“Get the big ideas right”. That’s the fundamental conclusion of “Conflict”, a new history of warfare since 1945 by retired Army Gen. David Petraeus and Andrew Roberts. And it applies emphatically to Israel’s war against Hamas in Gaza.
Israel’s biggest idea in this war — its overriding mission — is to destroy the military and governing power of Hamas. That’s surely a correct goal; most Arab analysts recognize the menace of Hamas as clearly as the Israelis do, although they might not say it out loud. But there are other big ideas, too, starting with the need to avoid unwise actions that expand the war, arouse international opposition and leave Israel more vulnerable.
In light of these complex objectives, Israeli commanders are struggling with how to shape the campaign to destroy Hamas. They don’t want to win the kinetic war on the ground but lose the information war for public support. On Tuesday, Secretary of State Antony Blinken urged at the United Nations that Israel consider “humanitarian pauses” to help get food, water and medicine to Palestinian civilians caught in the crossfire.
What frames the thinking of Israel Defense Forces commanders as they navigate this dark military and political terrain?
Like every element of Israeli society, the IDF was rocked by Hamas’s terror assault on Oct. 7. They didn’t see it coming, assuming Hamas would be deterred from such reckless actions by Israel’s overwhelming might. Now, military leaders worry they might be wrong again in assuming that Hezbollah and Iran won’t attack Israel.
Thus, one essential “big idea” for Israeli commanders is to restore deterrence — without triggering a devastating multi-front war. The IDF sees Hezbollah’s sporadic attacks so far as a limited show of support for Hamas to avoid losing face — and Israel is responding proportionally. But Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warned that if Hezbollah goes further, “we will cripple it with unimaginable force.”
Talking to Israeli officials, you understand that the sense of trauma after Hamas’s terrorist assault is personal. One official described the loss of a family friend whose body was so battered it took hours to identify; another spoke of the genocidal Hamas attackers, going house to house and room to room to kill Jews. Such intense emotions animate every IDF soldier and officer; but Israeli commanders know they must surmount this personal anguish to frame wise strategy.
Israeli commanders bristle at the idea of aiding pro-Hamas civilians after the Oct. 7 slaughter, but they know it is necessary to reduce civilian casualties and maintain international support — especially that of the United States.
They are using every available technology to map the battlefield, especially the network of tunnels that amount to a hidden city beneath Gaza. That’s one reason the IDF leaders haven’t rushed to begin the ground invasion. Every additional day gives them more information from their expanding array of sensors above and below ground. As Hamas runs lower on fuel and supplies, it needs to surface — allowing Israel to gather more intelligence about where Hamas fighters are hiding and where more than 200 hostages are being held.
The IDF will use its high-tech map of Gaza to launch its air and ground assault, ideally in a way that targets Hamas precisely and spares Palestinian civilians and Israeli hostages. Commanders want every bullet fired by their forces to have a specific address. But war rarely works out that way in practice; “precision bombing” is often a contradiction in terms. The ground operation, when it comes, will be ugly.
How can Israel achieve its end goal of destroying Hamas but minimize the negatives? One top-level U.S. military veteran offers this advice: Take it slow. Don’t fight block to block and house to house, which will increase casualties for Israeli soldiers and civilians, alike. Let intelligence be the driver of operations; then use drones and autonomous weapons, wherever possible, to strike targets. That was the approach the United States and its partners used against the Islamic State.
U.S. commanders are urging Israel to study the nine-month campaign to liberate Mosul, Iraq, that began in October 2016. ISIS fighters were hiding in tunnels and caves there, just as Hamas terrorists are in Gaza. The United States and its partners moved slowly, using a mix of commando operations and drone attacks. Gradually, they were able to destroy ISIS. But civilian casualties were severe; the Associated Press in 2017 estimated that 9,000 to 11,000 residents might have died.
That leads to another big idea that Israel must study carefully: In the language of counterinsurgency, when the IDF “clears” Hamas from Gaza, another force trusted by Palestinians should move in to “hold and build” the enclave.
Israeli commanders have started thinking about “day after” scenarios, but they don’t have answers. Could security responsibility in post-Hamas Gaza be shared with an international force, perhaps a version of the European and Arab anti-ISIS coalition, as suggested Tuesday in Israel by French President Emmanuel Macron? Could a revitalized Palestinian Authority do the job, backed by money and political support from Saudi Arabia? These might be the hardest “big ideas”, but they’re essential for a stable future.
Israeli commanders must weigh, finally, whether Israel can tolerate the long war that would be necessary to totally clear Hamas from Gaza. Israel called up 360,000 reservists after this month’s attack. If the war drags on for months, as some have predicted, the effect on the Israeli economy could be severe. A weakened Israel would be more vulnerable to attack from Hezbollah and Iran. It might need a military rescue from the United States.
Given these enormous stakes, the final big idea for Israel is obviously to be careful. Hamas set a trap when it burst through the Gaza fence, butchering Israelis and seizing hostages. As Israel fights back, it must avoid becoming entangled in that snare in a way that leaves it weaker, even as it destroys its enemies.
David Ignatius writes a twice-a-week foreign affairs column for The Washington Post. His latest novel is “The Paladin”.