup> Boin, Ekengren & Rhinard, op.cit, p.66

<sup>41</sup> Ibid.p.72

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.,p.73

<sup>43</sup> Boin, Ekengren & Rhinard, op.cit, p.75

<sup>44</sup> Ibid, p.71

<sup>45</sup> Bono, G. (2007) 'EU approach to conflict management: A distinctive contribution?' in *Managing a multilevel foreign policy :the EU in international affairs*, US: Lexington Press p.172

<sup>46</sup> Ibid, p.73



member states.<sup>47</sup> The EU has addressed security issues by appealing to its development agenda and engaging into democratic governance, rested on the belief that poverty reduction will address the root causes of violent conflict. It has addressed this through efforts in governance reforms, anti-corruption measures and building of viable state institutions.

The EU's political power does not stand in hard power display but rather it can be seen in the deployment of soft power, described by Nye as shaping and influencing political events outside its borders through discourse, economic and diplomatic means as opposed to military means. Here the EU can be seen as complementary to the US, which has been accused of focusing too much on hard power policies. This section has been analysed through the prism of constructivist and liberal lenses which perfectly capture the EU's political ability.

### **Military worm**

While the European Union does not have an army per say, that does not make it weak. The EU can draw armed forces from all its member states, which combined represent the second largest, most potent army in the world. Although its defence budget is lower than the US's by about its half<sup>48</sup> (estimated at 301 billion dollars in 2008), on world scale the EU contains number 5, 6 and 7 (UK, France and Germany) of the top spenders of the world in 2013.<sup>49</sup> From a defensive point of view the EU is a military superpower as it can draw on the power of its member states in the case of a crisis. As President Barroso stated in 2004, 'An attack against an EU citizen is an attack against all Member State citizens. An attack against a member state is an attack against the Union. It is against the values we stand for.'<sup>50</sup> The Lisbon Treaty's article 188 R contains the solidarity clause in which case if a state is a victim it will be defended by all the others and is clear on defence issues.<sup>51</sup> This, in turn contains three obligations to which all states adhere: the first enjoins not only member states but also institutions to 'act jointly...If a member state is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster'. In these respects the character transcends intergovernmental aspect suggesting a supranational one. The second states that 'the Union shall mobilize all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources available by the Member States' to both prevent and respond to terrorist attacks and to assist one another in the case of terrorism or natural disaster. This emphasizes its collective strength. The third demands that EU institutions and member states governments organize their responses via the Council of ministers thus suggesting a coordinated effort from the EU level when attacks happen or disaster strike.<sup>52</sup>

On the other hand, when issues shift from defence to intervention, the EU is far from a strong actor. Out of the almost 2 million troops the EU holds on, only about 10% are properly trained for peacekeeping missions and even out of those only about 50 000 could be actually deployed due to legal or administrative restrictions. As according to military law rotation is necessary, this number further decreases to a maximum of 20 000 genuinely deployable EU troops in military operations. In 2007 for example only 64, 132 military personnel from the EU 27 were deployed a total of 3 per cent of the available manpower.<sup>53</sup> According to IISS, European defence spending continues to fall in real terms, by an average of 2.5 % per year, questioning the capability to sustain military actions.<sup>54</sup> However, in 2013, real defence spending fell in more than half (57%) of member states, slightly less than 70 and 65 % of them that reduced in 2011 and 2012 respectively, and therefore the number of states cutting defence is reducing. Moreover, the Ukraine crisis might actually lead to an increase in EU member states military budget. Romania, amongst other countries has already increased military spending over the Ukraine crisis.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> Smith, M. (2011) op.cit, p179

<sup>48</sup> Howorth p.211

<sup>49</sup> SIPRI (2014) 'Trends in world military expenditure', retrieved from [http://books.sipri.org/product\\_info?c\\_product\\_id=476](http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=476)

<sup>50</sup> Barroso, J.M (2005) 'Fighting terrorism together in the EU', retrieved from [europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_SPEECH-05-168\\_en.pdf](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-05-168_en.pdf), date accessed 10/05/14

