Négocier avec un adversaire désarmé en pointant un pistolet sur sa tempe, c’est l’inviter à une reddition sans conditions. Il semble que nous assistions à ce scénario entre Donald Trump et le régime des mollahs iraniens. En 2018, Trump avait déchiré l’accord international sur le nucléaire iranien approuvé par son prédécesseur, puis fait exécuter en 2020 le général Qassem Soleimani, architecte de l’expansion régionale de l’Iran et concepteur de son «axe de la résistance» chargé d’étrangler Israël et qui a culminé avec l’attaque du 7 octobre 2023. Désormais, avec des bombardiers furtifs B2 déployés à Diego Garcia et deux porte-avions dépêchés sur zone, Trump ne laissera plus à l’Iran l’opportunité de ruser pour gagner du temps et attendre l’arrivée d’un successeur plus clément à la Maison Blanche.… Seguir leyendo »
On Saturday, April 12, American and Iranian officials will restart talks over curbing Tehran’s nuclear program. The talks come after U.S. President Donald Trump sent a letter, in early March, to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei proposing negotiations. “We have a very big meeting”, the president said in announcing the talks. “We’ll see what can happen”.
There are reasons to hope that Trump’s overtures will succeed. The president has an almost instinctive love of dealmaking, and he has said he wants to make Iran prosperous again. But there are also reasons to be trepidatious. Even as they have embraced talks, Trump’s officials have upped the pressure on Tehran.… Seguir leyendo »
Poco después de que Ucrania lanzara misiles ATACMS de fabricación estadounidense contra objetivos en Rusia en noviembre del año pasado, el filósofo Slavoj Žižek criticó duramente las voces estadounidenses que alegaban que las operaciones defensivas de Ucrania contra objetivos militares rusos corrían el riesgo de desembocar en una nueva guerra mundial.
Žižek también condenó las amenazas rusas de tomar represalias contra Ucrania con armas nucleares, argumentando que Rusia, al haber iniciado la guerra, no tenía justificación para tal retórica.
Para contrarrestar las amenazas nucleares rusas, Žižek propuso una nueva doctrina occidental:
"Si un país independiente es atacado con fuerzas no nucleares por una superpotencia nuclear, sus aliados tienen el derecho, incluso el deber, de proporcionarle armas nucleares para que tenga la oportunidad de disuadir un ataque".… Seguir leyendo »
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The Trump administration’s volatile approach to its allies has forced the UK to reconsider fundamental pillars of its defence policy, including whether it can rely on the US. This extends even to the UK’s nuclear deterrent, with many questioning whether the UK needs a nuclear weapons system that is less dependent on the US for maintenance and support.
Unlike most US allies in NATO, the UK is officially a nuclear weapons state, and therefore less reliant on Washington’s nuclear extended deterrence guarantee. It has its own nuclear weapons system, Trident, which is based in Britain and ostensibly operates independently.
However, Trident is closely linked to the US’s nuclear programme, raising concerns about its independence.… Seguir leyendo »
2025 is the year the Iran nuclear agreement known as the JCPOA, signed in 2015, is set to formally expire. The deal has been on life support since the US withdrew in 2018 under the first Trump administration. Efforts at reviving it, or reaching a longer and stronger agreement, have failed amid a trust deficit, US ‘maximum pressure’ policy, and geopolitical and regional crises – particularly the Gaza war.
When the JCPOA expires, so too will the few remaining enforcement tools that allow some pressure to be exerted on Tehran – including snapback sanctions, which can be invoked by any party at the United National Security Council (UNSC).… Seguir leyendo »
The Trump administration’s hostile rhetoric towards Europe, including remarks about potentially withdrawing or relocating US troops stationed there, has reignited debates about Europe’s nuclear deterrence.
Europeans are worried that the US might even go as far as withdrawing the nuclear weapons stationed there as part of its extended deterrence agreement with NATO.
That guarantee dates back to 1949 and includes US nuclear weapons kept on European territory. It is important to note that, despite its insistence on Europeans providing their own security, the US has not so far suggested withdrawing US nuclear weapons from Europe, or made any practical moves to signal this.… Seguir leyendo »
En 2022, un avion ravitailleur italien a participé à un exercice nucléaire français. Un geste symbolique, mais un premier pas. Deux ans auparavant, Emmanuel Macron avait marqué, davantage que ses prédécesseurs ne l’avaient fait, la dimension européenne de nos « intérêts vitaux », et invité nos partenaires au dialogue, voire à la participation à de tels exercices. Certains d’entre eux acceptèrent le débat, mais les conversations furent discrètes. Et non exemptes d’hésitations à aller plus loin, par crainte de provoquer une réaction négative de la part des Etats-Unis.
