In just a few weeks, the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) has shredded its reputation for boring political stability. A long-running power struggle, disguised by a wider anti-corruption campaign, has resulted in the sudden sacking of both the country’s president, Vo Van Thuong, and the chair of the National Assembly.
The outcome of this fight should cause those who still hope that Vietnam could join an ‘anti-China’ coalition to think again. Although this power struggle is not about foreign policy, it will result in a turn towards China and away from the West.
The sackings in March and May this year follow the dismissal, early last year, of the then president and deputy prime minister. The communist party’s politburo, its paramount political leadership, has lost four top members in a year and a half. The turmoil is unprecedented.
Although CPV control remains unchallenged, the fissures within it are becoming more obvious. This is not to say that the party will split. The vanquished are being allowed to retire quietly, so long as they cede power to their rivals.
What we are seeing is a takeover. The winners of this power struggle are the hardliners: the police generals and the dogmatic Leninists. Vietnam looks set to follow China in a political inward turn. A recent instruction (Directive 24) instructs officials and party members to limit contacts with foreign organizations. There will be consequences in several areas, not least in slower economic growth.
The new-look Vietnamese leadership appears more focused on regime survival than further liberalization. All this at a time when Vietnam had appeared well-placed to benefit from the diversification of Western investment away from China. The country now appears to be a much riskier bet. It seems the CPV leadership is willing to sacrifice some economic growth in the interests of tighter political control.
The prospect of losing that control is what frightens CPV leaders the most. For over a decade, the hardliners have been attempting to marginalize and suppress those at the top of the party who would prioritize faster economic growth over rigid political discipline. As in China, this has been done through an anti-corruption campaign. While Vietnam does have a major problem with corruption – as some recent high-profile court cases have demonstrated – it is also true that the so-called ‘blazing furnace’ anti-corruption campaign in Vietnam has become a political weapon.
The victims have been those whom the hardliners regard as insufficiently committed to the primacy of the communist party. They may have been guilty of ‘self-evolution’, the tendency of individuals to place themselves ahead of the party, which the ideologues see as a grave threat to party legitimacy. For them, the party must always come first.
Vietnam now has three potential future leaders: Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh, Minister of Public Security To Lam, and Truong Thi Mai. However, in the chauvinistic space of Vietnamese politics, the two men – Chinh and Lam – are likely to be the frontrunners. Both are also police generals. What these two seek most is political security and both look to China for inspiration.
Whoever wins the race to become the next general secretary of the CPV, the country will have taken a turn towards becoming a literal police state. With the security apparatus in charge of the party (rather than the other way around), the tendency towards repression and ever-greater control will be baked into the system. This will make it harder for democratic countries to work with Vietnam. The CPV leadership will find greater acceptance in Russia and China.
While Vietnam has disagreements with China, most notably over the South China Sea, the two countries’ ruling communist parties have a shared Leninist heritage and political ties that date back a century. This is in stark contrast to popular opinion, which is generally more hostile towards China. However, the CPV and its Chinese counterpart frequently swap ideas on the best ways to manage public opinion.
It is unlikely that any country will wish to downgrade relations with Vietnam because of its hard-line turn. However, they should downgrade their expectations of what they hope to gain from the relationship. It is now clearer than ever that the Vietnamese leadership has no interest in initiating confrontation with China or being part of an ‘anti-China’ coalition. The CPV has successfully ‘played’ Western expectations on this score for some time. With the new leadership in place, the CPV’s affinity with its Chinese political counterparts will be harder to disguise.
What this will mean for the Vietnamese economy is hard to predict. It is, to a large degree, at the mercy of global developments, including the war in Ukraine and trade disputes between the US and China. However, the domestic policy environment is also an important factor. Fear of being ensnared in the anti-corruption campaign has caused officials to avoid taking decisions, delaying job-creating investments. An economic slowdown may cause popular discontent and it is not clear how the CPV will manage mass disaffection.
One strategy is to use the revival of wartime memories. The CPV has just celebrated the 70th anniversary of the defeat of French forces at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu with a huge parade and there will likely be more appeals to history in the coming months and years.
The CPV also has the support of a new class of home-grown oligarchs who control the country’s private conglomerates. As recent court cases demonstrate, the wealthy need to toe the party line or risk becoming victims of the anti-corruption campaign. If the party tells them to create jobs, they will have little choice. Will it be enough? That is the question that will ultimately decide the longevity of this hard-line turn.
The current political turmoil in Hanoi is a prelude to the CPV congress, expected in January 2026, which will formally choose the new leadership. This will reveal whether this inward turn is a mere blip before a correction or a long-term trend.
Internationally, Vietnam will continue to trumpet what it calls ‘bamboo diplomacy’, bending with the wind while remaining firmly rooted. Behind the slogan however, Vietnam is turning away from the West and towards like-minded authoritarian partners.
Dr Bill Hayton, Associate Fellow, Asia-Pacific Programme.