A month after the 7 October Hamas attack on Israel, a junior Israeli government minister, Amihai Eliyahu, suggested that an atomic bomb could be dropped on Gaza.
Almost all analysts and certainly all governments took his remarks as an empty gesture aimed at a specific domestic audience – the minister later said his comments in the radio interview were metaphorical, and he was suspended from the government.
Behind the headlines and resulting fury, however, is a long-held common understanding that Israel has an undeclared nuclear weapons capability, and that Iran is closer to crossing the nuclear weapons threshold.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has made little secret of his desire to address Iran’s developing capacity with military force. Such posturing makes it plain that nuclear weapons are a present danger and could wreak havoc in a regional escalation.
The threat of nuclear weapons is resurging in a manner not seen since the height of the Cold War. Since February 2022, Russian officials and pundits have made a number of threats – some insinuated, some overt – to use nuclear weapons, presumably against Ukraine, a non-nuclear weapons state. Russia has pre-positioned nuclear weapons in Belarus.
Interest in nuclear weapons and their hoped-for deterrent effect has subsequently grown in non-nuclear countries such as South Korea, Germany and Poland.
The latter is considering joining the European countries that host US nuclear weapons (Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey).
North Korea continues to develop untrammelled its nuclear weapons programme while India and Pakistan remain in a state of a bilateral nuclear belligerence.
The five nuclear weapons states are all modernizing their nuclear weapons. Numbers though remain far lower than in the Cold War (the US and Russia for example have an estimated 5,044 and 5,580 warheads, respectively, down from cold war heights of around 31,000 and 40,000).
China is not only modernizing its nuclear forces but also expanding their reach and numbers of delivery systems – albeit from a far lower level (some 500 warheads).
Other Middle East countries attempted the nuclear weapons route. Iraq in the 1980s and 1990s got very close but was thwarted by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors after the invasion of Kuwait.
Syria’s secret reactor was bombed before it was loaded with nuclear fuel, and much of Libya’s imports from AQ Khan (the lead scientist in Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme) was left unpacked.
Sending a nuclear signal
Things are different and more dangerous now. Tensions remain high. A cycle of attack and counter-attack between Israel and Iran in April has ended – for now – with Israel’s prompt and pointed strike in the vicinity of the Isfahan nuclear facility in Iran. The choice of target was a clear signal to Iran that Israel could, in the future, stealthily attack Iranian nuclear sites should it so choose.
Iran’s choices, long debated by its officials, remain as they have been for years: a) to continue as a nuclear threshold state with the capability to develop nuclear weapons but choosing not to cross that threshold, at least for now; or b) to cross the nuclear threshold and declare their status, either via a nuclear weapons test explosion or by declaration.
So far, Iran has stayed under the critical nuclear threshold, despite getting very close prior to 2003. Since the US quit the Iran nuclear deal (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) in 2018, Iran has declared that it is no longer bound by those obligations. It has also recently also withdrew the designation of several experienced IAEA inspectors, although as yet cooperates and allows routine inspections.
The Israeli–Iranian attack and counter attacks are likely to strengthen arguments in Iran for acquiring nuclear weapons. Yet doing so poses greater risks for Iran in terms of a pre-emptive Israeli attack, and would undermine the fragile progress made in its relationships with neighbours.
Weighing up nuclear options
Indeed, Saudi Arabia is moving ahead with a nuclear energy programme. Many fear this is cover for starting a nuclear weapons programme, which Saudi leaders occasionally threaten. Given US reticence about supporting nuclear efforts, Saudi Arabia may be tilting towards less complicated assistance from China.
Other states such as Egypt have – or may decide to acquire – the technical capability to develop nuclear weapons but none seems to be at a stage where that is an immediate option.
Further afield, interest in reconsidering nuclear options is growing. India and Pakistan remain in a nuclear stand-off, with several instances of high alert.
South Korea and Japan are under constant threat from North Korea, while Taiwan is ever fearful of China’s claims to its territory. Each country has the technical capacity to develop a national nuclear weapons programme. South Korea reported 20 years ago that it had conducted laser isotope separation experiments with uranium and plutonium in contravention of its IAEA commitments – it has since worked with the IAEA to ensure full compliance.
Japan maintains a strong commitment to global nuclear disarmament, having been the only country to have suffered nuclear weapons attacks in war. The US does, however, extend its military capabilities in defence of Japan, Taiwan and South Korea, and these include US nuclear weapons systems.
Underscoring all these developments is how nuclear weapons are perceived in military doctrines and postures in the US, Russia and increasingly in China. Rising fear of major regional and global violent conflict suggests that faith in the concept of nuclear deterrence is eroding.
Also causing alarm is the ‘madman theory’ of nuclear threats – in which only authoritarian, unhinged leaders would actually make good their threats to use nuclear weapons. Democracies, with their emphasis on human rights and international law and with checks on domestic power, are – rightly – highly reluctant to take action that might lead to the use of nuclear weapons.
Call to prioritize arms control
A regional or global nuclear war would cause unspeakable suffering through the explosions themselves, and the consequent fires, radiation and radioactive debris that would spread far and wide.
With this in mind, leaders must redouble their efforts to make nuclear arms control, non-proliferation and multilateral nuclear disarmament one of the top global priorities once again.
The forthcoming UN Summit for the Future offers a focal point to initiate a new way forward – at the very least it should contain a stress on the continued commitment to global nuclear disarmament and to preventing the use of nuclear weapons.
States outside multilateral arms control and disarmament treaties could participate as observers to demonstrate their commitment to preventing nuclear war.
Possessors of nuclear weapons that are outside the comprehensive test ban treaty could also commit not to conduct any new nuclear weapons tests or make more fissile material for new nuclear weapons.
The NPT nuclear weapons states are undertaking a series of discussions on nuclear risk reduction measures. These could also be extended to include the non-NPT nuclear weapons possessors.
In addition, the newly initiated strategic discussions between the US and China could develop new approaches to strengthen the taboo against the use of nuclear weapons. China has been very supportive of calls to reduce Russia’s nuclear threats and it may be able to extend progress in these talks to Russia and other nuclear weapons possessors in the future.
Presidents Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev stated that a nuclear war could never be won and should never be fought – as true today as it was in 1985. The world needs new, energized leaders to address the Cold War nuclear weapons legacy that is exacerbating the current dire international situation – before it is too late.
Dr Patricia Lewis, Research Director; Director, International Security Programme.