From Israel’s founding to the present, no concept has so thoroughly dominated the country’s strategic imagination as much as deterrence. Former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon once said deterrence was the country’s “main weapon—the fear of us”. “Israel”, remarked the fabled Israeli general Moshe Dayan, “must be seen as a mad dog; too dangerous to bother”.
That’s why, after the attack on Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, an unprecedented existential urgency was placed on reestablishing the country’s deterrence, which had been steadily waning since Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000. “What happened today has never before been seen in Israel”, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told Israelis after the Oct. 7 attack. The military, he vowed, would attack Hamas with a force “like never before”. Since the Oct. 7 attack was unprecedented, it then followed that Israel’s response, too, had to be at least equally so, a paroxysm of violence unparalleled in both scope and intensity.
But on these basic terms, the war has been a failure. Israel’s unprecedented displays of military might in Gaza—and the associated efforts elsewhere in the region—have failed to restore Israeli deterrence.
The most basic reason for this failure is that a major military victory, such as decisively crippling Hamas, is still not in sight. Instead, the ground offensives of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have drawn international condemnation, and the IDF’s alarmingly high casualty rates have exacerbated earlier concerns about the vulnerability of Israel’s land forces. None of this has communicated a message of strength to Israel’s foes—especially not to Hezbollah.
Ever since the Israeli onslaught on Gaza began in October 2023, Hezbollah and Israel have been involved in a measured escalation of tit-for-tat exchanges of fire along the Israeli-Lebanese border. Despite Hezbollah’s battlefield losses, with at least 240 fighters killed, the organization has managed to portray itself as standing in solidarity with the Palestinians while keeping tensions below a certain threshold. Furthermore, without entering into a full-scale war, the organization has so far tied a sizable portion of the IDF ground forces down along Israel’s northern front. Moreover, instead of withdrawing north of the Litani River, just as U.N. Resolution 1701 calls for, Hezbollah has pushed more than 80,000 Israeli civilians farther south, away from the border. In other words, Hezbollah has imposed its own terms of engagement by creating a buffer zone inside Israel, essentially forcing Israel to do internally what Resolution 1701 could not make Hezbollah do: relocate away from southern Lebanon.
This constitutes a grave affront to Israeli deterrence, even prompting IDF Maj. Gen. (res.) Gershon Hacohen to describe the IDF’s conduct in the north as “embarrassing”. “Hezbollah managed to make a move here, with limited fighting, that embarrasses the state of Israel”, Hacohen said, while adding that Hezbollah “conditions everything that will happen in the future by ending the war in the Gaza Strip. In fact, Hezbollah is the ones who are currently deciding whether they will stop”.
With neither Gaza nor Lebanon offering a realistic path to redemption, Netanyahu appears to have sought to escalate pressure on Iranian military assets in Syria, most likely in an effort to stem the flow of Iranian military aid to Hezbollah, project Israeli power, and possibly provoke an Iranian response that could draw the United States into a broader regional conflict. But Israel’s bombing of Iran’s embassy complex in Damascus and the killing of high-level officers appear to have unwittingly exposed not only the limits of Iranian patience, but also the limits of Israel’s operational latitude, military capacity, and impunity, factors that are likely to have serious ramifications for Israel’s long-term threat perception.
Iran promised retaliation almost immediately after Israel’s airstrike on the Iranian complex. It finally made good on its promise about 12 days later with a barrage of at least 300 drones, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles fired at Israel from inside Iranian territory. Iran’s deliberate pace kept Israel on edge before the ultimate retaliation. It also gave Israel and its allies time to prepare defenses. As noted by Israeli defense analyst Tal Inbar, despite spending billions on underground missile cities, the Iranians chose to launch their largest ballistic missile attack with above-ground missiles, making them detectable to various intelligence-gathering platforms.
The scope, pace, timing, and official communication of the Iranian attack suggest that it was designed to be a largely theatrical show of force to inspire fear while minimizing the risk of casualties. Significantly, several Iranian projectiles penetrated Israeli airspace, reaching the country’s southernmost regions, including an Israeli air base. Despite official Israeli claims that 99 percent of Iran’s projectiles were intercepted, this was achieved with significant assistance from the French, Jordanian, American, and British militaries.
In stark contrast, Israel’s response to Iran’s retaliation now appears extremely underwhelming, both in terms of substance and theatrics. Unlike Iran, which communicated its intentions through various channels, including the United Nations, Israel’s response to Iran’s retaliation appeared disjointed and lacking in clarity. The nature and origin of the Israeli strike remain unclear, with no definitive statement from Israeli officials or iconic images to convey its impact. There is also no conclusive evidence of the Israeli weapons used, whether they were warplanes or drones. Even Israeli National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir could not help but ridicule the half-hearted Israeli strike, calling it “lame”.
Despite having a sophisticated, multilayered air defense system costing billions to construct, maintain, and replenish, it took a Herculean effort involving Israeli, French, Jordanian, British, and American forces—along with billions of dollars of interception costs—to shoot down Iran’s barrage. This was despite advance preparation and reports that half of Iran’s missiles failed either at launch or during flight. Nevertheless, an unknown number of Iranian missiles did penetrate Israel’s thick defensive wall. Ironically, had the Netanyahu government not provoked Iran’s attack by targeting the Iranian consular complex in Damascus, and had the Biden administration not made clear to Netanyahu that the United States would not participate in an all-out war against Iran, the vulnerabilities of Israel’s defenses may very well have remained hidden. The scope and scale of Iran’s attack, coupled with the meekness of Israel’s underwhelming response, may thrust Israeli military planners into a strategic introspection that could reshape the country’s security calculus for years to come.
For decades, Israeli strategic doctrine has been dominated by a unique notion of deterrence, what Sharon referred to as the region’s “fear of us”. But with the enduring image of Iranian warheads soaring over Israeli skies now etched firmly into the region’s consciousness, that fear has become ever more difficult to preserve. Israel’s future engagements and tactical decisions will be calibrated by the humbling realization that what remained of Israel’s aura of invincibility has been profoundly shaken.
This could force Israeli leaders to intensify their efforts to rebuild deterrence in a full-scale war with Hezbollah, even though the prospects for success will be slim without robust U.S. involvement in such a war. It may also prompt Israel either to escalate military operations in Gaza, potentially triggering increased international criticism and its own isolation, or to push to develop next-generation air defense systems, such as cutting-edge laser technologies. More hopefully, it could catalyze a move toward more diplomatic avenues as a means of securing lasting peace and stability. What’s clear, however, is that Israel’s bid to reestablish its security is nowhere near over.
Sajjad Safaei is a postdoc fellow at Germany’s Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology. The views expressed in this article are solely the author’s and do not reflect the opinions of any other person or entity.