<sup>51</sup> Howorth, J. (2011) 'The EU's security and defence policy: towards a strategic approach', in Hill, C., & Smith, M. (Eds.) *International relations and the European Union*, Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 217

<sup>52</sup> Boin, A., Ekengren, M., & Rhinard, M. op.cit p.29

<sup>53</sup> Howorth, op.cit. p.211

<sup>54</sup> IISS(2014) 'Military Balance 2014 Press Statement', retrieved from <http://www.iiss.org/en/about%20us/press%20room/press%20releases/press%20releases/archive/2014-dd03/february-0abc/military-balance-2014-press-statement-52d7>, date accessed : 10/05/14

<sup>55</sup> DNews (2014) 'Romania To Boost Military Spending Over Ukraine Crisis', retrieved from <http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140428/DEFREG01/304280018/Romania-Boost-Military-Spending-Over-Ukraine-Crisis>, date accessed : 10/05/14

European armies seem geared towards territorial defence against an attack, not mobilizing for conflict operations and complex insurgencies in places such as Africa., Afghanistan or Middle East. Youngs, for example, considers that the EU remains ill prepared for contemporary challenges in conflict resolution in particular that of protracted counter-insurgency in places such as Afghanistan, resembling 'a boxer with a glass chin and a psychological trauma connected to an earlier unexpected defeat against an opponent from the Balkans.'<sup>56</sup> In general the EU seems willingly only to deploy to areas already pacified by other organizations and operations seem to be more about signalling an EU role in international security than actually contributing to the conditions for durable conflict resolution.<sup>57</sup>

While the EU as an actor may not be militarily powerful, nevertheless it is far from a worm and many of its capabilities and deployments are underestimated. Youngs, for example does not take into consideration the multitude of operations the EU has and is involved in. According to ISIS Europe, as of May 2014, there are 16 active missions the EU is engaged in at the moment. As such the EU is engaged in military operations in Somalia (EUNAFVOR Atalanta), Central African Republic (EUFOR RCA) and Bosnia Herzegovina (EUFOR Althea), in military trainings in Mali (EUTM Mali) and Somalia (EUTM Somalia), supporting missions in the Horn of Africa (EUCAP Nestor) , Niger (EUCAP Sahel) and The Democratic Republic of Congo, monitoring missions in Georgia (EUMM), rule of law missions in Kosovo (EULEX), EUPOL (police) missions in the DRC, Afghanistan and the Palestinian territories (COPPS) and border missions (EUBAM) in Libya, Ukraine-Moldova and Rafah (Gaza). In addition, 19 other military, supporting, monitoring, police and rule of law missions have been completed up to date.<sup>58</sup> (See appendix 3) As it can be seen in appendix number 3, the EU has an impressive geographical presence.

The EUROCORPS have been deployed on a variety of missions: they deployed 7000 peacekeeping forces in Bosnia Herzegovina, led ISAF6 Force in Afghanistan and were also land components of NATO Response Forces in 2006-2007 and 2010-2011.<sup>59</sup> In 2003 the EU sent 2000 troops in the Democratic Republic of Congo without NATO support where it demonstrated it is able to fight high-intensity battles against insurgent groupings. In 2008 it sent 3700 troops in Chad and the Central African Republic overcoming logistic problems.<sup>60</sup> The European Commission's Humanitarian Aid Department funds NGOs and international organizations such as the UN which provide direct emergency relief to victims of natural disaster or armed conflicts. The anti-piracy missions of the coast of Somalia has seen the EU take the lead in a major naval operation in which many countries' warships are coordinating from an EU HQ.<sup>61</sup> In the case of Operation Atalanta, where the EU not only engaged not only in capturing but also brining pirates to justice, NATO was criticized for having to release the pirates it captured. The Commission used its financial instrument to encourage the government of Kenya and later that of Seychelles to accept and prosecute the pirates captured by EU forces. Given NATO's negative reputation in sub-Saharan Africa it simply could not have achieved such a high degree of voluntary cooperation, under a clear legal mandate with local authorities.<sup>62</sup> The Haiti mission in turn showed that the different sides of the house could cooperate. A temporary cell was created in Brussels, called EUCO Haiti coordinate member states' offers of military and security capacities. The EU was able to deliver boots on the ground within a reasonable time frame and also sent 323 military police from France, Italy, and Spain, the first use of the European Gendarmerie Force.<sup>63</sup>