Est-il temps désormais de déployer un véritable « parapluie nucléaire » européen au-dessus du continent ?… Seguir leyendo »
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L’ « axe de la résistance » sous l’égide de l’Iran a connu des revers majeurs ces derniers mois, avec la décapitation des commandants du Hezbollah et la réduction très significative de ses capacités opérationnelles, dont son arsenal de missiles. Pis encore, avec Bachar el-Assad réfugié à Moscou, Téhéran a perdu de sa profondeur stratégique, compliquant l’approvisionnement en armes du Hezbollah.
Privé de l’essentiel de cette force de projection – qui prendrait des années à être reconstituée, Téhéran semble n’avoir plus qu’une seule jambe sur laquelle se tenir : son programme nucléaire. L’Iran a, par le passé, fait preuve de malléabilité sur ce sujet, réduisant son intensité en échange d’un allégement des sanctions, ou, à l’inverse, l’augmentant afin d’être en position de force lors de négociations.… Seguir leyendo »
Un aspecto particularmente escandaloso de la guerra ruso-ucraniana ha sido, desde su inicio en febrero de 2014, su dimensión nuclear. El comportamiento, en esta guerra, no sólo de Moscú y Kiev, sino también de todas las demás partes, está condicionado por la posesión de Rusia y la no posesión de Ucrania de armas atómicas.
Rusia posee el mayor arsenal de cabezas nucleares del mundo, mientras que Ucrania no tiene ninguna.
Moscú no ha tenido reparos, durante los últimos diez años, en recordar repetidamente al mundo su destructivo poder atómico. En noviembre de 2024, el Kremlin modificó públicamente la doctrina militar de la Federación Rusa y rebajó el umbral de Moscú para el uso de armas nucleares.… Seguir leyendo »
“Let it be an arms race. We will outmatch them at every pass and outlast them all.” In 2016, just before moving into the White House for the first time, Donald Trump set the tone for an ambitious agenda to “modernise and rebuild” America’s nuclear arsenal. In his second term the stakes will be higher, and the pressing question is not if but by how much the Trump administration will update America’s nuclear deterrent. The smart move would be to aim for fewer warheads, not more.
China has been the primary factor fuelling the desire for a build-up. American officials have come to believe that China’s nuclear policy has changed, especially since satellite imagery from 2021 showed 300 new missile silos at nuclear facilities in Inner Mongolia, Gansu and Xinjiang.… Seguir leyendo »
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It’s easy to feel overwhelmed by the growing risk of nuclear war today. Russia is making regular nuclear threats. America is undertaking a large-scale nuclear modernization program. China is increasing its nuclear arsenal. Tensions are escalating between nuclear-armed states.
But nuclear weapons are not an inevitable fact of human life. They are not impossible to get rid of, and pushing for that can be done by ordinary people like you and me.
Precedent exists for solving the problem of weapons of mass destruction. At one point, the United States and the Soviet Union, then Russia, together had over 70,000 tons of chemical weapons.… Seguir leyendo »
The start and course of the Russo-Ukrainian War since 2014 have been principally shaped by the fact that Russia has, and Ukraine does not have weapons of mass destruction. Oddly, this war-enabling situation is legitimized, codified and preserved by one of the politically most important and, with 191 signatory states, most comprehensive multilateral agreements of modern international law. The 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) allows Russia, as an official nuclear-weapon state, to build and acquire atomic warheads. At the same time, the NPT explicitly forbids Ukraine, as an official non-nuclear-weapon state, to do the same. Ukraine’s non-nuclear allies – from Canada in the West to Japan in East – are similarly bound, by the NPT as well as conventions on chemical and biological weapons, to their statuses as purely conventional military powers.… Seguir leyendo »
El inicio y el curso de la guerra ruso-ucraniana desde 2014 han estado determinados principalmente por el hecho de que Rusia tiene, y Ucrania no tiene, armas de destrucción masiva. Curiosamente, esta situación propicia para la guerra está legitimada, codificada y preservada por uno de los acuerdos multilaterales políticamente más importantes y, con 191 Estados firmantes, más completos del derecho internacional moderno. El Tratado de No Proliferación Nuclear (TNP) de 1968 permite a Rusia, como Estado poseedor oficial de armas nucleares, construir y adquirir cabezas atómicas. Al mismo tiempo, el TNP prohíbe explícitamente a Ucrania, como Estado no poseedor oficial de armas nucleares, hacer lo mismo.… Seguir leyendo »
The fall of Bashar al-Assad in Syria is a momentous event, bringing to an end one of the most brutal dictatorships of the past half-century. But it does not automatically usher in reconciliation and democracy. To be clear: the Middle East was and remains on an escalation path, while Russia’s determination to annihilate Ukraine as an independent country is unlikely to be affected by its humiliation in Syria.
Within Syria, violence, sectarianism and division are more likely scenarios than peace and stability, especially in the Kurdish-populated north, on which Turkish coercion is likely to increase.
Assad’s toppling may further weaken Hezbollah in Lebanon, which has already been severely degraded by Israel.… Seguir leyendo »
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