When deep in bilateral negotiations, usually one side may produce a draft treaty for the purposes of having text on which to negotiate or, in a multilateral negotiation, the chair or a group of trusted states may produce an attempt at a draft consensus text. In both cases, it is a stage in the negotiations to help focus minds and to move deliberations to the next stage, and normally the draft treaty will be drastically altered by the end of the process.
Tabling a draft treaty in the absence of negotiations tends to be more the statement of a vision, a set of principles, or elements of a possible eventual treaty – a wishlist perhaps – but has little grounding in any agreed reality which can form the basis of genuine negotiation.
The problem with initiatives which table draft conventions is that one country has laid down text which it ‘owns’ and, as any negotiator knows, it is hard to move on from specific language once it has been tabled – and so draft treaties can often paralyse a process rather than assist it.
However, Russia’s two proposed treaties of 17 December – the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Security Guarantees and the Agreement on Measures to Ensure the Security of the Russian Federation and Member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization – are following no actual process.
Striking an odd tone and content
Expected practice would be for Russia to set out its concerns and ask for formal discussions so they can be addressed. The same points would have been covered but in a manner which does not effectively lay down the law or take what feels like a protection racket approach – Russia promising not to attack Ukraine provided it enjoys free rein in the parts of Europe it thinks it has rights to.
The tone and the content of both drafts is odd in that it harks back to the era of the end of the Cold War and the early-to-mid 1990s. A misplaced nostalgia for the Cold War has been a hallmark of recent years but – given the brutal Russian treatment of treaties addressing conventional forces in Europe and the recent dismantlement of the INF (Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces) Treaty and the Open Skies Treaty by both Russia and the US – to call for restraints on INF deployment strikes an odd note.
The content of the proposals are not new by any means so there are no big surprises – the main purpose appears to be yet another attempt to constrain NATO and free up Russia, leaving the US and NATO with no basis on which to assist Ukraine in its defence against Russian military and political aggression.
There is also an emphasis on nuclear weapons and a demand to roll back military capabilities in new NATO states to the deployments of 1997. Nobody in Russia would expect NATO or the US to agree to any of these demands, even after protracted and deep negotiation – not least because of Russia’s history of disdaining and abandoning a whole set of these treaties from the 1980s and 1990s which were designed to increase international peace and security, and reduce the risks of military confrontation.
But NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has wisely not ruled out discussions on Russia’s demands, and this could be an opportunity to address NATO concerns over Russia’s military activities, weapons development and deployment, and European security more widely. But this is a potential trap for the new NATO states as there is a risk concessions will be made but adhered to by only one side.
A question also remains as to why Russia is putting forward proposals it has agreed before – such as under the Vienna Documents – and then walked away from. It is feasible Russia is trying to renegotiate these agreements with better terms for itself and lesser terms for NATO, but the US and NATO states are not naive.
Russian proposals must be seen as self-serving
There is a great deal of experience in both the US and key European states of negotiating with Russia and, to quote a well-known Norwegian academic ‘too much spilt milk has flowed under the bridge’ in the last few decades for anyone to take Russia’s proposals at face value and imagine they are anything but self-serving – but that is normal in negotiations and will be factored in from the start.
Although many of the proposals have been negotiated before in the 1990s and early 2000s, there are elements in the drafts with merit such as the proposed reinstatement of hotlines, and the regular exchange assessments of contemporary threats and security challenges which would be useful to supplement the US-Russia strategic dialogues.
In addition, a return to informing each other about military exercises and manoeuvres – and the main provisions of their military doctrines – should happen as was agreed back in the 1980s and 1990s. And reigniting the mechanisms for urgent bilateral or multilateral consultations such as the NATO-Russia Council and to prevent incidents in the high seas would be important areas for discussion.
Despite misgivings about the purpose behind these demands and way in which they have been made, it would be a mistake – and potentially a bigger trap – to turn down the offer of negotiations. Better to talk and watch with a clear eye for any duplicity, but also for any real opportunity to improve the security situation with Russia and perhaps prevent the otherwise imminent conflict in Ukraine.
Dr Patricia Lewis, Research Director, Conflict, Science and Transformation; Director, International Security Programme.