The EU wisely selected its missions and even though they were small, they were clearly mandated. They did not pose real threats to the Union or member states and did not pose immediate danger to EU nationals who were sent abroad. Troops returned without scandals, overt failures or loss of EU lives and although their impact has been questioned on numerous occasions, the fact that the EU had been able to run and deploy simultaneously different types of operations in different parts of the world

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<sup>56</sup> Youngs, op.cit. p.80

<sup>57</sup> Ibid, p.82

<sup>58</sup> ISIS EU (2014)' CSDP Note', retrieved from

[http://www.isis-europe.eu/sites/default/files/publications-downloads/ISIS%20-](http://www.isis-europe.eu/sites/default/files/publications-downloads/ISIS%20-%20CSDP%20missions%20chart%20and%20table%20May%202014.pdf)

[%20CSDP%20missions%20chart%20and%20table%20May%202014.pdf](http://www.isis-europe.eu/sites/default/files/publications-downloads/ISIS%20-%20CSDP%20missions%20chart%20and%20table%20May%202014.pdf), date accessed : 10/05/14

<sup>59</sup> Eurocorps (2011), 'Operational capacity', retrieved from <http://www.eurocorps.org/>, date accessed: 10/05/14

<sup>60</sup> Howorth op. cit. p. 207

<sup>61</sup> Ibid

<sup>62</sup> Smith, M.(2011) op. cit. p. 189

<sup>63</sup> Youngs, op.cit p.84

demonstrated significant progress made since the EU launched its first missions.(see appendix 4) Its main role has been as a pacifier and has been successful in maintaining stability where it has deployed its peacekeeping missions. As it has been pointed out on many occasions, hard-power is becoming nowadays less and less effective in contemporary warfare.<sup>64</sup> The war on terror and US hard-power failures from Somalia in the 1990's to the ones in Afghanistan and Iraq in the 21<sup>st</sup> century perfectly illustrate the need for a more careful approach in selecting and deploying missions. The EU is still far from properly equipped to engaging into large-scale complex military options but nevertheless it seems that it is building a strong foundation to an alternative approach to violent conflict management. On the other hand, there is no doubt it is no longer the military worm of 1991.

## Conclusion

The European Union is a continuously growing international actor. While there is no consensus on what path it is going to take, the evidence that it is heading towards a superpower is overwhelming. As this essay has shown, in only two decades, not only has it maintained and improved its economic giant status a trade superpower, but also highly increased its political and military scope. As Youngs summarizes it perfectly, 'The EU today is able to make a significant contribution to complex crisis management operations due to the broad range of political, economic, civilian and military instruments at its disposal.'<sup>65</sup> These abilities have been applied in a variety of arenas, ranging from state building assistance in N Africa to protecting ships from Somali pirates, from Pakistani floods to repatriating EU citizens from Lebanon.<sup>66</sup> The EU is more and more recognized for its capacities both by individual actors such as the US , which sees it as a an essential counter-terrorism partner but also by international bodies such as the UN or NATO which can call upon its military forces in times of crisis. The European Union has affirmed its status as a global governor through the model it exports in developing countries, especially in African countries and also as a pacifier through the multitude of peace-keeping operations it has and it is simultaneously managing. While it is still an economic giant, the EU can definitely no longer be described as a political dwarf or a military worm. Certainly it is no giant, especially in comparison to the world's superpower, the US, and still faces challenges in better consolidating its statuses but it is certainly on its way there.

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<sup>64</sup> Kaldor, M. (1999) *New wars and old wars: Organized violence in a global era*, Cambridge: Polity p.12


<sup>65</sup> *Ibid*, p.86

<sup>66</sup> Boin, A., Ekengren, M., & Rhinard, M., *op. cit.* p.86



**Appendices**


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
2)

**The world's largest multilateral donor**




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4)



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